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PART I

THE CAUSES OF PEACE

Part I describes and analyzes the remarkable, but little understood, decline in international conflicts since the 1950s and intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War era. It also examines the very uneven decline in battle deaths over the same period.

PART I

THE CAUSES OF PEACE

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INTRODUCTION

Since the Cold War ended some 20 years ago, there has been a major decline in the number of armed conflicts being waged around the world, with high-intensity conflicts dropping by almost 80 percent. Despite the obvious importance of this change, it has been largely ignored by the research community.

The Causes of Peace, Part I of this *Report*, offers a comprehensive explanation of the drivers of war and peace in the post-World War II world.

Chapter 1 examines the decline in international conflicts—a category that includes anticolonial conflicts as well as wars fought between states. International conflicts thus defined have been declining since the late 1960s. From 1946 to 1967, there were on average between six and seven international conflicts being fought around the world each year; in the new millennium there was less than one conflict per year on average.

Some researchers see the absence of war between the major powers during the Cold War as resulting from a stable East-West "balance of power"—one underpinned by the deterrent effect of the mutual possession of nuclear weapons. But while nuclear weapons may have helped deter wars between the major powers, they did not deter less powerful actors from attacking the states that possessed them. And far from being peaceful, four of the five nuclear weapons states—France, the United Kingdom, the US, and Russia/USSR—have been involved in more international wars than any other country.

Among liberal peace theorists, proponents of the *democratic peace thesis* point to the fact that democracies very rarely fight each other. Insofar as this theory is correct, then given that the number of democracies around the world has risen dramatically over the past 40 years, there will have been fewer and fewer countries in the international system likely to fight each other.

Advocates of the *capitalist peace thesis*, on the other hand, maintain that increased economic interdependence between states—most importantly increased international trade and cross-investment—creates powerful economic interests in avoiding war, while conquest becomes less and less profitable.

Finally, *constructivists* argue that a major shift in popular and elite attitudes to war helps explain the decline in international conflicts. Since the end of World War II, war has been normatively proscribed except in self-defense or with the authorization of the UN (United Nations) Security Council. Like all norms, this one is sometimes breached—as was the case with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003—but this does not mean that it is ineffective.

With the Cold War over and international wars becoming increasingly rare, conflict researchers have shifted focus to explaining the causes of civil wars that make up the overwhelming majority of today's conflicts. The resulting research has yielded a number of important findings that have resonated in the policy community.

Chapter 2 examines some of these findings and reviews the pros and cons of qualitative and quantitative research on the causes of intrastate conflicts. While quantitative conflict research has become increasingly influential in the policy community, it is plagued with divergent findings and its models have a poor track record at prediction. Chapter 2 examines the methodological and data challenges that this emerging field continues to confront, and discusses the efforts taken to address them.

But despite the widespread lack of consensus over the causes of civil war, very few quantitative researchers would disagree that there is a robust association between high levels of national income and a lower risk of war. Other things being equal, high national incomes translate into greater state capacity and more resources for governments to buy off grievances and defeat insurgents in those wars that cannot be prevented.

The conflict trends in East Asia over the past 30 years, which are the focus of Chapter 3, provide an instructive example of the association between rising levels of economic development and the incidence of armed conflict. As national incomes in the region have steadily risen since the late 1970s, state capacity and performance legitimacy have also increased—and conflict numbers have declined by some 60 percent. Indeed, insurgents—who have been largely excluded from the benefits of economic growth in the region—have not achieved a single military victory since the 1970s.

However, the state capacity thesis does not explain the dramatic decline in the deadliness of warfare in East Asia after the mid-1970s. Here the answer is found with the effective ending of Cold War-driven major power interventions in the region. The bloodiest wars in East Asia, and indeed the world, from 1946 to 1979 were the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, the French war in Indochina, and the US war in Vietnam.

Each of these wars was marked by massive foreign intervention—either direct with troops, or indirect via the provision of finance and military hardware. The combination of huge armies and the external supply of heavy conventional weapons and sometimes huge numbers of troops assured very high death tolls. But with the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and China's short-lived border war with Vietnam in 1979, major-power military interventions essentially stopped.

Chapter 4, the final chapter in Part I, includes an analysis of the extraordinary transformation of the global security landscape that followed the end of the Cold War.

The end of East-West hostilities not only removed a major source of conflict from the international system and helped end the various superpower proxy wars, it also liberated the UN to lead a raft of initiatives designed to stop ongoing wars and prevent those that had stopped from starting again.

The UN did not act alone of course. Other international agencies, donor governments, and huge numbers of NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) were also active players in what was in essence an embryonic mode of global security governance focused primarily on stopping ongoing civil wars (*peacemaking*) and on preventing them from starting again (*post-conflict peacebuilding*).

Other drivers of peace, including the impact of three major shifts in security-related global norms and rising incomes and state capacity, also played a role, though we believe a relatively minor one. We conclude by arguing that these latter factors complement rather than contradict the international activism thesis.

The still-evolving post-Cold War system of global security governance associated with the above changes is messy, inefficient, and prone to failure. But it has also been the primary driver of the remarkable decline in political violence around the world over the past two decades.

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CHAPTER 1

Why International Wars Have Become Increasingly Rare

The changes in the international security landscape over the past 60 years have been remarkable. In the 1950s there were on average between six and seven international conflicts being fought around the world each year; in the new millennium the average has been less than one. The decline in international conflicts precedes, and has been greater than, the decline in civil wars. The latter did not start to decline worldwide until after the end of the Cold War. International conflict numbers—which here include wars of colonial liberation—have been dropping since the late 1960s.

International conflicts are not only fewer, they have also become less and less deadly. In the 1950s, a decade whose battle-death toll was driven by the hugely destructive Korean War, the average international conflict killed more than 21,000 people a year. In the 1990s the average annual battle-death toll was approximately 5,000. In the new millennium it was less than 3,000.

Researchers rely on two broad, but contrasting, approaches in seeking to explain the causes of international war and peace. In this chapter we examine the evidence for each and ask if it provides a compelling explanation for the decline in the frequency and deadliness of international conflict since the end of World War II. In the scholarly community the two approaches are usually labelled *realism* and *liberalism*. The conceptions of global politics and human nature that inform them are sharply divergent—although there is some overlap in practice.

Realism and liberalism are not simply academic theories. The ideas that underpin them also drive—or sometimes rationalize—the international security policies of governments. *Realists* tend to be pessimistic about human nature, seeing individuals and governments as motivated primarily by self-interest and inescapable competition. They believe that the causes of war have their origins in power struggles between states in an international system that lacks effective mechanisms to prevent deadly conflicts. This leads them to advocate policies of *peace through strength* and alliance-building as the surest means of guaranteeing national security. This does not mean, however, that realism should be equated with war-mongering—many of the most trenchant critics of the US decision to invade Iraq were realists who argued that no American interests would be served by the invasion.

Liberals are less pessimistic about human nature, and the prospects for peace between states, and believe that the surest path to avoiding deadly international conflict lies with increasing economic interdependence between states, their growing enmeshment in international institutions, and the spread of democracy.

Liberals do not eschew the use of force—and indeed have been the major supporters of using military force to prevent gross violations of human rights. But when it comes to reducing the risks of war, they have a clear preference for nonmilitary means—from quiet diplomacy to economic sanctions.

In addition to reviewing the core claims of liberalism and realism, we also include discussion of a third approach, whose proponents are sometimes described as *constructivists*. Here the focus is on neither military power, economic interdependence, international institutions, nor governance per se, but rather on the role of ideas in changing popular and elite beliefs about the legitimacy of war as an instrument of statecraft.

Changing Patterns of International Conflict

Before discussing realist and liberal theories in detail, we will look briefly at the trends in international conflict in the post-World War II era. *International conflicts* are conventionally defined as violent contests between the military forces of two or more states. In the case of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) datasets, a conflict is deemed to have occurred if the fighting results in at least 25 battle deaths in a given year.

Figure 1.1 Average Number of International Conflicts per Year, 1950–2008



Data Source: UCDP/PRIO.[1]

There has been a steady decline in the number of international conflicts—defined here to include interstate and extrastate conflicts—around the world. Extrastate, or anticolonial conflicts, ended in the 1970s.

The issue of whether to include wars of colonial liberation as "international" conflicts is contested. Some scholars count them as civil wars *within* a colonial power. Others, including UCDP, believe they are *sui generis* and should be treated as separate from both interstate and intrastate conflicts. UCDP uses the term "extrastate" to describe anticolonial conflicts.

For the purpose of this chapter, the arguments for including wars of liberation from colonial rule under the rubric of "international" conflicts are compelling. While national liberation struggles are clearly not inter*state* conflicts, they are conflicts between very different nations—i.e., they are, literally, international. And like international wars more conventionally defined, they involve the projection of power by one of the warring parties across national boundaries. Moreover, the consequence of liberation struggles after 1946 was almost invariably the creation of a new state led by the victorious nationalists.

Part of the purpose of this chapter is to examine the utility of different approaches to preventing and ending wars. Anticolonial struggles are particularly interesting from this perspective. In almost all of these conflicts, the party that was weaker in conventional military terms prevailed—an outcome that is very much at odds with the assumption of realist scholars that material power is a critical factor both in deterring wars and prevailing when the opponent cannot be deterred. Both the initiation and consequent outcome of anticolonial conflicts are inexplicable without reference to global norms as drivers of change—an explanation that is again at odds with realist assumptions.

Figure 1.1 shows the changing trends in international conflict since the end of World War II. Two things are apparent. First, until the end of the 1960s, most international conflicts were anticolonial struggles. Second, there has been a decline in the average number of international conflicts of all types over the past six decades. International conflicts, although relatively rare, remain important because for most of the post-World War II period they have been far more destructive and deadly than civil wars.

Figure 1.2 Reported Battle Deaths per State-Based Armed Conflict: International Conflicts versus Intrastate Conflicts, 1946–2008



Data Sources: PRIO; UCDP/HSRP Dataset.[2]

With very few exceptions, international conflicts have been far more deadly than intrastate conflicts.

Figure 1.2 shows the average number of battle deaths per year from international and intrastate conflict. The data illustrate two things very clearly. First, they show just how much more deadly the average international conflict has been compared with the average conflict waged within states. And second, they show that the deadliness of international conflicts has declined sharply, though very unevenly, over time.

"Peace through Strength"—the Realist Prescription

All realists are pessimists, but they are pessimistic for different reasons. For *classical* realists like Hans Morgenthau, the "will to power" is innate in human nature and it is this drive that determines the national security policies of states.[3] It follows that each state will seek to aggrandize power at the expense of other states. The resulting power struggles will sometimes culminate in war.

> The deadliness of international conflicts has declined sharply over time.

Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer focus not on human nature, nor the political make-up of individual states, but on the anarchic nature of the international system.[4] By anarchy neo-realists do not mean chaos but rather the absence of any form of global government. Without effective international governance, the argument goes, there are no institutions that can authoritatively resolve disputes and provide security to individual states the way that national governments can provide security for individual citizens. Neo-realists are profoundly skeptical that the UN (United Nations) might ever play such a role.

In realist theory, fear and suspicion are omnipresent features of international anarchy because states, particularly the major powers, have the capacity to attack each other, because there are unavoidable uncertainties about their future intentions, and because there is no superordinate authority to impose or maintain the peace. In such a system it follows that states have no choice but to resort to "self-help"—i.e., they must provide for their own security. Hence, the strategic maxim, "If you want peace, prepare for war."

But when it comes to the most effective strategies for achieving peace, realist scholars disagree quite profoundly. Some realists, like Waltz and Mearsheimer, argue that a "balance of power" between adversaries is the best guarantee of peace. Others, notably A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler,[5] hold that preponderance of power is the best way to avoid war.

Peace and the "Balance of Power"

The claim that a balance of military power has the effect of reducing the risk of war between states is not implausible. The argument goes something like this: where there is rough parity in the military forces between two states, neither can be sure of victory, war will likely be protracted, and winning is likely to be highly costly. It follows that the payoff of avoiding war will be greater than the payoff of fighting. And since states are assumed to be rational actors, they will be dissuaded from going to war by the anticipated costs and peace will be preserved.[6] Some proponents of balancing take the argument further, pointing to the military rule of thumb that attacking forces need to be three times more powerful than defending forces to be assured of victory. Insofar as this is true, and insofar as there is rough parity in the balance of forces, then neither side has the military advantage needed to wage an offensive war successfully. Both understand this and each is thus deterred from attacking the other.

Security Dilemmas and Arms-Racing

At the heart of balance of power theory lurks the stability-eroding threat of the *security dilemma*.[7] Security dilemmas arise because, under conditions of anarchy, states that harbour no aggressive intentions towards one another may nevertheless find themselves embroiled in wars they never intended.

The logic of the security dilemma is simple enough. Consider a hypothetical situation in which a state, convinced of the virtues of balancing the military power of potential adversaries in a world of strategic uncertainty, embarks on a prudential defense buildup. Its purpose is wholly defensive, but its arms buildup may nevertheless be perceived by other states as indicating aggressive intent. If other states—equally prudential and equally defensive—respond by building up their military capabilities, their actions may be misperceived by the first state as an indication of hostile intent, prompting it to build up its forces still further.

The risk here is that escalating mutual suspicion will generate a conflict spiral and arms race that culminates in a war that neither side originally intended. The outbreak of World War I is often cited as a case in point.

The war-provoking risks of arms-racing have been a major source of concern for students of the dynamics of security dilemmas. But the extent of the risk is far from clear from the statistical evidence. A much-cited 1979 study by Michael

Wallace found that in 28 cases where serious disputes between great powers were preceded by an arms race, war occurred 23 times—i.e., 82 percent of the time. But where such disputes were not preceded by an arms race, they escalated into war in only three out of 71 times (4.2 percent).[8]

Wallace's methodology was subject to sharp criticism, however, and the findings of some subsequent research suggested that less than 30 percent of all arms races culminated in war. Some types of arms competition were associated with a considerably greater probability of subsequent conflict. Those that were associated with a high defense burden—i.e., high levels of defense expenditure—and a territorial dispute, for example, culminated in war 59 percent of the time.[9]

Even if 100 percent of arms races culminated in war, it still could not be assumed that the former necessarily caused the latter. In reality both the arms race and the war are likely being driven by the dispute itself—i.e., each may be the effect of the same cause.

Much of the research on the strategic outcomes of power-balancing has involved statistical analyses of the risk of war between pairs of states, but states can also balance power by creating, or joining, military coalitions with other states. Such alliances, argue Morgenthau and Waltz, can deter aggression.[10] Critics, however, claim that "alliance commitments can serve to provoke and to expand war,"[11] and note that entangling alliance commitments can drag coalition members into conflicts they never sought and could have avoided had they not joined the alliance in the first place.

The statistical evidence on the security benefits of joining or forming alliances, like that on arms-racing, is inconclusive. Some studies show that nations in alliance relationships are more war-prone than nations that are not alliance members, while others show they are less war-prone.[12]

But here too, we need to be careful not to jump to conclusions about causal relationships. Even where alliance formation has been followed by war, which has often been the case in the twentieth century, this does not necessarily mean that the creation of the alliance caused the war. It is perfectly possible, indeed quite likely, that the creation of the alliance was an effect of the anticipation of war, not the cause of its subsequent outbreak.

Brett Ashley Leeds argues that different types of alliances are associated with very different risks of war, but that these relationships may be hidden by the very statistical models used to detect them.[13]

While it is clear that we should be skeptical about claims that "peace through balancing" strategies are reliable means of preventing war, we should not assume that rejecting balance-of-power strategies in order to avoid the risks associated with security dilemmas will necessarily avoid war. Security dilemma dynamics are only one possible cause of war—some states actively pursue aggression, and where this is the case, joining alliances and other "peace through strength" strategies make perfect sense. Scholars who worry about the dangers of security dilemmas often urge policies of reassuring adversaries. But attempting to "reassure" states bent on aggression amounts to little more than appeasement—a strategy that may be, quite literally, self-defeating.

Aggressor states can only be deterred—or defeated if deterrence fails—but this may be a decreasingly important challenge since the evidence indicates that cross-border aggression has become increasingly rare.

Peace through Military Preponderance

Some of the strongest critics of balance-of-power approaches to preventing war are other realists who believe that military preponderance, or hegemony, is the most stable form of power distribution in the international system (at least in the medium term) and thus more conducive to peace.[14] Here the argument is that militarily dominant powers have no need to fight, while other states are deterred from attacking them by the high probability that they will lose. A benign hegemon may also use its suasion over the states in its sphere of influence to help create stability-enhancing "rules of the game" that prevent disputes from escalating into war.

The statistical evidence on the security benefits of joining or forming alliances, like that on arms-racing, is inconclusive.

The statistical evidence tends to support the "peace through preponderance" thesis. In a study published in 1988, William Moul examined the escalation of serious disputes among the great powers between 1815 and 1939. His statistical analysis suggested that where power was balanced—i.e., where there was rough parity between the great powers—there was a much greater probability that disputes would escalate into war than when the disputes were between unequals.[15]

But this finding was not just applicable to great-power relationships. In a much-cited 1993 analysis, Stuart Bremer examined factors associated with militarized disputes between

pairs of states from 1816 to 1965. Controlling for a range of intervening factors, he found that a marked disparity of power between two states reduced the probability of war while parity increased it.[16]

In an article published in 2008, Håvard Hegre confirmed the earlier findings that the greater the inequality of power between any two states, the lower the risk of war.[17] But the policy prescriptions that flow from this finding are far from clear since Hegre also found that attempts to achieve preponderance led "unambiguously" to a higher risk of conflict onsets. In other words, while preponderance itself may reduce the risk of war, the process of trying to attain it increases the risk.[18]

Preponderance Theories Challenged

As with other realist claims, there are reasons for skepticism about the peace through preponderance thesis. First, if it were true, we might expect that the most powerful states would experience the least warfare. However, since the end of World War II, the opposite has in fact been the case. Between 1946 and 2008, the four countries that had been involved in the greatest number of international conflicts were France, the UK, the US, and Russia/USSR.[19] Yet, these were four of the most powerful conventional military powers in the world—and they all had nuclear weapons.

The fact that major powers tend to be more involved in international conflicts than minor powers is not surprising. Fighting international wars requires the capacity to project substantial military power across national frontiers and often over very long distances. Few countries have this capacity; major powers have it by definition.

But there is a more serious challenge to the preponderance thesis. From the end of World War II until the early 1970s, nationalist struggles against colonial powers were the most frequent form of international conflict. The failure of the far more powerful colonial powers to prevail in these conflicts poses a serious challenge to the core assumptions of preponderance theories—and marked a remarkable historical change.

During most of the history of colonial expansion and rule there had been little effective resistance from the inhabitants of the territories that were being colonized. Indeed, as one analyst of the wars of colonial conquest noted, "by and large, it would seem true that what made the machinery of European troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain."[20]

The ease of colonial conquest, the subsequent crushing military defeats imposed on the Axis powers by the superior military industrial might of the Allies in World War II, and the previous failure of the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations, to stop Fascist aggression all served to reinforce the idea that preponderance—superiority in military capability—was the key both to peace through deterrence and victory in war.

But in the post-World War II world, new strategic realities raised serious questions about assumptions regarding the effectiveness of conventional military superiority. In particular, the outcomes of the wars of colonial liberation, the US defeat in Vietnam, and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan demonstrated that in some types of conflict, military preponderance could neither deter nationalist forces nor be used to defeat them. The outcomes of these conflicts posed a major challenge for preponderance theories.

While preponderance itself may reduce the risk of war, the process of trying to attain it increases the risk.

Not only did the vastly superior military capabilities of the colonial powers fail to deter the nationalist rebels from going to war but in every case it was the nationalist forces that prevailed. The colonial powers withdrew and the colonies gained independence. Military preponderance was strategically irrelevant.

Writing about US strategy in Vietnam six years before the end of the war, Henry Kissinger noted:

> We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.[21]

For the nationalist forces, military engagements were never intended to defeat the external power militarily—that was impossible. The strategy was rather to seek the progressive attrition of the metropole's political capability to wage war—"will" in the language of classical strategy.[22] In such conflicts, if the human, economic, and reputational costs to the external power increase with little prospect of victory, support for the war in the metropole will steadily erode and the pressure to withdraw will inexorably increase.

But asymmetric political/military strategies were not the only reason that relatively weak nationalist forces prevailed over militarily preponderant colonial powers in the post-World

War II era. In the aftermath of World War II, there had been a major shift in global norms with respect to the legitimacy of colonial rule—a shift that made crushing nationalist rebellions politically more difficult for the colonial powers.

In 1942 Winston Churchill had defiantly declared that "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."[23] Less than 20 years later, another British prime minister, Harold MacMillan, sounded a very different note: "The wind of change is blowing through this [African] continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it."[24]

The "wind of change" made crushing anticolonial uprisings fought in the name of self-determination politically difficult for the colonial powers who were after all signatories to the UN Charter that had strongly proclaimed the right to self-determination.

Understanding this shift in global norms helps explain the failure of the colonial powers to prevail in the wars of colonial liberation.

The anticolonial nationalists had history on their side, plus international political, and sometimes material, support from the US, from European countries that were not colonial powers, and, of course, from the Soviet Union. In many cases power was transferred to nationalist movements without any violence—fighting was often more about the timing of independence than its principle.

Traditional realist "peace through strength" theories, with their focus on the importance of material capability in deterring war, and winning if deterrence fails, and their deep skepticism about the importance of ideas as drivers of change in the international system, have never been able to provide compelling explanations for the strategic successes of militarily weak insurgents in national liberation wars.

The Nuclear Peace

Finally, we turn to what for many is the most compelling realist argument of all—namely that peace has reigned between the major powers for more than 60 years because of the existence of nuclear weapons.

Waltz noted in 1995 that "never in modern history, conventionally dated from 1648, have the great and major powers of the world enjoyed such a long period of peace."[25] Many scholars and practitioners believe that this remarkable war-free period is attributable in large part to the nuclear "balance of terror."

The logic of the "nuclear peace" is simple. Where nuclear adversaries both possess so-called mutual assured destruction capabilities, each can respond with a devastating nuclear counterstrike if the other attacks it with nuclear weapons. In such a world, war between nuclear powers becomes completely irrational. Peace is assured because no conceivable political or strategic gains can make the mutual slaughter and destruction of nuclear war worth contemplating. As former US President Ronald Reagan put it, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."[26]

Since resort to nuclear weapons was thought most likely to occur in a conventional war that one side was losing, nuclear weapons states also have a strong incentive to avoid conventional wars.

The "nuclear peace" extends to the non-nuclear allies of the nuclear powers who benefit from so-called extended deterrence. Thus, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Australia do not need their own nuclear deterrent because their security from external attack has been guaranteed by the "nuclear umbrella" provided by their US ally.

For supporters of nuclear deterrence, it is precisely the unparalleled destructiveness of atomic arsenals that has made war "unthinkable" and has rendered aggression between the major powers obsolete. Even proponents of nuclear disarmament concede that nuclear deterrence may have been effective. As the 2009 *Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament* noted:

> It is hard to contest the almost universally held view that the absence of great power conflict since 1945 must be at least in part attributed to the fear of nuclear war. On the face of it, nuclear weapons on the other side will always provide a formidable argument for caution, and it does seem that they generated a degree of mutual respect and careful handling between the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War.[27]

Waltz, the leading proponent of the security-enhancing role of nuclear weapons—and of the benefits of nuclear proliferation—makes a stronger case:

> Nuclear weapons helped to maintain stability during the Cold War and to preserve peace throughout the instability that came in its wake. Except for interventions by major powers in conflicts that for them are minor, peace has become the privilege of states having nuclear weapons, while wars are fought by those who lack them.[28]

The Dubious Utility of Nuclear Weapons

Waltz's suggestion that the nuclear weapons states enjoy peace because they are nuclear armed is simply untrue. As mentioned previously, the four countries that have fought the most international conflicts since the end of World War II—France, the UK, the US, and Russia/USSR—are all nuclear-armed states.

And some of the "minor interventions" Waltz refers to are not so minor. They include the major international conflicts fought by the major powers since the end of World War II—including the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Claims that nuclear weapons provide a reliable and consistent deterrent against conventional war, while plausible in theory, are far from being universally true. From 1945 until the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, America's nuclear monopoly proved powerless to prevent the consolidation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe—the greatest expansion of the Soviet empire during the entire Cold War period.

> The case for the "nuclear peace" is far from being compelling.

US nuclear weapons did not deter China from attacking US forces during the Korean War, nor did they prevent the North Vietnamese from engaging militarily with the US during the Vietnam War. Israeli nuclear weapons did not deter Egypt from attacking Israel in 1973, Britain's independent nuclear deterrent failed to deter Argentina from invading the Falkland Islands in 1982, and Soviet nuclear weapons did not dissuade the mujahedeen from waging war against the occupying Soviet army in Afghanistan—nor did they prevent a Soviet defeat.

Part of the reason for the non-use of nuclear weapons in these conflicts is that in no case did the nuclear weapons state in question perceive the strategic issue at stake to be sufficiently important to warrant the huge carnage, the international opprobrium, and the likely political backlash that the use of nuclear weapons would have caused.

Abhorrence of, and political resistance to, the actual use of nuclear weapons derives in part from what Nina Tannenwald has called the "nuclear taboo"—the widespread popular and elite revulsion against using weapons that would cause the annihilation of possibly tens of millions of innocent civilians.[29]

It is true that neither the US nor the Soviet Union, nor any of their Cold War allies, has suffered a major conventional attack on its homeland and it is quite possible that nuclear deterrence was one of the factors that prevented such attacks. But the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is by no means the only plausible explanation for the absence of major power war in this period. As John Mueller has argued: "world war in the post-1945 era has been prevented not so much by visions of nuclear horror as by the generally-accepted belief that conflict can easily escalate to a level, nuclear or not, that the essentially satisfied major powers would find intolerably costly."[30]

The point here is that if the claimed efficacy of nuclear deterrence derives from the fact that the horrific costs of nuclear war outweigh any conceivable benefits, then much the same argument can be made for the deterrent effect of major conventional warfare in the aftermath of World War II. According to Mueller's argument, the costs of World War II, where the death toll likely exceeded 50 million, were horrifying enough on their own to make the Cold War adversaries determined to avoid future world wars.

Moreover, the claim that it was nuclear deterrence that had kept the peace during the Cold War is both speculative and unprovable. While both sides in the Cold War—prudentially—had contingency plans for war, there is no compelling evidence that either side wanted war and was deterred from waging it solely by the existence of nuclear weapons. The claimed "success" of nuclear deterrence, in other words, is necessarily speculative; the deterrence failures—some noted above—are not.

In the post-Cold War era the strategic relevance of nuclear weapons in the security planning of the major powers is much reduced. Civil wars and terrorism are the major focus of security for these states in the new millennium, and nuclear weapons have no conceivable strategic role in either case.

Today nuclear weapons are no longer seen as an indispensable guarantor of peace between the major powers, but rather as a source of instability rising from their attempted acquisition by minor powers and terrorists.

The case for the "nuclear peace" is not implausible, but it is far from being compelling either.

The Liberal Peace

Liberal peace theorists tend to be more optimistic about human nature than realists and less convinced of the virtues of military solutions to security problems. Like realists, they disagree over some issues. Liberal peace theories make the case that both the incidence and the threat of international war have been reduced since the end of World War II by changes in the international system. First, the number of democracies has increased dramatically over the past 30 years and democratic

states very rarely fight each other. Second, there has been a dramatic increase in international economic interdependence. In addition, nation-states have become increasingly enmeshed in transnational and international institutions.

Democracy and Peace

The "democratic peace" thesis is the best known of the three elements of the liberal peace. It has been described by Jack Levy as being "close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."[31] It rests on the finding, which has been replicated in many studies, that liberal democracies almost never fight each other, and on the claim that this forbearance derives primarily from their democratic nature.

It follows from democratic peace theory that, since the share of democratic governments has almost doubled since the end of the Cold War, as Figure 1.3 shows, the net risk of war between states in the international system should have declined.

