



**Changing Perceptions in Zimbabwe -  
Nationwide Survey of the Political Climate in Zimbabwe  
November 2010-January 2011**

Report by Susan Booyesen

With fieldwork and data-processing  
by *Mass Public Opinion Institute*, Harare

4 March 2011

## CONTENTS

	<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<b>4</b>
	Acronyms and Map of Zimbabwe	9
<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction, objectives, methodology and political context of the December 2010 FHSA survey</b>	<b>10</b>
	1.1 Introduction and objectives	10
	1.2 Methodology	10
	1.3 Political context of the survey – during and subsequent to fieldwork	14
	1.4 Report structure	17
<b>2</b>	<b>Power, power shifts and performance of the Inclusive Government</b>	<b>18</b>
	2.1 Power-sharing – main trends	18
	2.2 Assessments of power-sharing in the Inclusive Government	19
	<i>Centres of power and shifting power in the IG</i>	20
	<i>Parties benefitting from involvement in the IG</i>	21
	2.3 Performance of the Inclusive Government	22
	2.4 Trust in prevailing state and political institutions	24
	2.5 Zimbabwe’s general direction – and country versus personal economic conditions	25
<b>3</b>	<b>The politics of violence and fear in Zimbabwe</b>	<b>29</b>
	3.1 Zimbabwean politics, violence and fear – main trends	29
	3.2 Histories of Zimbabweans’ exposure to violence and intimidation	30
	3.3 Experiences of violence and intimidation in contemporary Zimbabwe	32
	<i>Community-anchored experiences of reasons and responsibility for violence</i>	35
<b>4</b>	<b>Constitution-making and constitutional expectations</b>	<b>36</b>
	4.1 Expectations of the new constitution – main trends	32
	4.2 Realism, moderation and high stakes in getting a new constitution	37
	<i>High stakes in getting a new constitution</i>	37
	<i>Perspectives on the preceding constitution</i>	38
	4.3 The 2010-11 constitutional outreach process	38
	4.4 The ‘story’ of experiences of the COPAC process	40
	<i>News of the COPAC outreach meetings</i>	40
	<i>Voices in the COPAC meetings</i>	41
	<i>Time, timing for discussions and participants’ preparation for COPAC discussions</i>	42
	<i>Violence in the COPAC process</i>	42
	<i>Issues that COPAC dealt with</i>	42
	4.5 Constitutional content – trends and specifics of institutions	43
<b>5</b>	<b>Party support and declaring vote intention</b>	<b>45</b>
	5.1 Main party support trends – declared support	46
	5.2 Growing trend of non-declaration of party support	47
	5.3 Select parallel indicators of core party support	47
	<i>Trust in political institutions and parties</i>	47
	<i>Issues of party political polarisation</i>	48
	5.4 Membership of political parties	50
<b>6</b>	<b>Elections – expectations, experiences and electoral violence-fear-coercion</b>	<b>51</b>
	6.1 Expectations of elections – main trends	51
	6.2 Order and timing of constitution-making and elections	52
	6.3 Memories of the 2008 elections	53
	6.4 Expectations of ‘free and fair’ future elections	54
	<i>Roles for SADC</i>	54
	6.5 Violence and elections – main trends	55
	6.6 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and readiness	56
	6.7 Voter registration	57

<b>7</b>	<b>Political interest and media use</b>	<b>58</b>
	7.1 Media exposure and political interest – main trends	58
	7.2 Interest in public affairs-politics	59
	7.3 Media use	59
	<i>Zimbabweans’ trust in the news media they use</i>	61
	<i>Demographics and media use</i>	61
	<i>Geographical spread and media use</i>	61
	Appendix A	<b>63</b>
	Questionnaire	63

## Executive Summary

---

- I: Power, power shifts and performance of the Inclusive Government
- II: Politics of violence and fear in Zimbabwe
- III: Constitution-making and constitutional expectations
- IV: Party support and declaring vote intention
- V: Elections – expectations, experiences and electoral violence-fear-coercion
- VI: Political interest and media use

**The following represent the main findings of the Freedom House Southern Africa (FHSA) December 2010 survey of Zimbabwean politics:**

### **I: Power, power shifts and performance of the Inclusive Government**

Zimbabwe *circa 2010-11* was in many respects a different place from the Zimbabwe of February 2009 (the time of formation of Inclusive Government, IG), and even from the time of the previous Freedom House survey of September 2009. Some power relations have been changing and living conditions have improved. Simultaneously, much had remained the same, including presidential and security force powers, and the power to unleash violence and enforce compliance. To illustrate:

- ✿ Despite the IG's incorporation of all three main political parties of the time there is widespread recognition that power remains overwhelmingly vested in the hands of ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe. There is little doubt in this survey that Mugabe continuously relies on the back-up of the state security forces to remain entrenched.
- ✿ Zimbabweans report that their lives have been improving over a wide front subsequent to the introduction of IG. The MDC-T is the political party that receives, by far, the most credit for the positive changes.
- ✿ Zimbabweans are divided as to the general direction in which the country is moving – 35% say the direction is right; 31% that it is wrong. In line with the perception-recognition of ZANU-PF remaining in charge (in effect), and Zimbabweans over a wide front enjoying a better life, it is not surprising that ZANU-PF supporters are more likely than MDC-T supporters to believe that the country is heading in a right direction – 51% of ZANU-PF's compared to 26% of MDC-T supporters feel this way.
- ✿ Zimbabweans in the past two years have experienced many improvements in their economic conditions – but still believe that their personal conditions have not quite improved as much as those of the country in general.

- ☀ In comparison to the previous survey Zimbabweans are less optimistic about the possibility that things will improve. In 2009, 65% felt that *economic conditions in the country* would improve in the following 12 months – the comparable percentage for 2010 was 49. In 2009, 63% of Zimbabweans reckoned *their own economic conditions* would be better in 12 months from then – in 2010 this percentage had shrunk to 48.

## **II: Politics of violence and fear in Zimbabwe**

Political violence and intimidation have been widespread in Zimbabwe. Violence and intimidation shape the context of constitution-making and elections. Hence, the analysis places these phenomena in the foreground, showing how a large proportion of Zimbabweans have been affected by violence and fear of violence and intimidation – and many more of the supporters of the MDC-T than of ZANU-PF have been affected.

The transition might have been progressing, but there is little doubt that violence and important political decisions hang together. 76% in the survey believe that each time Zimbabwe comes to important political decisions, violence and intimidation surface. The memories of violence and retribution for dissidence from ZANU-PF also lie just below the surface, and need very little to be rekindled.

One-third of Zimbabweans in this survey report that they have been exposed personally to intimidation and threat in the period since independence in 1980 – and 27% have witnessed politically inspired killing and injury. These percentages rise even further when the political parties' supporters are separated – with MDC-T supporters far more exposed than their counterparts in ZANU-PF. Again on the general population level, 58% of respondents reported that they had experienced violence and intimidation in their communities in the past two years.

It is not surprising therefore that there is an omnipresent awareness of the threat to personal safety once Zimbabweans exit the zone of non-political daily activities into the world of politics. In this *political* world they do not feel free to express their views. 89% say they have to be careful what they say politically. When probed in open-ended questions about the reasons for violence and the identity of the perpetrators, the survey respondents' experiences indicated ZANU-PF's 'misuse' of supporters and associates, in the context of greed for political power and disregard of electoral verdicts. The bulk of survey responses identify ZANU-PF associated persons and agencies as by far the most prevalent amongst the perpetrators. The most prominent responses in open-ended questions were 'ZANU-PF youths and supporters' (26%), 'war veterans and youth militia' (9%), 'all political parties or both ZANU-PF and MDC-T supporters' (6%), 'youths or idle youths' (3%) and 'MDC-T supporters' (3%).

## **III: Constitution-making and constitutional expectations**

Zimbabweans appear to have been confused by the on-off constitutional debates and proceedings of the past decade, combined with a partial transition that brought mixed signals of improved economic conditions (yet, continuous hardships), and apparent entrenchment of ZANU-PF in power.

On the one hand, they hold out hope that the emerging constitution will change politics and their lives for the better. They are impatient for the new constitution to take shape and replace the old one. 38% want the existing constitution repealed and another 28% want it amended. 62% reckon that the COPAC constitutional outreach process was meaningful. They also say they are tired of being consulted on constitutions, and want to see the job done. They definitely want to see the constitution going to referendum before a next round of elections.

On the other hand, only 42% reckon that citizens' views will be reflected in a new constitution. Only 30% believe that a constitution will be produced that will be good for democracy and human rights. Simultaneously, they are certain as to what they want from a new constitution – a limitation of presidential terms, no appointed members of parliament, restriction of the role of traditional leaders to local government, independent courts and an independent election management body.

The Zimbabweans in the survey speak positively of the COPAC constitutional outreach process – but only 24% had attended a meeting. They observed relatively limited violence around the process – although about 1 in 7 of the attendees report that they had seen political parties use violence to get their way in constitutional deliberations. Spokespersons had been appointed by political parties, mostly at local level, and speeches and prayers had their political content. Generally, however, they believe that the deliberations were fine, and participants say they did not feel intimidated articulating their constitutional wishes.

#### **IV: Party support and declaring vote intention**

The survey delivers the result that the MDC-T has suffered a substantial drop of support in the time since the previous September 2009 Freedom House survey – from 55% to 38%. ZANU-PF appears to have grown its support by 5 percentage points from 12% to 17%. The MDC-M has effectively disappeared, with an indicated support level of below 1%. ZAPU-Dabengwa remains in the sub-1% zone.

Simultaneously, 42% of respondents chose not to declare their vote preference – a percentage that was substantially up from the previous, September 2009, Freedom House survey's 31%. Given the violence structure of Zimbabwean society it is probably not surprising that so many chose not to declare. It remains possible that the MDC-T retains substantial levels of hidden support in the ranks of the 42% of non-declarants.

The MDC-T drop is not entirely explained through the rest of the survey data. The survey indicates that the Inclusive Government is widely credited with good performances. The MDC-T is receiving substantial credit for the performance. Simultaneously, the MDC-T in the time since the 2009 survey has been confirmed to be the subject partner in the IG, with effective power remaining in the hands of Mugabe and the security forces. This is likely to have dented the MDC-T image. In the political context it has also been evident that the MDC-T has been less able to be simultaneously effective as party and as government partner.

The current survey contained items which can be used as 'parallel indicators' of party support (besides directly asking respondents who they would support in an election). These measures were included in

the questionnaire design, given the expected low level of declaration. They cover issues of political trust and political statements that differentiate between the supporters of the main political parties. The measures show that the survey's party support levels probably indicate the core minimum support for ZANU-PF, and a level of MDC-T support that is seemingly lower than the support the MDC-T enjoys on a range of parallel measures:

**ZANU-PF parallel support indicators:** 16% of the respondents want a government body to run elections; 17% deny that violence and intimidation affect the party vote in elections; 16% believe that the youth militia look after the best interests of Zimbabweans. In addition, 16% say they trust ZANU-PF 'a lot' (a further 20% reckon they 'somewhat' trust ZANU-PF) – for a total of 36% compared with the MDC-T total of 66%. A higher percentage of 43% said that they trust the Presidency of the country.

**MDC-T parallel support indicators:** 45% credit the MDC-T with good performance in the IG. In the domain of trust, 66% say that they trust the MDC-T 'somewhat' or 'a lot'; and 67% trust the Office of the Prime Minister (occupied by the MDC-T's Tsvangirai) 'somewhat' or 'a lot' (compared with the 43% of the Presidency gets).

#### **V: Elections – expectations, experiences and electoral violence-fear-coercion**

The contradictions of contemporary Zimbabwe are nowhere more evident than in Zimbabweans' expectations and experiences of elections. None of the Zimbabwean presidential and parliamentary elections of the 11 years since February 2000 has been less than traumatic for large proportions of Zimbabweans. The continued practice of violence signals that 'Election 2011/12' will be no less disturbing. Zimbabweans in this survey expect violence again to prevail – whilst they also believe new elections would be 'more free and fair' than those of 2008.

Zimbabweans believe that violence will impact on the vote proportions that parties get in the elections – 74% think that people sometimes vote for those they don't support, due to fear. They expect that rights of freedom of expression will be compromised. 55% think that fear of violence might make Zimbabweans abstain from voting – substantially more than the 33% that reckon that on the day of elections Zimbabweans will bury fear of violence and intimidation and go and vote.

Yet, they are impatient to get elections. When the survey was conducted in December 2010, 11% declared that elections should be held 'immediately' (in 2009 31% wanted elections 'immediately'). Another 46% in the 2010 survey chose '2011', which in effect means that 57% want elections in 2011. Almost the same percentage as in 2009 (56% in 2009) thus wanted elections within one year. However, this is not a *carte blanche* insistence on immediate elections. The respondents clearly stated that the constitution needs to be drafted and subjected to referendum *before* they go to elections. Their desired date for elections confirms this – it is more than a year since the previous survey and still in the 2010 survey they wanted elections 'within a year'. The prerequisite of a new constitution clearly has to fall into place. Lawmakers and constitutional drafters are expected to waste no time in getting a new constitutional dispensation in place.

It is not entirely clear from the survey what the tipping point is, where Zimbabweans might decide that the catalyst factor of another election is needed, flaws and all, in order to propel Zimbabwe out of both a vaguely defined timeline for delivery of a new constitution, a slow pace of change, governance shortfalls, and poor economic conditions.

#### **VI: Political interest and media use**

Zimbabweans' interest in public and political affairs is reasonably high, albeit on levels somewhat lower than in the comparable 2009 Freedom House survey, which was done seven months after institution of the IG. Interest in public and political matters may have declined, given the more confused and doubtful days of late 2010. Some of the differences are within the margin-of-error range, but the lowering is consistent over a series of items. Nevertheless, only 20% report that they are 'not interested in public affairs at all' or that they 'never' discuss political matters when they get together with friends. 42% of Zimbabweans are 'somewhat' or 'very' interested in public affairs, and 74% in this survey reported that they 'sometimes' or 'often' discuss politics when they get together with their friends. MDC-T supporters reported a lower interest in public affairs than their ZANU-PF counterparts.

Radio remains the predominant news source for Zimbabweans, with 52% reporting that they get their news from radio at least a few times a week. Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) has the widest reach. Television is largely the domain of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), although channels 1, 2 and 3 of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) enjoy substantial penetration. 23% of Zimbabweans report that they get their news from the papers 'a few times a week' or 'every day'. Another 17% occasionally access the newspapers for public affairs news. Internet, according to this survey, is used regularly by 6% of Zimbabweans for political news (almost all from the MDC-T). The analysis shows significant media use differences across the provincial rural-urban divides.



## Acronyms

<b>COPAC</b>	Parliamentary Select Committee on the Constitution
<b>CIO</b>	Central Intelligence Organisation
<b>CSO</b>	Central Statistical Office / ZimStats
<b>EAs</b>	Enumeration Areas
<b>FHSA</b>	Freedom House Southern Africa
<b>GPA</b>	Global Political Agreement
<b>IG</b>	Inclusive Government
<b>JOC</b>	Joint Operations Command
<b>MDC-T</b>	Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai
<b>MDC-M/N</b>	Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara/Ncube (after Welshman Ncube)
<b>MPOI</b>	Mass Public Opinion Institute
<b>POSA</b>	Public Order Security Act
<b>Q</b>	Question
<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
<b>ZANU-PF</b>	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
<b>ZAPU-Dabengwa</b>	Zimbabwe Africa Patriotic Union-Dabengwa
<b>ZBC</b>	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
<b>ZEC</b>	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

## ZIMBABWE



# 1

## Introduction, objectives, methodology and political context of the December 2010 Freedom House survey

- 1.1 Introduction and objectives (10)
- 1.2 Methodology (10)
- 1.3 Political context of the survey – during and subsequent to fieldwork (13)
- 1.4 Report structure (16)

### 1.1 Introduction and objectives

Freedom House Southern Africa (FHSA) has been conducting a series of surveys of the political situation in Zimbabwe. The primary objective has been to support partner organisations in Zimbabwe that Freedom House works with in pursuit of the ideals of a politically free society in Zimbabwe, which can only come about through free, democratic and legitimate elections, anchored in an empowered civil society.

This survey was conducted just over two years after the formation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), 22 months after the formation of the Inclusive Government (IG) and 15 months after the first survey of September 2009. The surveys offered Zimbabweans a platform to express opinions and relate experiences on a series of issues that are critically important to the citizenry as Zimbabwe continues its transitional process. The surveys are vital in helping to ensure that the voices of the people are known, and that they help shape the political decisions that are made in this transition.

### 1.2 Methodology

This section relates essential details of the polling process that generated the data for this report. The process was a cooperative endeavour between Freedom House, Susan Booyesen, and the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI).

#### *The questionnaire*

The sections of the questionnaire dealt with the issues of continuous transition and gradual political change in Zimbabwe, circa 2010 – and were designed to speak to the needs of Freedom House and its partner organisations in its 2011 work in Zimbabwe. The main themes in the questionnaire centred on:

- ✿ General socio-political-economic attitudes (experiences and expectations regarding the nature and extent of change in contemporary Zimbabwe);

- ✿ The Inclusive Government (IG) (issues of power-sharing vis-à-vis elections, the performance of the IG);
- ✿ Constitutional reform (the need for constitutional change, experiences of the COPAC process, the need for further constitutional education, performance of the main political parties in shaping inputs into the emerging constitution, expectations of the contents and directions of the new constitution, content and process);
- ✿ Violence and Intimidation (experiences of violence and intimidation – historically and in contemporary Zimbabwe, possible change in experiences of the level of violence);
- ✿ Elections (timing, expectations of future elections, the order of elections and constitution-making, violence and elections, things that would help people feel safe in time of elections, the relation between violence and the vote, voter registration and confidence in the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC));
- ✿ Political interest and media use; and
- ✿ ‘The vote’ – and non-declaration of vote intent.

The questionnaire was anchored in consultative interviews conducted in Zimbabwe in September 2010.<sup>1</sup> Partner organisations were engaged on their needs for information – types of questions, for example, that would help inform their advocacy work in Zimbabwe. These consultations were conducted by Susan Booyesen and Freedom House. Many of the questions in the survey directly emerged from these consultations. With a view to tracking political attitude change in Zimbabwe over time, the questionnaire retained a series of items that were used, for example, in the September 2009 FHSA-MPOI survey, then under the guidance of pollster Michael Bratton. The questionnaire went through a series of drafts. The inputs of a range of Freedom House persons, as well as those of MPOI, are acknowledged.

The political volatility and associated dangers to both researcher-interviewers in the field, and the survey respondents, were continuous considerations in the drafting of the questionnaire. Based on reports by MPOI, it was considered at one stage to postpone fieldwork, when planning processes unfolded in October-November 2010. Several questions were deemed too dangerous to include in the survey. In the end, in most instances, it was decided to include crucial themes, even if they were deemed *politically sensitive*, but to exclude *politically dangerous* questions as judged by MPOI, that had the potential to trigger attacks on the interviewers.

***The rest of the methodology section draws on and summarises methodology inserts provided by MPOI.***

### ***Sampling***

The Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) was responsible for the sampling. MPOI cooperated with the Central Statistical Office (CSO) for population projections (Table 1).

---

<sup>1</sup> Freedom House Southern Africa (FHSA), 14 September 2010, *Report on Consultation with FHSA Partner Organisations in Zimbabwe*, by Susan Booyesen.

MPOI applied a random selection method at every stage of sampling and also a probability proportionate to population size (PPPS) wherever possible. A sample size of 1 200 allows for a margin of error of plus or minus 2.8% at the 95% level of confidence. This is regarded as sufficient to make population inferences. The sample was stratified first by province and secondly by rural/urban distinctions within provinces. In total 100 enumeration areas (EAs) were sampled with the latter subdivided into 71 rural EAs and 29 urban EAs (Table 2).

<b>Table 1: Projected Population for Zimbabwe 2010</b>				
<b>Province</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of national population</b>
<b>Manicaland</b>	214 647	1 226 203	1 440 850	11.7
<b>Masvingo</b>	32 197	1 383 858	1 416 055	11.5
<b>Harare</b>	1 395 207	0	1 395 207	11
<b>Mashonaland Central</b>	135 943	1 217 444	1 353 388	11
<b>Midlands</b>	354 168	980 962	1 335 130	11
<b>Mashonaland West</b>	343 436	919 652	1 263 088	10.2
<b>Mashonaland East</b>	146 676	1 033 514	1 180 190	9.6
<b>Matebeleland North</b>	64 394	1 059 790	1 124 184	9
<b>Matebeleland South</b>	46 507	937 169	983 676	8
<b>Bulawayo</b>	844 279	0	844 279	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>3 577 453</b>	<b>8 758 593</b>	<b>12 336 046</b>	<b>100</b>

In order to use up-to-date population figures, the Institute requested the Central Statistical Office (CSO) to project the Zimbabwe population figures for 2010. Zimbabwe population projections for the period 2002 to 2010 were computed using the cohort component method. The method is defined simply by the use of estimates and projections of births, deaths and net migration to update the population. The cohort component method is inherent in *Spectrum* computer package. The *Spectrum* software was designed by Futures Group International for making population projections taking HIV-AIDS into account. The issue of internal migration remains a major challenge for both the CSO and research organisations in Zimbabwe, because of difficulties associated with factoring that component into the projections. Tables 1 and 2 summarise Zimbabwe's projected population figures for 2010, as well as EA sample allocation of EAs by province.

