

# Language policy, multilingualism and language vitality in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

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## **Abstract**

*Pakistan is a multilingual country with six major and over fifty-nine small languages. However, the languages of the domains of power—government, corporate sector, media, education, etc.—are English and Urdu. The state's policies have favored these two languages at the expense of others. This has resulted in the expression of ethnic identity through languages other than Urdu. It has also resulted in English having become a symbol of the upper class, sophistication and power. The less powerful indigenous languages of Pakistan are becoming markers of lower status and culture shame. Some small languages are also on the verge of extinction. It is only by promoting additive multilingualism that Pakistani languages will gain vitality and survive as cultural capital rather than cultural stigma.*

## **Language policy, multilingualism and language vitality in Pakistan**

Pakistan is a multilingual country. Its national language, Urdu, is the mother tongue of only 7.57 per cent of the population though it is very widely used in the urban areas of the country. Pakistan's official language is still English as it was when the British ruled the country as part of British India. In addition to this, the country has five major indigenous languages given below.

*Table 1. Pakistani languages*

Languages	Percentage of speakers
Punjabi	44.15
Pashto	15.42
Sindhi	14.10
Siraiki	10.53
Urdu	7.57
Balochi	3.57
Others	4.66

Source: Census 2001: 107

There are also over fifty other languages, some of them on the verge of extinction (see Appendix-1). The aim of this paper is to study the language policy of Pakistan with a view to determining how it privileges certain languages and with what political, social, educational and economic consequences. The paper also looks briefly at the impact of globalization on the languages of Pakistan.

As the issue of power is central to policy, both to its making and consequence, let us consider it first.

## **Power**

Power is that quality which enables the users of a language to obtain more means of gratification than the speakers of other languages. Forms of gratification may be tangible goods: houses, cars, good food etc. or, they may be intangibles like pleasure, ego boosting, self-esteem etc (for full explanation see Rahman 2002: 38-42). A powerful language is one that makes it possible for its speakers and writers to obtain a higher share of these gratifications than others.

This is mostly possible in settled, modernizing or modern societies where there are domains such as religion, education, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military, commerce, the media, research and so on. In primitive tribes the manipulation of language matters less; in agricultural societies it

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emerges and becomes pervasive but is not the only passport to power; in industrial, modern societies it becomes vitally important. Indeed, one simply cannot enter the domains of power without being able to manipulate language for entry into these domains. It is the language of employment (Rahman 2000: 41-42), and without employment one cannot possess much power in modern societies.

### **Consequences of Pakistan's language policies**

There have been statements about language policy in various documents in Pakistan—the different versions of the constitution, statements by governmental authorities in the legislative assembly debates and, above all, in the various documents relating to education policy which have been issued by almost every government. These are stated in the 1973 constitution as follows:

- (1) The National language of Pakistan is Urdu and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day.
- (2) Subject to clause (1) the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.
- (3) Without prejudice to the status of the National language, a Provincial Assembly may by law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language (Article 251).

The national language is Urdu (it was Urdu and Bengali from 1955 till 1971 when East Pakistan became Bangladesh) though it is, and has always been, the mother tongue of a minority of the population of Pakistan. This minority came from India, mostly after the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and is called Mohajir (refugee or immigrant).

The rationale for this privileging of Urdu, as given by the government of Pakistan, is that Urdu is so widely spread that it is almost like the first language of all Pakistanis. Moreover, since most jobs are available through Urdu, it is only just that all children should be given access to it. Above all, it is a symbol of unity and helps in creating a unified 'Pakistani' identity. In this symbolic role, it serves the political purpose of resisting ethnicity, which otherwise would break the federation. As for the provision that other Pakistani languages may be used, it is explained that the state, being democratic and sensitive to the rights of the federating units, allows the use of provincial languages if desired.

As for the medium of instruction, the rationale is that Urdu, the most widespread urban language, is the one used for teaching. As English is the official and international language, it too is taught at the higher levels especially to those who seek to study science and technology.

### **The political consequences of the privileging of Urdu.**

The major consequence of the privileging of Urdu has been ethnic resistance to it. As mentioned before, Urdu is not the mother tongue of most Pakistanis, as census figures given earlier illustrate. However, Urdu is indeed the most widely understood language and perhaps the major medium of interaction in the urban areas of the country. Even ethnic activists agree that it could be a useful link language between different ethnic groups. However, it has been resisted because it has been patronized, often in insensitive ways, by the ruling elite at the centre.