Figure 1.3 The Rising Tide of Democracy, 1946–2008



Data Source: Polity IV.[32]

In 1946, 28 percent of the world's governments were democratic. By 2008 that share had more than doubled.

Yale University's Bruce Russett, one of the leading theorists of the democratic peace thesis, spells out the case for the democratic peace in nontechnical language in the text box, The Democratic Peace.

The Realist Response

As Russett points out, the democratic peace thesis does not claim that democracies are always peaceful—they frequently fight nondemocracies. Indeed, as noted earlier, three democracies—France, Britain, and the US—are ranked first, second, and third in the league table of countries that have been involved in the highest number of international conflicts between 1946 and 2008.

Moreover, leading realist scholars Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have argued that even if democratic states almost never fight each other, the process of becoming a democracy increases the risk of conflict. Looking at the history of wars from 1811 to 1992, they found that states experiencing a democratic transition have been about 40 percent more likely to become involved in hostilities than states experiencing no regime change.[33] This, the authors argue, should raise questions about the "policy of promoting peace by promoting democratization."[34]

> The democratic peace thesis does not claim that democracies are always peaceful—they do fight nondemocracies.

However, while the percentage increase in risk is substantial, the absolute level of risk is extremely small. For states whose governments were becoming more democratic over a period of five years, the risk of being embroiled in an interstate war over the following five years was just over 4 percent; for the states that experienced no such change, the risk was just under 3 percent.[35] This small increase in a relatively tiny risk hardly seems to warrant abandoning efforts to assist countries to democratize, or the security benefits that increasing the number of inclusive democracies seemingly bestows. Moreover, Mansfield and Synder's basic thesis that transitions towards democracy increase the risk of interstate war has been strongly challenged on methodological and empirical grounds by Vipin Narang and Rebecca Nelson.[36]

Like most claims about the causes of peace and war, the democratic peace thesis is contested. The finding itself—that democracies very rarely go to war against each other—is not in doubt, but critics argue it is not the democratic nature of democratic states that accounts for the absence of war between them but other factors. Realists, for example, argue that it was the common interest in maintaining a united front against a mutual—Soviet—enemy, plus nuclear weapons, that prevented war between the Western democracies during the Cold War, not the nature of their political institutions.[37]

In 1990, as the Cold War had ended and the presumed war-inhibiting effect of a common enemy had disappeared with it, noted neo-realist Mearsheimer offered this gloomy

view of Europe's future: "The prospect of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically now that the Cold War is receding into history. The next forty-five years in Europe… are likely to be substantially more violent than the past forty-five years."[38]

It is now two decades since Mearsheimer wrote his much-cited article, yet the threat of war between Western European states seems even more remote than it was in the Cold War years.

The Capitalist Peace

There is widespread agreement among scholars of the liberal peace that economic interdependence between national economies is, on balance, a positive force for peace. Most scholars working in this field see such interdependence as complementing the effect of democratic institutions in promoting peace between liberal democracies. Erik Gartzke, however, argues that what he calls the "capitalist peace" supplants the democratic peace.[39]

The executive summary of the 2005 Cato Institute report, in which a much-publicized article by Gartzke appeared, noted,"When measures of both economic freedom and democracy are included in a statistical study, economic freedom is about 50 times more effective than democracy in diminishing violent conflict."[40]

The overriding national objective of almost all modern states is wealth maximization, not so much for its own sake but because national wealth is a necessary condition for meeting the huge number of demands that citizens have imposed on modern states, particularly liberal states.

In previous eras, invading other countries to seize control of their land or raw materials had a certain economic logic—land and raw materials were seen to be central to creating wealth and were valued for their own sake as well. But today there are far fewer economic incentives for invading other countries than there were in previous eras. Ownership of land and raw materials is not a necessary condition for creating wealth in the modern world—if it were, Singapore and Luxembourg would be poverty-stricken, and Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be rich.

Moreover, in today's global marketplace it is almost always cheaper in both financial and political terms to buy raw materials from other countries than to endure the international odium of mounting an invasion in order to seize them. As Mueller puts it, "free trade furnishes the economic advantages of conquest without the unpleasantness of invasion and the sticky responsibility of imperial control."[41]

Trade is the element of international economic interdependence that has received the most attention from democratic peace theorists, but it is not necessarily the most important. Cross-investment is also critical.

As the economies of countries become more and more enmeshed with each other as a result of wealth-enhancing cross-investment, the costs of fighting a war will outweigh any conceivable economic benefit that might follow from starting one. Indeed, if one state goes to war against another under such circumstances, it is effectively attacking itself.

Solomon Polachek, Carlos Seiglie, and Jun Xiang found that both trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) were associated with a reduced risk of conflict between pairs of states in the 1990s.[42] In particular, they noted that a 10 percent increase in FDI was associated with an average 3 percent decrease in net conflict. They found that trade had a comparable impact.

Insofar as this thesis is correct, if international trade and FDI levels continue to grow, as seems highly probable, the risk of interstate conflict should decline still further.[43]

Figure 1.4 Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, 1970–2008



Data Source: UNCTAD.[44]

Economies in the developing world have experienced a dramatic acceleration of foreign direct investment over the last two decades.

Figure 1.4 shows the dramatic increase in FDI in the developing world. The increase in trade levels between rich and poor countries follows a similar trajectory.[45]

Not surprisingly, democratic peace theorists, while agreeing that economic interdependence helps reduce conflict between states, reject Gartzke's wholesale dismissal of the impact of democracy on the prospects for international peace. The debate between Gartzke and his critics, which has focused

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE *By Bruce Russett*

The democratic peace is an empirical observation, a fact. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, when real democracy started to take hold in many countries, violent conflicts between democracies have been rare, and full-scale wars between democracies have been virtually nonexistent.

A more precise statement of the democratic peace thesis is that the more democratic any two countries are, the less likely they are to get into disputes that kill people, and the less violent any conflicts that do arise between them are likely to be. These facts have important implications for global security, since the number of democratic governments in the world has doubled since 1990 and the number of dictatorships has halved, while the number of armed conflicts has declined substantially. By democracy I mean a country with free and competitive elections that the government really can lose, and in which nearly everyone can vote and a broad range of people might achieve high office.

The association between different types of government and the risk of war is striking. Two highly democratic countries are some 80 percent less likely to get into a violent dispute with each other than are two countries—otherwise similar—that are ruled by strong dictatorships. In medical research such a reduction in risk would be a very big deal.

The democratic peace is a strong generalization, a probabilistic statement that allows some exceptions. My colleagues and I have spent much of the last 15 years analyzing the evidence for the democratic peace. We have found that it stands up with different definitions of democracy and different measures of international violence and war. But it is *not* an iron law—there are no iron laws about social and political phenomena. Individual leaders can make bad decisions. Democracy is dependent on a separation of powers, on checks and balances that work better in some countries than in others, and in particular countries better at some times than others.

The democratic peace is a thesis about pairs of democratic countries. It does *not* mean that democracies are necessarily peaceful in their relations with nondemocracies, although there is some evidence that democracies are less likely to get into violent international conflicts in general, and when they do it is usually the dictators who start, or escalate, the violence. But here the evidence is not nearly as strong as for the propositions about peace between pairs of countries. Great powers, whether democracies or dictatorships, get into a lot of conflicts. This is not surprising, since great powers have widespread interests, and the military capabilities to attack distant countries—attributes that weaker powers lack.

Several influences help explain the democratic peace phenomenon. Both policy-makers and publics in democracies, for example, may share the belief that it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to get into violent conflicts with countries whose governments and peoples are accustomed to resolving conflicts non-violently and might be expected to follow that practice in dealing with international conflicts.

However, probably the most important contribution to keeping the peace between democracies is the fact that democratic states have institutions for replacing their leaders peacefully. Democratic leaders must address the concerns of a majority of their populations in order to stay in office. Some wars may be popular at first, but long wars, costly in money and blood, are rarely popular, as their costs are mostly born by the general populace. Democratic leaders know that if they fight unpopular wars, they risk being thrown out of office in the next election.

Democracies win well over half of the wars they are involved in, and 90 percent of those they start. The fact that democracies are formidable opponents provides an incentive for other countries, including other democracies, to try and avoid waging war against them. Dictators, by contrast, do not have to satisfy a broad electorate and, even if they start and lose a war, they often can stay in power afterwards by paying off a small circle of cronies and the security forces they need to repress opposition.

While democratic governance contributes to international peace, it is *not* a panacea. And democratic

peace rhetoric can be misused—notably to legitimate the resort to war in the name of establishing democracy. Even putting domestic and international legal considerations aside, the historical record demonstrates that efforts to establish democracy in other countries by force usually fail. The experiences of Germany and Japan after World War II were rare exceptions. Few other defeated dictatorships have had such favourable political, social, and economic conditions for starting or reviving democracy. In the case of the two defeated Axis powers, these included an advanced capitalist economy with a highly skilled labour force, previous experience of democracy, an ethnically homogenous population, occupiers who were resolutely committed to reinstating democratic institutions, no oil curse, and most of Germany's neighbours being democratic. Some US government officials may have thought Iraq looked like Germany. They were wrong.

The democratic peace complements other security-enhancing influences. A new democracy is safest in a neighbourhood mostly populated by other democracies, for example. International commerce, meaning trade and finance, is also a force for peace. Pairs of countries whose mutual trade accounts for a high percentage of their national income are nearly as likely as a pairs of democracies to stay free of warfare. Trade produces politically powerful interest groups that have a big stake in avoiding costly military conflict. In turn, peace promotes more trade. There is also an indirect contribution to peace in that democracies trade more heavily with other democracies where rule of law and respect for property rights prevail. And trade promotes economic growth, which itself enhances democracy.

International governmental organizations (IGOs) are another force for peace—particularly the strongly institutionalized IGOs that are composed mostly of democracies. Those organizations promote and help stabilize the democratic institutions of their new members. Many of them make democracy a condition for membership. Pairs of countries sharing membership in many such organizations have about a 30 percent lower risk of violent conflict than do countries sharing few or no such memberships. That is less than the contribution of democracy and trade, but still substantial. Strong ties of trade and IGO membership make a contribution to peace even with countries that are not democratic—grounds for peace between the United States and China.

Countries that rank near the top of the measures for all three of these security-promoting influences—democracy, trade, and shared IGO memberships—are over 90 percent less likely to fight each other than are countries ranked near the bottom of all three.

Together, these three influences create a self-reinforcing cycle that constitutes key elements of what I call the Kantian system—the reference being to Immanuel Kant's prescient insights into the role of democracy and commerce in promoting international peace. They are also key elements of what we call globalization, and their contribution to peace is part of the good news about globalization.

The democratic peace has been most evident in Europe since the end of World War II: a region that has been bound together in peace for an unprecedented 60-plus years after centuries of bloody warfare. But it is *not* limited to Europe. The three influences also operate, if less strongly, in much of the rest of the world, including among poorer countries. One example is Mercosur, an IGO that promotes free trade in South America and that was established by newly democratic countries when they got rid of their dictators. Democracy is a condition for membership in Mercosur. It has become a mutual protection society for democratic leaders who use it to promote commerce and economic growth and reduce old antagonisms that had led to wars and threats of war in the past.

Democratization often follows when governments and their peoples observe that democracy works in other countries, especially neighbouring countries, by bringing human rights and steady, if not spectacular, increases in standards of living. They begin to see the value of being able to hold elected officials accountable at the polls. No democracy with an income equal to that of Argentina in the 1980s has ever reverted to dictatorship.

The democratic peace counsels patience. Over time these powerful mutually reinforcing influences work to create expanding zones of war-free democratic states. While nothing is guaranteed in this world, this is the best prospect for international peace.

on research design, is complex, highly technical, and unlikely to be resolved any time soon.[46]

The sharp divergence of views and findings evident in this debate is typical of much of the quantitative conflict research literature, which is characterized both by a marked lack of consensus over findings and by many methodological disputes. Some of the latter are explored in the next chapter.

> Peace is "overdetermined," and determining the impact of one causal factor vis-à-vis another is challenging.

The controversy over the capitalist peace—like many others in this field—points to a more general problem within the literature on the causes of peace between democracies, particularly between the long-established democracies. It is true that OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) democracies do not fight each other, but these same democracies also have liberal capitalist economies and high levels of economic interdependence; they are members of long-established alliance systems; they possess nuclear weapons, or shelter under the "nuclear umbrella"; and they are deeply "enmeshed" in regional and international organizations. Each of these factors has been identified as reducing the probability of war.

Peace, in other words, is "overdetermined," and determining the impact of one causal factor vis-à-vis others at the onset (or termination) of warfare can be extremely challenging. In principle, isolating and determining the impact of different causal factors is possible using multi-variate statistical analysis. In practice, as the very large number of divergent findings indicate, this is very difficult. In addition, it is likely that some of these factors interact with others in complex and nonobvious ways, a fact that makes the statistical and causal modelling of these phenomena even more challenging.

Peace through Ideas: The Constructivist Contribution

Ohio University's John Mueller has posed a radical challenge to both realist and liberal theories that seek to explain the causes of international peace. He suggests that the primary driver of the decline in both the number and deadliness of international conflicts since the end of World War II has been changing public and elite attitudes towards the legitimacy of war as an instrument of statecraft. This growing norm of "war aversion," he argues, presents a dramatic change from past ideas about the legitimacy of the use of force in international politics.

Noting that developed states have fought zero (or near-zero) wars against each other in the past 60-plus years, Mueller suggests this is because they have "substantially abandoned war as a method for dealing with their disagreements."[47] Post-World War II attitudes towards war as an instrument of statecraft are strikingly different from those in previous eras when warfare was "almost universally considered to be an acceptable, perhaps an inevitable, and for many people a desirable, way of settling international differences."[48]

The extent of the change in global norms over the past 60-plus years is evident in the universal recognition of the illegitimacy of colonial rule noted previously; in the proscription on war except in self-defense, or with the sanction of the UN Security Council; and in the near-complete absence in foreign and defense establishments in the developed world of the type of extreme hypernationalism that underpinned German and Japanese aggression leading up to World War II. What the French call *bellicisme*—the glorification of warfare—is rarely found in governments today, though it is characteristic of some radical terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda.

> It has been suggested that the decline in international conflicts is the result of changing attitudes to war.

The relatively recent changes in public and elite attitudes to war are part of what Steven Pinker and others see as a broader long-term normative trend away from the use of violence and coercion in social life. Referring to a centuries-long pattern of normative change, Pinker notes:

> Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution—all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far less

> common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light.[49]

Norms are shared understandings that create obligations to behave, or refrain from behaving, in certain ways. They determine what is, and what is not, legitimate. Sometimes they are codified in law; often they are not. Like all norms, the norms against the use of force are sometimes transgressed—the US-led invasion of Iraq without UN Security Council authorization is a case in point. But occasional transgressions do not mean that the norm is ineffective.

Realists see war-averseness as an effect of power-balancing, alliance membership, and nuclear deterrence.

It is, however, difficult to determine the impact of normative changes. Unlike democracy, international trade, FDI, and military capacity, norms of war-averseness are very difficult to measure. Neither their provenance nor their causal impact are amenable to the sort of quantitative studies that have been used to determine the impact of democratic institutions, interdependence, and military power balances on the risk of war.

Both realists and liberals have tended to treat war-averseness as epiphenomenal. Realists see it as an effect of power-balancing, alliance membership, and nuclear deterrence. For liberals, war-averseness is an outcome of growing economic interdependence and the democratic peace. Neither sees the war-averse norm as a cause of peace in its own right. Mueller argues this may be a mistake. With respect to claims about the contribution of capitalism to peace, for example, he argues:

> It is not so much that free-market capitalism and the economic development it spawns cause peace, but rather that peace causes—or perhaps better, facilitates—capitalism and its attendant economic development. It is peace, not capitalism, that is the determining factor in the relationship.[50]

Mueller's normative theory has not been tested in any of the statistical models for the reasons noted above, but other notable strategic thinkers have made similar arguments about the independent effects of changing attitudes to war on the prospects for peace.[51]

Conclusion

For most of the Cold War period, realist assumptions prevailed in security communities in both the West and the Communist world, but these assumptions appear to be decreasingly relevant in the post-Cold War era. Realists believed that it was the common interest in uniting against the Soviet threat that kept the peace between Western democracies during the Cold War. But as noted earlier, the Cold War has been over for 20 years and the prospect of war between the OECD democracies seems more remote than ever.

It is quite unclear how traditional realist security policies—creating or joining alliances, balancing military power, or seeking military preponderance—are supposed to contribute to peace between the advanced industrialized countries today. Most OECD countries feel secure from attack, not because of the mutually deterring effect of their military forces but because they do not believe that other states wish to attack them. Among the countries of Western Europe, the idea that disputes might be settled by war has become simply unthinkable.

Realists believe that such sentiments are naive because international anarchy—the absence of any supranational security authority—means that world politics is condemned to be a constant struggle for power. But as constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt famously noted nearly 20 years ago, "Anarchy is what states make of it."[52] In their dealings with each other, today's Western democracies do not find that the absence of any supranational authority is a major source of security concern.

The Cold War has been over for 20 years and the prospect of war between the OECD democracies seems very remote.

Whether or not liberal or realist security prescriptions are useful guides for policy-makers depends very much on context. "Peace through strength" and alliance-building strategies made sense when confronting Fascist Germany and Japan—states that were bent on imperial aggression. Liberal security policies—more democracy and greater international trade and economic interdependence—would have been completely irrelevant responses to the Fascist threat. And in the 1930s, the promotion of war-aversion norms, which were quite common among the upper classes in pre-World War II Britain, amounted to little more than appeasement.

Although today's world might appear very different, for neo-realists like Waltz, nothing has really changed. Writing a decade after the end of the Cold War, Waltz argued, "Every time peace breaks out, people pop up and proclaim that realism is dead. This is another way of saying that international politics has been transformed. The world, however, has not been transformed."[53]

But there are, as we have argued, reasons to believe that, contrary to Waltz, the international system may indeed have been transformed since the end of World War II, and in ways that have dramatically reduced the risk of international war. This does not mean an end to conflict—far from it—simply that the form that international conflict takes today is likely to be less violent than in the past. There is ample evidence, for example, that national trade policies and cross-investment by multinational corporations generate many often rancorous disputes. But the evidence also suggests the resulting interdependencies have created powerful incentives to prevent the disputes from escalating into cross-border warfare.

In the next chapter we examine the current academic debates about the causes of intrastate war and peace. There have been some striking findings but there is even less consensus among quantitative researchers than is the case with respect to international conflicts.

Jacques Demarthon / AFP / Getty Images. FRANCE.

CHAPTER 2

Peace, War, and Numbers: A Non-technical Guide to Recent Research on the Causes of War and Peace

Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of statistical research being undertaken on the causes of war and peace. This chapter examines the often-striking findings produced by researchers in what has become an increasingly influential field, one whose impact is felt well beyond the research community. Quantitative conflict research findings are now regularly cited by governments, international agencies, think-tanks and NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and in the media.

The previous chapter examined some of the findings of quantitative research on the causes of international conflict and peace. Here we examine the intrastate (or civil) wars that make up the overwhelming majority of today's armed conflicts.

Our central focus is the burgeoning literature that relies on cross-national datasets to determine the causes of civil war.[54] In particular, we examine two major challenges that sharply reduce the practical utility of quantitative research findings for policy-makers. First is the remarkable lack of consensus in the research findings on the causes of war and peace. Second is the inability of conflict models to predict the outbreak of conflicts. We also examine some innovative recent attempts to address these problems.

We start, however, with a brief introduction to the key differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

Quantitative versus Qualitative Methodologies

Macro-quantitative studies of civil wars use statistical models to determine what in general increases the risks of war and the prospects for peace. Qualitative conflict analysis, by contrast, seeks to gain an understanding of the dynamics of particular conflicts and does not use statistical models.[55] Each of the two approaches serves a different, but complementary, analytic purpose. In subsequent chapters we draw on both qualitative and quantitative methods to demonstrate the explanatory utility of combining the two approaches. Such so-called mixed-methods analyses are attracting growing interest in the research community.

Qualitative Research: The Case-Study Approach

Qualitative conflict research, which has been around for far longer than quantitative research, remains highly influential in policy communities.

Rather than undertaking statistical analyses of conflict risk in large numbers of countries over many years, qualitative researchers focus on detailed and historically and culturally contextualized analyses of causal pathways to war onsets in one or a few countries. Such research is typical of much of the "current intelligence" analysis produced in foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, as well as the work of think-tank analysts and country and area experts in the scholarly community.

Policy-makers are comfortable with qualitative analysis—it is the approach they mostly rely on in analyzing conflict

risks in particular countries, and in formulating strategies for conflict prevention, *peacemaking* (stopping ongoing wars), and *post-conflict peacebuilding* (preventing wars that have stopped from starting again.) And it has the additional virtue of being readily comprehensible to those unfamiliar with the technical complexities of regression analysis.

> The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the number of civil war onsets.

But individual case studies, however insightful, cannot, by their very nature, reveal global and regional trends in the number or deadliness of armed conflicts—or detect the common causes that may drive them. For example, only macro-statistical analysis reveals that the most pervasive common factor shared by countries embroiled in civil conflict is low GDP (gross domestic product) per capita. And only quantitative trend data could have shown that there had been a 70 percent-plus decline in high-intensity conflicts around the world in the two decades following the end of the Cold War.[56] This remarkable decline, which remained largely unrecognized in the UN (United Nations) until the new millennium, provides supportive evidence for the effectiveness of the upsurge of international initiatives that started in the early 1990s and that was directed towards reducing the number and deadliness of armed conflicts around the world. This latter change, which is examined in depth in the final chapter of Part I, was also revealed by global trend data.

Quantitative Research: Using Statistics to Understand the Causes of War and Peace

One of the major factors driving the quantitative revolution in conflict research has been the inherent limitation of qualitative case-study analysis. Individual case studies can provide deep insights into the causes of particular conflicts and can suggest reasons why such causes might apply more broadly. But as noted above, they cannot be used to determine whether what is true for one or a few cases is true more generally. The inherent limitation of case-study analysis is summed up in the methodological imperative: "Don't generalize from the particular."

To make valid generalizations about the conditions under which the risks of war increase or decrease, a much wider evidence base is needed than qualitative studies can provide. What have come to be known as large-N datasets, which include statistics on most countries in the world over long periods of time, were developed to meet this need. These datasets typically go back to 1945 or 1946, but some start as early as 1816. The unit of analysis is usually the country-year—so a dataset that covered 150 countries over a period of 40 years would contain 6,000 separate country-years of data.

In seeking to understand what increases and decreases the risk of a war breaking out, quantitative researchers typically rely on *multiple regression analysis*—a statistical technique that is used to determine the degree of association between different factors and the risk of conflict.[57] *Independent variables* are the factors that analysts believe may be causally related to the *dependent variable*—which in conflict research is usually the onset of war.[58] As James Fearon and David Laitin put it:

> To ascertain whether some interesting pattern, or relationship between variables, obtains, the best approach is normally to identify the largest feasible sample of cases relevant to the hypothesis or research question, then to code cases on the variables of interest, and then to assess whether and what sort of patterns or associations appear in the data.[59]

The statistics that are fed into the models that researchers deploy to reveal associations between war onsets and a range of independent variables are typically derived from socio-economic, environmental, and demographic datasets collated by the World Bank, the UN, other international agencies—and sometimes from the research community. Information on *when* wars start and end comes from datasets produced by the research community, like those created by the Correlates of War (COW) project, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

Civil War and the Quantitative Revolution

The end of the Cold War was associated with a considerable upsurge in interest in civil wars in both the research and policy communities, with much of the most innovative research coming from the quantitative research community.

The increased focus on civil wars arose partly because the security issue that had engaged Western security communities for more than four decades had simply evaporated as the Cold War ended, and partly because the 1990s had seen a dramatic increase in the number of civil war onsets around the world.

The average number of new wars starting each year in the 1990s was double that of the 1980s, with many of them attracting massive media coverage. The decade still witnessed a *net* decline in conflict numbers because there were more

terminations than onsets. But the decline went largely unnoticed because the mostly undramatic endings of these wars attracted much less attention than their violent beginnings.

The increased interest in civil wars was paralleled by a growing reliance on quantitative methods, not just in the conflict research community but in political science more generally. This change had in turn been facilitated by increased access to low-cost desktop computing power, new conflict datasets, and more sophisticated conflict models.

In North America quantitative conflict research is not merely mainstream—it now dominates the field of scholarly enquiry into the causes of war.

The Growing Impact of Quantitative Conflict Research

The World Bank's project, the Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence, led by Paul Collier, the director of the World Bank's Research Development Department from 1999 to 2003, was highly influential in raising the visibility of quantitative conflict research in policy communities. The increased demand from international agencies and donor governments that policy be "evidence-based" has generated further interest in quantitative research.

A landmark in the evolution of this increasingly influential research field was the seminal paper written by Collier and his collaborator Anke Hoeffler, entitled "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." First published on the World Bank's website in 2000, the article has had a major impact on policy communities in donor states and international agencies, as well as among researchers.[60]

> There are profound disagreements between quantitative scholars about the factors that drive war and peace.

The article, which went through several iterations before being published in *Oxford Economic Papers* in 2004, has been the subject of an extraordinary number of citations and commentaries. Its statistical findings have subsequently been evaluated against a large number of country case studies.[61]

"Greed and Grievance" argued that low and falling incomes, dependence on primary commodities, and a recent history of warfare were associated with increased risk of violent conflict but that neither political nor economic grievances, inequality, or ethnic diversity made countries more war-prone. The claim that grievances have no impact on the risk of war, which was by far the most controversial finding in the Collier/Hoeffler paper, is subjected to a critical examination in "Why Grievances Matter" that appears in Chapter 4.

In 2007, Collier's best-selling book, *The Bottom Billion*, brought many of the key findings of the World Bank's project and subsequent work to a far wider public.[62]

The policy impact of quantitative conflict research has become even more evident with the publication of the World Bank's 2011 *World Development Report*, which focuses on security in fragile states, and which draws heavily on the work of leading quantitative scholars in the US, Europe, and elsewhere.

The Major Challenges Confronting Quantitative Conflict Research

Despite the vast amount of research and real progress in many areas, the early promise of quantitative research on civil wars has yet to be realized and the field continues to confront major methodological and data challenges. These challenges raise serious questions about the current utility of much of the work being done for the policy community.

As noted earlier, for governments and international agencies, quantitative research at the present stage of its development confronts two major limitations that reduce its value for informing policy. First, very few findings about the causes of armed conflict command widespread assent among quantitative researchers themselves, and second, conflict models are very poor at offering predictions.

Lack of Consensus About the Causes of War and Peace

Although rarely discussed in quantitative research literature, there are profound disagreements between quantitative scholars about the factors that drive war and peace. As one review put it: "Despite immense data collections, prestigious journals, and sophisticated analyses … Many statistical results change from article to article and specification to specification. Accurate forecasts are nonexistent."[63]

This bleak assessment by three leading methodologists in the US was directed at quantitative studies of international conflicts 10 years ago, but it is equally applicable, and largely for the same reasons, to quantitative studies of civil wars today.

This was made evident in a recent survey of key findings in the quantitative conflict research literature on civil war by Håvard Hegre and Nicolas Sambanis, which reported that the literature was rife with divergent findings.[64] Their research—

and that of other scholars[65]—points out that various quantitative studies have found that:

- Ethnic diversity has no impact on the risk of armed conflict—and it does.
- Dependence on primary commodities makes war more likely—and it does not.
- Increases in levels of democracy reduce the risk of war—and have no impact.
- Inequality increases the risk of war—and has no effect.
- Grievances increase the risk of war—and they do not.
- Countries whose neighbours experience civil war face increased risks of war themselves—and they do not.
- Economic growth decreases the risk of war—and it has no significant effect.
- Mountainous terrain increases the risk of war—and it does not.

Surprisingly, despite these and many other divergent findings, there have been very few attempts by researchers to resolve their differences.

