Mozambique's
Sixteen-Year Bloody Civil War
AUTHOR
Major Lance S. Young, USAF
CSC
1991
SUBJECT
AREA - General
MOZAMBIQUE'S 16-YEAR BLOODY
CIVIL WAR
OUTLINE
THESIS:
Our exploration of the background and development of Mozambique,
including
the current status of its brutal Civil War, demonstrates that it is in our
national
interest economically and militarily to continue to support the nation's
evolution.
I. Profile of Mozambique
A. Geography
B. People
C. Economy
D. Colonialism/Nationalism
II. Development of the Civil War
A. Mozambique's Liberation Front
(Frelimo)
B. Mozambique's National Resistance
(Renamo)
III. Current status of the Civil War
A. Political situation
B. Civilian/Refugee dilemma
C. Constitutional Reform
D. South African nations' involvement
IV. Mozambique's Foreign Relations
A. USSR and Mozambique Relations
B. U.S. and Mozambique Relations
V. Mozambique Bilateral Improvements
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
I. Purpose: To help determine if it is in
our national interest economically and
militarily
to continue our current support to Mozambique by examining its
background
and development, including the current status of its sixteen-year Civil
War.
II. Background: Although the United
States is currently one of the largest
economic
contributors to Mozambique, we are also increasing our military influence.
Our
interests in Mozambique are not widely understood or accepted in the political
or
military communities. Acceptance of a strong viable bilateral agreement
requires
a
new review of Mozambique's internal situation and its progress towards
democracy.
III. Data: Famine and dismal conditions
in Mozambique began centuries ago
when
foreign inhabitants exploited the country. Plagued with a high illiteracy rate
and
its people forcibly removed for slavery and sold as cheap labor, a slow but
understandable
resistance movement began to surface. Sentiment for Mozambique's
own
national independence developed and the Front for Liberation of Mozambique
(FRELIMO)
was born. This organization fought its Portugese foe for ten years to
finally
win an agreement to transfer power to FRELIMO. The struggle continued,
but
this time it was against an internal resistance movement known as the
Mozambique
Resistance Movement (RENAMO). With U.S. encouragement, the
FRELIMO
government initiated contact with RENAMO and direct peace talks
began.
This past December a partial cease fire was achieved. U. S. policy of
constructive
relations with the government of Mozambique has moved their
government
towards a more genuine pursuit for internal political and economic
reform.
IV. Conclusion: I feel we should continue
our economic and military support
to
Mozambique contingent on a continued cease fire and their continued effort
towards
democracy. The long term payoff would be a stable country in Southern
Africa
friendly to the U.S., one which would promote peaceful regional initiatives.
Militarily,
it is useful as a strategic access to secure lines of communications as well as
the
strategic minerals it possesses. It would be beneficial to our nation while
providing
the basis for Mozambique to rebuild itself.
MOZAMBIQUE'S SIXTEEN-YEAR
BLOODY CIVIL WAR
Since December 1990, Mozambique has
enjoyed a partial cease fire from its
16-year
devastating Civil War. This war has torn the nation apart and has caused
widespread
economic misery and famine. Few
Americans are familiar with
Mozambique;
therefore, a review of its background and development, including the
current
status of its brutal Civil War, will help determine if it is in our national
interest
economically and militarily to continue our current involvement.
Mozambique is located on the Indian Ocean
in southern Africa. Its 2,000-mile
coastline
and three major ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala are all ideally suited
for
naval bases and have long been coveted by the superpowers. These ports, from
which
a great power could interdict, or at least disrupt, Indian Ocean commerce and
alter
the balance of power in Southern Africa, also offer international gateways to
the
landlocked countries of the region.(5:1) Maputo, the capital, is the economic,
political,
and cultural center of Mozambique.
The nation's strategic importance,
however, transcends its geographic position.
Mozambique,
according to Business International, "Mozambique: On the Road to
Reconstruction
and Development? (Geneva, 1980), has enormous mineral potential.
The
world's largest reserve of columbotantalite, which is used to make nuclear
reactors
and aircraft and missile parts, is located in Zambezia Province in central
Mozambique.
