

Packing for Perth: The Growth of a Southern African Diaspora

Eric Louw

University of Queensland

Gary Mersham

University of Zululand

Southern African decolonization, the civil war and post-apartheid turmoil are creating a Southern African diaspora across the Anglo world. Australia has become a popular destination within this diaspora that South Africans now refer to emigration in general as "packing for Perth." Thus far, little work has been done on this migratory phenomenon. This article seeks to develop an overview of the birth and developments of this diaspora, with a focus on the growth of the South African Australian community. As an overview, the article provides insights on how this emergent diaspora relates to earlier migrations, the factors behind post-apartheid emigration, the patterns and characteristics of post-apartheid migration, and the significance of Australia as a destination for South African migrants.

In the 1950s and 1960s a trickle of South Africans began leaving their country as migrants and refugees. From the 1970s this trickle turned into a stronger flow, but it was not until the 1980s when the exodus became large enough so as to generate noticeable South African diasporic communities in host countries.¹ But the 1980s anti-apartheid civil war, followed by the 1990s

¹ One possible exception was Zambia, from where, in the late 1970s, South African (and Namibian and Zimbabwean) exiles launched political and guerrilla struggles against the South Africans and Rhodesians. These exiles were not permanent migrants, and they left Zambia once the wars ended.

post-apartheid socio-political transformations, generated much larger waves of migrants who began to settle in identifiable communities in places like Australia.² The 1990s, in particular, witnessed the emergence of a South African diaspora large enough to develop a presence in host countries like Australia.

By 2001, a discernible South African Australian community had formed as part of a wider global South African diaspora, a diasporic community that is likely to continue growing until the turmoil of Southern Africa's post-colonial transition is completed. Rex (1997:274) argues that "a diaspora is said to exist when an *ethnie* or nation suffers some kind of traumatic event which leads to the dispersal of its members, who nonetheless, continue to aspire to return to the homeland." Rex's definition certainly fits the post-1970s exodus of people from South Africa, fleeing the anti-apartheid wars and turmoil of post-apartheid restructuring. Many adults of this diaspora have reported a longing to return, but it is as yet unclear if this hankering will be transferred to their children.

Rex (1997:275) would presumably argue that the South African exodus should not be considered a diaspora because it is a population movement associated with the 'end of empire.' For a minority of the South African population Rex's argument holds some validity, i.e., the Anglo South Africans who migrated to South Africa during the twentieth century retained their British citizenship, and still share linguistic and cultural bonds with the UK. Many of these Anglos returned to the UK in the 1990s. However, the majority of white, colored and Indian (WIC)³ South Africans

² Recent outward flows of migrants are generating diasporic communities in what the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) identifies as the five most popular destinations for South Africans, namely, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, United States (USA) and Canada. Large enough concentrations of South Africans exist in London, Sydney, Perth, Toronto, San Diego, New York and Auckland where identifiable communities have been formed. Diasporic South Africans can now also be found in various European Union countries. SANSA's figures reveal that in 1995 the total flow of South Africans to the European Union (excluding the UK) was equivalent to the flow to the USA. There are also South Africans in Israel and in the expatriate communities of the Gulf States and Hong Kong, although they are fewer in numbers.

³ This paper uses terminology like white, colored, Indian and black because no analysis of South Africa (or Southern Africa) is possible without deploying these categories given that race and ethnicity have been (and remain) so central to South Africa's socio-economic and political order. In South Africa, skin color tends to be a marker of 'race,' while home language is a marker of 'ethnicity.' This article employs the definition of 'race' as it is normally used in South Africa: 'black' means someone of 'pure' (Bantu) African ancestry; 'white' someone of 'pure' European ancestry; 'colored' is someone of mixed ancestry. Coloreds are a mix of Khoi (Hottentot), San (Bushmen), Dutch, Indonesian and some black. 'Indian' means someone of Indian or Pakistani

have no 'former metropolis' to which they can 'return.' Afrikaners trace their origins back to Dutch, French and Germans who settled in South Africa in the seventeenth century.⁴ Coloreds also trace their origins back to the Dutch colonial period of the seventeenth century.⁵ Indian South Africans arrived as indentured laborers in the nineteenth century. These WICs have no cultural ties to any former metropolis, and do not even share a common language with those societies where their ancestors originally came from. In short, by the 1970s (when South Africa's migrant exodus began) the WIC populations had been substantively 'South Africanized' and could no longer be considered a settler population with an overseas home to which they could return.

Migration has multiple causation. Some migrants are 'pulled' by the prospects of a better life elsewhere; others are 'pushed' by unbearable conditions in their home countries; and others move because of a mixture of 'push-pull' factors. Kunz (1973:134-143) argues that the particular mix of push-pull factors determines the form of displacement experienced by those fleeing their homelands. One variety of push-migration involves political shifts that create conditions deemed 'threatening' (i.e., economically, culturally, politically or in terms of personal safety). South Africa is a society that has for decades produced wave after wave of push-migrants, i.e., migrants who engage in "flight" because they feel "impelled" (though not "forced") to move elsewhere (Petersen, 1958:261). In the South African case, each wave of 'impelled' / pushed migrants has been larger than the one before. Push-migrants tend to develop a 'presence' at certain moments in time because they are the products of political-economic turmoil that is

footnote 3 (continued)

ancestry. These four 'race groups' continue to be very powerful markers of status, life chances and identity within South Africa. However, South Africa's ethnic groupings cut across these racial categories. Hence, 80 percent of coloreds are ethnically similar to white Afrikaners. Most 'Indians' and 20 percent of coloreds are now closely identified with an 'Anglo' ethnicity. Within South Africa, there are at least three major white 'ethnic groups' (Afrikaners, Anglos and Portuguese) and nine black ethnic groups (Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Pedi, Sotho, Swazi, Venda, Ndebele and Tsonga). A new urban 'black group' appears to be emerging (especially in Gauteng province) which cuts across these other ethnicities.