#### ***Preparation for and implementation of fieldwork***

MPOI undertook fieldworker training in late November 2010. Training included trial interviews and feedback on technical aspects of the questionnaire. At the end of November, MPOI dispatched three teams of six interviewers each, each under the leadership of a supervisor. The 'Harare team' covered Harare province, Mashonaland Central, parts of Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West; the 'Bulawayo team' covered Bulawayo province, Midlands, Matebeleland North and Matebeleland South; and the 'Manicaland team' covered Manicaland, Masvingo and part of Mashonaland East.

On average each interviewer conducted six interviews per day. This was more practicable in the urban areas, with short travelling distances between the EAs. In rural areas this was only possible when the team had overnighted in close proximity to the EAs. 12 interviews were conducted in each EA.

<b>Table 2:</b>			
<b>Sample allocation of enumerator areas by province</b>			
<i>12 interviews were conducted in each Enumerator Area (EA)</i>			
<b>Province</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Manicaland</b>	2	10	12
<b>Midlands</b>	3	9	12
<b>Masvingo</b>	1	11	12
<b>Mashonaland Central</b>	1	10	11
<b>Harare</b>	10	0	10
<b>Mashonaland East</b>	1	8	9
<b>Mashonaland West</b>	2	7	9
<b>Matebeleland North</b>	1	8	9
<b>Matebeleland South</b>	1	8	9
<b>Bulawayo</b>	7	0	7
<b>Total</b>	29	71	100

The interviewers submitted the completed questionnaires to a supervisor after conducting a first round of inter-interviewer cross-checks for completeness. The supervisors checked all the administered questionnaires for completeness and validity of responses. Supervisors conducted one back-check per EA. This was, however, in the words of MPOI ‘with considerable difficulty since some respondents felt this violated the principle of confidentiality’. There were regular end-of-day and end-of-EA debriefing sessions to help interviewers handle conditions on the ground. MPOI’s principal researcher monitored the research teams on randomly selected areas to confirm survey protocols on walk patterns, and household and respondent selection procedure. Monitoring of fieldwork was synchronized together with the cross-checking of the completed questionnaires. For quality control, MPOI’s principal researcher visited the three teams in the field. Fieldwork was completed in mid-December 2010. MPOI reported that no major political challenges had been experienced in the course of fieldwork implementation (also see section on *Political context*).

#### ***Data processing***

MPOI undertook data processing, working on the requests from Freedom House and the pollster. MPOI furthermore undertook the coding of open-ended questions. The data sets and select statistical applications were made available by MPOI in the period from mid-January to mid-February 2011.

### 1.3 Political context of the survey – during and subsequent to fieldwork

This section briefly takes stock of pertinent political conditions at the time the survey went into the field, and of state of events at the time of the release of the report – the context into which the report may be put to use.

#### ***Political context in the run-up and course of fieldwork***

Much had transpired in Zimbabwe in the period since the formation of the Inclusive Government in February 2008. People were benefiting from a semblance of economic and political stability and normality. This was evidenced in the combination of improved economic conditions, and a relative (cyclical) decline in political violence. The momentum of economic change, however, was slowing down and Zimbabweans increasingly became aware of continuous deficits and of the fact that their lives had been changing, somewhat for the better, but that there was no clear escape from conditions of abject poverty and deprivation, both absolute and relative. The situation on the ground in most of the provinces in the course of the interview fieldwork was testimony to the Inclusive Government still having a long way to go.

The period from October to December 2010 was relatively volatile, given the unfolding ZANU-PF campaign, Operation *Budiranaï Pachena* ('Declare your Position', relating to the theme of *where were you when we were hunting... and now you want a piece of the meat?*). The campaign was used to intimidate villagers and witch-hunt MDC-T supporters, particularly in Masvingo province. Past experience had taught that ZANU-PF congress times require all in Zimbabwe to be extra careful not to antagonise the powers that be.

The MPOI fieldwork period turned out to be free of the problems of physical violence emerged. Yet, circumspection prevailed and was probably manifested in the low level of responses to the most sensitive questions on voting, party support and judgements on the victors of preceding elections. The question on the victor of the June 2008 presidential election was deemed so sensitive that MPOI and Freedom House decided that it should not be included. The following extract from MPOI's fieldwork report illustrates some of the conditions that fieldworkers encountered whilst administering the survey:

'The polarised environment that was the order of the day prior to the formation of the Inclusive Government seems to have had a negative bearing on the survey given that research teams encountered suspicious respondents. This problem was evident in Mutare Rural (Manicaland province), Chief Charumbira's area in Masvingo, and Gokwe in the Midlands province where most of the respondents were unwilling to take part in the interviews. In Saai 4 (Gokwe) and Kangula (located between Gokwe and Binga), it coincidentally happened that while interviews were underway, the vehicle for the House of Assembly MP for the area who is ZANU-PF passed through and this almost caused alarm among the interviewees as they noted that the legislator is the mastermind of all political crimes and was a vital cog of the party's machinery.

'In Mateme and Gokwe Kana, all enumeration areas located in the Midlands province, respondents were cautious as they were afraid of being labeled sell-outs within their

communities who would report every occurrence to ZANU-PF members. In Mberengwa another politically restive area in the Midlands province, the research team covered Chief Mataruse's area, one of the respondents thought the research team was from the feared CIO and thus demanded identification and upon being shown the MPOI identity card, went on to demand the national ID. In Chimanimani ward 7, the research team was approached by overzealous female war veterans who demanded to know the purpose of the team's visit in that area. In Chidodo and Mudzengerere communities of Guruve (Mashonaland Central province), the research assistants were told to seek the permission of the traditional leaders ...'

### ***Political context into the present***

Come the month of February 2011 evidence started mounting of ZANU-PF youth militia activities, centred in Mbare. It started with the ZANU-PF attacking MDC youth in their offices. Then, just outside of Harare, gangs attempted to take resorts and a bird sanctuary around Lake Chivero. Incidents spread as far away as Mutare. By the middle of the month the MDC-T stated that more than 1 000 of its members had been displaced. Independent humanitarian aid organisations supported such numbers with evidence of homes destroyed in Epworth and Bindura. In mid-February 2011 Tsvangirai said 'either the Commander-In-Chief is aware of [the youth violence] or there is now a Third Force that has assumed control in this country without the mandate of the people'.<sup>2</sup>

Violence was reported as ZANU-PF was building support for its petition against 'sanctions', with two million targeted to sign. Observers suggested that the militia campaign, *Operation Ngatizivane* ('Let's get to know one another') indicated the beginning of ZANU-PF's election and/or constitutional referendum campaign.<sup>3</sup> In the wake of battles with MDC youth in Mbare and the arrest and effective disappearance of MDC MP Douglas Mwonzora, the chair of the parliamentary constitution drafting committee, predictions were that the violence could approach the level of June 2008. This time, however, a parliamentary committee was called to investigate and Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri was summoned to testify.

### ***Constitution-making and elections***

In December, the COPAC public meetings on the constitutional dispensation had come to a close and preparations for the referendum on the constitution were beginning. According to the GPA, the constitutional referendum must be complete before an election can be called, often anticipated for September 2011. The principals to the GPA – the leaders of ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M – should agree to call an election, but if they cannot agree (and the early 2011 splits in the MDC-M could mean that, without a president, the MDC-M may not have a voice in the process, so the process would be unconstitutional) the Zimbabwean president can go ahead and call one. ZANU-PF's strategy remained uncertain – but was crucial because of the apparent powers of President Mugabe (and his stated intention) to call elections when he so wishes.

---

<sup>2</sup> Peta Thornycroft, 'Rising Political Violence Reported in Zimbabwe', *VOANewsCom*, <http://www.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?expire=&title=Rising+Political+Violence+Re...>

<sup>3</sup> It is alleged that at least 70 000 youths would be trained by the end of May 2011 in intimidating and unleashing violence on opposition party supporters.

ZANU-PF's December 2010 congress declared that an election would be held in 2011. Reports were that at this congress, ZANU-PF stated that it wanted a presidential election only – to put to rest 'the question of illegitimacy associated with the farcical Presidential run-off election of June 2008'. The current Constitution and Electoral Act do not allow an election for President only. It would thus either have to be amended, or the new constitution would allow it.

Tsvangirai said in February 2011 that he would not participate in elections amidst violence, probably meaning not in 2011. He indicated the constitution issue would be settled in late 2011 year and elections would follow in early 2012. According to him, the main agenda for 2011 was to support the road-map to a free and fair election – one with clear benchmarks and time-lines that would put in place mechanisms to ensure a legitimate and credible poll. He reiterated that '(o)nly when we have achieved the necessary conditions for a free, fair, credible and legitimate election will the MDC consider giving its blessing and participating in such a poll'.<sup>4</sup>

In an attempt to prepare for elections, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) in February 2011 demanded the voters' roll from the Registrar-General's office to clean it up. It indicated that it was contemplating a 'new mechanism' to improve the roll.

Regardless of the readiness for elections, much depends on the way in which the constitutional amendments 18 (which paved the way to the 2008 'harmonized' elections) and 19 (which lays down the rules for the GNU) are interpreted. The MDC-T and its supporters say that Amendment 19 states that the president can only call an election 'in consultation' with the prime minister. Others suggest that *if the GNU collapses* (dysfunctionality of the MDC-M as one of the three principals may be taken to indicate a 'collapse') Mugabe can call an election under the precepts of Amendment 18.<sup>5</sup> Mugabe said:<sup>6</sup>

'I have the constitutional right, in the absence of any position regarding the new constitution, to cause an election ... Those who don't want elections, if they don't want, we will have parliament dissolved and go for elections.'

Zimbabwean politics in many (and very important) respects thus remained 'business as usual' – ZANU-PF, in association with the Joint Operations Command (JOC),<sup>7</sup> was in charge, albeit with some fraying at the edges. There was uncertainty over elections, internal friction in government, a strained fiscus, little

---

<sup>4</sup> Morgan Tsvangirai, 'Zanu PF sabotage derailing unity govt', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 18 February 2011. <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/29937-zanu-pf-sabotage-derailing-unity-govt.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Paidamoyo Muzulu, 'Zimbabwe: 'Mugabe Can't Dissolve Parly Under GPA'', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 27 January 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201101310158.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Nelson Gore Banya, 'Zimbabwe's Mugabe Dismisses Surgery Reports, Says He Can Call an Election', *Bloomberg* 24 January 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-01-24/zimbabwe-s-mugabe-dismisses-surgery-reports-says-he-can-call-an-election.html>.

<sup>7</sup> The Joint Operations Command (JOC) includes the top security people – the heads of the army, air force, prison, police, intelligence services, *ex officio* the governor of reserve bank. Since 2002 JOC has been the key forum for government and policy decisions and it is widely believed to be running the country. Constantine Chiwenga, Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and JOC member, is widely believed to be the most likely successor to Mugabe.



indication from SADC (or South Africa) that pressure would come from outside to help ensure 'free and fair' elections, little action from the MDC-T, and violence seemingly increasingly being employed.

#### 1.4 Report structure

The rest of this report deals with the findings of the December 2010 Freedom House survey. Some findings are also compared with the results of the preceding September 2009 poll.

- ✿ Section 2 addresses issues of power in the Inclusive Government – power shifts, and how participation and performance in Inclusive Government (IG) have been affecting the main political players.
- ✿ Section 3 explores the violence-and-intimidation structure of contemporary, transitional Zimbabwe. Both violence and intimidation have been rife in Zimbabwe, and both in memory and in tangible form continue to impact contemporary politics.
- ✿ Section 4 focuses on constitution-making and the emerging new constitution, investigating how Zimbabweans have experienced the unfolding process and what their expectations of the new constitution are.
- ✿ Party support and declaration of vote intent follow in Section 5. The reality of low levels of revelation of party identity stands side by side to the proportion of Zimbabweans who *do* declare. Several parallel indicators of assessing party support are explored.
- ✿ Section 6 deals with elections – expectations of a next round of elections, and the experiential base of previous elections onto which new practice builds. Violence in the context of elections is one of the section sub-themes.
- ✿ Section 7 takes stock of Zimbabweans' interest in politics, their media consumption patterns, and how these intersect with some of the demographics that were recorded in this survey.

Conclusions and summary interpretations of the sections are encapsulated in the Executive Summary.

## 2

## POWER, POWER SHIFTS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT

### 2.1 Power-sharing – main trends (18)

### 2.2 Assessments of power-sharing in the inclusive government (19)

*Centres of power and shifting power in the IG (20)*

*Parties benefitting from involvement in the IG (21)*

### 2.3 Performance of the Inclusive Government (22)

### 2.4 Trust in prevailing state and political institutions (23)

### 2.5 Zimbabwe's general direction – and country versus personal economic conditions (24)

The games of the powerful in Zimbabwe entered a new phase with the (post-2008 election) commencement of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and Inclusive Government (IG). The IG, an interim measure, was envisaged to lead to the follow-up phase of a new constitution, renewed elections and the installation of a democratically elected, legitimate and lawful government. The IG hence became an important launch pad for a next round of power manoeuvres – ranging from entrenchment in power to efforts to gain enough power to unseat the incumbent.

This report's findings attest to a complex – and often contradicted – process of transition. There were increasing frustrations about the transformation shortfalls and the frequently slow pace of change. The IG was credited with bringing vast change to the living conditions of Zimbabweans – and it was the MDC-T that was receiving most of the praise for positive change. Yet, as the engine of change seemed to be running short of steam, and the constitutional transformation process was too low-key to set a faster and specifically benchmarked pace, Zimbabweans started exploring ways to help propel them out of the quagmire of contemporary Zimbabwe.

### 2.1 Power-sharing – main trends

Zimbabweans as represented in this survey are ambiguous about the power-sharing arrangements that have epitomised the Inclusive Government (IG) arrangement between the three main parties. There is little doubt that governance has improved, yet it remained contested as to how the IG had been impacting on power relations between the parties.

The main trends identified by the survey respondents, December 2010, were:

- ☀ Power resides with the president [Q10] – 'Only: with the president': 28%; 'mostly with the president': 47%; total: 75%.
- ☀ Zimbabweans are divided on whether ZANU-PF has been shedding power – 35% believe it has; 45% believe it has not [Q18A.]

- ✿ The President in his exercise of power relies on the security forces – ‘All the time’: 26%; ‘often’: 25% [Q11].
- ✿ Zimbabweans are divided on whether the MDC-T has been taking power away from ZANU-PF – 35% believe it has; 32% believe it has not [Q18D].
- ✿ 58% of respondents approve or approve strongly of the power-sharing arrangement between the main parties (25% disapprove) [Q7].
- ✿ 46% reckon that the 18 months of power-sharing were a success or a huge success (21% estimates that it has been a failure or a huge failure) [Q8].

## 2.2 Assessments of power-sharing in the Inclusive Government

A complex picture emerges of Zimbabweans simultaneously approving of the power-sharing agreement – and believing it has been a success – and then making clear that the IG power-sharing arrangement is a distant second best alternative, if not something that should never substitute for democratic elections (Table 3) [Q9].

<b>Table 3: Assessments of power-sharing vis-à-vis competitive elections</b>		
<b>Statements</b>	<b>September 2009 (%)</b>	<b>December 2010 (%)</b>
Power-sharing is a good alternative to competitive elections, the latter rarely works well	17	14
Power-sharing is a second best solution, to be used only when elections fail	43	42
Power-sharing is a bad alternative that should never replace competitive elections	33	35
Question: ‘Which of the following descriptions of power-sharing comes closest to your view?’ [Q9] Note: The percentages exclude ‘none’ and ‘don’t know’ responses		

When overall assessments of the decision of the political leaders to enter into power-sharing were called for, from the perspective of how the respondents were ‘feeling today’, the power-sharing arrangement received the support of 58%. 25% disapproved (and 14% were not sure) [Q7]. It was notable that the support for the dispensation had changed little compared with opinions assessed in September 2009. Then 62% had approved and 23% disapproved (and 13% were not sure). In both surveys 3% declared ‘don’t knows’.

Power-sharing is, by far, not the governance option of choice of Zimbabweans – 42% say it is the second best alternative, after elections, and a substantial 35% feel that power-sharing ‘is a bad alternative that should never replace competitive elections’ [Q9]. This latter sentiment could also be one of the parallel support indications for the MDC-T (see below). A comparison with the 2009 survey findings indicates remarkable consistency in Zimbabweans’ views on these dimensions of power-sharing agreements in relation to elections (Table 3).

### ***Centres of power and shifting power in the IG***

There are strong convictions that power (still) resides with the President, and that the MDC-T has gained through its participation in IG, but that the President exercises power and does so relying on the security forces.


<b>Table 4: Centres of power in the Inclusive Government (IG)</b>		
<b>Power resides ...</b>	<b>2009 (%)</b>	<b>2010 (%)</b>
Only with the president	<b>27</b>	<b>28</b>
Mainly with the president	<b>31</b>	<b>47</b>
In equal shares between the president and prime minister	<b>23</b>	<b>11</b>
Mainly with the prime minister	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>
Only with the prime minister	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>
Question: 'In your opinion, where does power reside in Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government (IG)?' [Q10] Note: Percentages exclude 'don't know' responses		

Table 4 shows that 75% observe that executive power in 2010 resided 'only' or 'mainly' with the President (Robert Mugabe; see first two response options in 2010). This is notably up from the 58% that held this opinion in the 2009 survey. In contrast, the Prime Minister (Morgan Tsvangirai) has consistently been rated as holding top-power by only around 10% of the respondents. Thus whilst more had still believed in 2009 that power-sharing was an equivalent business, more cynicism had emerged by late 2010.

Whereas 73% thought that the MDC-T 'brought positive changes to government', there was a split in opinion on whether the party had managed to 'take power from ZANU-PF' (34% say it had; 32% say it had not). To corroborate, 45% felt that ZANU-PF 'has not demonstrated willingness to cede power'. This belief is further clarified through 42% stating that through IG involvement ZANU-PF had gained the space 'to fight for an electoral comeback'. The survey also indicated that Zimbabweans mostly believe that the MDC-T had not been getting 'too close to ZANU-PF' in the course of practicing IG [Q18].

Zimbabweans have little illusion as to the extent to which the president in his exercise of power 'depends on the help of the security forces'. A total of 51% said that the president 'all the time' or 'often' relies on the security forces [Q11] (Figure 1).

**Figure 1: The president's reliance on the security forces in his exercise of power**



***Parties benefitting from involvement in the IG***

There is substantial uncertainty in the minds of the survey respondents as to how the IG dispensation has been impacting on political parties, especially on the MDC-T. There is a fairly general agreement that the MDC-T has been impacting on IG in a *positive* way. Large proportions of survey respondents – far out of range of what might be explained by party political support – believe that ‘the MDC-T brought positive changes to government [Q18B]: 36% ‘strongly agreed’ and a further 37% ‘agreed’. Yet, uncertainty rules as to *how the MDC-T is faring in relation to ZANU-PF*, and who has been benefitting in *exactly what way* from IG engagement.

Whereas only 15% of respondents believe that the MDC-T was the party that benefitted more from involvement in the IG, 35% saw ZANU-PF as the party that had best gained from IG involvement – thus suggesting that ZANU-PF has been emerging with more power than what it had in the past [Q17].

MDC-T supporters believe that both ZANU-PF and MDC-M had benefitted more than the MDC-T from involvement in the IG. 12% of the MDC-T supporters thought their own party had benefitted most, by far; and 7% said that their party had gained most, by a little. In contrast, 37% of respondents thought that ZANU-PF had gained most by far, and another 6% said ZANU-PF had gained most, by a little. 13% thought that MDC-M had gained most, by far.

The extent to which the partners have been contributing to improved government performance in Zimbabwe – in the IG – is bound to impact on citizens’ future party evaluations. With this in mind, the

survey explored assessments of the extent to which each of the three IG principals is credited for the improvements in governance [Q13] (also see next section).

It was strongly perceived that the MDC-T was to be credited most for the improvement in governance under IG – 45% held this view. A further 31% saw the MDC-T and ZANU-PF as equally responsible for the improvement. Only 1% thought that the MDC-T, ZANU-PF and the then MDC-M were all equally responsible. In addition, only 9% believed that ZANU-PF was the party that was to be credited most [Q13].

This set of trends contrasted with those delivered in response to the question of which of the two main parties benefitted most from involvement in the IG [Q17]. 29% reckoned that ZANU-PF had benefitted most – ‘by far’. Another 6% reckoned it had benefitted just a little more. Only 10% thought that the MDC-T had benefitted ‘most by far’ (also 6% reckoning the MDC-T has benefitted just a little more).