The country is the second most important producer of beryllium,
another
highly desired strategic mineral.(5:1)
Mozambique's social structure merits
attention because of its diversity. There
are
10 major ethnic groups that are divided into subgroups with their own
languages,
dialects,
cultures, and history; the largest are the Makua and Tsonga. The north
central
Provinces of Zambezia and Nampula are the most populous, comprising
about
50% of the population. However, between 1986 and 1988, hundreds of
thousands
of Mozambicans fled conflict-torn areas of central Mozambique to
neighboring
countries or secure areas within the country.(1:3) By far, they are
probably
the lucky few because if caught by the rebels they could have been killed,
used
as forced labor, or systematically raped or beaten. More than 2 million
Mozambiquens
have fled their homes and found sanctuary, either in secure camps in
their
own country or across the border in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and South
Africa.
An additional 100,000 to 200,000 have died at the hands of what may be
today's
most brutal rebel army.(7:45)
During the colonial regime, educational
opportunities for black Mozambicans
were
limited and 93% of the population was illiterate. Since independence, the
government
has placed a high priority on expanding education, reducing the illiteracy
rate
to 86%. The continuing insurgency, however, has disrupted education in many
of
the rural areas.(1:3) The illiteracy rate has added to the continued internal
problem
of the economy.
Agriculture is the most important sector
of the economy, employing
approximately
85 percent of the labor force. Mozambique historically has been a
major
world supplier of cashew nuts. Other agricultural exports include sugar, tea,
cotton
and copra.(10:4) Mozambique has a small industrial sector to include food
processing,
fisheries, textile plants, mining (large deposits remaining), and assorted
transportation
factories.
To understand the enormous economic,
social, and political difficulties of
Mozambique,
we must examine its
past
history. Impoverishment and inequality, rooted at least as far back as the
sixteenth
century, dramatically increased as a direct consequence of Portugal's
imposition
of colonial-capitalism during the early years of this century. By the middle
of
the eighteenth century, Mozambique had become to Portugal little more than a
backwater
malarial zone of minimal value in comparison to Lisbon's holdings in Asia,
Brazil,
and even Angola.(5:15)
During the 19th century the slave trade
had far-reaching economic and social
effects
on the colony. It is likely that more than 1 million Mozambicans were forcibly
removed
from their homelands and sold as cheap bound labor.(5:18) This destroyed
entire
villages and compelled survivors to flee to inaccessible, unproductive
locations
to
avoid slave raiders. The violent disruption of much of the rural economy and
the
export
of many of the most productive members of the indigenous Mozambican
societies
ensured continuing of underdevelopment and impoverishment.
In the early 20th century, the Portuguese
shifted the administration of much of
the
country to large private companies (controlled and financed mostly by the
British),
which made lucrative profits by establishing railroad lines with neighboring
countries
and by supplying cheap (often forced) African labor to the mines and
plantations
of the nearby colonies. Because policies were designed to benefit white
settlers
and the Portuguese homeland, little attention was paid to developing
Mozambique's
economic infrastructure or the skills of its population.(7:45) After
World
War II many European nations were granting independence to their colonies,
but
Portugal decided to hold on to its overseas provinces.
Mozambican resistance began to surface,
as people eventually concluded that
decades
of exploitation, oppression and neglect by Portugal's colonial expansion was
the
cause of their misery. Sentiment for Mozambique's own national independence
developed
and on 25 June 1962 several Mozambican anti-Portuguese political groups
formed
the Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).
FRELIMO's first president was Eduardo
Mondlane whose first objective was
to
forge a broad based insurgent coalition that could effectively challenge the
colonial
regime. Mondlane had been a professor of anthropology at Syracuse
University
in New York prior to his heading a national liberation front and a guerrilla
movement.
He was a man of iron will, who became a hard-core revolutionary of
radical
thought.(4:171) In FRELIMO's struggle, Mondlane sought to forge as wide a
coalition
of nations against Portugal as possible. Pragmatically, he reasoned that aid
and
diplomatic supports from the West were as useful as that from the East. The
United
States gave no overt assistance to FRELIMO, but its Agency for
International
Development provided a few scholarships for Mozambicans to study in
America.