A Small Number of Robust Findings

Hegre and Sambanis suggest that just three findings command widespread consensus:

- The lower a country's average income, the higher the risk of war.
- War is more likely if a country has already experienced a war—the more recent the war, the greater the risk.
- The risk of war increases as a country's size increases.

Other studies have found a somewhat greater number of consensual findings, but no one doubts that research in this field is characterized by an extraordinary amount of disagreement.[66]

The first two consensual findings identified by Hegre and Sambanis are not only robust, but they also have clear policy relevance. The first suggests that economic development is a form of long-term conflict prevention; the second suggests that peacebuilding policies in post-conflict environments should focus particular attention on trying to ensure that conflicts that have stopped do not reignite. The third finding does not have much policy relevance, however. Shrinking the size of a country's population or territory in order to reduce its risk of succumbing to war is hardly a realistic security policy—though secessionists might disagree.

The lack of agreement within the research community matters because inconclusive, divergent, and sometimes outright contradictory statistical findings are of little value to policy-makers who have neither the time, nor usually the technical expertise, to determine which, if any, of the findings is valid.

To be fair, however, we note that disagreement over the causes of war is in no sense unique to quantitative research—historians still cannot agree on the causes of World War I, notwithstanding nearly 100 years of intensive research and the production of thousands of books and scholarly articles.

Conflict Models Are Poor at Prediction

A second area of concern for policy-makers is the inability of quantitative models to predict the onset of armed conflicts. As one recent study noted, "global models of civil conflict have performed notoriously poorly at prediction."[67]

In the Collier/Hoeffler "Greed and Grievance" study, the associations between a range of variables and civil war onsets that the authors tested were "statistically significant," suggesting that each of these factors affect the probability of war onsets. But as a recent study by Michael Ward, Brian Greenhill, and Kristin Bakke points out, the Collier/Hoeffler model only predicted 7 percent—three out of 46—of the wars that actually broke out in the period examined.[68] But it also predicted five wars that did not occur—so-called false positives.

Ward and his co-authors also tested the predictive power of the model that Fearon and Laitin used in their powerfully argued and highly influential, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War" study.[69] The Fearon/Laitin model fared even worse than the Collier/Hoeffler model, predicting not one of the 107 wars that started within the period they studied.[70]

But as Fearon and Laitin point out, the low predictive power of the models is not surprising: "Predicting civil war onset in a given country year from factors that can be coded across a large sample of countries and years is a bit like trying to find a needle in a haystack."[71]

Collier agrees that the Collier/Hoeffler model is of little use for prediction, but suggests that this is not its intended purpose:

> Our analysis is not well suited to prediction… To predict a civil war, it is surely more useful to focus on near-term indicators such as political incidents and rising violence. Rather our model is useful in pointing to the typical structural risks and so provides some guidance on longer-term policies for prevention.[72]

One research project, the CIA-funded Political Instability Task Force (PITF), claims a far superior prediction rate than the models recently reviewed by Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke. Indeed, rather than the 7 percent rate achieved by the Collier/

Hoeffler model, the PITF model claims an extraordinary 80 to 81.5 percent success rate in predicting civil war onsets.[73]

The PITF model's level of predictive success, which is described in a recent article in the *American Journal of Political Science*, is extraordinarily high compared with any other study—and thus of great potential interest to policy-makers.[74] But PITF researchers define prediction quite differently from the more conventional definition used by Ward and his co-authors, and the two sets of findings are in no sense comparable.

Defined more conventionally, PITF's prediction rate is similar to the Collier/Hoeffler rate—but greater than that of the Fearon/Laitin model.[75] In some ways this is a remarkable achievement since PITF's result is achieved with just four independent variables—far fewer than the Collier/Hoeffler model.

But while conflict models perform badly in predicting whether or not a conflict will break out in a particular country in a particular year, they do much better in determining the risk of conflict onsets over a longer period—say, five or 10 years. This suggests that their policy value lies primarily in informing long-term conflict prevention policies, rather than warning policy-makers of the imminence of war in a particular country.

Methodological Challenges

Why should there be so many divergent findings in this field and such poor rates of prediction? Part of the reason is that many reported results are not robust—that is, they can change quite substantially in response to minor alterations in the specifications of the statistical models being used.[76]

As Chris Blattman and Edward Miguel have noted:

> [The quantitative civil war literature] has been enormously provocative but has faced equally important limitations: convincing causal identification of key relationships is rare; robustness to alternative specifications or assumptions is seldom explored; country-years are often assumed to be independent units in time and space; measurement error is rarely addressed; an absence of evidence about particular effects has often been interpreted as evidence of absence; and theories of individual or armed group behavior are tested at the country level despite obvious aggregation difficulties. It would be easy to conclude that the cross-country literature has been exhausted, but that would go too far.[77]

These conclusions reflect widespread concern among a number of leading quantitative scholars about the state of the field.[78] Below we examine briefly some of the issues that have occasioned concern.

Correlation and Causation

The statistical models typically used by conflict researchers are designed to uncover associations—usually referred to as correlations. *Correlation* simply means that when the value of independent variables in a model changes, so too does the value of the dependent variable.

In the literature it is often assumed that when values of what have been identified as an independent and a dependent variable—i.e., a presumed cause and its presumed effect, respectively—vary together it is because the former causes the latter. But the correlation between the two could be spurious—i.e., the changes in both could be driven by a third unmeasured causal factor. This problem is widely recognized and researchers can attempt to reduce it by introducing control variables, but this is not always sufficient.

It is also possible that cause and effect will be confused—that the "causal arrow" will actually run in the opposite direction to that which has been assumed—or in both directions. This is the so-called endogeneity problem.[79] To give one obvious example, in the quantitative literature it is typically assumed that low income per capita is a factor that increases the risk of war—as incomes go down, the risk of war goes up, with the former driving the latter. But clearly the causal relationship between income and war can also work in the opposite direction—i.e., the low incomes may be a consequence, rather than a cause, of war. This assertion hardly needs demonstrating—it is fairly obvious that warfare can ravage national economies and drive down average incomes.

The policy value of conflict models lies primarily in informing long-term conflict prevention policies.

Researchers can attempt to ensure they are detecting the impact of declining incomes on the risk of wars by measuring income levels two or more years prior to the onset of wars. But while this approach reduces the endogeneity problem substantially, it does not eliminate it completely. Wars rarely erupt without some warning and it is possible that the anticipation of war will drive incomes down before the fighting starts if business confidence erodes and investment slows. However, this possibility does not invalidate the finding

that when incomes *rise* the risk of war falls. It is possible to argue—and demonstrate—that war causes incomes to fall; it makes little sense to argue that the absence of war causes incomes to rise.

Finally, there is the problem that even when there is a strong correlation between an independent variable and conflict onsets, there may be several different causal paths from the former to the latter.

Take the much-discussed association between mineral wealth and the risk of war. A major study by Michael Ross published in 2006 found there was a statistically significant association between mineral wealth and conflict onsets but noted that scholars have posited a diverse range of possible causal mechanisms that could lead to the latter from the former.[80] It has been argued, for example, that mineral wealth could foster conflict by:

- Providing funding via predation or extortion for rebel groups.
- Creating the perverse effect of weakening state institutions.
- Making the state that receives the resource rents an attractive target for rebel takeover.
- Generating "economic shocks" if there are sharp market-driven declines in the export values of the minerals in question.
- Making separatism a financially attractive proposition for potential secessionists in resource-rich regions.

Policy-makers need to understand the causal mechanisms that increase the risk of conflict onsets if they are to devise effective prevention policies. But in cases where there are a number of very different possible causal paths from dependence on mineral wealth to the outbreak of war, conflict models have little policy utility. They can identify correlations and measure their degree of statistical significance but cannot determine which of the possible causal mechanisms is determinate in a particular case.[81]

Statistical versus Substantive Significance

Uncovering statistically significant correlations between dependent and independent variables—i.e., those that are unlikely to occur by chance—is the goal of most statistical studies of civil war.

But statistical significance, while it may indeed point to causal relationships, is not necessarily the same as substantive significance—the type of finding most likely to be useful for policy-makers. Consider a case where researchers find that a change in the value of a particular independent variable is associated with a statistically significant increase in the risk of war of, say, 40 percent. This sounds impressive. But the probability of a civil war starting in a country-year chosen at random from a typical global dataset is normally extremely low. So, a 40 percent increase in what is a *very* low risk remains a very low risk—and thus of limited interest to policy-makers.

> Statistical significance is not necessarily the same as substantive significance.

In the Fearon and Laitin dataset, for example, there are just 127 war onsets in the nearly 7,000 country-years of observations. This means that the probability of a civil war starting in any country-year chosen at random is just 1.8 percent.[82] Increasing this by 40 percent would mean that the risk of war would rise to just 2.4 percent. For policy-makers interested in knowing if—and when—a particular country is likely to succumb to civil war, this sort of finding is of little practical utility. Qualitative research is more useful here.

Quantitative Models Ignore Fear, Hatred, and Humiliation as Potential Drivers of Conflict

Case-study analyses of armed conflicts find that fear, hatred, humiliation, resentment, concern for legitimacy and honour, nationalism, and feelings of solidarity are all sentiments that can be central to understanding the causes of war. But they are almost completely ignored in mainstream quantitative conflict research, where researchers rely primarily on slow-changing structural variables like GDP per capita, infant mortality rates, ethnicity, or economic inequality that are readily available in World Bank, UN, and other datasets.

It is not that quantitative scholars believe that emotions, attitudes, and beliefs are unimportant, of course, but rather that their research methodologies normally require access to data for 100-plus countries over many decades. However, opinion survey and other data on people's emotions, attitudes, and beliefs for most countries, and over such long periods of time, simply do not exist.

"The quantitative data that exist," notes Stanford political scientist Jeremy Weinstein, "have limited the questions scholars have been able to ask about civil war."[83]

In principle, the challenge that missing data on attitudes presents can be addressed by the use of proxy variables—i.e., factors for which there are available data that can "stand-in" for the missing variable. Income inequality, for example,

is often used as a proxy for "grievance." But the use of proxy measures in this field is often controversial.

Accounting for Agency

Agency—the capacity for human beings to make choices and act on them—obviously plays a critical role in transitions from peace to war, and war to peace. At some stage in the causal path to war, a decision has to be made by one of the parties to initiate hostilities. Agency factors, though rarely included in conflict models, always matter.

With respect to war initiation, agency encompasses far more than the decisions of individual political leaders to commit to combat. It also embraces a wide range of human actions that may push high-risk situations across the threshold from peace into war. Individual decision-makers can obviously play a critical role in moving a country towards war, but so too can small groups and mass movements.

Agency factors, though rarely included in conflict models, always matter.

Notwithstanding the obvious importance of human agency, most quantitative models, as we have pointed out, rely on structural variables, i.e., on things that are—like country size or GDP per capita—rather than things that happen. The latter, which are often referred to as events data, include a wide variety of agency-driven phenomena—antiregime demonstrations, strikes and boycotts, the ousting of political leaders, or rigged elections, etc. These are often identified as potential trigger or precipitator factors that can push a crisis situation across the threshold into open warfare.[84]

Access to events data is problematic, however. Unlike the structural data on which most conflict models rely, no national or international agency collects global statistics on political events that might be useful in testing conflict models.

In the research community, a considerable effort was put into collecting socio-political events data from the 1940s to the late 1970s, with the findings being published in the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* series in 1964, 1972, and 1983. But human coding of events data is expensive, time-consuming, and prone to error, and the *World Handbook* series is no longer being published. As a study published in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 2003 pointed out, "this type of cross-national event research has virtually disappeared from the literature."[85]

There have nevertheless been some studies that have sought to use events data in an effort to improve the ability of quantitative models to predict conflict onsets, but thus far without a great deal of success.[86] As the Genocide Prevention Task Force report noted: "While scholars have had some success in identifying long-term risk factors, it has proven much more difficult to find generalizable near-term indicators, 'accelerators,' or triggers."[87]

There appear to be a number of reasons for this lack of success. First, many of the events that would appear to be prime trigger candidates are extremely common but turn out to be only rarely associated with conflict onsets.[88] Second, some events that appear to have been triggers in particular cases are so rare that their association with conflict onsets would not be statistically significant in regression analyses. Third, to repeat a point made earlier, finding an association is not the same as determining a cause. To determine whether or not putative triggers actually cause the onset of war requires the sort of painstaking "process tracing" methodology that only qualitative researchers employ.[89]

Should We Assume That the Future Will Be Like the Past?

A central assumption in most large-N studies of civil war is that the causes of war are both universal and time-independent. With respect to the causes of war and peace, in other words, it is assumed that the future will be like the past. It logically follows that if statistical models can explain the past, they should also provide a reliable guide to the future. But this takes for granted what really needs to be demonstrated, namely that the impact of independent variables will not change over time.

This particular challenge has received little attention in the quantitative literature, but as Graham Brown and Arnim Langer have argued:

> The prospect that even some of our strongest findings of conflict may not hold as valid now as they did in the past, or vice versa, should be tantalizing rather than a matter of concern. This means taking the passage of absolute time much more seriously.[90]

Brown and Langer demonstrate that the impact of independent variables can indeed change over time by taking the well-known Fearon and Laitin model and rerunning it for successive 20-year periods. They found that, while the association between income per capita and conflict remained robust from period to period, other associations did not.[91]

In other words, the assumption that the impacts of presumed causal factors do not change over time was not supported.

Data Challenges

Accessing reliable quantitative data is particularly challenging for conflict researchers. Statistics for poor countries—where most wars take place—are rarely adequate and often terrible, and researchers have to make difficult choices about what to include in their datasets and what to leave out.

But access to reliable data is by no means the only problem. Reviewing 12 datasets covering the period from 1960 to 1993, Nicholas Sambanis found that the number of armed conflict onsets that each contained varied sharply.[92] The differences were largely a consequence of methodological choices researchers made with respect to:

- The types of political violence that are included under the rubric of "civil war."
- The combat fatality thresholds. If the thresholds are high (typically 1,000 battle deaths a year), there will clearly be fewer conflict onsets than if they are much lower (say, 25 battle deaths a year).
- The criteria used to determine when wars start and when they end.

> Today serious political violence rarely affects more than a small fraction of a nation's territory.

The following example illustrates how increasing or decreasing the number of country-years included in a dataset can make a major difference to substantive findings. Indeed correlations can simply disappear.

One of the most widely publicized findings from the Collier/Hoeffler "Greed and Grievance" article was that there is a strong association between the risk of war and a country's dependence on primary commodities. But missing data, together with the decision to study five-year intervals instead of individual country-years, meant that the authors had to exclude one-third (27 of 79) of the countries in which civil war onsets occurred between 1960 and 1999.[93]

When Fearon reran the statistical tests with a sample that included 16 of the 27 excluded cases, he found that the much-publicized correlation between commodity dependence and the onset of war simply disappeared.[94] The Collier/Hoeffler finding was not robust.[95]

As mentioned previously, if associations are truly robust, like that between income per capita and the risk of war, then minor changes in either datasets or model specifications should make little difference to the findings.

Reliance on Country-Year Data Can Be Problematic

A number of problems arise with reliance on country-year data. The first, which has been noted by many conflict researchers, is the assumption that the observations in each country-year in the dataset are independent of each other. Clearly, in many cases they are not.

Second, the "footprint" of most of today's wars is relatively small, with serious political violence rarely affecting more than a small fraction of a nation's territory.[96] This fact has implications for the overwhelming majority of quantitative studies to date that use the country-year as the unit of analysis. The problem with this practice is that aggregated national data tell us about national averages, but data aggregation at the national level can hide important differences at the subnational level.

This matters because nonaverage conditions at the subnational level—deep poverty among geographically concentrated ethnic minorities, for example—could be associated with an increased risk of war onset. But such subnational differences may well be invisible in nationally aggregated data. In other words, causal relationships may be hidden by the very methodology used to uncover them.

Meeting the Challenges

This review has pointed to a number of important challenges that continue to confront quantitative conflict research and that go some of the way towards explaining the many inconsistent findings produced by conflict models—as well as their weak predictive capability.

Quantitative researchers are of course aware of these challenges and a number of promising new methodological and data initiatives are being developed to address them. Below we note just a few of them. But it is important to remember—as pointed out earlier and demonstrated in the next chapter—that some of the most important findings in this field are in fact both robust and highly policy-relevant.

Understanding Local Conflicts Requires Local Data

We highlighted some of the problems that result from the near-universal reliance on the country-year as the unit of analysis in macro-quantitative conflict research. Today's wars tend to be geographically concentrated and may be driven more by particular socio-economic conditions in the locale

of the fighting than by average conditions across the entire country. But until recently, testing this claim with quantitative models was difficult because conflicts were not geo-referenced within countries and it was difficult to access local/regional—as against national—data.

Initiatives in the research community are now addressing these challenges and a number of new datasets have been—or are being—developed to address the knowledge gaps. They include the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED) that maps the location of a number of conflict-related events,[97] and a new UCDP project that is adding geo-references for conflict locations to existing datasets.[98]

Some of the most innovative quantitative research currently being produced has drawn on household and other survey data generated at the local level, sometimes in conjunction with geo-referenced conflict location data. Notable examples of this so-called micro-quantitative research include studies by Ana Arjona and Stathis Kalyvas on Colombia; Chris Blattman on Uganda; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein on Sierra Leone; and Philip Verwimp on Uganda.[99] Two consortia of researchers are particularly active in this area, namely the Households in Conflict Network and MicroCon.[100]

However, while these studies are providing interesting new insights into particular conflicts, the data on which they rely are available for only a relatively small number of conflicts. This means there is no way of testing whether the findings apply universally.

Addressing the International Dimensions of Intrastate Wars

Most civil war models are based on the assumption that the risk of war can be explained purely in terms of factors and events that are located within individual countries. As Kristian Gleditsch and his colleagues from the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) at PRIO point out, conflict models rarely take into account transnational factors that may play an important role both in the initial outbreak of civil wars and in their subsequent evolution.[101] The somewhat inconvenient reality is that the conflict dynamics of civil war rarely stop at national boundaries.

Armed conflicts are not distributed evenly around the world; they tend to cluster together geographically. Clustering can arise from spillovers from one country to neighbouring countries—where government forces pursue rebels across borders, for example, or when rebels attack government forces from bases in cross-border sanctuaries.

Gleditsch and his CSCW colleagues have undertaken a number of studies that demonstrate the importance of taking into account the role of transnational actors and neighbourhood effects.[102] The fact that earlier studies tended to ignore transnational actors and neighbourhood effects may help explain some of the divergent findings in the literature.

The internationalization of some intrastate wars is clearly evident in the UCDP/PRIO conflict datasets that count the number of internationalized intrastate conflicts and their battle-death tolls. An intrastate armed conflict becomes an *internationalized intrastate armed conflict* when the government, or an armed group opposing it, receives support, in the form of troops, from one or more foreign states. These conflicts are perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the important role transnational actors can play in wars that are ostensibly intrastate. International intervention in civil wars, as we point out in the next chapter, is associated with elevated battle-death tolls.

Broadening the Scope of Conflict Datasets

In the research literature, armed conflict has traditionally been defined as a violent contestation between a state and another state (interstate war), or a state and a rebel group (civil war). But this very narrow definition left many forms of organized violence uncounted, including armed violence between non-state groups—rebel organizations, community groups, militias, and warlords, for example. The traditional definition also excludes organized violence against civilians—on the grounds that such "one-sided violence" is not armed conflict but rather the slaughter of defenseless individuals. To address these knowledge gaps, HSRP commissioned UCDP to collect data on these two previously uncounted forms of violence. The resulting "non-state armed conflict" and "one-sided violence" datasets are discussed in Part III: Trends in Human Insecurity.

Other researchers are also examining different manifestations of conflict. A new dataset on social conflict in Africa has been compiled by researchers at the University of North Texas. It records a broader spectrum of conflict-related events data than other datasets and includes peaceful protests, riots, communal conflicts, and military coups.[103]

As noted earlier, creating events data datasets is expensive, time-consuming, and error-prone. One way around some of these problems is to create software that automatically codes and records relevant political events. A considerable amount of research has gone into automatic coding with some encouraging results. But to the best of our knowledge,

the events data produced by these automated systems have yet to be used in any macro-quantitative conflict models that seek to explain the causes of war.[104]

Building Bridges

Cross-national quantitative research and qualitative analyses of the causes of war and peace are complementary, not contradictory. Neither is sufficient on its own. Case-study material can be particularly valuable in suggesting causal mechanisms whose broad applicability can be tested by quantitative models. Conversely, findings from quantitative research can suggest fruitful lines of enquiry for the analysis of individual conflicts.

In the past there has been relatively little interaction between qualitative and quantitative researchers in this field. Indeed, the two research approaches embody what in many ways are two quite different cultures. As James Mahoney and Gary Goertz put it: "Each has its own values, beliefs, and norms. Each is sometimes privately suspicious or skeptical of the other though usually more publicly polite. Communication across traditions tends to be difficult and marked by misunderstanding."[105]

Mutual skepticism and lack of communication are still common in some quarters, but interest is growing in so-called mixed or multi-methods analyses that seek to marry the strengths of both approaches.[106]

One example of a mixed-methods approach is the two-volume World Bank study edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis that tested the findings of the Collier/Hoeffler quantitative model using country case studies.[107] There was some support for the model's findings, but many case-study authors argued that grievances—which the Collier/Hoeffler and Fearon/Laitin models reject as explanatory variables—are important drivers of conflict. This exercise raised questions that have yet to be resolved.

In a study published in 2008, Fearon and Laitin adopted a somewhat different mixed-methods approach. They created narrative case histories of randomly chosen cases of conflict onsets from their dataset and compared the case-study findings with the findings generated by their conflict model. Their study stressed the importance of contingency and human agency factors that are so difficult to include in conflict models:

> The random narratives reinforced our prior belief that a great deal of essentially random historical contingency is involved in determining whether and exactly when a country will "get" a civil war. Bad luck, idiosyncratic choices by leaders, complicated and ex ante unpredictable political and social interactions may all factor into explaining why a particular civil war started at a particular time, or even at all, in a particular country. It is a historian's project, and an admirable project at that, to try to understand such particularities and idiosyncrasies for particular cases. Our social science project, implausible though it may be, is to try to identify some factors and mechanisms that do "travel" across countries and years, raising the risk of civil war onset in a consistent and appreciable manner.[108]

There are, the authors argue, clear advantages in a creative mix of methods: "Done well, multi-method research combines the strength of large-N designs for identifying empirical regularities and patterns, and the strength of case studies for revealing the causal mechanisms that give rise to political outcomes of interest."[109]

Finally, we note that the micro-quantitative studies discussed earlier are using quantitative methods in what has traditionally been the domain of qualitative research on the causes of war, namely case studies of conflict dynamics in a single country. Here the prospects for collaboration and cross-fertilization of ideas are promising since both quantitative and qualitative researchers are studying essentially the same phenomena.

Conclusion

In this review we have suggested that quantitative conflict research continues to confront major methodological and data challenges that raise questions about the utility of many—but not all—of its research findings for policy-makers. We have also noted that some of the most innovative work in the field is being devoted to addressing these challenges.

In this context, it is interesting to note this thought-provoking cautionary note issued by Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, writing in *Oxford Economic Papers* in 2009. Quantitative analysis, they argue, "should be seen as complementing qualitative in-country research rather than supplanting it."[110]

In Chapter 3 we investigate further the association between income levels, state capacity, and peace. In Chapter 4 we examine one of the most controversial assertions to emerge from quantitative conflict research, namely that grievances have no causal impact on the risk of armed conflict.

Godfrey / AP Images. VIETNAM.

CHAPTER 3

The East Asian Peace

Over the past three decades, East Asia has undergone an extraordinary transformation.[111] From 1946 to the end of the 1970s, it was the most war-wracked region in the world. Today it is enjoying "the most broadly peaceful era in its history."[112] It has been free of international conflict for almost two decades and is now one of the least violent regions in the international system.

This chapter seeks to explain this transformation. It examines the decline in the number of armed conflicts in the region and the drivers of the far more dramatic, though uneven, decline in battle deaths since the late 1970s.

The analysis starts with a description of the changing trends in the number and deadliness of armed conflicts in the region before examining the major policy shifts by the US, the Soviet Union, and China during the 1970s that sharply reduced the level of external intervention in the region. This in turn led to the steep and rapid decline in war death tolls.

By the 1980s, Northeast Asia was free of major armed conflict.[113] The remaining conflicts in Southeast Asia started to decline in 1979, a process that would see their number almost halve by the mid-1990s.

In explaining the reduction in the number of civil conflicts in Southeast Asia, we cite both the ending of Chinese support for the communist insurgencies in the subregion and the security implications of the unparalleled period of economic growth the region has experienced since the 1950s.

As noted in Chapter 2, the single-most robust finding in the cross-national statistical literature on civil wars is that increased levels of economic development are associated with a declining risk of intrastate conflict. As national economies grow, state capacities—political, economic, and administrative, as well as military—grow with them. Because rebels are largely excluded from the benefits of increased economic growth, the balance of resources relevant to winning civil wars will, over time, tend to favour governments.

There is one more rather remarkable feature of East Asia's recent strategic history, one that is directly related to the growth in the capacity of regional governments that is worth noting. Insurgent armies have not scored a single military victory in the region since the end of the Vietnam War and the Khmer Rouge's rise and fall in Cambodia in the 1970s—nor is there any prospect of them doing so in the foreseeable future.[114] This finding not only has important implications for the region's security future but, as we point out later, it stands in sharp contrast to two major studies that have argued that incumbent governments around the world are increasingly on the losing side in their struggles against violent insurgencies.

The increased levels of development in the region have been matched since the mid-1970s by a dramatic, though not universal, increase in democratization within its states. Democratization, like development, has important security implications since inclusive democracies rarely go to war against each other and are associated with a relatively low risk of civil war.



FIGURE 3.1

East Asia

Northeast Asia

Southeast Asia

Conflict Years*

East Asia is made up of two subregions: Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Each is a regional security complex. East Asia forms a broader regional security complex because of the pivotal role played by China in both subregions.

Conflict years indicate the war-proneness of a particular country.

**Conflict years are calculated by counting the number of state-based armed conflicts that a country experienced between 1946 and 2008, and then summing the number of years each conflict was active. For example, if a country experienced one conflict that lasted 20 years, and another that lasted one year, the country would have experienced 21 conflict years. The result is the same regardless of whether the conflicts occurred in the same or different years.*

Data Source: UCDP/PRIO.[115]

The Case for Analyzing Conflict Dynamics at the Regional Level

This chapter has a broader purpose than simply determining the causes of peace in East Asia. We also seek to demonstrate the analytic value of taking the region as the "level of analysis" when attempting to understand the drivers of political violence in the post-World War II world.

In the previous chapter, we argued that case studies of individual countries can provide deep insights into the causes of particular conflicts but cannot—by definition—tell us about the factors that in general increase the probablity of a country succumbing to war.

Statistical analyses of cross-national country-year data taken over several decades, on the other hand, can tell us about general risk factors, but they rarely provide a useful guide to understanding particular conflicts.

Between the two extremes of single-country case studies and cross-national statistical analysis at the global level lies the "middle-range" of regional security analysis. Taking a regional approach to understanding the causes of war and peace can be fruitful for several reasons.

> The trend in the number of armed conflicts in East Asia is quite different from the global trend.

First, regional states tend to share important commonalities in history, interaction, culture, and levels of development. They tend to have more in common than states in the more heterogeneous international system. It is not surprising, therefore, that rich, democratic, and economically interdependent countries in Western Europe should have a very different conflict risk profile from those in mostly poor sub-Saharan Africa.

Second, as we noted in the previous chapter, most of the big cross-national statistical studies of the risk of war assume that the causes of civil war are internal to individual states. But the Northeast and Southeast Asian subregions, shown in Figure 3.1, form what Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver call *regional security complexes*, by which they mean collectivities of states or other actors whose security concerns are so interlinked that they "cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another."[116]

East Asia as a whole also constitutes a regional security complex because of the pivotal security role China plays in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Cross-national statistical studies that ignore these linkages—as most do—are unlikely to provide compelling explanations of changing patterns of regional conflict.