The story of this patronization is given in detail in several books (see Rahman 1996) but it always fell short of what the more ardent supporters of Urdu demanded (for their position see Abdullah 1976). In the beginning, since a very powerful section of the bureaucracy spoke Urdu as a mother tongue (being Mohajirs), there was an element of cultural hegemony about the privileging of Urdu. The Mohajir elites' position, stated or implied, was that they were more cultured than the speakers of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. Hence it was only natural that Urdu should be used in place of the 'lesser' languages. This position, with which we are familiar through the

works of linguists who oppose the arrogance of monolingual English speakers (see the following authors for such arrogance in other contexts: Skutnabb-Kangas 2000; Crystal 2000: 84-88; Nettle and Romaine 2000) created much resentment against Urdu and, indeed, may be said to have infused the element of personal reaction to or antagonism against the speakers of Urdu in the first twenty years of Pakistan's existence.

The main reason for opposition to Urdu was, however, not merely linguistic or even cultural. It was because Urdu was the symbol of the central rule of the Punjabi ruling elite that it was opposed in the provinces. The use of Urdu as an ethnic symbol is given in detail in Rahman (1996) but a brief recapitulation of major language movements may be useful.

The most significant consequence of the policy that Urdu would be the national language of Pakistan was its opposition by the Bengali intelligentsia or what the Pakistani sociologist Hamza Alavi calls the '*salariat*'—people who draw salaries from the state (or other employers) and who aspire for jobs (Alavi 1987). One explanation is that the Bengali *salariat* would have been at a great disadvantage if Urdu, rather than Bengali, had been used in the lower domains of power (administration, judiciary, education, media, military etc). However, as English was the language of the higher domains of power and Bengali was a 'provincial' language, the real issue was not linguistic. It was that the Bengali *salariat* was deprived of its just share in power at the centre and even in East Bengal where the most powerful and lucrative jobs were controlled by the West Pakistani bureaucracy and the military. Moreover, the Bengalis were conscious that money from the Eastern wing, from the export of jute and other products, was predominantly financing the development of West Pakistan or the army which, in turn, was West Pakistani- (or, rather, Punjabi-) dominated (HBWI: 1982: Vol 6: 810-811; Jahan 1972). The language, Bengali, was a symbol of a consolidated Bengali identity in opposition to the West Pakistani identity. This symbol was used to 'imagine', or construct, a unified Bengali community, as communities, such as nations, were constructed through print language and other unifying devices in Europe (Anderson 1983).

In Sindh, Balochistan, the N.W.F.P and South Western Punjab the languages used as identity symbols were Sindhi, Balochi and Brahvi, Pashto and Siraiki. The mobilization of people, especially the intelligentsia, as a pressure group, which became possible through these languages, made them powerful ethnic symbols (Rahman 1996). However, Urdu was not resented or opposed much except in Sindh where there were language riots in January 1971 and July 1972 (Ahmed 1992). But even in Sindh the crucial issue was of power. The Mohajirs were dominant in the urban areas and the rising Sindhi *salariat* resented this. The most evocative symbol to mobilize the community was language and it was this that was used.

Apart from the riots, people's real conduct remains pragmatic. The Mohajirs, knowing that they can get by without learning Sindhi, do not learn it except in rural areas where it is necessary for them. The Sindhis, again because they know they cannot get by without learning Urdu, do learn it (Rahman 2002: Chapter 10).

In short, the privileging of Urdu by the state has created ethnic opposition to it. However, as people learn languages for pragmatic reasons (Rahman 2002: 36), they are giving less importance to their heritage languages and are learning Urdu. This phenomenon, sometimes called 'voluntary shift', is not really 'voluntary' as the case of the native Hawaiians, narrated by Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine, illustrates (Nettle and Romaine 2000: 94-97). What happens is that market conditions are such that one's language becomes a deficit in relation to what Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist, would call 'cultural capital' (Bourdieu 1991: 230-231). Instead of being an asset it becomes a liability. It prevents one from rising in society. In short, it is ghettoizing. Then, people become ashamed of their language as the Punjabis, otherwise a powerful majority in Pakistan, are observed to be by the present author and others (for a survey of the attitude of Punjabi students towards their language see Mansoor 1993: 49-54). Or, even if language movements and ethnic pride does not make them ashamed of their languages, they do not want to

teach the language to their children because they think that would be overburdening the children with far too many languages. For instance, Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan (1864-1937) reported in 1932 that the Pashtuns wanted their children to be instructed in Urdu rather than Pashto (LAD-F 12 October 1932: 132). And even this year (2003), the MMA government has chosen Urdu, not Pashto, as the language of the domains of power, including education, in the N.W.F.P. The same phenomenon was noticed in Baluchistan. Balochi, Brahvi and Pashto were introduced as the compulsory medium of instruction in government schools in 1990 (LAD-Bal 21 June and 15 April 1990). Language activists enthusiastically prepared instructional material but on 8 November 1992, these languages were made optional and parents switched back to Urdu (Rahman 1996: 169). Such decisions amount to endangering the survival of minor languages and they devalue even major ones but they are precisely the kind of policies that have created what is often called 'Urdu imperialism' in Pakistan.