Anonymous private contributors, many of them friends of Mondlane,
financed
or secured money for FRELIMO's health, publicity, and educational
projects,
while military equipment and training came from Algeria, Russia and
China.(5:79)
On
25 September 1964, FRELIMO solders, with logistical assistance from the
surrounding
population, attacked the administrative post at Chai in Cabo Delgado
Province.
This raid marked the beginning of the armed struggle against the colonial
regime.
FRELIMO militants were able to evade pursuit and surveillance by
employing
classic guerrilla tactics: ambushing patrols, sabotaging communication
and
railroad lines, and making hit-and-run attacks against colonial outposts before
rapidly
fading into accessible backwater areas.(5:84) At the war's outset, FRELIMO
had
little hope for a military victory; its hope lay in a war of attrition to
compel a
negotiated
independence from Lisbon. The goal of FRELIMO was to make the war
so
costly that eventually Portugal would withdrawl, a goal made difficult by loans
from
the United States and West Germany and arms from NATO to
Portugal.(4:
187) Portugal fought its own version of protracted warfare. Had the
military
succeeded with a minimum of expenditure and casualties, the war could have
remained
undecided for much longer. But the expense in blood and treasure, not
military
defeat, cost Lisbon the war; its army was never destroyed on the battlefield,
although
some of its officers were converted to FRELIMO's revolutionary social
goals
for Portugal.(4:187&188)
On 24 April 1974 the authoritarian regime
had been overthrown in Lisbon, a
move
that was supported by workers and peasants. The Armed Forces Movement in
Portugal
pledged a return to civil liberties and an end to the fighting in all colonies.
The
rapid chain of events within Portugal caught FRELIMO, which had anticipated
a
protracted guerrilla campaign, by surprise. It responded quickly to the new
situation
and on 7 September 1974 won an agreement from the Armed Forces
Movement
to transfer power to FRELIMO within a year. On 25 June 1975
Mozambique
became free. At the independence celebration the now President
Samora
Machel warned that although the first phase in the struggle had been won,
the
young country still had to overcome illiteracy, disease, poverty, and economic
dependence,
which were the legacies of colonialism.(5:106&107)
In 1977 a new resistance movement was
formed by the name of RENAMO, the
Mozambique
Resistance Movement. This force was formed to counter the
FERLIMO
government and to disrupt the logistical flow of goods to neighboring
Zimbabwe.
Once Zimbabwe became independent, South Africa then became
RENAMO's
chief sponsor. RENAMO is a shady organization. It is led by Afonso
Dhlakama,
who is 38 years old. What makes this organization remarkable among
insurgencies
is not only its level of violence but its total unconcern for politics or
winning
popular support. It makes no effort to preach a political program, to
provide
services or to set up an alternative government in the 10 percent of
Mozambique
it controls. People are compelled to work long hours without pay on
farms,
to serve as porters on forced marches without food, and to service the sexual
needs
of RENAMO warriors.(7:45) The "Gersony Report" submitted on April
1988,
reported
that refugees provided eyewitness or other credible accounts about killings
(from
RENAMO) which included shooting executions, knife/axe/bayonet killings,
burning
alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, and random
shooting
at civilians in villages during attacks.(3:21)
RENAMO is estimated to have 15,000 to
20,000 combatants. Mozambican
civilians
have been RENAMO's principal targets in the war, although the insurgents
have
also attacked government installations and the economic infrastructure.
Between
1986 and mid-1988, some 100,000 civilians are believed to have been
murdered
by RENAMO, and about 1 million others fled to neighboring
countries.(1:4)
Foreign relief organizations estimate that a total of 3.2 million people
are
now totally dependent on food aid, while about the same number require some
assistance.(1:5)
Peasants who have fled said they were pleased to be free of the
rebels,
to whom each homestead had to donate at least a quart of flour each week.