⁴ The merging of Dutch, French and German produced a new language called Afrikaans (meaning 'African'). Although the Afrikaner cultural-formation is a Northwestern European-derivative, its members would be cultural and linguistic foreigners in Europe.

⁵ Indonesian cultural influences are especially strong in the colored population. Because of close ethnic-linkages between coloreds and Afrikaners, there have also been marked Indonesian influences on Afrikaner culture.

contextually-bound. Once the turmoil ceases the migration flows dry up. Hence, in mid-nineteenth century, push-migration generated an Irish 'presence' across North America and Australasia. The 1970s witnessed Vietnamese push-migration. At the end of the twentieth century, turmoil in the former-Yugoslavia, Russia, Iraq and South Africa generated new waves of push-migrants.

Researching the Southern African Diaspora

By 1999-2000 6.2 percent of Australia's annual immigrant-intake came from South Africa. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) there were over 71,000 South Africans in Australia (Lucas, 2000:34), compared with only 15,500 in 1976. Despite this, not much research has been done about this growing population of migrants in Australia. One possible explanation for this lack of research is that South African migrants prefer to become invisible and to simply assimilate in societies like Australia. This is, in part, derived from the habit of not drawing attention to oneself when travelling abroad, a behavior learned during the years of apartheid. In addition, if the stock of materials available in the libraries is anything to go by, the study of Southern African migrants is relatively unexplored compared with the interest in the study of Chinese, Vietnamese or Greek migrants. The authors of this paper engaged in exploratory research to draw a historical overview of this emergent diasporic phenomenon. This article examined four questions: (1) how does this emergent diaspora relate to earlier migrations; (2) what are the factors behind the post-apartheid migration out of South Africa; (3) what are the patterns characteristic of post-apartheid migration; and (4) what are the factors associated with the popularity of Australia as a destination for South African migrants.

The key source of data on this migrant population in Australia comes from ABS. Data published in the "Community Profiles" series of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' publication, *South Africa Born* (Lucas, 2000), served as the central source of statistical data used in this paper. However, data on the wider (non-Australian) phenomenon of South African migration were drawn from the work of the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA).⁶ SANSA began as a University of Cape Town project but was later absorbed by the National Research Foundation, a division of the South African central government's Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology. Noting the skill flight from South Africa in the 1990s, SANSA was established to build up a data base of skilled South

⁶ Found on SANSA's website www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa.

Africans abroad for the purpose of keeping track of skilled South Africans abroad. When required, the project hopes to call on skilled South Africans to assist in development projects (Kaplan, 1997).

In addition, the authors also engaged in some preliminary data collection. In 1999 South African students were surveyed and interviewed as part of a global 'Foreign Attitudes Towards Australians' research project (Louw et al., 2001). This project (hereafter referred to as the 1999 survey or study), which surveyed 867 students, included interviews and four focus groups which include migration questions. Participants in the survey and focus groups were drawn from first year communication students at two universities: Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) in Johannesburg, a university with a mixed student profile, mostly from the highly urbanized Witwatersrand area, and the University of Zululand (UZ), where students are 100 percent black and they come from rural backgrounds. Drawing students from both RAU and UZ was aimed at coming up with a fairly representative sample of South Africa's ethnic make-up. The participants, however, were skewed in favor of females (74 percent) due to the profile of communication students. The mean age of the sample was 20. In terms of home language, 44 percent spoke English at home, 39 percent spoke a black-African language (90 percent cited Zulu), and 17 percent spoke Afrikaans.

Further, pilot ethnographic studies were conducted in Australia in 1998 (Sydney) and 2000 (Brisbane). To locate populations of South African Australians, importers of South African food stuffs based in Perth were contacted and asked to supply the addresses of retail sites where South African products were sold. Two sites in Sydney and three sites in Brisbane provided initial entry-points into the community, after which a snowball method of contacting South African Australians was undertaken. This eventually led to visits to South African functions (such as school and university reunions) and *braais* (barbecues) where interviews were conducted. In these gatherings (which were usually attended by about a hundred people), a helpful approach was to join groups of people already in discussion and then use focus group methodology to elicit discussion about migration issues. People attending these events came from a wide range of occupational backgrounds, although businesspeople were a large percentage. In-depth interviews were carried out with selected individuals encountered in these gatherings. The 1999 study and the ethnographic studies undertaken in Sydney and Brisbane provided insights into the attitudes of South Africans (both inside and outside South Africa) about migration and about Australia, which have been incorporated into this paper.

Five Waves of Southern African Migration

The emerging South African diaspora is largely made up of white Anglo South Africans, but includes other subgroups, such as Rhodesians, Southern African Indians, coloreds and Afrikaners. According to SANSA, Australia is home to the second largest concentration of South Africans within this global diaspora, ranking next to the UK (Kaplan et al., nd).

Our ethnographic studies of the South African community in Australia undertaken in 1998 and 2000 confirmed that this diasporic community is not limited to ex-South African citizens or South Africa-born people. It has also come to include whites, Indians and coloreds (WICs) from other Southern African countries like Zimbabwe, Namibia and Zambia. Rhodesians (i.e. white Zimbabweans), in particular, form an important subgroup within the wider South African diaspora. Thus, the diasporic 'South African community' has effectively incorporated migrants from those parts of Britain's wider Southern African Empire where colonial-settler communities existed - e.g., Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (Namibia). This is not surprising given that many WIC settlers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and Southwest Africa were, in fact, of South African descent (and included South African Anglos, Afrikaners and South African Indians). In addition, the economic and cultural linkages between South Africa and WICs in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Southwest Africa were strong. There was, in effect, a shared socio-political 'British Empire experience' across Southern Africa. The process of imperial decline, Afrikanerization and Africanization have induced the push-migration of many Zambian, Zimbabwean, Namibian and South African WICs.