78% of MDC-T supporters believed that it was their party that deserved to be credited most, indicating discrepancy between what they believe their party deserves [Q13] and the recognition it had gained through IG involvement [Q17].

### **2.3 Performance of the Inclusive Government**

There is a substantial perception that the Inclusive Government (IG) has been performing well [Q12]. The Freedom House surveys used an 11-item mapping of Zimbabweans’ rating of the performance of the IG, first in 2009 and then in 2010 (Table 5) [Q12]. There are strong indications that the ratings could be ascribed to a wide-ranging improvement in economic conditions. Added to this, is the fact of a fair level of reduction of political violence compared with the extreme mid-2008 election period, albeit not in comparison to levels in the preceding years. Its best performance was seen to be in the realm of consumer goods – 97% of respondents reckon that there has been improved (‘better’ or ‘much better’) availability. The second set of good performances, with between 80% and 89% of respondents seeing an improvement, has been manifested in the better availability of foreign currency (86% observe this) and the reduction of political violence (80% believe there has been a reduction). Good IG performance in the 70% range was in terms of ‘reforming the constitution’ – 70% saw good IG performance here.

Most of the IG assessments that were asked delivered positive assessments in the 60-68% range – 68% think the IG had performed well in the distribution of food relief; 66% see a reduction in arbitrary arrests; 62% notice improved observation of the Rule of Law; 61% see a lowering of land invasions and another 61% saw an improvement in the attraction of international investment. The perception of improvement in the Rule of Law situation somewhat diverges from the experience of only 52% who felt that there had been an increase in freedom of speech (‘Increasing freedom to speak about political matters openly’) [Q12K]. 34% reckoned that nothing much had changed on this front.

Thus, the comparative surveys delivered consistency in the respondents' ranking of the power-sharing agreement, high general levels of approval of the IG across the periods of analysis, and consistency over time in the ranking of the top-three performance areas – availability of consumer goods, access to foreign currency and a reduction in levels of political violence. Important changes emerged lower down the rankings. There was a notable improvement in the ranking of government performance on transformation of the constitution, and distribution of food relief.

Assessments of the IG declined, however, in the areas of prevention of arbitrary arrest, healing a broken nation, and observance of the rule of law. This suggests that Zimbabweans were increasingly recognising that the IG was no magic wand that would make political polarisation go away. Such ambiguity was also evident in the respondent split between assessing Zimbabwe as moving in a right or a wrong direction.

<b>Performance area</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>2009 (%)</b>	<b>2010 (%)</b>	<b>Ranking and Total % 2010*</b>
<b>Making consumer goods available</b>	Better (B)	64	59	1 <sup>st</sup> (97)
	Much better (MB)	31	38	1 <sup>st</sup> 2009
<b>Ensuring access to foreign currency</b>	B	63	58	2 <sup>nd</sup> (86)
	MB	14	28	3 <sup>rd</sup> 2009
<b>Reducing political violence</b>	B	67	60	3 <sup>rd</sup> (80)
	MB	20	20	2 <sup>nd</sup> 2009
<b>Reforming the constitution</b>	B	42	56	4 <sup>th</sup> (70)
	MB	6	14	7 <sup>th</sup> in 2009
<b>Distributing food relief</b>	B	49	47	5 <sup>th</sup> (68)
	MB	11	21	8 <sup>th</sup> in 2009
<b>Preventing arbitrary arrest</b>	B	61	53	6 <sup>th</sup> (66)
	MB	12	13	4 <sup>th</sup> 2009
<b>Observing the rule of law</b>	B	60	51	7 <sup>th</sup> (62)
	MB	9	11	6 <sup>th</sup> in 2009
<b>Attracting international investment</b>	B	49	45	8 <sup>th</sup> (61)
	MB	11	16	8 <sup>th</sup> in 2009
<b>Healing a broken nation</b>	B	61	49	8 <sup>th</sup> (61)
	MB	11	12	5 <sup>th</sup> 2009
<b>Stopping land invasions</b>	B	51	51	8 <sup>th</sup> (61)
	MB	9	10	8 <sup>th</sup> in 2009
<b>Increasing freedom to speak openly about politics</b>	B	-	43	9 <sup>th</sup> (52)
	MB		9	Not rated 2009

Question: 'How do you compare the performance of the Inclusive Government (IG) with the previous ZANU-PF government with regard to the following matters?' [Q12]  
 \* Both surveys delivered a few joint rankings towards the lower end of the slate; the percentages in this table exclude the rest of the response categories, e.g. 'worse' and 'much worse'; the reported percentages indicate the overwhelming approval rate of the IG.

## 2.4 Trust in prevailing state and political institutions

Patterns of trust in public institutions in current Zimbabwe help reveal both issues of contemporary politics, and the challenges that are faced in the transition to a new system. The survey revealed a hierarchy of trust [Q62] (Table 6).

<b>Table 6: Levels of trust in public institutions</b>			
<b>Trust in Institutions</b>	<b>Trust somewhat</b>	<b>Trust a lot</b>	<b>Total of two categories of trust</b>
	<b>Row percentages (%)</b>		
<b>Churches (in general)</b>	31	50	<b>81</b>
<b>International donor organisations</b>	35	44	<b>79</b>
<b>Office of the Prime Minister</b>	37	30	<b>67</b>
<b>MDC-T</b>	34	32	<b>66</b>
<b>Traditional leaders</b>	34	25	<b>59</b>
<b>Civil society</b>	39	17	<b>56</b>
<b>Local government</b>	38	11	<b>49</b>
<b>Parliament</b>	31	16	<b>47</b>
<b>The military</b>	30	16	<b>46</b>
<b>Presidency</b>	24	19	<b>43</b>
<b>The police</b>	27	16	<b>43</b>
<b>Political parties (in general)</b>	33	7	<b>40</b>
<b>ZANU-PF</b>	20	16	<b>36</b>
<b>MDC-M</b>	18	4	<b>22</b>

Question: 'In the current Zimbabwe, how much do you trust each of the following institutions?'  
Note: 'Don't know' and refuse percentages are not reported in this table

Several of the items in Table 8 are cross-referenced below as parallel measures of party political support – especially the three political parties, the Presidency (Robert Mugabe / ZANU-PF), and the Office of the Premier (Morgan Tsvangirai / MDC-T). Interestingly, whereas 43% report that they trust the police, a much higher percentage, 64%, states that if violently attacked by a member of an opposition party, they would report the incident to the police [Q43].

It is notable that none of the prevailing public-state institutions – apart from the Office of the Prime Minister and in a sense the traditional leaders – have trust levels of over 50%. This reinforces the need for a new constitution, civic education to build ownership, and a referendum to legitimate the emerging constitution.



## 2.5 Zimbabwe’s general direction – and country versus personal economic conditions

Zimbabweans appear seriously divided as to whether the country is moving in the right or wrong direction – 35% thought it was ‘right’ and 31% said ‘wrong’ [Q1]. This indicated confusion and uncertainty as to whether the country is truly emerging from the *status quo ante* into a new dispensation, infused by ‘new politics’ ... despite the suggested solid IG performances. It is equally a function of changing dynamics, where earlier expectations are becoming diluted, if not defeated.

Notably, in terms of the two main party political protagonists, supporters of ZANU-PF were far more likely than those of the MDC-T to declare the direction ‘right’ rather than ‘wrong’ (Table 7). 51% of the ZANU-PF supporters (compared with 26% of MDC-T supporters) said the country was moving in a right direction. Inversely, 40% of MDC-T supporters said the direction was wrong (compared with 26% of ZANU-PF supporters).

Direction	Political party (%)	
	ZANU-PF	MDC-T
<b>Right direction</b>	51	26
<b>Wrong direction</b>	26	40
<b>Bit of both</b>	15	21
<b>Not moving at all</b>	1	7
<b>Don’t know / Refuse</b>	7	6

Question: ‘How do you feel about the general direction in which Zimbabwe is moving?’  
 Note: These trends only pertain to the 58% of the respondents in the survey who were prepared to say which political party they would vote for, should parliamentary elections be held ‘tomorrow’ [Q78]

The survey explored the reasons for these answers in unprompted open-ended questions, high up in the survey (to pre-empt ‘conditioning’). The twin issues that inspired the largest chunk of judgement of ‘right direction’ were ‘the economy is now stable’ and ‘the improved availability of basic commodities’ [Q1B]. Other important contributing motivations were political and socio-economic stability that had been achieved. Economic reasons in the form of the ‘high cost of living’ and the ‘shortage of foreign currency’ were the predominant reasons for believing that Zimbabwe is heading in the wrong direction [Q1C].

A breakdown by party vote support indicates that 28% of MDC-T supporters and 25% of ZANU-PF supporters [in terms of Q78] constitute the bulk of those who believe that Zimbabwe is heading in the right direction. The body of voters that sees Zimbabwe as moving in the wrong direction is far more MDC-T-dominated – 48% of them come from the MDC-T (14% from ZANU-PF) supporters in the survey. Similarly, 41% of those who observe both a movement in the right and wrong directions, come from the MDC-T (13% from ZANU-PF).

Demographics variably impact on the perceptions of the direction in which Zimbabwe is heading:

Education level seems to be the clearest – the highest levels of optimism ('right direction') are found amongst those of lower education levels. In general the trend is: the higher the education, the higher the level of cynicism. In the education groups of 'some post-secondary' to 'post-graduate' a minimum of 42% see Zimbabwe as moving in the wrong direction. These trends were manifested across demographic differentiation.

Age, however, does not clearly differentiate, although the most cynical about the country's direction is likely to be in the 31-50 year old age group.

Urban-rural differentiation indicates that urban people are more inclined to see the direction as 'wrong', and rural people are more concentrated in the grouping of 'right' direction. However, both 'right' and 'wrong' remain diffused across the rural-urban divides.

Gender analysis of the data shows that men are more likely than women to see the country as heading in a wrong direction.

Employment status (employed versus unemployed) does not differentiate the perceptions of right or wrong direction that the country is seen to be heading in.

Provincial differentiation shows that the most optimistic about the country's direction are to be found in Mashonaland-Central (52% in this province see the direction as right). Manicaland, Masvingo and Mashonaland East (in this order and declining) are the other provinces most likely to observe the direction as right. Bulawayo is the most cynical of the provinces (only 10% observe the overall direction as right). The two Matabeleland provinces are the second and third most cynical.

A further level of contradiction emerges from the survey in that 62% of respondents report the country's current economic condition to be very good or fairly good (compared with 7% that say it is very or fairly bad) [Q2A]. A lower 50% reckon their own present living conditions are very or fairly good [Q2B]. A comparable 63% feel the country's economic condition 'today' is better or much better than a year earlier [Q3A], and 60% estimated *their own* living conditions were better at the time of the survey than a year earlier [Q3B]. Thus, there is an improvement in personal living conditions, but Zimbabweans' present living conditions are felt to be lagging behind the national condition.

The survey itself does not offer further explanations of this phenomenon, but it is in line with complexities that prevail in contemporary Zimbabwe – a society undergoing change, in which individuals could very well feel that things are not exactly going as well for them personally, *as it is reported to be going* in the country in general.

More optimism is evident in the respondents' assessment of movement the country's and their own economic condition *in the next 12 months* – 49% reckoned the country's economic condition would be better in a year's time than in the present [Q4A], and 48% thought that would be true regarding *their own* conditions [Q4B]. These percentages, however, were both substantially down compared with 2009. Then, 65% had thought the country's economic conditions would be better 12 months on, and 63% thought their own living conditions would be better. The original IG optimism had clearly come face to face with much harsher realities than initially expected.

The question on access to food, water, medicines and cooking fuel [Q6] reveals that conditions were trying – 23% say they had gone without food 'many times' or 'always'; with the equivalent deprivations on water 23%; modern medical treatment 32%; traditional medical treatment 3%; and cooking oil 29%.

In contrast to these relatively 'modest' deprivations, 73% report that in the preceding year they had gone without a cash income 'many times' or 'always'. A comparison of the 2009 and 2010 Freedom House surveys shows consistent evidence of improvement in terms of six factors (Table 8).

Type of deprivation and Overall trend on 3-level 'SMA' index	Frequency on SMA: Several times (S) Many time (M) Always (A)	September 2009 (%)		December 2010 (%)	
			Combined		Combined
<b>Not enough food to eat – declining from 85 to 50%</b>	S	17	85	27	50
	M	43		20	
	A	25		3	
<b>Not enough clean water for home use – declining from 49 to 43%</b>	S	17	49	20	43
	M	20		18	
	A	12		5	
<b>Lack of modern medicines / - medical treatment –declining from 80 to 65%</b>	S	20	80	31	65
	M	32		27	
	A	28		7	
<b>Lack of traditional medicines / - medical treatment – not measured in 2009</b>	S	-	-	6	9
	M	-		3	
	A	-		0.3	
<b>Not enough fuel to cook food – declining from 55 to 48%</b>	S	18	55	19	48
	M	22		22	
	A	15		7	
<b>Lack of a cash income – declining from 94 to 91%</b>	S	10	94	19	91
	M	33		39	
	A	51		33	

Question: 'Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you, or anyone in your family, gone without ...?' [Q6] Note: The percentages over represent those the levels of deprivation (the percentages of 'never' and 'once or twice' are not listed (but are indicated by the percentage remainders)

The change in deprivation trends from 2009 to 2010 corroborates the survey indications that Zimbabweans' lives have been improving over a broad front. However, life remains far from rosy. 50% in 2010 report that in the preceding year (December 2009 to December 2010) they or someone in their families had at times gone without enough food to eat, 43% did not always have enough clean water for home use, and 48% lacked good access to cooking fuel. On all three these fronts, however, there were substantial improvements compared with their reports of September 2009.

When respondents were asked [Q5A; Q5B] in open-ended questions to identify the first and second *most important problems facing Zimbabwe 'today'*, unemployment emerged as the most serious, by far. Thereafter came the shortage of foreign currency, food shortages, bad governance and political instability, and shortages of agricultural implements and production. Additional issues, emerging from the listing of second most important problems, were the expensive nature and poor quality of education and health care.

**3.1 Zimbabwean politics, violence and fear – main trends (29)****3.2 Histories of Zimbabweans' exposure to violence and intimidation (30)****3.3 Experiences of violence and intimidation in contemporary Zimbabwe (32)**

*Community-based experiences of reasons and responsibility for violence (35)*

Zimbabwe today is a complex blend of contrasting transitional trends. Parts suggest that a normalisation of politics may be pending; elsewhere there is a continuous prevalence of fear. Even in the 'quiet' times violence and intimidation are often just below the surface. It is only on the most generic questions about safety (and on issues of daily non-political business) that Zimbabweans feel free to operate. As soon as the world of politics is entered, there are multiple expressions of continuation of fear due to violence and intimidation (or the manifest threat thereof). Where there have been improvements, these combine with threatened-expected resuscitations. The theme of violence and fear also features in the context of past and future elections.

**3.1 Zimbabwean politics, violence and fear – main trends**

The survey reveals a pattern of virtually omnipresent awareness of threat to personal safety once the border of the personal is crossed and the world of politics is entered. Whilst a large majority feel safe to go about doing their daily business [Q46], 89% say they have to be careful about what they say about politics [Q42A], and 54% say they do not feel free to express their political views [Q47A].

Other pertinent trends are:

- ✿ Zimbabweans say that they feel free to speak to strangers who enter their communities [Q29E], or to simply move around their daily business [Q46].
- ✿ But, when it comes to political matters specifically, 54% say they do not feel free to express their political views [Q47A].
- ✿ Simultaneously, when the question was placed in a political context, 74% said they fear the possible occurrence of violence and intimidation *in their daily lives* [Q42B]; 89% reckon that they often or always have to be careful about what they say about politics [Q42A].
- ✿ Substantial proportions – more than one-third of the total number of respondents on several violence-intimidation items – have been exposed to violence and intimidation [Q44].
- ✿ Large proportions of the survey respondents – 44% in the case of violence and intimidation – report that family members have been exposed [Q45].
- ✿ These Zimbabweans report that mere threats of political violence rekindle the fears that they have once felt in situations of violence [Q47B].

- ✿ They believe that politics need not be dangerous; that it is *not inevitable* that violence and politics cohere [Q40]. 93% agree with the statement that ‘violence is never justified’ [Q41]. To illustrate the party support dimension, of those who ‘strongly agree’ that violence is never justified in politics in Zimbabwe – 42% are from the MDC-T and 15% from ZANU-PF.
- ✿ 62% feel that ZANU-PF’s youth militia (often cited as perpetrators of violence) do not look out for the interests of Zimbabweans [Q47C].

### 3.2 Histories of Zimbabweans’ exposure to violence and intimidation

As essential background, the Freedom House surveys have anchored Zimbabweans’ opinions on violence and intimidation in the respondents’ reports on whether they and members of their families had been affected, in the period since independence in 1980, by nine forms of violence and intimidation (Table 9).

Acts of politically motivated violence, force & intimidation	Personal exposure (%)				Exposure of family members (%)			
	September 2009		December 2010		September 2009		December 2010	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Intimidation, threat, harassment	35	37	35	65	39	33	44	51
Theft, damage to personal property	12	60	13	87	18	54	25	69
Denial of food or starvation	17	55	15	85	18	53	21	73
Forced removal from home, land	9	63	7	93	16	55	17	78
Closure of business	7	65	4	96	10	62	9	85
Loss of a job	7	65	5	95	14	86	11	82
Arrest, kidnap abduction	6	66	6	94	13	59	29	64
Personal injury, incl. rape, torture	12	60	10	90	22	50	38	54
Witnessed someone killed, injured	27	45	35	65	24	46	7	29

Question: ‘Thinking about the period since independence in 1980, please tell me whether you personally / members of your family were ever affected in any of the following ways – refer only to events that were politically motivated’ [Q44; Q45]

These historically focussed experiences are counter-posed to *experiences in the present* (immediate past in current Zimbabwe). In this respect, the 2010 survey results show that violence and intimidation are ‘alive and well’ in Zimbabwe today. (In the two months since fieldwork, there have also been multiple reports about escalations; see *Political context*.) A battery of items [Q47] tested the contemporary experiences of political violence and the perceived impact of violence on party support.

The highlighted pairs of blocks in Table 10 demonstrate the overwhelming continuation of practices and experiences of violence and intimidation, as well as continuous operation of a palpable ‘fear structure’ in Zimbabweans politics, as measured in December 2010. At best, there was some sense that there is more freedom nowadays to express political views than before. The prevailing effects of politically

directed violence and intimidation are evident from the strong survey belief that memories of violence are easily reactivated and that fear of violence and intimidation impact Zimbabweans' voting decisions.

<b>Table 10: Provincial detailing of experience of <u>politically motivated</u> acts of violence since independence</b>		
<b>Acts of politically motivated violence</b>	<b>Two provinces with HIGHEST reported incidence</b>	<b>Two provinces with LOWEST reported incidence</b>
	<b>% of respondents who have experienced the acts (in brackets)</b>	
Intimidation, threat, harassment	Harare (50) Mash East (39)	Manicaland (28) Bulawayo (24)
Theft / damage of personal property	Bulawayo (20) Mat South & North (19)	Masvingo, Mash E (8) Manicaland (8)
Denial of food / starvation	Mat North (25) Midlands (23)	Masvingo (6) Manicaland (4)
Forced removal from home / confiscation of land	Harare (13) Bulawayo (12)	Mash East (3) Masvingo (2)
Closure of a business	Harare (9) Bulawayo (8)	Masvingo (0.7) Manicaland (0.7)
Loss of a job	Mat South (12) Bulawayo (11)	Mash Central (0.8) Masvingo (0.7)
Arrest, kidnap, abduction	Mat South (12) Midlands (11.8)	Masvingo (1) Manicaland (1)
Personal injury, sexual assault, torture	Midlands (19) Bulawayo (17)	Masvingo (3) Manicaland (3)
Witnessed someone else being injured, killed	Harare (52) Mash East (44)	Mat North (23) Bulawayo (23)
Question: 'Thinking about the period since independence in 1980, tell me if you personally were ever affected in any of the following ways ... Refer only to events that were <i>politically motivated</i> ' [Q44, by Province] Note: 'Mat'=Matabeleland; 'Mash'=Mashonaland		

The provincial-geographic location of exposure to acts of violence indicates that Harare and the Matabeleland provinces, especially Matabeleland South, are regularly the provinces with the highest exposure. In contrast, Manicaland and Masvingo tend to be the two provinces with the lowest incidence of the acts of violence that were explored in Q44, for the period since independence. Table 10 offers a listing of the provinces that were most, or least, exposed to each of the nine acts of politically motivated violence.

The data (Table 11) revealed the remarkable difference (in all instances *beyond* the range of margin of error) of acts of violence and intimidation suffered by supporters of the MDC-T, compared with those of ZANU-PF. Supporters of other parties, for example ZAPU and MDC-M, also experienced such acts, but the actual numbers of party supporters in these two cases were too small for trend analyses. For *all nine*

types of violence and intimidation assessed, the MDC-T supporters had been far more exposed than their ZANU-PF counterparts.