"When
RENAMO first came (to their village) in 1985, a lot of people wanted to fight
back,"
said Pinto Simone, 35, father of three. "But they had arms. They were a
force
the
people could not resist."(8:4)
The FRELIMO administration, led by
President Machel, was economically
ruined
by RENAMO's rebels. The military and diplomatic entente with the Soviet
Union
could not alleviate the nation's economic misery and famine. As a result, a
reluctant
President Machel signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa, known as
the
Nkomati accord. In return, Pretoria promised to sever economic assistance in
exchange
for FRELIMO's commitment to prevent the African National Congress
(ANC)
from using Mozambique as a sanctuary to pursue its campaign to overthrow
white
minority rule in South Africa.(9:1313) The volume of direct South African
Government
support for RENAMO diminished after the Nkomati accord, but
documents
discovered during the capture of RENAMO headquarters at Gorongosa
in
central Mozambique in August 1985 revealed continuing South African
Government
communications along with military support for RENAMO.(1:4)
On 19 October 1986, Mozambique's first
president, Samora Machel died when
his
presidential aircraft crashed near South Africa's border. An international
investigation
determined that the crash was caused by errors made by the flight crew.
Machel's
successor was Joaquim Alberto Chissano, who had served as foreign
minister
from 1975 until Machel's death. Chissano continued Machel's policies of
expanding
Mozambique's international ties, particularly the country's links with the
West,
and pursuing internal reforms.(1:4)
Since 1973 the Soviet-Mozambican ties
have been strong. The USSR's
interests
were brought to light in 1973 when Soviet President Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev
said,
"Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the
West
depends:
the energy treasures of the Persian Gulf, and the mineral treasure house of
central
and southern Africa." In the 27th CPSU Congress in March 1986, the Party
Programme
stated, "Relations with those countries are based on strict respect for
their
independence and equality and that the Soviet Union supports those countries'
struggle
against imperialist neocolonialist policies, against the remnants of
colonialism,
for peace and universal security. The Soviet-Mozambican economic,
trade,
scientific, technical and cultural ties are an example of mutually advantageous
and
equitable cooperation between socialist and developing states."(11:49) The
Soviet
Union seem to want to "serve the interest" of both countries but the
real goal
of
the USSR is to secure the strategic minerals in the region.
The fall of communism in Eastern Europe
is being felt throughout the Third
world.
The Soviet Union with its dismal economy and "new thinking" is
shaping a
new
foreign policy. Moscow is disenchanted with a strategy that annually pumps well
over
$19 billion into the Third World, two-thirds of it in military assistance and
much
of
it never repaid. The emerging Soviet policy reduced expensive military
commitments
in favor of cheaper political solutions, with Moscow exhorting Third
World
allies to adopt glasnost and perostroika reforms. "The Third World,"
says
Andrei
Kozyrev, a senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official, "suffers not so much
from
capitalism
as from a lack of it." What this means for Moscow's Asian, African and
Middle
Eastern clients is a drying up of crucial economic and military funds.(12:27)
The
current President, Joaquim Chissano, is showing signs of change and has
abandoned
the Marxist-Leninist form of government and changed to one for all the
people
of his country. He no longer depends on the socialist bloc for military
assistance
and announced that he will remove all Soviet military advisors from
Mozambique.
The FRELIMO government is looking to find a new source of
assistance
and the ties to the West are improving rapidly.
U.S. relations with Mozambique were
established 23 September 1975. In 1977,
because
of concerns with alleged human rights violations, the U.S. Congress
prohibited
the provision of development aid to Mozambique unless the president
certified
that such aid would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States.
After
that, the Chissano government expelled four members of the U.S. Embassy
staff.
At that point, our relations were at their lowest and mutual suspicions were at
their
highest. In 1983 reestablishment of cooperative relations between the two
countries
began again. The United States has significantly expanded its economic
support
to Mozambique and the FRELIMO government. The United States is now
the
largest provider of emergency food assistance to Mozambique.(1:7) The U.S.
policy
has been to encourage the government of Mozambique to initiate contact with
RENAMO
and explore all peace options.
This was successfully accomplished and on
3 November 1990 President
Chissano
called for an immediate end to his country's civil war, saying a new
constitution
adopted by the legislature had guaranteed the right of all Mozambicans,
including
rebels trying to overthrow his government, to organize and compete in
democratic,
multi-party elections. The new constitution addresses RENAMO's main
political
demands for direct elections by secret ballot in a multi-party democracy, a
free
enterprise economy and freedom of religion.(8:4) The following month
RENAMO
agreed to a partial cease fire along the Beira and Limpopo corridors. A
ten-nation
Joint Verification Commission, which includes the U.S., had been
established
in Maputo to monitor that agreement. There have been no violations
reported
since 9 January 1991.(6:1)
The U.S. has recognized these recent,
positive transitions in Mozambique.