The South African diaspora has coalesced out of five waves of Southern African migration, with each wave being bigger than the one preceding it. Each wave was born out of a different set of issues within Southern Africa's overall decolonization process, and so each of the five migrant waves constitutes something of a 'subculture' within the overall South African diaspora. The ethnographic research conducted in Australia in 1998 and 2000 revealed that these five subcultures did not always share exactly the same 'picture' of South Africa, with each subgroup having a 'picture' largely fixed by the moment in time they emigrated (although modified by visits back to South Africa and by discussions among them). Each of the five waves has had an impact upon Australia.

The First Wave

The first wave dates back to the 1950s. South Africa's 1948 elections produced an unexpected victory for Afrikaner nationalism. It became a

political watershed in South Africa with the National Party's (NP) electoral triumph representing a serious challenge to British hegemony over Southern Africa. Throughout the 1950s the NP implemented policies aimed at checking Anglo influence over South Africa, promoting Afrikaner interests and implementing the first stages of apartheid. The emergence of Afrikaner political power was deeply traumatic for white Anglo South Africans who came to see 1948 as the year they 'lost power' (Strangewayes-Booth, 1976: 44-46). The 1950s saw the earliest phase of South African 'push-migration,' as Anglos, resentful about the Afrikaner nationalist challenge to Anglo hegemony and what they perceived as the Afrikanerization of South Africa, began to leave for Rhodesia⁷ and other Commonwealth countries (Lipton, 1986:284). Some 2,000 settled in Australia during the 1950s. The 1950s exodus was more like a slow trickle, rather than a wave of migrants. It was the early 1960s that produced the first significant discernible wave of South African emigrants triggered by two political events. A black rebellion at Sharpeville led to the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC) in 1960. This produced the first handful of black exiles fleeing political repression. Over the next 30 years this exiled community of political activists expanded in Africa, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the USA. These events did not have a significant impact on migration to Australia as when South Africa became a republic in 1961 (and left the Commonwealth). For Afrikaners, proclaiming a republic represented the attainment of the long struggle for independence from Britain. Anglos became divided on the issue (Davenport, 1977:289). Most resented the severing of ties with the British crown. Those areas where Anglos constituted the majority of voters recorded an overwhelmingly anti-republic vote in the referendum. However, the "Winds of Change" speech by British Prime Minister Macmillan, coupled with British decolonization in Africa, served to drive some Anglos into an alliance with the Afrikaner nationalists (a phenomenon that accelerated after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965). But in 1961, the declaration of a republic was largely perceived as a political defeat for Anglo South Africans and the victory of an Afrikaner-nationalist hegemony. It dashed hopes that white Anglos could regain political dominance or halt the process of Afrikanerizing South Africa. In addition, capitalists were being heavily

⁷ White Rhodesians voted against joining South Africa in a 1922 referendum largely because of fears that becoming South Africa's fifth province would open Rhodesia up to Afrikaners, who would then dominate Anglo-settler culture. Hence between 1922 and 1965 Boer-Briton rivalries were a sub-text within the South African-Rhodesian relationship - it is an antipathy that remains a sub-text, despite the 'association' between Rhodesians and South Africans within Australia.

taxed to pay for an NP-run affirmative action program to uplift Afrikaners (Louw, 1994:24-27). Given that the economy was largely in Anglo hands, this translated into taxation of Anglo capitalists, which generated resentment towards the 'Afrikaner hegemony.' The declaration of a republic prompted the Anglos' departure due to what they saw as the consolidation of an Afrikaner-dominated (anti-Anglo) South Africa. This wave was directed to the UK, Rhodesia and other Anglo-derivative societies (like Australia). Over 5,000 South African Anglos settled in Australia in the 1960s. Overall, during the first 20 years of NP rule some 7,000⁸ Anglos migrated to Australia. They carried with them the strong anti-Afrikaner prejudices (pejoratively called 'Boers')⁹ and a deep hostility to the NP¹⁰ that generally characterized Anglo South African attitudes in the 1960s (Lipton, 1986: 284 & 292; O'Meara, 1983: 5; De Villiers, 1971:418).¹¹ Before migrating, most had been supporters of the United Party (which championed British hegemony over Southern Africa), although some were former members of the South Africa Communist Party (which was banned in 1950).¹²

The Second Wave

The second migration wave was numerically more significant. It began with the 1976 Soweto revolt, which rapidly spread to most black townships. For

⁸ All Australian figures quoted come from the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. In Australia only South Africa-born persons are included in the migration category "South African." These figures consequently represent a serious undercounting of South Africans in Australia because many South Africans who have migrated to Australia were born elsewhere, e.g., the UK, Ireland, Portugal (and its empire), Zimbabwe and Zambia.

⁹ Merle Lipton (1986:284) has discussed these South African Anglo prejudices against Afrikaners and, in fact, argues that the only thing that held "English" South Africans together as a group (given that they were a highly diverse, multicultural group) was their shared "dislike and fear of the Afrikaners" (Lipton, 1986:292). Dan O'Meara (a pro-ANC intellectual) similarly drew attention to this South African Anglo prejudice towards, and dislike, of Afrikaners which, he argues, has long distorted Anglo intellectual analysis of Afrikaner nationalism (O'Meara, 1983:5).

