Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda

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Dr. Roy Godson
NSIC President and Emeritus Professor of Government,
Georgetown University

Dr. Richard Shultz
Professor and Director, International Security Program
Fletcher School, Tufts University

With the assistance of

Dr. Querine Hanlon
Associate Professor, College of International Security Affairs,
National Defense University

&

Dr. Samantha Ravich
Former Deputy National Security Adviser,
Vice President of the United States

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It is now time to recognize that a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly occurred: from armies with comparable forces doing battle to a strategic confrontation between a range of combatants . . . using different types of weapons, often improvised. The old paradigm was that of interstate industrialized war. The new one is the paradigm of war amongst the people . . . [It] can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defense of civilians.

General Sir Rupert Smith
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (1998–2001)

This is a different kind of fight . . . Our strategy cannot be focused on . . . destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort . . . [W]e must interact more closely with the population and focus on operations that bring stability, while shielding them from insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion. [This] demands a persistent presence.

General Stanley McChrystal
Commander, US Forces/International Security
Assistance Force, Afghanistan (2009–)

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Key Findings

1. Although the 21st-century environment is more complex, some patterns are discernable. Among them are the predominant security challenges arising from weak states, armed groups (even without weapons of mass destruction), other super-empowered nonstate actors and authoritarian regimes using irregular techniques.

2. These are certainties of the security landscape, and they will persist for years to come.

3. The seriousness of these challenges is further magnified by the fact that these state and nonstate actors often do not act alone. Rather, they develop cooperative relationships ranging from *de facto* coalitions to loose affiliations.

4. These challenges cannot be managed if we remain diverted by 20th-century, state-centric mindsets and capabilities.

5. There is a creative, relatively inexpensive 21st-century security agenda available that, if adopted, can make a difference—and save U.S. lives and treasure.

6. The key capabilities that we will need are NOT super-enhanced technology and more divisions and firepower—although we do need to retain robust U.S. conventional and nuclear forces.

7. The U.S. now needs dedicated units of civilian and military professionals with skill sets focused on the certain challenges. There are creative public servants and soldiers with these exceptional skills. We need many more.

8. Among the highest priorities are:

   a. Reoriented and restructured military units whose primary mission is to prevail in these nontraditional irregular conflicts that the U.S. most likely will face.

   b. Intelligence dominance through collection, analysis, and exploitation derived from local knowledge and operations in conflict zones.

   c. Civilian and military stability units, trained, dedicated, and resourced to assist indigenous leaders by bringing security, development, and rule of law principles to local areas.

   d. Strategic communication principles becoming a major component of top down driven policy, implemented by career specialists educated for this purpose.

   e. Political capabilities performed by small corps of trained professionals—military and civilian—with authorities, skills, and resources to forge coalitions among foreign state and nonstate actors.

The 21st Century Is Different

To say the world is changing is to state the obvious. The security environment is becoming more complex, with shadowy and seemingly unpredictable threats around the globe. What is much less understood is exactly how the environment has changed, why it is evolving so rapidly, and what can be done to meet the new national security challenges that arise as a result. Understanding these trends and patterns is critical, since these new challenges are likely to persist for decades.

As this report documents, one key factor in the evolution now under way is that half of the nearly 200 countries in the world are weak, failing, or failed states. These states often have little control over major parts of their territory. They cannot provide security or deliver major services to large segments of their population. They are vulnerable to whoever can mobilize the population and armed groups—terrorists, criminals, insurgents and militias—within their territories. Afghanistan and Pakistan are among the most dramatic examples, but many other regions face similar problems.

To further complicate matters, major authoritarian states and extremist movements seek regional dominance and even global influence. In those pursuits, they often use the territory of weak states and the armed groups within them to advance their global interests and aims.

This is the landscape the United States and other democracies will confront for years to come. These events are not a temporary disruption of the ordinary state of world affairs or a short-lived distraction from a normal state of peace and order. Rather, they are symptoms of a new environment that will likely—in one form or another—constitute the major security challenge in the early 21st century.

As surprising as it may seem, pirate attacks off Somalia, militias in Lebanon, and criminal armies in Mexico are part of a global pattern and not anomalies.

Critical to making sense of this new state of affairs—and to creating significant security capabilities—is the realization that wars between nation-states, all too common in the last century, are becoming an anomaly. Rather, events such as insurgent attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, atrocities in Darfur, terrorist plots in and around Yemen, weapons dealing by rogue individuals, the use of the Internet to instill fear and influence politics, proxy wars in the Middle East, and kidnappings of civilians in dozens of nations continue. These are not isolated incidents but rather examples of what is becoming the norm for conflict in far-flung corners of the world.

This new environment poses dangerous and evolving threats. Yet these are threats that the world's stable democracies—now a minority of today's expanded roster of countries—can successfully deal with if they first understand exactly what they are facing.

An important way to combat threats emanating from weak and fragile states is to strengthen legitimate government and the rule of law to alleviate pressures that lead to instability.

Beyond threats, the new situation also presents opportunities. Fragile states are at the core of the new

environment. Often, they are not so much hostile to democratic principles as they are weak and incapable of asserting authority over their territory and population, thus paving the way for nefarious forces to fill the vacuum. If the world's strong democracies can exert a positive influence in these areas, helping local authorities create resilient communities while building effective governing institutions that provide protection and services for their citizens, the dangers posed by hostile and extremist forces are likely to be reduced.

To help make this a reality, the United States needs a set of tools and skills suited to the world as it is and as it is likely to evolve, not as it was. Among them:

- A reoriented and retrained military better able to deal with irregular challenges;

- More effective intelligence collection, analysis, and exploitation derived from local knowledge in conflict zones;

- Military and civilian teams, comprised of well-trained professionals to assist indigenous leaders, to bring stability, development, and rule of law culture to local areas;

- Strategic communication that supports these goals; and

- Corps of political entrepreneurs, civilian and military, skilled at building coalitions at the local, national, and transnational levels to prevent and prevail in irregular conflicts.

Part One of this report provides the specifics of how instability, conflict, and war in the 21st century have changed in significant ways, and the challenges facing the United States and other democracies. It spells out the key dimensions of the new security paradigm.

Part Two identifies specific capabilities that the United States and its allies need to develop to manage and mitigate the threats emerging from this new environment. Some elements of each already exist but need to be adapted and reconfigured and augmented. Others will have to be developed and expanded. And all need to be meshed into a coherent, functioning whole.

Part 1
Confrontation and Conflict in the 21st Century

The 9/11 attacks alerted America—if belatedly—to the dangers of the battle being waged against the West by irregular, extremist forces. Other ominous threats demand our attention as well: A nation run by religious zealots with nuclear arms ambitions that talks of wiping another country off the map; the indiscriminate killing of schoolchildren; hostage-taking; criminal armies who possess more sophisticated weaponry than the police; the worldwide trafficking of women and children; or ship invasions and seizure by pirates off the coast of Somalia—something we thought belonged to a bygone era.

These events occur against a continual backdrop of roadside and suicide bombings, the massacre of civilians, and the just-in-time disruption of terrorist plots leading to arrests, all appearing on the media like a monotonous rerun documentary—punctuated by occasional spectaculars like the Madrid train attack or mayhem in Mumbai.

What, it's natural to wonder, is going on? What happened? Is the world falling apart? Is there some conspiratorial thread in all of this?

A key point to be made at the outset is that these events are related—not in the conspiratorial sense—but because they share several characteristics. Each event springs from the profound changes that mark our world in this century. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry that for 40 years featured army vs. army, industrial might vs. industrial might ended. While it lasted, the strength of the two adversarial blocs, made for a dangerous world. But it was a largely predictable situation in which U.S. policymakers and their allies understood a great deal about the opponent and

about how to guard against the threat. Neither side wanted to risk retaliation from the other.

Now, the relative stability that dominated the second half of the 20th century has been replaced by an increasingly decentralized world in which conflicts and hostilities—some new and others long frozen in place by the big-power showdown—manifest themselves. In this and other ways, as will be explained, the events we watch unfold are less random than might at first appear. While that may seem counterintuitive in a world that suddenly appears chaotic, understanding the links in these outwardly disparate attacks and threats is paramount to building the capacity to meet them.

Some spring from religious strife, others are ethnic or territorial in nature. What they have in common is a disregard for the value of human life; a breach of the traditional norms of warfare or even of criminal activity; an embrace of extreme violence; a rejection of democratic principles, and a proclivity not only to ignore the distinction between military and civilian targets but often to intentionally focus on the latter. In many but not all instances, the protagonists are willing—and sometimes eager—to die for their cause. That makes their assaults harder to prevent, while their zealotry renders negotiations or compromises almost impossible.

A decade into the 21st century we are able to see that these often decentralized low-level yet intense confrontations across the globe are here to stay.

Many of those who orchestrate these acts, while ruthless in the present, simultaneously take a pa-

tient and long-term view; they are willing to wait out their foes and will not be deterred by short-term setbacks. Their tactics put Americans and others at risk. A nation need not border a failed state to experience the conflict. Nor does it have to be formally at war for its citizens to be harmed by actions originating in weak states or ungoverned territories.

These types of confrontations will persist, at least for the foreseeable future—the opening shots in a form of continuous low-level yet intensely deadly warfare. As technology advances and these outlaw groups acquire more resources and use them more skillfully, the potential dangers will grow exponentially.

We can manage these conflicts if we shake our 20th-century mindset and begin to see that overcoming this century's conflicts requires more than purely military solutions with a declaration of war at the beginning and a peace treaty at the end. Irregular conflict and "war amongst the people" are the norm rather than the exception going forward.

Fortunately, in seeking to construct a national security approach adequate to the task, we can identify patterns among the disparate events taking place in many parts of the globe, and use that framework to connect the dots and make sense of them.

For that to occur, however, we have to realize that the world of today cannot be understood through the lens of the 20th-century, state-centric security paradigm. Not only has the global structure shifted markedly, this has been accompanied by dramatic changes in the nature of instability, conflict, and war. Among the most important differences are these:

First, there are many more actors and players, making for a far more complex field of engagement. And the strategies and techniques that countries, armed groups, and rogue states employ differ markedly from those used in the 20th century. We also see the emergence of new types of coalitions, partnerships, and networks of state and nonstate actors that are able to challenge the United States and other democracies.

Second, when fragile and new democracies are categorized among the world's weak states, as they must be, it turns out that more than half of the world's population lives within these territories. Because the governments of these countries are unable to control large areas within their borders, these states provide the conditions—and the fertile ground—for the incubation and maturation of hundreds of armed groups. The magnitude of the risk posed by weak states and unexercised authority still has not been fully appreciated. A successful security strategy will require the world's stable democracies to focus on this and respond in cooperative fashion.