Increased
humanitarian assistance ($110 million in development and humanitarian
relief
in 1990), investments, and political influence along with the dynamic
personality
of Ambassador Melissa Wells has netted many improvements for
Mozambique:
--A new market-basket economic system
that replaced a centrally planned
economy.
--Improved railroad systems with new
G.E.locomotives ($10 million supplied by
the U.S. for this effort).
--Exploration of the possibilitiy of
establishing a small Peace Corps program for
Mozambique centered on providing health
care in Maputo and Beira.
And for the first time the U.S. has
programed funds for a military education
and
training program for Mozambique. Also, in 1990 the Department of Defense
established
a position for a Defense Attache Officer to work with the Ambassador in
establishing
better relations with Mozambique's military.(6:4) And in 1990 a
delegation
from the U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, headed by General James P.
McCarthy,
DCINCEUR, flew into Maputo to meet with President Chissano. As a
member
of this delegation, I witnessed the discussions of many issues concerning
possible
military aid, especially in the form of Security Assistance.
It is reasonable to assume that these
improvements will support the cease fire
currently
in effect. During a recent discussion with Commander Grant J. Caughey
from
the African Affairs Division at the Joint Staff, he conveyed that the stability
of
the
region in Southern Africa would be enhanced by the resolution of Mozambique's
Civil
War.(2)
The U.S. should continue its current
support to Mozambique. The long term
political
payoff would be a stable country in the Southern Africa area friendly to the
U.S.,
one which would promote peaceful regional initiatives. Militarily, it is very
attractive
to have strategic access to a "choke point" such as Capetown point to
secure
lines of logistical reinforcement for naval supremacy. Additionally, the
strategic
minerals in Mozambique could be useful to the U.S. U.S. support to
Mozambique
contingent on a continued cease fire of its civil war would be beneficial
to
our nation while providing the basis for Mozambique to rebuild itself.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.
Adams, Juanita. Mozambique. U.S. Department of State Publication 7965.
Bureau of Public Affairs. Washington
D.C., May 1989, pp. 3-7.
2.
Caughey, Grant J. DOD Africa Affairs Divison of the Joint Staff. Personal
interview about U.S. military
involvement in Mozambique. Pentagon,
Washington D.C., 26 February 1991.
3.
Gersony, Robert. The Gersony Report. Submitted to the Director, Bureau for
Refugee Programs, U.S. State
Department. Washington D.C., April 1988,
p.21.
4.
Henriksen, Thomas H. Mozambique: A History. Southhampton, England. The
Camelot Press, 1978, pp. 171-188.
5.
Isaacman, Allen, and Barbara Isaacman. MOZAMBIQUE: From Colonialism to
Revolution, 1900-1982. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1983, pp. 1-
107.
6.
Lecocq, Randy. Changes in Mozambique Since 1987. African Affairs Desk
Officer, U.S. State Department.
Washington D.C., 1991, pp. 1-4.
7.
MacFarquhar, Emily. "The killing fields of Mozambique." U.S. News
& World
Report, 104 (2 May 1988), p. 45.
8.
Maier, Karl. "Mozambique's Leader Urges Rebels to Take Fight to Ballot
Box."
The Washington Post, 4 Nov 1990,
Section C, p. 4.
9.
Moorcraft, Paul L. "Mozambique's long civil war." International
Defense Review,
20 (October 1987), p. 1313.
10.
Mozambique American Embassy Maputo. "Foreign Economic Trends and Their
Implications for the United
States." U.S. Department of Commerce
Printing, May 1989, p. 4.
11.
Shchedrin, Vladimir., Major. "USSR--Mozambique." Soviet Military
Review, 8
(25 August 1986), p. 49.
12.
Smolowe, Jill. "Don't Call Us, Friend, We'll Call You." Time, 135 (5
March
1990), p. 27.
NEWSLETTER
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |