

**Is the “New Terrorism” Really New?
An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism**

Originally published in
The Journal of Conflict Studies, Winter 2001, Vol. XXI, No. 2
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Until September 11, 2001, the symbol of American economic power – the World Trade Center – stood within sight of the symbol of American freedom – the Statue of Liberty. That day four U.S. commercial airliners were hijacked by terrorists and turned into flying bombs; two brought down the towers of the World Trade Center, another crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Although the death toll was significantly reduced from initial estimates in the tens of thousands, more than 6,000 people lost their lives in the attacks. The most horrendous terrorist attack in history literally came out of the clear blue sky.

Facing the Fearful Future

In the 21st century, the United States and other advanced countries face a growing – and fundamentally different – threat from terrorism, a threat aimed not only at undermining the stable system of peace and prosperity we currently enjoy but at destroying countries, cultures, or all of humanity. At least, this is what we are being told, and in the immediate shock following the events of September 11, it is easy to believe. Scholars and government analysts have begun in the past few years to articulate a new paradigm for terrorism that includes different actors, actions, motivations, tactics, and outcomes from the “old” paradigm of political terrorism of the mid-20th century. This new paradigm has been outlined by experts appearing on television, in recent articles and books on terrorism such as *The New Terrorism*, *The New Jackals*, and *Countering the New Terrorism*, and at conferences for policy analysts and security specialists.¹

Some of the best-known analysts of terrorism have stated the case for the new paradigm in fairly strong terms. Bruce Hoffman, Director of the RAND Corporation’s Washington Office, states that the new terrorism “represents a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the more familiar, ‘traditional’ terrorist groups” and that this “shatters some of our most basic assumptions about terrorists.” He makes the implications clear, “[N]othing less than a sea-change in our thinking about terrorism and the policies required to counter it will be required.”² Veteran terrorism expert Walter Laqueur, Co-Chair of the International Research Council at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, suggests that “new definitions and new terms may have to be developed for new realities.”³ He argues further that “there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism.”⁴ Ian Lesser, also of RAND, suggests that the new terrorism “renders much previous analysis of terrorism based on established groups obsolete...”⁵

Interestingly, authors often stake out a firm position on the newest trend in terrorism, then hedge by noting that current trends nevertheless will continue to predominate into the next century.⁶ Their caution is supported by Brian Jenkins, who counsels:

“The analysis of ‘dream threats’ is filled with pitfalls. It is easy to begin by identifying vulnerabilities... positing theoretical adversaries... then reifying the threat – a subtle shift of verbs from *could* to *may* happen. ... The danger arises when speculation becomes the basis for launching costly efforts to prevent ‘what ifs,’ or worse, when policymakers believe that highly publicized preventive or mitigation efforts will deter such adversaries.”⁷

As U.S. policy makers determine how to allocate more than \$40 billion in response to the recent attack, and consider new directions and priorities in government counter-terrorism policy, it is worth evaluating (a) whether the evidence exists to move entirely to this new paradigm, and (b) whether the paradigm is simply a U.S. problem frame (with correlated institutional incentives, and mission and funding priorities) or a genuinely different pattern of terrorism with global implications. The General Accounting Office has cautioned that because there is a lack of consensus on terrorism,

“some fundamental questions should be answered before the federal government builds and expands programs, plans, and strategies to deal with the threat... It seems to us that,

without such an assessment or analysis and consensus in the policy-making community, it would be very difficult – maybe impossible – to properly shape programs and focus resources.”⁸

The thesis of this paper is that although there are some important recent developments in terrorism, they primarily reflect older trends in terrorism which never really went away but which had been ignored or submerged during the height of political terrorism in the 1970’s and 80’s. The impetus to move to the new paradigm comes not only from a legitimate desire on the part of policy makers and bureaucrats to be prepared for new threats to international security, but from institutional incentives that are sharpened when a “new” threat emerges. Policy recommendations based on the new paradigm need not be dismissed, but should be placed in historical perspective and considered with some degree of skepticism.

The Other “HDTV” – How to Define Terrorist Violence?

Nearly every book and article on terrorism includes a requisite discussion of the definitions of terrorism, yet there is little consensus on an appropriate definition of the phenomenon. According to one author, there are at least 212 different definitions of terrorism in use worldwide, ninety of them used by governments and other well-established organizations.⁹ Laqueur suggests that “there has been no ‘terrorism’ per se, only different terrorisms.”¹⁰ In a survey of definitions in use by over a hundred terrorism experts, Alex Schmid found that: terrorism is an abstract concept with no real essence; all the possible uses of the term cannot be encapsulated in a single definition; and that the meaning of terrorism is usually derived from the victim or the target.¹¹ That is, if one identifies with the victim or the target of the act, then the act is considered terrorism; whereas if one identifies with the actor, the act is not terrorism, although perhaps regrettable.¹² This dilemma is summarized in the popular canard, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” which ignores the fundamental differences between terrorism and the legitimate and regulated uses of violence.

The task of defining terrorism is made more difficult thanks to two factors. First, because “terrorism” is a pejorative term, most terrorist groups do not like to call themselves such. Instead they use names for their groups that stress freedom and liberation, armies or military structures, self-defense, righteous vengeance, or poetic neutrality (e.g., The Shining Path). Second, these obfuscations are accepted and employed by the Western news media, which often bends over backwards to avoid the appearance of partiality in describing terrorists – they write of guerrillas, freedom fighters, gunmen, separatists, ‘urban’ guerrillas, or commandos.¹³ This is not just a trend of bygone days of media affinity for leftists; many news stories equate terrorists with guerrillas,¹⁴ blurring the distinction between guerrillas who operate in the open as units, seize territory, and seek political control, versus terrorists who do none of those three things.¹⁵

This misleading labeling, combined with the institutional imperatives of organizations involved in studying or combating terrorism, has created a situation where there is no widely accepted definition of terrorism. However, Hoffman provides some clarity and a useful definition that will be adopted in this essay. In distinguishing terrorism from other types of crime, he concludes that terrorism is:

- “ineluctably political in aims and motives;
- violent – or, equally important, threatens violence;
- designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;
- conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and
- perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.”¹⁶

Based on these characteristics, he defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”¹⁷

The Era of Political Terrorism

Terrorism has waxed and waned over the centuries, from the zealots of first century Palestine to the Irgun and Stern gangs of the 1940’s, from the Assassins of the 11th-13th centuries to Carlos the Jackal, from Guy Fawkes to Timothy McVeigh. The era of international political terrorism began with a series of skyjacking incidents in 1968 prompted by the previous year’s Arab-Israeli war. These were followed in 1970 by the hijacking and destruction of several jets at Dawson’s Field in Jordan, and in 1972 by the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. This period marked the transition – from the national to the global stage – of terrorism in support of left-wing and ethno-nationalist causes.¹⁸ With the end of the Cold War and developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, analysts now look back on the 1970’s and 80’s as the “old” paradigm of terrorism.

The “old” terrorists were generally motivated by left-wing ideologies (i.e., Marxism) or ethno-nationalism and separatism (e.g., Irish, Basque, and Palestinian). The goal of Marxist terrorist groups was to use violence to politicize the masses and incite them to revolt against the capitalist system. Ethno-nationalist separatists wanted either independence for their ethnic group or merger with another state, often using a long-term strategy of violence meant to force the “foreign” government out of a given country (such as the British out of Palestine and Ireland). Whether Marxist or nationalist, these groups were also predominantly secular in orientation.

The specific demands made by the “old” terrorists were often negotiable – they wanted the release of certain jailed comrades, or payment for the release of hostages. Even where the demands would have been difficult to meet (such as the reunification of a divided country, the reestablishment of an ethno-national homeland, or fundamental changes in the capitalist system), they were usually stated publicly in relatively clear and understandable terms, and there seemed to be room for dialogue or negotiation in many circumstances.

Terrorists wanted maximum publicity for their acts, playing for an audience and soliciting audience participation, in order to communicate their ideological message.¹⁹ “Terrorism is theater,” stated Brian Jenkins in 1974, pointing out that terrorist attacks were often choreographed for the media.²⁰ An attack was nearly always followed by a communique taking credit for the act, laying out demands, or explaining why it was carried out against that particular target (and in the case of accidental deaths, terrorists became spin-doctors, expressing sorrow for the deaths). The media obliged the terrorists with constant coverage and friendly reportage of their demands, validating terrorism as a tactic.²¹

The violence that they perpetrated, and the publicity they craved, were key facets of the terrorists’ broader strategy of building power to force political change. Hoffman explains how their application of violence was meant to achieve a series of objectives:

- *Attention.* Focus attention on themselves and their cause through dramatic violence.
- *Acknowledgement.* Translate that attention into acknowledgement (maybe even sympathy and support) of the cause.
- *Recognition.* Turn these into a recognition of their rights (the cause) and of their organization as the true spokesman for the cause or constituency they represent.
- *Authority.* Move from recognition to actual power and authority to make the changes in society or government that are the basis for the struggle.
- *Governance.* Consolidate direct and complete control over the state, homeland, or the population.²²

Hoffman points out that although few terrorist groups attained more than the first three of these objectives (it might be argued that the IRA and PLO have now gained the first four), governance was still the ultimate goal of all terrorist groups.²³

Nation-states were important sponsors of old-style terrorism. Within the Cold War framework, terrorists often became proxies for both superpowers and middle powers intent on forcing political change without going to war. Arguments that the USSR was behind a global terrorism conspiracy may have been overstated, but the KGB certainly had a large role in training, supplying, and supporting a number of active terrorist organizations.²⁴ Among middle powers, Iran and Libya may have been the most active supporters of terrorism, but they were joined by Iraq, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea.

The "old" terrorists had other distinguishing characteristics. Their organizations had fairly well-defined command and control structures; even their cells were connected to one another. Terrorist groups were small, ranging from 20 to 30 hardcore members to at most five hundred.²⁵ They had professional training in terrorist tactics (often with the help of state sponsors) and were permanently engaged in conspiracy and planning for terrorist attacks. The PLO, IRA, and ETA were typical of this type, and they usually were selective in their choice of highly symbolic targets and individuals who represented the source of their political hostility.²⁶

Selective targeting and mostly discriminate violence were carried out with generally conservative tactics. Terrorists were interested in successful missions, and hand-held guns and machine guns, as well as bombs, proved time and again to be effective.²⁷ When governments began to respond more effectively to airplane hijackings, terrorists reverted to more traditional tactics. They showed little interest in innovative tactics or non-conventional weapons (such as weapons of mass destruction [WMD]) for a number of practical, technical, and moral reasons,²⁸ and in part because it was unnecessary to kill very many people to get the attention they wanted.²⁹ Additionally, these attacks generally took place within a self-proclaimed operational area that included both proximate regional targets and international centers. Although groups occasionally took action outside of their normal target areas (e.g., Palestinians in Europe, the IRA in Germany), only rarely did international terrorism spill over outside of Europe and the Middle East.³⁰

The New Terrorism

Although it is difficult to pinpoint when one trend ceases and a new one begins, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinrikyo cult might be taken as the inaugurating events for the new paradigm of terrorism. Broadly stated, the new paradigm holds that modern terrorism has different motives, different actors, different sponsors, and greater lethality than the traditional terrorism described above.

Laqueur argues that the motives of the new terrorists are shifting. Terrorism from the left is declining; Paul Wilkinson posits that the extreme left ideological motivation for terrorism has almost disappeared in Europe, although it is surviving in Latin America.³¹ Terrorism is rising from the right (such as white supremacists in Europe and North America), and nationalist-separatist terrorism continues in many places. In fact, ethno-nationalist terrorist groups may have more staying power than the others, because they can draw on a naturally sympathetic constituency and have relatively clear and tangible goals.³² Whereas the "old" terrorist groups were primarily secular in their orientation and inspiration, terrorism connected to religious fanaticism is on the rise (not only in Islam, but also in Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism).³³ Hoffman declares that (fanatical) religious motivation is the defining characteristic of the modern terrorist, producing "radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and world-view... compared with his secular counterpart."³⁴