Third, these first two developments provide opportunities for small decentralized groups of individuals, organizations, or outlaw states to pursue their objectives at the local, national, regional, and even sometimes at the global level. Many of these actors are capable of causing major damage in their own territory, to U.S. allies in various regions, or to the United States. Terrorists and criminal organizations hit targets in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America. Crime cartels are players in Mexico as well as in Central and South America. Experts predict cyber attacks; and the use of biological, chemical, and even weaponized nuclear materials is on the horizon, expanding the potential geographic and casualty ranges that are in play.

Fourth, authoritarian regional powers—most importantly Iran, China, and Russia—are unlikely to seek direct confrontation with U.S. military forces. Rather they will use irregular means to weaken American influence. Among their tools are alliances with armed groups and movements that act as proxies and surrogates. The nature of the threats posed by each of these states differs, but in each case it is significant: China's economy and military-industrial capacity is expanding, Iran is marching toward a nuclear capacity, and Russia's strong-man regime is achieving domestic acceptance.

Fifth, to achieve their aims, armed groups, political movements and (through proxies) authoritarian regimes are waging irregular conflict and sometimes warfare. There is no clear beginning of or end to this kind of conflict. It can continue for years or even decades. It is not fought on battlefields between armies. There are no front lines to identify and attack. In this type of warfare, the enemy uses many nontraditional tactics—assassinations and roadside bombs, suicide attacks, bribery, propaganda in the new and old media—to gain power slowly over territory and populations. The theater of irregular conflict includes streets, neighborhoods, villages, websites, schools, and television—settings where the local governments are often weak, targets are highly vulnerable, and the effectiveness of U.S. military superiority is diminished or nonexistent.

Unless Americans grasp that these transformative developments not only make for uncertainty but that they are here to stay for decades, they won't be prepared to meet the challenges to U.S. security interests in the short and long term. This deficit could inflict a heavy toll on the United States and its allies.

What follows are the "known knowns" of the 21st-century security environment, grouped into three principal categories:

• Identification of the major actors—both state and nonstate—who are poised to dominate.

• Description of these actors' visions and strategic cultures and how these shape their goals and actions.

• Delineation of the varied means and instruments these actors are employing to achieve their objectives.

Actors Who Will Dominate the 21st-Century Security Environment

In the period 2010–2025, the chief sources of instability, conflict, and war at the local, regional, and global levels will be a diverse frequently decentralized set of actors. They are grouped into strong, weak, or failing/failed states; local, regional, or global armed groups; and super-empowered individuals, groups, and institutions.

Authoritarian, Weak, and Failing States

The proliferation of weak states will be among the preponderant sources of instability, conflict, and war over the next decade or two, at the very least. They already outnumber strong states. Although the boundary lines are somewhat blurred, states can be classified by *strength* and *by system of government.* The approximate breakdown is:

A majority of states today are weak, including roughly one in five that are failing or failed. To varying degrees, weak states—whether democratic or authoritarian—are unable to control all their territory, maintain a monopoly over the instruments of force or perform core functions beginning with providing security for significant sections of their populations. When these conditions become severe, a state's legitimacy seriously erodes, or even vanishes.

Strong States	(Democratic)	40 to 45
	(Authoritarian)	10 to 15
Weak States	(Democratic)	50 to 55
	(Authoritarian)	30 to 35
Failed/Failing States		35 to 40

More than 50% of the world's population live in these states

Such states afford opportunities that armed groups and political movements can exploit. In major parts of Mexico, for example, a violent struggle is under way. On one side are criminal organizations acting with relative impunity, corrupting or targeting officials, and/or each other. These organizations operate locally and regionally, and sometimes at the national level. On the other side are the efforts of governments, at various levels, to provide security and services with the support of elements of courageous civil society leaders and major sections of the population. In Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area, and other parts of the country, armed groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban threaten much of the country. From these sanctuaries they launch violent attacks into Afghanistan and against the Pakistani government and the civil society leaders who oppose them. If Pakistan disintegrates, its 50–100 nuclear weapons will be up for grabs.

As this suggests, individual states can face differing challenges, with some states finding themselves at risk from extremist groups with political agendas while others battle local and nationally organized criminal groups—or in some cases, combinations of both. The extremist groups are more problematic for other countries and pose the greatest threat to global stability, but both types of armed groups—extremist and criminal—are antithetical to the rule of law and contribute to chaos and violence.

In the 21st-century security environment, fairly competent authoritarian states likewise will be sources of instability and conflict, thereby also affecting U.S. security. Their instability may be caused by their own internal problems resulting from a lack of legitimacy and the suppression by force of internal opposition movements, such as the protests of Iranian citizens and domestic unrest in China. But these states will also project power in their geographic region and potentially beyond, sometimes through conventional but more often by irregular means. In the Middle East, both Iran and Syria employ armed groups as proxies to extend their power and influence. This allows them to seek power in the oil rich Persian/Arab Gulf, and to fight Israel with irregular means. Chinese arms and technology find their way into Iran and Iraq, in support of armed groups hostile to the United States. All this contributes to the capacity of these states to undermine U.S. influence and interests.

Local, Regional, and Global Armed Groups

Since the late 1980s armed groups have burgeoned in number and in the capacity to inflict damage. They have become more diverse in terms of subtypes—terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and militias—each varying in vision, mission, and the means they employ. However, it is important to appreciate that these diverse armed groups, of which there are hundreds, share the following characteristics:

- They often have above-ground operations that seek legitimacy and public support, locally and internationally, and command significant territory.

- They also develop a clandestine organization that controls the above-ground operation; this hidden stratum secures funds usually by illegal means; obtains arms, communications equipment and intelligence; and imposes discipline and security within the organization and the territory it controls.

- They do not recognize international norms, the rule of law, or the idea of human rights, and they are willing to kill those who oppose them.

- They use protracted irregular tactics to gain control of territory and populations.

- Many are skilled in the use of media, propaganda, and the Internet to broadcast their narrative.

- Almost all detest U.S. influence and norms.

These common characteristics notwithstanding, armed groups have important differences among themselves. While for analytic purposes they can be subsumed into subtypes, in the real world they are evolving and should never be thought of as static. At a given point, an armed group may be classified as a terrorist organization based on its

operational and organizational profile. But it can morph into a criminal enterprise. Also, an armed group can simultaneously fit more than one subtype. Many of their leaders are skillful and cunning. Hezbollah, for example, operates as a political party, but at the same time it is a terrorist organization, a highly trained militia, and a clandestine criminal organization with illegal enterprises in Lebanon and abroad.

The capacity of armed groups to adapt, transform themselves and to establish linkages with other armed groups, political movements, and states greatly complicates the ability of security services to understand these actors, particularly when their activities are largely clandestine. This was true for the United States following the invasion of Iraq—and helps explain the difficulties U.S. policymakers and strategists encountered there after initial military successes. Chaos, internal conflict, and societal breakdown ensued, as armed groups multiplied, many with the help of other state and nonstate actors.

Since the 1980s, armed groups have evolved rapidly from local to regional standing. Some have even become global players. They have proven adept at acclimating and adapting, with their flexibility and command structures often allowing them to outpace far larger and more powerful states. In doing so, armed groups have used violence strategically to undermine the authority, power, and legitimacy not only of weak states but even of the most powerful ones.

Bold actions have enabled some armed groups to pose direct strategic challenges to major states. For example, al-Qaeda's 9/11 and subsequent attacks on a global superpower had a profound impact on America and on U.S. policy. In 2004, a decentralized combination of armed group attacks caused a European power—Spain—to withdraw from Iraq.

Armed groups can also present *regional threats* to major powers that likewise have potentially strategic consequences. For example, armed groups at

> **These groups are very adept, very skilled in the use of cyberspace, but what we haven't seen yet is the major use of cyber attacks by terrorists. It's inevitable that there will be in the future.**
>
> Peter Clark, former Director of UK Anti-Terrorist Branch

war with each other engage in terrorist, insurgent, and criminal practices to attack U.S. and allied forces in S.W. Asia in an attempt to force their withdrawal and thus inflict a strategic defeat on the world's sole superpower.

Finally, armed groups pose *indirect threats* by destabilizing states that are important to major powers, even short of the violence taking place in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These tactics include subversion, corruption, criminal enterprise, intimidation, murder, and assassination. Mexico and Central America share some of these characteristics and vulnerabilities. Major transnational criminal groups and many smaller local and regional gangs of extortionists, kidnappers, and drug dealers are having an impact on a daily basis on the quality of life in the region and even in some cities and local communities in parts of the United States.

Super-Empowered Individuals, Groups, and Institutions

Although it may seem like the stuff of movies, the security landscape of the 21st century is also being shaped by super-empowered individuals. Operating separately, or at times through or aligned with armed groups, these micro actors have the capacity to affect the security environment by facilitating conflict and instability. Conversely, some super-empowered nonstate actors play very positive roles in the world. Their empowerment flows from personal wealth; financial or other material resources and technologies; access to weapons; and their ability to influence directly or serve as a conduit for influence.

The 9/11 Commission, for example, noted that al-Qaeda financed itself, in part, through an informal network of wealthy Gulf sheikhs and business executives. They did so in the 1980s to bankroll important parts of the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance. When that conflict ended, they continued to provide money, including funds to establish al-Qaeda bases and capabilities in Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

Beyond individuals empowered by personal wealth, groups can also be empowered by access to financial or other material resources—provided wittingly or unwittingly—and they may use those resources to foster instability. Examples include some religious charities as well as funding from diaspora communities.

Then there are super-empowered individuals who traffic in technology and weapons of both mass disruption and mass destruction. The former is well illustrated by Victor Bout, the Russian arms merchant. Through his access to large inventories of conventional weaponry along with the means to transport it virtually anywhere in the world, he provided various armed groups with the tools to engage in bloody conflicts. Another example is A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear technology entrepreneur, who sent nuclear technology to both Sunni and Shia protagonists. Closer to home, the individual, or individuals behind the 2001 anthrax letter attacks in the United States took the concept of super-empowered micro actor to a new order of magnitude.

Visions and Strategic Cultures of Major 21st-Century Actors

All the 21st-century state actors and nonstate armed groups identified above have visions of themselves and of how they would like the world to be. They are guided by strategic cultures that shape ends and means for achieving their objectives. Only through an un-blinkered understanding of these actors can U.S. security policymakers be prepared to meet the threats, and develop the necessary partnerships and capabilities.

Stable Democracies:
Can they continue to work effectively together?