In short, the state's use of Urdu as a symbol of national integration has had two consequences. First, it has made Urdu the obvious force to be resisted by ethnic groups. This resistance makes them strengthen their languages by corpus planning (writing books, dictionaries, grammars, orthographies etc) and acquisition planning (teaching the languages, using them in the media pressurizing the state to use them; for these terms see Cooper 1989). Secondly, it has jeopardized additive multilingualism as recommended by UNESCO and, of course, by many eminent linguists and educationists (Cf., Edwards 1994). As Urdu spreads through schooling, media and urbanization, pragmatic pressures make the other Pakistani languages retreat. In short, the consequence of privileging Urdu strengthens ethnicity while, at the same time and paradoxically, threatens linguistic and cultural diversity in the country.

### **The policy for English**

English was supposed to continue as the official language of Pakistan till such time that the national language(s) replaced it. However, this date came and went, as had many other dates before it, and English is as firmly entrenched in the domains of power in Pakistan as it was in 1947. The major reason for this is that this is the stated but not the real policy of the ruling elite in Pakistan. The real policy can be understood with reference to the elite's patronage of English in the name of efficiency, modernization and so on.

To begin with, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was an Anglicized body of men who had moulded themselves in the tradition of the British. The officer corps of the armed forces, as Stephen P. Cohen suggests, was also Anglicized. It was, in his words, the 'British generation', which dominated the army till 1971 (Cohen 1994: 162-163). It is understandable that members of this elite had a stake in the continuation of English because it differentiated them from the masses; gave them a competitive edge over those with Urdu-medium or traditional (*madrassa*) education; and, above all, was the kind of cultural capital which had snob value and constituted a class-identity marker. What is less comprehensible is why members of these two elites, who now come increasingly from the lower-middle and middle classes and who have studied in Urdu-medium schools (or schools which are called English-medium but teach mostly in Urdu), should also want to preserve, and indeed strengthen, the hegemony of English—a language that has always been instrumental in suppressing their class.

The answer lies in the fact that the elite has invested in a parallel system of elitist schooling of which the defining feature is teaching all subjects, other than Urdu, through the medium of English. This has created new generations, and ever increasing pools, of young people who have a direct stake in preserving English. All the arguments which applied to a small Anglicized elite of the early generation of Pakistan now applies to young aspirants who stand ready to enter the ranks of this elite. And their parents, themselves not at ease in English, have invested far too much in their children's education seriously to consider decreasing the cultural capital and importance of English.

Moreover, most people think in terms of present-day realities which they may be critical of at some level but which they take as permanent facts of life. This makes them regard all change as utopian or suspiciously radical. To think of abolishing English is one such disquieting thought because, at least for the last century and a half, the people of this part of the world have taken the ascendancy of English for granted. In recent years, with more young people from the affluent classes appearing in the British O' and A' level examinations, with the world-wide coverage of the BBC and the CNN, with globalization and the talk about English being a world language, with stories of young people emigrating all over the world armed with English—with all these things English is a commodity in more demand than ever before.

The present author carried out a survey of 1085 students from different schools in Pakistan in 1999-2000. The results of this survey regarding English are reproduced below.

**Table 2. Survey results for English**

	Madrassas (N=131)	Sindhi medium schools (N=132)	Urdu medium schools (N=520)	English-medium schools		
				Elitist (N=97)	Cadet college (N=86)	Ordinary (N=119)
1. What should be the medium of instruction in schools?						
Urdu	43.51	9.09	62.50	4.12	23.26	24.37
English	0.76	33.33	13.65	79.38	67.44	47.06
Mother tongue	0.76	15.15	0.38	2.06	Nil	1.68
Arabic	25.19	Nil	0.19	Nil	Nil	0.84
No response	16.79	37.88	16.54	5.15	Nil	8.40
2. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English?						
Yes	10.69	30.30	27.69	72.16	70.93	45.38
No	89.31	63.64	71.15	27.84	29.07	53.78
NR	Nil	6.06	1.15	Nil	Nil	0.84
3. Should English-medium schools be abolished?						
Yes	49.62	13.64	20.19	2.06	12.79	5.88
No	49.62	84.09	79.04	97.94	86.05	93.28
NR	00.76	2.27	0.77	Nil	1.16	0.84
Note: The results do not add up to 100 in some cases because those choosing two or more languages have been ignored.						