Third, as Figure 3.2 reveals, the trend in the number of armed conflicts in East Asia is quite different from the global trend. From the early 1950s to the beginning of the 1990s, conflict numbers in the rest of the world increased eightfold but then dropped sharply. However, as Figure 3.2 shows, in East Asia conflict numbers started to drop in the late 1970s, more than a decade before the global decline.

Figure 3.2 Trends in State-Based Armed Conflicts: East Asia versus the Rest of the World, 1946–2008



Data Sources: UCDP/PRIO.

Conflict numbers in East Asia began to decline in 1979; in the rest of the world they more than doubled between 1977 and 1991.

In the next chapter, we argue that changes set in motion by the ending of the Cold War provide the most compelling explanation for the global decline in conflict numbers that started in the 1990s. But they clearly do not explain the earlier decline in East Asia. Understanding this requires an analysis of regional security dynamics.

The three different levels of analysis—global, regional, and individual country—offer complementary, though sometimes quite different, insights into the drivers of war and peace. In post-World War II East Asia, armed conflict trends were driven in part by political and economic forces from outside the region—from decolonization and the geopolitics of the Cold War, to the dramatic increase in international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) that accelerated the pace of economic development. However, trends in conflict numbers were also deeply affected by the interrelated security policies and interests of regional states.

Why Focus on East Asia?

There are several reasons to focus on East Asia:

- Security developments in East Asia are intrinsically important to an understanding of global security. More people were killed by warfare in this region from 1946 to 2008 than in all the other regions of the world combined over the same period. And as Figure 3.3 clearly shows, while most battle deaths around the world in the first three decades of the post-World War II period occurred in East Asia, since then the battle-death toll in the region has constituted a small-to-negligible share of the global total.
- The dramatic decline in conflict numbers, and the even greater decline in war deaths, in the region since the mid-1970s has received curiously little attention in the scholarly community.[117]
- East Asia's post-World War II history provides a striking illustration of the enormous impact that external intervention—and stopping it—can have on battle-death tolls.
- East Asia provides a compelling illustration of the thesis that economic development is a critically important form of long-term conflict prevention. The number of completely new civil war onsets in the region was substantially lower between 1980 and 2008 than during the previous 30-odd years, while the number of ongoing conflicts dropped by more than half between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s.

Figure 3.3 Trends in Reported Battle Deaths from State-Based Armed Conflicts: East Asia versus the Rest of the World, 1946–2008



Data Sources: PRIO; UCDP/HSRP Dataset.[118]

East Asia accounts for the majority of the global battle-death toll for the period 1946 to 2008. However, for the last 30 years, East Asia has been much more peaceful.

Trends in Political Violence in Northeast and Southeast Asia, 1946–1979

Over the past 60 years, there has been a series of remarkable changes in the East Asian security landscape. From 1946 until the late-1970s, the number of conflicts in East Asia nearly doubled; over the next three decades they more than halved. There have also been significant changes in the predominant forms of conflict and the associated battle-death tolls as illustrated in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4 shows that the deadliest conflicts were concentrated in two periods. Between 1946 and 1954, the conflicts with the largest death tolls were the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), the anticolonial struggles in French Indochina (1946–1954),[119] and the Korean War (1950–1953).

Since the 1950s, there has been no more civil war in China, while the two Koreas, although remaining in a state of mutual hostility, have avoided further warfare. By the late 1950s, the wars associated with the ending of colonial rule—all of which were in Southeast Asia—were over. The anticolonial nationalists had prevailed, the colonial powers had largely withdrawn, and an important source of conflict and instability in the region had ceased to exist.[120]

The next period of high-fatality warfare was from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. Here most of the killing took place in Vietnam, where the US and its allies, including South Vietnam, were engaged in a bloody, but ultimately futile, war against North Vietnam and the revolutionary forces of the southern-based National Liberation Front, both of which were supported by Moscow and Beijing. More people were killed in this war than in any other during the entire post-World War II period.

The last major upsurge of fighting during this period was in 1979, the first year of a series of border clashes between China and Vietnam that lasted for most of the 1980s. Chinese forces had invaded Vietnam in response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime, which was a Chinese client state.

Each of the high-fatality conflicts in the region—the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, the war in French Indochina, and the Vietnam War—was characterized by a high level of foreign involvement, driven by the geopolitics of the Cold War. The Chinese, the Soviets, and the US (and sometimes its allies) committed either combat forces or massive military and economic assistance—or both. In each case the importation of large numbers of major conventional weapons—aircraft, tanks, long-range artillery, and sometimes combat forces—to the battlefield drove the death tolls up.

Figure 3.4 Trends in Reported Battle Deaths from State-Based Armed Conflicts in East Asia by Type, 1946–2008



Data Sources: PRIO; UCDP/HSRP Dataset.

Intrastate—or civil—conflicts have been the most numerous, and with the notable exception of the Chinese Civil war, the least deadly form of conflict in East Asia. Interstate conflicts have been the least frequent but the most deadly form of conflict. The Vietnamese struggle against the French was the most deadly anti-colonial conflict, the other extrastate conflicts in the region had many fewer causalities. Internationalized intrastate conflicts—civil conflicts in which armed forces of other states support one or more of the warring parties—have, like interstate and extrastate conflicts, disappeared from East Asia. They were at their deadliest in the 1960s and 1970s.

Note: Figure 3.4 is a "stacked graph," meaning that the number of battle deaths in each category is indicated by the depth of the band of colour. The top line shows the total number of battle deaths of all types in each year.

Ending Major Power Interventionism in East Asia

America's defeat in Vietnam had a deep impact on US security policy. The US military had won most of the battles it fought in Vietnam but lost the war because its political capability to continue fighting had been eroded by rising popular and elite opposition to the war at home. Unable politically to continue to wage war, America's vast military power became strategically irrelevant.

Vietnam demonstrated to Washington just how difficult it was to sustain public support for costly wars against distant enemies that posed no direct threat to the US. Even before the war was over, the Nixon Doctrine had signalled that the US would no longer provide combat forces for Vietnam-type conflicts.[121] In Richard Nixon's words, there would be "no more Vietnams."[122] Since 1975 the US has not intervened militarily with major conventional forces anywhere in East Asia.[123]

The Nixon Doctrine was not the only radical policy shift by a major power in the region. Although the Soviet Union had given military aid to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, its influence in East Asia, which was already weak, dwindled still further after the war ended. From the 1980s onwards, active conflicts in the region were concentrated in Southeast Asia where Moscow's influence was minimal.

The shift in China's regional policy was equally far-reaching—but more complicated. With the death of Mao Tse-tung, and under the leadership of the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping, Beijing had decisively downgraded, or completely ended, its remaining support to communist rebel groups in Southeast Asia.

There were several reasons for this major shift in policy.

First, China's policy of supporting revolutionary movements in the region was already failing. The rebel groups in Southeast Asia that Beijing had been assisting were weak and on the defensive, and Chinese enthusiasm for supporting them was waning in part for this reason. None had any realistic chance of prevailing.

And the domino theory propounded by US conservatives, which had predicted that victory for the communists in "Indochina" would lead other Southeast Asian countries to

succumb to communist-led rebellions, turned out to be hopelessly wrong.

Second, with the US defeat in Vietnam, China had much less reason to be concerned about US interventionism in its border regions.

Third, and most important, was the major shift in Chinese economic policy associated with the Four Modernizations program and driven by the pragmatic new leadership in Beijing that had taken power after Mao Tse-tung's death. Economic modernization required increased access to Western markets, investment, and technology, which in turn required good relations with both the West and other states in the region. The need to improve relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states provided further incentives for China to stop its support for rebel movements in Southeast Asia, a policy that had understandably angered governments in the subregion.[124]

Whatever weight is accorded to these different explanations, the results are not in doubt. By the early 1980s, China's policy of military interventionism had come to an end, with the exception of some relatively minor border clashes with Vietnam. In the last three decades, China has not launched a major military operation outside its borders, and Beijing has ceased to provide material support to rebel movements in the region, with the exception of its support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia that continued into the 1980s. Today China's economic power, and its willingness to use it for political ends, is a far more powerful source of leverage than its military power.

With the US defeat in Vietnam, China had less reason to be concerned about US interventionism in its border region.

The ending of major-power military interventionism in East Asia led to a steep reduction in the level of political violence in the region.

As Figure 3.4 clearly shows, the battle-death toll dropped sharply following the ending of the Vietnam War in 1975, and again after the 1979 border war between China and Vietnam. The change over a very short period of time was remarkable. There were close to 300,000 battle deaths in East Asia in the peak year of the Vietnam War in 1972. In 1980 there were some 20,000 battle deaths.

Figure 3.5 Trends in State-Based Armed Conflicts in East Asia by Type, 1946–2008



In East Asia, the wars of colonial independence were over by the early 1960s. The last two—comparatively minor—interstate conflicts ended in the 1980s. Internationalized intrastate conflicts came to an end in the early 1990s. For the last 18 years, all conflicts in the region have been intrastate conflicts, and all have taken place in Southeast Asia.

Note: Figure 3.5 is a "stacked graph," meaning that the number of conflicts in each category is indicated by the depth of the band of colour. The top line shows the total number of conflicts of all types in each year.

In 1978 there were 13 conflicts being waged in the region; by the mid-1990s, there were just five. The ending of the modest level of Chinese support for communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia played a minor role in this decline.[125]

A recent study by David Cunningham of civil wars between 1945 and 2004 found that conflicts in which there was external intervention lasted twice as long on average as those in which there was none.[126] Where rebel groups have relied on external support, and that support has been withdrawn, then—other things being equal—the military balance will shift in favour of the government forces and the rebels are likely to lose.

However, as we argue, the ending of external support for the communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia is not a sufficient explanation for the decline in armed conflict numbers in the subregion. With the exception of Vietnam and Cambodia, Chinese aid to fraternal parties in the 1970s had always been extremely modest. Furthermore, the communist insurgencies in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand were facing major challenges prior to China's decision to cease support.

Conflict in East Asia in the Post-Vietnam Era

With the exception of the brief engagements between China and Vietnam along Vietnam's northern border, all the conflicts that have been fought since the early 1980s have been in Southeast Asia. In 1980 there were nine intrastate conflicts in the subregion and one interstate conflict. The former included five conflicts in Burma, two in the Philippines, and one each in Thailand and Indonesia.

Figure 3.5 shows a few episodes of interstate armed conflict in the region continuing into the 1980s. Border clashes between China and Vietnam continued throughout the decade and there was a very brief low-level conflict between Thailand and Laos. The death tolls from these conflicts were so small compared with earlier wars that they are not even visible in Figure 3.4.

One internationalized intrastate conflict continued into the 1980s—that in Cambodia, where Vietnamese troops had maintained a considerable military presence since the late 1970s.

In 2008 there were just five ongoing conflicts in the region—less than half as many as in 1980. All were in Southeast Asia. Two were in Burma, still the poorest country in the subregion, two were located in impoverished rural areas of the Philippines, and there was one Muslim separatist conflict in southern Thailand. Islamist terrorism in Indonesia generated a great deal of media coverage but by early 2011 appears to have been largely contained.[127]

Explaining the Decline in Conflict Numbers

The end of major power interventions in East Asia provides the most compelling explanation for the dramatic drop in battle deaths in the region that started as the Vietnam War ended. As noted above, however, the end of intervention does not provide a compelling explanation for the decline in conflict numbers—the level of external Chinese support for the Southeast Asian insurgencies was simply too low.

What else might account for the 60 percent decline in conflict numbers from 1978 to the mid-1990s in Southeast Asia[128]—and for the absence of civil war in Northeast Asia during this period and subsequently?

An important part of the answer is to be found in the decades-long increase in economic development in most countries in the region.

As we noted earlier, the most robust finding in the statistical literature on the causes of war is that there is a close association between levels of economic development and the risk of armed conflict. As national per capita incomes rise, the risk of war declines. "Per capita income," James Fearon has noted, "is the single best predictor of a country's odds of civil war outbreak, empirically dominating other factors."[129]

Figure 3.6 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita and the Risk of Armed Conflict



Data Source: Macartan Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney.[130]

There is a strong association between levels of economic development and the risk of armed conflict: the poorer the country, the greater the risk.

The association between income and conflict risk is evident in Figure 3.6. Here we can see that the probability of succumbing to conflict within five years for countries with a per capita income of USD 250 is approximately 15 percent. For countries with a per capita income of some USD 5,000, the five-year risk is around 1 percent—a huge reduction. These

are average risks, of course. Individual countries will have different risk profiles.

The evidence from East Asia in the post-Vietnam War era appears to confirm this association. From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, average incomes in East Asia almost doubled, while conflict numbers more than halved, as Figure 3.7 indicates.

The claim that factors associated with rising incomes have caused conflict numbers to fall in East Asia confronts one obvious objection, however. Figure 3.7 clearly shows that from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, average incomes in the region had increased just as steadily as they had in the 1980s and beyond. Yet, conflict numbers did not decrease between the mid-1950s and the late 1970s, they doubled. If the peace-through-development thesis was correct, then we would expect conflict numbers to have declined in the earlier period as well as the latter.



Figure 3.7 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita and State-Based Armed Conflicts in East Asia, 1950–2008

Data Sources: UCDP/PRIO; Angus Maddison.[131]

Although incomes have been increasing in East Asia since the 1950s, conflict numbers did not start to decline until 1979. Prior to this, the security dynamics of the Cold War overwhelmed the conflict-reducing effects of rising incomes.

This is a valid point. It is in fact very difficult to determine the independent effect of development versus other factors in reducing the number and deadliness of conflicts in the region and—perhaps more importantly—in preventing completely new conflicts from starting.

The increase in conflict numbers in the earlier period was driven in part by the interventionist policies of the major powers and in part by the struggles for control over the post-colonial state in Southeast Asia. The conflict-reducing effects of rising incomes were likely present during this period, but they clearly were not strong enough to overcome the geopolitics of the Cold War and other dynamics that were driving the number, duration, and deadliness of conflicts upwards. When major power interventions ceased, the conflict-reducing impact of rising levels of economic development became apparent as conflict numbers began to fall and the number of new conflicts starting dropped sharply.

As noted previously, conflict numbers in the region had dropped from 13 in 1978 to five by the mid-1990s. We would also expect the effect of higher incomes to be reflected in an even greater reduction in civil war onsets. This is in fact what the data show. From 1951 to 1979, 12 new intrastate conflicts started; from 1980 to 2008, there were just three—a 75 percent reduction.

Why Rising Levels of Development Bring About Peace

Although there is a strong consensus in the research community that rising per capita incomes are associated with reduced risks of conflict, there is much less agreement as to why this should be the case. Income in itself is clearly not the driver—money is simply a medium of exchange. It is what is done with money, and the incentive structures that are associated with it, that matters. It is here that the disagreements lie.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that income levels are important because they determine the economic opportunity costs of joining a rebellion. When incomes are very low, the perceived benefits of joining a rebel group—especially for young unemployed males living on the edge of survival—may be high enough to outweigh the potential costs, which include getting captured, imprisoned, killed, or wounded.[132] The benefits of joining a rebel group include access to food, guns, excitement, comradeship, and the possibility of loot. As Collier puts it:

> Young men, who are the recruits for rebel armies, come pretty cheap in an environment of hopeless poverty. Life itself is cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these young men a small chance of riches.[133]

But as Chris Blattman has pointed out, while plausible and having some empirical support, as a universal proposition this argument is not very compelling: "The people who riot or rebel are poor, unemployed young men. We can see that. The problem is that the people who don't riot are also poor, unemployed young men."[134]

THE EAST ASIAN PEACE: DIFFERENT ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES

The East Asian civil peace has received relatively little attention in the scholarly community. What has been written has tended to focus on the abscence of international conflict in the region.

In the case of Northeast Asia, the focus of the scholarly work has primarily been the risk of interstate war. Realists have explained the absence of war in the subregion as resulting in large part from the deterrent effect of US forces in the region and the protective "nuclear umbrella" over Washington's allies in South Korea and Japan.[135]

Other researchers have pointed to increased elite interactions, and a related process of confidence-building among subregional powers, that are intended to reduce the risk of crises that escalate out of control.[136] The two explanations are complementary—deterrence strategies are not risk-free; confidence-building measures are designed in part to reduce the "security dilemma" risks associated with deterrence policies.[137]

A third—and related—theme in the literature on Northeast Asian security has been the question of whether or not China has become a status-quo power.[138] Here researchers, drawing on the liberal theories discussed in Chapter 1, have argued that as China has become more integrated into the global economy, it has gained a growing stake in the stability of the international system. This is evident in Beijing's growing and generally constructive involvement in multilateral fora, both at the regional and global level; in its aid and investment policies in the developing world; and in its growing participation in UN (United Nations) peace operations.

These developments support the contention that China is a status-quo military power with a vested interest in avoiding war.[139] Beijing can, of course, use its growing economic power as an instrument of political suasion and sometimes coercion. Indeed, the Chinese use their economic leverage to greater effect, over far greater distances, and at far less risk, than would be the case if they relied on coercive military power.

Analysts of security in Southeast Asia, by contrast, have focused on very different factors in explaining the 30-year absence of major interstate conflict in the subregion. Here the analysis has centred on the achievements of subregional institutions—notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and on what has become known as the "ASEAN Way"—in reducing the level of conflict in the subregion.[140]

In the early years of the Cold War, the Southeast Asian subregion was a collectivity of states afflicted by violent ethnic conflicts, anticolonial struggles, communist insurgencies, and bitter intraregional territorial disputes.[141]

The central elements of the ASEAN Way are a strong norm against interference in the affairs of other regional states, informal elite networking, and the promotion of habits of consultation, dialogue, and consensus-building. But ASEAN's focus has been primarily on reducing the risk of interstate conflicts. It has been difficult for the organization to address intrastate conflicts at the subregional level because of the norm against intervening in the domestic affairs of member states.

In both Northeast and Southeast Asia, increased levels of economic interdependence have been associated with steadily rising levels of economic development at the national level. Economic development has become a paramount national goal for regional states whose leaders share a common interest in avoiding anything that threatens the trade and investment relationships on which development depends.

A 2007 econometric study by Benjamin E. Goldsmith found that "the importance of economic interdependence for reducing conflict in Asia [is] robustly confirmed."[142]

Proponents of the democratic peace thesis also point to the dramatic, though far from complete, growth in the number of democracies throughout the region. This again is another development associated with reduced risks of armed conflict.

We certainly do not discount the importance of these approaches, but they apply primarily to interstate wars that effectively came to an end in the region three decades ago.[143] Our analysis focuses on the dramatic reduction in the deadliness of warfare in the region—which none of the above approaches attempts to explain—and on the role of economic development in driving intrastate conflict numbers downwards.

Moreover, rebels are not necessarily motivated by narrow material self-interest as the opportunity-costs argument suggests. Country case studies make it clear that ideology, deeply held grievances, and the altruistic desire to create a more just society have also been major factors driving recruitment in many rebellions.[144]

Most recent research has focused on income per capita as a proxy variable for various elements of state capacity that determines the feasibility of rebellion rather than on the opportunity costs for poor unemployed young men. Here the argument, in essence, is that more affluent states have the resources to crush rebel groups, buy off their leaders, and address the grievances of their supporters. Poor states, which lack these resources, find it far more difficult to deter or otherwise prevent wars, or to stop those that cannot be prevented.

The state-capacity argument gained a growing following after the publication of James Fearon and David Laitin's seminal "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War" article in the *American Political Science Review* in 2003.[145] A subsequent study by Fearon prepared for the World Bank's 2011 *World Development Report* tested the state capacity thesis directly by examining the association between the quality of governance measured by three separate datasets and the risk of conflict onsets. The tests revealed that the quality of governance was strongly associated with reduced risks of conflict onsets.[146]

> Case studies show that ideology and deeply held grievances have been factors driving recruitment in rebellions.

Fearon and Laitin do not disagree that the opportunity costs for joining a rebellion may be one determinant of civil war. But they argue that "economic variables such as per capita income matter primarily because they proxy for state administrative, military, and police capabilities."[147] Here the focus is not on the incentives and disincentives for individuals to join rebel groups but rather on state strength—the ability of governments to deter or otherwise prevent wars, and win those that cannot be prevented.

"Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War" stresses the critical role of the coercive capacity of the state in determining the probability of civil war. "Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency," the authors argue, "*are the government's police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas.*"[148]

Coercive state power reduces the feasibility of rebellion. If rebels are denied the opportunity to mount successful insurgencies, then addressing rebel motives—particularly grievances—becomes unnecessary.

In this context, it is interesting to note that neither Fearon and Laitin nor Collier and Hoeffler have had much to say about conflict resolution strategies. The logic of their position is clear enough. If grievances are not a major cause of conflict, as these authors have maintained, then addressing them will not prevent wars or stop those that cannot be prevented. We return to this contentious issue in Chapter 4.

Why State Capacity Matters

Although Fearon and Laitin stress the importance of coercive state capacities in deterring and defeating insurgencies, their own research findings suggest that other capacities may be as, or more, important.

The problem for governments that confront the small rural insurgencies that are typical of Southeast Asia today lies not with any inability to defeat rebel forces in battle—even the weakest state armies in Southeast Asia are capable of this—but in locating them.[149] As long as the insurgents remain relatively few in number, they can be hard to find while posing no threat to the state. Given that the insurgents are so difficult to locate, and given that they represent no serious threat to public order, let alone the security of the state, governments have few incentives to embark on difficult and costly campaigns to defeat them. The result is an uneasy strategic equilibrium that can last for years.[150] This in part explains why the decline in conflict numbers in Southeast Asia levelled out in the mid-1990s.

The fact that locating insurgents, rather than defeating them, is the critical strategic challenge suggests, as noted above, that the military capability of states may not be as important as Fearon and Laitin argue. In this context, Cullen Hendrix notes that "the state's ability to put boots and arms in the field" may matter less than its ability to collect and manage information.[151]

However, collecting and managing security information—intelligence in other words—is only one of the elements of state capacity that can be used to help prevent conflicts and bring those that cannot be prevented to an end. And this is where the argument about the security impact of rising incomes becomes most relevant.

Economic development increases state capacity via increased tax revenues. These in turn provide states with the political and economic resources to prevent rebellions—by buying off grievances or through political co-optation—and to

end militarly those conflicts that can be prevented. Increased tax revenues also, of course, allow for increased state military capacities.

When we look at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP's) conflict terminations data by region, we find that the greatest number of insurgent victories have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa—the poorest of the world's regions and the region with the least capable states. Here insurgents were successful in some 47 percent of cases where a civil war was ended in victory between 1980 and 2007.[152] In East Asia, a region of relatively high incomes and capable states, no government was defeated by insurgents during this period.

The evidence from East Asia also indicates that states that address the needs of their citizens acquire performance legitimacy.[153] This simply means that governments gain popular support because of their perceived ability to "deliver the goods"—whether in terms of creating opportunities for citizens to increase their personal incomes or via the provision of public goods.[154]

For most citizens in East Asia—a region with recent memories of devastating poverty and violent conflict—a critical determinant of performance legitimacy has been the effectiveness of the state in promoting economic development and social stability. In a review of the determinants of legitimacy in East Asia, Andrew Nathan notes, "public opinion studies suggest that perceived government performance affects legitimacy; regimes that deliver on issues that the public considers important gain support, and those that don't lose support."[155]

The dramatic increase in democratization across the region since the mid-1970s has also contributed to state legitimacy by giving citizens a voice in governance. The relationship between the level of democratization and regime support is neither consistent nor simple, however. Opinion surveys undertaken by Asian Barometer, for example, indicate that the decidedly undemocratic Chinese system of government has an extremely high level of citizen support. Here the success of the state in "delivering the goods" has clearly been important, but "traditional values"—notably respect for strong government —and the popular understanding of democracy in China have also played a role.[156]

The evidence suggests that legitimacy, however acquired, makes a very real difference—not only in reducing the risk of wars starting but in determining the outcomes of ongoing conflicts.

A recent RAND Corporation report found that governments that were popular with their citizens were highly unlikely to be defeated by insurgencies. Indeed, in the 73 conflict terminations studied by RAND, only one government that had high levels of public support was defeated; 22 governments with low levels of public support were overthrown.[157] Where insurgents had a high level of support, governments were victorious in only two instances, insurgents in 10.[158]

Since rebel groups, as noted earlier, are generally excluded from the benefits of economic development, the rising national incomes that have been witnessed in most regions of the world over the past two decades should mean—other things being equal—that the balance of resources relevant to winning insurgencies is shifting in favour of governments.[159] But this assumption is at odds with the findings of two major studies on conflict outcomes, both of which offer compelling, though very different, accounts of how and why the weak may, under certain circumstances, defeat the strong.

Are Insurgents Really Winning More Wars Than Governments Are?

In a study published in *International Organization* in 2009, Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson argue that there has been a systematic decline in the percentage of conflicts won by incumbent governments over the past 200 years.[160] They found that between 1851 and 1875, incumbents defeated insurgents more than 90 percent of the time. Their data indicate that since then, the share of wars in which incumbent governments have been victorious has steadily declined. Between 1951 and 1975, they find that incumbents were victorious in slightly less than 40 percent of conflicts; between 1976 and 2005, this figure had dropped to less than 25 percent.[161]

In a 2001 article in the leading strategic studies journal *International Security*, Ivan Arreguin-Toft makes a similar argument—although his focus is not exclusively on incumbent regimes versus insurgents but on "strong" versus "weak" actors. A *strong* actor is one whose material power exceeds that of its adversary by at least 10:1.[162] Since the material power of most governments is far greater than that of their non-state adversaries, we would expect Arreguin-Toft's findings to be similar to Lyall and Wilson's.[163] This is in fact the case. Arreguin-Toft's study of asymmetric conflicts found that in the first half of the nineteenth century, strong actors won 88 percent of the time. Between 1950 and 1998, however, strong actors won only 45 percent of the time.[164]

Our concern is not with the pre-World War II era, however, but the 1946 to 2007 period. The conflict termination data produced by UCDP reveal a very different picture from that depicted by Lyall and Wilson and Arreguin-Toft. UCDP's data, which cover the period from 1946 to 2007, indicate that

EAST ASIA'S DEADLIEST CONFLICTS

Just four conflicts—the Chinese Civil War, Vietnam's war of independence against the French, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War—are responsible for the overwhelming majority of battle deaths in East Asia between the end of World War II and 2008. Each war was characterized by major power intervention and motivated in large part by the perceived geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War. In all four conflicts, many more lives were lost to war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition.

After the US withdrew from Vietnam in 1975, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was over, major power interventions in the region effectively ceased and subsequent wars were dramatically less deadly.

The Chinese Civil War (1946–1949)

The last phase of the Chinese Civil War can be considered the first proxy war of the Cold War period. Both superpowers had a security interest in the outcome of a conflict that was perceived to be part of a larger geopolitical struggle between the East and West. The US provided massive military and economic aid, plus direct logistics support—largely via air transport—to the anti-communist Kuomintang. The Soviet Union supported Mao Tse-tung's communists.

The external supply of heavy weapons to both the Kuomintang and Mao's forces amplified the destructive capabilities of the huge armies that each deployed and greatly increased the material destruction and human costs of the fighting. The final phases of the civil war involved conventional battlefield formations with large infantry armies supported by tanks, artillery, and aircraft—a far deadlier mode of combat than the rural guerrilla strategy that Mao's army had originally relied on.

The estimated overall battle-death toll from 1946 to the Communist victory in 1949 was some 1.2 million.[165]

Vietnam's War of Independence (1946–1954)

By far the deadliest of the anticolonial struggles in Southeast Asia was that in Vietnam between French forces and the communist-led Viet Minh nationalists.[166]

What had started in 1946 as a relatively low-level guerrilla campaign against a colonial power had by the early 1950s become a major Cold War proxy conflict.