¹⁰ A good illustration of the prejudices held by this wave of migrants can be found in the Boer-Brit and Boer-Black stereotypes encoded into Bryce Courtenay's, *The Power of One*, the biggest selling Australian novel ever. Courtenay was a first wave South African migrant to Australia.

¹¹ De Villiers was an MP who represented an overwhelmingly Anglo constituency which supported the opposition Progressive Party.

¹² Some of the first wave migrants (associated with the South African Communist Party) who settled in London were to play a role in helping to launch the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

the first time South Africa's white hegemony came under serious attack, and it took the police and military almost two years to crush this revolt. The 1976 revolt generated two groups of South African migrants. Firstly, a new cohort of black political activists (called the class of '76) exiled themselves to Zambia, Tanzania, Eastern and Western Europe and the USA. However, from Australia's point of view, a more significant outcome of the 1976 revolts was a renewed flow of Anglos to Australia: some 17,000 South African Anglos settled in Australia between 1977 and 1984. By the 1986 census, there were 37,000 South African-born Australians. The push factor for this second wave of migrants was the specter of an impending civil war caused by many blacks feeling compelled to fight to overturn their political repression, while many whites felt compelled to fight to try and prevent South Africa from becoming black-ruled. Among second wave migrants were also those avoiding the two-year conscription into the South African Defence Force (introduced to fight guerrillas in Namibia, a war in Angola, and to patrol South African black townships). These second wave migrants were also responding to the perception that a major white-black war was looming, following Portugal's withdrawal from its African colonies after the 1974 coup, and the perception that the Rhodesians were losing the Bush War (1973-80) against black nationalist guerrillas. The second wave of South African migrants were overwhelmingly Anglo urbanites. Many were Jewish.¹³ Before migrating, these Anglo urbanites mostly resided in suburbs which overwhelmingly voted for the liberal, anti-apartheid, Progressive Federal Party (PFP). Within South Africa there was much hostility to migrants who were seen as taking the easy option of migrating (disparagingly referred to as 'the chicken run'). This led to the emergence of a pejorative term for 'affluent Anglo liberals' with no 'loyalty' to South Africa, who were henceforth called PFPs (i.e., 'Packed for Perth's'). The second wave also saw the start of another trend – Anglo businessmen began relocating their capital¹⁴ and then themselves to places like Australia, the UK and USA.

The Third Wave

A third wave of Southern African migration began in the late 1970s and continued until the mid-1980s. This consisted of Rhodesians (many of

¹³ Some 13.5 percent of South African Australians are Jewish which has had a major demographic impact on Australia's Jewish population.

¹⁴ This often meant illegally circumventing South Africa's foreign exchange control regulations.

whom were British or South African citizens).¹⁵ Rhodesian migrants tended to merge into South African diasporic communities in places like Australia,¹⁶ joining the same South African social clubs and patronizing the same retailers selling South African foodstuffs. Perth was always an especially popular destination for Rhodesian migrants. These migrants brought with them a different set of attitudes and experiences from the South Africans because they were effectively fleeing an intense guerrilla war (that caused 20,000 deaths), or were leaving in the wake of losing this war. Rhodesians also tended to be more rural and conservative than their South African counterparts and brought with them an anti-British sentiment — i.e., a sense of ‘betrayal’ derived from Britain’s refusal to grant Rhodesia independence in 1965, and from a belief that their Anglo ‘kith and kin’ helped facilitate their defeat at the hands of what they saw as ‘black communists.’ Later, a smaller, second wave of Rhodesians began arriving in Australia from 2000 when the occupation and seizure of white-owned farms began in Zimbabwe.

The Fourth Wave

The bloody South African civil war between September 1984 and February 1990 fuelled the fourth wave of migration. The initial catalyst for this wave of migration was President P.W. Botha’s 1985 ‘Rubicon speech’ in which he ‘declined’ to enter into negotiations to end the civil war, saying whites were not prepared to ‘surrender their country.’ This was followed by the 1985 declaration of a state of emergency which intensified the war. Further, during this period, South Africa’s wars against black nationalist guerrillas in Namibia and against Cubans, Russians and Angolans in Angola also intensified (Bridgland, 1990). White males found themselves conscripted more regularly (and into more dangerous situations), which drove many to opt for migration. The profile of wave four migrants was similar to wave

¹⁵ Calculating how many Rhodesians migrated to Australia is even more difficult than calculating the South African figures because a high percentage of Rhodesians were born elsewhere (UK, Ireland, South Africa and Zambia). A similar problem exists when calculating the number of South African migrants to Australia because the category ‘South Africa born’ does not cover the many South African Australians born in the UK, Ireland, Portugal or Zimbabwe. However, the problem is greater for the category ‘Rhodesian’ because a much higher percentage of Rhodesians were born outside Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

¹⁶ While living in Africa, there had been some tension between white South Africans and Rhodesians because the latter regarded themselves as ‘superior’ due to being ‘more Anglo’ with less ‘Boer-influences.’ South Africans, on the other hand, regarded Rhodesians as their ‘country-cousins.’

two migrants, although Indians, coloreds and even some Afrikaners began to join the exodus. The UK, Australia, Canada and the USA were the most popular destinations. From 1986 until 1990 some 12,000 South African WICs migrated to Australia to escape the civil war. During the same period there was also a significant growth in the number of (mostly black) South African political activists joining exile communities in Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe who were engaged in fighting the South African government.