Source: Rahman, 2002: Appendix-14

These results suggest that 16 year-old students of matriculation (or equivalent level) in Pakistani schools are not in favour of English as the medium of instruction in schools except in English-medium schools. In the other schools they suffer because of English and, therefore, do not favour it. When they grow up and enter elitist positions their investment in English, which now becomes the language of schooling of their children, grows and they no longer support policies that would replace English with other languages.

However, paradoxically, even school students do not support the abolition of English-medium schools. Perhaps this seems too radical, visionary and impractical to them. Perhaps they feel that English-medium schools provide good quality education and should remain available for the modernization of the country. Or perhaps they understand that such schools are a ladder out of the ghetto of their socio-economic class to a privileged class which their siblings or children might make use of. In short, it is probably because of their pragmatism and a shrewd realization that nothing is going to change that they want the English-medium schools to keep flourishing.

### **The real policy regarding English**

As mentioned earlier, the British colonial government and its successor Pakistani government rationed out English. The stated policy was to support Urdu but that was only to create a subordinate bureaucracy at low cost (vernacular-medium education costs less than English-medium education). It was also to keep an anti-ethnic, centrist, ideological symbol potent and vibrant in the country.

The armed forces, better organized than any other section of society, created cadet colleges from the nineteen fifties onwards. These schools, run on the lines of the elitist British public schools, were subsidized by the state. In the 1960s when students from ordinary colleges, who came by and large from vernacular-medium schools, protested against these bastions of privilege, the government appointed a commission to investigate their grievances. The report of this commission agreed that such schools violated the constitutional assurance that 'all citizens are equal before law' (Paragraph 15 under Right No. VI of the 1962 Constitution). However, the Commission was also convinced that these schools would produce suitable candidates for filling elitist positions in the military and the civilian sectors of the country's services (GOP 1966: 18). This meant that the concern for equality was merely a legal nicety. And this, indeed, was what happened. Today the public schools are as well-entrenched in the educational system of the country as ever before. The total spending is as follows:

**Table 3. Total spending**

<b>Cadet college</b>	<b>Budget</b>	<b>Average monthly tuition Fees</b>	<b>Part of the budget covered by fees</b>	<b>Number of students</b>	<b>Total cost per student per year</b>
Kohat	19,981,217	4,701	44% (8,785,923)	575	34,750
Larkana	23,176,006	550	95% (22,017,205)	480	56,617
Pitara	71,720,000	6000	80% (57,376,000)	700	1,02,457
Lawrence	98,886,181	2000	18.19% (17,987,396)	711	1,39,080
Hassanabdal	48,223,000	1350	12.75% (6,148,433)	480	100,465
Mastung	36,300,000	2200	15.75% (5,500,000)	360	100834

*Source: Offices of the respective institutions except for the cost per student per year, which was obtained by dividing the total budget by the number of students.*

The total expenditure is not covered by tuition fees. The cadet colleges report subsidies from the provincial government, grants by visiting dignitaries and free gifts of various kinds from "old boys" and officials of the state.

Spending on other educational institutions is as follows:

**Table 4. Differences in costs in major types of educational institutions (in Pakistani rupees)**

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Average cost per student per year</b>	<b>Payer (s)</b>	<b>Cost to the state</b>
<i>Madrassas</i>	5,714 (includes board and lodging)	Philanthropists + religious organizations	Very little as subsidy on computers, books etc in some <i>madrassas</i>
Urdu-medium Schools	2264.5 (only tuition)	State	2264.5
Elitist English medium schools	96,000--for 'A' level & 36,000 for other levels (only tuition)	Parents	None reported except subsidized land in some cantonments.
Cadet colleges/public schools	90,061 (tuition and all facilities).	Parents + state (average of 6 cadet colleges + 1 public school)	14,171 (average of 5 cadet colleges only)
Public universities	68,000	Parents + state (parents pay an average of Rs. 13,000 per year)	55,000
Public Colleges (provincial)	9,572	State + parents (parents pay Rs. 1,591 per year on the average).	7,981
Public Colleges (federal)	21,281	Parents pay Rs 2,525 for B.A on the average.	18,756

Source: Data obtained from several institutions

In short, by supporting English through a parallel system of elitist schooling, Pakistan's ruling elite acts as an ally of the forces of globalization, at least as far as the hegemony of English, which globalization promotes, is concerned. The major effect of this policy is to weaken the local languages and lower their status even in their home country. This, in turns, militates against linguistic and cultural diversity; weakens the 'have-nots' even further and increases poverty by concentrating the best-paid job in the hands of the international elite and the English-using elite of the peripheries.