The liberal democracies of the Atlantic community, as well as Israel, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and others on different continents share a common vision with respect to the core tenets of their political systems, and to the principles and institutions that comprise their political culture.

Several of these stable democracies were willing, in past situations, to protect and assist other democracies whose security was threatened. This was true, for example, of the democracies of the Atlantic community when they formed the North American Treaty Organization. A common defense strategy was adopted, and it shaped ends and means for achieving NATO's security objectives. But there were limits. NATO has been reluctant to undertake missions outside of Europe.

Any group which has global reach has to have some backing, whether it's a state or a super-empowered individual. A. Q. Kahn, for example, sold nuclear technology to the Shias and the Sunnis on different sides.

Vikram Sood, former Chief, Research and Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence service

These limitations persist today, as seen in the splintering of NATO over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan—a splintering all the more worrisome because it is taking place on several levels. In the most practical sense, a plethora of varying rules of engagement limits the nature of the military participation of many NATO members. That not only reduces the effectiveness of individual nations, it also complicates coordination within the overall force. More broadly, divergent views exist among NATO members, and importantly their citizens, over whether, and if so to what extent, Afghanistan should even be considered a serious security threat and worth risking the lives of their soldiers. Within some countries, including the United States, there are significant differences over this issue, and, as a result, over the allocation of resources and deployment of troops. Thus, even in the community of strong democracies, the conflict is not universally understood in the context of the 21st-century security challenges described in this report.

What makes this all the more remarkable is that it concerns the status of a failed state that just eight years ago provided the launching pad for the worst attack on the American homeland in history, and is adjacent to a weak nuclear armed state. While NATO nations have long differed over Afghanistan, until very recently— particularly while Iraq appeared to be almost a lost cause—there was consensus among U.S. lawmakers and policymakers that Afghanistan was a vital engagement that had to be won.

Beyond the issue of Afghanistan, some stable democracies have provided assistance to weak states making a transition to democracy, for example, Australia's leadership (with U.S. support) of the multinational intervention in East Timor. Many others have for the most part been unwilling to accept or undertake, as part of their national security policy, significant protection of and assistance to weak states attempting to make the transition. This reluctance even extends to weak democratic states whose stability and institutions are being under-mined by armed groups and their allies. In neither case do many strong democracies typically regard weak states and the extremist or criminal groups exploiting them as a priority requiring prompt, serious action. Some democracies are willing to help by providing money and other types of assistance—such as Spain in the case of Colombia—but they are generally less willing to go outside their perceived area of interest or influence to provide significant assistance. However, by not helping early on through soft power/non-kinetic means, they and the U.S. may end up later employing military force to curtail mushrooming violence. In the 21st century, similar scenarios are unfolding, for example, in the energy-crossroads region of Eurasia.

In sum, a major 21st-century security challenge for the United States will be both to reach and maintain consensus and to persuade other stable democracies to work together to assist fragile states—especially democratic ones—that are threatened by hostile alliances of armed groups and states. Doing so can be a key to avoiding the need for major military intervention later on.

Competent Authoritarian States:
Working through proxies, they are a destabilizing force and a challenge to U.S. interests.

In the security environment of the 21st century, certain authoritarian states will challenge the U.S. role in their region as well as American global influence and the democratic values to which the United States and its allies subscribe. Of these states, China, Russia, and Iran notably perceive Washington—both militarily and because of the ideas it represents—as a major threat to their power base and to their geopolitical ambitions.

Leaders of these authoritarian states have a unique vision of themselves and of the world, shaped by a historical narrative. They also have something in common that is very important. Unlike the United States, where peace is seen as the norm, and conflict and war as the anomaly, the

strategic cultures of China, Russia, and Iran view instability, conflict, and war much more as a constant state of affairs, and even as an advantageous condition. Moreover, they all challenge the prevailing world order—and believe that the United States, as the predominant global force, is a key obstacle to achieving their visions. In dealing with the United States, they are more likely to use strategies based on irregular techniques and nonstate proxies than conventional and nuclear means, especially in view of the contemporary military force imbalances. They are also interested in broader state and nonstate coalitions to further their agenda, such as the Venezuelan, Cuban, Andean, and Iranian loose coalition, or through the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Weak Democratic and Authoritarian States:

Only by blending development, education, and efforts to strengthen weak actors through security assistance will the U.S. and other democracies mitigate threats caused by instability in nearly half the globe.

Weak states—whether democratic or authoritarian—share an impulse to survive. This is at the core of their strategic culture. When their weakness in basic governance intensifies, armed groups often proliferate, undermining fundamental security and even jeopardizing the continued existence of the regime.

Weak states diverge, however, over what it means to be successful and how to strengthen themselves. For example, the leaders of some fragile democracies equate strength with the adoption of human rights and rule of law principles and institutions that are characteristic of stable democracies. However, as the post-Cold War experience reveals, some fledgling electoral democracies do not believe they have the luxury of following this course of action because of the instability and violence emanating from armed groups and the external state and nonstate actors aligned with them.

Given these threats, weak democracies too often resort to authoritarian methods and coercion to preserve the regime. In the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, this was true in Colombia and Peru.

Some nascent democracies have followed the same course for different reasons. Their fledgling institutions do not have the capacity to constrain officials and elites from using corruption and repression for personal gain. In those cases, political officeholders and the staffs of the legal-governmental establishment as well as the security forces are tempted to collaborate or provide impunity for criminal enterprises at the local, national, and transnational levels.

Though official corruption or impunity—or criminal activity that challenges the state—might appear less threatening than the actions of terrorist groups or hostile states, they can also be dangerous. At the very least such activities sap the energy of the legal system and diminish the legitimate institutions; at worst they can lead to violent attacks on those institutions and systems. They damage or destroy the rule of law and the very fabric of democracy, or derail progress toward those goals.

Reversing such trends and the instability they foster remains a major security challenge. The downward spiral in these weak states can create a vacuum of authority, paving the way for the very chaos and lawlessness in which terrorist groups and political extremists often flourish. Addressing the threat will require the creation of new partnerships and coalitions of democratic allies composed of state and nonstate actors, in ways that blend development and security assistance with progress toward legitimacy and the rule of law, and security sector reform.

Armed Groups:

These groups usually pose a significant security threat and need to be challenged by rallying local populations against their organizations and activities.

Some armed groups have grandiose worldviews and visions stated in the ideologies they propagate and seek to impose on others. They generally

critique the existing political system and propose an alternative vision and system to replace it. To achieve these ends armed groups are willing to employ unrestrained means and cause macro geopolitical damage.

Such armed groups often align with, or indeed are created as part of a larger political and social movement. An examination of al-Qaeda and its associated movements (AQAM) reveals how this transnational armed group has developed and employed its historical narrative to establish a vision and worldview that identifies near and far enemies and shapes ends and means for advancing its global goals. AQAM has demonstrated the capacity to produce extraordinary destruction.

Other armed groups may have less grandiose visions and adhere to value systems that are generally not written down but instead are communicated orally in their communities. Armed criminal groups fit this pattern. The latter are not usually attempting to transform the entire political system. Instead, their main goal is to achieve sufficient control over a particular territory and over its population so that they can govern themselves, keep enemies out, and operate freely. However, an examination of major criminal enterprises reveals that they too have visions and worldviews, codes of conduct, and strategies and narratives that integrate ends and means.

While their vision is much less grandiose than al-Qaeda's, the long-lived Cosa Nostra in Sicily and the 'Ndrangheta in Calabria nonetheless have one. They adhere to a value system and execute a strategy that seeks to maintain control over a particular territory and population. Other major criminal organizations follow similar patterns.

Whether formally stated in an ideology or communicated orally through custom, armed groups across the continents pursue their visions without regard to the rule of law and the principles of sovereignty. They strive to establish de facto quasi-government, ruling the lives of thousands or even millions of people. The strategic culture of armed groups nonetheless has several common precepts:

the conflict and the suffering entailed are constant conditions and not anomalies; the political and legal system is corrupt and is rigged to favor the elite; the gang or organization provides the only real protection, governance, and economic opportunity for the community; the use or threat of violence is everyday business, to be employed as a routine tool, not as a last resort; the support, submission, or passive acceptance of the population is essential to an armed group's ability to operate and continue. But these strategic cultures also provide windows into their vulnerabilities and offer opportunities to influence and degrade the armed groups.

Instruments and Techniques

How do we fight this fight? What's possible in the 21st-century security environment?

Different state actors and nonstate armed groups will use different instruments and techniques to conduct conflict and achieve their objectives. Worldviews and strategic cultures provide the framework through which instruments and techniques are selected, organized, and employed. Also influencing the selection of means will be the 21st-century "war amongst the people" techniques, which involve political struggle through both violent and nonviolent tactics to gain the support of, or control over, a relevant population.

Stable Democracies:

There is division and debate among the democracies about how to respond.

There is little agreement within liberal democracies over which instruments and techniques should be used to manage instability, conflict, and security. Some within the U.S. national security community continue to view conflict and war as predominantly "owned" by the 20th-century defense establishment. They rely on enhanced conventional forces and deterrence as the primary means for managing conflicts, and believe war can still be fought to a decisive conclusion. In an uncertain world of states where China is rising, Russia revitalizing, and Iran nuclearizing, holders of this viewpoint believe that U.S. security is still best ensured by being able to deter, contain, repel, or defeat major state adversaries and have a limited capability for irregular conflict at the same time. Similar views can be found within other stable democracies.

However, in the United States and other democracies there are those who have come to believe that, in additional to a modernized nuclear deterrent and a robust conventional capability, there needs to be a focus on a broader array of methods and practices for irregular conflicts and to achieve security. They believe that their adversaries—both states and nonstate actors—are using irregular means to challenge them. To counter them, the U.S. will need to develop new or much more regular and professional means that harness a wide range of civilian intelligence and military capabilities across government agencies and beyond. For the United States, the use of counterinsurgency coupled with stability, security, strategic communication, and rule of law capacity building is the predominant challenge, while still maintaining conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Moreover, there is now a need to build regional and local partnerships and networks of state and nonstate to counter contemporary irregular threats. The good news is that there are thousands of local and regional leaders, groups, and movements in many parts of the world willing to help enhance human rights and rule of law principles, and who would welcome such partnerships.

Competent Authoritarian States:

These players will challenge the U.S. and other democracies through cyber warfare and other irregular means.

Authoritarian states such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea can challenge democracies by employing varied means to achieve their visions. Although they possess substantial conventional forces, their weapons of choice are irregular instruments and partnerships with armed groups and other authoritarian regimes. For example, there is an ongoing relationship among Iran, Venezuela, Russia, Cuba, and China to promote "resistance" to what they view as liberal domination of the world.