Deeply alarmed by the Communist victory in China in 1949, the US had started actively supporting the French in 1950. Washington's aim was not to support French colonialism per se, but to prevent a second major communist victory in Asia. By 1954 Washington was paying 80 percent of the cost of the French war effort.[167] The Viet Minh in turn had received the bulk of their weapons systems and ammunition from China, plus further assistance from the Soviet Union.[168] The mass importation and use of major conventional weapons systems was the major driver of a death toll estimated at 365,000—a figure that dwarfed that of the other anticolonial conflicts in the region.[169]

In 1954 the French were defeated in the war's last and most decisive battle—at Dien Bien Phu. Although only one-tenth of the French forces in Indochina were involved in this battle, and notwithstanding the fact that far more Viet Minh soldiers died in the battle than French, the impact of the defeat on France was devastating.

The Viet Minh had fought a highly successful war of psychological attrition whose strategic goal was to progressively undermine France's political capability—"will" in the language of classical strategy—to wage war. Attacking French forces was a means to that end, not an end in itself.

The Korean War (1950–1953)

The Korean War, which had its genesis in the division of the Korean peninsula at the end of World War II, also became a Cold War proxy war. After the North Koreans invaded the South across the 38th parallel in June 1950, the US entered the war, leading what was nominally a multi-nation UN (United Nations) operation.

The Soviet-trained North Korean Army received military and other assistance from China as well as the Soviet Union during the war, with Chinese and Soviet pilots flying combat missions against US aircraft over the North.[170] In October 1950, as US forces pushed north towards the border with China, Chinese combat forces,

an estimated 300,000 in all, crossed the Yalu and joined the fighting.[171] Some 425,000 troops fought under the UN flag, including approximately 178,000 Americans.[172] Overall, the communist side had well in excess of a million men under arms.

Once again the predictable effect of bringing tens of thousands of foreign troops and the transfer of huge numbers of major conventional weapons into the Korean theatre was a rapid escalation in the battle-death toll. Although estimates of the overall casualties vary, a thorough review of the sources suggests that the conflict resulted in around 1 million battle deaths.[173]

The Vietnam War (1965–1975)

Although most accounts of the US war in Vietnam focus on the period from 1965 to 1975, Washington's political and military involvement in South Vietnam had started much earlier. In 1955 a "US Military Assistance Advisor Group" took over responsibility for training South Vietnamese forces from the French.[174] In 1957 a new guerrilla insurgency started in the South, supported by the North.

America's military involvement in South Vietnam steadily increased in the early 1960s. By the end of 1963, there were some 16,000 US military "advisors" in the South. In March 1965 the first official combat troops arrived in Saigon. Over the next four years, US troop numbers climbed steadily, reaching a peak of 543,000 in April 1969, by which time more than 33,000 Americans had already been killed.[175] Political opposition to the war at home increased as the US body count rose.

In January 1969 peace talks began in Paris and the US started withdrawing its forces as part of a doomed "Vietnamization" plan to make Saigon take responsibility for running a war the US could not win. In January 1973 the Paris Peace Accords were signed, officially ending the war. Two months later the last American troops left Vietnam.

In early 1975 North Vietnam, assured of victory now that US troops had been withdrawn and the US Congress had banned any further US military involvement in Vietnam, stepped up its efforts to conquer the South.

On 29 April 1975, as the North Vietnamese army began its final assault on Saigon, the US was forced to mount a humiliating last-minute air evacuation of its remaining personnel and some South Vietnamese who had worked with the US.[176]

The estimated battle-death toll in the Vietnam War of more than 1.6 million—the largest of any war in the post-World War II period—was driven on the US side by a decade of sustained use of huge numbers of imported heavy conventional weapons that included bombers, tanks, long-range artillery, and rockets.

North Vietnam received massive supplies of similar matériel from Russia and China. The fact that the bombing tonnage dropped by US aircraft during the war was far greater than the total tonnage dropped by the US in all theatres of the war in World War II was indicative of the scale of the destruction.[177]

The impact of the war on the US military was significant. By war's end almost 3 million Americans had served in Vietnam, some 58,000 were dead—more than in Korea—and 150,000 had been seriously injured.[178]

The lesson US military leaders drew from their Vietnam experience was that fighting wars against foes that pose no direct military threat to the US, but generate large numbers of American fatalities, will inevitably lose elite and public support in the US and thus become unwinnable.

The Vietnam War was the last US military intervention in Southeast Asia.

After Vietnam

After the US quit Vietnam in 1975, and the short-lived Chinese border war with Vietnam came to an end in 1979, there was a dramatic change in the regional security climate. Major power interventions in the region effectively ceased. Northeast Asia has been essentially conflict-free ever since—apart from minor border clashes between Vietnam and China in the 1980s.

The armed conflicts that remain are relatively minor rural insurgencies in Southeast Asia that are being fought mostly with small arms and light weapons. The rebel groups involved in these conflicts have few sources of external support and the fighting tends to be sporadic and results in low battle-death tolls. In none of these conflicts do the rebels pose a serious threat to incumbent governments.

governments prevailed over surgents in some 67 percent of the civil conflicts that ended in formal victories.[179]

However, UCDP's stringent coding rules mean that the true extent of government victories is underestimated. A conflict termination is only coded as a victory if one warring party is "either defeated or eliminated, or otherwise succumbs to the power of the other through capitulation or public announcement."[180] But in many cases insurgents simply give up, stop fighting, and merge quietly back into civil society without being militarily defeated. These terminations are not counted as formal victories, but they are clearly de facto wins for the government.[181] It follows that the actual share of government wins from 1946 to 2007 should be even larger than the 67 percent that comes from counting formal victories alone.

While UCDP's coding rules tend to underestimate the number of actual government victories, the coding rules that Lyall and Wilson, and Arreguin-Toft rely on considerably overestimate rebel victories—at least for the post-World War II period that is the focus of this chapter.

Lyall and Wilson count draws (which include peace settlements) as incumbent losses. But while it is true that peace agreements invariably involve concessions by the incumbent government, this does not mean the incumbent has been defeated—defeat would mean that the insurgents had seized power and had become the government. Draws, however defined, do not lead to a change of government and, given this, it is quite unclear why they should normally be considered insurgent victories. (The only exception is found with secessionist conflicts. Here of course rebels can gain independence—a form of victory—without the incumbent government being displaced. But secessionist victories are extraordinarily rare.)

Arreguin-Toft's coding rules overestimate weak actor victories to an even greater degree. Like Lyall and Wilson, he not only counts stalemates (draws) as strong actor defeats, but he also assumes that all ongoing conflicts are also defeats for the strong actors.

There is little evidence to support this latter assumption. The UCDP terminations data indicate that government losses to insurgents account for only 9 percent of all conflict terminations in the post-1946 period. We have no reason to believe that this share will grow dramatically when the conflicts being waged today come to an end. There is, in other words, no good reason to count ongoing wars as rebel victories.

The findings of these two studies, and our analysis of UCDP's terminations data, have important, but very different, security implications. If Lyall and Wilson and Arreguin-Toft are correct and insurgents are winning most wars today, there may well be an emulation effect, with insurgent victories in one country encouraging further insurgencies elsewhere. There is ample evidence in the recent historical record to indicate that rebel success in one country tends to be emulated in other countries.[182]

If, on the other hand, the analysis based on the UCDP terminations data is correct, as we believe is the case, the historical evidence suggests that the high percentage of government victories may over time deter would-be rebels from starting new insurgencies. Since the end of World War II, failed insurgent strategies have tended to discourage emulation elsewhere—the failure of the Che Guevara-inspired guerrilla *foco* strategy in Latin America, and the weak and abortive neo-Marxist "urban guerrilla" campaigns in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s being cases in point.

Wars Without End?

As noted previously, East Asia has seen only three new intrastate conflicts in the last three decades. However, when we look at the number of conflicts that stop and then start again, a rather different picture emerges. No fewer than 22 of the 25 conflicts that started between 1980 and 2008 were reoccurrences.

What explains this pattern of conflict recurrence? There are several possible explanations, some general and some specific to the region:

- Armed conflicts tend to exacerbate the conditions that caused them in the first place, while the experience of war tends to heighten hostility between the warring parties.
- Insurgent groups may stop fighting for a period for purely tactical reasons—typically in order to regroup and rebuild the resources needed to continue the armed struggle more effectively at a later date.
- Many of the conflicts that have recurred in Southeast Asia have very low annual battle-death tolls. This means that small increases or decreases in fatalities can easily cause overall battle-death numbers to move above or below the 25-battle-deaths-per-year threshold that determines whether or not a conflict is recorded. When this happens, we see a pattern of conflict episodes formally stopping and then starting again but with very little real change on the ground.

But perhaps the most persuasive reason for the recurrence of these minor conflicts is that while insurgents lack the power to defeat governments, governments often lack strong incentives to defeat the insurgents.

IS REPRESSION AN EFFECTIVE TOOL OF COUNTERINSURGENCY?

Writing in *Harper's Magazine* in February 2007, Edward Luttwak outlined what he called an "easy and reliable way of defeating all insurgencies everywhere."[183] All that is needed, he argued, is to "out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the [citizens'] desire to help the insurgents."[184]

The target of Luttwak's critique was the assumption—one that is central to the current US counterinsurgency doctrine—that government forces need to have popular support in order to defeat insurgents.[185]

Not so, says Luttwak, pointing out that for centuries rebels have been defeated by the use of violent repression. The repression often takes the form of barbaric collective punishments imposed on civilians in order to deter them from supporting the insurgents.

Counterinsurgent forces, according to this thesis, need obedience—not support—from the population in order to quell rebellions. And obedience can be coerced by resort to lethal violence.

Luttwak argues that willingness to use large-scale violent repression enabled the rulers of the Roman and Ottoman empires, and the Nazis, to control vast expanses of territory with minimal manpower:

> Terrible reprisals to deter any form of resistance were standard operating procedure for the German armed forces in the Second World War, and very effective they were in containing resistance with very few troops.[186]

It is far from clear, however, that "out-terrorizing the insurgents" was ever as effective as Professor Luttwak claims, not least because tactics that work in the short term are often counterproductive in the long term.[187]

During the Algerian war of independence, for example, France used brutal collective punishment tactics and widespread torture to successfully quell the armed nationalist resistance. But the tactics that the French military used were so barbaric that they caused widespread revulsion in metropolitan France where the political mood shifted in favour of withdrawal.

In July 1962, little more than two years after the rebel organization had been decisively crushed by the French military, Algeria gained its independence.

The French military had won an inglorious battle but had lost the war.

In April 2007 David Kilcullen, former counterinsurgency advisor to US General David Petraeus, challenged the core assumption of Luttwak's thesis: "The Nazis, Syrians, Taliban, Iranians, Saddam Hussein and others," he argued, "all tried brutalizing the population, and the evidence is that this simply does not work in the long term."

This was certainly true of the Roman, Ottoman, and Nazi empires, all of which collapsed despite—some would argue because of—their reliance on Luttwak's "easy and reliable way of defeating all insurgencies everywhere."

The case-study evidence from recent counterinsurgency campaigns supports Kilcullen's view. A new RAND Corporation report on the effectiveness of COIN (counterinsurgency) strategies based on 30 in-depth case histories found that:

> While some repressive COIN forces have managed to prevail, this analysis shows unambiguously that repression is a bad COIN practice. Only two of eight COIN winners used repression, and they still employed a pack of good COIN practices … Repression does win phases, but, in our data, the vast majority of phases won with repression preceded ultimate defeat.[188]

In a sense this is not surprising. Attempting to crush rebellions via large-scale indiscriminate and violent repression may sometimes stop armed rebellion in the short term, but will exacerbate the grievances that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. Repression is conducive neither to long-term stability nor to conflict resolution.

The evidence indicates moreover that states have been killing fewer civilians since the late 1990s.[189] Massive repression thus appears to be ineffective, except in the short term. It is also decreasingly common—and thus of shrinking strategic relevance in the late 1990s.

As noted earlier, small insurgent groups, often operating in remote areas, are very difficult to defeat. This is not because they are militarily powerful—they are not—but because they are often extremely difficult to locate. But while the fact that most insurgent bands are so small makes them difficult to find, it also ensures they can pose no military threat to the state.

Since these insurgent bands pose no real threat to the state, and little threat to public security more generally, governments may well choose to focus on containment rather than the costly campaigns needed to defeat them.[190]

Conclusion

Our examination of conflict trends in East Asia since World War II focused on the impact of major power interventions in the region, and on the impact of rising levels of economic development on the risk of war. We argued that the dramatic decline in the number of people killed in conflicts in the region since the mid-1970s was caused by the ending of major power interventions (indirect as well as direct) in regional conflicts.

On the other hand, the steady increase in levels of economic development across East Asia over the past 30 years, particularly in Southeast Asia, has enhanced the financial, political, administrative, and military capacities of governments relative to those of rural guerrilla organizations that typically operate outside the mainstream economy in remote, poverty-stricken rural areas.

As state incomes rise, other things being equal, governments will have more political and economic resources to prevent conflicts, buy off grievances, and co-opt adversaries, and more capable military forces to deter them. In the wars that cannot be prevented, the shift in the relative balance of resources that determines who will prevail in civil wars will also tend to favour governments.

Rising levels of economic development—and hence personal incomes—plus the remarkable increase in levels of democratization across the region has also enhanced the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of their citizens, reducing the incentives for individuals to join rebellions in the first place.

The evidence from East Asia supports the thesis that development is an important long-term force of conflict prevention. As we pointed out previously, the number of new intrastate conflicts between 1980 and 2008 was 75 percent less than in the previous 30-odd years.

The increased levels of trade and FDI in East Asia, which are both cause and effect of rising levels of economic development, have increased the level of regional economic interdependence. Economic interdependence is in turn associated with reduced risks of interstate warfare—as are increased levels of inclusive democracy.

The region has been free of interstate war for some 20 years.

The East Asian experience has interesting implications for the future of global security. According to the World Bank, per capita income has been growing in all regions of the world in recent years, in some more strongly than in others. Even the UN's (United Nation's) "least-developed" countries have on average experienced steady economic growth over the past decade.[191]

> The dramatic decline in the number of people killed in conflicts is a result of the ending of major power interventions.

Across the developing world, growth rates, savings rates, and government reserves are up; inflation is down; remittances are increasing (and now exceed economic aid); and the share of global trade accruing to developing countries is rising.[192] The expectation is that per capita incomes across most of the developing world will continue to grow notwithstanding the impact of the current economic crisis. If this assessment is correct, it follows that, other things being equal, future governments in poor countries will—in general—become more capable of preventing, deterring, co-opting and defeating insurgencies, while citizens will have fewer reasons to join them. This should mean fewer wars.[193]

We stress here that we are talking about long-term trends and about the factors that reduce the probability of conflict. In the future, as in the past, the risk of conflict may increase in response to new sources of instability that are more powerful than the conflict-risk-reducing impact of increased levels of development.

In Chapter 4 our focus shifts back to the global level and to the causes of the sharp worldwide decline in intrastate conflict numbers since the end of the Cold War. Here we argue that the principal factor driving this decline has less to do with rising levels of economic development than with the dramatic upsurge of international activism, spearheaded by the UN and devoted to *peacemaking*—policies directed at stopping ongoing wars—and to *post-conflict peacebuilding*—policies whose strategic purpose is to prevent wars that have stopped from starting again.

Jacob Silberberg / Panos Pictures. HAITI.

CHAPTER 4

Explaining the Global Decline in Civil Wars

In this chapter we analyze the post-Cold War decline in intrastate conflict numbers that we described in the *Human Security Report 2005*. We advance two main explanations for this remarkable change.

The first examines the direct political impact of the end of the Cold War—an epochal change that removed a major source of conflict from the international system and helped end superpower proxy wars around the world. However, the net impact of this change on conflict numbers is difficult to determine because the end of the Cold War not only brought existing conflicts to an end but also triggered new ones.

Moreover, as we explain later, while of obvious historical importance, the direct impact of the end of the Cold War has diminished over time.

The second explanation for the decline in conflict numbers since the early 1990s focuses on the indirect effects of the ending of East-West hostilities. Here the key factor was the liberation of the UN (United Nations) from the paralyzing rivalries of Cold War politics. This change permitted the organization to spearhead an upsurge of international efforts to end wars via mediated settlements and seek to prevent those that had ended from restarting again.

As international initiatives soared—often fivefold or more—conflict numbers shrank. Indeed, high-intensity conflicts declined by some 80 percent between 1991 and 2008.

As noted in previous chapters, one of the most robust findings from quantitative research is that as national incomes—and hence state capacity—rise, the risk of new conflict onsets falls. The evidence also indicates that rising incomes are associated with shorter wars.[194] Given that average per capita incomes across the developing world—where most wars take place—have risen by some 40 percent since the end of the Cold War, we ask if these effects can help explain the decline in conflict numbers.

We also review three shifts in global norms that have driven:

- A dramatic increase in the number of democracies since the end of the Cold War.
- A growing rejection of the culture of impunity that protected gross abusers of human rights during the Cold War years.
- A sharp decline in the level of political discrimination against minority groups.

Each of these changes has made a contribution to reducing the number of conflicts; however, as we explain, determining their separate impact is very difficult.

The End of the Cold War

The worldwide decline in political violence that followed the end of the Cold War has been the subject of surprisingly little research. Not a single book or monograph—and only a handful of articles—has sought to explain it. The causes of peace, as we noted earlier, appear to interest scholars much less than the causes of war.

The starting point for our analysis is the end of the Cold War itself and its impact on the incidence of civil wars. This momentous, though largely unpredicted, event directly caused, or indirectly catalyzed, a series of changes that have had a major impact on global security.

By the end of the 1980s, the ideological confrontation that had divided the world into two hostile camps for some 40 years, and that had been a political force fuelling both international and civil wars, simply disappeared. The security significance of this change was profound. The geopolitics of the Cold War and the support that warring parties in so-called proxy wars received from one or other superpower had lengthened many civil wars and in some cases prevented their resolution.[195] Indeed, according to one study, conflicts that had a clear Cold War ideological dimension and received superpower support lasted three times longer than conflicts where this was not the case.[196]

> The end of the Cold War set in motion changes that caused new conflicts.

There is no doubt that the ending of East-West ideological hostility removed an important driver of armed conflict from the international system. It also stopped the flow of resources from Washington, Moscow, and their allies, to warring parties in proxy wars across the developing world. For both superpowers, the assistance went beyond the provision of weapons to include education, indoctrination, training, on-the-ground advisors, and sometimes troops.[197] The ending of this assistance, together with the delegitimization of the communist model in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, argues Ann Hironaka, "led to the end of nearly all the large-scale communist insurgencies in the world."[198]

But determining the extent to which these changes impacted the decline in armed conflict numbers in the 1990s is far from simple.

There is no dispute that the withdrawal of superpower support from clients in some proxy wars accelerated the ending of a number of conflicts—including those in Mozambique, Guatemala, El Salvador, Yemen, and Ethiopia. But the loss of external support was rarely a sufficient condition for peace, not least because the level of support was often minimal.

Take the case of the civil war in El Salvador. The end of the Cold War, and the withdrawal of the relatively modest level of Soviet and Cuban support for the rebels, meant that the US no longer had a major strategic interest in the outcome of the conflict or in continuing to provide political and military support to a regime that had an appalling human rights record.

But while the ending of superpower rivalry ensured that neither Washington nor Moscow was opposed to a negotiated settlement, neither was actively involved in promoting an agreement. The 1992 settlement was primarily a result of the unprecedented role the UN played in mediating the peace negotiations, verifying the terms of the agreement, and coordinating the subsequent post-conflict peacebuilding phase.[199] In other words, while the ending of East-West hostility may have been a necessary condition for peace in El Salvador, it was certainly not a sufficient one.

There are other reasons for being skeptical about claims that the end of the Cold War was the primary cause for the reduction of conflict numbers in the 1990s:

- While the direct impact of the end of the Cold War clearly helped bring some conflicts to an end, it also set in motion political changes that caused new conflicts to erupt—particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The big increase in conflict onsets in the 1990s was also related to the political events unleashed by the withdrawal of superpower assistance to governments in the developing world. In other words, the direct impact of the end of the Cold War had the effect of both decreasing and increasing the number of conflicts. Determining the net effect of these changes would require a detailed analysis of individual cases that is beyond the scope of this *Report*.
- Some conflicts had never been affected by Cold War politics and in these cases the ending of Cold War hostilities was irrelevant. Examples include the conflict in Northern Ireland and the Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict in Bangladesh.
- There were some proxy wars where the warring parties had been affected by the cut-off of superpower support but where the fighting did not stop because other sources of support became available. In the case of Angola, for example, the regime had been supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba; the rebels by the US and South Africa. When the Cold War ended, most of the external support dried up, but the regime was able to rely on oil revenues to fund its war effort, while the rebels generated income from illicit diamond mining. The point here is that warring parties sometimes had domestic sources of revenue that could compensate for the loss of external support. For governments, these included oil and other economic rents, plus taxation. For rebel groups, possible revenue

sources included "taxation" of local peasants, extortion of foreign companies, and control over illicit drug and gemstone production.

- Lastly, there have been a handful of communist rebel organizations—notably the Maoist-oriented Naxalite movement in India and the New People's Army in the Philippines—that fought their respective governments during the Cold War years and continue to do so today. These radical groups were influenced by Cold War politics, but they were never dependent on external aid from either the Soviet Union or China, so the end of the Cold War had no impact on their material ability to continue to wage war.

So, while the direct effect of the end of the Cold War certainly hastened the ending of a number of proxy wars, it alone cannot explain the decline in conflict numbers. And because it was a one-off event, its direct effects have diminished over time.

On the other hand, the indirect effects of the end of the Cold War—in particular the dramatically increased international commitment to peacemaking and peacebuilding—are even more salient today than in the 1990s.

An Explosion of International Activism

Since the end of the Cold War, the increase in the level of international activism aimed at reducing the incidence of political violence around the world has been astonishing. Importantly, the end of the Cold War transformed the UN. No longer paralyzed by the rivalries of the Cold War, the organization spearheaded an extraordinary upsurge of international activism directed at *peacemaking*—i.e., stopping ongoing wars—and *post-conflict peacebuilding*—i.e., preventing those that had stopped from starting again.

Despite the UN's many flaws, its universal membership and its Charter gave it a unique and legitimate leadership role in addressing a number of the global security challenges that emerged in the years that followed the end of the Cold War. But the UN did not act alone. Donor states, other international agencies, national governments in war-affected countries, and literally thousands of international and national NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) not only supported the UN's efforts but played important peacemaking and peacebuilding roles on their own.

The increases in peacemaking and peacebuilding-related activities include the following:

- A fivefold increase in the number of diplomatic interventions intended to bring armed conflicts to a negotiated settlement in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.
- From 1991 to 2007, a tenfold increase in the number of Friends of the Secretary-General, Contact Groups, and other political arrangements that support peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.
- From 1987 to 1994, a more than threefold increase in the number of UN peace operations.
- From 1989 to 2007, a more than twofold increase in the number of countries contributing troops to UN peace operations.
- A ninefold increase in the number of post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs from 1989 to 2008.
- A thirteenfold increase in the number of multilateral sanctions regimes between 1991 and 2008.

In some important areas—notably preventive diplomacy—we still lack reliable trend data.

It is not possible to determine which of these security-related initiatives has had the greatest overall effect—and of course the impact of different policies will vary from conflict to conflict. Multivariate regression analysis could, in principle, determine the average impact of different initiatives, but no such analysis has yet been attempted. Researchers undertaking such an exercise would confront formidable methodological challenges. Furthermore, assessments of success depend very much on the criteria used to determine it. These criteria can differ substantially and the higher the bar for success, the lower will be the success rate.

Because the end of the Cold War was a one-off event, its direct effects have diminished over time.

The fact that the number of peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives has increased while the number of conflicts has decreased does not, of course, mean that the former necessarily caused the latter. The case that peacemaking and peacebuilding reduce the incidence of armed conflict is, however, supported, not only by the statistical data but also by many individual case studies—and by the absence of compelling alternative explanations for the decline.

In the following sections we examine the impact of:

- Preventive diplomacy initiatives.
- Peacemaking initiatives.
- Peacekeeping operations, including DDR programs.
- Sanctions regimes.

THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF THE DECLINE OF WAR THESIS

In May 2008 Columbia University's Jack Snyder, a leading realist scholar, offered a skeptical assessment of what he described as "the end of war" thesis associated with the sharp decline in conflict numbers in the post-Cold War period.

Snyder argued that:

- It is inappropriate to extrapolate from short-term trends.
- The battle-death data that have been used to demonstrate that the deadliness of war is declining ignore *one-sided violence*—the intentional killing of civilians by governments and non-state armed groups.
- The battle-death data ignore the phenomenon of *indirect deaths*—i.e., fatalities from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition.[200]

These are important arguments, but they do not detract from the case being argued in this *Report*.

First, we agree that it would be inappropriate to draw strong conclusions from conflict data for a short period—e.g., less than a decade. However, as noted elsewhere in this *Report*, the number of high-intensity conflicts has dropped by nearly 80 percent over a period of some 20 years. There was nothing remotely comparable to this decline during the Cold War years. Moreover, as we have argued in this chapter, the change is clearly related to forces unleashed by the ending of the Cold War and is unlikely to be reversed.

Second, it is quite true that the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) battle-death data do not include deaths from the targeted killing of civilians in wars. UCDP does, however, collect these data separately and makes them publicly available.

But the numbers killed by one-sided violence are relatively small compared with battle deaths and, for the period for which we have data, make little difference to the overall trends.[201] And notwithstanding many unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, there is no reliable evidence to support the suggestion that civilian deaths as a share of all war deaths have been increasing.[202]

Third, it is also true that indirect deaths from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition are not included in the UCDP/PRIO battle-death counts and that the latter on their own provide an inadequate measure of the true human costs of war. We made precisely this point in the *Human Security Report 2005*.

But, contrary to Snyder, we do not believe that if the estimates of indirect death tolls were added to battle-death tolls (assuming that this were in fact possible) "the trend away from war would not look so compelling."

In fact, as we argue in Part II of this *Report*, indirect deaths have very likely declined more than battle deaths since 1946.

In his critique of "the end of war" thesis, Professor Snyder also touches on the state-capacity thesis associated with the work of James Fearon and David Laitin. This holds that as state capacity increases, the risk of war declines because states have more resources to buy off grievances and crush rebellions where negotiations fail or are impractical.[203]

Snyder accepts that there is a historical trend towards higher levels of state capacity, and that increased state capacity is associated with declining risks of conflict. But he argues that per capita economic growth—the most common proxy measure for increased state capacity—"is at best shaky in Africa, where much of the fighting has been."[204]

In fact, economic growth in Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s was worse than shaky—between 1985 and 1995, average GDP (gross domestic product) per capita in sub-Saharan Africa shrank by 1.1 percent a year.[205] But there has been a radical change since then. As a recent McKinsey and Company report noted, "real GDP rose 4.9 percent per year from 2000 through 2008, more than twice its pace in the 1980s and '90s."[206] And between 1999 and 2008, conflict numbers in the region declined by some 30 percent.[207]

Finally, we agree with Snyder that it makes little sense to claim that "war will go away soon." And indeed we do not know any scholars who make this case.[208]

The conditions that give rise to civil wars have changed, but certainly not enough to suggest that political violence is likely to end in the foreseeable future.

Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy was defined in former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's influential 1992 *Agenda for Peace* report as involving "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, [and] to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts."[209]

Preventive diplomacy initiatives can include mediation; dispute resolution mechanisms; "good offices"; political assistance; diplomatic recognition or normalization; fact-finding and observer missions; public diplomacy or pressure; and the threat, or use, of diplomatic sanctions.[210] And, as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has pointed out:

> [preventive diplomacy is a] core function of the United Nations and is central to the Secretary-General's role. The prevention of violent conflict is key to the Organization's Charter obligations to maintain international peace and security.[211]

There is, moreover, widespread agreement in the international community that "prevention is better than cure," that preventive diplomacy is highly cost-effective, and that failing to prevent wars creates "conflict traps" in poor countries that generate recurring warfare—and huge human and financial costs.[212]

Yet, despite what US Institute of Peace analyst Lawrence Woocher has described as "quite dramatic advances in rhetorical and declaratory support for conflict prevention" in recent decades, preventive diplomacy has been more talked about than practiced.