English, after all, is the language of the greatest power in the world. It spread as the language of the colonies of Britain in African and Asian countries (Brutt-Griffler 2002). Then, when Britain withdrew from its ex-colonies, English spread because of American economic power, American control of world media and international commerce. This has been condemned as linguistic imperialism by Phillipson (1992: 38-65) and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas calls English a 'Killer language' (2000: 46).

Globalization will increase the power of English because it will open up more jobs for those who know it. These jobs will be controlled by multinationals, which are dominated by the U.S.A. They are also controlled by the international bureaucracy—United Nations, World Bank, IMF, donor agencies etc.—which have started operating increasingly in 'English'. This will increase the demand for English schooling, which will make parents invest in English at the cost of their own languages.

Let us look at the other languages that suffer because of the present policies.

#### **Psychological and cultural costs of linguistic imperialism**

As movements for the preservation of minor (or weaker) languages in Europe tell us, if a child is told that his or her language is inferior, the message being conveyed is that he/she is inferior. In short, one is giving a negative image to children by telling them that the 'cultural capital' they possess is not capital at all but a stigma and a handicap. This makes children reject an aspect—

and an essential one at that—of their legacy, history, culture and identity. What is created is ‘culture shame’—being ashamed of one’s own true identity.

Incidentally, the poor and less powerful classes, gender and communities have always been ashamed of aspects of their identity. In South Asia, the caste system forced manual workers to live miserable lives. This was unjust enough but the worst form of injustice is perpetrated by the fact that the lower castes (or *ajlaf*, *kammis*, outcastes, Sudras etc) not only accept lower social status but look down upon people lower in the social scale and even upon themselves. That is why when people became literate and rose in affluence and power, they left their communities and even started using names of groups with higher social respect. Here, ‘the number of Shaikhs and the other categories’—Syed, Mughal and Pathan—increased phenomenally, while the occupational “caste” groups registered a sharp decline’ (Ahmad, R. 1981: 115).

Moreover, there are many literary works in Urdu and other languages—not to mention one’s own observation—that show how embarrassed the poor are by their houses, their clothes, their food, their means of transportation and, of course, their languages. In short, the reality constructed by the rich and the poor alike conspires to degrade, embarrass and oppress the less powerful, the less affluent, the less ‘gifted’ of the human race. This relates to language-shame—being embarrassed about one’s language—and hence to possible language death.

### **Language vitality in Pakistan**

The year 2000 saw three excellent books on language death. David Crystal’s, *Language Death*; Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine’s *Vanishing Voices* and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas’, *Linguistic Genocide in Education or Worldwide Diversity and Human Rights*. These books have made linguists conscious that, with the standardization created by the modern state and the corporate sector, the smaller languages of the world are dying. Either the speakers die or, which is more often the case, they voluntarily shift to a powerful language which helps them survive but as members of another human group rather than their own.

In Pakistan, as brought out earlier, the linguistic hierarchy is as follows: English, Urdu and local language. In the N.W.F.P and Sindh, however, Pashto and Sindhi are seen as identity markers and are spoken informally. In Punjab, unfortunately, there is widespread culture-shame about Punjabi. Parents, teachers and the peer group combine to embarrass students about Punjabi. In all of the elitist English-medium schools the author visited there were policies forbidding students from speaking Punjabi. If anyone spoke it he or she was called ‘*Paendu*’ (rustic, village yokel) and made fun of. Many educated parents speak Urdu rather than Punjabi with their children.

Pakistan TV plays use the term ‘Urdu-medium’ for lack of sophistication. The children of elitist English-medium schools are indifferent to Urdu and claim to be completely bored by its literature. They are proud to claim lack of competence in the subject even when they get ‘A’ grades in the O’ and A’ level examination. They read only English books and not Urdu ones nor those in other languages.

These attitudes are having a squeezing effect on Pakistani languages. Urdu is safe because of the huge pool of people very proficient in it and especially because it is used in lower level jobs, the media, education, courts, commerce and other domains in Pakistan. Punjabi is a huge language and will survive despite culture shame and neglect. It is used in the Indian Punjab in many domains of power and, what is even more significant, it is the language of songs, jokes, intimacy and informality in both Pakistan and India. This makes it the language of private pleasure and if so many people use it in this manner, it is not in real danger.

Sindhi, and Pashto are both big languages and their speakers are proud of them. Sindhi is also used in the domains of power and is the major language of education in rural Sindh. Pashto is not a major language of education nor is it used in the domains of power in Pakistan. However, its speakers see it as an identity marker and it is used in some domains of power in Afghanistan. It

too will survive though Pakistani city Pashto is now much adulterated with Urdu words. Educated Pashtuns often code-switch between Pashto and Urdu or English. Thus, the language is under some pressure.