Radically different value systems are not only a result of the shift to religious motivation. Laqueur argues that "the new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population."³⁵ This may entail the liquidation of a country or an entire ethnic group, and perhaps even all of humankind. Shoko Asahara,

leader of Aum Shinrikyo, apparently believed that his group needed to provoke Armageddon, and many white supremacist groups have as a goal the elimination of all non-Aryan people. The thirst for anarchy and destruction is found not only in doomsday cults and racist paramilitaries, but also in the large-scale terrorism and popular rage – disconnected from a clear political agenda – observed in Algeria, Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia.³⁶

It is the anarchist and nihilist groups that pose perhaps the greatest challenge to government action, because their strategy is non-sequential and non-political and their demands are non-negotiable, if they make any demands at all. New terrorists still demonstrate an interest in notoriety or celebrity, but generally show less interest in “theater” as a part of their political strategy – though it must be acknowledged that the September 11th attacks were highly symbolic and hauntingly theatrical. Some of the largest recent terrorist attacks have gone unclaimed,³⁷ a trend which Hoffman asserts is a signal of loosening constraints on violence.³⁸ When the new terrorists do communicate their objectives, they are often unintelligible.³⁹ The new non-negotiability may also be due to a learning process on the part of terrorists. They have largely given up on “traditional” airplane hijackings and the associated protracted negotiations in part because of governments’ more forceful reactions to resolve those crises, and they must have observed what fate befell the terrorists who took hostages at the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru in 1996.

A third type of terrorist motivation which seems to be emerging is what Laqueur calls “exotic” – the ideology comes from outside (e.g., Maoism in Peru), or the terrorists are concerned with but a single issue, such as ecology, animal liberation, or opposition to abortion.⁴⁰ What unites the single-issue groups from different points on the political spectrum is their willingness to use terroristic violence to correct what are perceived to be urgent wrongs. They certainly seek attention, acknowledgement, and recognition for their causes, but they are less likely to seek authority and governance because those processes take too long when the emergency (the threat to nature, endangered species, or the unborn) is immediate and clear. The FBI reports that for the first time ever, in 1999, radical groups like the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) were responsible for more terrorist attacks in the U.S. than any other type of organization.⁴¹

State sponsorship is still an important factor in the new terrorism, but the rise of globalization and the mobility of people and money create opportunities for terrorists to diversify their income sources through criminal enterprise. Terrorists are no longer able to depend on the superpowers to sponsor them as proxies, but have found new wealth in crime. For example, a number of Tamils arrested in Western Europe and the U.S. have been engaged in drug trafficking.⁴² Some terrorist groups are cooperating with transnational criminal organizations, either trading with or providing protection for them, such as the Shining Path with Peruvian drug traffickers and FARC and M-19 with Colombian drug cartels.⁴³ State sponsorship continues, particularly from Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, although they may provide safe harbor more than funds and training.

The new terrorism also exhibits characteristics that contrast with traditional terrorism. First, terrorist groups are more likely to form networks, rather than hierarchies or cells; this is particularly true of the groups emerging from decentralized radical Islamic movements organized around charismatic clerics.⁴⁴ These networks are transnational, amorphous, and diffuse, permitting the groups to engage in a wider range of activities, to consider new strategies like netwar,⁴⁵ and to come together for one-time operations like September 11th. Second, new terrorist groups are much larger in size than their predecessors. Whereas the Abu Nidal Organization may have had four or five hundred members, Osama Bin Laden reportedly has between four and five thousand trained men at his call.⁴⁶ Third, they are more likely to include amateurs, “part-time” terrorists who do not have professional training but who can access the resources and methods of terrorism through informal (often Internet-based) sources – and who therefore can be as deadly as professionals.⁴⁷

With these large, networked, amateur organizations, target and tactics selection are more indiscriminate. New terrorist attacks exhibit greater lethality; a higher percentage of attacks in the 1990’s re-

sulted in one or more fatalities than in any previous decade.⁴⁸ Hoffman cites a number of reasons for the increasing lethality:

- The desensitization of the media and the public to terrorist violence leads terrorists to attempt ever more dramatic or destructive attacks to get the attention they seek.
- Terrorists have learned from the past and improved their tactics and weapons.
- State sponsorship continues to provide terrorists with training, logistics, and the resources needed to buy new and deadlier weapons.
- Religiously-motivated terrorists find violence to be a divine duty, and seek religious justifications for committing violence against a broad range of opponents (anyone who opposes their faith).
- Amateurs are difficult to track and anticipate and have no central authority to put constraints on their behavior.
- The truly professional terrorists are becoming more sophisticated and competent.⁴⁹

Perhaps the greatest danger in this increased lethality is the likelihood that new terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction. The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack is the only well-known incident of chemical weapon use, and there have been no nuclear attacks thus far, although there have been a larger number of incidents and attempts at using biological agents. The relative scarcity of WMD attacks in the past has been attributed to a lack of technical expertise by terrorists,⁵⁰ to the fact that mass casualties would hurt rather than help their political agenda,⁵¹ or to the notion that causing mass casualties is simply “out of character” for terrorists.⁵² Hoffman is not sanguine about the new threat, cautioning that “many of the constraints (both self-imposed and technical) which previously inhibited terrorist use of WMD are eroding.”⁵³ He finds support from the authors of a number of popular new hardcover books focused on the threat of WMD terrorism, written by terrorism experts, journalists, and government experts.⁵⁴ The threat of mass destruction (or mass *casualty*) by terrorists is a fundamental part of the new paradigm.

In sum, the proponents of the new paradigm see a major change in the motives, strategies, characteristics, and tactics of terrorism. These changes have all occurred in an evolving international environment. Stephen Sloan argues that the end of the Cold War and the demise of many communist governments have unmasked old ethnic and religious conflicts (often accompanied by terrorism and other forms of violence). The end of the bipolar system and the superpowers’ use of regional surrogates as proxies have allowed the emergence of a number of regional powers, such as Iran, which see terrorism as a tool of diplomacy. Other new non-state actors, particularly in organized crime, are stepping in to fill the void left by the breakdown of central authority in many less developed countries and the decline in the legitimacy, power, and authority of the nation-state. Sloan asserts that the disappearance of Marxism as a viable political theory has changed the motivations of many left-wing groups,⁵⁵ but Hoffman counters that the number of Marxist (and Leninist and Maoist) terrorist groups has not changed since the end of the Cold War.⁵⁶ Finally, interventions by the United States, its presence overseas, the predominance of its military power,⁵⁷ and Western culture more generally have incited new animosity from fundamentalists, particularly in the Middle East. Osama Bin Laden has stated clearly that the American presence on the Saudi peninsula is the cause for his terrorist campaign.⁵⁸

Out with the Old, In with the New?