<b>Table 11: Respective experiences of <u>politically motivated</u> acts of violence since independence by supporters of the two main political parties</b>		
<b>Acts of politically motivated violence</b>	<b>MDC-T</b>	<b>ZANU-PF</b>
	<b>% of party supporters who have personally experienced the acts of violence and intimidation</b>	
Intimidation, threat, harassment	46	12
Theft / damage of personal property	18	4
Denial of food / starvation	20	4
Forced removal from home / confiscation of land	11	2
Closure of a business	6	1
Loss of a job	8	1
Arrest, kidnap, abduction	9	1
Personal injury, sexual assault, torture	15	2
Witnessed someone else being injured, killed	42	20
Question: 'Thinking about the period since independence in 1980, tell me if you personally were ever affected in any of the following ways ... Refer only to events that were <i>politically</i> motivated' [Q44, by party support – of the 58% of respondents who did declare it]		

### 3.3 Experiences of violence and intimidation in contemporary Zimbabwe

Zimbabweans live in a world of extreme consciousness of omnipresent political violence and intimidation. There is also a widespread recognition of the likelihood that important political events and decisions in contemporary Zimbabwe are likely to see political violence.

Zimbabweans nevertheless do not accept the prevalence of violence as inevitable. They continue to believe that things can and should be better:

They are far more inclined to say that 'the use of violence is never justified in Zimbabweans politics' (93%), than to agree with the statement that 'in Zimbabwe it is sometimes necessary to use violence to support a just cause' (3%) [Q41]. This set of responses transcends the party political divide.

They also strongly believe that 'politics need not be dangerous; people can learn how to work together in peaceful ways' (81%) [Q40].



This, however, is the *ideal* situation. In their daily political lives they are conscious that Zimbabwe is still not a country of freedoms of expression and belief – despite some progress in the time of IG [Q12]. Freedom to speak openly about politics was the lowest-rated (out of 11) performance areas of the IG, although 52% of the respondents reckoned that things had improved on this front as well.


A total of 89% of Zimbabweans feel that they ‘often’ or ‘always’ have to be careful what they say about politics (compared to 10% that argue that is ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ necessary).

A somewhat smaller proportion (74%) reports that they ‘have to fear’ political intimidation daily. The close association of elections with intimidation is reflected in 93% saying that they ‘often’ or ‘always’ have to fear political intimidation in election campaigns [Q42].

<b>Statements</b>	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>
Violence & intimidation were bad in the past, but nowadays we feel free to express our political views	10	21	30	24
Our experiences of violence & intimidation mean that perpetrators nowadays need only threaten violence to bring fear back to life again	28	36	12	5
The youth militia & war veterans look after the good interests of the people of Zimbabwe	4	12	27	36
Each time Zimbabwe comes to important political decisions to be made, violence & intimidation surface	37	39	7	3
Fear of violence & intimidation makes people vote for parties or candidates other than the ones they prefer	49	25	10	3
Question: ‘People are saying different things about intimidation in the current era in Zimbabwe. Which of the following statements do you agree or disagree with?’ [Q47]				

Table 12 shows *how much* violence and intimidation remain omnipresent in Zimbabweans’ daily lives. The highlighted blocks show the continuous presence – even just threats bring back memories of fear, important decisions are associated with violence, violence and intimidation make people vote in certain ways, and, as in the past, they *do not feel free* to express themselves politically. It is a very high percentage of 74% of the respondents that felt that violence and intimidation make people vote for candidates they would usually *not* prefer. This shows that even if on election days in Zimbabwe people show the courage to go out and vote, their votes may very not go to the party of their choice.

**Figure 2:**  
**Reasons for violence and intimidation - proportions of identified reasons**



The extreme **political nature** of violence and intimidation in Zimbabwe is evident from the fact that when Zimbabweans are asked about their ordinary daily activities and whether they fear going about executing these, the levels of feeling of safety rise dramatically (compared with feelings when engaged in the political domain). The totals of respondents feeling 'very safe' or 'somewhat safe' were: going to the market – 93%; sleeping at night – 92%; meeting policemen – 91%; meeting security personnel other than the police – 85%; meeting strangers – 71%; and walking around at night – 67% [Q46].

Yet, contradictions emerge, which indicates that Zimbabweans become confused as to when they are in fear and when not. When asked about these daily activities [Q46] in clearly non-political questions their answers were quite unambiguous (see paragraph above). When, however, a question on fearing intimidation as they go about their daily lives was inserted into a 3-item battery in which the other two items dealt with political matters, 73% of the respondents reported that they 'often' or 'always' have to fear political intimidation as they 'go about their daily lives' [Q42B].

### ***Community-based experiences of reasons and responsibility for violence***

The survey explored Zimbabweans' perceptions of **the reasons** for the widespread violence and intimidation, as well as their own community-based experiences as to **who are responsible** for the acts of violence (in open-ended questions). The Zimbabweans are frank about the links between violence and politics. The reasons for the violence include political immaturity and intolerance, greed for power, disregard of electoral choice, misuse of party loyalists to perpetrate violence on political opponents, and, in general, resistance to political change (Figure 2). In more detail:

**The reasons:** The reasons were solidly in the realm of conflict between political interests of the main political parties [Q49]. Since the answers were unprompted, the categories of answers overlap. Yet, the responses are valuable because they offer the respondents' spontaneous identification of reasons. Conflicts of political interests and clashes between the supporters of the two main parties got 196 mentions; the 'misuses' of ZANU-PF supporters, war veterans the youth militia, and ZANU-PF politicians pulled in 147; disregard for freedom of electoral choice was mentioned by 130; the need for political power and politicians' greed 119; lack of political maturity, along with forcing people into campaign and vote support 115; resistance to change 77; and intolerance of other parties 74 mentions.

**The level of occurrence, 2008-2010:** A total of 58% of the survey respondents had experienced cases of politically motivated violence and intimidation *in their own communities in the two years leading up to the survey* [Q50]. 39% reported that they had *not* experienced such incidents.

**The perpetrators:** In another open-ended question the respondents were given the chance, in their own words and unprompted, to specify who they had experienced as 'most likely to be involved' in political violence in the respondent's own community. The question did not apply to those who had not experienced violence and intimidation in the period in their communities, and a further 164 said they did not know, could not identify the perpetrators, or refused to answer [Q51].

A total of 560 respondents offered the following identifications of the persons who are seen to be responsible for violence in the communities, 2008-2010:

☀ ZANU-PF youths and supporters	307
☀ War veteran and militia	112
☀ Both the MDC-T and ZANU-PF, 'all political parties', 'the party leaders'	79
☀ MDC-T	31
☀ Youths and 'idle youths'	31
TOTAL	560

- 4.1 Expectations of the new constitution – Main trends (36)**
- 4.2 Realism, moderation and high stakes in getting a new constitution (37)**
  - High stakes in getting a new constitution (37)*
  - Perspectives on the preceding constitution (38)*
- 4.3 The 2010-11 constitutional process (38)**
- 4.4 The ‘story’ of experiences of the COPAC process (39)**
  - News of the COPAC outreach meetings (40)*
  - Voices in the COPAC meetings (40)*
  - Time and timing for discussions and participants’ preparation for the COPAC discussions (41)*
  - Violence in the COPAC process (42)*
  - Issues that COPAC dealt with (42)*
- 4.5 Constitutional content – trends and specifics of institutions (42)**

The constitution-making process in Zimbabwe is ongoing and is an activity that is close to the hearts of the Zimbabweans in this poll – even if they have only modestly participated. They have seen quite a number of constitution-making processes unfold. During the process of 200, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) led the opposition to the constitution, and was associated with the formation of the MDC. The contemporary process, known as COPAC (Parliamentary Select Committee on the Constitution), started unfolding in 2009. The consultative outreach processes had just been completed when the survey went into the field.

### 4.1 Expectations of the emerging constitution – main trends

Zimbabweans have little doubt that the existing constitution needs to be replaced, and that this has to happen fast. Whilst they are impatient to get to the next round of elections, they are *adamant that the constitution needs to be enacted before a new election takes place*.

The main survey trends on a new, emerging constitution are:

- ✿ 38% of respondents want the current constitution to be replaced – and 28% want to see it amended. Only 4% think it meets the country’s needs as is [Q20].
- ✿ There is impatience that the new constitution needs to be adopted. The message is: get on with the job! [Q26B]. Zimbabweans are tired of being consulted on constitutional matters [Q26C], with 52% agreeing with the statement to this effect.
- ✿ The IG is doing well in making the people think about constitutional matters [Q25], and the two main parties are rated approximately equally on how well they have explained their constitutional positions to the people [Q27A, Q27B].

- ✿ Only 42% anticipate that citizens' views will be reflected in the emerging constitution [Q23] – and the rest are evenly split over four categories of 'neither likely nor unlikely', 'unlikely', 'highly unlikely' and 'don't know'.
- ✿ 62% reckon that the COPAC process has been meaningful – 27%: very meaningful; 35% somewhat meaningful. 8% thought it was devoid of all meaning [Q30].
- ✿ More constitutional-civic education is necessary before a draft constitution can be taken to a referendum [Q26A]. This could be seen in the context of only 3% of COPAC participants having received civic education before their COPAC engagements [Q22J]. This education was received from a range of party political, church, school and informal networks.
- ✿ There is uncertainty as to whether the COPAC process will produce a constitution that will be good for democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe: Agree/strongly agree: 30%; disagree/strongly disagree: 17%; neither: 18%; the balance: variations on 'don't know' [Q26D].
- ✿ Only 6% of the overall respondents (attendees and non-attendees) reckoned that political parties had been using violence to get their way in the COPAC process [Q28].
- ✿ Intimidation-informant activities were visible only to a small minority of respondents – spokesperson activity, war veteran intervention and news cars (observers-informants) that came into communities were seen only by a few [Q29A, Q29B].

#### **4.2 Realism, moderation and high stakes in getting a new constitution**

Scepticism and moderated expectations prevail. 42% of respondents supported the statement that even the smartest constitution cannot in itself bring Zimbabweans a good-willed, democratic government [Q38A]. A substantial 31%, however, held the opposing view, indicating that there was still some space for optimism about the emerging constitution.

Zimbabweans are accustomed to politicians imposing themselves on people, with powers to override constitutional provisions. This process of constitutional override has been facilitated by state security institutions. Zimbabweans realise that a new constitution is not a panacea. There is cynicism pertaining to the authoritarianism and subjugation of constitutions to executive authority of the past.

53% felt that a new constitution would only bring change 'if it ends the alliance between the president and the security forces'. Only 14% reckoned that the ability of a new constitution to bring change *does not* depend on ending this alliance [Q38B].

##### ***High stakes in getting a new constitution***

Much is at stake for Zimbabweans in the making and adoption of the new constitution – even economic livelihoods are seen to be dependent on the new constitution [Q29D].

80% of the respondents say it is essential for the new constitution to protect the right of freedom of expression [Q37C]. Zimbabweans link the emerging constitution to hopes (where they exist) for better safety in a next election – 83% say that a constitution that guarantees rights of freedom of belief, expression and association would make them feel 'very safe' (56%)

or 'safe' (27%) come the time of a next election. 13% felt indifferent on the matter [Q57E]. (Other items in this question are discussed in the context of elections and safety.)

### ***Perspectives on the preceding constitution***

Zimbabweans' awareness of the new constitutional processes rose substantially in the period from 2009 to 2010. So too, did their insistence that the old constitution should be completely replaced. A consistently miniscule group – 3% in 2009; 4% in 2010 – insisted that the old constitution met the needs of Zimbabweans.

There were sharp rises from 2009 to 2010 in respondents who thought that the constitution had to be amended – 15% to 28%, and who thought it needed to be replaced<sup>8</sup> – 19% to 38%.

### **4.3 The 2010-11 constitutional process**

There is haste and impatience that a new constitution needs to be adopted and that the constitution-shapers should 'get on with the job'. Yet, there is concurrent insistence that more civic education is needed on constitutional matters before the draft can be taken into a referendum.

The COPAC process is seen as quite credible. Only small percentages of respondents report having experienced problems, or having experienced prescriptions regarding the nature of inputs. Anecdotal reports prior to the survey had suggested that there might have been widespread intimidation and prescription on the inputs into the process.

Respondents felt reasonably confident that the inputs would be reflected in the to-be-drafted constitution (42% reckoned it would). Yet, they also expressed doubt as to whether the 'meaningful' COPAC process would carry over into the formulation of a constitution that will be good for democracy.

The COPAC process is widely known:

- ✿ Close to three-quarters of the respondents (72%) have heard of the unfolding constitution-making process [Q21A]. (74% had heard of the Constitution of Zimbabwe [Q19].)
- ✿ However, only 24% of respondents report that they had attended a COPAC constitutional outreach meeting in their areas [Q22A]. This attendance appears to have been overwhelmingly by personal choice, rather than coercion [Q22B].

The 2010 survey retained a 2009 item on Zimbabweans' understanding of the constitution-making process (Table 13). (To prevent distortions, those respondents who were not aware of the process, were excluded from the tally.) The results showed a substantial increase in awareness of the process, as judged by the percentage of the total sample that responded – rising from 38% to 70%. The 70% comes to within the margin-of-error range of the 74% who reported having heard of the constitution.

---

<sup>8</sup> This theme was covered through an equivalent (not identical) question formulation in 2010, to capture the rising three-point scale of insistence on a new constitution [Q20].

The trend was sustained across the provinces – albeit with variations. Provincial comparisons show that the highest rate of attending because they ‘feared to anger someone’ were in the Midlands (by a factor of 6:1 – for every six persons attending because they wanted to, one indicated attendance to prevent angering someone), similarly 8:1 in Matabeleland South, and 9:1 in Mashonaland Central.

The data suggests that the urban areas of Zimbabwe are far more conducive to freedom of political choice. Although the sample numbers get modest upon exploration of the cross-tabulations, there is a trend that the rural areas have a far bigger proportions of those who attended due to not wanting to anger anyone than *vice versa*.

<b>Table 13: Comparative impressions on the 2009-11 process for making a new constitution</b>		
<b>The COPAC process is about ...</b>	<b>September 2009 (%)</b>	<b>December 2010 (%)</b>
Appointing a parliamentary select committee	4	11
Consulting all stakeholders in public hearings	15	29
Submitting the draft constitution to voting in a national referendum	9	11
Ratification of the new Constitution by parliament & president	3	1
All of the above	7	18
Percentage of sample responding to question	38	70
Question: ‘Parts of the constitution-making process have been completed; others are still to follow. According to what you have heard, what is the process for making a new constitution?’		

There is haste and impatience that a new constitution has to be adopted and that the constitution-shapers should ‘get on with the job’. Yet, there is a simultaneous insistence that more education is needed on constitutional matters before the draft can be taken into a referendum.

The COPAC process is seen as quite credible. Only small percentages of respondents report having experienced problems, or having experienced prescriptions regarding the nature of inputs. Anecdotal reports prior to the survey had suggested that there might have been widespread intimidation and prescription on the inputs into the process.<sup>9</sup> It is possible that these incidents had been occurring in

<sup>9</sup> Non-governmental human rights organisations in Zimbabwe had been receiving substantiated reports of such events. This was reported in Freedom House Southern Africa (FHSA), 14 September 2010, *Report on Consultation with FHSA Partner Organisations in Zimbabwe*, by Susan Booyesen.

isolated areas, which a random survey might miss. It is equally possible that it had happened in known dangerous areas, which had been avoided as far as possible in fieldwork.<sup>10</sup>

#### **4.4 The 'story' of experiences of the COPAC process**

The survey context of COPAC participation is therefore that a total of 74% of Zimbabweans report that they have heard of the Constitution of Zimbabwe ([Q19]; 72% have heard of the constitution-making process that is rolling out in contemporary Zimbabwe [Q22]; 24% of the total sample had attended a COPAC constitutional outreach meeting [Q22C]; and 93% of those who had attended a COPAC outreach meeting, reported that they had done so out of free will – as opposed to having done so due to wishing 'not to anger' other persons [Q22B]. The rest of this 'story' of attendance of and participation in the COPAC outreach meetings includes that 55% of those who had attended the meetings reported that they had spoken at the meeting [Q22C].

##### ***News of the COPAC outreach meetings***

The COPAC meeting participants (288 or 24% of the total sample) reported a wide range of sources where they had first heard of the meetings [Q22L]. The four dominant sources were traditional leaders (68 mentions; politically often strongly associated with ZANU-PF), neighbours (44 mentions), radio (37 mentions (Q70A shows state radio has by far the deepest reach into Zimbabwe), ZANU-PF structures (37 mentions), schools (24 mentions) and MDC-T structures (13 mentions). Hence, it was ZANU-PF and its associated structures that appeared to dominate the dissemination of information of the COPAC outreach meetings.

About one in seven survey respondents who had attended the COPAC meetings reported that they had received civic education on constitutional matters prior to their COPAC engagement [Q22J; see above]. In addition, one in every three COPAC participants had enjoyed constitutional discussions beyond the COPAC process [Q22M]. The predominant 'neighbour' form of constitutional exchanges was equally evident in urban and rural areas [Q22N]. Of the 86 cases of respondents reporting having had discussions about the constitutional process, 57 were with neighbours. All other mentions were of a frequency of lower than 20.

The respondents that reported having had access to such exchanges were concentrated in the Harare, Midlands, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South provinces. Civil society workshops represented only a fraction of these engagements. It was far more likely that these constitutionally-active citizens had informative exchanges with their neighbours (by far the predominant informal source).

Small numbers cited the main political parties, traditional leaders, schools and the church as forums in which they had discussed the emerging constitution [Q22N].

---

<sup>10</sup> In a comparable *Afrobarometer* survey (also with fieldwork by MPOI, October 2010) only 4.7% of respondents reported either having been prevented from attending an outreach meeting, or expressing their views.



The widespread absence of constitutional education was evident across rural-urban and provincial boundaries. Due to the small overall number of survey respondents that had participated in civil society exchanges on constitutional matters, the numbers on these items cannot be interpreted as quantitative trends.

The COPAC meetings appear to have happened largely as scheduled [Q24C], across the provinces.

### ***Voices in the COPAC meetings***

Reports in the run-up to and course of the COPAC outreach meetings suggested that the COPAC meetings might have been compromised due to party political control over proceedings, amongst others through the appointment of spokespersons to speak on behalf of communities, and influence of deliberations through politically loaded speeches and prayers. The survey outcome suggests that appointments and political speeches and prayers indeed took place, but that it had not been experienced as intimidatory, and that it had not created much fear and apprehension.

Only 9% (27 out of 288)<sup>11</sup> of those who had attended reported that someone had been appointed to speak on their behalf [Q22D]. Of these 27 cases (too small for statistical analysis) 11 were reported to have been appointed by persons or persons-in-positions that are directly associated with ZANU-PF [Q22D]. The 11 cases comprised, in the words of the respondents, ZANU-PF, a ZANU-PF cadre, ZANU-PF youth, ZANU-PF leadership, a ZANU-PF official, war veterans, and local ZANU-PF leaders. In addition, three of the spokespersons were reported to have been appointed by the traditional leader or headman. The only other notable appointments were those three that were done by community members. Whilst the number of 27 is too small to analyse deeper, it is important that *no commensurate appointments by the MDC* were reported – ZANU-PF was the only political party that featured in the constitutional spokesperson appointment stakes in this survey.

70% (201) of those who had attended a COPAC outreach meetings reported that the meetings had started with speeches [Q22E], and 49% (143) that prayers had been done that suggested things to be said in the meeting [Q22F].

It was further related by 73% (211 out of the 288 participants) of the COPAC meeting participants that the people who had spoken at the COPAC meetings were community members [Q22G]. Amongst these community-member speakers, it was once again ZANU-PF that was prominent. 152 respondents stated that those who spoke in the COPAC meeting were ordinary community members, rather than people belonging to a particular political party or other type of organisation [Q22H]. However, ZANU-PF followed in second place – 47 respondents noted

---

<sup>11</sup> The number of 288 is taken as a constant for the number of COPAC meeting participants in the rest of this section.

that the speakers came from this party. The MDC-T got 8 mentions, and chiefs 7. 35 respondents did not know what the affiliation of the speakers was.

### ***Time and timing for discussions and participants' preparation for the COPAC discussions***

Based on discussions with NGOs prior to this survey, it had been expected that many participants may have felt done in, through too little time for participation and 'silent intimidation', or through cameras recording the proceedings.

Participants were next asked whether they had felt comfortable participating in the COPAC meeting with cameras rolling to record the proceedings. Here 104 of the 288 participants reported that there were no cameras recording the proceedings. Of the 184 remaining participants, 158 reported that they had felt comfortable.

72% of the participants reckoned that enough time had been given for discussions the COPAC outreach meetings [Q22I].