In November 2007 Ban Ki-Moon reported to the General Assembly that the UN's Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was so overstretched that there was "little time for the Department's officers to carry out the practice of preventive diplomacy or provide oversight to United Nations missions."[213]

This was a remarkable admission. The central mandate of the UN is to prevent the "scourge of war," yet here was a Secretary-General telling UN member states that the UN department with the primary responsibility for preventive diplomacy lacked the resources to undertake it.

Given that DPA has lacked the most basic resources that it needs to practice preventive diplomacy, it is unsurprising that this policy instrument is rarely practiced at the UN. However, DPA officers are not the only preventive diplomacy actors associated with the organization. In addition to the Secretary-General himself, there is a small army of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) who have a range of important security roles in crisis-affected countries that can include preventive diplomacy. The number of SRSGs has increased more than fourfold since the end of the Cold War.[214] Few of them appear to have been involved in preventive diplomacy missions, however.

Nor is there any evidence that preventive diplomacy has been part of the agenda of the Friends of the Secretary-General, Contact Groups, and other informal groupings of states that have emerged to help end civil wars and to prevent wars that have ended from starting again.[215]

Perhaps the best evidence we have that preventive diplomacy missions are rarely attempted—or, if attempted, are ineffectual—comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP's) conflict onset and terminations data. As discussed in more detail in Part III of this *Report*, there were twice as many conflict onsets in the 1990s as in the 1980s. Many of these were restarts of older conflicts, but the number of completely new conflicts nearly doubled as well. The implications are obvious. If preventive diplomacy initiatives were being attempted in the chaotic 1990s, they were clearly not very successful. But there is little evidence to suggest that many such initiatives were in fact being attempted during this period.

Given the near-universal agreement that prevention is valuable and cost-effective, and given the repeated rhetorical endorsements of the virtues of preventive diplomacy, why has it been practiced so rarely—not least by the UN?

There are several reasons. First, the top priority of the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General, and DPA is always going to be crisis management, not conflict prevention. This is a matter of necessity, not choice. Neither the Security Council, nor the Secretary-General, nor DPA has any realistic option but to respond to crises. As a 2006 Secretary-General's report on conflict prevention noted, DPA's resource shortages have meant the department's workload has been "heavily driven by the exigencies of crisis response."[216] Preventive diplomacy almost never has the same degree of urgency.

Second, securing agreement from at-risk governments to deploy external preventive missions on their sovereign territory confronts formidable political barriers. As Barnett Rubin and Bruce Jones of the Center for International Cooperation have noted, preventive diplomacy:

> [is] the most politically problematic type of UN conflict prevention. The process treats both governments and opposition groups as parties to a conflict, rather than granting the government a monopoly on legitimate representation … The appearance of taking sides becomes almost unavoidable. Even the most scrupulous neutrality of expression cannot disguise the

> fact that the UN is treating as a political actor a group that the government may depict as criminal deviants.[217]

Third, as Rubin and Jones also point out, DPA not only lacks a strong field presence in crisis countries but was "not designed to have, and consequently lacks, the capacity to undertake the analysis needed for prevention."[218] Member states of the UN have repeatedly blocked attempts by the UN to create an in-house analytic capacity for DPA.

Finally, there are a range of bureaucratic impediments to implementing effective prevention policies. These include "a deeply embedded inability to coordinate based on differing mandates, governance structures, and funding mechanisms of different parts of the organization."[219]

However, the UN is not the only actor that pursues diplomatic initiatives to prevent conflicts from starting—or restarting. There are a number of "private diplomacy" organizations—discussed in more detail in the section on peacemaking—that also play an active role.[220]

Private diplomacy actors are not as constrained as international organizations and states when dealing with armed non-state actors, but here too the emphasis has been on mediating an end to ongoing conflicts rather than using diplomatic means to prevent conflicts from erupting in the first place.[221]

But the prospects for preventive diplomacy are not quite as negative as the above discussion might indicate. There is some case-study evidence to suggest that preventive diplomacy can succeed in practice.[222] Some of the more notable successes have been associated with the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), in particular the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities that, since the mid-1990s, has:

> helped to head off inter-ethnic conflicts in several Central and Eastern European countries such as Slovakia, the Baltic states, Albania, as well as Macedonia through informal diplomacy and crafting minority rights legislation that were adopted by the governments.[223]

There is also evidence that interest in preventive diplomacy is growing within the UN system. In 2008 DPA received funding for 50 new posts, which is enabling it to build in-house mediation capacity and to support mediation efforts in the field.[224] This capacity can in principle be used to support preventive diplomacy measures.[225]

During 2010 there was also evidence of increasing—though typically cautious—support for the idea of preventive diplomacy from the Security Council. As Security Council Report, an independent organization, noted in July 2010:

> It seems that the Council is no longer quite so hesitant about the thematic issue of conflict prevention and may now be open in principle to more concrete language on the subject than was possible for much of the last decade. However, a key unresolved issue is whether members are also prepared to advance the issue of conflict prevention concretely in specific cases.[226]

In other words, there appears to be slow progress at the UN towards taking the idea of preventive diplomacy seriously. But it is still far from clear to what extent the Council will be prepared to push actively for preventive diplomacy initiatives in particular at-risk countries—or indeed how such initiatives might be received by the governments of these countries given ongoing concerns about sovereignty.

However, with some deficit-burdened donor states becoming concerned about the rapidly rising costs of peacekeeping, the case for preventive diplomacy with its minimal price tag may seem increasingly compelling. At the same time, a number of key African states are becoming increasingly vocal in their support of preventive diplomacy—a marked change from the situation a decade or more ago.[227]

If this modest progress continues, the rhetorical support for preventive diplomacy may eventually be matched by its actual use in states at risk of succumbing to conflict.

Peacemaking

Peacemaking is the UN's term for the use of external mediation to assist warring parties in ending conflicts through negotiated settlements. Most research on peacemaking has examined attempts to mediate interstate wars and, until very recently, there were no long-duration time-series data on attempts to end civil wars via diplomatic interventions. This changed with the recent release of a new dataset compiled by Patrick Regan and colleagues that recorded 438 peacemaking interventions in some 68 intrastate conflicts from 1945 to 1999.[228] The large majority of these interventions (352) were mediations, though 44 were offers—or requests—for mediation that were not taken up, while 23 involved multilateral forums.[229]

The new data provide the first real insight we have into post-World War II trends in diplomatic attempts to end intrastate conflicts via mediation.[230] Of the 153 intrastate conflicts between 1945 and 1999 recorded in the new dataset, 44 percent (68) experienced some form of diplomatic intervention.[231] The number of diplomatic interventions per

conflict was highest in the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa; lowest in Asia and the Middle East.

Diplomatic interventions worldwide increased slowly from around 10 in the years between 1944 and 1949, to some 50 in the 1980s. Then in the 1990s the number shot up fivefold to more than 250. And as diplomatic interventions increased sharply in the 1990s, the number of military interventions fell.[232]

Regan's data show that the UN has been the most frequent conflict mediator since the end of World War II, with some 89 diplomatic interventions in 22 conflicts, followed by the US (56 interventions), and the Catholic Church (30). Of the 14 most active interveners, four were regional organizations and eight were national governments.



Figure 4.1 UN (United Nations) Peacemaking Initiatives, 1989–2003

Data Source: UN DPA.[233]

The number of UN peacemaking initiatives increased more than fivefold between 1989 and 2003. This figure is an underestimate because it does not included the confidential peacemaking efforts of UN Secretaries-General.

Although peacemaking is central to the mandate of the UN, and although the UN has been the most frequent mediator in civil wars since the end of World War II, DPA has not done a good job of recording its own peacemaking missions. However, data provided to the Human Security Report Project (HSRP) in 2004 indicate that the number of peacemaking missions increased at least fivefold between 1989 and 2002, as Figure 4.1 shows.[234] This is an underestimate, however, because the data do not include the various personal peacemaking initiatives undertaken in confidence by Secretaries-General.

As mentioned, regional organizations, private diplomacy actors, and individual states have also played an important—and increasing—role in peacemaking.

Regional organizations have advantages and sometimes liabilities as mediation actors. Their proximity and shared history with the countries in conflict means that they likely have a better understanding of the issues than distant international organizations like the UN. But they may also have political and economic interests in particular conflict outcomes that compromise their ability to act as impartial mediators.

The post-Cold War era has witnessed the rise of a new constellation of informal political organizations that seek to help end wars and prevent those that have stopped from starting again. These so-called Friends groups, noted briefly earlier, have been described by Teresa Whitfield, author of the most comprehensive account of the Friends' phenomenon, as:

> ad hoc, issue-specific minicoalitions of states and intergovernmental organizations that become involved in and provide support for the resolution of conflicts and the implementation of peace agreements.[235]



Figure 4.2 Groups of Friends and Other Mechanisms, 1956–2007

Data Source: Teresa Whitfield.[236]

The number of Friends groups and other mechanisms to support peacemaking and peacebuilding missions have increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War.

As Figure 4.2 shows, the number of active Friends groups increased dramatically in the post-Cold War years. And as Whitfield's description indicates, these so-called minilateral organizations are involved in supporting peacebuilding as well as peacemaking processes.

Friends groups typically play a supporting role in peacemaking efforts rather than being directly involved in the mediation process itself, but that support has often been of critical importance in achieving an eventual settlement.

WHY GRIEVANCES MATTER

The most-cited quantitative research on the causes of war explicitly rejects claims that grievances cause conflicts and has consequently paid little attention to peacemaking, peacebuilding, or other strategies that seek to resolve grievances. Clearly, if grievances do not drive conflicts then pursuing policies that seek to resolve them makes little sense.

Two main arguments have been advanced for rejecting grievance-based explanations for conflict onsets. Neither is compelling.

First, it is argued that grievances are ubiquitous, while wars are very rare. The implication is clear—if grievances really were a major driver of political violence, as so much of the case-study literature suggests, then the world should be suffering far more armed conflicts.

There is one obvious response to this objection, namely that some grievances are far more deeply felt than others and it is only those that are most deeply felt that are likely to lead to political violence.

Second, it is claimed that the statistical evidence does not support the grievance thesis. Study after study has failed to find any association between various measures of grievance and the onset of conflicts. These findings are highly problematic.

Grievances are psychological variables for which quantitative researchers have no direct measures. In attempting to get around this problem, they use measures for which there are global data—such as income inequality—as proxies for grievances. But this approach has been strongly criticized on the grounds that many of the measures that have been chosen to proxy grievances are inappropriate.[237]

There is, however, a more profound reason for contesting the claim that grievances do not matter—one that cannot be rebutted by creating better proxy measures, better cross-national data, or more sophisticated statistical significance tests.

Paul Collier and colleagues use nationwide data in seeking to determine the impact of grievance on the risk of war, as do James Fearon and David Laitin in their equally influential research.[238] With nationwide data, they can in principle measure the average impact of societal grievance on the risk of war.

But whole populations do not start wars—relatively small collectives of individuals do.

The proxy measures for grievance tell us about average levels of societal grievance—not about the grievances of the only individuals that really matter—i.e., the minority who start the wars. The fact that there is no association between societal levels of grievance and conflict onsets does not disprove grievance-based explanations.

Indeed Fearon and Laitin do not deny that grievances may motivate rebels. They argue instead that what determines whether or not war breaks out is opportunity. Absent opportunity, war is not feasible.

Opportunity and feasibility are largely determined by the capacity of states to deter and otherwise prevent wars. So it is not surprising that Fearon and Laitin's prescriptions focus on the need to build state capacity as a means of preventing civil wars while largely ignoring conflict resolution and peacemaking strategies.

An extreme hypothetical example illustrates the logic of Fearon and Laitin's thesis. Imagine a country where persecuted dissidents have been banished to an offshore island. Burning with a deep sense of grievance, the dissidents would seize any chance to engage the regime in armed struggle. But they are denied the opportunity to do so by the fact they are physically unable to leave the island. It is the lack of opportunity that prevents conflict—notwithstanding intense dissident grievances. But in other cases opportunity may be largely irrelevant and grievances critical.

Consider another hypothetical case—a society in which there is ample opportunity to start a conflict and even some prospect of victory but where the citizens harbour no grievances against the state. In this case, the absence of war arises not because the citizens have been deterred by the coercive power of the state but because they are not motivated to try and overthrow it.

Motivation and opportunity are necessary conditions for rebellion but neither is sufficient. Understanding what drives conflicts requires explanations that take both into account.

The post-Cold War world has also witnessed a remarkable upsurge in private diplomacy actors. A 2008 survey by the Crisis Management Initiative described the evolution and rapid growth of 14, mostly European, NGOs involved in peacemaking. Only two of these private diplomacy organizations were established before the end of the Cold War; 12 have been created since then.[239]

Private diplomacy initiatives, unlike UN-led peacemaking missions, are not constrained by the requirements of Security Council mandates or by pressure from powerful UN-member states. And private mediators "have the advantage of being able to engage early and with discretion with conflict parties who may be reluctant to engage with official actors."[240] But they rarely have the leverage of official peacemaking actors—whether the UN or governments.

How Successful Are Peacemaking Efforts?

It is remarkable how little is known about the success of peacemaking efforts. As Regan and his co-authors note in their study of more than six decades of peacemaking, "We know little about the effect of diplomatic initiatives on warring parties' decisionmaking or the record of external diplomatic efforts in the management of civil wars."[241]

The available evidence on the impact of peacemaking is fragmentary but suggestive.

A new and as yet unpublished 2010 study by Bernd Beber, which used a new mediation dataset, found that in approximately half the 35 high- and medium-intensity conflicts being waged around the world between 1990 and 2005, third-party mediation led to a "full or partial" settlement. [242]

Regan and colleagues find a similar relationship, but over a much longer period:

> If we consider full or partial settlements as successful outcomes, mediations were coded as ending successfully in 133 out of 352 cases (38%). Over 57% of mediations result in a ceasefire, and only 4% fail completely.[243]

In 2011 Frida Möller and co-authors reported on a rare quantitative study of regional peacemaking efforts—in Southeast Asia and Oceania. They found that as conflict management efforts increased in the region, so too did the number of conflict terminations. They concluded that there was "a strong positive relationship between mediation and agreements."[244]

Comparing peacemaking efforts in the first post-Cold War decade with the previous 10 years is particularly instructive. The Regan dataset shows that there was a fivefold increase in peacemaking efforts in the 1990s, compared with the 1980s. Over the same period, UCDP's conflict terminations dataset shows that the number of peace agreements increased sevenfold—up from three in the 1980s to 22 in the 1990s.[245]

Reaching a negotiated peace settlement is a major achievement, but in no sense a guarantee of sustained peace. The most common yardstick used to indicate the success—or "stability"—of peacemaking is a period of at least five years after the agreement is signed without the conflict recurring. Among the factors that determine the success or failure of peace settlements thus defined are the actual crafting of agreements and the degree of post-conflict support available to help implement them.

> Private diplomacy actors rarely have the leverage of official peacemaking actors—whether the UN or governments.

The 1990s was a bad decade for the stability of peace agreements, with some 46 percent—almost twice the post-World War II average—breaking down within five years.

However, as Part III of this *Report* points out, the new millennium has witnessed what may turn out to be a substantial improvement in the stability of peace agreements—though it is far too early to determine whether it will prove durable. Between 2000 and 2003, only one of the seven new peace agreements failed within five years—a success rate of 86 percent—compared with a rate of just 55 percent in the 1990s.

This change suggests—no more—that today's peace agreements may be better timed, better crafted, and better supported than those of the turbulent 1990s.

Finally, we note that the potential for new peacemaking initiatives to further reduce the incidence of conflict is considerable. According to the Regan dataset, less than half (44 percent) of the civil wars between 1950 and 1999 saw external diplomatic interventions to help resolve them.[246] There is, in other words, great scope for new peacemaking initiatives to be pursued in the future.

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Very few wars that break out in the current era are truly new. The majority of onsets in the new millenium are of conflicts that stopped at some stage and have started again. So, stopping conflicts from recurring once they have ended has become an increasingly important security goal for the

UN and other international actors. The term the UN uses to describe the policies it pursues to achieve this goal is *post-conflict peacebuilding*.

Peacebuilding has both a military and—increasingly—a civilian component. In principle, peacekeeping—the military component—provides the security needed for the implementation of civilian assistance programs that focus on helping war-affected countries rebuild their socio-economic, administrative, and political institutions.

The term *peace operation* is often used to describe the combined military peacekeeping and civilian peacebuilding effort.

The peace operations of the 1990s and subsequently were very different from the peacekeeping missions of the Cold War years, which often amounted to little more than the monitoring of ceasefires by small numbers of lightly armed peacekeepers. Today's peace operations tend to be large and highly complex exercises in state- and nation-building, with Security Council mandates that legitimize the use of force to protect civilians.

As Figure 4.3 indicates, between 1989 and 1994 the number of UN peacekeeping missions almost doubled and has since stabilized at a high level.[247]

As of 31 December 2010, there were a record 123,000 UN personnel serving in 16 peace operations on four continents. This represents a ninefold increase in UN peacekeepers since 1999.[248]

Figure 4.3 also shows that other international organizations such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the African Union (formerly known as the Organization of African Unity) have increased the number of their peace operations at an even greater rate.

The overwhelming majority of the studies that have examined the security impact of peace operations have concluded that they significantly reduce the probability that war will recur.

The first statistical analysis of the impact of peacebuilding was published in 2000 by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. It concluded that an appropriately designed peace operation significantly improved the prospects for peace.[249]

In 2008 another major quantitative study by Page Fortna noted that "the risk of war resuming is much lower when peacekeepers are present than when belligerents are left to their own devices."[250] Where peacekeeping missions were deployed, the risk of war recurring was reduced by at least half compared with post-conflict countries where there was no peacekeeping operation.[251]

Lessons Learned

Notwithstanding the real successes, post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations have suffered serious and much publicized failures. In 1999 a UN report was published under Secretary-General Kofi Annan's name that described the failure of the organization to prevent the massacre of thousands of Muslims who were in the UN-designated "safe haven" of Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995. Written with atypical frankness, the report argued that the failure to stop the slaughter was due in large



Figure 4.3 UN (United Nations) and Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), 1948–2007

The number of UN PKOs almost doubled between 1989 and 2007. There has been an even larger increase in the number of non-UN PKOs over the same period.

Data Source: Birger Heldt.[252]

Note: Figure 4.3 is a "stacked graph," meaning that the number of operations in each category is indicated by the depth of the band of colour. The top line shows the total number of operations of all types in each year.

part to the UN's commitment to the peacekeeping ethos of impartiality and its opposition to using force when confronted by blatant aggression.

That report, and another major investigation that examined the international community's even greater failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, led Annan to initiate a full-scale review of peacekeeping operations in 2000. The *Brahimi Report*—so called because the investigation was led by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi—was published in 2000. It criticized the UN for applying "best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behavior."[253]

Brahimi argued for greater emphasis on long-term peacebuilding programs to address root causes of conflict.

The *Brahimi Report* called for more realistic appraisals by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the situation on the ground where missions would be deployed, and stressed the need for appropriate mandates, sufficient resources, and intelligence in order to credibly deter violent behaviour and "to leave no doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers" about the consequences of their actions.[254] Above all, it warned of the grave risks of sending lightly armed peacekeepers where there was no peace to keep.

Brahimi's stress on the importance of ensuring that peacekeeping forces are appropriately resourced was supported by the findings of a second statistical study by Doyle and Sambanis on the effectiveness of UN peace operations that was published in 2006. The authors argued that:

> the greater the hostility, measured in terms of casualties, refugees, number of factions, type of war, and ethnic divisions, and the less the local capacity, measured in an underdeveloped and undiversified economy, the lower the probability of peacebuilding success, and the greater must international capacities be to increase that probability.[255]

Recognizing that simply preventing violence for the duration of the peace operation was rarely sufficient to prevent the outbreak of future conflict, Brahimi also argued for a much greater emphasis on long-term peacebuilding programs to address the root causes of the conflict and in so doing create the conditions for a sustainable peace. Central to this goal was the need to strengthen state capacity and foster a climate for sustained economic development. In short, the report concluded:

> History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers' support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders' work.[256]

Continuing Challenges

Notwithstanding much reform and many real achievements, a decade after the publication of the *Brahimi Report*, UN peace operations still confront major challenges:

- The growth in the number and scope of missions has caused the organization to suffer from "overstretch," with a growing gap between commitments and the resources needed to meet them.[257]
- The quality of peacekeeping forces remains uneven and "has even worsened as many rich Western nations have followed US practice and become less willing to commit their armed forces to UN operations."[258] In addition to having inadequately trained personnel, many peacekeeping missions are short of appropriate communication and logistics equipment—and in some cases even more basic supplies.[259]
- Operational coordination between the UN Secretariat, missions in the field, local authorities, donor governments, international agencies, and local and international NGOs, and between the different national contingents of the multi-national peacekeeping forces is rarely satisfactory and remains a source of ongoing contention.[260]
- Deployment times of peacekeeping missions, particularly to sub-Saharan Africa, are often agonizingly slow, though the fault is not always that of the UN. Sometimes delays arise because of obstruction by the governments of the conflict-affected countries.[261]
- The sheer size of multidimensional peace operations means that they often have a distorting impact on local economies,[262] and there have been persistent—though sometimes exaggerated—problems with abuse and corruption within missions.[263]
- Finally, even though the UN constantly stresses the critical need to build local capacity in its peace operations in order to make progress self-sustaining, this ambition is rarely fully realized.[264]

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION

When civil wars come to an end, especially when they end in peace agreements rather than decisive victories, security is far from guaranteed and—as Part III of this *Report* demonstrates—there is a serious risk of the country succumbing to further conflict. One important means of reducing this risk is the effective disarmament and demobilization of insurgent forces and their reintegration into civil society.

The United Nations (UN) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Resource Centre defines DDR as a process that:

> aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that results from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development.[265]

Formal DDR programs have become a central element of the multidimensional peace operations that have proliferated since the end of the Cold War. In 2000 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described DDR programs as having "repeatedly proved to be vital to stability in a post-conflict situation."[266]

Figure 4.4 below reveals the rapid increase in the number of DDR operations since the end of the 1980s. In 1989 there were just two ongoing programs; in 2008 there were 18. While remarkable, this ninefold increase is not untypical of the increased international security activism in the wake of the Cold War.

As we can see from Figure 4.4, for most of the post-Cold War period DDR programs in sub-Saharan Africa have made up more than half of the worldwide total. This is not surprising since the region has also seen the greatest number of conflicts during this period—and a large number of UN peace operations.

DDR programs can take many different forms. In cases where the conflict ended because one party defeated the other decisively (Angola, 2002; Rwanda, 1994; Uganda, 1986; and Ethiopia, 1990s), the DDR process tends to be one-sided, relatively rapid, and coercive.[267]

In rare cases (Mozambique, 1992; Cambodia, 1991; Laos, 1962), agreements call for *both* government and rebel armies "to demobilize equally in order to integrate the same number of soldiers into a new national army."[268] But more often the focus is on the demobilization of rebel forces, with any government demobilization taking place subsequently.

DDR processes may be important, but they are also inherently challenging. As Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein point out, years of violent armed struggle often mean that relationships between the warring parties are characterized by distrust and uncertainty. This means that:

> disarmament efforts, which aim to remove the means by which the war was fought, also leave factions and combatants vulnerable, without the weapons they would need to protect themselves if the other side reneges on an agreement.[269]



Figure 4.4 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Operations, 1989–2008

DDR operations are much more numerous than they were at the end of the Cold War. The vast majority of these operations have been in sub-Saharan Africa.

Data Source: Robert Muggah.[270]

These factors can provide powerful security incentives for the former warring parties to cheat on peace agreements—not least by understating the number of combatants and weapons.

This sort of cheating can be seen as a form of security insurance rather than as evidence of aggressive intent. But whatever the motive, if cheating is discovered, peace agreements are—at best—at risk; at worst the political fallout creates a new conflict spiral and fighting is renewed.

As Barbara Walter puts it, adversaries in these situations find it extraordinarily difficult *on their own* "to abide by the terms of a treaty that offers enormous rewards for cheating and enormous costs for being cheated upon."[271]

Walter argues that peace treaties often require external support to reassure the former warring parties that agreements—particularly with respect to disarmament—will be adhered to. The latter is precisely what UN-mandated DDR programs seek to achieve.

But there are serious equity issues at stake in many instances. Reintegration assistance is provided to former combatants but rarely to the often far larger number of conflict-displaced refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their homes after the fighting is over. In Liberia, for example, only 11 percent of post-conflict returnees were ex-combatants.[272] In some cases ex-combatants who perpetrated gross human rights violations in the course of the conflict have received reintegration assistance from the international community that their victims were denied. This has been a source of major concern in a number of countries where DDR programs have been implemented.

Determining the success of the reintegration phase of DDR programs—as against the disarmament and demobilization phases—is neither easy nor often attempted.

Humphreys and Weinstein note:

> there have been few systematic efforts to evaluate the determinants of successful reintegration by ex-combatants after conflict … In particular, no studies have systematically compared the reintegration success of those who have and have not participated in demobilization and reintegration programs.[273]

The latter comparison was precisely what Humphreys and Weinstein undertook in Sierra Leone. Their findings were sobering. Individuals who had participated in the reintegration program did not reintegrate into civil society any better than those who had not. In other words, the reintegration phase of Sierra Leone's DDR program was a failure.

But the authors are careful to note that the fact that "there is little evidence that DDR programs were effective in Sierra Leone … does not mean that DDR programs are never successful."[274]

Indeed, in an analysis of the impact of the UN's DDRR[275] program in Liberia that used a very similar methodology to the study in neighbouring Sierra Leone, James Pugel found:

> solid empirical evidence that the DDRR program in Liberia has indeed enabled a much better life for those ex-combatants who have completed their program of training when compared with those former fighters who chose not to register, preferring to reintegrate on their own.[276]

The Sierra Leone and Liberia evaluations of the impact of DDR programs were notable for their methodological rigour and reliance on data. This type of study remains the exception rather than the rule.[277] And because researchers have not gathered enough quantitative data, they have not been able to make meaningful cross-national comparisons of DDR program outcomes.

Part of the problem is that neither researchers nor practitioners have agreed on what might constitute success in a reintegration program.

A minimal, but important, criterion for success might seem to be whether conflict re-erupted following a DDR program—such programs are, of course, intended to reduce the risk of this happening.

But there are many reasons why conflicts may start again that have little to do with the effectiveness of a DDR program. And if no conflict erupted, it will rarely be possible to determine whether this was due to the success of the DDR program, to other peacebuilding initiatives, to the fact that the previously warring parties had simply lost their appetite for conflict, or to any of a host of other plausible explanations.

It is clear that the challenges that confront the effective deployment of peace operations remain formidable. But in one sense this makes the successes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in reducing the risk that conflicts will reignite all the more remarkable.

Although few in the UN believe that the many problems that peace operations confront will be overcome in the near future, there is no reason for undue pessimism.

Resource constraints remain a serious problem in many areas. However, the level of funding per mission has actually increased considerably over the past two decades. While the number of UN missions has almost doubled since 1989, total peacekeeping expenditures have increased more than fivefold.[278] More and more countries are contributing troops to UN peace missions, reflecting the international community's growing commitment to peacebuilding. As Figure 4.5 indicates, the number of countries contributing troops to UN peace operations more than doubled between 1989 and 2007. The number of troop-contributors to non-UN missions has grown at a similar rate.

Figure 4.5 Troop-Contributing Countries to Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), 1970–2007



Data Source: Birger Heldt.

The number of countries contributing troops to UN and non-UN PKOs has increased steeply in the last two decades.