Despite the compelling images and details of the September 11th attack, there are logical and empirical reasons for questioning a shift to the new paradigm of terrorism, illustrated by an analysis of the key features of the new paradigm.

Motivation. Proponents of the new paradigm argue that terrorist motivations are shifting, and are most alarmed by the growth of religious fundamentalism. However, Hoffman himself points out the strong historical ties between religion and terrorism – in fact, from the first century zealots to the 13th century assassins and even up to the 19th century, religion offered the only justification for terroristic vio-

lence. The emergence in the nineteenth century of nationalism, new ideas of citizenship, and new radical philosophies such as Marxism led to a secularization of terrorism, a process accelerated by the anti-colonial battles of the mid-twentieth century.⁵⁹ Most authoritarian and totalitarian governments of the 20th century were ruthless in their persecution of religion, forcing it underground although not eliminating it successfully. At the same time, Western culture in general has become far more secular and less attuned to religious motivations. So it is fitting – though unfortunate – that Western analysts are surprised by the reassertion of vigorous and intense religious motivations for terrorist action (“holy war”).

These authors are also concerned about the related rise of millenarianism, anarchism, and nihilism. Certainly the coming of the millennium brought into the public spotlight a number of unusual cults and sects that believe the end is near. Yet similar apocalyptic predictions (as well as intentions and some actions) about the end of the world or Armageddon have been made by religious or cult figures for centuries. Laqueur points out that although modern anarchists have fewer compunctions about indiscriminate violence than their predecessors, their origins are in the anarchist “movement” of the late 19th century – *The Anarchist Cookbook* published in the 1960’s was inspired by a book written in the late 1800’s by Johann Most, a former worker in an ammunition factory, outlining his philosophy of revolutionary warfare.⁶⁰ Again, as with religious motivation, it seems that what we are witnessing is a reemergence of an older historical trend in terrorism. However, it is fair to suggest that the rage and despair seen in the recent rash of office, church, and school mass murders in the United States is a sign of a growing fascination with nihilism on the part of young, educated, middle class males (often characteristic traits of terrorists).

The decline of Marxism that coincided with the end of the Cold War is also given credit for changing terrorist motivations. Although Hoffman argues that the number of Marxist-oriented terrorist groups remains unchanged, significantly, he is writing about the *number* of groups – not the level of their motivation.⁶¹ The Marxist philosophy of left-wing terrorism of the 1960’s and 70’s was overstated – groups labeled themselves Marxist and were accepted as such, but the ideological language was often a cover for their real motivations. In the late 1980’s the decline of leftist ideologies coincided with, though was not caused by, the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the impetus for terrorism shifted from the progressive and liberating (and thus “justifiable”) left wing to the destructive and reactionary (un-justifiable) right wing.⁶² It seems then that the true believers have mostly faded away, and that the ideological language of the other Marxist terrorists in the era of political terrorism masked their true underlying ethno-nationalist or religious motivations.⁶³

Strategic Objectives. Most modern terrorists remain interested in getting attention and acknowledgement for their cause, although their audience is often *internal* – for example, within the white supremacist community, or a particular religious or ethnic group. They do not need to make public statements taking credit for an attack because their constituency is already aware of the actors and their cause. Alternatively, they may want to avoid public scrutiny of their group (which risks bringing down the authorities on them) while hoping the public will notice the act of terrorism and find in it a spark for the crisis (revolution or Armageddon) desired by the terrorists. For example, Timothy McVeigh hoped to instigate a rebellion in the United States with his bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma City, and Shoko Asahara hoped to spark a war between Japan and America with the sarin gas attack in 1995. The pattern of strategic objectives pursued by new terrorists thus looks like a continuation of Hoffman’s model of old terrorism, albeit with some groups opting out of the last two steps.

State Sponsorship. The new paradigm suggests both that terrorists are changing the source of their financing to organized crime and private financiers (such as Bin Laden), and at the same time that state sponsorship remains vital.⁶⁴ Whatever the source, massive amounts of money presumably will be needed for terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Yet private and criminal funding are as difficult to trace as state funding; in fact, perhaps funding from transnational organized crime – because of its symbiotic relationship with many governments – is merely a variation on state sponsorship. Is the move toward alternative financing simply the substitution of one source for another, or is there an overall increase in

funding for terrorism (adding together money from all three sources)? Estimates of the real finances of organized crime and terrorists are guesses at best from open sources, so caution is in order when attempting to determine the level of state support for terrorism.

Organizational Doctrine. There is a strong case for the argument that networking and amateurization are the wave of the future in terrorism. Many of the worst terrorist attacks in recent history – the bombings in Oklahoma City, the World Trade Center (1993), and the U.S. embassies in Africa – allegedly were conducted by individuals who were not full-time, well-trained terrorists, were not part of larger, established terrorist organizations, or who had come together primarily for the execution of the single act. The September 11th hijackers were not amateurs in the traditional sense – apparently a large number of them were relatively skilled pilots – but they were not full-time terrorists who intended to live and fight another day.

The success of law enforcement agencies in tracking down the culprits in the first three cases was not due to infiltration of the organizations or other traditional tactics but to blunders by the terrorists and a bit of luck. McVeigh was picked up on a routine traffic stop for missing license tags on his car, the World Trade Center bombers were caught when one tried to get back his deposit on the rental truck used in the attack, and the link to Bin Laden was made when a Pakistani immigration official caught a Palestinian man arriving from Kenya with a false passport on the day of the attack.⁶⁵ Law enforcement is not well-organized or prepared for the fluid, ad hoc conglomerations of terrorists already in evidence, yet there are still many groups organized along more traditional lines which may be vulnerable to traditional surveillance and counter-terrorism tactics.