### ***Violence in the COPAC process***

Despite some expectations that the COPAC process would be violent, due to the contested nature of a new constitution and politicisation of the process, the survey trend was one of relative contentment with the process, and observations that violence only played a small role in it [Q28]. This was the case in both rural and urban areas, and across the provinces. Harare province reported the highest incidence of violence in the COPAC process, but this was also the only province in which large proportions of the respondents did not opt out of the question through 'not applicable' (potentially escapist) answers.

Of MDC-T supporters, 13% reported having witnessed violence being used in the process, whilst 4% of ZANU-PF supporters reported such sightings.

There was no detectable difference in responses between the supporters of the two main political parties on the bulk of the constitutional outreach issues covered in this section. On all of the items regarding experiences of the COPAC process, the differences were within margin-of-error range, except on the probably minor question of whether enough time had been given for the discussions.

### ***The issues that COPAC dealt with***

Of those Zimbabweans that had engaged with the questions posed by COPAC, only about one-fifth reckoned that the questions had failed to capture community concerns [Q24A]. Hence there was a fair amount of satisfaction with the questions. In addition, it was roughly the same proportion of respondents that felt the questions were posed in a clear and concise manner [Q24B].

#### 4.5 Constitutional content – trends and specifics of institutions

There were few surprises on the body of items that covered content expectations of the emerging constitution. Some of the relatively obvious points – given the party-split in the survey – included that the president’s terms should be limited to two (77% agreed or strongly agreed), and that the president should not have the powers to appoint some of the members of parliament. Thus, all members of parliament should be elected (80% agreed or strongly agreed) [Q31, Q32, Q33]. These 2010 findings are strongly corroborated through the fact that there is a high degree of consistency in the findings on the six constitution content-questions between the 2009 and 2010 Freedom House surveys (Table 14).

<b>President’s term be limited to two, or unlimited</b>	<b>Limit to two</b>		<b>Unlimited</b>	
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
	78	77	14	16
<b>One or two houses for parliament</b>	<b>Abolish senate</b>		<b>Keep both houses</b>	
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
	43	42	42	40
<b>Appointment versus election of MPs</b>	<b>President has power to appoint</b>		<b>All MPs elected</b>	
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
	11	13	84	80
<b>Role of traditional leaders facilitated or limited</b>	<b>Reserve position</b>		<b>Limit role to local government</b>	
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
	26	23	65	70
<b>Courts to be independent or politically loyal</b>	<b>Establish independent courts</b>		<b>Judges must be politically loyal</b>	
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
	78	87	12	7
<b>Election run by independent or government body</b>	<b>Run by government agency</b>		<b>Independent commission</b>	
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
	20	16	73	77

Question: ‘Let us now briefly look at the type of government institutions Zimbabweans would like to see emerge from the new constitution. Which of the following statements do you most agree with, and how strongly?’ [Q31-Q36]

Note: Percentages in this table represent the joint percentage, on the respective items, for ‘agree with’ and ‘agree very strongly with’

To summarise, the main trends on *the contents* of the desired new constitution were (Table 14):

- ✳ The president needs to be limited to serving two terms [Q31].
- ✳ Opinion is divided on whether both houses of parliament should be kept, or if the upper house should be scrapped [Q32].
- ✳ There is strong opinion against the president having the power to appoint some members of parliament [Q33].

- ✿ The role of traditional leaders should be limited to the local domain [Q34].
- ✿ Elections need to be held by an independent body [Q36].
- ✿ Independent courts need to be established [Q35].

The details show the overwhelming support for change away from a range of fundamentals of the prevailing system, which had been anchored in presidential control. The overwhelming support for the role of independent bodies in elections (77%) and justice (87%) was also relatively predictable, given the political split in the survey / survey results [Q36, Q35].

**5.1 Main party support trends – declared support (45)****5.2 Growing trend of non-declaration of party support (46)****5.3 Parallel indicators of core party support (46)***Trust in political institutions and parties (47)**Issues of party political polarisation (48)***5.4 Membership of political parties (47)**

Zimbabweans are notorious – albeit justifiably so – for playing party identification-association issues close to the chest. Party affiliation and voter support in Zimbabwe have been repeatedly demonstrated to be directly linked to political recrimination and retribution. The findings in this survey equally indicate the extent to which party linkage and activity expose the ‘badge carrier’ to violence, especially the opposition supporter that chooses to challenge ZANU-PF (although violence on both sides of the main party divide is well known).<sup>12</sup> Those who quietly go their way and refrain from political engagement (and in particular opposition party engagement, as the findings show) can be quite assured of peaceful daily lives.

Thus, it is not surprising that 42% in this survey exercised the option not to declare their party support. Given the potential exposure of researchers and respondents to political attacks linked to declared vote intention, the survey took care to make it clear to interviewees that they have the right to exercise ‘non-declaration’, even if full confidentiality of responses were guaranteed. It also has to be borne in mind that some respondents may deliberately choose to misrepresent their party identification, for reasons of personal security.

The survey delivers the result that the MDC-T (in terms of *declared* support) suffered a substantial drop in support in the time since the previous Freedom House September 2009 survey. ZANU-PF is indicated to have grown in support by 5 percentage points to 17%. The MDC-M has effectively disappeared, with an indicated support level of below 1%.

The MDC-T drop is not entirely explained through the rest of the survey data. As seen in previous sections of the report, the IG is seen to have performed well, and the MDC-T is receiving substantial credit for the performance. *Simultaneously*, the MDC-T in the time since the previous survey has been confirmed to be the subject partner in the IG, with effective power remaining in the hands of Mugabe and the security forces. This would have dented the MDC-T

---

<sup>12</sup> In recent years, MDC (and MDC-T) supporters have increasingly (although still moderately so) been more inclined to retaliate against attacks from ZANU-PF supporters. This was acknowledged, for example, in NGO interviews in September 2010 (see Susan Booyens, for FHSA, ‘Consultation Report’ in preparation for the current survey).

image. MDC-T supporters feel that their party has not been getting the credit it deserves for its contribution to the IG. In the political context it has also been evident that the MDC-T has been less able to be effective as party *and as* government partner. Its leadership resources have been stressed. It remains possible, nevertheless, that the MDC-T retains substantial levels of hidden support in the ranks of the 42% of non-declarants.

In addition, in the past year Zimbabwe has moved through a relatively ‘reconstructive with modest levels of violence’ phase. This is likely to have impacted positively on ZANU-PF. It has been receiving some credit for operating in the IG, and, given the non-electoral phase, it has been possible to moderate its coercive repertoires – possibly with support effects.

The current survey contained items which can be used as alternative measures. These measures show that the support levels for the two main parties are probably quite accurate (see below).

### 5.1 Main party support trends – declared support

Analyses of party support in Zimbabwe thus suffer from widespread non-declaration [Q78]. The survey, like preceding MPOI polls conducted in Zimbabwe, elicited high rates of non-declaration (42% in the case of the current 2010 survey). The 42% offered their answers in the categories of ‘will not vote’, ‘my vote is my secret’, ‘refuse’, ‘don’t know’ or ‘not sure’ (Table 15).

Table 15: Trends in declared party support – 2009 and 2010		
Party	Stated vote choice 2009 (%)	Stated vote choice 2010 (%)
MDC-T	55	38 (38.1)
ZANU-PF	12	17 (17.3)
MDC-M	1	1 (0.8)
ZAPU-Dabengwa	0	1 (0.8)
Other	2	1 (1.4)
Undeclared*	31	42 (41.6)
<b>TOTAL**</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Question: ‘If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?’[Q78] * Represents the combination of ‘my vote is my secret’ (22.4%), refuse (8%), don’t know / not sure (3.3%), will not vote (7.9%). Corresponding percentages in the 2009 survey were: refuse (23%), don’t know (2%) will not vote (6%) ** Total excludes the minor categories of ‘other parties’		

The MDC-T, according to this poll, enjoys by far (despite having declined) the highest level of declared vote support. ZANU-PF follows with less than half of the declared support than that of the MDC-T, and the MDC-M demonstrates a likely case of implosion of support. Its support is on par with that of ZAPU-Dabengwa (both on 0.8%).

The September 2009-December 2010 poll comparison shows that it was particularly the percentage of support for the MDC-T that fluctuated – downwards by 17 percentage points.

The analysis urges caution in the interpretation of this result, especially given the high ‘undeclared’ category. The survey in general indicates the continuous and high levels of fear and intimidation in Zimbabwe. It is suspected that only the die-hard and very strongly committed, and those with exceptional trust in the confidentiality of the survey process, would offer truthful responses to this most-politicised-of-all questions.

It is for this reason – and for reasons of anticipated possible discrepancies in party support over time – that the report next explores a series of *parallel indicators of party support*, which were specifically included in the 2010 survey design to tap into potential supplementary indicators of party support. (The 2009 survey did not specifically cater for this.)

## **5.2 Growing trend of non-declaration of party support**

As important as the specific party support trends, was the drop in the apparent readiness to declare MDC-T support. A far larger proportion of respondents in 2010 (42% in 2010, compared to 31% in 2009) took refuge in the response categories of ‘my vote is my secret’, ‘don’t know’ (whom I shall be voting for), ‘will not vote’, or the respondents just refused to answer the question which party they would vote for.

The overall survey findings show that it is overwhelmingly MDC-T supporters that are victimised, and who feel that they cannot express themselves politically, without fear of recrimination. The survey also showed that whilst there were great accolades for improvements wrought by the IG. Yet, freedom of political expression and healing of a broken nation were at the bottom of the list of improved performance areas. Furthermore, election talk is in the air in Zimbabwe, and the survey confirmed both that past experiences of elections were violence-ridden and that expectations of more peaceful future electoral experiences were modest. This is a political environment that helped explain extensive non-declaration.

The current set of data analyses did not specifically link the non-declaration responses to other political orientations of the respondents. As an alternative and supplementary step, the analysis explored a series of measures that could very well serve as indicators of party support in conditions of threat to declaration.

## **5.3 Parallel indicators of core party support**

The December 2010 survey instrument included a few questions and statements that tested (in indirect formulations) core support for the two main political parties. A few political-statement measures were identified on which solid ZANU-PF and solid MDC-T supporters would be most likely to agree. In practical

politics these are divisive, politically-polarised issues. These political-statement measures were identified, because the high level of non-declaration of party support was expected.<sup>13</sup> The ‘political-statement measures are not direct substitutes for declaration of party support, but serve as valuable indicators in the absence of transparency about party support.

**Trust in political institutions and parties**

One of the most familiar measures to suggest approximate levels of party support is political trust. The survey assessed the levels of trust in a series of institutions, several of them ‘politically connected’. The set of institutions that respondents were asked to rate in terms of how much they trust these institutions included the three main political parties, as well as the Presidency and the Office of the Prime Minister [Q62] (Table 16):

- ✿ The MDC-T was trusted (‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’) by 65% of the respondents.
- ✿ ZANU-PF’s equivalent percentage was 36. ZANU-PF is only ‘trusted a lot’ by 16% of the respondents (compared to 32% for the MDC-T).
- ✿ The Office of the Prime Minister (occupied by Morgan Tsvangirai; possible MDC-T support indicator) was trusted (‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’) by 67% of the respondents.
- ✿ The Presidency (occupied by Robert Mugabe; possible ZANU-PF support indicator) was trusted ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’ by 43% of respondents – and not at all or just a little by 47%.

<b>Extent of trust</b>	<b>MDC-T (%)</b>	<b>ZANU-PF (%)</b>
A lot	31.5	15.7
Somewhat	33.5	20.3
Just a little	10.9	18.7
Not at all	9	33.6
Question: ‘In the current Zimbabwe, how much do you trust ...?’		
Note: Table percentages exclude the irresolute categories		

**Issues of party political polarisation**

The survey findings help suggest a series of measures (here referred to as statement-measures) that offer further indications of levels of party support in an otherwise obscure landscape of non-declaration.

- ✿ On whether the election should be executed by a government body or by an independent body [Q36]: 16% of respondents opted for a government body, and 77% for an independent body. The 16% corresponds to the declared ZANU-PF support. *On the party politically declared portion of the respondents, 90% of MDC-T supporters preferred an independent*

<sup>13</sup> An anonymous vote question had been considered, but was then ruled out.



body, compared with 52% of ZANU-PF supporters, confirming this question as a measure that is likely to differentiate supporters of the two parties.

- ✿ A similar trend was identified in the question of whether violence and intimidation affect the party vote in elections [Q47E]. 17% denied or strongly denied that this was the case – whilst 74% agreed or strongly agreed. *On the party politically declared portion of the respondents, 87% of MDC-T supporters believed that violence affect the way in which Zimbabweans vote, compared with 51% of ZANU-PF supporters, confirming this question as well as a measure to help differentiate supporters of the two parties.*
- ✿ A variation on the theme was the statement that the youth militia (closely aligned with ZANU-PF, and known to have been associated with acts of violence) ‘look after the good interest of Zimbabweans’ [Q47C]. 16% of overall survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, whilst 63% disagreed or strongly disagreed. *On the party politically declared portion of the respondents, 86% of MDC-T supporters disagreed, compared with the 25% of ZANU-PF supporters, pointing to differentiation potential of this measure.*
- ✿ There was also the issue of the president only ‘occasionally’ or ‘never’ depending on the security forces in his exercise of power [Q11] – 14% of the overall survey respondents thought it happened occasionally, and another 4% said ‘never’, again equalling the approximate level of declared ZANU-PF vote support. *On the party politically declared portion of the respondents, 68% of MDC-T supporters compared to 37% of ZANU-PF supporters agreed that the security forces were propping up the president.*
- ✿ A few questions offered a comparable parallel indicator of MDC-T support. One was the attribution of credit for the improved IG performance, as compared with that of the preceding ZANU-PF government. 45% of the overall survey respondents reckoned it was more the contribution of the MDC-T than that of the other parties [Q13]. The other item, trust, is dealt with above.

These parallel measures suggest that the 17-18% declared party support for voting in an election ‘tomorrow’ is the minimum that ZANU-PF will receive in an election in which the result is not manipulated. There are obviously no indications that this will be the only ZANU-PF support, but the convergence on these items suggests that this is the guaranteed minimum level of support. Simultaneously, the measure of trust in the MDC-T and its performance in the IG indicate of solid minimum support level ranging from the mid-30s upward – lower than the declared 2009 support, but more than double the support that is indicated for ZANU-PF.

#### **5.4 Membership of political parties**

In line with widely manifested international trends, the bulk of Zimbabweans report that they are not members of political parties. A total of 71% declared that they are not members of political parties at all [Q73C]. Membership could be under-declared in Zimbabwe, given that it can often be dangerous to belong to a political party in a society where animosities and violence between parties are frequent. Amongst respondents in this survey, 65% of the MDC-T supporters and 60% of the ZANU-PF supporters were not members of their respective parties. In addition, of the declared supporters, 22% for each of the parties were only inactive members.

It appears though that fewer Zimbabweans may today be active party members than was the case in September 2009. In 2009, 15% reported being inactive party members – in December 2010 the percentage had risen to 20%. Active party membership, in terms of this survey trends, had declined from 15% in 2009 to 8% in 2010.

- 6.1 Expectations of elections – main trends (50)
- 6.2 Order and timing of constitution-making and elections (51)
- 6.3 Memories of the 2008 elections (52)
- 6.4 Expectations of ‘free and fair’ future elections (52)
  - Roles for SADC (53)*
- 6.5 Violence and elections – main trends (54)
- 6.6 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and readiness (55)
- 6.7 Voter registration (56)

A huge amount of ambivalence and contradictory orientations characterise Zimbabweans’ anticipation of a next round of elections, likely to be held in the period from late 2011 to early 2012. Elections are keenly awaited by the survey respondents, but by far not all expect that they will venture to participate. Violence in particular might deter them. There are reports of experiences of electoral violence, and limited expectations that a 2011 election will be peaceful ... yet, Zimbabweans hold out hope for improvements on ‘free and fair’, compared with 2008.

### 6.1 Expectations of elections – main trends

There are high levels of cynicism, despite some modest expectations of future improvements on the 2008 set of elections. Expectations prevail that violence will continue and will impact on the vote in a next election.

There is little evidence of a belief that the prevailing new era in Zimbabwean politics will spill over into the electoral domain – in terms of the conduct of the election. High levels of cynicism prevail, ranging from suspicions about administrative ability to run elections, to the election being able to deliver a clear winner. Zimbabweans, judged by the responses in this survey, have become used to (perhaps have even come to ‘accept’) their elections as being imperfect events that deliver partial solutions and piecemeal changes. They hope for more, but perhaps they do not expect it.

The main survey trends on elections were:

- ☀ There are common expectations that there will be problems in the next election; equally, it is anticipated that the elections will fall short on the ‘free and fair’ requirement [Q16A].
- ☀ It is nevertheless anticipated that the level of ‘free and fair’ of forthcoming elections will be higher than in the elections of 2008 [Q16B].
- ☀ There is a predominant expectation that the opposition will not be able to participate without fear of political recrimination (a large 50% opinion block expect this) [Q54A].

- ✿ Political parties use violence, and ‘nothing is going to change this’, is believed by 51% [Q58C].
- ✿ 45% (by far the biggest single opinion block) believe that the elections will suffer intervention by the security forces [Q54C].
- ✿ 38% – by far the biggest single block of opinion – believe that the election will not deliver a clear presidential winner [Q54E].
- ✿ 43% believe that elections will end power-sharing, but a substantial 23% declare a ‘don’t know’ [Q54G].
- ✿ 46% disagreed with the statement that ‘this time around, there will be nothing to fear’ [Q58B].
- ✿ Zimbabweans are divided on whether elections will end power-sharing (43%), whilst 23% don’t know whether it will or not [Q54G].
- ✿ 42% reckon that the counting processes of the election votes will not be transparent; 19% ‘did not know’ [Q54D].
- ✿ It is widely believed that the results will *not* be accepted by all political parties [Q54F].

## 6.2 Order and timing of constitution-making and elections

Zimbabweans feel strongly (73%) [Q15] that the order of (further) constitution-making and elections should strictly be: *first* the finalisation of the constitution and *then* elections. Only 17% reckoned that ‘elections can be brought forward, whether the new constitution is finalised or not’ [Q15].

The next presidential and parliamentary elections should be held in 2011, is the opinion of 46% of the survey respondents [Q14]. This is not a majority opinion, but it is by far the largest single opinion block on the issue (Table 17). If one transfers the 11% that stated in December 2010 that elections needed to be done ‘immediately’ to 2011, it is roughly 57% that want elections in 2011 – *albeit not unconditionally so in that they first want the draft constitution and referendum that will put the constitution out to popular verdict*.

Table 17: Desired timing for the next election, 2010 survey (%)					
Immediately	2011	2012	2013	Other	Don’t know
10.6	45.9	8.0	7.8	12.9	14.8
Desired timing for the next election, 2009 survey (%)					
Immediately	Within 1 year	Within 2 years	Within 3 years	Within 5 years	Don’t know
31	25	17	5	15	7
Question: ‘In your opinion, when should the next presidential and parliamentary elections be held?’ [Q14A]					

The rest of the opinions were scattered. There were two opinion blocks of 8% each, which reckoned more time was needed and they only want to see elections in 2012, or in 2013. 15% stated that they 'did not know' when such an event should take place.<sup>14</sup>

A total of 40% of the respondents (by far the largest opinion block)<sup>15</sup> felt that 'Zimbabweans are ready for elections' [Q52A]. On the perceived readiness of the main political parties, 41% feel that ZANU-PF was ready, compared with the 32% that believes the MDC-T as ready for elections.

ZANU-PF supporters, far more than those of the MDC-T, believe that Zimbabweans are ready for elections:

**ZANU-PF supporters:** 59% say Zimbabweans *are ready* for elections; only 25% reckon Zimbabweans are 'not ready' or 'not ready at all' for elections.

**MDC-T supporters:** Only 43% believe Zimbabweans are 'ready' for elections; 51% say Zimbabweans are 'not ready' or 'not ready at all' for elections.

### 6.3 Memories of the 2008 elections

76% of the survey respondents report that they had voted in the *March 2008* presidential and parliamentary elections [Q56A]. In contrast, only 56% responded that they had cast a ballot in the *June 2008* presidential run-off elections. Given the escalated and high levels of violence that characterised the June 2008 elections, credence is lent to later survey respondent statements that voters may very well abstain in 2011 elections if electoral violence resurfaces [Q56B].<sup>16</sup>

The respondents are certain that elections in 2011 will reopen the wounds of violence and fear that are associated with previous election periods [Q47B].

Zimbabweans are deeply divided on whether the official result of the parliamentary election of March 2008 had been an accurate reflection of the will of the people – 36% said it was; 41% say it was not; 23% go into the 'don't know', 'not sure' or refuse response categories. The same was not assessed for the 2008 presidential run-off election, due to possible danger that the question could pose to MPOI fieldworkers.

---

<sup>14</sup> Working note: Cross-tabulation of these responses with expectations on violence will be inserted, as soon as the requested information is received from MPOI.

<sup>15</sup> The term 'opinion block' is used normally when there is not a majority opinion (and obviously not consensus) yet there is one largely chunk of sub-majority opinion, which is much larger than any of the other cohering opinions.