Some donor governments, worried about soaring deficits at home, have fretted about peacekeeping's rising costs.[279] But, as Doyle and Sambanis have pointed out, the pay-off from peace operations is "a relative bargain."[280]

In 2007 the total UN peacekeeping budget was less than the US was spending in a single week in Iraq.[281] And while the UN's annual peacekeeping budget had soared to some $7.8 billion by mid-2009, this was still only half of 1 percent of global military expenditure, and only a small fraction of the defense budgets of most developed nations.[282] Considering the impact that peace operations have in reducing the risk of armed conflicts recurring, this would appear to be very good value for money.

Sanctions

As Figure 4.6 illustrates, the post-Cold War era has seen a dramatic increase in the number of sanctions regimes imposed by multilateral organizations, yet one more indication of the international community's increased activism in this period.

Sanctions have been used to coerce reluctant warring parties to join negotiations, to restrict the flow of arms to war zones, to pressure regimes to stop human rights abuses, and for many other purposes. They have been targeted mostly, but not exclusively, at governments in the developing world that are embroiled in civil wars, or are guilty of perpetrating gross human rights violations against their own citizens.

Notwithstanding the greatly increased resort to sanctions in the post-Cold War era, the evidence from a number of statistical analyses suggests that they are not a very effective means of coercing governments to change their behaviour.

Different datasets, methodologies, and criteria for success mean that statistical findings on the efficacy of sanctions regimes vary, but, whether the sanctions regimes are unilateral or multilateral, the findings are consistent enough to support the claim that in terms of coercing policy change in target regimes, sanctions are a weak policy instrument.

Figure 4.6 Countries Targeted by Multilateral Sanctions Regimes, 1960–2008



Data Source: Joakim Kreutz.[283]

The number of countries targeted by economic and political sanctions exploded after the end of the Cold War, going from just two in 1989 to 26 in 2008.

In what has been by far the most comprehensive and widely cited statistical study of US sanctions to date, the Washington-based Institute for International Economics examined 170 cases of economic sanctions imposed between 1915 and 2000 and found that they were "partially successful" in just 34 percent of cases.[284]

The success rate of sanctions imposed by the UN is little better. In a study of the effectiveness of 11 UN sanctions regimes, David Cortright and George Lopez determined that a maximum of just four cases (36 percent) could be judged as "partially successful" in producing compliance with the relevant UN resolutions.[285] The cases in question were Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, and to a lesser extent, Cambodia.

> Conflict-affected countries under sanctions had shorter wars than countries that were not under sanctions.

A 2007 analysis by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research examined 27 UN arms embargoes intended primarily to stop, or at the very least slow, the flow of arms to conflict zones.[286]

The success rate of these embargoes was not impressive either. The study was able to measure an "improvement in target behaviour" in just 25 percent of all observations.[287] In many cases, the embargoes had little effect—except perhaps to help bring the very idea of arms embargoes into disrepute.

The evidence suggests that sanctions have a positive impact in just 25 to 36 percent of cases, which raises an obvious question. Do these unimpressive findings mean that sanctions are such a weak policy instrument that they should be abandoned?

The short answer is no—and for several reasons.

In many cases where UN sanctions regimes have failed, the reason has little or nothing to do with any intrinsic flaws in sanctions strategy. A major reason for past failures has been that the Security Council has often put little or no effort into implementing, monitoring, or enforcing the regimes that they have imposed. As Cortright and Lopez point out, "lax enforcement has vitiated the potential impact of most arms embargoes."[288]

Had serious efforts been made to enforce the sanctions regimes the Council imposed on countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s—as they clearly could have been—then the impact would surely have been greater. Here the problem lies not with sanctions, but the lack of will to enforce them.

The negative overall assessment of the efficacy of sanctions is also due in part to the fact that the criterion for success has become the degree to which sanctions regimes succeed in coercing target states to change their behaviour. But different measures of impact suggest that less pessimistic assessments are warranted.

One such alternative measure is the impact of sanctions on the length of wars. A recent study by Abel Escribà-Folch focused on 87 wars and used new data on sanctions to examine the association between the imposition of sanctions and the duration of civil wars.[289] Among the key findings of the study were that, other things being equal, conflict-affected countries under sanctions had shorter wars than countries that were not under sanctions, and the wars were also more likely to end in negotiated settlements. Escribà-Folch also found that in the average war-affected country under a multilateral sanctions regime, the fighting ended more quickly than did the average conflict in a country under a unilateral sanctions regime.[290]

Sanctions can also support the achievement of other security goals—from containing aggressor states to serving as instruments of deterrence. Both of these objectives, if realized, would tend to reduce the incidence of political violence, even if the target state failed to comply with Security Council resolutions.

To take one obvious example, the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq is widely believed to have failed. Saddam Hussein never conceded to key Security Council demands despite being subjected to the most draconian sanctions regime in modern history—one that imposed huge suffering on ordinary Iraqis.

Few would disagree that sanctions on Iraq failed to achieve their major objectives, yet the arms embargo component of the sanctions package was highly successful in preventing the regime from rebuilding its military capacity and again posing threats to its neighbours. Arms embargoes, in other words, have the potential to prevent, as well as shorten, conflicts.

With respect to the relationship between sanctions and the post-Cold War decline in conflict numbers, we would stress just two points.

First, as noted above, the Escribà-Folch study finds that where countries in conflict suffer the imposition of a sanctions regime, the duration of war will be shorter than in cases where sanctions are not applied. However, although this is an important finding, we should not place too much weight on it until it has been tested by further studies.

Second, even when the success rate of a particular security policy initiative is low, as is the case with the imposition of sanctions regimes, if the initiatives are numerous enough, the absolute number of successes may well be quite significant.

Today there is widespread consensus that the international community needs an instrument of suasion that lies between mere diplomatic censure on the one hand, and the use of force on the other. For this purpose—and notwithstanding the challenges—there is no real alternative to sanctions.

Other Possible Explanations for the Post-Cold War Decline in Conflict Numbers

The international initiatives discussed above have been directed at deterring wars, stopping those that cannot be prevented, and preventing those that have stopped from starting again. But there have been other changes associated with the end of the Cold War that may also have contributed to the decline in conflict numbers since the early 1990s.

The explosion of international peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives is central to any understanding of the decline in intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. But these initiatives in turn need to be understood in the context of a broader shift in a range of security-related global norms that has taken place since the end of World War II. (We noted the evolution of the war-averseness norm in Chapter 1.) These evolving norms have provided a supportive context for the dramatic expansion of peacemaking and peacebuilding policies since the early 1990s, but may also have played an independent role in reducing the incidence of civil wars. It is the latter possibility that we address here.

In this section we consider the possible impact on the incidence of armed conflict in the post-Cold War period of three important shifts in global norms, namely:

- The ascendancy of democracy as the dominant norm of global governance—which is evident in the steep increase in the number of new democracies around the world over the past two decades.
- The increased salience of human rights norms evident in the more than fourfold increase in states with human rights prosecutions since the end of the Cold War.
- The sharp post-Cold War decline in the level of governmental discrimination directed at minority groups. This latter change is in turn related to the spread and deepening of the human rights and democracy norms.

We consider each in turn and finish with an examination of the possible impact of rising incomes on the incidence of armed conflict in the post-Cold War world.

Has the Democracy Revolution Driven Civil War Numbers Down?

At the end of World War II there were just 20 democracies (as defined by the Polity IV dataset) in the world. Today there are more than 90,[291] and democratic governance has become an entrenched global norm.

Chapter 1 pointed out that the increase in the number of democracies worldwide has been associated with a decline in international conflicts. Democratic peace theory suggests that this is because democracies almost never go to war against each other. And because the percentage of democracies in the international system has increased dramatically, the number of states that are never likely to fight each other has also increased.

But there is also persuasive evidence for a *democratic civil peace*—a peace that arises because inclusive democracies have much lower risks of succumbing to civil war than do autocracies and anocracies.[292] (*Anocracies* are regimes whose mode of governance is neither democratic nor authoritarian, but an unstable mix of both.)

Monty Marshall, director of the Polity IV Project, notes that anocracies "have been about six times more likely than democracies and two and one-half times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars."[293]

The finding that democracies have lower levels of violent conflict than nondemocracies is potentially relevant to explanations of the post-Cold War decline in armed conflict numbers because the number of democracies in the international system has almost doubled since the late 1980s. [294]

Given that inclusive democracies are at much lower risk of succumbing to war than either autocracies or anocracies, we would expect, other things being equal, that the post-Cold War doubling of the number of states with democratic governments would have tended to reduce the number of civil war onsets.

But while inclusive democracies may be at low risk of succumbing to armed conflict, the evidence indicates that the process of becoming a democracy increases the probability of a country suffering war. As a consequense, determining the extent of the impact of democratization on the risk of civil war is extremely difficult.[295]

The Deterrent Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions

In a recent issue of *International Studies Quarterly*, Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink noted that human rights prosecutions "have been the major policy innovation of the late twentieth

century designed to address human rights violations."[296] Their data show that the number of countries with prosecutions of perpetrators of human rights abuses has increased more than fourfold since 1989[297]—a change that has been aptly described as a "revolution in accountability."[298]

With respect to human rights abuses, Kim and Sikkink observe that "[p]rior to the 1970s, there was an almost zero likelihood that heads of state and state officials would be held accountable for past violations."[299] The resulting "culture of impunity" existed because, in the absence of prosecutions and punitive sanctions, there was no possibility of deterring rights violations.[300] But over the past two decades the number of prosecutions has increased dramatically, providing Kim and Sikkink with enough information to produce "the first full quantitative analysis on the impact of such prosecution on human rights practices."[301]

> Sharp reductions in political discrimination should lead to reduced numbers of conflicts onsets.

The authors analyzed the impact of human rights prosecutions on 100 "transitional" countries. They examined three types of transition—political transitions to democracy, transitions from civil war, and transitions by state creation.[302] They do not include any human rights prosecutions in autocracies or democracies—and give reasons for these exclusions.

The key findings from the study were that:

> transitional countries with human rights prosecutions are less repressive than countries without prosecutions [and] countries with more cumulative prosecutions are less repressive than countries with fewer prosecutions.[303]

Kim and Sikkink's findings appear to be directly relevant for conflict prevention since there is a striking correlation between increases in abuses of core human rights—notably those relating to assaults on physical integrity—and subsequent armed conflict onsets. As James Fearon has noted, when countries have a very poor human rights performance, this "is a *very* bad sign for a government: major civil conflict is then much more likely to begin."[304]

It follows that if human rights prosecutions reduce the risk of human rights abuses, they should also be associated with a reduced risk of future conflicts. The underlying argument here—one that aligns with grievance-based explanations of civil war onsets—is certainly plausible and may well be true. Fearon, however, points to a number of methodological challenges that caution against leaping too quickly to policy conclusions.[305] Although Kim and Sikkink's analysis controls for factors other than prosecutions that might affect their results, their findings need to be replicated before too much weight is placed on them.

The Decline in Discrimination Against Minority Groups

A third remarkable normative shift associated with the end of the Cold War has been evident in the decline in the level of discrimination directed by governments against ethnic and other minority groups around the world. Data from the Minorities at Risk Project indicate that between 1991 and 2004, the number of minority groups around the world that were being victimized by governmental discrimination almost halved, dropping from some 75 to 41.[306]

This finding has obvious relevance for global security. As a 2005 study by Victor Asal and Amy Pate noted, "there is abundant evidence that high levels of political discrimination are a key cause of violent ethnic conflict."[307] It follows that sharp reductions in political discrimination should lead to reduced numbers of conflict onsets.

In fact, the data presented by Asal and Pate's colleagues show that a significant decline in self-determination conflicts being waged around the world was associated with the downturn in governmental discrimination since the end of the Cold War. These types of conflicts dropped from 40 in 1991 to just 25 in 2004.[308]

In the case of the three normative shifts noted above, we see the impact of shifts in global security norms that have deepened since the end of the Cold War and that have helped drive increases in democratization, respect for human rights, and opposition to political and ethnic discrimination. In each case the normative shift is correlated with the decline in conflict numbers. This finding supports claims that the impact of shifting norms may have been a contributory cause of the decline in conflict numbers. It does not, of course, demonstrate this—correlation is not the same as causation.

Could Rising National Incomes Have Caused the Decline in Intrastate Conflict?

As noted previously, the most robust finding to emerge from the quantitative conflict literature over the past two decades has been that there is a strong association between GDP (gross

domestic product) per capita—which is a proxy measure for state capacity—and the risk of intrastate conflict onsets. Other things being equal, the greater the capacity of the state, the lower the risk of war.

World Bank data indicate that global incomes did indeed rise following the end of the Cold War. In low- and middle-income countries—where most wars take place—average GDP per capita increased by almost 40 percent between 1989 and 2008.[309]

Other things being equal, the effect of this increase should have been a modest decrease in the number of conflict onsets. But this is not what happened—intrastate conflict onsets in the 1990s increased sharply. This suggests that although the post-Cold War increase in incomes may have had a conflict-onset-reducing impact, this impact was overwhelmed by more powerful forces that were driving conflict onsets upwards during the political turmoil that followed the end of the Cold War.

But rising incomes and state capacity are also associated with shorter wars,[310] and shorter wars mean more terminations. And as we know, terminations did increase in the 1990s. So, rising state capacity may be part of the explanation of that increase. But whatever the impact on the incidence of terminations, it is clear that it would have been very modest. We would therefore expect changes in income to have a substantial impact on the risk of conflict when measured over many decades, but only a minor impact over shorter periods.

Implications for Policy

We referred earlier to the major methodological and data challenges that would be involved in attempting to conduct quantitative analyses of all of the potential policy initiatives and structural changes that may have been drivers of the decline in conflict numbers in the post-Cold War era.

Our analysis has taken a very different approach—although we have cited econometric research findings where appropriate. Our approach has been driven in considerable part by descriptive statistics that have revealed the changing patterns of conflict since the Cold War and raised many of the questions that this chapter has sought to answer.

The evidence from various statistical studies cited here suggests that both the peacemaking initiatives (focused on mediating conflict settlements) and the peacebuilding initiatives (focused on peace operations) have been moderately successful in stopping wars and preventing them from restarting. And, as noted above, when policy initiatives have even moderate to low success rates, the absolute number of successes—i.e., wars stopped or prevented—will increase as the number of initiatives increases. This is highly pertinent since, as we have seen, there have been dramatic increases in all forms of international security activism since the early 1990s.

This latter point also applies to the impact of sanctions—policy initiatives that have success rates varying between 25 and 36 percent and are widely regarded as ineffectual policy instruments for coercing change in the behaviour of target states. In the 1980s there were never more than three sanctions regimes in place in any year; in 2008 there were more than eight times that number. Even with a 25 percent success rate, this would have meant a substantial increase in the absolute number of successes. We also pointed out that sanctions can have positive security impacts—notably in shortening the length of wars—that have been largely overlooked in the sanctions literature.

The clear message for policy-makers is that international activism—primarily, but by no means solely, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding—works. Indeed, we believe that it is the single most compelling policy-relevant explanation for the post-Cold War reduction in political violence around the world.

In our review of the causes of the decline in the number of intrastate conflicts since the early 1990s we also examined the direct impact of the end of the Cold War on conflict numbers. We suggested that while this extraordinary event clearly brought some conflicts to an end, it caused others to start. It is therefore impossible to determine the net effect without an in-depth investigation of all the relevant cases.

But it is clear that whatever the direct impact of the end of the Cold War on conflict numbers in the 1990s, this change no longer has any policy relevance. The political changes catalyzed directly by the end of East-West hostilities have ceased to be a cause of conflict, and there are no more proxy wars to be brought to an end by the withdrawal of superpower assistance to the warring parties. From the point of view of current and future security policies, the end of the Cold War, which was a one-off event and not a policy initiative, is of little consequence.

Conclusion

In the 60-plus years since the end of World War II, two powerful system-wide drivers of armed conflict—colonialism and the Cold War—have ceased to exist. Neither will return and at this time no obvious new system-wide threat to peace appears likely to replace them.

Some will argue that violent Islamist radicalism, as exemplified by al-Qaeda, already constitutes such a threat.

But, as we note in Part III, support for extremist Islamist ideologies has declined substantially throughout the Muslim world in recent years. Absent popular support, Islamist radicals cannot wage a successful "people's war," and without conventional armies—which no Islamist insurgents possess—overthrowing governments becomes a huge challenge. The radicals may possibly prevail in a small number of countries where state capacity is very weak, but it is highly unlikely that radical Islamist ideology can ever energize a sustained global campaign comparable to the anticolonial movement or the leftist insurgencies of the Cold War period.

There are several other reasons for cautious optimism regarding the global security future.

First, there is no real indication that the international community's commitment to peacemaking and peacebuilding is waning, notwithstanding the global economic crisis. As the authors of the authoritative *Annual Review of Peace Operations 2011* recently pointed out, 2010 was a year:

> in which global peace operations continued to grow in overall levels of deployment *despite expectations that significant operational, political, and financial pressure would lead to downsizing*.[311]

Second, barring a major collapse of the global economy, incomes will almost certainly continue to grow throughout most of the developing world. Over the long term this will in turn continue to enhance state capacity which, almost all the statistical studies agree, reduces the risks of civil wars. International economic interdependence, which is associated with reduced risks of interstate war, will also continue to grow.

Third, the universalization of norms that help reduce the risk of conflict appears unlikely to be reversed.

None of these developments, of course, provides any guarantee that the security future, even in the short and medium term, will necessarily be benign. Conflict research, as discussed in Chapter 2, does not have a great record when it comes to predicting the security future—and wars have very disparate causes, many of which may be unaffected by the trends noted above.

In the short term we know that the 2011 political uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa may cause an increase in the number of conflict onsets—though it is unclear how long these conflicts will persist. Over the longer term, new security challenges will be posed by the combined impacts of climate change and population growth in the developing world. But at the very least the trends noted in this *Report* provide a powerful antidote to some of the more direly pessimistic predictions about the global security future.[312]

Finally, we note that in the two decades since the Cold War ended, the world has witnessed the creation of a new, but little-analyzed, global security architecture, one that is radically different from the bipolar security system of the Cold War years.

The new architecture comprises a loose but ever-expanding network of international organizations, donor and other governments, inter-agency committees, informal clusters of like-minded states like the Friends groups discussed previously, think-tanks, and large numbers of national and international NGOs.

The central rationale of the system is the reduction of political violence—in particular civil wars—around the world.

The universalization of norms that help reduce the risk of conflict appears to be unlikely to be reversed.

The evolving mode of security governance that is associated with this new architecture does not eschew use of the military—uniformed peacekeepers play a central role in its missions. But its major security objectives—conflict prevention, peacemaking, and post-conflict peacebuilding—are undertaken primarily by nonmilitary means.

The pursuit of these objectives is grounded in a growing normative consensus that the international community has a responsibility to prevent war, to help stop wars that cannot be prevented, and to try and prevent those that have stopped from starting again.

This still emerging system of security governance has been, and remains, rife with coordination problems, disagreements over strategy, and unresolved tensions between international agencies, states, and NGOs. It is a system that is inherently inefficient and disputatious and—as Rwanda and Darfur remind us—prone to tragic failures. But the best evidence that we have suggests that its collective efforts have been a primary driver of the major decline in the deadliest forms of armed conflict since the end of the Cold War.

This is a considerable achievement.

PART I

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 1

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6. Morgenthau and Waltz are the most influential scholarly proponents of the balance of power thesis.
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10. See Brett Ashley Leeds, "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 3 (July 2003): 427, for an extended discussion.
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34. Ibid., 114.
35. Ibid., 115.
36. See Vipin Narang and Rebecca M. Nelson, "Who are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War," *International Organization* 63, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 357–379. See also the response by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Pathways to War in Democratic Transitions," *International Organization* 63, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 381–390.
37. John Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," August 1990, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=713 (accessed 6 August 2010).

38. Ibid.
39. Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (January 2007): 166–191.
40. James Gwartney, Robert Lawson with Erik Gartzke, *Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report* (Washington: The Cato Institute, 2005), 4.
41. John Mueller, *Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 245.
42. Solomon Polachek, Carlos Seiglie, and Jun Xiang, "Globalization and International Conflict: Can FDI Increase Peace as Trade Does?" American Economic Association, 2005, http://www.aeaweb.org/assa/2005/0109_0800_0204.pdf (accessed 6 August 2010). (The authors used the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) as their source of conflict data.)
43. Ibid. (Unlike Gartzke, the authors found that democracy is associated with reduced risks of conflict.)
44. UNCTADstat, United Nations, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed 15 November 10).
45. The data presented in Figure 1.4 include FDI in the People's Republic of China that is disproportionately larger than that in other countries in the sample. Including China brings up the overall level of FDI in developing countries, but has virtually no effect on the trend.
46. See Allan Dafoe, "Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor." *American Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming 2011; Ceren Altincekic, "FDI Peace: Which 'Capitalism' Leads to More Peace among Dyads?" (working paper, One Earth Foundation, 2009), http://www.oneearthfuture.org/siteadmin/images/files/file_41.pdf (accessed 6 August 2010).
47. John Mueller, "War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment," *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 300.
48. Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 9.
49. Steven Pinker, "A History of Violence; We're Getting Nicer Every Day," *The New Republic*, 19 March 2007, http://www.tnr.com/article/history-violence-were-getting-nicer-every-day (accessed 6 August 2010).
50. John Mueller, "Capitalism, Peace, and the Historical Movement of Ideas," *International Interactions* 36, no. 2 (April 2010): 180.
51. See Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Knopf, 1993).
52. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (March 1992): 391–425.
53. Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 39.

CHAPTER 2

54. Other quantitative approaches are not covered here. They include game theory, explorations of the collective action problems associated with rebel recruitment and peace agreements, and power law theory.
55. There are some exceptions to these general rules. Some scholars, for example, examine global security developments using nonquantitative methodologies. While, as we point out later, *micro-quantitative* methods—which use quantitative techniques often in conjunction with population surveys at the local level and regional level—are being increasingly used to examine conflict dynamics in individual countries.
56. High-intensity conflicts are those in which there are 1,000 or more battle deaths per year. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which provides the statistics used by the Human Security Report Project (HSRP), refers to these conflicts as "wars." Conflicts with 25 or more, but fewer than 1,000, deaths a year are referred to as "minor conflicts." The decline in all state-based armed conflicts between 1992 and 2003 was more than 40 percent. HSRP follows common usage here and uses the terms "civil war" and "intrastate conflict" interchangeably.
57. More specifically, regression analysis can reveal how the value of the dependent variable changes when any one of the independent variables is changed, while the other independent variables are *controlled*—i.e., held constant.
58. Some studies have conflict duration as the dependent variable.
59. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 756.
60. See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (August 2004): 563–595.
61. Nicholas Sambanis and Paul Collier, eds., *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, vol. 1, *Africa*, vol. 2, *Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions* (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2005).
62. Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
63. Nathaniel Beck, Gary King, and Langche Zeng, "Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 1 (March 2000): 21.
64. Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 3 (August 2006): 508–535.
65. Notably, Jeffrey Dixon, "What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings," *International Studies Review* 11, no. 4 (December 2009): 707–735.
66. Hegre and Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," 508–535 and Dixon, "What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings," 707–735.
67. Cullen S. Hendrix and Sarah M. Glaser, "Trends and Triggers: Climate Change and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa" (paper presented at the international workshop on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker, Norway, June 2005), http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Hendrix_Glaser.pdf (accessed 2 September 2010), 4.
68. Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristin M. Bakke, "The Perils of Policy by P-Value: Predicting Civil Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 4 (March 2010): 1–13.
69. James D. Fearon and David A. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90.

70. The Fearon/Laitin model predicted none of the 107 wars under the 0.5 threshold above which civil wars are deemed to occur. Under the 0.3 and 0.1 thresholds, their model predicted 1 out of 107 and 15 out of 107 wars, respectively, but the higher predictive power comes at the cost of a greater number of false positives. See Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke, "The Perils of Policy by P-Value," 4.
71. Fearon and Laitin, "Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods," 11.
72. Paul Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 203.
73. Jack A. Goldstone et al., "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 1 (December 2009): 190–208.
74. Ibid.
75. Calculations for the comparison of success rates were undertaken in-house at HSRP.
76. Model specification determines which independent variables should be included in, or excluded from, the statistical model. Errors can arise when theoretically relevant variables are excluded or theoretically irrelevant variables are included. See Michael Patrick Allen, *Understanding Regression Analysis* (New York: Plenum Press, 1997). By "model" we mean a simplified mathematical representation of reality showing the interrelationships/associations between selected variables.
77. Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, "Civil War," *Journal of Economic Literature* 48, no. 1 (March 2010): 3–57.
78. Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke, "The Perils of Policy by P-Value," 1–13; Hegre and Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," 508–535; Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (December 2004): 814–858.
79. Something is *endogenous* to a system if it is determined within the system, and *exogenous* if it is determined outside the system.
80. Michael Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (June 2006): 265–300.
81. An additional point to note is that few influential papers in this literature test for interaction effects between the ostensibly independent variables, despite the fact that the qualitative literature on civil war indicates that these can be important in some cases.
82. Fearon and Laitin, "Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods," 11.
83. Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 366.
84. Natural disasters—droughts, floods, earthquakes, for example—can also trigger conflict in high-risk situations. See Philip Nel and Marjolein Righarts, "Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (April 2008): 159–185.
85. Doug Bond et al., "Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA): An Event Typology for Automated Events Data Development," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 6 (November 2003): 733–745.
86. Jack Goldstone, "Triggers of Instability: Random Events or Aids to Forecasting?" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association's (ISA) 50th Annual Convention, "Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future," New York, February 2009), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/2/6/7/p312671_index.html (accessed 10 September 2010).
87. Genocide Prevention Task Force, *Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers* (Washington: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2008): 21.
88. Goldstone, "Triggers of Instability" (accessed 10 September 2010).

89. See Jeffrey Checkel, "It's the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics," October 2005, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2005/papers/wp05_26.pdf (accessed 2 September 2010).

90. Graham Brown and Arnim Langer, "Dealing with Time in the Quantitative Study of Conflict" (Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity [CRISE], *Working Paper No. 66*, University of Oxford, 2009), 16.

91. Ibid., 18.

92. Sambanis, "What Is Civil War?" 814–858.

93. James D. Fearon, "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (August 2005): 483–507.

94. Ibid. Reproducing the Collier/Hoeffler model, Fearon was able to include 16 of the 27 excluded cases by using a single country-year as the unit of analysis rather than the five-year period used by Collier and Hoeffler—the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* article contains a detailed rationale for doing this. Other things being equal, we would expect that the more complete, and thus more representative, dataset would generate more reliable results. The issue is re-examined in Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (August 2005): 625–633. Here they focus more on resource rents than primary commodity dependence.

95. The authors had performed some robustness checks, but not the one that Fearon used.

96. Personal communication from Clionadh Raleigh of Armed Conflict Location and Events Data (ACLED) to HSRP Director Andrew Mack, 2 March 2009.

97. See Clionadh Raleigh and Håvard Hegre, "Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset" (paper presented to the Conference on Disaggregating the Study of Civil War and Transnational Violence, San Diego, CA, 2005), 13–24.

98. This dataset, which is not yet complete, is being compiled by UCDP.

99. See, for example, Christopher Blattman, "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda," *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2 (May 2009): 231–247; Philip Verwimp, "Testing the Double-Genocide Thesis for Central and Southern Rwanda," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 4 (August 2003): 423–442; Ana M. Arjona and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Rebelling against Rebellion: Comparing Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Recruitment" (paper presented at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity Workshop: Mobilisation for Political Violence What Do We Know? Oxford, UK, 2009), 4 and Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 2 (April 2008): 436–455.

100. See http://www.hicn.org/index.html (accessed 2 September 2010) and http://www.microconflict.eu/ (accessed 2 September 2010).

101. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Transnational Dimensions of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 3 (May 2007): 293–309.

102. Ibid.

103. For an audiofile description of the dataset, see http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/videos/05-17-2010/political-disorder-africa-new-dataset (accessed 2 September 2010).