Tactics and Technology. Although proponents of the new paradigm suggest that terrorists will continue to use tried-and-true tactics, they also assert that WMD technology proliferation and the availability of terrorist information on the Internet are dangerous new trends. The availability of information is arguably nothing new; advice on bomb-making and terror tactics has been available in newsletters and handbooks since at least the turn of the 20th century. However, the widespread and long-lasting effects of the indiscriminate use of WMD do pose a significant and serious threat to humanity – even if the probability of such an act is low. The increased likelihood of WMD terrorism thanks to the availability of technology and to fanatical motivations (whether religious or nihilist) is perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the new paradigm, although the danger of focusing policy on “what-ifs” has been noted.⁶⁶ Indeed the U.S. General Accounting Office argues strongly against overstating the threat of WMD terrorism because terrorists face enormous challenges in utilizing WMD.⁶⁷

Recent Incidents. The new paradigm is based on the evidence of several recent terrorist attacks. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing brought terrorism home to American soil, but the home-grown, right wing terrorism of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was perhaps even more of an eye-opener for a public which had always assumed that terrorism was only imported. However, Americans had witnessed various forms of domestic terrorism – bombings, lynchings, kidnappings, assassinations – for decades, and had seen quite lethal attacks on American citizens before (such as the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut). The events were shocking, but they were not a new phenomenon to Americans in most respects, and certainly were not new to the millions of people who live in countries visited by terrorism.

The threshold of WMD attacks was purportedly crossed in the 1995 Tokyo subway attack.⁶⁸ Yet biological warfare has been in existence for centuries, and there is evidence that there have been plans and attempts by terrorists to use WMD for several decades, although none except Aum Shinrikyo have been successful.⁶⁹ Hoffman, citing the RAND-St. Andrew’s University *Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents since 1968*, states that of 8,000 incidents tracked in the database, fewer than sixty involved plans or attempts to use WMD. However, the fact that there have been as many as sixty events indicates that perhaps the “psychological threshold” of WMD use had been crossed prior to 1995,⁷⁰ if not on such a large scale.

Hoffman also contends that the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were a watershed moment for the new terrorism: first, the bombers inflicted random, widespread casualties rather than striking directly and in a limited way at the citizens of the enemy state; second, the bombings occurred in Africa, which is outside the normal area of terrorist operations and where states generally are not well prepared to deal with terrorism; third, the bombings were believed to be the work of Osama Bin Laden, not a pre-existing, identifiable terrorist organization; fourth, the bombings have not been clearly claimed; and fifth, the bombers apparently were organized only on an ad hoc basis.⁷¹ However, this seems to ignore the indiscriminate nature of many terrorist attacks (airplane bombings, for example), the already-present volume of African terrorism (witnessed in Algeria, Egypt, Burundi, and South Africa, among others), and the number of terrorist incidents that regularly go unclaimed. Interestingly, the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen – reputedly also the handiwork of Bin Laden – was targeted at U.S. military personnel, in the Middle East, with a conventional bomb.

Similarly, although one must acknowledge that the astonishing number of casualties from the recent attack on New York and Washington would be predicted by the new terrorism paradigm, there are a number of older trends evident in the September 11th attack. The terrorists used an old-fashioned, low-tech approach by hijacking commercial airliners, carried out with simple weapons like knives and box cutters. Their targets were highly symbolic – the World Trade Center and the Pentagon – and they had planned to hit other symbols like the White House or the U.S. Capitol building. Early indications suggest that Bin Laden's group received not only state sponsorship in the form of safe haven from Afghanistan, but perhaps intelligence information, funding, and false documents from Iraq.

The logical and empirical reasons for questioning a shift to the new paradigm of terrorism are clear. Contrary to the theorists, it seems that the motivations of known terrorist groups have not changed substantially; religious fanaticism and anarchism are powerful but not new. Indeed, Paul Wilkinson points out that “the underlying causes of the bitter ethnic and religious struggles which spawn terrorism pre-dated the Cold War, and most of these conflicts remain unresolved.” Even those terrorist groups whose strategic objectives do not include national governance still pursue attention and acknowledgment, although sometimes this is for internal audiences rather than external. It is difficult to put a finger on terrorists' state sponsors, as well as private financiers or organized crime groups, at least based on unclassified sources. Although the emerging network-based organizations bear watching, there are still many terrorist organizations that fit the traditional mold and may be susceptible to existing counter-terrorism tactics. And finally, the most tragic terrorist incidents of the 1990's do not seem to provide sufficient support for the new paradigm. It remains to be seen from the evidence collected after the September 11th attacks whether it is the archetype of the new paradigm or a one-time aberration from the older trends.

U.S. Problem Frame vs. Global Phenomenon

If the new paradigm is not well supported, there must be some other basis for its apparent acceptance. The basis may be found in the institutional impact of adopting the new paradigm. The degree to which the new paradigm is accepted will greatly influence the direction and funding of the global campaign against terrorism, particularly in the United States. Key proponents of the paradigm include the analysts at places like the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the RAND Corporation (home to Laqueur and Hoffman respectively), who influence both mid-level bureaucrats (at CIA, State, and DOD, whose job it is to defend against terrorism), and the policy makers who decide how to spend the government's counter-terrorism money.

The contrasting paradigms have tremendous implications for funding decisions and the various institutions involved in fighting terrorism which use those funds. If we believe the old paradigm, then we are likely to see a continuation of bombings, state sponsors, sequential and negotiable political motives, and low risk of WMD. This fits with the needs of several kinds of organizations. First are those which deal primarily with nation-states, sanctions, and diplomatic negotiations (the U.S. State Department and

international organizations). Second are organizations that are essentially reactive in nature – law enforcement (Justice Department and the FBI), emergency responders who need training and equipment (the National Guard, and state and local emergency services), and public health providers (such as the Department of Health and Human Services, and the World Health Organization). Third are those institutions that are not well-tuned to dealing with new problems or rapidly-developing crises (such as major multilateral organizations like the G-7 and the United Nations).