<sup>16</sup> It was reported in 2008, based on official statistics, that of the 5.9 million registered voters at the time, 42.8% (2.5 million voters) had voted in the March presidential election, 40.9% (2.4 million voters) in the March parliamentary election, and 42.8% (2.5 million voters) in the June 2008 presidential run-off election. See Susan Booysen for the (then) Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), 2008, 'The Zimbabwe harmonised elections of 29 March 2008, with postscript on the presidential run-off of 27 June 2008', EISA Election Observer Mission Report. Johannesburg: EISA.

## 6.4 Expectations of ‘free and fair’ future elections

Respondents accept that political parties routinely incorporate violence into their repertoires. There was no clear-cut sense that elections in 2011 (or later in the pending cycle) are realistically expected to deliver a violence-free political world. 55% of the respondents reckoned that the next round of elections would either be ‘hardly free and fair with major problems’ (25%), or ‘free and fair, with minor problems’ (30%). The roughly even split is complemented by 10% believing the elections will ‘not be free and fair at all’ – and only 16% trusting that they will be ‘completely free and fair’ (Table 18) [Q16A].

A comparatively higher level of optimism emerged in positioning forthcoming elections against the 2008 electoral background. 43% reckon the next round of elections will be more free and fair than the March 2008 elections, and 46% hope that they will be an improvement on the June 2008 elections [Q16B; Q16C].

<b>Table 18: Expectations of ‘free and fair’ for the next round of Zimbabwean elections (All figures represent percentages)</b>			
<b>How free and fair do you expect the next general elections to be?</b>			
<b>Not free &amp; fair at all</b>	<b>Hardly free &amp; fair, major problems</b>	<b>Free &amp; fair with minor problems</b>	<b>Completely free &amp; fair</b>
10	25	30	16
<b>Compared with March 2008, the next round of elections will be ...</b>			
<b>More free &amp; fair</b>	<b>Less free &amp; fair</b>	<b>No difference</b>	
43	15	24	
<b>Compared with June 2008, the next round of elections will be ...</b>			
<b>More free &amp; fair</b>	<b>Less free &amp; fair</b>	<b>No difference</b>	
46	17	19	
Note: Table does not report on ‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse’ responses			

The survey respondents were probed (in open-ended questions) on what could be done to make the next round of elections free and fair [Q16D]. The answers were quite obvious. The need to restrict/eliminate violence and intimidation topped their list. The need to ensure peace in elections featured in much of these reflections. Their second most important proposed action was to allow regional and international observers and peacekeeping forces into central positions in the elections. The respondents also identified the need for the re-professionalisation of the army and police.

These needs were corroborated through responses to a question on what the *most important thing was that needed to change* before Zimbabwe could embark on a next round of elections [Q53A]. Ensuring and maintaining peace and order, guaranteeing freedom of association, finalising the new constitution and ending political violence constituted the bulk of the ‘most important things to be done’. Additional prominent factors included the reform of electoral laws

and ZEC, instituting a neutral police force and army, and ensuring freedom for parties to campaign [Q53B].

### ***Roles for SADC***

Zimbabweans see important roles for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in forthcoming elections in Zimbabwe.

Asked what SADC actions they believe should be undertaken when Zimbabweans parties practice violence and intimidation in elections [Q59], the top-three suggested actions were (on the same question):

- ✿ 38% – a peace-keeping force should be sent into Zimbabwe;
- ✿ 28% – SADC should take over the running of the elections; and
- ✿ 17% – SADC should refuse to recognise the results of the perpetrating party.

This indicated that 59% of Zimbabweans see the need for SADC intervention in elections in Zimbabwe, in the case of violence and intimidation being perpetrated.

### **6.5 Violence and elections – main trends**

As the bottom-line, violence and elections are intricately linked in Zimbabwean politics – both historically and continuing today. Zimbabweans appear to accept this as a given, although many believe that it need not be the case. There is little evidence that Zimbabweans expect a next round of elections to be violence-free, although large proportions of optimists hold out hope that ‘more free and fair than in the past’ will be the new norm.

The detailed trends on elections and violence were:

- ✿ Each time there are important political decisions to be made in Zimbabwe, violence and intimidation surface – 76% agreed or strongly agreed with this statement [Q47D].
- ✿ Elections are equally associated with fear -- 46% disagreed with the statement that this time around, there will be nothing to fear [Q54B]; new elections will reopen the wounds of violence and fear that are associated with election times in Zimbabwe [Q47B].
- ✿ ‘Fear of violence and intimidation will affect the vote’ [Q47E] – 74% agreed with this statement.
- ✿ There have been many recent experiences (2008-10) of politically motivated violence and intimidation in the communities (58%) [Q50].
- ✿ There is fear of intimidation in election campaigns [Q42C]; 54% disagreed with the statement that opposition parties will be able to participate in elections without fear [Q54A].
- ✿ Elections will not be free of security force intimidation, was believed by 45% [Q54C].
- ✿ Election Day itself, however, is somewhat different from the general setting of fear – come Election Day, Zimbabweans will bury their fears and will go out and vote – 33% agreed [Q65]. The majority, however, reckon that fear of violence and intimidation will *make Zimbabweans stay away from the polls* (55%) [Q65].
- ✿ International and domestic observers will help make Zimbabweans feel safe at the polls [Q57A].

In contrast with the general association of elections with freedoms and democratic rights, elections in Zimbabwe have a close-to-umbilical cord with violence and intimidation, and concomitant coercion and often either fearful participation – or abstention.

An overwhelming majority of respondents, 76%, felt that ‘each time there is an election, there is intimidation and violence’ [Q47D].

Violence and intimidation is by far not yet history in Zimbabwe. A vast 58% report that in the period 2008-10 there had been incidents of violence and intimidation in their communities [Q50].

There are widespread expectations that electoral violence will continue and that 2011 elections will be afflicted. There will not be ‘nothing to fear’ [Q54B]. For example, it is expected that opposition parties will campaign in fear [Q54A], and that fear of violence and intimidation could make many Zimbabweans abstain on the next Election Day. The Zimbabweans in this survey also note that violence and intimidation will affect ‘the vote’ (the party that is supported on the ballot).

## **6.6 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and readiness**

Three main trends characterised the survey’s response to ZEC:

- ✿ There are split opinions and uncertainty on whether ZEC is ready to conduct elections or not [Q61B].
- ✿ Zimbabweans have little confidence in the administrative power of ZEC [Q61C].
- ✿ A strong belief prevails that ZEC will not be treating all participating parties equally [Q61D].

These assessments of ZEC are anchored in Zimbabweans’ preceding experiences of the (insufficient and biased) ways in which previous elections had been conducted. Zimbabweans find it difficult to step away from these memories, and have not yet seen sufficient evidence that a new reality is emerging.

### ***ZEC’s credibility and readiness***

ZEC enjoys a low level of credibility, a trend that was repeated over several questions [Q61A-F]. These opinions were expressed by the 59% of respondents who reported that they had heard of ZEC.

Confidence in ZEC’s administrative capacity is very low [Q61C]. Only 13% reported that they had confidence in this capacity. Half of the 59% who had heard of ZEC stated outright that they did not believe that ZEC has this capacity. ‘Bias towards ZANU-PF’ in previous elections was the overriding motivation for the lack of confidence in ZEC’s administrative capacity. The sentiment was simply ‘ZEC has failed us before’.



The readiness of ZEC to execute elections is seriously questioned [Q61B]. Only 17% reckoned that ZEC is ready to conduct elections, whilst 11% said ZEC was not quite ready, and a further 13% averred that ZEC is not ready at all. The 'don't know' category was substantial (19%). The balance of 41% was those who reported that they had not heard of ZEC.

Zimbabweans are also sceptical as to whether ZEC in the next elections will act in fairness to all political parties [Q61D]. 31%, by far the biggest opinion block on the question, answered 'no' to the question of whether they have confidence that ZEC would treat all political parties equally in the next election. As in the previous question, bias towards ZANU-PF featured as the reason for this assessment – this time around the bias was virtually unanimously cited.

## 6.7 Voter registration

A large majority of Zimbabweans are reported to be registered as voters – 82.7% according to this survey, whilst 17% report that they are not registered [Q60A]. Only 0.4% was not sure of their registration status. The detailed follow-up questions on registration issues had low numbers of responses, and only limited statistical analysis is thus possible.

Of those who are registered, 57% reported that the registration process had been easy or very easy [Q60B]. They found the registration process to have been easy, largely because they had all the required documents, and because the process itself was 'simple and fast' [Q60C]. Only 6% thought that the registration process had been difficult or very difficult.

Of those who are not registered, only 7% reported that they had tried to get registered, but had been unsuccessful [Q60E].<sup>17</sup> The reason for lack of success appears to have been largely due to the absence of a national identity document. Other reasons that featured were no proof of residence, and non-citizen indication on the identity document [Q60F]. Of those who had no identity document, half reported that they had subsequently been able to get a replacement document [Q60G].

It appears from the trends reported that the vast majority of potential Zimbabwean voters are registered. Those who are not registered related little apparent political intervention with the registration process. The biggest reason for not being registered, appears to have been the *bona fide* loss of identity document – although the continuous prohibition of registration or 'non-citizens' featured as one of the (small) reasons for not being registered.

---

<sup>17</sup> The trends reported in this paragraph are off an extremely small respondent base, and should be interpreted with care.

**7.1 Media exposure and political interest – main trends (57)****7.2 Interest in public affairs-politics (58)****7.3 Media use (58)***Zimbabweans' trust in the news media they use (60)**Demographics and media use (60)**Geographical spread and media use (60)*

The section explores some of the ways beyond direct experience and exposure in which politics and news about politics reach Zimbabweans. It specifically investigates their patterns of media exposure and use – access, preferences and the trust they have in these sources. Exposure to the mass media is often voluntary (even if without options of alternatives), and interest in public affairs is therefore one of the filtering mechanisms.

The Freedom House survey reveals the marked unevenness in media exposure – and continuation of known trends in media use in Zimbabwe. The state electronic media, especially television and radio, retain their extreme dominance over alternative, privately-owned news sources. Large proportions of Zimbabweans remain entirely dependent on state media for their information about public affairs. Urbanites are often the more privileged when it comes to access to *varied* sources of information – but the print media require cash resources. Radio remains the medium with the widest reach – yet, even this source is not accessible to vast numbers of Zimbabweans. Newspapers are widely used, but lag far behind the electronic media. The internet is used by about 9% of Zimbabweans for political news.

**7.1 Media exposure and political interest – main trends**

The most pertinent trends regarding media exposure and political interest were:

- ✿ Radio remains the predominant news source for Zimbabweans, with 52% in this survey reporting that they get their news from radio at least a few times a week. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) has the widest reach.
- ✿ Television is largely the domain of the ZBC, although Channels 1, 2 and 3 of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) enjoy substantial penetration, especially in the southern and urban parts of the country.
- ✿ Newspapers remain the domain of a modest number of Zimbabweans. 23% report that they get their news from the papers 'a few times a week' or 'every day'. Another 17% occasionally access the newspapers for public affairs news.
- ✿ Internet, according to this survey, is used by 9% of Zimbabweans for political news; two-thirds of the 9% use this source so regularly.

- ☀ Whereas 42% of Zimbabweans are ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ interested in public affairs, 74% in this survey reported that they ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ discuss politics when they get together with their friends. MDC-T supporters reported a lower interest in public affairs than their ZANU-PF counterparts.

## 7.2 Interest in public affairs-politics

Interest in public and political affairs is reasonably high – and shows only modest variation on the trends in the comparable 2009 Freedom House survey. Only 20% reported in 2010 that they are not interested in public affairs at all, or that they never discuss political matters when they get together with friends.

It appears that interest in public and political matters may have declined slightly from the relatively early post-institution-of-IG days of the September 2009 survey to the more confused and doubtful days of late 2010. Some of the differences are in the margin-of-error range, but the lowering is consistent over a series of items and the two items in Table 19 thus appear to offer valid indications of a decline in Zimbabweans’ interest in politics. This is possibly due to the novelty of the IG fading, Zimbabweans becoming used to the slow pace of change and despondency about prospects for short-term change setting in.

<b>‘How interested are you in public affairs?’ [Q75]</b>			<b>How often do you discuss politics when you get together with your friends? [Q76]</b>		
<b>Reported level of interest</b>	<b>2009 (%)</b>	<b>2010 (%)</b>	<b>Frequency of discussions</b>	<b>2009 (%)</b>	<b>2010 (%)</b>
Not interested at all	15	20	Never	19	25
Not very interested	27	39	Sometimes	62	58
Somewhat interested	38	28	Often	19	16
Very interested	21	14			

Note: ‘Don’t know’, ‘not sure’ and refuse are not reported in this table

The level of political interest of MDC-T supporters appears to be lower than that of ZANU-PF supporters. Whereas 73% of the declared ZANU-PF supporters report that they ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ discuss politics when they get together with friends, the corresponding percentage for the MDC-T supporters was 58%.

## 7.3 Media use

The survey explored media usage of radio, television, newspapers, the internet and certain cell phone uses (Table 21). Compared with the trends of the September 2009 survey, media use appears to have declined. The declines were mostly beyond the reported margin of error. The details in Table 20 indicate that radio remains, by far, the most common source of news [Q70A]. Yet, it is still only 52% of the

respondents that use radio a few times a week or every day for news on politics and public affairs (61% in 2009). 35% answered that they ‘never’ use the radio for news.

**Table 20:  
Frequency of media use for news about ‘government and politics’**

News source	Frequency					
	‘A few times a week’ / ‘Every day’		‘A few times a month’ / ‘A few times a year’		‘Never’	
	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010
<b>Radio</b>	57	52	23	13	21	35
<b>Television</b>	38	34	19	12	42	54
<b>Newspapers</b>	24	23	28	17	49	0
<b>Internet</b>	-	6	-	3	-	91

Question: ‘How often do you get news about matters of government and politics?’

A total of 65% of Zimbabweans use radio (even if highly infrequently) for news about politics and public affairs (Table 20). The three most commonly used radio sources were, in descending order, for the total of radio use for public affairs-political news:<sup>18</sup>

- ☼ ZBC Radio Zimbabwe – 35%
- ☼ VOA Studio 7 – 14%
- ☼ ZBC Power FM – 9%

Television was the second most widely used source for news on politics and public affairs. A total of 34% said that they use this medium for their political-public affairs news a few times a week or every day (38% in 2009). 54% said that they never access television for these types of news. The most commonly used television stations-channels were, for the total of television use for public affairs-political news:

- ☼ ZBC TV – 24%
- ☼ SABC TV 1,2,3 – 18%
- ☼ ETV – 0.9%

Newspapers constituted a further important source of news on politics-public affairs. A total of 23% reported the use of newspapers for politics-public affairs news a few times a week or every day. The corresponding percentage in the 2009 survey was 24%. This was manifested whilst the variety of newspapers available was increasing in Zimbabwe. Dire economic conditions, and specifically the scarcity of foreign currency (now also the Zimbabwe currency), may have contributed. The most widely used newspapers, were:

- ☼ *The Herald* – 17%
- ☼ *The NewsDay* – 7%

<sup>18</sup> Respondents were asked: ‘Which radio station do you most commonly listen to for news on politics and public affairs?’ (or, ‘which television station do you most commonly watch ...’, ‘which newspaper do you most commonly use ...’, and ‘which internet news sites do you most commonly use ...?’) [Q70A-D]

- 🌟 *The Chronicle* – 6%
- 🌟 *Zimbabwe Independent* – 3%
- 🌟 *The Sunday Mail* – 2%

Internet sites have grown as a source of information for Zimbabweans. The survey showed that it was a news information source for supporters of the MDC-T, much rather than for ZANU-PF supporters. The most commonly used sites were:

- 🌟 Newzimbabwe.com – 2%
- 🌟 Zimdaily.com – 1.9%
- 🌟 Zimbabweituation.com – 1.8%
- 🌟 Zimonline – 1.7%

About 67% of Zimbabweans seem to have access to cell phones – 33% reported in this survey that they never use cell phones. Whereas 41% of the survey respondents said they used cell phones every day, only 2% recorded cell phone internet use. Much more common is usage to text (40% of cell phone users) and for calls (67% of cell phone users).

#### ***Zimbabweans’ trust in the news media they use***

Zimbabweans appear to differentiate between the ‘political slant’ of media they use and their usefulness as sources of information. This was probably because access and financial constraints mean that they do not always have the luxury only to expose themselves to those media with which they know they agree politically. The result was, for example, the MDC-T supporters would still believe that *The Herald*, or ZBC-TV, could be trusted as news sources.

It was notable that in this survey it was only opposition party supporters that use internet news sources on public affairs and politics.

#### ***Demographics and media use***

Zimbabweans’ media use is generally not clearly differentiated by age categories – similar media use trends (in line with the general trends in the earlier parts of the section) are evident across the age categories of 18-30, 31-50 and 51 and older. Concerning radio and newspapers, it is particularly the two younger age categories that have similar patterns of use.

There appears to be little gender-specific differentiation in the patterns of media use for news of public affairs. The gender use patterns in this survey were largely similar and were well within the range of margin of error.

#### ***Geographical spread and Zimbabweans’ media use***

Television and radio penetration, as well as newspaper distribution, vary widely in Zimbabwe depending on the rural-urban factor, and on the province.

In the northern parts of Zimbabwe there is overwhelming reliance on the electronic broadcasts of the ZBC. In contrast, the southern parts have access to the television broadcasts of the SABC and E-TV that 'spill over' from South Africa. SABC-TV is widely used in Bulawayo for news on public affairs.

The range of ZBC radio stations has wide-ranging cross-province penetration in Zimbabwe. There is very wide usage of ZBC's Radio Zimbabwe. ZBC's Spot FM Urban and Power FM have extensive usage in the two main cities of Harare and Bulawayo.

The newspapers too have distinct provincial-penetration profiles. For example, *The Herald's* widest consumption is in Harare; *The Chronicle* in Bulawayo, Matabeleland North and South; *Zimbabwe Independent* in Harare, Mashonaland East and West, and Manicaland; *The NewsDay* in Harare, Bulawayo and Midlands; *Financial Gazette* does well in Bulawayo; and the *Sunday Mail* in Midlands, Masvingo and Mashonaland East and West. *The Zimbabwean* has equivalent coverage levels across the provinces.

---

## Appendix A

### Questionnaire

# NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN ZIMBABWE

## MPOI/FHSA SURVEY-NOV/DEC 2010

**Respondent Number**

Z	I	M				
<i>[Office Use Only]</i>						

*[Supervisor Use Only]*

**Fieldworker No.**

Z	I	M		
---	---	---	--	--

**Data Entry Clerk No.**

Z	I	M		
---	---	---	--	--

**Field Number:**

--	--	--	--

*[Allocated by]*

<b>Household back-checked?</b>		Questionnaire checked by:	<b>PSU/EA: [Circle one]</b>	
Yes	1	<i>[Supervisor signature]</i>	Urban	1
No	2		Rural	2

*[Interviewer: Select appropriate code for Region/Province. Write names for District and Town/Village and EA number in the boxes.]*

Region/Province		District	
Harare	860	<b>Ward</b>	
Bulawayo	861	<b>Town/Village</b>	
Midlands	862	<b>EA Number</b>	
Masvingo	863		
Mashonaland East	864		
Mashonaland West	865		
Mashonaland Central	866		
Matebeleland South	867		
Matebeleland North	868		
Manicaland	869		

### Household and Responded Selection Procedure

Select the first household from the starting point towards your selected direction, i.e. N, S, E, and W. To select the second household, use the day code method. This means that on every 5<sup>th</sup> day of the month, you select the 6<sup>th</sup> household, i.e. you skip 5 households from the northern direction, if you are facing the north. If the settlement comes to an end and there are no more houses, turn at right angles to the right and keep walking, continuing to count until finding the 6<sup>th</sup> dwelling.

If no one is at home (i.e., premises empty), substitute with the very next household. If the interview is refused, use the day code method to select a substitute household. When you find a household with someone home, please introduce yourself using the following script. You must learn this introduction so that you can say it exactly as it is written below.



## Introduction:

Good day. My name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am from Mass Public Opinion Institute, an independent research organization. I do not represent the government or any political party. We are studying the views of citizens in Zimbabwe about how the country is governed and how the economy is managed. We would like to discuss these issues with a member of your household. Every person in the country has an equal chance of being included in this study. All information will be kept confidential. Your household has been chosen by chance. We would like to choose an adult from your household. Would you help us pick one?

*Interviewer:* Within the household, it is your job to select randomly (this means any) individual. This individual becomes the interview. *Interviewer, ask for names of all males / females who presently live in the household. Consider only citizens of [Zimbabwe] and who are 18 years and older. Record first names only directly onto the respondent selection cards. Place the cards face down for a random draw of a potential respondent. Thereafter, destroy the cards, either by tearing or burning them in fire.*

**Interviewer instruction: Write responses to all open-ended questions in capital letters and ensure legibility.**

*[Read] Please be assured that there is no way in which you will be identifiable in your responses to this interview. Your name does not appear anywhere, and your responses will be combined with those of more than a thousand other people from across the country. Our report only uses percentages and general trends. It is your sincere answers – as part of this big group of people – that will help us better understand the wishes and needs of Zimbabwean people at this time.*

START TIME (24 HOURS): .....