In February 1990, President De Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC and PAC, and announced the start of negotiations to end the civil war. The negotiations (1991-93) produced a new constitution and culminated in the 1994 elections, which the ANC won. The period 1990-1993 saw anti-apartheid exiles returning from all over the world. The returnees coalesced into distinct subcultures upon their return to South Africa, reflecting their quite different experiences while in exile. There were, for example, an Eastern European group, an African group and a liberal group.¹⁷

The Fifth Wave

A fifth (post-apartheid) wave of migration began in 1990. The period 1990-1993 actually saw a slowing down in the exodus due to a widespread mood of optimism following De Klerk's ending of the civil war, which led to the belief that South Africa was finally going to build a political culture that transcended race and ethnicity. However, this optimism quickly waned due to a rising death toll caused by an ANC-Inkatha Freedom Party war during the first half of the 1990s. Also, from 1992 onwards, the ANC increasingly mobilized a black nationalist rhetoric (Louw, 1994:31-37) and came to rely on racial and ethnic appeals to mobilize its constituency (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:341). Non-blacks (whites, coloreds and Indians) found these appeals to black nationalism alienating. Hence, by 1993, a significant post-apartheid migration wave was in motion as the perception grew that post-apartheid South Africa would remain a race-based society and a society characterized by racial conflict. Migration accelerated once a shift was perceived towards a one-party dominant democracy where minority groups perceived themselves to have been rendered increasingly powerless (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:337-354). This fifth wave is still underway and looks set to be the biggest of South African migrations. This wave has consisted of Anglos, Indians, coloreds and, for the first time, significant

¹⁷ The Eastern European and African groups were overwhelmingly black activists associated with the ANC or PAC while the liberal group consisted of individual white Anglos who were returning once 'apartheid was over.' The latter were not generally political activists.

numbers of Afrikaners. This wave has also been more representative of a wider range of class positions and political attitudes held by WICs. Those seeking to leave South Africa in the 1990s have included not only affluent liberals (who dominated waves two and four), but also middle and working class WICs left-wingers and conservatives. Some Namibians are included as well.¹⁸ The fifth wave has been dominated by middle aged WICs with young families (hence, 11 percent of South African Australians were under 15 in 1996), and has also included a family reunion component associated with fourth wave migrants persuading relatives to join them. For fifth wave migrants, migration is less traumatic because they now have sizeable and established South African diasporic communities to join. In addition, a new type of migration has emerged – white school-leavers are being encouraged to leave the country by their parents.¹⁹ Often, they go as university students or on temporary resident permits, a step towards gaining permanent residence in places like the UK and USA. This has led to a new genre of South African ‘migration journalism’ dealing with such themes as warning parents about the dangers of encouraging their children to emigrate (*You*, 4 January 2001) or advising South African grandparents on how to cope when their children/grandchildren emigrate (*FairLady*, 20 December 2000). Migration themes have also become a feature of South African television (news and entertainment) programming. Each week, national newspapers like the *Sunday Times* feature advertisements placed by migration consultants offering ways to get into Australia, the UK, USA, Canada and New Zealand.

The fifth wave exodus is being driven by a complex set of post-apartheid factors associated with crime and a post-1994 political program of racial re-ranking. Given the significance of this wave in the twenty-first century global South African diaspora,²⁰ some discussion will be given to unravelling its causes, size and composition.

¹⁸ Namibia received its independence from South Africa in 1990.

¹⁹ The parents often say they are personally ‘too old’ to consider starting a new life in a foreign place, but they see no future for their children in South Africa and so encourage them to leave. Many of those who have migrated did so because they assumed their offspring would migrate, and wanted to avoid the prospect of living in a different country as their children. As one migrant said: “The country is in a continuous downward spiral. There are a few blips of encouragement, but the direction doesn’t change. Many South Africans have reached the cut: either you go or your children go” (*Style*, August 1996:48).

²⁰ One indicator that the flow out of South Africa seems unlikely to abate is the extent to which migration has become a central topic of conversation in the WIC communities. A 1998 *Business Times Appointments* survey revealed that 79 percent of its readers would consider emigrating - 46 percent cited Australia as their favored destination (*Sunday Times*, 28 February 1999).

Motivations Behind the Post-Apartheid Exodus

From the 1990s onwards, crime represents a new factor driving South African migration. The other major reason behind post-apartheid migration, racial re-ranking is not entirely a new factor. The perception that Afrikaner nationalists were using the state to rank themselves upwards and to Afrikanerize South Africa motivated many Anglos to leave in the 1950s and 1960s. Post-apartheid political culture turned out to be as race-driven as its apartheid predecessor, and hence the 1990s have seen similar perceptions grow. This time, however, it is whites, Indians and coloreds who believe black nationalists are using the state to rank themselves upwards and Africanize South Africa. Some may question the validity of these perceptions in the 1950s and 1990s, but they were powerful enough beliefs to generate the outward flow of South Africans.

The two themes of crime and the politics of racial re-ranking came up in both the 1999 attitudes survey and the early ethnographic studies in Australia. They have also been reported by SANSA and by journalists who have interviewed migrants (e.g., *Style*, August 1996; *FairLady*, 22 July 1998).

Post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a law and order crisis involving a significant increase in murder, assault, robbery associated with violence, drug-related crimes, burglary and fraud. Between 1994 and 1999 violent crimes increased by 21.6 percent. In 1999, 32.6 percent of reported crimes were of a violent nature, compared to 15 percent in the USA and 6 percent in the UK. Interpol's 1997 figures showed that South Africa had the world's highest per capita number of murders, rapes, violent robberies and thefts.²¹ Because the police and criminal justice system are widely perceived to be incapable of solving this crime wave, private policing organizations and vigilantism proliferated all over South Africa. This only served to further increase the levels of violence. Post-apartheid migrants consistently ranked crime and fear for their own safety, especially for their children's safety, as the topmost reasons for migrating, according to a report by SANSA. Similar reasons and rankings were revealed by the 1999 attitudes surveys and ethnographic studies. Focus group participants in the 1999 study portrayed Australia as "peaceful," "safe," "well-governed" and having a "good economy," which was continually contrasted with the situation in South Africa. Comments from black South African students revealed an interesting perspective on this migration phenomenon. Some representative comments were: "People are leaving South Africa to go to Australia so it must be good;" "lots of South Africans are migrating there;"

²¹ De Kock (2000) provides a comprehensive breakdown of crime statistics.