In addition to exploiting more traditional proxies and surrogates—as in the case of Iran's use of Hezbollah or Russia's backing of separatist groups in Georgia and Moldova—other less traditional irregular means are already being developed, and sometimes employed by these authoritarian states.

There is, for instance, strong evidence that both China and Russia have developed the capacity for cyber warfare, and have used it. A Chinese cyber attack in early 2009 took over approximately 1,200 computers in 103 nations, specifically targeting overseas Tibetans linked to the exiled Dalai Lama. China also has utilized hackers extensively against the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies and companies. Russia carried out cyber attacks on Georgia's computer networks as part of its military campaign in the summer of 2008. Both China and Russia have also used their economic strength as an instrument of power.

In a fight for survival, weak states relying on coercive solutions often increase their own vulnerabilities; they need other means of bringing stability.

Most weak states have few capabilities to counter the complex array of security challenges that other states, armed groups, and political movements can pose. Some will attempt to counter the security threats by using their military forces for security purposes. Yet a reliance on the military does not necessarily translate, in the long run, to an enhanced capacity to address internal vulnerabilities. For those threats the institutions, forces, and weapons associated with a state's constabulary and police are more appropriate.

Other weak states transfer this traditional core function of governance—the internal provision of security—to nonstate actors such as Private Security Companies (PSCs). This has happened in Liberia and in other countries in Africa. While a reliance on PSCs for security may bring immediate benefits, the state risks trading short-term security gains for the longer-term erosion of its own capacity and legitimacy.

Some weak states make use of local armed militia groups (paramilitaries) to strengthen themselves and keep their elites in power. These local militias serve as proxies to meet the threats posed by other armed groups. For example, in Sudan the government has used the Janjaweed for regime survival. The Janjaweed militia has fought two armed groups—the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement—who are trying to overthrow the government. It has also used indiscriminate violence to shift ethnic settlement patterns in Darfur, so that future election outcomes favor the ruling National Congress Party.

Many of these security predicaments of weak states, including their use as operational hubs by armed groups and—in the case of fledgling democracies—their "Faustian" resort to authoritarian methods to seek regime survival, will also threaten

U.S. interests. Resorting to such means is tempting. They may prolong a regime's life but at the same time they also impede progress toward legitimacy and long-term stability.

Armed Groups:
There is often much more to their operations than is readily apparent.

To varying extents, armed groups are iceberg-like organizations, with below-the-waterline operational units that can be difficult to detect and disrupt. Hamas, for example, has many facets. In Gaza it has an overt political, security and social welfare apparatus, as well as sophisticated propaganda and media operations, in multiple languages. Hamas also maintains complex clandestine fighting capabilities. They include various types of armed units, explosives and munitions workshops, special programs for selection and training of suicide bombers, and an international network to support such capabilities.

Armed groups may rely on a broad assortment of means, both violent and nonviolent, to acquire the support of or control over the population and to gain ascendancy over state and nonstate rivals. The gold standard in this respect is Hezbollah. In addition to substantial irregular war-fighting capabilities in Lebanon and in northern Israel, it maintains a powerful clandestine apparatus in the Levant and globally. Hezbollah's strategic communications capabilities also include a sophisticated television, radio, print, and web media apparatus. In Lebanon, its overt political organization provides the Shia

Armed groups are iceberg-like organizations, with below-the-waterline operational units, difficult to detect and disrupt.

population with local security, employment, and basic social services. As a result, Hezbollah now holds 28 seats in Lebanon's parliament and enjoys the status of a political organization that negotiates directly with governments, both its own and foreign.

Armed groups place a premium on the use of intelligence and security to protect themselves from states and rivals both inside their own and other armed groups. They usually specialize in local knowledge and conduct extensive surveillance and reconnaissance to find and exploit their enemies' weaknesses. They also use intelligence to penetrate and manipulate their adversaries. Here too, Hezbollah stands out. But other armed groups also penetrate and manipulate their adversaries, as exemplified by Mexico's criminal groups.

To gain local and transnational acceptance and even support, armed groups typically construct a story or narrative that justifies their existence and their actions, extreme as those often are. The internal and external narrative need not be the same. Conveying the narrative through word and deed is viewed as crucial. Many armed groups create a sophisticated communication apparatus in diverse languages to convey their narrative; al-Qaeda has long used the Internet for this purpose. In addition to its Web 1.0 noninteractive websites and Internet forums, it employs such Web 2.0 tools as blogs and social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter, as well as the video sharing site YouTube.

Armed groups maintain, to varying degrees, regional and transstate linkages both with states and nonstate actors. They benefit from outside linkages for a continuing supply of arms and financial resources (usually from criminal activities) and sometimes for sanctuary. They also rely on these ties for an appearance of legitimacy in their dealings with the international community.

Often, armed groups form partnerships and alliances with other armed groups and states, a fact the United States belatedly discovered in the case of Iraq. Following the 2003 invasion, Iraq-based armed groups established networks and cooperative relationships with regional authoritarian states like Iran and Syria, as well as nonstate Sunni political movements abroad. Failure to understand the underlying complexity of these arrangements in Iraq as they developed cost the U.S. dearly. Conversely, the situation improved as the U.S.-led coalition professionals unraveled the various links among groups in Iraq, grasped the implications, and creatively determined what type of ad hoc response was required. Greater understanding helped U.S. military and civilian leaders develop a better strategy that, combined with changes among Iraqis themselves, including an increasing rejection of extremist violence, contributed to an amelioration of what just a few years ago had been a dire situation.

Part 2
Security Agenda

T o meet and manage the serious challenges of the 21st century, the United States needs to adapt and improve its security capabilities. We are at one of those crossroads in history. Just as horses were sent back to the stables in 1914 and tanks became the new cavalry, a new set of tools and tactics will need to be developed and employed. In today's complex world there is no one solution, no silver bullet. Managing the security environment for the next several decades will require a security focus led by military, intelligence, and civilian operators. The political, developmental, and local intelligence components to security can no longer be on the periphery—they must be major ingredients. The ad hoc, and sometimes excellent improvisations that the United States has created to patch around its 20th- century capabilities are insufficient. It should not take another crisis or commission of inquiry to tell us that. It should also be noted that while major U.S. policy statements from elected leaders and government officials have called for some version of these capabilities—and even funded some—they are not functioning regularly and professionally as they need to be.

It is important to be clear about what is being proposed in this report, and what is not. This is *not* a call for a new grand strategy for the United States. Such policy overviews may well be needed, and the President and Congress are charged with their formulation. Rather, this report deals with something both broader than policy prescription— about the evolving security environment—and also more concrete, the specific tools needed to manage

> **"Military action is not enough alone . . . Most modern conflicts don't end with a victory on the field of battle, so political and development work is essential."**
>
> U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

that environment. The first part of this report was devoted to making sense of the new security environment confronting the United States and other democracies. This second part of the report addresses specific professional instruments and capabilities that the United States requires to manage this environment—regardless of who is elected to lead the nation in executive and legislative capacities—between now and at least 2025.

One size does not fit all—different conflict zones will have different requirements.

The specific configuration and deployment of these capabilities must be adapted based on the political and security context or conflict zone in which the United States is engaged. These will range from *small-scale advisory missions,* to those involving *limited U.S. presence "on the ground"*—such as in Pakistan and in Colombia— to *war zones* where the U.S. military is or was the main security force, as in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The first—small advisory missions—are mainly preventative in scope and have as their objective assisting or building local capacity, particularly in

fragile democracies. These missions aim to address the origins of those weaknesses before they generate violent instability that might spread from local to regional levels. They should receive a high priority. However, the capabilities identified below will also be needed for larger missions to include those where U.S. military forces—combat brigades—are engaged in major population-centric security operations against one or more robust armed groups or proxy movements.

Although it may not be necessary to deploy every proposed new capability in all situations, **time is short. If we do not invest in these capabilities now they will not be available in specific theaters and conflicts where their presence could decrease the costs in lives and treasure, and determine the outcome.**

Establishing and building up these capabilities will not entail major additional budget commitments. In national security terms they are not big-ticket items like advanced technology, aircraft carriers, or more troop divisions. What will probably be required is more central coordination, some reorganization, and adaptation to decentralized irregular conflict. Responsibility must be vested. Some elements of the required capabilities are lost skill sets. Others that can be reviewed exist or are today in small-scale, ad hoc use by dedicated and creative individuals in various government departments and agencies. However, very few Americans specialize in, or are even authorized to undertake and adapt such activities.

The ad hoc, and sometimes excellent improvisations that the United States has created to patch around its 20th-century capabilities are insufficient.

For the most part, these capabilities are not part of the regular U.S. government set up. They have few associated, established career paths, specialties, education and training opportunities, and professional recognition. Most senior U.S. military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and foreign assistance personnel who would have to manage this government-wide program have not been professionally prepared to use these tools. And few of our elected leaders have had the opportunity to study their strengths—and limitations.

Required Capabilities

1. *Major parts of the U.S. military will require reorientation and retraining. The answer is not more soldiers, but making different and better use of the forces we already have.*

For the United States to prevail against both irregular and conventional forces, several brigade combat teams (BCTs) now in the Army and Marine Corps regimental combat teams (RCTs) need, as their primary mission, to be prepared to support local struggles against armed groups with both kinetic and non-kinetic tools. The imperative here is not adding more soldiers, but rather reorganizing existing forces and providing different training. For example, military skills must be adapted and meshed with civilian skill sets to produce adaptable rule of law and security sector reform—which will help us win the conflict.

2. *Local intelligence will be a critical factor in determining dominance in 21st-century conflicts.*

In order to make sense of the new "battlefield"—which usually lacks a front line and often involves civilians as players—U.S. and allied forces need much better intelligence at the local level. This is critical, for example, to help distinguish who is part of an armed group, who is assisting

them, who is engaging only in political dissent, and who can work effectively locally against the armed group networks. The top U.S. intelligence officer in Afghanistan has acknowledged that we lack sufficient relevant information about who the "power brokers" are in a given area—knowledge that is critical to knowing how to proceed. More simply put, we need and can obtain more reliable and sophisticated information about who the good and bad guys are—and aren't. Such focused intelligence can be provided by trained frontline foreign police, military and security collectors, analysts, and others who operate adaptively at the local level, even in the most hostile circumstances, to complement the formidable U.S. and other national capabilities. This combination is necessary to strengthen decisive operations and efforts by U.S., allied, and local forces—or some combination thereof—against armed groups, and bolster the capabilities and legitimacy of the local government.