AGE: What is your age? [Asked as part of recruitment, but also coded by interviewer].....

## Section 1: General socio-political-economic attitudes

*[Read] May we start by briefly talking about the direction in which things are going in Zimbabwe today, both in general and in your own circumstances?*

**Q1A: How do you feel about the general direction in which Zimbabwe is moving? Is Zimbabwe moving in a right or a wrong direction?**

Right direction	Wrong direction	Bit of both	Not moving at all	DK /R
1	2	3	4	5

*[If 'Right' ask Q1B, if wrong, ask Q1C, if a 'Bit of both', ask Q1D, if 'Not moving at all', ask Q1E.]*

**Q1B: What is the one most important thing that makes you feel Zimbabwe is moving in the right direction?**

..... [PoC]

**Q1C: What is the one most important thing that makes you feel Zimbabwe is moving in a wrong direction?**

..... [PoC]

**Q1D: What is the one most important thing that makes you feel Zimbabwe is moving in both directions?**

..... [PoC]

**Q1E: What is the one most important thing that makes you feel Zimbabwe is not moving at all?**

..... [PoC]

**Q2: In general, how do you describe [Read options];**

	Very Bad	Fairly Bad	Neither good nor bad	Fairly good	Very good	DK/NS
<b>Q2A:</b> The present economic condition of this country?	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q2B:</b> Your own present living conditions?	1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q3: Looking back, how do you rate [Read options];**

	Much worse	Worse	Same	Better	Much better	DK/NS
<b>Q3A:</b> Economic conditions in this country today, compared to twelve months ago?	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q3B:</b> And how would you rate your own living conditions today, compared to twelve months ago?	1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q4: Looking ahead, do you expect [Read options];**

	Much worse	Worse	Same	Better	Much better	DK/NS
<b>Q4A:</b> The country's economic conditions to be better or worse in twelve months time?	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q4B:</b> Your own living conditions to be better or worse in twelve months time?	1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q5: Let's talk about the problems that Zimbabwe faces today ...**

**Q5A: Which would you say is the most serious problem that Zimbabwe faces today?**

..... [PoC]

**Q5B: Which would you say is the second most serious problem that Zimbabwe faces today?**

..... [PoC]

**Q6: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without [Read options]**

	Never	Once or twice	Several times	Many times	Always	DK	NA
<b>Q6A:</b> Enough food to eat?	1	2	3	4	5	9	
<b>Q6B:</b> Enough clean water for home use?	1	2	3	4	5	9	
<b>Q6C:</b> Modern medicines or modern medical treatment?	1	2	3	4	5	9	77
<b>Q6D:</b> Traditional medicines or traditional medical treatment?	1	2	3	4	5	9	77
<b>Q6E:</b> Enough fuel to cook your food?	1	2	3	4	5	9	
<b>Q6F:</b> A cash income?	1	2	3	4	5	9	

## Section 2: The Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the Inclusive Government (IG)

*[Read]* As you know, the three main political parties in this country signed a Global Political Agreement just over two years ago, in September 2008, by which the main parties agreed to share political power. In February 2009, they established the Inclusive Government with Robert Mugabe as President, Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and Arthur Mutambara as the Deputy Prime Minister. This power-sharing arrangement has now been in place for well over a year. Let us talk about power-sharing, the Inclusive Government, and progress.

**Q7: Thinking about how you are feeling today, do you approve or disapprove of the agreement among Zimbabwe's political leaders to share power and form the Inclusive Government (IG)?** *[Probe strength of opinion]*

Disapprove very strongly	Disapprove	Neither approve nor disapprove	Approve	Approve very strongly	DK	Cant Judge
1	2	3	4	5	9	98

**Q8: Has the approximately 18 months of the Inclusive Government (IG) been a success or a failure?**

*[Probe strength of opinion: How much of a success or failure?]*

Huge success	A success	Neither/both success nor/and failure	Failure	Huge failure	DK	Cant Judge
1	2	3	4	5	9	98

**Q9: Which of the following descriptions of power-sharing comes closest to your view?** *[Read out options: Choose one response]*

1. Power-sharing is a good alternative to competitive elections, which rarely work well	1
2. Power-sharing is a second-best solution, to be used only when elections fail	2
3. Power-sharing is a bad alternative that should never replace competitive elections	3
None of the above	0
DK	9

**Q10: In your opinion, where does political power reside in Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government (IG)?** *[Read options: Choose one response]*

Only with the President	1
Mainly with the President	2
In equal shares between the President and Prime Minister	3
Mainly with the Prime Minister	4
Only with the Prime Minister	5
DK	9

**Q11: When the President exercises power, how often does he depend on the help of the security forces?**

All the time	Often	Occasionally	Never	NS	DK/R
1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q12: Turning to specifics of government performance, how do you compare the performance of the Inclusive Government with the previous ZANU-PF government with regard to the following matters? Or haven't you heard enough [HHE] to know, or don't know [DK]? [Ask Q12A-K; Probe for strength of opinion]**

	Much worse	Worse	Same	Better	Much better	DK/HHE
<b>Q12A:</b> Making consumer goods available	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12B:</b> Ensuring access to foreign currency	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12C:</b> Reducing political violence	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12D:</b> Preventing arbitrary arrest	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12E:</b> Stopping land invasions	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12F:</b> Reforming the Constitution	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12G:</b> Distributing food relief	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12H:</b> Attracting international investment	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12I:</b> Observing the rule of law	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12J:</b> Healing a broken nation	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q12K:</b> Increasing freedom to speak about political matters openly	1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q13: [If the Inclusive Government fares better or much better on 1 or more of Q12A-K:]**

**Do you believe the THREE main political parties, ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M, were equally responsible for the improvement or improvements that you have noted, or was it more the contribution of one of the parties?**

*[Read options]*

Equal contribution of ZANU-PF and the MDC-T	1
More the contribution of ZANU-PF	2
More the contribution of the MDC-T	3
More the contribution of the MDC-M	4
More the contribution of other parties	5
Equally contributed	6
DK/HHE	9

**Q14A: In your opinion, when should the next presidential and parliamentary elections be held?**

*[Read options; Choose one.]*

Immediately	0
2011	1
2012	2
2013	3
Other (specify).....	4
DK	9

**Q14B: What is your main reason for this answer?**

..... [PoC]

**Q15: How do you feel about the order in which elections and constitution-making happen? Choose one of the two statements. [Read options, not DK]**

Elections should only be held after a new Constitution is finalised	Elections can be brought forward, whether the new Constitution is finalised or not	DK/NS
1	2	9

**Q16A: How free and fair do you expect the next general elections to be? Will they be:**

[Read options; not DK]

Not free and fair at all	Hardly free and fair, with major problems	Free and fair, with minor problems	Completely free and fair	DK
1	2	3	4	9

**Q16B: In comparison with the parliamentary and presidential elections of March 2008, do you expect 2011 elections to be more or less free and fair? [Read options]**

More free and fair	Less free and fair	No difference	DK/R
1	2	3	9

**Q16C: In comparison with the presidential run-off elections of June 2008, do you expect 2011 elections to be more or less free and fair? [Read options]**

More free and fair	Less free and fair	No difference	DK/R
1	2	3	9

**Q16D: In your view, what should be done to ensure that the next election will be free and fair?**

..... [PoC]

**Q17: In your opinion, which of the three main political parties benefitted most from involvement in the Inclusive Government (IG)? Was it by far, or just a little?**

MDC-T by far	1
MDC-T by just a little	2
ZANU-PF by just a little	3
ZANU-PF by far	4
MDC-M by far	5
MDC-M by just a little	6
All benefitted	7
DK/NS/R	9

**Q18: Let us further explore the impact of IG on two main political parties. In your opinion, how did the IG affect ZANU-PF and MDC-T? [Ask Q18A-D; Read options]**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK
<b>Q18A:</b> ZANU-PF demonstrated willingness to cede some power	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q18B:</b> The MDC-T brought positive changes to government.	1	2	3	4	5	9

<b>Q18C:</b> ZANU-PF gained the space to fight for an electoral comeback	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q18D:</b> The MDC-T has failed to take power from ZANU-PF.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q18E:</b> The MDC-T got too close to ZANU-PF.	1	2	3	4	5	9

### Section 3: Constitutional reform (content and process)

**Q19: Have you ever heard of the Constitution of Zimbabwe?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

*[If "Yes", ask Q20. If "No", go to Q21]*

**Q20: I am now going to read statements about this Constitution. Please tell me which statement comes closest to your own opinion.**

1. The current Constitution meets the needs of Zimbabwe and should be retained	1
2. The current Constitution should be amended to take account of changing political needs	2
3. The current Constitution is unsuitable for Zimbabwe's needs and should be completely replaced	3
None of the above	0
DK	9

**Q21A: Have you heard about the process that has been taking place to make a new Constitution?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

*[If "Yes" ask Q21B and Q22; If "No", Q23 & 25 onwards:]*

**Q21B: Parts of the constitution-making process have been completed; others are still to follow. According to what you have heard, what is the process for making a new Constitution?**

*[Read options; Choose one of the following options]*

Appointing a parliamentary select committee to undertake the task	1
Consulting all stakeholders in public hearings	2
Submitting a draft Constitution to a vote in a national referendum	3
Ratification of the new Constitution by Parliament and President.	4
All of the above	5
DK	9
NA	77

**Q22: Tell me about your involvement, or not, in the constitutional outreach process, known as COPAC, that has just recently come to an end. [Ask A-M; Read options]**

**Q22A: Did you attend the constitutional outreach meeting in your area?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

*[If "Yes" to Q22A, ask Q22B-Q22N; If "No", go to Q23]*

**Q22B: Did you attend because you wanted to, or because you wanted to make sure not to anger people who wanted you to attend?**

Attended because I wanted to	Attended because I did not want to anger people	Refuse
1	2	9

**Q22C: Did you speak at the outreach meeting?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

**Q22D: Was someone appointed to speak on your behalf?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

*If "Yes": Who appointed this spokesperson? .....* [PoC]

**Q22E: Were there speeches to start your outreach meeting?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

*If "Yes": What kind of thing was being said? .....* [PoC]

**Q22F: Did prayers take place that made suggestions on what to say in the meeting?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

*If "Yes": What were they praying for? .....* [PoC]

**Q22G: Were the people who did most of the speaking at your meeting members of your community?**

Yes	1	No	2	Not sure	3
-----	---	----	---	----------	---

**Q22H: Which party, or perhaps just group of people, did these speakers come from?** *[Do not read; Code on responses]*

ZANU-PF	1
MDC-T	2
MDC-M	3
Chiefs or traditional leaders	4
Ordinary community members	5
Other (specify) .....	6
DK/NS/R	9

**Q22I: Did you feel there was enough time given for the consultation?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

**Q22J: Did you receive civic education from civil society organisations about the constitutional process before this COPAC consultation meeting?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

*If "Yes": Who or what organisation provided this education? .....* [PoC]

**Q22K: Were you comfortable speaking in the COPAC meeting with cameras recording proceedings?**

Yes	1	No	2	There were no cameras	3
-----	---	----	---	-----------------------	---

*If "No": Please motivate your answer: .....* [PoC]

**Q22L: How did you come to hear of the COPAC meeting?**

*[Do not read; Code response]*

Newspaper/s	1
Radio	2

Local MDC-T structures	3
Local ZANU-PF structures	4
Neighbours	5
Schools	6
Church	7
Traditional leader	8
Other (specify): .....	9
Can't remember/DK/R	10

**Q22M: Other than in the COPAC meetings, did you also discuss the constitutional process in other forums?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

[If "Yes" to Q22M, ask Q22N; If "No" skip to Q23:]

**Q22N: Apart from participation in the COPAC process, in which other forums did you also discuss the constitutional process? Note all such forums in which you were involved.**

[Do not read; Code response]

Civil society workshops	1
Meetings organised by the church	2
Meetings with traditional leaders	3
Conversations with the MDC-T	4
Conversations with ZANU-PF	5
At the schools	6
Conversations with neighbours	7
Other (specify) .....	8
DK/Can't remember/R	9
N/A	77

**Q23: How likely do you think it is that citizens' views collected during the outreach will be reflected in the new Constitution?**

[Read options]

Very likely	Likely	Neither likely nor unlikely	Unlikely	Highly unlikely	DK
1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q24: Which of the statements in each of the following pairs best captures your feelings about the questions that the outreach team asked? [Read options; Choose the one you most agree with]**

**Q24A:**

The questions captured the concerns that the community wished to talk about	The questions failed to capture the concerns that we have about the future Constitution	NA	DK/NS/R
1	2	3	9

**Q24B:**

I did not understand what the questions were asking or how I should respond	The questions were clear and concise and helped me prepare for participation	NA	DK/NS/R
1	2	3	9



**Q24C:**

The COPAC meeting in my area happened as scheduled	The COPAC meeting in my area was postponed	NA	DK/NS/R
1	2	3	9

**Q24D:** *[If Option "2" on Q24C, ask]*

Do you know why this meeting was postponed (please, specify)? ..... [PoC]

**Q25: How well or badly is the current Inclusive Government (IG) doing in asking ordinary people what they think about constitutional reform?**

Very badly	Badly	Neither well nor badly	Well	Very well	DK
1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q26: Let us talk about further rounds of consultation of Zimbabweans in the process of making the country's next Constitution. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.**

*[Ask Q26A-D; Read options]*

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't Know
<b>Q26A:</b> There has to be more education about the new draft Constitution before it is taken to a referendum.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q26B:</b> It is time just to get the new Constitution adopted and let a new government get on with the job.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q26C:</b> Zimbabweans are tired of being consulted on constitutional matters when the politicians do as they like anyway.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q26D:</b> COPAC will produce a Constitution that will be good for democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe.	1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q27: How would you rate the performance of each of the MDC-M, MDC-T, and ZANU-PF in explaining their own constitutional positions in the COPAC process?**

*[Ask Q27A-D; Read options]*

	Very poorly	Poorly	Neither poorly nor well	Well	Very well	Don't Know	NA
<b>Q27A:</b> In explaining its own constitutional positions ZANU-PF performed:	1	2	3	4	5	9	77
<b>Q27B:</b> In explaining its own constitutional positions the MDC-T performed:	1	2	3	4	5	9	77
<b>Q27C:</b> In explaining its own constitutional positions the MDC-M performed:	1	2	3	4	5	9	77

**Q27D: Any brief motivation you would like to add for any of your three answers?**

..... [PoC]

**Q28: Did you see any of the political parties or their supporters using violence, intimidation or coercion to get things to go *their way* in the constitutional process?**

Yes	1	No	2	DK/R	9
-----	---	----	---	------	---

**Q29: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Ask Q29A-E; Read options]**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK
<b>Q29A:</b> Spokespersons were appointed to express views on the new Constitution.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q29B:</b> The War Veterans were seen in the community using their presence to intimidate people.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q29C:</b> Suspicious cars were driving into the community and the occupants observed us, or asked questions.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q29D:</b> Our economic livelihoods are secure, irrespective of what we say about the contents of the new Constitution.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q29E:</b> I always feel free to speak to strangers who enter my community.	1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q30: Judging from your own experiences or observations, whether you attended a *meeting yourself or not*, how meaningful or meaningless do you reckon participation in the COPAC process was? [Read options]**

Very meaningful	Somewhat meaningful	Neither	Somewhat meaningless	Devoid of all meaning	DK/No opinion
1	2	3	4	5	9

**Let us now briefly look at the type of government institutions Zimbabweans would like to see emerge from the new Constitution.**

**Q31:** Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. Or haven't you heard enough about this issue to form an opinion? [Probe for strength of opinion: Do you agree or agree very strongly]

1. The Constitution should limit the President to a maximum of two consecutive terms in office.		2. There should be no constitutional limit on how long a President can serve.	
Agree very strongly with 1	Agree with 1	Agree with 2	Agree very strongly with 2
1	2	4	5
Agree with neither			3
DK/HHE [Do not read]			9

<b>Q32: Choose Statement 1 or 2. [Probe for strength]</b>			
<b>1. The Constitution should retain the House of Assembly but abolish the Senate.</b>		<b>2. The Constitution should keep both a House of Assembly and a Senate.</b>	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK/HHE [Do not read]			9

<b>Q33: Choose Statement 1 or 2. [Probe for strength]</b>			
<b>1. The President should be able to appoint some Members of Parliament.</b>		<b>2. The House of Assembly should be composed only of elected MPs.</b>	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK/HHE [Do not read]			9

<b>Q34: Choose Statement 1 or 2. [Probe for strength]</b>			
<b>1. The Constitution should reserve positions in national government for traditional chiefs.</b>		<b>2. The Constitution should limit the role of traditional chiefs to local government only.</b>	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK/HHE [Do not read]			9

<b>Q35: Choose Statement 1 or 2. [Probe for strength]</b>			
<b>1. The Constitution should establish independent courts, for example by ensuring that judges are appointed and dismissed on merit, rather than for political reasons.</b>		<b>2. The Constitution should require that judges are politically loyal, for example by having them appointed and dismissed by the President.</b>	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK/HHE [Do not read]			9

<b>Q36: Choose Statement 1 or 2. [Probe for strength]</b>			
<b>1. The Constitution should provide that elections in Zimbabwe are run by a government agency.</b>		<b>2. Zimbabwe requires an independent Electoral Commission whose members are appointed from outside of government.</b>	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK/HHE [Do not read]			9

<b>Q37: Choose Statement 1 or 2. [Probe for strength]</b>			
<b>1. The Constitution should protect every individual's right to freely express political views.</b>		<b>2. Because it can be dangerous and confusing to allow too many different points of view, the Constitution should place limits on free expression.</b>	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK/HHE [Do not read]			9

**Q38: Let us also consider the political context of the constitutional developments. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Ask Q38A-B; Read options:]**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	D K
<b>Q38A:</b> Even the smartest Constitution cannot in itself bring Zimbabweans a good-willed and democratic government.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q38B:</b> The new Constitution will only bring change if it ends the alliance between the President and the security forces.	1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q39A: Have you ever heard about the Organ on National Healing? [If "Yes", ask Q39B:]**

No	Yes	DK
0	1	9

**Q39B: Briefly tell me what it is that you have heard about the organ.**

..... [PoC]

## Section 4: Violence and intimidation

[Read] Let us move on to a subject that is often on Zimbabweans mind, and which they often talk about – the freedoms to talk about and practice politics, with or without fear of becoming targeted. Please share with us, in confidence, your experiences and feelings.