Balochi and Brahvi are small languages under much pressure from Urdu. However, there is awareness among educated Balochs that their languages must be preserved. As neither of these languages is used in the domains of power they will survive as informal languages in the private domain. However, the city varieties of these languages will become much Urduified.

It is the over fifty small languages of Pakistan (Annexure A), mostly in Northern Pakistan, which are under tremendous pressure. The Karakorum Highway, which has linked these areas to the plains, has put much pressure on these languages. The author visited Gilgit and Hunza in August 2002 and met local language activists, among others. They all agree that their languages should be preserved but they are so appreciative of the advantages of the road that they accept the threat to their languages with equanimity. Urdu and English words have already entrenched themselves in Shina and Burushaski and, as people emigrate to the cities, they are shifting to Urdu.

Even in the city of Karachi the Gujrati language is being abandoned, at least in the written form, as young people seek to be literate in Urdu and English, the languages used in the domains of power.

The languages that are about to become extinct are:

**Badeshi** exists in the Chail Valley of Swat and is probably a variety of Persian. However, Baart (2003) confirms that it is under great pressure and may cease to be spoken soon.

**Chilliso**, spoken by a small number of people on the east bank of the Indus in District Kohistan, is under great pressure by Shina. According to Hallberg, 'A point which further underscores the idea that language shift is taking place in this community is the fact that of the thirteen individuals who were asked, four said that they spoke Chillisso in their home as a child but speak Shina in their home today' (Hallberg in SSNP Vol. 1, 1992: 122-123).

**Domaaki** is the language of the Doma people in Mominabad (Hunza). Backstrom reported only 500 speakers in 1992 (Backstrom in SSNP Vol. 2, 1992: 82). The present author visited the village in 2002 and estimated 300 only.

**Gowro** is spoken on the east bank of the Indus in District Kohistan mainly in the village of Mahrin by the Gabar Khel class. Hallberg (in SSNP Vol. 1, 1992: 131). says that 'it would seem that the dominance of Shina may be slowly erasing the use of Gowro'. Baart (2003) confirms that only a 1000 speakers are left now and it may be dying.

**Ushojo** is spoken in the Chail Valley of Swat. According to Sandra J. Decker of SIL, it was spoken by 2000 people in 1990 (Decker in SSNP Vol. 1 1992: 66). She also reported that both men and women spoke Pashto with her (ibid, 76). J. Baart (2003) suspects that the language is under great pressure and is moribund.

The smaller languages of Chitral are also about to be lost. The Kalasha community, which follows an ancient religion and lives in valleys in Chitral, is in danger of losing its languages. Some young people are reported to have left the language when they converted to Islam (Decker in SSNP Vol. 5, 1992: 112). Other small languages, Yidgha, Phalura and Gawar-bati, are also losing their vitality.

Two small languages, which would have been lost otherwise, are being recorded by local language activists with the help of Baart. The first is Ormuri, the language of the village of Kunigaram in South Waziristan, which was described as 'a strong language in that area' by

Hallberg in 1992 ('Hallberg in SSNP Vol. 4, 1992: 60). This is being recorded by Rozi Khan Burki, a resident of the village, with the help of J. Baart.

The other one is Kundal Shahi which was discovered by Khwaja Abdur Rahman and is spoken in the Neelam Valley in Azad Kashmir about 75 miles from Muzaffarabad. This is being preserved by Khwaja Rahman with the help of Baart.

In short, while only the remotest and smallest of the languages of Pakistan are in danger of dying, all other languages have decreased in stature. The undue prestige of English and Urdu has made all other languages burdens rather than assets. This is the beginning of language sickness if not death.

### **Conclusion**

We have seen that the language policies of Pakistan, declared and undeclared, have increased both ethnic and class conflict in the country. Moreover, our Westernized elites, in their own interests, are helping the forces of globalization and threatening cultural and linguistic diversity. In this process they are impoverishing the already poor and creating much resentment against the oppression and injustice of the system.

Both globalization and the continuation of colonial language policies by the governments of Pakistan have increased the pressure of English on all other languages. While this has also created an increased awareness of language rights and movements to preserve languages, it has generally resulted in more people learning English. In Pakistan this means that the poor are under more pressure than before because they cannot afford expensive schools that 'sell' English at exorbitant rates. As such, linguistic globalization is anti-poor, pro-elitist and exploitative.

While it may not be possible to reverse the trend of globalization, it is possible to promote the concept of additive bilingualism rather than subtractive bilingualism. This means that we should add to our repertoire of languages to gain power while retaining skills and pride in our own languages. In order to do this the state and our education system should promote the concept of linguistic rights.