3. *Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Rule of Law Teams need to be further professionalized and in greater numbers to prevent the outbreak of conflict and to strengthen weak governments and civil society.*

The goal here is to help build governments whose legitimacy is recognized by citizens, and to inculcate rule of law principles and understanding in the population. Rather than waiting for weak states to slip into critical conditions, we need to employ the 21st-century security equivalents of "wellness programs" to bolster and support them. Repeated full-scale military operations to rescue failing states are too costly in money and human terms for the U.S. to shoulder.

Building a comprehensive capability will require the U.S.—alone or with partners—to develop systematic plans, personnel, and resources. We will need the standing (or reserve) professional capabilities to act in diverse environments:

Strategic communication should be central to policy making and strategy in Washington and across the broad spectrum of policy implementation overseas.

- preventive mode in weak states, especially fragile democracies (e.g., Central America)

- high-intensity support (e.g., S.W. Asia)

- less-intensive conflicts (e.g., Africa)

4. *The U.S. currently lacks the strategic communication compentency to support U.S. interests.*

There is consensus in Washington that this capability would greatly enhance the effectiveness of U.S. policy. Effective strategic communication would increase support from friends and allies, and positively influence adversarial state and nonstate actors. Strategic communication is not just about public affairs (policy PR) and public diplomacy (exchanges between U.S. and foreign leaders and citizens and better use of international broadcasting and new media). It is about how senior U.S. leaders, national security managers, and local implementers understand and manage their words and actions to resonate with and influence the perceptions and behavior of foreign audiences. This can be accomplished by making strategic communications central to policy making and strategy in Washington and across the broad spectrum of policy implementation overseas.

The United States needs corps of professional skilled personnel—military and civilian—capable of bringing together coalitions of foreign state and nonstate actors to prevent or prevail in conflicts with adversarial coalitions. This new corps would operate with the authority, skills, and resources needed to work with both senior and local foreign leaders to enhance their effectiveness. Creative U.S. individuals have played extraordinary roles in recent years, but professional programs do not exist in this area to build expertise, continuity, and to integrate these activities into operations.

More integration of security capabilities is a winning combination.

These five capabilities are interrelated. Military reorientation, restructuring, and training, for example, will benefit from and assist the other four capabilities. To illustrate, intelligence dominance that systematically maps local power brokers and communication networks, and the underground and above-ground infrastructure of armed groups is a force enhancer. It also can assist security, reconstruction, and rule of law teams who are building local capacities. Effec-

tive strategic communication applied globally, regionally and locally would weaken the hold of armed groups on the minds of the population, and strengthen those opposed to authoritarian, corrupt, and violent elites. Skilled local and regional U.S. political entrepreneurs would be able to take advantage of these favorable conditions to identify and cement relationships between U.S. and foreign local civilian elements and security forces. The U.S. did much of this in a very effective but ad hoc fashion in Iraq, before and during the "surge" in 2006–07.

A further illustration of the interrelationship among the capabilities would be that local intelligence dominance in turn benefits from strategic communication and community-oriented military and civilian assistance. Enhanced policing and governance, particularly when based on rule of law principles, such as equity and fairness, tend to lead the local population to have more confidence and trust in the authorities, and hence to provide significantly more information about—and even penetration into—the armed groups, including their sources of money and arms, and their communications. This information in turn assists both the police and military operators in detaining—and neutralizing—incipient and mature terrorist or criminal insurgent groups. Similar synergisms exist with each of the capabilities proposed.

A key difference between 20th-century state-centric warfare and 21st-century irregular conflict is the importance of acquiring granular local knowledge and rapidly exploiting it, so that armed groups and coalitions can be neutralized.

Following this report are action-oriented summations of what would be needed for the creation of each individual capability. These summaries are based on individual Working Papers written for NSIC by specialists who either have had command responsibility or have worked closely on their subjects with senior-level practitioners. The specialists propose new concepts of operations; pinpoint requisite doctrine, tools, and techniques; and call attention to necessary authorities and costs. The papers are intended for those working on these issues, mostly in and around Washington, DC, and U.S. government missions and bases elsewhere. They address in much greater detail the characteristics of each capability, suggest how the capability can be operationalized, and assess to what extent legal authorities already exist in the U.S. government to employ them. The papers include scenarios, and a range of the resources required for the effective development and use of these capabilities. They are available upon request from NSIC.

The United States must improve the capability of its political instruments of power, particularly to catalyze constructive internal political development within . . . fragile or post-conflict states.

Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations

It should also be emphasized that these capabilities, even if developed and deployed, are not a panacea or cure-all for the challenges ahead. Rather, they are tools that would substantially enhance the United States's ability to manage the current environment, providing opportunities around the world to safeguard lives, improve security, and achieve a better quality of life.

Military Capabilities for "War Amongst the People"

*General Sir Rupert Smith and *Dr. Ilana Bet-El

In the 21st -century security environment what U.S. military commanders will have to accomplish and how they use military forces to do so has changed. The concept of operations (CONOPS) for conflict is different. Rather than decisive victory, the objective will be to establish local security and law and order in conflict zones. This serves as a "table setter" enabling civil agencies to execute activities ranging from humanitarian aid to development.

The New CONOPS

The new concept of operations defines the fight at two levels—*confrontation* and *conflict*. *Confrontation* is won by providing security and assistance to the population, *conflict* by destroying enemy forces. *Confrontation* activities establish local security for the people; isolate the enemy from them; and provide civil agencies with secure space to carry out humanitarian and developmental activities, making the desired end state attainable. *Conflict* actions, by destroying enemy forces, support civil activities but are not a substitute for them.

Required Doctrine, Tools, and Techniques

In the 21st-century security environment, U.S. military forces, together with civil agencies, will defeat enemies by winning the battle for legitimacy with the population. The new doctrines that guide military forces provide for versatile and adaptable forces. Those doctrines include: Counterinsurgency; Counterterrorism; Stabilization, Security, Reconstruction, and Rule of Law Operations; Unconventional Warfare; and Foreign Internal Defense. Regardless of the ways each of these doctrines identifies the opponent, executes specific missions, and achieves core goals, military forces executing them will need—in varying quantities—the following competencies/capabilities:

- Commanders who can lead in battle, and who have an understanding of a range of civil disciplines and an ability to fulfill specific roles traditionally seen as civilian.

- Combat brigades reconfigured to secure the population in conflict zones. Forces organized on a self-contained modular basis. 21st-century war is usually small unit dominated and hence the basic module will be one or a few companies.

- Military units with greater civil proficiencies to meet the needs of the population that are a fusion of civil and military elements. Military and civil activities run in parallel.

- Proactive special operations units to target armed group's clandestine organization. These operations will be intelligence-led and use force in precise ways.

- Information and intelligence are essential for all civil and military actions. And they serve as the basis for devising a convincing narrative, the foundation for the overall campaign.

- A training system is crucial. Home bases prepare core forces for specific missions abroad.

*General Sir Rupert Smith (Ret), UK was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1998–2001.
*Dr. Ilana Bet-El is a writer, historian, and political analyst based in Brussels.

The training system's deployable unit will accompany the core forces to provide similar training to the host country's forces.

- A networked command structure is needed to link military forces to civil agencies, allies, and local forces to facilitate collaboration and integration.

Re-shaping Existing Capabilities and Crafting New Ones for Three Security Environments

Some elements of the above competencies/capabilities already exist in the U.S. inventory, including doctrines, combat brigades, civil proficiencies of military forces, and Special Forces. But resources are needed to adapt each for three security environments: 1) war zones where the U.S. military is the main security force; 2) non-war zones with a significant U.S. military presence; 3) zones receiving security assistance with little U.S. presence. For example, several existing Army combat brigades will need to be adapted for population-centric security operations. Likewise, the civil proficiencies of military forces that are mainly in reserve civil affairs brigades will need to be adapted for each of these three security environments.

Resources will also be needed to create the following new competencies/capabilities and add them to the U.S. inventory:

- Expanded education and training of military commanders to encompass an understanding of the civil disciplines, role, and missions of civilian agencies and the ability to execute specific tasks traditionally seen as civilian.

- Information and intelligence capabilities require considerable expansion. This includes additional means for gaining local knowledge to map adversary and civilian networks.

- Additionally, the information staff in the commanders' HQ must be elevated to a core function and provide the driving logic for all operations to include the campaign narrative. This necessitates changes in the people selected; reorganization of the staff itself; and provision of appropriate training.

- The training system and networked command structure also have to be created and crafted to meet the requirements of the three security environments.

Authorities and Costs

Additional authorities are likely to be needed for *Confrontation* activities especially when the military crosses over into civil areas; develops collaborative networks to facilitate collaboration and integration; and expands its information and intelligence activities as noted above.

In terms of costs, these changes can be accomplished largely within the existing budget. But it will require a re-ordering of that budget to develop these competencies/capabilities within the existing force structure. For example, resources will be needed so that several of U.S. Army and Marine combat brigades and regiments can be re-equipped and trained for irregular warfare missions in each of the three security environments identified above. Likewise, resources will be needed to adapt civil affairs and military training capabilities to these three contexts. Other resources will have to be re-allocated for the new competencies/capabilities that have been identified.

Stability, Security, Reconstruction, and Rule Of Law Capabilities

Dr. Marin Strmecki*

To effectively deal with armed conflict "amongst the people," the United States must develop new concepts of operations for what should be called SSRR operations. The capability to conduct such operations effectively is a crucial—and inadequately developed—requirement for competing at the sub-state level in weak and failed states, either as part of major operations or in stand-alone stability and preventive operations.

At present the U.S. has very few full-time, civilian and military trained professionals whose career is devoted to these tasks. The U.S. often operates in an ad hoc manner in reaction to crises and military operations, with little recognition of the need to prepare the people, equipment, and logistics to meet its needs in contested parts of the world.

The U.S. needs to focus on achieving four end-states through political shaping operations, constabulary-type security operations, and state building. The **first is security** for the host nation population at the local level, produced through a combination of foreign and indigenous forces. The **second is political stability,** which is a function of creating legitimacy for the new political order and an effective process for inclusion and collective decision making for the society. The **third is reconstruction,** both of state institutions and a framework and system for wealth generation. The **fourth is the rule of law,** creating institutions to provide impartial enforcement of the law and conflict resolution of private disputes, strengthening systems to ensure integrity of personnel within state institutions, and propagating a positive ethos and culture of lawfulness, in collaboration with multiple local indigenous sectors. In pursuing these end-states, it is vital to recognize that adversarial political players—both indigenous and regional—will be competing to disrupt these efforts and to achieve alternative end-states.