Many of these institutions have mixed incentives. On one hand, they may wish to resist the move to the new paradigm because the shift may force a painful change in their organizational mission or reduce their funding; on the other, they may find a way to capture the new paradigm and make it their own – i.e., to turn it into effective budget requests. The FBI, for example, cites the “new trend in terrorism... of less frequent but more destructive attacks” and uses the language of national security – not law enforcement – to support a range of new counter-terrorism programs.⁷² The Office of Justice Programs in DOJ saw an increase in funding for state and local domestic preparedness programs from zero in FY1997 to roughly \$135 million in FY2000 for national training centers and programs for first responders.⁷³ Funding for HHS for its “bioterrorism initiative” increased from \$7 million in 1996 to more than \$200 million by 2000.⁷⁴ Not about to be left behind, the National Guard created Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams to respond to biological or chemical attacks, despite the fact that there are more than 600 existing state and local hazmat response teams capable of responding to terrorist incidents. The first ten RAID teams were established in 1999 at a cost of \$52 million, with another \$38 million requested the following year to set up five more.⁷⁵

If we believe the new paradigm, we are more likely to see new motivations and heretofore undiscovered actors, new technologies such as lasers and non-lethal weapons, new tactics such as cyberwar, and a much greater chance of WMD attacks. The new paradigm fits with the imperatives and goals of three other types of institutions. First are the proactive institutions that must somehow predict or preempt terrorist attacks, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Second are those whose missions are most closely related to the new threats, particularly the high-technology side – like the Air Force and DARPA, who will be asked to devise new technical solutions. Third is a different set of reactive organizations, emergency responders that would be called upon to respond to a massively destructive attack (such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the State Department’s Foreign Emergency Support Team).⁷⁶ These organizations have obvious incentives to make the shift to the new terrorism paradigm because it offers opportunities for expanded missions and increased funding. In fact, the Pentagon’s FY2000 budget for counter-terrorism was about \$4.5 billion (plus another \$2.3 billion for personnel costs associated with counter-terrorism and force protection), and the State Department’s was over \$500 million; together they comprised more than half of the \$10 billion spent in 2000.⁷⁷

As the counter-terrorism “pie” has gotten bigger – from \$5.7 billion in 1996 to \$10 billion in 2000 to roughly \$11 billion in 2001⁷⁸ – U.S. government agencies (over 40 of them at last count)⁷⁹ have found greater incentive to hype the new terrorist threat. The infusion of an additional \$40 billion in response to the September attack, with the promise of more funding to come, will only sharpen the incentive. Analysts and authors who wish to be accepted by this part of the policy community therefore are motivated to articulate and advocate the new paradigm. This is not to suggest by any means that they are engaging in some kind of intellectual dishonesty, but a confluence between the findings of social scientists or policy analysts and the imperatives of the institution funding their research is not unusual.

To be fair, it is not only potential government contractors who wish to influence funding decisions. Schweitzer boldly offers that “we need a long-term strategy to counter terrorism in its many new forms... with a U.S. commitment *on a level that rivals our expenditures to ensure we did not lose the Cold War*” (emphasis added).⁸⁰ Prior to September 11th, the idea of spending tens of billions of dollars a year would have seemed alarmist, but since that date it seems to be the universal expectation in the United States.

The attack on New York and Washington brought forth a global outcry, and immediate pleas for a global response. President Bush moved quickly to define the threat of terrorism in global terms, supported by other world leaders such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair (“This was in a very real sense an attack on all of us.... We must stand united in response.”) and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien (“The world has been attacked. The world must respond.”).⁸¹ But the notion that “this could happen anywhere,” while appealing, is simply not true. It is unlikely that such attacks would occur except in places of symbolic value to the U.S. or our closest allies.

Foreign terrorism experts (from Britain, France, and Israel) see the United States as becoming increasingly exposed to the new terrorism, and generally view their own terrorism threat as different – narrower and more stark – from that faced by America.⁸² There are also many different interpretations of the terrorist threat among states that the U.S. is asking to join in the global fight against terrorism. French, German, and Italian leaders made it clear early on that they are reluctant to join the American “war” effort, perhaps for fear of domestic unrest in their own large Muslim communities. China is willing to assist the U.S. if it will join Beijing in fighting Muslim separatists and Taiwanese independence activists.⁸³ Russia’s involvement may be tied to ending criticism of its war on Chechnya. Moderate Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia find themselves in a precarious position as they decide how far to go in cooperating with the U.S., though Turkey seems to have come down squarely on the side of the global effort.

Thus it seems that the new terrorism is primarily a U.S. policy frame, not truly a global phenomenon, despite the valiant efforts of some world leaders to define it as such. The implications for other nation-states and international bodies of a truly new terrorism paradigm are extremely complex and challenging, and do not coincide with the institutional imperatives found in most U.S. government agencies. In the aftermath of September 11th, it should not be forgotten that terrorism comes in many shapes and sizes and has many faces – not just Bin Laden’s.

Conclusion: Evolution not Revolution

The argument that access to weapons of mass destruction will be “the most striking new development in terrorism in the future”⁸⁴ may well be true, and we may see more attacks like September’s. The intent of this analysis is not to disprove wholly the new paradigm, or to suggest that policy adaptations and innovations are unnecessary, but to suggest that it is perhaps too soon to declare a paradigm shift. Indeed, the State Department has pointed out the difficulties in finding clear patterns in terrorism.⁸⁵ There are some disturbing trends evolving that seem likely to pose new threats in the future, but it is as yet impossible to state unequivocally that we are witnessing a revolution to a “new” terrorism.

The language of the “new” terrorism is evident everywhere in the aftermath of September 11th. A *Washington Post* story days after the attack ran under the headline: “Bin Laden: Architect of New Global Terrorism,” and its authors wrote that the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 “sketched the first rough outlines of a new kind of terrorism that emerged as a finished portrait on Tuesday...”⁸⁶ Bruce Hoffman was quoted as saying, “This kind of terrorism is the face of war in the 21st century,”⁸⁷ and wrote an op-ed piece titled “Terror’s Aftermath: A Counterterrorism Policy for Yesterday’s Threat.”⁸⁸ One horrendous incident alone does not form a new pattern. In fact, terrorism seems to be returning to its historic roots in many ways.

Endnotes

My thanks to Phil Williams, Davis Bobrow, Paul Hammond, and Javad Sedehi, all of whom offered important suggestions and constructive criticisms of this paper.