"many people are moving there;" "from what I hear it sounds like a peaceful place;" and "it sounds like a nice place because there are no wars there" (Louw et al., 2001:125).

The other cluster of concerns that appears to have underpinned post-apartheid push-migration are essentially political in nature, and derive from the politics of racial re-ranking associated with the ANC's policies of "black empowerment" and "corrective action." These ANC interventions reflect the fact that race has always served as a powerful marker of status, life chances and identity in South Africa. In both British and apartheid South Africa a racial ranking system placed whites at the top, Indians and coloreds in the middle and blacks at the bottom. A core feature of 1990s ANC policy has been state-intervention to undo the former "racial hierarchy" and actively elevate the "African majority" upwards (Jordan, 1997:3)²² through black empowerment initiatives (Mbeki, 1999:2-3). For whites, coloreds and Indians, the resultant re-ranking exercise has become an important push factor. In the 1999 survey some students reported that their parents encouraged them to leave because they would be "discriminated against" in the new South Africa. Such attitudes parallel how Malaysia's *bumiputera* policy became a push-factor in Malaysian-Chinese migration to Australia (Milne and Mauzy, 1999:89-96). Given the likelihood that the politics of racial re-ranking will continue to generate WIC migration during the first part of the twenty-first century, the roots of this re-ranking exercise are examined below.

Racial Re-ranking and Migration

A feature of the British Empire was a race-ranking system that Donald Horowitz (1985:184) has called "positional psychology," i.e., racial ranking allocated group worth. Within the colonial system there were what Horowitz called "backward" and "advanced" groups. One's worth as an individual was ascribed according to the ethnic group one was born into. An empire-wide colonial race-ranking system existed, a worldview that justified English-rule over an Empire of lesser human types. A unified British South Africa was established in 1910 as a white racial oligarchy in which Anglos were dominant. Racial oligarchy was encoded into South Africa's origins by the founder of modern South Africa, Lord Alfred Milner, and has remained a feature of "the South African way" of life ever since.

²² Pallo Jordan, a leading ANC leader and intellectual produced a discussion paper, "The National Question in Post-1994 South Africa" for the ANC's 1997 National Conference. This paper outlined the historical emergence of South Africa's racial hierarchy and the ANC's attempts to undo the existing hierarchy through black empowerment programs (Jordan, 1987).

As Horowitz said (1958:154), "the colonialists thus set in motion a comparative process by which aptitudes and disabilities imputed to ethnic groups were to be evaluated...[and] .. the evaluations took hold ...[so that] ... no one emerged from colonial rule untouched by the new standards of group evaluation." To be born a white Anglo was to see oneself and be seen by others as automatically superior and "advanced." To be born a black South African was to be automatically "backward." To be born Afrikaans was to be allocated to an intermediary position. Anglos saw Afrikaners as "honorary Europeans," slightly "better than blacks," but somehow tainted by their long association with Africa. This Anglo-manufactured ascribed ranking affected not only one's economic life chances, but also affected one's perceived self-worth. It was a social-order in which non-Anglos could never feel fully "worthy." This produced a sense of inferiority because being in a "backward" (or intermediary) position produced a feeling of being "weak and helpless" vis-a-vis the "advanced" group (Horowitz, 1985:170). It also produced a form of self-stereotyping in which members of the "backward" groups adopted compliant personalities characterized by unassertiveness, an unambitious demeanor and the assumption that others were more intelligent, better educated and more worthwhile (Horowitz, 1985:170-171). Besides being psychologically unsettling, exclusion from the "advanced" group produced feelings of envy, insecurity and deprivation (Jesudason, 1995:7). These had profound effects on subsequent socio-political developments in South Africa because it produced "catch-up nationalism," i.e., Afrikaner nationalism and South African black nationalism. In the final analysis these catch-up nationalisms (with their policies of apartheid and affirmative action) are all attempts by groups "psychologically damaged" by the Anglo-colonial ranking system to re-arrange it and achieve the "same recognition" accorded to the "advanced" group (Horowitz, 1985:165). They are nationalisms triggered by 'pain.'

This is suggested in President Thabo Mbeki's lament that South Africa remains "a country of two nations" (Mbeki, 2000:8). Mbeki referred to whites as the "oppressor nation" (2000:6), "colonialists" (2000:2) and "the arrogant ...[who] ... believe themselves to be superior" (2000:2). He reproached whites as "the beneficiaries of racism [who] consider it their duty to discourage the victims of racism from reflecting and acting on the pain they feel" (Mbeki, 2000:8). He noted that, unlike other colonial situations, in South Africa "our own "oppressor nation" and "ruling class" ceased to be foreign" (Mbeki, 2000:3) and so remained within the country. This created the challenge for black people to destroy the old order while having to continue to live within the same state as the "oppressor nation." Mbeki (2000:6) called upon black South Africans to fight for "upward mobility" and reproached those blacks who became (token) "black faces" for white

business seeking to circumvent black empowerment regulations. He added, "the fault will not be in our stars but in ourselves if we remain underlings" (Mbeki, 2000:8). He made his first public airing of the notion that South Africa is a country of two nations in 1998 when he proposed that reconciliation needed to be reappraised because South Africa was "not becoming one nation" and would not become one nation until there is substantive progress in upgrading the black nation's socio-economic position (Mbeki, 1998). This theme of "two nations" has been widely criticized, including by Nelson Mandela, for fanning racial tensions inside South Africa.