New Needed Capabilities

The United States needs to develop six discrete capabilities:

1. **Senior-Level Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAG),** at headquarters in the U.S. and in Embassy operations, are configured to serve as not just the military commands but also serve as the political brain of the SSRR operation. Most important, the MAAG will have strategic planning and political action cells to develop and lead the implementation of a tailored political-military strategy for achieving stability and progress in the host country, based on detailed political mapping and interaction with local leaders and social groups.

2. **U.S. Foreign Liaison and Assistance Groups (FLAG)** will be brigade-sized military combat units optimized for classic population-centric security operations based on securing areas of strength and then expanding security outward in incremental steps (i.e., an "ink spot" security campaign). This will require that several of U.S. Army and Marine combat brigades and regiments are re-equipped and re-trained for this kind of irregular warfare.

***Dr. Marin Strmecki** is Senior Vice President of the Smith Richardson Foundation, and adviser to the U.S. Department of Defense.

3. **Security Training and Equipping Groups (STEG)** will be a near-brigade-sized unit that will be a standing part of the U.S. force structure designed to rapidly train and equip indigenous police, intelligence, and military institutions. It will have major dedicated stockpiles of equipment—arms, ammunition, mobility assets, communications, etc.—to outfit host-country security and police forces without procurement delays.

4. **Advisory Corps** will be U.S. military officers qualified to serve as embedded advisors or mentors of host-country forces, playing the key role of facilitating the partnering of U.S. and local forces and moving local partners up the learning curve as quickly as possible.

5. **Civilian Operations, Reconstruction, and Development Support (CORDS)** Groups will be a brigade-sized unit (or smaller depending on the context) that will be a standing part of the U.S. force structure and designed to create parallel advisory offices to the host-country civil administration structure at the national, provincial, and local levels. These units, which exist within Army Civil Affairs brigades, will facilitate the improvement of governance and delivery of services through indigenous institutions.

6. **Rule of Law Support (ROLS)** will entail a new deployable capability within the U.S. Army Reserve Legal Command and its civilian agency counterparts. They will strengthen Host Nation institutions supportive of the rule of law, both by providing integrity training and security sector reform for law enforcement and security agencies, and by working with multiple civil sectors within the country to create a culture supportive of the rule of law.

Configuring Capabilities for Varying Scenarios

The configuration of deployed SSRR capabilities should vary based on the nature of the intervention.

- For *high intensity* (Phase IV) operations, all the SSRR capabilities—MAAG, FLAGs, STEGs, CORDS Groups, Advisory Corps, and ROLS—will be needed.

- For a *limited presence mission,* such as in Pakistan or Colombia, the configuration of deployments will vary. All will require a MAAG, which designs the strategy, carries out political engagement, and commands all deployed U.S. forces. If host-country security forces require enhancements, STEGs and elements of the Advisory Corps would be deployed. If unit-partnering is required, FLAGs would be used. For governance, particularly at the local level, CORDS Groups and ROLS would be employed.

- For a small *advisory mission*, the most appropriate deployment would be MAAG commanding a small Advisory Corps, supported by limited components of the CORDS Groups and ROLS.

Resources and Costs

The most significant resource required is dedicated U.S. force and civilian structure to this purpose. The United States should convert several of the Army's combat brigades and Marine regiments into SSRR-optimized capabilities. This will still allow for an adequate capability to deal with the legacy threat of major conventional combat while providing the necessary forces for the far-more-likely-to-occur SSRR operations. Most of the converted brigades and/or regiments should become FLAGs, while a few others should be converted into STEGs, CORDS Groups and Rule of Law Support capabilities. The Advisory Corps is not a separate organization, but it may require building a larger U.S. officer corps. The STEGs will require POMCUS-like stockpiles (storage of light infantry equipment and logistics) to equip host-country forces.

Rule of Law Support will require professional experts on legal and security sector reform as well as those schooled in working with key civil society sectors—the media, education, and centers of moral authority.

Political Capabilities to Stabilize Fragile or Post-Conflict States

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad*

The world has seen a shift from the Cold War era, in which two opposing ideological blocs vied for power, to a period in which multifarious, substate and transnational security threats rooted in weak or failed states pose the principal challenge to world order. To address this challenge, the United States must improve the capability of its political instruments of power, particularly to catalyze constructive internal political development within countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. This might be characterized as developing greater capability to engage in expeditionary political entrepreneurship in fragile or post-conflict states.

The problem set confronting U.S. leaders involves the transformation of the local political context. In these settings, political power is typically personalized, factionalized, and underwritten by nonstate armed groups, some of which are supported by neighboring countries. The desired transformation entails a political effort to enable local leaders and social groups to arrive at a national compact—an agreement on power sharing and the rules of the game—and to jump-start local institutional building and economic development, while managing the policies of neighboring powers to prevent destabilizing interventions. Success requires an intensive engagement—both in terms of leadership time and resources—and therefore should be undertaken selectively in the service of genuine strategic priorities.

The U.S. needs to focus on five lines of action in such political transformations. The **first** is to position the United States as a trusted political intermediary among internal factions. The **second** is to use this position to catalyze negotiations to forge a national compact among key actors and communities on the initial sharing of power, the political structure of the state, and the rules for future political competition. The **third** is to develop a political process to transition from a period in which armed groups are the coin of the realm for acquiring political power to one in which participatory politics is the path to achieving influence. The **fourth** is to build up local state institutions, including not only security forces but also those that secure popular legitimacy by delivering services and fostering economic growth. In post-conflict settings, opportunities need to be effectively created to demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, giving them constructive options to avoid their evolution into criminal organizations. The **fifth** is to engage diplomatically with neighboring states to secure their tacit or active support for stability and progress. The fifth is to engage diplomatically with neighboring states to secure their tacit or active support for stability and progress.

New Needed Capabilities

The United States needs to develop or improve its capabilities in six areas:

1. **Making and signaling enduring commitments:** Even though the duration of U.S. involvement in Europe, Japan, South Korea, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrates an ability to fulfill long-term and expensive commitments, the United States is profoundly hampered by a reputation for abandoning allies or curtailing interventions when difficulties arise. Yet,

*Dr. **Zalmay Khalilzad** was U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (November 2003–June 2005), Iraq (June 2005–March 2007), and the United Nations (February 2007–January 2009).

the willingness of local actors to compromise among themselves—and to take risks in doing so—depends on convincing them of U.S. staying power, often including a third-party guarantee of power sharing arrangements. At one level, this means political leaders should ensure that U.S. interventions have broad-based domestic support. However, more generally, the U.S. must become more effective in signaling, through its actions and words to local and regional actors, that it is irrevocably committed to success.

2. **Developing diplomats, military, and intelligence officers skilled at mediation and shaping local politics:** It is vital that the U.S. embrace the need to take a "hands-on" approach in shaping the local political context. This mediation and shaping role should seek not to impose American-made solutions but rather to use U.S. influence to help local leaders agree on local solutions to local challenges. Though American history has many examples of politically skilled expeditionary diplomats and officers, the dominant cultures of the State Department, the military services, and the operational branches of intelligence agencies focus on managing government-to-government or multilateral relations, kinetic operations, and intelligence collection, respectively. Consequently, these departments and agencies must develop cadres of officials and officers with deep area expertise and a talent for political action to shape the orientation and conduct of local leaders and communities. In addition, the U.S. government must develop mechanisms to hire such talent laterally from the private sector as needed.

3. **Catalyzing progress in the domestic politics of foreign societies:** U.S. civilian and military institutions, as well as agencies of the international community, need to develop a general doctrine or concept of operations for helping local leaders in fragile and post-conflict soci-

eties develop a process to achieve stable power sharing arrangements, build trust and confidence in order to rise above zero-sum struggles for power, and crafting inclusive constitutional orders that produce stability and enable effective collective decision making. Among the skills U.S. diplomats and officers must possess are abilities to assess the political culture and landscape of host nations to craft realistic goals and strategies, to manage and marginalize political spoilers, to shape and enforce compromises on core political questions among local actors, to strengthen politically local individuals and groups whose success is integral to U.S. political strategy, and to develop networks and coalitions among constructive political actors and international partners. It is vital that the United States have mechanisms to strengthen good political actors, particularly if spoilers or extremists are receiving external support.

4. **Demobilizing and reintegrating nonstate armed groups and developing new legitimate security forces:** The instruments of the U.S. and the international community to demobilize and reintegrate armed groups are weak and the capabilities to build new and legitimate security forces are slow and uneven in their effectiveness. Key political aspects of these challenges are to find positive political and economic roles for former militia leaders and members, to reform or create security ministries that all political groups and communities view as trustworthy and reliable, and to develop strategies in partnership with local actors to isolate and defeat those armed groups that cannot be reconciled to the new political order. A major weakness that the United States must overcome is the ineffectiveness of approaches to reintegrate fighters meaningfully into civilian life.

5. **Delivering results in service delivery and economic development in the "golden hour" after an intervention or major political transition:** Unless a new government can start deliver-

ing positive results to the people quickly, it is likely that negative trends—such as the rise of organized crime or the disillusionment of the public—will set in. U.S. civilian and military institutions are not well designed to beat the clock. A key and missing ingredient is the ability to field expeditionary development organizations, whether civilian or military, and to deliver timely results, through local institutions whenever possible. This means the United States must develop mechanisms to engage in integrated development planning, to field organizations and personnel along military timelines, to access flexible operational and contingency funding, to streamline contracting, and to embed advisers and accountability processes within host country institutions.

6. **Fielding diplomatic capabilities to manage regional political dynamics:** Apart from the U.S. regional military combatant commanders, U.S. foreign policy departments and agencies are principally focused on country-specific policies. However, in fragile and post-conflict states, the success of U.S. policies depends on managing actions by a variety of regional actors, many of which have abilities to undermine U.S. initiatives. Bureaucratically, while assistant secretaries of state would be the logical focus of action, they generally spend most of their time in interagency processes and have enormously diverse and demanding responsibilities. As a result, ad hoc solutions—such as the Bonn Process for Afghanistan or improvised special envoys—are the dominant current approach. Consequently, the United States needs to develop diplomatic structures tailored to sustained regional engagement to support major interventions in fragile and post-conflict states if it hopes to be successful over time.

Resources and Costs

The most significant resource and cost is to develop cadres of politically skilled personnel, rapidly deployable diplomatic and development capabilities, and funding for stabilization programs in fragile and post-conflict states. Because these efforts are personnel- and program-intensive, it is not a matter of simply reallocating resources from the current structures and processes in the Department of State and USAID. While the civilian response corps is a good initiative, the longer-term solution lies in dedicated and elite civilian organizations, formed and trained as units, that are a separate part of or separate from the Foreign Service. Also, these organizations need to be supported with standby or contingency budget accounts for operations that enable immediate responses to events, perhaps done in consultation with relevant congressional committees but not reliant on supplemental appropriations bills or new authorizations/appropriations through the two-year budget cycle.