¹ One week after the September 11th attack, 16 of the top 20 titles on the Amazon.com best-seller list were books related to terrorism, intelligence, or prophecy about calamities and “the end times.” Bill Eichenberger, “Terrorism Books Top Online Best-Seller List,” *The Columbus Dispatch*, September 18, 2001, p. 5A.

- ² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: St. Andrew's, 1998), pp. 200, 204, 212.
- ³ Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, Sep/Oct 1996.
- ⁴ Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (London: Oxford, 1999), p. 4.
- ⁵ Ian Lesser, et al., *Countering the New Terrorism*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), p. 2.
- ⁶ Lesser admits that the "old image... has not quite disappeared" (p. 1), and Laqueur admits that "traditional terrorism will certainly continue; for years to come it will remain the prevalent mode of conflict..." (1999, p. 274).
- ⁷ Brian Jenkins, Preface, in *Countering the New Terrorism*, p. x.
- ⁸ General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues," GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 (April 23, 1998), p. 7.
- ⁹ Jeffrey Simon, *The Terrorist Trap*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 29, cited in Glenn Schweitzer, *Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Plenum Trade, 1998), p. 26.
- ¹⁰ Laqueur (1999), p. 79.
- ¹¹ Alex Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5-6.
- ¹² Hoffman (1998), p. 31.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-37.
- ¹⁴ A *Washington Post* story on November 30, 1999, called Basque ETA terrorists "guerrillas" in both the headline and body; an *LA Times* story on September 22, 2001 labeled both the ETA and the IRA as guerrilla organizations rather than terrorist groups; other examples abound.
- ¹⁵ See Hoffman, p. 41, for a discussion of the distinctions between terrorists and guerrillas, ordinary criminals, and lunatic assassins. On the distinction between urban guerrillas and terrorists, see also Laqueur (1999), pp. 8-9.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸ Schweitzer, p. 30.
- ¹⁹ Hoffman (1998, p. 131) quotes Dr. Frederick Hacker, psychiatrist and terrorism expert. In Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. xi.
- ²⁰ Brian Jenkins, 'International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,' in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 16; quoted in Hoffman, p. 132.
- ²¹ See Hoffman's discussion of terrorism, the media, and public opinion in chapter five of his 1998 book. See also Grant Wardlaw, pp. 38-39 and chapter nine, *Political Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- ²² Sometimes the psychology of fear was used to cause disorientation from society and authority and reinforce unpredictability, suggesting that the current government was incapable and that only the terrorist group could govern effectively. Laqueur disagrees with Hoffman, suggesting that terrorists seldom assumed that they would ever be able to seize power outright, and instead relied on a strategy of provocation that would reawaken the masses. See Laqueur, p. 37.
- ²³ Hoffman (1998), pp. 183-184.
- ²⁴ For an interesting statement of this argument, see *Terrorism and Other 'Low-Intensity' Operations: International Linkages*, a conference report from the Fletcher School and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, April 1985. The authors firmly believed that the Soviets were behind a great deal of contemporary terrorism. More interesting, however, are their predictions about the increasing lethality of terrorism, infrastructure vulnerabilities of advanced countries, and the availability of new and more deadly technology – more than a decade before the "new" paradigm.
- ²⁵ Hoffman (1998), p. 206, cites U.S. Defense Department figures for 20-30 for the Japanese Red Army and the Baader-Meinhof gang, 200-400 for the ETA and IRA, and 500 for Abu Nidal.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 197. For an excellent discussion of target selection, see C.J.M. Drake, *Terrorists' Target Selection* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). Even 18th-century anarchists were reluctant to use force, especially against a democracy.
- ²⁷ See Schweitzer, p. 32; also Hoffman, p. 198.
- ²⁸ Hoffman (1998), p. 198. For an excellent discussion of the history of WMD acquisition and use, see Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer, *America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 27-62.
- ²⁹ Contemporary authors were certain that terrorists were not interested in indiscriminate, mass-casualty attacks. See Brian Jenkins, *Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?* (Santa Monica: RAND, P-5541, November 1975).
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 206.
- ³¹ Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism: Motivations and Causes" (Commentary No. 53, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Jan 1995), pp. 4-5. Accessed at www.csis-scrc.gc.ca/eng/comment/com53e.html.
- ³² Hoffman (1998), p. 171. Cf. Laqueur (1996), p. 2.
- ³³ Laqueur (1999), pp. 80-81, 127-155.
- ³⁴ Hoffman (1998), pp. 87, 94.
- ³⁵ Laqueur (1999), p. 81.

³⁶ Lesser, p. 109. It is also worth noting in relation to nihilism what Grant Wardlaw calls the “ecstasy factor,” the psychological thrill that many terrorists get when committing violence which supersedes or replaces political motivations (p. 54). This ecstasy factor is also present in Islamic suicide bombers, who apparently are often seen smiling moments before their bomb goes off.

³⁷ However, it seems that Osama Bin Laden often gives vague warnings before an attack and then refused to take credit for it later.

³⁸ Hoffman (1999), p. 28, in Lesser.

³⁹ Consider the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski, and his rambling 35,000 word statement on the threats of technology, modernity, and environmental destruction. Kaczynski may not be the typical new terrorist, but his ravings are similar in tone to those of many radical (left and right) terrorist groups. Interestingly, Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh shared a cell-block with Kaczynski for a while, and found that they had a great deal in common in their political beliefs.

⁴⁰ Laqueur (1999), pp. 184-209. See also G. Davidson Smith, “Single Issue Terrorism” (Commentary No. 74, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Winter 1998).

⁴¹ According to Andrew Dirosa of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, speech at a symposium sponsored by the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, Crystal City, VA, May 14-15, 2001.

⁴² *The Washington Post* reports that al-Qaeda seems to have used credit card fraud as one source of financing. See Karen DeYoung and Michael Dobbs, “Bin Laden: Architect of New Global Terrorism,” *The Washington Post*, September 22, 2001, p. A8.

⁴³ Phil Williams, “Getting Rich and Getting Even: Transnational Threats in the Twenty-First Century,” in Stanley Einstein and Menachem Amir, *Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas* (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1999), pp. 20-21, ff.