<b>Q40: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. [Probe for strength of opinion: Do you agree or agree very strongly?]</b>			
<b>1. Whenever politics is involved, violence is inevitable.</b>		<b>2. Politics need not be dangerous; people can learn how to work together in peaceful ways.</b>	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK [Do not read]			9

<b>Q41: Choose Statement 1 or 2. [Probe for strength of opinion]</b>			
<b>1. In Zimbabwe it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.</b>		<b>2. The use of violence is never justified in Zimbabwean politics.</b>	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK [Do not read]			9

**Q42: In this country, how often do people:**

[Ask Q42A-C; Read options]

	Never	Rarely	Often	Always	DK
<b>Q42A:</b> Have to be careful about what they say about politics?	0	1	2	3	9
<b>Q42B:</b> Have to fear political intimidation as they go about their daily lives?	0	1	2	3	9
<b>Q42C:</b> Have to fear political intimidation during election campaigns?	0	1	2	3	9

**Q43: What would you do if you were violently and physically attacked by a supporter of another political party? [Read options]**

Report this person to the police	1
Get this person back (or plan to do this), using the same methods	2
Suffer in silence as I am not physically in the position to retaliate	3
Other (specify).....	4
DK/R	9

**Q44: Thinking about the period since independence in 1980, please tell me if YOU PERSONALLY were ever affected in any of the following ways. Important: refer only to events that were POLITICALLY MOTIVATED:**

[Ask Q44 A-I]

	No	Yes	DK
<b>Q44A:</b> Intimidation, threat or harassment	0	1	9
<b>Q44B:</b> Theft of (or damage to) your personal property	0	1	9
<b>Q44C:</b> Denial of food or starvation [ <b>Remind respondent: For POLITICAL reasons</b> ]	0	1	9
<b>Q44D:</b> Forced removal from your home or confiscation of land	0	1	9
<b>Q44E:</b> The closure of a business	0	1	9
<b>Q44F:</b> The loss of a job [ <b>Remind respondent: For POLITICAL reasons</b> ]	0	1	9
<b>Q44G:</b> Arrest, kidnap or abduction	0	1	9
<b>Q44H:</b> Personal injury (including, physical assault, sexual assault or torture)	0	1	9
<b>Q44I:</b> Witnessed someone else being injured or killed	0	1	9

**Q45: Please tell me if MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY were ever affected in any of the following ways.**

**Important: refer only to events that were POLITICALLY MOTIVATED:** [Ask Q45A-I]

	No	Yes	DK
<b>Q45A:</b> Intimidation, threat or harassment	0	1	9
<b>Q45B:</b> Theft of (or damage to) your personal property	0	1	9
<b>Q45C:</b> Denial of food or starvation [ <b>Remind respondent: For POLITICAL reasons</b> ]	0	1	9

<b>Q45D:</b> Forced removal from their home or confiscation of land	0	1	9
<b>Q45E:</b> The closure of a business	0	1	9
<b>Q45F:</b> The loss of a job <b>[Remind respondent: For POLITICAL reasons]</b>	0	1	9
<b>Q45G:</b> Arrest, kidnap or abduction	0	1	9
<b>Q45H:</b> Personal injury (including, physical assault, sexual assault or torture)	0	1	9
<b>Q45I:</b> Witnessed someone else being injured or killed	0	1	9

**Q46: Looking at the situation in Zimbabwe today, please tell me how safe or unsafe you feel in the following situations: [Ask Q46A-F:]**

	Very unsafe	Somewhat unsafe	Somewhat safe	Very safe	NA	DK
<b>Q46A:</b> Going to the market	1	2	3	4	8	9
<b>Q46B:</b> Sleeping at night	1	2	3	4	8	9
<b>Q46C:</b> Walking around at night	1	2	3	4	8	9
<b>Q46D:</b> Meeting strangers	1	2	3	4	8	9
<b>Q46E:</b> Meeting policemen	1	2	3	4	8	9
<b>Q46F:</b> Meeting security personnel, other than the police	1	2	3	4	8	9

**Q47: People are saying different things about intimidation in the current era in Zimbabwe. Which of the following statements do you disagree or agree with? [Ask Q47A-E; Read options]**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK
<b>Q47A:</b> Violence and intimidation were bad in the past, but nowadays we feel free to express our political views.	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q47B:</b> Our experiences of violence and intimidation mean that perpetrators nowadays need only <i>threaten</i> violence to bring fear back to life again.	1	2	3	4	8	9
<b>Q47C:</b> The youth militia and war veterans look after the good interests of the people of Zimbabwe.	1	2	3	4	8	9
<b>Q47D:</b> Each time Zimbabwe comes to important political decisions to be made, violence and intimidation surface.	1	2	3	4	8	9
<b>Q47E:</b> Fear of violence and intimidation makes people vote for parties or candidates other than the ones they prefer.	1	2	3	4	8	9

**Q49: What do you see as the main reason for the violence and intimidation, where this occurs in the communities? Your perspective, just in one sentence, would really help us understand Zimbabwe as it is today.**

..... [PoC]

**Q50: In the years 2008-2010, have there been cases of politically motivated violence and intimidation in your community?**

Yes	No	NS/DK/R
1	2	9

[If "Yes" to Q50:]

**Q51: In your experience, who has been most likely to be involved in political violence in your community in the period of 2008-2010?**

..... [PoC]

## Section 5: Elections (Timing and trends)

[Read] There is much talk about Zimbabweans going to the polls again next year, about three years after the 2008 elections, to vote for a new Parliament and President. Please share with us some of your ideas about possible elections in 2011.

**Q52: Let us start by talking about readiness for elections ... [Ask Q52A-C:]**

**Q52A: In your opinion, are the Zimbabwean people ready for elections in 2011? Please tell me how ready you believe they are. [Read first three options]**

Ready	Not quite ready	Not ready at all	DK/NS/R
1	2	3	9

**Q52B: Is ZANU-PF ready for elections in 2011? [Read first three options]**

Ready	Not quite ready	Not ready at all	DK/NS/R
1	2	3	9

**Q52C: Is the MDC-T ready for elections in 2011? [Read first three options]**

Ready	Not quite ready	Not ready at all	DK/NS/R
1	2	3	9

**Q53A: In your opinion, what is the most important thing that needs to change BEFORE Zimbabwe embarks on a next round of elections, possibly in mid-2011?**

..... [PoC]

**Q53B: In your opinion, what is the second most important thing that needs to change BEFORE Zimbabwe embarks on a next round of elections, possibly in mid-2011?**

..... [PoC]

**Q54: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

**"Elections in 2011 will ..."** [Ask Q54A-G; Read options]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	NA	DK
<b>Q54A:</b> Offer all Zimbabweans the opportunity to participate without fear.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
<b>Q54B:</b> Reopen old wounds of violence and fear.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

<b>Q54C:</b> Be free of security force interventions.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
<b>Q54D:</b> Have transparent counting processes.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
<b>Q54E:</b> Deliver a clear winner of the presidential election.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
<b>Q54F:</b> Deliver election results that will be accepted by all political parties.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
<b>Q54G:</b> End the era of power-sharing between the main parties.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

**Q55: In your opinion, was the official March 2008 parliamentary result (with its small difference between the two main parties) an accurate reflection of the will of the voters?**

Yes	No	Not Sure	DK/ R
1	2	3	9

**Q56A: Did you vote in the March 2008 elections?**

Yes	No	R
1	2	9

**Q56B: Did you vote in the June 2008 elections?**

Yes	No	R
1	2	9

**Q57: When we talk about the next round of elections, from your side, what would have to happen to *make you feel safe* during elections? [*Ask Q57A-E; Read options*]**

	Very safe	Safe	Neither safe nor unsafe	NA	DK/R	Nothing has to happen
<b>Q57A:</b> International observers are present at your polling station. <i>Would make me feel:</i>	1	2	3	8	9	98
<b>Q57B:</b> Domestic election monitors are present at your polling station. <i>Would make me feel:</i>	1	2	3	8	5	98
<b>Q57D:</b> There is no police inside your polling station. <i>Would make me feel:</i>	1	2	3	8	5	98
<b>Q57E:</b> A new Constitution guarantees our rights to freedom of belief, expression and association. <i>Would make me feel:</i>	1	2	3	8	5	98



**Q58: If we compare the 2008 and the likely 2011 elections, based on what you know and feel today ...** *[Ask Q58A-C; Read options]*

**Q58A: Would you feel 'more safe' or 'less safe' voting in 2011 than you did in 2008?**

Much more safe	More safe	About the same	Less safe	Much less safe	NA	DK/NS/R
1	2	3	4	5	8	9

**And how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?** *[Probe for strength of opinion]*

**Q58B: This time around, elections will be different ... there will be nothing to fear.**

Agree strongly	Agree	Nether agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	DK[Do not read]
1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q58C: Political parties in Zimbabwe use violence to ensure victory in elections and nothing is going to change this.**

Agree strongly	Agree	Nether agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	DK[Do not read]
1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q59: What in your opinion should SADC (the Southern Africa Development Community) do to any political party that practices violence and/or intimidation?** *[Read options; and ask:] Which is the one action that you believe will have the biggest impact?*

Send a peace-keeping force into Zimbabwe	1
Take over the running of elections	2
Refuse to recognise the election result of the perpetrating party	3
Extend the scheduled life-span of the Inclusive Government	4
Other (specify) .....	5
Nothing	8
DK/NS/R	9

**Q60A: Are you a registered voter of Zimbabwe?** *[If "Yes" ask Q60B]*

Yes	No	Not Sure	DK/R
1	2	3	9

**Q60B: How did you find the registration process?**

Very easy	Easy	Neither easy nor difficult	Difficult	Very Difficult	NA
1	2	3	4	5	8

*[If "Option 1" or "Option 2" on Q60B:]*

**Q60C: Could you briefly tell me why this process was easy (or very easy)?**

..... [PoC]

*[If "Option 4" or "Option 5" on Q60B:]*

**Q60D: Could you briefly tell me why this process was difficult (or very difficult)?**

..... [PoC]

*[If “No” or “Not sure” to Q60A, ask the rest of Q60 and Q61; if “Yes”, skip to Q62:]*

**Q60E: If you are *not currently registered*, but are eligible to be registered, have you *tried to get registered*?**

Yes	No	Not Sure	N/A	DK/R
1	2	3	7	9

**Q60F: If you have been prevented from becoming registered, what was the reason given to you for this?**

*[Do not read]*

No national identity document (or passport)	1
No proof of residence (letter from the local chief / landlord not giving a letter)	2
‘Alien’ or ‘non-citizen’ indication on identity document	3
Other (specify)	4
N/A	7

*[If “Option 1” on Q60F, ask Q60G and Q60H:]*

**Q60G: Have you been able to get a replacement card?**

Yes	No	DK/R
1	2	9

**Q60H: If you do not have an ID card, how did you lose it? Which of the following statements is closest to how you lost it? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2, or offer an alternative.**

**1. It was just an ordinary matter of misplacing or losing it. It was just my mistake.**

Yes	No	DK/R
1	2	9

**2. My card was claimed or confiscated by people who probably did not want me to be able to vote.**

Yes	No	DK/R
1	2	9

**3. Other (specify)**

.....[PoC].

*[If “Yes” to Q60E (interviewee has been unable to get registered, Ask Q60H-J:)]*

**Q60I: Do you know *of others* who have been successful in registering?**

Yes	No	Not sure	DK/R
1	2	3	9

**Q60J: What do you think have they done differently from *what you have done*?**

..... [PoC]

*[Read]* Let us briefly talk about the people who will be responsible for running the next elections in Zimbabwe, possibly around mid-2011.

**Q61A: Have you heard about the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)?**

Yes	No	DK/R
1	2	9

[If "Yes" to Q61A, ask Q61B - F:]

**Q61B: Is the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) ready for elections in 2011?** [Read first three options]

Ready	Not quite ready	Not ready at all	DK/NS/R
1	2	3	9

**Q61C: Do you have confidence that ZEC has the administrative capacity to run the next election effectively?**

Yes	No	Not sure	DK/R
1	2	3	9

**Q61D: What is the most important reason for your answer?**

..... [PoC]

**Q61E: Do you have confidence that ZEC will treat all political parties equally in the next election?**

Yes	No	Not sure	DK/R
1	2	3	9

**Q61F: What is the most important reason for your answer?**

..... [PoC]

**Q62: In the current Zimbabwe, how much do you trust each of the following institutions? Or perhaps you haven't heard enough about them to say.** [Ask Q62A-N; Read options until interviewee is comfortable with the options]

	Not at all	Just a little	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	Somewhat	A lot	DK/R
<b>Q62A:</b> Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62B:</b> The Presidency	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62C:</b> The Office of the Prime Minister	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62D:</b> ZANU-PF	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62E:</b> The police	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62F:</b> The churches (in general)	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62G:</b> Political parties (in general)	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62H:</b> Civil society	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62I:</b> The military	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62J:</b> International donor organisations	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62K:</b> The MDC-T	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62L:</b> The MDC-M	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62M:</b> Local government	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Q62N:</b> Traditional leaders	1	2	3	4	5	9

**Q63: Which organisation, or which type of organisation, which you rated in the previous question, do you feel can be trusted most to stand up for you and defend your interests? Only give your first choice.**

[Use question number above to code the answer]

.....

**Q64A: Have you seen any campaign activities, which focus on 2011 elections, by the political parties in the last few months?**

Yes	No	Not sure	DK/R
1	2	3	9

*[If "Yes" to Q64A, ask Q64B-C; if "No" go to Q65:]*

**Q64B: Have you personally been targeted or involved in such campaigning, or have you observed campaigning in the media or in the community? Please tell us of all forms that you have observed.**

*[Read and Note all categories that have been observed / experienced]*

I have been personally approached / engaged	1
I have seen party/parties operate in the community	2
I have seen campaign behaviour in the media	3
Other (specify) .....	4
N/A	7
DK/R	9

*[If 1-4 affirmed on Q64B, ask Q64C; if not, go to Q65:]*

**Q64C: For each of these types of campaign activities in the previous question, which political party/ies have you seen campaigning? Mention *all parties* that you have observed campaigning.**

	MDC-T	ZANU-PF	MDC-M	Other	DK/R
<b>Q64C(i):</b> I have been personally approached / targeted / involved by the following party/ies:	1	2	3	4	9
<b>Q64C(ii):</b> I have seen the following party/parties operate in the community where I live or work:	1	2	3	4	9
<b>Q64C(iii):</b> I have seen campaign behaviour in the media by the following parties:	1	2	3	4	9

**Q65: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. *[Probe for strength of opinion: Do you agree or agree very strongly?]***

1. On the day of elections Zimbabweans bury fear of violence and intimidation and go and vote.		2. Fear of violence and intimidation makes Zimbabweans stay away from the polls.	
Agree very strongly with 1 1	Agree with 1 2	Agree with 2 4	Agree very strongly with 2 5
Agree with neither			3
DK/Refuse <i>[Do not read]</i>			9

## Section 6: Demographic information

*[Read]* Finally, please tell me a just few things about yourself.

**Q66: *[Interviewer: What is the respondent's gender?]***

Male	1	Female	2
------	---	--------	---

**Q67: What is the highest level of education you have completed?** [Code from answer. *Do not read options*]

No formal schooling	00	Some secondary school	04	University completed	08
Informal schooling only	01	Secondary school completed	05	Post graduate	09
Some primary schooling	02	Post-secondary diploma	06	DK	99
Primary school completed	03	Some university	07		

**Q68A: Are you employed?**

Yes	1	No	2
-----	---	----	---

[If "Yes" to Q68A, ask Q68B & Q68C; if "No" go to Q68D:]

[For respondents who are employed:]

**Q68B: Are you employed part-time or full-time:** [Read first THREE options]

Full time	1	Part time	2	Both	3	N/A	7
-----------	---	-----------	---	------	---	-----	---

**Q68C: Are you employed in the formal sector, or informally?** [Read first THREE options]

Formal sector	1	Informal sector	2	Both	3	N/A	7
---------------	---	-----------------	---	------	---	-----	---

[For respondents who are unemployed:]

**Q68D: For how long have you been unemployed now?** [Do not read; code according to response]

I have never been employed	1
0-12 months / 1 year	2
13-24 months / 2 years	3
25-36 months / 3 years	4
More than 3 years	5
DK/Can't remember/R	9

**Q69: How often do you get news about matters of government and politics from the following media sources?** [Ask Q69A-D; Read options]

	Never	A few times a year	A few times a month	A few times a week	Every day	DK
<b>Q69A:</b> Radio	0	1	2	3	4	9
<b>Q69B:</b> Television	0	1	2	3	4	9
<b>Q69C:</b> Newspapers	0	1	2	3	4	9
<b>Q69D:</b> Internet news sites	0	1	2	3	4	9

**Q70: On which of these media do you most rely for news on politics and current affairs?**

[Ask Q70A-D; Do not read options; Code on response:]

**Q70A: Which radio station do you most commonly listen to for news on politics and current affairs?** [Do not read]

ZBC's Radio Zimbabwe	1
ZBC's Spot FM Urban	2
ZBC's Power FM	3
ZBC's National FM	4
VOA-Studio 7	5
Voice of the People	6
SW Radio Africa	7
Zimbabwe Community Radio SW	8
SABC radio	9
Other (specify) .....	10

DK/NS/R	99
NA	77

**Q70B: Which television station do you most commonly watch for news on politics and current affairs?** [*Do not read*]

ZBC-TV	SABC-TV (1,2,3)	ETV	Other (specify)	DK/NS/R	NA
1	2	3	4	9	77

**Q70C: Which newspaper do you most commonly use for news on politics and current affairs?**

[*Do not read*]

The Herald	1
The Chronicle	2
The Zimbabwe Independent	3
The NewsDay	4
The Standard	5
The Financial Gazette	6
The Zimbabwean	7
The Sunday Mail	8
The Sunday News	9
The Peoples Voice (ZPF)	10
The Prime Minister's Newsletter (MDC-T)	11
The Changing Times (MDC-T)	12
The Legal Monitor (ZLHR)	13
Other (specify) .....	14
DK/NS/R	99
NA	77

**Q70D: Which internet news sites do you most commonly use for news on politics and current affairs?**

[*Do not read*]

Zimonline	NewZimbabwe.com	Zimdaily.com	Zimbabwe Situation.com	DK/NS/R	Other	NA
1	2	3	4	9	5	77

Specify other .....

**Q71: About this news source that you said you mostly use for your news on politics and current affairs, do you trust the news that you receive from this source?** [*Q71 is directly linked to Q70; [Ask Q71A-D:] [Read options]*]

	Strongly trust it	Trust it	Neither trust nor distrust it	Distrust it	Strongly distrust it	DK	NA
<b>Q71A:</b> Radio station mostly used [ <i>Repeat answer to Q70A</i> ] - How much do you trust it?	0	1	2	3	4	9	77
<b>Q71B:</b> Television station mostly used [ <i>Repeat answer to Q70B</i> ] - How much do you trust it?	0	1	2	3	4	9	77
<b>Q71C:</b> Newspaper mostly used [ <i>Repeat answer to Q70C</i> ] - How much do you trust it?	0	1	2	3	4	9	77
<b>Q71D:</b> Internet news source mostly used [ <i>Repeat answer to Q70D</i> ] - How much do you trust it?	0	1	2	3	4	9	77

**Q72A: How often do you use a cell phone?**

Never	A few times a year	A few times a month	A few times a week	Every day	DK
0	1	2	3	4	9

*[If 'Never' on Q72A, go to Q72C:]*

**Q72B: Which of the following do you use your cell phone for?**

*[Read; Ask for all relevant options]*

Telephone calls	1
Text messaging	2
Other (specify) .....	3
N/A	7
DK/NS/R	9

**Q72C: How often do you use a computer?**

Never	A few times a year	A few times a month	A few times a week	Every day	DK
0	1	2	3	4	9

*[If 'Never' on Q72C, go to Q73:]*

**Q72D: Which of the following do you use the computer for?**

*[Read; Ask for all relevant options]*

Document writing	1
Email messaging	2
Internet information gathering	3
R/DK	9
Other (specify) .....	5

**Q73: I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member?**

*[Ask Q73A-C; Read options]*

	Not a member	Inactive member	Active member	Official leader	DK
<b>Q73A:</b> A religious group	0	1	2	3	9
<b>Q73B:</b> A voluntary or community group	0	1	2	3	9
<b>Q73C:</b> A political party	0	1	2	3	9

**Q74: What is your religion, if any?**

*[Code from answer; Do not read options]*

**CHRISTIAN GROUPS / DENOMINATIONS**

Christian only (i.e., respondents says only "Christian", without identifying a specific sub-group)	1
Roman Catholic	2
Orthodox	3
Coptic	4
<b>Protestant - Mainline</b>	
Anglican	5

Lutheran	6
Methodist	7
Presbyterian	8
Baptist	9
Quaker / Friends	10
Mennonite	11
<b>Protestant – Non-mainline</b>	
Evangelical	12
Pentecostal (e.g., “Born Again” and/or “Saved”)	13
Independent (e.g., “Mapostori”)	14
<b>Others</b>	
Jehovah’s Witness	15
Seventh Day Adventist	16
Mormon	17
<b>MUSLIM GROUPS / DENOMINATIONS</b>	
Muslim only (i.e., respondents says only “Muslim”, without identifying a specific sub-group)	18
<b>Sunni</b>	
Sunni only (i.e., respondents says only “Sunni” or “Sunni Muslim”, without identifying a specific sub-group)	19
Ismaeli	20
Mouridiya Brotherhood	21
Tijaniya Brotherhood	22
Qadiriya Brotherhood	23
<b>Shia</b>	
Shia only (i.e., respondents says only “Shia” or “Shia Muslim”, without identifying a specific sub-group)	24
<b>OTHER</b>	
Traditional / ethnic religion	25
Hindu	26
Bahai	27
<b>NON-BELIEVERS</b>	
None	28
Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God)	29
Atheist (Do not believe in a God)	30
Other	31
Refused	98
Don’t know	99

**Q75: How interested are you in public affairs?**

[Prompt if necessary: *You know, in politics and government? Read options*]

Not at all interested	Not very interested	Somewhat interested	Very interested	DK
0	1	2	3	9

**Q76: When you get together with your friends or family, how often do you discuss political matters?**

Never	Sometimes	Often	DK
0	1	2	9

**Q77: What is your ethnic group?**

Ndebele	01	Karanga	05	Kalanga	09
Shona	02	Manyika	06	Tonga	10



ZeZuru	03	Ndau	07	Zimbabwean only	11
Korekore	04	Venda	08	Refused to answer	98
DK					99
<b>Others (specify).....</b>					(PC)

## Section 7: The 'Vote'

**Q78. If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?**

*[DO NOT read options. Code from response]*

MDC-T	1
ZANU-PF	2
MDC-M	3
Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD)	4
ZAPU-Dabengwa	5
MDC-99	6
Would not vote	8
My vote is secret	9
R	10
DK/NS	11
Other (specify).....	7

**Q79. Finally, do you think interviews about these and other issues are important?**

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	99

**Thank you very much. Your answers have been very helpful. Please remember that we do not represent any political party and that your answers are confidential.**

**END TIME (24 HOURS): .....**