Jesudason (1995:7) has noted that "deprived individuals and their leaders, especially if they possess strong cultural and affective ties, are prone to using the state to ... modify the opportunity structure of society." The earliest such nationalist catch-up project was undertaken from the 1930s to the 1960s by an intermediary-ranked South African group, namely Afrikaner nationalists. Apartheid was an enormous racial re-ranking and "affirmative action" project designed by the NP to upgrade Afrikaners who had been impoverished by Anglos after the Boer War through a program that has been dubbed *Volkskapitalism* ("people's capitalism") (O'Meara, 1983).²³ To achieve this, the NP focussed its energy on capturing the state which was used as a vehicle to create opportunities for Afrikaner advancement. The result was the creation of an ethnic-patronage system. Apartheid became, in effect, a huge affirmative action program for Afrikaners. The NP dispensed public service jobs and built a huge education system of Afrikaner schools, colleges and universities in order to upgrade their constituency. An interesting feature of this Afrikaner affirmative action program was that the NP created *separate* structures alongside and parallel to the Anglo structures. Initially "standards" were not as high in the parallel Afrikaner

²³ Various explanations have been advanced regarding the roots of apartheid. Six of the more common interpretations include the following: (1) the belief within a branch of Calvinist Christianity within the Dutch Reformed Church that Afrikaners were a "chosen people" tasked with Christianizing Africa (see De Klerck, 1976); (2) apartheid is a black-white competition over land (see Davenport, 1977); (3) it is a race-based conflict motivated by a belief in racial domination, an approach associated with liberal historians (see De Villiers, 1971); (4) the pursuit of Nationalist Party policies by Afrikaner nationalist ideologues is another example of the "natural" nationalist impulse in Western civilization to promote one's own "nation" (see Meyer, 1966); (5) apartheid as the logical response to external challenges threatening the survival and political, economic and cultural well-being of Afrikaners, an approach associated with Afrikaner historians (see Meyer, 1966); and (6) economic explanations, according to Marxists (see O'Meara, 1983). There are overlaps in the interpretations of Marxists and Afrikaner nationalist historians in viewing apartheid as a means to promote Afrikaner well being in the face of Anglo capitalism. This paper is located where these two interpretations overlap.

institutions — i.e., Afrikaners were effectively “protected” from Anglo competition while standards were raised over a twenty-year period until they reached the same level as the Anglo institutions. This parallel infrastructure was paid for by taxing businesses in South Africa (which were generally Anglo-owned). The trade-off for these businesses was, as O’Meara (1983:247) argues, that the state facilitated the exploitation of black workers by the business sector. Apartheid meant businesses could generate substantive profits even after paying taxes from exploiting black people, and not be “damaged” by having less competent people forced on them by affirmative action. Hence the Anglo business sector was left unscathed by Afrikaner affirmative action during the upgrade/transition period.²⁴ The current ANC-led black empowerment program replicates many aspects of the NP’s ethnic patronage system, but also differs from the NP’s model because the ANC program is not based upon building a separate and parallel set of infrastructures. Instead, it is based upon taking control of *existent* socio-economic structures in order to promote black (middle class) interests.

In 1990s South Africa, black empowerment, corrective action and affirmative action represented the policies adopted by black people who used the ANC to successfully take control of the state. Consequentially, black people previously ranked “backwards” (Horowitz, 1985:174) during the colonial period now demanded that they be granted preferential treatment relative to those formally deemed to belong to the “advanced” group. The objective was to ensure that those previously ranked “backwards” were now to take charge politically so as to facilitate state-led upward-ranking initiatives (Jordan, 1997:3). In this regard, South Africa’s black empowerment/corrective action policies are much closer to the Malaysian *bumiputera* model of social reorganization than to America’s equal opportunity-driven approach to affirmative action. Hence, in 1990s South Africa, black people (referring to themselves as “the majority” or “the previously disadvantaged”) demanded preferential employment opportunities and university placements while whites (pejoratively referred to as “the elite” or “the minority”) were to be “penalized.” Businesses whose ownership and staffing structures were seen to be “too white” were not given government contracts and were legislatively forced to meet race quotas. The ANC government also set about re-staffing the civil service and state-owned enterprises by retrenching whites and replacing them with blacks. In 2001 South African universities which had difficulty finding qualified black

²⁴ Afrikaner affirmative action never succeeded in upgrading Afrikaners to economic dominance. Up until the present Anglos remain where Lord Milner’s system placed them, i.e., at the top of the economic racial ranking system.

academies were told by the government to recruit black staff from the rest of Africa rather than continue employing white South African citizens (ANC, 2001:3). Indians and coloreds occupied an ambiguous position within this re-ranking exercise. Although they were not specifically "targeted" as "the elite," they were also affected by the new policies. Colored and Indian²⁵ resentment about this generated ANC moves to try and rectify the situation, especially with regard to coloreds (a group the ANC wishes to win over as voters in order to take control of the Western Cape provincial government).²⁶ When he stepped down as ANC leader, Nelson Mandela drew attention to the tensions black empowerment and affirmative action were creating within the white, colored and Indian communities. Mandela called upon the ANC to address these tensions, and the need to get the support of all three national minorities. He noted that the other groups in South Africa perceive themselves to be disadvantaged: "It is clear that the majority within these national minorities continue to believe that the ANC represents the interests of the African majority and that their own perceived interests stand opposed to those of the African majority... the view has emerged that where apartheid benefited the national minorities, a non-racial democracy would disadvantage them. Such imagined disadvantaged would range from economic and employment opportunities to language and cultural rights" (Mandela, 1997:7). These WIC perceptions, whether valid or not, have driven white, colored and Indian migration out of South Africa in the 1990s.