There are tolerance-related and promotion-oriented rights. In Pakistan we have the former but not the latter. This means that, while we keep paying lip service to our indigenous languages, we create such market conditions that it becomes impossible to gain power, wealth or prestige in any language except English and, to a lesser extent, Urdu. This must be changed and the change must come by changing the market conditions. This is what was done in the case of Catalan, a language which had been banned by General Franco of Spain, and which has been revived. Making Catalan the language of jobs and the government of Catalonia (Hall 2001) has changed the power equation and people started learning Catalan.

What we need in Pakistan are such promotion-oriented rights for our languages. What is needed along with such rights is a good but fair system of schooling which will teach English and Urdu but equally to all children and not as it is done now—very well to the elite and very badly to all others (for details see Rahman 2002: Conclusion). Such steps might save us from the more harmful linguistic effects of unjust and anti-poor language policies.

## Annexure-1

### MINOR LANGUAGES OF PAKISTAN

The number of language listed for Pakistan is 69. This chart however, lists only 58 as the major languages are given in the text. The mutually intelligible varieties of Grater Punjabi (Siraiki, Hindko, Potohari and Pahari) have not been included in this list.

Language	Other Names	Where Spoken	Speakers	Source
Aer		Jikrio Goth around Deh 333, Hyderabad	200 in 1998	Grimes 2000
Badeshi	Badakhshi (variety of Persian)	Bishigram, Chail Valley (Swat, Kohistan)	Not known, maybe 400	Grimes 2000 Zaman 2002
Bagri	Bagria, Bagris, Baorias, Bahgri	Sindh and Punjab (nomadic between India and Pakistan)	200,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Balti	Baltistani, Sbalti	Baltistan	27,000-300,000	SSNP-2: 8 & Grimes 2000
Bashgali	Eastern Kativiri	Gobar, Rumbur Valley (Chitral)	3700-5100	SSNP-5: 134
Bateri	Bateri Kohistani Baterawal, Baterawal Kohistani	Indus Kohistan Batera village (East of Indus North of Besham)	30,000 (in 1992)	Breton 1997: 200; Grimes 2000
Bhaya		Kapri Goth near Khipro Mirpur Khas (Lower Sindh)	700 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Burushaski	Mishaski, Biltum, Werchikwar Khajuna	Hunza, Nagar, Yasin valleys (Northern areas)	55,000-60,000 (in 1981)	SSNP-2: 37 Grimes 2000
Chilisso	Chiliss, Galos	Koli, Palas, Jalkot Indus Kohistan	2000-3000 (in 1992)	Breton 1997: 200 & Grimes 2000
Dameli	Gudoji, Damia, Damed, Damel	Damel Valley (Southern Chitral)	2000-5000 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 11
Dehwari	Deghwari	Kalat, Mastung (Central Balochistan)	10,000-13,000 (in 1998)	Breton 1997: 200 & Grimes 2000
Dhatki	Dhati	Tharparkar, Sanghar (Sindh)	200,000 plus (in 1987)	Grimes 2000
Dogri	Punjabi, Pahari	Azad Kashmir	1 million?	Breton 1997: 200
Domaaki	Domaski, Doma	Mominabad (Hunza & Nagar)	300 plus (in 2002)	SSNP 2: 79; Grimes 2000; personal observation
Gawar-Bati	Narsati, Nurisati, Gowari, Aranduiwar, Satr, Gowar-bati	Southern Chitral, Arandu, Kunar river along Pakistan-Afghanistan border	1500 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 156 Breton 1997: 200 & Grimes 2000
Ghera	Sindhi Ghera, Bara	Hyderabad Sindh	10,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Goaria		Cities of Sindh	25,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Gowro	Gabaro, Gabar Khel (different from Gawri)	Indus Kohistan (on the eastern bank, Mahrin village)	200 (in 1990)	Breton 1997: 200 & Grimes 2000
Gujari	Gujari, Gojri, Gogri Kashmiri, Gujuri, Rajasthani	Swat, Dir, Northern areas, Azad Kashmir	300,000-700,000 plus (in 1992)	SSNP-3: 96 & Grimes 2000
Gujrati	Gujrati	Karachi, other parts of Sindh	100,000	Grimes 2000