104. See Doug Bond et al., "Mapping Mass Political Conflict and Civil Society: Issues and Prospects for the Automated Development of Event Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 4 (August 1997): 553–579; Phillip Schrodt and Omur Yilmaz, "Coding Sub-State Actors Using the CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations) Actor Coding Framework" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, "Bridging Multiple Divides," San Francisco, CA, 2008). A new dataset associated with Project Civil Strife is being developed that "uses automated coding of English-language news reports to generate multi-actor political event data focusing on Southeast Asia. These data are used in statistical models to predict and explain political change." See http://smshel.people.wm.edu/Data/PCS.html (2 September 2010).

105. James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," *Political Analysis* 14, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 227–249.

106. J. W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2009); Fearon and Laitin, "Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods"; Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Sambanis and Collier, *Understanding Civil War*.

107. Sambanis and Collier, *Understanding Civil War*.

108. Fearon and Laitin, "Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods," 766.

109. Ibid, 757.

110. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 61, no. 1 (August 2009): 1–27.

CHAPTER 3

111. *East Asia* is used here to include both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia includes China, Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan. Southeast Asia includes Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Timor Leste, and Vietnam. See Stein Tønnesson, "What Is It That Best Explains the East Asian Peace since 1979? A Call for a Research Agenda," *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 1 (2009): 111–136.

112. Elsina Wainwright, "Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific," Center on International Cooperation, New York University (April 2010): 6, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/global/docs/wainwright_conflict_asia.pdf (accessed 20 October 2010).

113. The exception was the border war between China and Vietnam, which continued sporadically until the late 1980s, but the casualty figures were only a small fraction of the huge death tolls the region saw in earlier decades.

114. The Khmer Rouge defeated the then Cambodian government in 1975, but were subsequently ousted in 1978 in part as a consequence of the Vietnamese invasion in support of the anti-Khmer Rouge rebels.

115. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2009, http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ (accessed 16 November 2010).

    The count of conflict years includes only countries that are independent as of 2008. For countries that gained independence from a colonial power or as a result of a war of secession, conflict years were counted for the colonial power as well as the future independent country.

    Note that the region displayed here is a sub-set of the HSRP region "East and Southeast Asia and Oceania" referred to in other parts of this *Report*, which includes the countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia shown in Figure 3.1 plus Oceania.

116. See Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44. Emphasis added.

117. The most comprehensive of the extraordinarily few studies that have sought to explain the dramatic decline in the number and deadliness of armed conflicts in East Asia is Stein Tønnesson's "What Is It That Best Explains the East Asian Peace since 1979?"

118. Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Battle Deaths Dataset 3.0, http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/The-Battle-Deaths-Dataset-version-30/ (accessed 16 November 2010), updated from Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2–3 (2005): 145–166; UCDP/Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
119. The colonial territory of French Indochina was made up of present-day Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
120. The conflict over Brunei's independence from the United Kingdom in 1962 resulted in only a few dozen battle deaths.
121. James Mayall and Cornelia Navari, eds., *The End of the Post-War Era: Documents on Great-Power Relations* 1968–75 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 92. The Nixon Doctrine, also known as the Guam Doctrine, was announced in Guam in 1969 by President Nixon.
122. Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (Westminster, MD: Arbor House Publishing, 1987).
123. The US has continued to maintain a sizable, though reduced, military presence in South Korea and Japan, but it abandoned its major military bases in the Philippines in the early 1990s.
124. China was particularly concerned to gain ASEAN's support for its goal of isolating Vietnam politically.
125. One communist insurgency remains in the subregion today, waged by the New People's Army in the Philippines. China stopped supplying it with aid in 1975.
126. David E. Cunningham, "Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (March 2010): 115–127.
127. The civilians killed in Bali, Jakarta, and other Islamist terror bombings are not counted as combat deaths.
128. The actual decline was from 13 to five ongoing conflicts from 1978 to 1995. The number of conflicts has remained at approximately the same level since then.
129. James Fearon, "Economic Development, Insurgency and Civil War," in *Economic Institutions and Civil War*, ed. Elhanan Helpman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 293.
130. Macartan Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney, "Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis and Recommendations," First draft, background paper prepared for the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals Poverty Task Force Workshop, Bangkok, June 2004, http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HV.pdf (accessed 15 November 2010), 9.
131. Angus Maddison, "Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD," http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/content.shtml (accessed 15 November 2010).

     Maddison aggregated data for 24 small economies under the category "24 small East Asian countries." However, the list mostly comprises countries that HSRP classifies as being in Oceania. Thus, this figure excludes these "24 small East Asian countries." However, including them would produce a virtually identical graph.
132. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (August 2004): 563–595.
133. Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 20.
134. Christopher Blattman, "Can Youth Employment Programs Foster Social Stability in Africa?" (paper presented to the World Bank Africa Management Retreat, April 2010), http://chrisblattman.com/files/2010/09/Blattman-Can-youth-employment-reduce-social-instability-April-2010.pdf (accessed 21 October 2010), 3.

135. See William T. Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player: U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy in the Asia-Pacific* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

136. Vinod Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, "An Institutional Path: Community Building in Northeast East Asia," in *The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issue, and New Order*, ed. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2007), 285–307.

137. Chung-in Moon and Seung-Won Suh, "Identity Politics, Nationalism and the Future of Northeast Asian Order," in *The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issue, and New Order*, ed. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 2007), 194.

138. See Alastair I. Johnstone, "Is China a Status-Quo Power?" *International Security* 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 5–56.

139. On a few issues—most obviously Taiwan—the Chinese have made it clear that they are prepared to use force regardless of the economic costs.

140. ASEAN, which was created in August 1967, is now made up of 10 countries: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. See ASEAN, "Overview," http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed 27 October 2010). Timor Leste has expressed its intention to apply for membership.

141. See Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 4.

142. Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "A Liberal Peace in Asia?" *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 1 (January 2007): 5–27.

143. The border war between China and Vietnam carried on well into the 1980s, but the casualty figures were only a small fraction of the huge death tolls the region saw in earlier decades.

144. See Elizabeth Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis* (Washington: World Bank, 2005).

145. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90.

146. See James D. Fearon, "Governance and Civil War Onset" (background paper for the World Development Report 2011, Washington, DC, 31 August 2010), http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/WDR%20Background%20Paper_Fearon_0.pdf (accessed 19 January 2011).

147. Ibid., 76.

148. Ibid., 80. Emphasis in original.

149. Fearon, "Economic Development, Insurgency and Civil War," 318.

150. Ibid., 319.

151. Cullen S. Hendrix, "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (May 2010): 273–285.

152. Note that the conflict terminations data referred to here are at the *dyadic* level—i.e., they relate to the outcomes of conflicts between pairs of warring parties as opposed to conflict terminations that can include several actors on each side. A number of the insurgent victories were in fact military coups—i.e., revolts from within the government—not cases where a rebel group overthrew the state.

153. Richard Stubbs, "ASEAN Plus Three: Process and Performance Legitimacy" (paper presented at the 2nd Annual Meeting of the GARNET Network, Coventry, United Kingdom, 17–19 September 2007).

154. A recent econometric analysis by Clayton Thyne found that states that provide public goods effectively—the study focused on educational and health policies—have a reduced risk of succumbing to conflict. See Clayton L. Thyne, "ABC's, 123's and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980–1999," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (December 2006): 733–754; and David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, "War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency," RAND Corporation, 2008, 96, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf (accessed 21 October 2010).
155. Andrew J. Nathan, "Political Culture and Diffuse Regime Support in Asia" (working paper series no. 43, Asian Barometer Project Office, Taipei, Taiwan, 2007), 2, http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.43.pdf (accessed 21 October 2010).
156. Ibid. In highly democratic Japan where the standard of living is far higher than in China, but where the economy has stalled over the last 20 years while China's has boomed, the level of support for the government is very low.
157. Martin C. Libicki, "Eighty-Nine Insurgencies and Endings," in *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 391, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf (accessed 21 October 2010).
158. Ibid., 385.
159. Indeed, the state-capacity argument advanced by Fearon and Laitin and others only makes sense if one assumes that government resources increase at a faster rate than do those of insurgents when national income is increasing. In some cases, of course, rebels may secure external funding or gain access to lootable resources—diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola, and other gemstones and timber in Cambodia, for example. This could counter the increased resources that accrue disproportionately to governments as the level of national development increases.
160. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* 63, no. 1 (January 2009): 67–106.
161. Ibid.
162. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Organization* 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 93–128.
163. Arreguin-Toft's dataset includes some interstate wars; both the Arreguin-Toft and Lyall and Wilson datasets include cases like Vietnam where insurgents are fighting external powers.
164. Ibid., 97.
165. Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2–3 (2005): 154.
166. The wars of liberation from colonial rule in Southeast Asia took place between 1946 and 1962, and included struggles by Indonesian nationalists against the Dutch, by the Communist Party of Malaya against the British, and by Vietnamese nationalists against the French.
167. Spencer Tucker, *Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 57.
168. Douglas Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union, Anatomy of an Alliance* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 106.
169. Lacina and Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat," 154.
170. Mark O'Neill, "Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Soviet-era Archives," *OAH Magazine of History* 14, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 20–24.
171. United States Army Center of Military History, "The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention 3 November 1950–24 January 1951," 3 October 2003, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm (accessed 8 October 2010).

172. Ibid.

173. Lacina and Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat," 154. In a recent update, the figures have been adjusted slightly downwards, with a best estimate of 995,000.

174. Major General George S. Eckhardt, *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 1950–1969* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 11.

175. See The History Place, "The Vietnam War: The Bitter End: 1969–1975," 1999, http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1969.html (accessed 26 October 2010).

176. Ibid.

177. Andrew Wiest, *The Vietnam War* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 70.

178. Anne Leland and Mari-Jana Oboroceanu, *American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 26 February 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf (accessed 26 October 2010).

179. The RAND study noted earlier, which used a somewhat different definition of the term "conflict" to that used by UCDP, found that governments won in 53 percent of conflicts that terminated in a victory. See Gompert and Gordon, *War by Other Means* (accessed 21 October 2010). The UCDP conflict terminations data referred to here and in what follows are at the *dyadic* level and are not comparable with the conflict terminations data discussed in Chapters 4 and 10 of this *Report*, which are at the *conflict* level—i.e., they may include conflicts between a state and *more than one* non-state armed group. At the conflict level, the share of government wins over insurgents is almost 70 percent of all formal victories.

180. Joakim Kreutz, UCDP *Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook: Version 2.1* (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, September 2008), http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/15/15902_Codebook_conflict_termination_2.1.pdf (accessed 20 October 2010).

181. UCDP counts a conflict episode as terminated if the battle-death toll falls below 25 a year. Not all conflicts that stop because battle-death numbers fall below this threshold are de facto government victories, of course. In some cases, the fighting stops because insurgents are simply taking time out to regroup and re-arm to fight again another day. But conflicts that stop because they fall below the threshold *and* do not start up again can reasonably be described as de facto government victories. In the case of East Asia between 1980 and 2008, almost half of the intrastate conflict dyads that became inactive because their battle-death toll fell below 25 in a year have not resumed fighting; at the conflict level the figure is 30 percent.

182. Steven Metz, "Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability," Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 1 February 1995, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=333 (accessed 20 October 2010).

183. Edward Luttwak, "Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice," *Harper's Magazine*, February 2007, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/02/0081384 (accessed 25 October 2010).

184. Ibid.

185. Ibid.

186. Ibid.

187. Dave Kilcullen, "Edward Luttwak's 'Counterinsurgency Malpractice,'" *Small Wars Journal Blog*, 15 April 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/edward-luttwaks-counterinsurge-1/ (accessed 25 October 2010).

188. Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 97, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG964.pdf (accessed 25 October 2010).

189. See the UCDP/HSRP one-sided violence dataset.

190. James Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 275–301.

191. World Bank, *World Development Indicators (WDI) & Global Development Finance (GDF),* World databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2 (accessed 20 October 2010).

192. Commission on Growth and Development, *The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development*, 2008, http://cgd.s3.amazonaws.com/GrowthReportComplete.pdf (accessed 20 October 2010).

193. One corollary is that we would expect that future wars will cluster in states that have weak institutions of governance and low levels of legitimacy.

CHAPTER 4

194. There are far fewer studies of civil war duration than there are of civil war onset. Among the most cited of the former are Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 253–273; James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 275–301.

195. Ann Hironaka, *Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War* (Cambridge: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2005), 106.

196. Ibid., 50.

197. Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 415–429.

198. Hironaka, *Neverending Wars*, 124.

199. Charles T. Call, "Assessing El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to Peace," in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 384.

200. Jack Snyder, "The End of War? Not So Fast" (paper prepared for The End of War: A Conference in Honor of Randall Forsberg, City College of New York, New York City, May 2008).

201. The one obvious exception here is the genocide in Rwanda.

202. See Human Security Report Project, "The Myth of Civilian War Deaths," in *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 75.

203. James D. Fearon and David A. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90.

204. Snyder, "The End of War? Not So Fast."

205. Tatyana P. Soubbotina with Katherine A. Sheram, *Beyond Economic Growth: Meeting the Challenges of Global Development* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000), 24.

206. Charles Roxburgh et al., *Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies* (San Francisco: McKinsey & Company, 2010), 1. Economic growth rates have continued to rise since 2008.

207. This supports the claim that increased state capacity decreases the risk of war. It in no sense demonstrates it, of course, since there are other possible explanations for the decline in conflicts in this period.

208. John Mueller has argued that war, as traditionally defined, may indeed be obsolescent, but he does not deny that what most conflict researchers define as armed conflict persists in very poor countries. However, he distinguishes what he sees as violent "predation" from more traditional conceptions of warfare. See John Mueller, "Policing the Remnants of War," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 5 (September 2003): 507–518.

209. UN Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council, 31 January 1992, http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf (accessed 20 December 2010).

210. Lawrence Woocher, "Preventing Violent Conflict: Assessing Progress, Meeting Challenges," *Special Report* no. 231 (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 12.

211. Report of the Secretary-General, *Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2008–2009* (New York: United Nations General Assembly, 2 November 2007), 2.

212. Once a country succumbs to conflict, its risk of again relapsing into conflict if the fighting stops increases sharply. This creates so-called conflict traps. These arise because the structural causes of war—notably weak state capacity—and the level of hostility between warring parties are intensified by the destruction wrought by prolonged wartime violence. See Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington: World Bank, 2003), 4.

213. Report of the Secretary-General, *Proposed Programme Budget*, 26.

214. SRSG Database created by Manuel Fröhlich, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (http://www.iog.uni-jena.de) as part of a project funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF); Manuel Fröhlich et al., "Mapping UN Presence. A Follow-Up to the Human Security Report," *Die Friedenswarte. Journal of International Peace and Organization* 81, no. 2 (2006): 13–23.

215. Theresa Whitfield, author of a study of Friends groups, has reviewed the security role played by these groups under three broad headings: peacemaking (stopping ongoing wars); post-conflict peacebuilding (preventing wars that have stopped from starting again); and preventive diplomacy. Her findings were instructive. While Friends groups were involved in peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding in approximately equal numbers, there was no evidence that any were involved in preventive diplomacy missions. Teresa Whitfield, *Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2007): 286–295.

216. Report of the Secretary-General, *Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict* (New York: United Nations General Assembly, 18 July 2006), 26.

217. Barnett R. Rubin and Bruce D. Jones, "Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations," *Global Governance* 13 (July–September 2007): 391–408.

218. Ibid., 404.

219. Ibid., 392.

220. See Antje Herrberg and Heidi Kumpulainen, eds., *The Private Diplomacy Survey 2008: Mapping of 14 Private Diplomacy Actors in Europe and America* (Brussels: Initiative for Peacebuilding, 2008).

221. The effectiveness of preventive diplomacy, when practiced, is difficult to determine for two reasons. First, when it succeeds, nothing happens. Proving the counterfactual, i.e., that if there had not been a preventive initiative there would have been war is extremely difficult. Second, it will frequently be just as difficult to attribute the nonhappening to the diplomatic initiatives rather than other factors.

222. See various case studies in David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2003).

223. Michael S. Lund and Lisa Schirch, "The Roles of Non-Military Programs Within a Comprehensive Preventive Approach to Terrorism and Insurgencies" (statement given before the House Armed Services Committee: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, Washington, DC, 7 May 2009), 7.
224. See UN Department of Political Affairs, "Politically Speaking: Bulletin of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs," Spring 2009, http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/dpa_ps_2009_spring.pdf (accessed 12 December 2010).
225. DPA preventive diplomacy intiatives sometimes include attempting to prevent the escalation of existing conflicts.
226. Security Council Report, "Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention," *Security Council Report Update Report*, 14 July 2010, 3.
227. Security Council Report, "Preventive Diplomacy."
228. Patrick M. Regan, Richard W. Frank, and Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 1 (2009): 135–146.
229. Ibid. There were also five cases of withdrawal of diplomatic representation.
230. Ibid. Another new dataset on mediation in intrastate conflicts has been compiled by Jacob Bercovitch, Karl DeRouen, and Paulina Popieszna. It was discussed at the annual conference of the International Studies Association in New Orleans, LA, in February 2010. It is not yet in the public domain, however.
231. Regan, Frank, and Aydin, "Diplomatic Inventions."
232. Ibid.
233. UN Department of Political Affairs, 2003, unpublished data.
234. The data came originally from a UN official who was then in the Department of Political Affairs.
235. Whitfield, *Friends Indeed?*, 285.
236. Ibid.
237. Laurie Nathan, "'The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics': A Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War," Crisis States Discussion Paper no. 11 (London: Development Studies Institute [DESTIN], London School of Economics, 2005).
238. See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (August 2004): 563–595 and James D. Fearon and David A. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90.
239. Herrberg and Kumpulainen, *Private Diplomacy Survey*. The study was undertaken for the European Union-funded Initiative for Peace Building.
240. Teresa Whitfield, "External Actors in Mediation," in Mediation Practice Series (Geneva: Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, February 2010), 10.
241. Regan, Frank, and Aydin, "Diplomatic Interventions," 136.
242. Bernd Beber, "The (Non-)Efficacy of Multi-Party Mediation in Wars Since 1990" (essay written at New York University, August 2010), 15. The dataset included interstate conflicts but these were only a very small percentage of all conflicts in this period.
243. Regan, Frank, and Aydin, "Diplomatic Interventions," 140.

244. Frida Möller, Karl DeRouen Jr., Jacob Bercovitch, and Peter Wallensteen, "The Limits of Peace: Third Parties in Civil Wars in Southeast Asia, 1993–2004," in *Unraveling Internal Conflicts in East Asia and the Pacific: Incidence, Consequences, and Resolutions*, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Karl DeRouen Jr. (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011), 60. There are, as we pointed out in Chapter 3, other factors that help explain the decline in armed conflicts in Southeast Asia, notably rising state capacity and increased state legitimacy. These long-term changes reduced both the incentives and opportunities for armed conflict and, in some cases, created conditions conducive to effective peacemaking as well. The point here is simply that explanations that focus on long-term socio-economic changes whose effects are conducive to peace, and explanations that focus on mediation processes that lead to peace settlements, are complementary, not contradictory.

245. Not all of these peace agreements involved international mediation, but the overwhelming majority certainly did.

246. Regan, Frank, and Aydin, "Diplomatic Interventions," 142.

247. The large number of conflict recurrences we see today is not a result of failed peacebuilding efforts. As the data presented in Chapter 10 indicate, the conflicts that recur are predominantly those in which there is neither a decisive victory nor a peace agreement, and certainly not a peacekeeping mission.

248. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping," UN Factsheet, January 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf (accessed 5 February 2011).

249. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 779–801.

250. Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 173. For further research that confirms the general stabilizing effects of peacekeeping operations, see Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, "Post-Conflict Risks," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 4 (July 2008): 461–478; Håvard Hegre, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, "Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peace-keeping Operations" (paper presented to the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2–5 September 2010), and Joakim Kreutz, "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (March 2010): 243–250.

251. Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?,* 173.

252. Dr. Birger Heldt, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sandöverken, Sweden.

     Note that the graph shows the average number of peacekeeping operations per month for each year.

253. UN Security Council, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," Report to the UN General Assembly, 21 August 2000, x.

254. Ibid., 9.

255. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 335.

256. UN Security Council, "Report on Peace Operations," 5.

257. See UN DPKO and Department of Field Support, "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping," July 2009, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf (accessed 20 December 2010).

258. James Dobbins, "The UN's Role in Nation-building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq," *Survival* 46, no. 4 (Winter 2004–2005): 81–102.

259. On critical equipment shortages for peacekeeping operations—from strategic airlift to night operations capabilities—see UN DPKO and Department of Field Support, "A New Partnership Agenda."

260. The UN has sought to address the coordination challenge by introducing the idea of "integrated missions," with mixed success and strong opposition from some humanitarian agencies. See Erin A. Weir, "Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative," Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Center (KAIPTC) Monograph, no. 4 (June 2006), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1EE897418FD9945CC12571CE003EB9F8-KAIPTC-Jun2006.pdf (accessed 20 December 2010), 36.
261. Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007).
262. Michael Carnahan, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore, "Economic Impact of Peacekeeping" (report prepared for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, NY, March 2006).
263. Sharon Wiharta, "The Legitimacy of Peace Operations," in *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 111.
264. Addressing this concern, a new report undertaken for the UN by an advisory group led by former Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno, has proposed a radical change to the way the UN provides civilian peacebuilding capacity to peace operations. Rather than relying heavily on outside expertise, the UN should, the report argues, draw more on the civilian capacities of conflict-affected countries themselves, "with international capacity the mechanism of last resort." UN News Service, "Nimbler UN, Global Partners Needed to Build Stability in Post-conflict States—Report," press release, 7 March 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37700&Cr=post-conflict&Cr1= (accessed 8 March 2011).
265. UN DDR Resource Centre, The UN Approach to DDR, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards: Level 2 Concepts, Policy and Strategy of the IDDRS," 1 August 2006, http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/02/#6 (accessed 20 April 2011).
266. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Demobilization and Reintegration," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 4 (August 2007): 531–567.
267. UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, "Overview: DDR Processes in Africa" (paper presented at the Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, June 2007), 7, http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/overview.pdf (accessed 20 April 2011).
268. Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 20.
269. Jeremy Weinstein and Macartan Humphreys, "Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration" (Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 69, Washington, DC, September 2005), 3.
270. Robert Muggah, "The Emperor's Clothes?" in *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 7.
271. Walter, *Committing to Peace*, 161.
272. James Pugel, "Measuring Reintegration in Liberia: Assessing the Gap between Outputs and Outcomes," in *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*, ed. Robert Muggah (New York: Routledge, 2008), 87.
273. Humphreys and Weinstein, "Demobilization and Reintegration," 532.
274. Ibid., 563.
275. DDR programs are increasingly being referred to as DDRR programs, i.e., disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs.
276. James Pugel, United Nations Development Programme, "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Liberia," April 2007, 69, http://www.lr.undp.org/UNDPwhatFightersSayLiberia_Finalv3.pdf (accessed 11 February 2011).

277. The study of the reintegration of former child soldiers in northern Uganda by Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan is another rare example of a methodologically sophisticated survey-based analysis—one that challenges many common assumptions about the impact of conflict on the prospects for successful integration. See Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, "Child Combatants in Northern Uganda: Reintegration Myths and Realities," in *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*, ed. Robert Muggah (New York: Routledge, 2008).

278. Michael Renner, "Peacekeeping Expenditures in Current vs. Real Terms: 1947–2005," Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/pk_tables/currentreal.pdf (accessed 11 February 2011).

279. Richard Gowan, "Will UN Peacekeeping Fall Victim to Budget Cuts?" *The Globalist*, 23 September 2010, http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=8708 (accessed 20 December 2010).

280. Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 350.

281. Timothy E. Wirth, "UN Peacekeeping: A Bargain and an Opportunity" (testimony to the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 13 June 2007) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070613-wirth.htm (accessed 10 December 2010).

282. The data for the UN peacekeeping budget are from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Global military expenditure in 2009 is estimated to have been $1,531 billion; see Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail, and Carina Solmirano, "Military Expenditure," in *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 178.

283. Joakim Kreutz, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; updated from Joakim Kreutz, "Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union," Bonn International Center for Conversion Paper 45, 2005, http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/papers/paper45/paper45.pdf (accessed 25 November 2010).

     The graph includes UN, European Union, and OSCE sanctions regimes.

284. Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (Washington: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 158. A study by the United States Institute of Peace found that US-imposed sanctions had a success rate of between 25 and 33 percent. See Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2003).

285. David Cortright and George A. Lopez, "Learning from the Sanctions Decade," *Global Dialogue* 2, no. 3 (Summer 2000), http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=90 (accessed 17 December 2010).

286. See Damien Fruchart et al., "United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour," report by SIPRI and the Special Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, November 2007.

287. Fruchart et al., "United Nations Arms Embargoes," 33–34. Note that these embargoes have also been included in the total of the other UN sanctions regimes discussed earlier. This separate discussion is included here because arms embargoes have some unique features.

288. David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds., *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 18.

289. Abel Escribà-Folch, "Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (March 2010): 129–141.

290. Ibid.

291. See Monty G. Marshall, “Polity IV Project,” http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed 10 December 2010). Note that the Polity IV dataset only includes countries with a population size of 500,000 or greater.

292. Håvard Hegre et al.,“Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 33–48.

293. See Monty G. Marshall,“Global Trends in Democratization,” in *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, eds. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005), 17.

294. Marshall,“Polity IV Project” (accessed 10 December 2010).

295. Determining the net impact of the increase in the number of democratic countries on the risk of conflict is difficult because the number of anocracies—the mode of governance that has the highest risk of war—has also increased over the past two decades. For a discussion of these issues, see Monty G. Marshall,“Global Trends in Democratization,” 17.

296. Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 4 (December 2010): 939–963.

297. Ibid.

298. Chandra Lekha Sriram,“Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses,” *American University International Law Review* 19, no. 2 (2003): 310–429.

299. Kim and Sikkink,“Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights,” 943.

300. The deterrent effect of punishment has been the subject of considerable debate in the research community, particularly with respect to the deterrent effect of punishments in domestic legal systems where almost all the research has been undertaken. Kim and Sikkink note with respect to the latter that the evidence indicates that it is the *probability* of punitive sanctions, rather than their *severity,* that determines the deterrent effect.

301. Kim and Sikkink,“Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights,” 940.

302. Ibid. See footnote 12 on page 946 of that paper for an explanation of how the authors used the Polity IV dataset to determine the coding criteria for the three categories.

303. Ibid., 941.

304. James Fearon,“Governance and Civil War Onset,” in *World Development Report 2011* (Washington: World Bank, 2010), 25. Emphasis in original. A key question is: Are core human rights violations an independent cause of civil war or merely an early manifestation of it? This is an important methodological caveat, but even if human rights violations are not an independent cause of civil war, knowing that any increase in their frequency could still provide early warning of impending conflict is a potentially relevant finding for policy-makers.

305. James D. Fearon, “Governance and Civil War Onset” (background paper for the World Development Report 2011, Washington, DC, 31 August 2010), http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/WDR%20Background%20Paper_Fearon_0.pdf (accessed 19 January 2011). As we noted in Chapter 2, the conflict-related quantitative research literature is replete, not only with methodological challenges, but also with studies that have divergent findings—indeed consensus is the exception rather than the rule.

306. To be included in the dataset, minority groups had to have a membership of at least 100,000 or constitute 1 percent of the national population of the country in question. See Victor Asal and Amy Pate, “The Decline of Ethnic Political Discrimination, 1950–2003,” in *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, eds. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005), 29, 33.

307. Asal and Pate,"The Decline of Ethnic Political Discrimination, 1950–2003," 33.

308. Deepa Khosla,"Self-Determination Movements and Their Outcomes," in *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, eds. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005), 25.

309. World Bank, World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2 (accessed 13 December 2010). The figure presented here is for low- and lower-middle-income countries.

310. Håvard Hegre,"The Duration and Termination of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 243–252.

311. Center on International Cooperation, announcement of the publication of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011*, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/annual_review_11.html (accessed 24 February 2011). Emphasis added. The authors of the annual review warn, however, that "the international community's unwillingness to mandate new operations amid fiscal constraints … mean that the era of large-scale growth in global peace operations may be coming to a close."

312. See, for example, Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight, *Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001); and Norman Podhoretz, *World War IV: The Long Struggle against Islamofascism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007).