⁴⁴ James Phillips, “The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism,” *Heritage Backgrounder* #1005 (October 6, 1994), p. 6. Accessed at www.heritage.org/library/categories/natsec/bg1005.html.

⁴⁵ See John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in Lesser.

⁴⁶ Marie Colvin, et al., “Clinton gambles all on revenge,” *Sunday Times*, London, August 23, 1998, cited in Hoffman (1999).

⁴⁷ Hoffman (1998), p. 203.

⁴⁸ Both the State Department and the RAND-St. Andrew’s Chronology of terrorism incidents arrive at the same conclusion regarding the dramatic increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks. See Hoffman (1999), p. 12-13.

⁴⁹ Hoffman (1999), pp. 13-28. For a lengthier discussion of religious terrorism and its increased lethality, see Hoffman (1998), pp. 87-129.

⁵⁰ Laqueur (1996), p. 4; Schweitzer, p. 141.

⁵¹ Wardlaw, p. 26; cf. Laqueur (1996), p. 4. Laqueur suggests that use of WMD would turn off sponsor or supplier states, have unintended consequences, and cause long-term damage; and that “traditional terrorism rests on the heroic gesture, on the willingness to sacrifice one’s own life as proof of one’s idealism... there is not much heroism in spreading botulism or anthrax...” (p. 5).

⁵² Jenkins (1975), quoted in Hoffman, p. 199.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 197. Cf. Phillips, pp. 6-7. It should be noted that since September 11th, Hoffman has publicly stated that he does not believe attacks like it will necessarily lead to WMD attacks. (Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb, “Experts Won’t Rule Out Another Attack Elsewhere in U.S.,” *The Washington Post*, September 15, 2001, p. A18.)

⁵⁴ *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (Laqueur) and *Super-terrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Schweitzer); see also Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramsi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism* (Northeastern University Press, 1999), and Ken Campbell, “On Not Understanding the Problem of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism,” based on his book, *Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism*.

⁵⁵ Stephen Sloan, “Terrorism: How Vulnerable Is the United States?” in Stephen Pelletiere, *Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front* (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 1995), p. 2. Accessed at www.terrorism.com/terrorism/sloan.html.

⁵⁶ Hoffman (1998), p. 91.

⁵⁷ See Falkenrath, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Interview with Bin Laden in June of 1999, conducted by Jamal Isma’il and presented by Salah Najm. Transcript accessed at www.terrorism.com/terrorism/binladintranscript.html.

⁵⁹ Hoffman (1998), pp. 89-90.

⁶⁰ Laqueur (1999), pp. 13-14.

⁶¹ Hoffman (1998), p. 90. Perhaps the number has remained unchanged, but it seems that the predominant Marxist groups have either disappeared – like the Red Brigade, the Red Army Faction, and the Japanese Red Army – or suffered serious setbacks, such as the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru.

⁶² Laqueur (1999), pp. 105-107.

⁶³ See also Laqueur (1999), p. 274, who suggests that though there were patriots and genuine revolutionaries among terrorists, this is no longer typical. Because "ideology or religious motivation, once believed to be all-important, often tak[es] a secondary place," we need to reassess the role of ideology in terrorism.

⁶⁴ Hoffman (1998), p. 191. He also suggests that some states now find terrorism a useful tool for foreign policy – through the use of surrogates or proxies – and for stifling external dissent (p. 186). Cf. Laqueur (1999), p. 215, on crime and terrorism; Schweitzer, pp. 41-42, argues that states will be crucial to the success of terrorists in the future.

⁶⁵ Hoffman (1998), p. 208. Conspiracy theorists assert that the fact that these "amateurs" were caught so quickly and easily indicates that they were really the "fall guys" for more insidious and complicated organizations or state sponsors.

⁶⁶ See Jenkins' comment above, p. 2.

⁶⁷ General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources," GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218 (July 26, 2000), pp. 3-4.

⁶⁸ However, it might be argued that the line was actually crossed several times earlier, as in the 1984 salmonella poisonings in Oregon and the 1990 use of chlorine gas by the Tamil Tigers against the Sri Lankan military.

⁶⁹ Schweitzer, pp. 119-121. Cf. Laqueur (1999), pp. 63-70 and Falkenrath, et al., p. 10. Reportedly the World Trade Center bombers had planned for cyanide gas to contribute to the devastation, but it burned up in the initial explosion.

⁷⁰ Hoffman (1998), p. 198.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 207-208.

⁷² Former Assistant Director of the FBI's National Security Division John F. Lewis, "Fighting Terrorism in the 21st Century," (*FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 68:3, March 1999), pp. 3 ff.

⁷³ General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism," GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107 (March 11, 1999), p. 6. See also the Gilmore Commission report, Appendix N, online at www.rand.org.

⁷⁴ GAO/T-NSIA/GGD-99-107, p. 5.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁷⁶ However, the State Department's FEST does not get the funding it needs from the department to update its equipment, according to a senior State Department official at a National Defense University conference in July 1999.

⁷⁷ GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, p. 5; cf. Gilmore Commission report.

⁷⁸ General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy," GAO-01-556T (March 27, 2001), p. 2.

⁷⁹ GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, p. 2.

⁸⁰ Schweitzer, p. 19.

⁸¹ T.R. Reid, "An Attack on the World: More than 50 Countries Lost Citizens in Trade Center Towers," *The Washington Post*, September 19, 2001, p. A1.

⁸² Lesser, pp. 141-142.

⁸³ Nicholas Kralev, "China, Iran Seek UN Role in Retaliation," *The Washington Times*, September 19, 2001, p. A1.

⁸⁴ Laqueur (1999), p. 271.

⁸⁵ From *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996*, (U.S. Department of State, April 1997), quoted in GAO report 97-254, *Combating Terrorism*, p. 14.

⁸⁶ DeYoung and Dobbs, p. A8.

⁸⁷ Robin Wright, "America Attacked: Tactics of Terrorism," *Los Angeles Times*, September 12, 2001, p. A26.

⁸⁸ Bruce Hoffman, "Terror's Aftermath: A Counterterrorism Policy for Yesterday's Threat," *Los Angeles Times*, September 16, 2001, p. M5.

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