Gurgula	Marwari, Ghera (Lexical similarity to Ghera)	Karachi, cities of Sindh	35,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Hazargi	Hazara, Hezareh, Hezare'i (similar to Persian)	Quetta	220,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Jadgali	Jatgali, Jatki, Jat	Southern Balochistan and Southwest Sindh	100,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Jandavra	Jhandoria	Southern Sindh from Hyderabad to Mirpur Khas	5000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Kabutra	Nat, Natra	Umarkot, Kunri, Nara Dhoru (Sindh)	1,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Kachchi	Cutch, Kachi	Karachi	50,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Kalami	Bashgharik, Dir Kohistani, Bashkarik, Diri, Kohistana, Dirwali, Kalami Kohistani, Gouri, Kohistani, Bashkari, Gawri, Garwi	Kalam (Swat) Dir Kohistan	60,000-70,000 (in 1995)	Baart 1999: 4
Kalasha	Bashgali, Kalashwar, Urtsuniwar, Kalashamon, Kalash	Kalash Valleys (Chitral) southern	2900-5700 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 11
Kalkoti	None reported	Dir Kohistan in Kalkot village	6000 (in 2002)	Breton 1997: 200; Zaman 2002
Kamviri	Skekhami, Kamdeshi, Lamertiviri, Kamik	Chitral (southern end of Bashgal Valley)	2000 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 143; Grimes 2000
Kashmiri	Keshuri	Kashmir & diaspora	105,000 (in 1993)	Breton 1997: 200; Grimes: 2000
Kati	Bashgali, Kativiri, Nuristani	(Chitral) Gobar Linkah Valleys	3700-5100 (in 1992)	Grimes 2000
Khetrani	None reported	Northeast Balochistan	Few thousand (in 1987)	Grimes 2000
Khovar	Chitrali, Qashqari, Arniya, Patu, Kohwar, Kashkara	Chitral, Northern areas, Ushu in northern Swat	250,000 plus (in 1993)	SSNP-5: 11 Breton 1997: 200; Grimes 2000
Kohistani	Indus Kohistani, Kalami, Dir Kohistani, Kohiste, Khili, Maiyon, Maiya, Shuthun, Mair	Indus Kohistan West bank of river	220,000 (in 1993)	Grimes 2000
Koli Kachi	Kachi, Koli, Kachi Koli	(Lower Sindh) around Towns of Tando Allahyar & Tando Adam	170,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Koli Parkari	Parkari (Lexical similarity with Marwari Bhil and Tharadari)	Lower Thar Desert Nagar Parkar	30,000 (in 1980)	Grimes 2000
Kundal Shahi		Neelam Valley, Azad Kashmir	500 (in 2003)	Baart and Rehman 2003
Lasi	Lassi	Las Bela District (south east Balochistan)	15,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Loarki		Sindh---various places	25,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Marwari (southern)	Rajasthani, Meghwar, jaiselmer, Marawar	South Punjab north of Dadu Nawabshah	220,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000

Memoni	Similarities to Sindhi and Gujrati	Karachi	Unknown	Grimes 2000
Od	Odki	Scattered in Sindh & south Punjab	50,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Ormuri	Buraki, Bargista	Kaniguram (south Waziristan) some in Afghanistan	3000?	SSNP-4: 54 Grimes 2000
Pashai		Refugees from Afghanistan	5000?	Breton 1997: 200
Persian	Farsi, Madaglashti Persian in Chitral Dari, Tajik, Badakhshi	Balochistan, Shishikoh Valley in Chitral, Quetta, Peshawar, etc.	2000-3000 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 11 Grimes 2000
Phalura	Dangarik, Ashreti, Tangiri, Palula, Biyori, Phalulo	7 villages near Drosh, Chitral possibly 1 village in Dir Kohistan	8600 (in 1990)	SSNP-5: 11
Sansi	None reported (Lexical similarity with Urdu)	North-western Sindh	10,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Shina	Sina, Shinaki	Gilgit, Kohistan, Baltistan	500,000	SSNP-2: 93
Sindhi Bhil	Bhil	Badin, Matla, Thatta (Sindh)	50,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Sochi	Dialect of Sansi with 83% lexical similarity.	Sindh- various places	100,000	Grimes 2000
Torwali	Kohistani, Bahrain Kohistani	Bahrain (Swat)	60,000	Breton 1997: 200; Lunsford 2001
Ushojo (Ushuji)	Upper part of Bishigram Valley in Swat	Chail Vally, Swat District	1000 (in 2002)	Zaman 2002
Vaghri	Vaghri Koli	Sindh (many places)	10,000 (in 1998)	Grimes 2000
Wadiyara	Wadiyare Koli	Between Mirpurkhas and Matli	180,000	Grimes 2000
Wakhi	Kheek, Kheekwar, Wakhani, Wakhigi, Wakhan	Northern ends of Hunza & Chitral	9,000 plus (in 1992)	SSNP-2: 61
Wanetsi	Tarino, Chalgari	Harnai (East of Quetta)	95,000 (in 1998)	SSNP-4: 51 Breton 1997: 200 Grimes 2000
Yidgha	Yidghah, Luthuhwar	Upper Lutkoh Valley (Western Chitral)	5000-6000 (in 1991)	SSNP-5: 11 Grimes 2000

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