Intelligence Dominance Consistent with Rule of Law Principles

Dr. Roy Godson*

Armed group threats to fragile democracies can be largely neutralized and some eliminated by the development of intelligence dominance in these societies. The UK, Israel, Australia, and others have demonstrated that this unique approach produces spectacular results. Experience has shown that many of these relatively inexpensive techniques can be embedded in a host nation's security force. Developing the capability to do this in fragile and new democracies will be an effective tool in strengthening democratic governance in these societies. There are many opportunities to do so, if the U.S. equips itself.

Achieving dominance means that host nations (HN) develop sufficient local knowledge to map the infrastructure of armed groups, and gather the evidence to arrest and neutralize the support structure and leadership of the groups.

To build this capability in HNs, the U.S. (and allies) need to develop:

1. An unclassified doctrine or model of dominance that is consistent with rule of law principles

2. Mentors who can adapt and pass on the doctrine to the HN

3. HN support for the principles of dominance consistent with rule of law, and a clear decision on the lead agency

4. A U.S.-HN survey of required skill sets, equipment, materiel support, and phased capacity building

5. U.S. technical support to the phased plan (2–4 years)

6. U.S. and HN evaluation and adaptation of the plan as it is implemented.

The U.S. would need resources and authority to develop the foreign capability in three types of political environments:

- War zones where the U.S. is the principal military security force, e.g., Iraq 2003–09, Afghanistan (now).

- Non-war zones with significant U.S. presence (20–30 countries)

- Zones receiving security assistance with little U.S. presence (40–50 countries).

In addition to U.S. interagency accord and support, this would require a specialized U.S. unit capable of collaborating with HN police, military, or intelligence services. The U.S. unit could be housed in State, Defense, or DOJ, or in a nongovernmental entity designed or adapted for this purpose.

Costs would vary with the type and size of the geopolitical environment, assuming the HN contributes personnel. The *minimum* cost per country would be $20 million/year, *maximum* $100 million/year for four years.

***Dr. Roy Godson** is President of the National Strategy Information Center, and Emeritus Professor of Government, Georgetown University.

Strategic Communication

Kevin McCarty*

Through their foreign policies, strategies, and the implementation thereof, governments attempt to persuade a person, persons, or organizations of interest (National Security audiences) to behave in ways that are conducive to their National Security goals. Governments use many tools of persuasion to do this, from coercion to diplomacy, to sanctions, development, communications, and other activities. Usually, more than one activity is used at a time, and multiple segments of a National Security audience are targeted. Strategic communication is more than the "standard" communications usually associated with governmental public affairs, public diplomacy, international broadcasting, and information operations, for example. Strategic communication is how you integrate foreign audience understanding to develop and manage persuasive foreign policies, strategies, and implementation plans.

The goal is ultimately to persuade foreign leaders or populations to change their behavior. To do so successfully with effective tools, the government must understand how the audience perceives the world and the government's actions; what their attitudes are towards the behavior change the government is seeking; and how those attitudes have been formed. It is not so much the action itself, or how well it is performed, but how they are perceived in the mind of the intended audience that matters—so words and actions must be gauged to be effective there. If they are not, the goal will likely not be reached. Strategic communication is about managing these perceptions.

Strategic communication as used in the formulation of the Marshall Plan to counter communism in post-World War II Europe is an excellent example of its successful application to National Security. The approach crafted by the U.S. policymakers was to appeal for European reconstruction and create confidence in their current forms of government, and not just to stop the spread of Communism, or promote U.S. power and interests. Lack of effective strategic communication was evident in the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty which ended World War I and laid the foundational causes of World War II.

Unlike discussions on more traditional governmental roles such as military force, intelligence, and international aid et al., strategic communication is not now a core competency of the U.S. government. This absence greatly hinders the development of this capability. Education and understanding inside the government are the keys to improving U.S. strategic communication.

There are three steps the United States could take now to improve this capability in the government. These measures do not require new legislation to adjust authorities; they are not expensive; and they do not require building new bureaucracies or entities.

1. **Senior leadership education:** Strategic communication is a top down capability—if it is not working at the top, it probably cannot be fixed from the bottom up. Senior leadership in the National Security policymaking arena

***Kevin McCarty,** a former naval aviator and National Clandestine Services officer, served on the National Security Council as Director for Global Outreach under Presidents Bush and Obama.

must have a strong conceptual understanding of strategic communication. A major first step to implement this conceptual understanding and to provide senior leadership with the tools to oversee how strategic communication is designed and implemented, would be a focused two-day course/workshop with a defined curriculum on what strategic communication is and how it must be integrated into policies and implementation. This can be done by use of case studies and tabletop exercises that highlight how the use of strategic communication can make or break policies and their execution. Initial efforts, such as the State Department's Foreign Service Institute Marketing College, can be built upon to provide this training.

2. **Create a culture of strategic communication:** The United States government needs to create a culture within its National Security operational ranks of what strategic communication is, the important role it plays, and how it affects everyone's mission. Just creating additional tools or programs alone will not enhance our capability sufficiently, as it often takes just a few negatives to offset many positives. To illustrate, the United States Navy faced a similar problem in the 1980s when it was dealing with a severe safety issue within its aviation community. Many attempts were made to improve procedures, training, equipment, and other approaches to fix the serious losses of aircraft and aircrew. They had little overall effect. Then the Navy instituted a strong safety culture program which altered the way safety was treated, placed new emphasis on it, and introduced Operational Risk Management procedures. These steps had a dramatic effect on the way the culture of safety was treated within the Navy. Within a few short years, major accident-free deployments became the norm. This type of approach is needed to shift the culture of strategic communication within the government to enhance its capability and prevent "accidents," or negatives.

3. **Build an audience understanding capability:** In order to persuade foreigners of concern to us to change their behavior and attitudes, the United States must understand how they think about and perceive the priority issues we desire change in, and how our actions affect those perceptions. Again, it is not so much the action or its accomplishment, but how it is perceived that matters. Many believe that this "audience understanding capability" means that we should appease the audience by doing what they want. To get them to change, however, we need to know how to reach them in ways that they care about, and in ways that will resonate with them. The more you know about how someone you want to persuade thinks and perceives, the higher the chance of successfully persuading them—it's not about appeasement. This is not as difficult as it seems. The most robust industry that has expertise and information in this area at present is in the market research community. We need to capitalize on this knowledge and expertise to create a center of excellence to support United States government agencies and departments to meet this critical need.

NSIC's International Practitioner Working Group

This report would not have been possible without the assistance and contributions of some of the leading security practitioners from democracies around the world. These highly qualified individuals have shared their first-hand experience in the contemporary security environment—all having held senior-level positions in their nation's military, diplomatic, or intelligence services. They were invited to participate based on their recent contributions to the development of effective capabilities in their countries and regions. All have distinguished records of command responsibility, and have enhanced their country's security policies in a manner consistent with democratic principles and the rule of law.

The International Practitioner Working Group meets periodically to review and collaborate on NSIC's research findings. Its members are:

Major General Jacob Amidror (Ret.), Israel
Former Commander, Israel Defense Forces Military Colleges, and Military Secretary of the Minister of Defense

Lieutenant General David Barno (Ret.), USA
Commanding General, Combined Forces in Afghanistan, 2003–2005

Lieutenant General Jerry Boykin (Ret.), USA
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting Support, 2003–2007

Peter Clarke, UK
Former Head of Counter Terrorism Command, 2002–2008; Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, 2005–2007; Acting Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations 2007–2008

Ambassador Henry Crumpton, USA
Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
U.S. Department of State, 2005–2007;
Former senior CIA official

Dr. Paula Dobriansky, USA
Under Secretary of State for Democracy
and Global Affairs, 2001–2009

Randall Fort, USA
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research, 2006–2009

Peri Golan, Israel
Former Chief, Counterterrorism Division,
Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet)

General Lord Charles Guthrie (Ret.), UK
Chief of the UK Defense Staff, 1997–2001

Lieutenant General Pat Hughes (Ret.), USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
1995–1999; Assistant Secretary, Department
of Homeland Security, 2003–2005

Brigadier General Yosef Kuperwasser (Ret.), Israel
Director of Analysis and Production,
Israel Defense Forces Directorate of
Military Intelligence, 2001–2006

General Carlos Ospina (Ret.), Colombia
Commander in Chief, Colombian Armed Forces,
2004–2006

Thomas Quinn, USA
Director, Federal Air Marshall Service,
2003–2006

Andrew Shearer, Australia
National Security Advisor to Australian
Prime Minister John Howard, 2007

General Sir Rupert Smith (Ret.), UK
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
1998–2001

Vikram Sood, India
Chief, Research and Analysis Wing (India's
external intelligence service), 2001–2003

Ing. Jorge Tello Peón, Mexico
Director, CISEN (Mexico's intelligence service),
1986–1999; Undersecretary of Public Safety,
1999–2001

Sybrand J. van Hulst, Netherlands
Director General, Dutch Intelligence and
Security Service (AIVD), 1997–2007

General Sir John Wilsey (Ret.), UK
Commander in Chief, UK Land Command,
Northern Ireland, 1994–1996

Authors & Acknowledgements

Glossary of Key Terms

ADAPTING AMERICA'S SECURITY PARADIGM AND SECURITY AGENDA

Adapting the Security Paradigm. Adaptation refers to changes in previously held assumptions about values, actors, interests, threats, and capabilities that no longer adequately explain the security environment. This project seeks to identify previous U.S. assumptions, and those that need revision to address the security challenges of the contemporary era.

- A **Paradigm** is an interrelated set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that comprise the way a professional community, discipline, or organization views itself and the environment in which it operates and carries out activities. Paradigms establish a framework and mindset that shape a way of thinking and a set of practices for acting during a particular period of time.

- A **Security Paradigm** consists of a security community's operating assumptions, concepts, and practices with respect to: One, the community's core values. Two, how that community understands the strategies employed by the actors that are perceived to threaten these core values. Three, how that community understands the means and instruments—regular, irregular, catastrophic—used by those actors. Four, the assumptions the security community makes about the capabilities it needs to protect and defend against these challenges and how best to organize, recruit, train, and educate to develop the most effective capabilities.

