[Inquiry] Pragmata = Objects?

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary,

I'll probably have to take this piece by piece ...

GR = Gary Richmond
JA = Jon Awbrey

Previously --

JA: In Peirce's way of thinking, from the theory of inquiry
     to the theory of signs to the pragmatic maxim, the word
     "object" marks a role in a relation -- object of a sign --
     and the role is more important than all the ontological
     essences that people may try to squeeze out of the word.
     Dewey was especially peirspicacious in articulating the
     relational matrix of objects, signs, and interpretants.

GR: Well, yes, right, and of course, and all that (except that I consider Peirce's
     theory of inquiry as well as the pragmatic maxim to be parts of his theory of
     signs, and I haven't quite the confidence in Dewey which you seem to have in
     this matter, finding Peirce's own explication of the semiotic relationship
     far superior in virtually every way).

JA: Was just about to hit the sack, so just a quick note on the Dewey point.
     I naturally agree that Peirce's account is superior in its own terms.
     But the thing about Dewey is that he lived long enough to observe the
     reception of Peirce's ideas over the long haul, especially the kinds
     of regressive forces that keep people slipping back to the imaginary
     safety of their absolutist archaisms.  With surprising insight for
     the amount of background he had in the sciences, he paid attention
     to the developments in physics and information theory that Peirce
     anticipated but never got a chance to see in full flower.  These
     experiences and sources of information -- and no small measure
     of relentless repetition, retrial, and rewriting -- produced
     an analysis of the blocks to inquiry that I have gradually
     come to see as an essential key to the future of inquiry.

JA: And you know I mean "essential" in the good sense ...

Interweaving --

GR: Let's consider the first diagram in your "Interpretation as Action" paper:

     http://www.chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html

GR: In your diagram the s-o-i relationship is given on the left, and on the right some
     mind (or psyche == the interpreter) grasps (observes, experiences, takes in, etc.)
     the whole of the triadic relationship (and if you also call THAT intuition an object,
     then we would seemingly have two objects -- and I'm not referring here to the 'immediate'
     vs the 'dynamic' object, but to an intuitive grasping of the whole being referred to as
     an 'object'.  The 'thing' which 'i' grasps is clearly NOT the same 'thing' as the 'object'
     itself since the psyche experiences the entire triadic movement, the semiosis (as process).
     So, in fact, you designate this not with a lower case 'o' but with a lower case 'i', and for
     good reason.

That first diagram was drawn from Aristotle's text, with an eye, of course, to seeing what
overarching continuities could be seen with Peirce's account.  I've probably mentioned before
that there is only so much that can be shown in a diagram like that.  If we understand the lone
triple that's singled out in the picture as a "prototypical" or a "representative" triple sampled
from a genuine sign relation, which is in general a much larger collection of similar triples, then
we can probably avoid being misled too far.  But we have to keep the extended aspect of a sign relation
constantly in mind, since many of its properties do not descend to the level of single triples, that is,
to the level of elemental sign relations of the form (o, s, i).

So let's pause here and see if we are congruent incidental to that point.

Jon

GR: So, as you wrote, "the word 'object' marks a role in a relation," namely the
     triadic relationship s-o-i, and I suppose one *could* refer to the apprehension
     of that relationship as an 'object of apprehension', but I think it may tend to
     confuse matters given that that other object-as-role (which is complex enough in
     being both 'immediate' and 'dynamic') would seem to have a special right to the
     'object' designation.

GR: Still, I'm trying to inquire with you and others into this matter (gnox's recent
     remarks seem to me especially cogent) and so I wouldn't presume to attempt to say
     anything "definitive" in the matter.  Nonetheless, I think we need to be as careful
     in our terminology here as Peirce was.

GR: So, in a word, the interpreter (psyche in your diagram) experiences
     (or participates in, or intuits) not an object but a semiotic process,
     and it seems to clarify the matter a little, perhaps, to refer to that
     totality -- which only *involves* an object--not as itself an object,
     but exactly as a process, which 'thing' it is.

GR: Yet, I also agree with you that "the role is more important than
     all the ontological essences that people may try to squeeze out of
     the word" 'object' (so long as we confine the term to the object in
     the semiotic process).  I personally think that such a distinction
     represents “a difference which makes a difference" and ought not be
     reduced to a matter of "the people who get it already ... and the
     people who don't."

-- 

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