- A **Paradigm Change/Shift** is the process by which a professional community changes its paradigm, often in responses to the accumulation of anomalies and contradictions to the existing operating assumptions, concepts, values, and practices. The shift or change is neither simple nor sudden. Paradigm paralysis—the inability or refusal to see beyond the current framework and mindset—often undermines a needed change or shift.

Armed Groups are a category of nonstate actor consisting of four subtypes: insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations. All armed groups challenge the power and legitimacy of states, seeking to undermine or co-opt them. To do so, they employ a clandestine infrastructure as their key organizational method, although they may maintain overt political fronts. Their leaders believe in the use of violence to achieve their aims, challenging the state's monopoly over coercive power. Armed groups employ multidimensional strategies to secure the loyalty or compliance of relevant populations. They operate within and across state boundaries, may exercise some degree of territorial control, and have at least a minimum degree of independence from state control.

- **Criminal Organizations** are a type of armed group that possess a clandestine or secret hierarchical structure and leadership infrastructure and whose primary purpose is to operate with impunity outside the law in one or more criminal enterprises. Such groups frequently engage in more than one type of criminal activity and can operate over large areas of a region and globally. Often, these groups have a family or ethnic base that enhances the cohesion and security of its members. These types of armed groups typically maintain their position through the threat or use of violence, corruption of public officials, graft, or extortion.

- **Insurgents** are a type of armed group that employ protracted political and military activities with the objective of gaining partial or complete control over the territory of a state through the use of irregular military tactics and illegal political activities. Insurgents engage in actions ranging from guerrilla operations, terrorism, and sabotage to political mobilization, political action, intelligence and counterintelligence activities, propaganda, and psychological warfare. These instruments are employed to weaken or destroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government, while at the same time increase the power and legitimacy of the insurgent group.

- **Militias** are a type of armed group with recognizable irregular armed forces that operate within the territory of a weak and/or failing state. The members of militias often come from the disad-

vantaged or underclasses and tend to be composed of young males who seek money, resources, power, identity, and security. Militias can represent specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, or other communal groups. They may operate under the auspices of a powerful factional leader, clan, or ethnic group, or on their own after the break-up of the state's forces. They may also be in the service of the state, either directly or indirectly. Generally, members of militias receive no formal military training. Nevertheless, in some cases they are highly skilled unconventional fighters. In other instances they are nothing more than a gang of extremely violent thugs that prey on the civilian population.

- **Terrorists** are a type of armed group that deliberately create and exploit fear through the threat or use of the most proscribed kind of violence for political or criminal purposes whether for or in opposition to an established government. The act is designed to have a far-reaching psychological effect beyond the immediate target of the attack and to instill fear in and intimidate a wider audience. The targets of terrorist groups are increasingly noncombatants—and large numbers of them—who under international norms have the status of protected individuals and groups.

Coalitions and Networks are security relationships—both formal and informal—among state and nonstate actors at the local, regional and/or global level. In the 20th century, coalitions were predominately formal relationships among states. In the 21st century, these formal relationships continue to exist alongside new coalitions and networks of state and nonstate actors. These diverse actors collaborate for mutual benefit but may conflict over other interests. More formal security relationships tend to take the form of coalitions that feature coordination and exhibit a greater uniformity of interests among members. Less formal security relationships tend to exist as networks. Some networks feature actors who share broad, general or even ideological interests but disagree on specific issues. Others are opportunistic. These feature actors with significantly different perspectives and ideologies who are willing to cooperate on specific shared issues. Both coalitions and networks may also have silent partners where one or more parties support or benefit from the activities of other partners without acknowledging this support or collaboration.

Culture of Lawfulness is a culture in which the overwhelming majority is convinced that the rule of law offers the best, long-term chance of securing their rights and attaining their goals. Citizens believe that the rule of law is achievable and recognize their individual responsibility to build and maintain a rule of law society. In a culture of lawfulness, most people believe that living according to the rule of law (respecting the rights protected by law, fulfilling the duties codified by law) is the best way to serve both their public and personal interests.

Failed States are states that cannot control much of their own territories or borders and exist as states principally in name only. They lack the ability to provide basic services to their populations and do not have much of the consent of the governed. Core functions, notably security, are frequently privatized. Warlords, criminal organizations, and private entrepreneurs assume much of the state's traditional functions, favoring some portion of the population and disadvantaging others. Failed states suffer from enduring internal violence.

Failing States are states which demonstrate measurable, and often rapid, declines in territorial control, performance, and security, and they suffer from internal violence.

Irregular Conflict is a political struggle with violent and nonviolent components for the control or influence over—and the support of—a relevant population. The parties to these conflicts, whether states or armed groups, seek to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of their adversaries and to isolate them from the relevant populations and their external supporters, both physically as well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population.

Legitimacy is the recognition that an actor has, or is recognized as having, a legal or moral claim to rule or act on behalf of a relevant population. States have legitimacy because they have, or are believed to have, a moral or legal right to rule. A state's legitimacy is

founded on a shared consensus about the political and moral values that define the state and its society. As well, a state's legitimacy is also derived from its ability to perform core functions for its citizens—functions such as infrastructure, health, food, education, as well as safety and border security.

Nonstate actors (e.g., armed groups, tribes, warlords, political movements, and charismatic leaders) have legitimacy because they have, or are believed to have, a just cause or a moral or legal right to act. Nonstate actors win legitimacy through tangible actions taken in furtherance of a cause or through a vision of the future that is perceived as being more just. Nonstate actors may also exploit their legitimacy to undermine states, to influence or control populations on a regional or global scale, or to justify a global struggle.

[In the U.S. Army *Stability Operations Manual* (FM 3-07), October 2008, the United States defines the highest stage of legitimacy in terms of the state. A state's legitimacy is based on a legal framework founded on the rule of law and the consent of the governed. Legitimacy "reflects, or is a measure of, the perceptions of several groups: the local populace, individuals serving within the civil institutions of the host nation, neighboring states, the international community, and the American public." Using this standard of legitimacy, the Army defines the conditions under which it considers U.S. intervention in a host nation as legitimate. The first condition is that the U.S. must have the full consent of the "host nation," "external actors with a vested interest in the intervention," and the international community. The manual also acknowledges an important exception to the requirement for consent. U.S. intervention is legitimate when it aims to depose a regime that significantly threatens national or international security or willfully creates conditions that foment humanitarian crises. A second condition for this type of intervention is that the mandate for intervention must win the broad approval of the international community and be multilateral in its composition. Third, U.S. forces must conduct themselves in accordance with national and international law. Fourth, particularly where intervention is likely to be protracted, expectations must be realistic, consistent, and achievable in terms of U.S. goals, time, and resources. Without the sustained will of the people—of the host nation, the international community, and the American people—the legitimacy of any mission will gradually decrease.]

A **Political Movement** is a social grouping that seeks to convince segments of the population to take action to support one or more issues. Political movements can be local, national, or transnational, coercive or noncoercive. Leaders shape issues and the movement's identity, and sometimes create organizations, networks, and infrastructure for fundraising, communication, and mobilization for their causes.

Rule of Law. While there are many definitions of the rule of law most contain the following elements: Every citizen has an opportunity to participate in making, overseeing, and modifying the laws and the legal system; the laws apply to everyone, including the rulers; and laws protect each individual as well as society as a whole. As much as any factor, the rule of law separates societies where citizens feel secure and are free to develop their individual potential from those where people live in fear of the state's arbitrary actions or of criminals enabled or emboldened by corruption and public apathy. It is the glue that holds together the structural elements of democracy—elections and the institutions of the state.

> The U.S. interagency (U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Department of State) definition reads: "**Rule of Law** is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights law. The desired outcome of SSR programs is an effective and legitimate security sector that is firmly rooted within the rule of law." Supplemental Reference: Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions, Program Area 2.1 "Rule of Law and Human Rights," U.S. Department of State, October 15, 2007.

Strategic Culture is a state or nonstate actor's shared beliefs and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and narratives, which shape ends and means for achieving national security objectives. These beliefs and modes of behavior give strategic culture its core characteristics and constitute the framework through which capabilities are organized and employed. Strategic culture can resist changing even as the security environment undergoes systemic

change. This results in an actor's reliance on preferred means and methods even when they are ill-suited for this changing context.

Strong States control their territories and maintain a monopoly of the use of force within their borders. These states derive the power to rule from competent institutions of coercion. Strong states may or may not have legitimacy. Strong states that have legitimacy adhere to the rule of law, provide core functions for their citizens, and enjoy the consent of the governed. Strong states that lack legitimacy usually favor a particular elite and rely on coercion to rule. Although these states do provide core functions, they do not adhere to the rule of law and much of their population withholds consent. These states are vulnerable to challenges by other groups and political movements who may be perceived as being more legitimate than the state.

Super-Empowered Individuals, Groups, and Institutions. Operating separately, or at times through or aligned with armed groups, are super-empowered individuals, groups and institutions. These micro actors have the capacity to affect the security environment by facilitating conflict and instability, or, in some instances, to play positive roles. They do so without employing their own armed capability. The sources of their empowerment include 1) access to personal wealth; 2) access to financial or other material resources and technologies; 3) access to conventional military capabilities; and 4) ability to influence or serve as a conduit for influence.

In **War Amongst the People,** states and nonstate actors compete for the control or loyalty of relevant populations. These actors use both violent and nonviolent means to bolster their legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over relevant populations and to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of their adversaries. Their purpose is not primarily to destroy enemy military forces or to capture territory. They act to isolate their adversaries from relevant populations and from external supporters, both physically and psychologically.

War in the 20th Century is the use of primarily conventional means by states in pursuit of centralized state interests. War is waged by professional military forces and is conducted according to internationally accepted legal norms. Force is not wielded against civilian targets but against an opponent's military forces to destroy or force their surrender. Victory is achieved when decisive battle either exhausts the opponent's capacity or undermines its will to continue fighting.

War in the 21st Century is the use of regular or irregular violent means, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, by a complex array of actors that include states, and often decentralized nonstate actors, and super-empowered individuals. These actors operate alone or in concert with other actors in complex combinations. Some actors continue to adhere to internationally recognized legal norms of war. Others deliberately target civilian populations. Victory may be achieved through the defeat of opposing forces, but it may also result from securing legitimacy or maintaining/securing control or influence over relevant populations.

Weak States exhibit a limited ability to control their own territories and provide multiple core services for significant sectors of their populations. A weak state that is legitimate lacks strong institutions but enjoys popular consent. A weak state that lacks legitimacy is one where the coercive institutions of the state and state competence are limited. These states are vulnerable to challenges by groups and political movements that claim legitimacy or impunity and that may have the capacity to deliver basic services to some portion of the state's inhabitants.