Thus, the post-apartheid breakdown of law and order plus the racial re-ranking exercise generated push factors and prompting the emigration of WICs from South Africa.²⁷ Firstly, WICs (especially Afrikaners) experienced economic and career pressures due to the implementation of black empowerment and corrective action. Secondly, the ANC actively promoted a black nationalist Afro-centric pride (tied to an active devaluation of Euro-

²⁵ Surveys in 2000 indicated that Indians were, surprisingly, more unhappy with post-apartheid conditions than whites (*Mail and Guardian*, 1 November 2000).

²⁶ Municipal elections in 2000 revealed coloreds remained resentful about ANC policies.

²⁷ Simultaneously, an internal migration has taken place to the Western Cape province. Whites and coloreds unable to gain entry to overseas countries have opted to move to the only South African province where blacks constitute a minority of the population and where Afrikaans is the dominant language. This internal migration to the coastal area between Cape Town and Plettenberg Bay has come to be called "semigration" (*Style*, November 2000), i.e., migrating away from those parts of South Africa where the pressures of 'Africanization' and violent crimes are most evident, as opposed to 'full migration' or leaving South Africa.

centric cultural forms). An example are the changes in policies at the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). In 1995, 33 percent of programming on SABC TV was in Afrikaans, which was reduced to 3.7 percent in 1996. During the apartheid period, there were four SABC TV channels, each of which targeted an audience. In post-apartheid period, TV1, the flagship channel which used to broadcast 50 percent English and 50 percent Afrikaans programming, shifted to Xhosa, Zulu and English to target Zulu, Xhosa, Nbedele and Swazi audiences. One channel, TV4, was privatized and broadcasts programs which have a multicultural thrust. Other changes were evident in the staffing profile, the shift to English as the internal "operating language" (instead of Afrikaans), and change in décor from so-called Eurocentric art to African art. WICs perceived these as promoting cultural "Africanization" at the expense of their non-Afro cultural forms. Thirdly, the ANC's language policy has *de facto* downgraded the status and use of Afrikaans which has alienated Afrikaners and coloreds.²⁸ There used to be two official languages, English and Afrikaans, and both languages were used in the civil service. Post-apartheid South Africa has 11 official languages. These languages, ranked from the most to least spoken, are: Zulu, Xhosa, Afrikaans, Pedi, English, Tswana, Sotho, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda, and Ndebele. However, using 11 languages proved to be impractical (due to cost and the logistics of using so many languages), hence *de facto* the state (and business) have taken to using English as the language of record, administration and commerce. Afrikaans has been largely dropped in the process. Fourth, as the ANC equalized resource distribution (i.e., transferred resources into the "black sector"), WIC communities experienced a decline in the levels of service delivery in health, education, welfare, roads and public service broadcasting. The 1998 and 2000 ethnographic studies in Australia revealed that amongst post-1995 migrants this sometimes translates into complaints about "a fall in standards" and a decline into "inefficiency" and "grubbiness." Fifth, for whites, racial re-ranking has been especially traumatic because until 1990 they were at the top of the racial hierarchy. During the 1990s this was replaced by the belief (whether justified or not) that they had become an "unwelcome minority" whose children faced a troubled future at the hands of black nationalists — i.e., there was a growing sense of marginalization and second-classness. As one white migrant said: "There is a sense of being ignored, as though we didn't matter. Hostility I can maybe take, irrelevance I can't handle" (*Style*, August 1996:49). Essentially, as South Africa showed signs of becoming a one-party dominant democracy (Louw, 2000:235-236; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:

²⁸ The majority of coloreds are Afrikaans-speakers.

chapter 14), minority groups experienced a growing sense of political powerlessness and/or having lost control over their destinies.

A feature of the post-apartheid exodus is that this population carries with them a sense of "displacement" and "loss" which translates into the sort of "collective identity" characteristics of diasporic populations (Clifford, 1997:286). As Clifford says (1997:286): "diasporic populations do not come from elsewhere in the same way that 'immigrants' do" (1997:286) and do not suffer "loss" and "nostalgia" only *en route* to their new homes. Rather, he argues that diasporics carry with them an identity built upon an on-going collective sense of "loss" and "displacement." Interviews of South African Australians revealed this sense of loss, displacement and dispossession, and the angst born of wanting to return home, but feeling unable to do because of the perceived push-factors operative there (*FairLady*, 22 July 1998). Clifford (1997:288) describes diasporas as "dispersed networks of peoples who share common historical experiences of dispossession, displacement, adaptation, and so forth." A shared experience of "loss" can be noted in the Web-based networking that has grown up among Southern Africans in the UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.²⁹ In our 1998 and 2000 ethnographic studies in Australia, this sense of "loss" did not emerge when people were questioned in group situations. More common then was the theme of "making a go of it" now that one had made the move.

Measuring the Post-Apartheid Exodus

It is difficult to accurately establish the size of the fifth (post-apartheid) migrant wave because South African government statistics include only those who were prepared to declare their emigrant status on departure, and increasingly South Africans were not doing this. The phenomenon of "closet emigration" (*Style*, August 1996:48) has emerged in which South Africans effectively migrate, but do not do so officially. SANSA has also noted this phenomenon. Two variants of "closet migration" appear to exist. Firstly, when a growing number of young people (18 to 25) depart they now declare themselves to be students or tourists who intend to return. Many are believed to deliberately seek out British, American or Irish spouses in the hope that this will improve their prospects of gaining overseas permanent residence. Secondly, many *de facto* long-term migrants now declare themselves to be departing only in order to undertake short-term contractual work overseas, or even claim to be tourists. This is sometimes done to avoid

²⁹ This Southern African diasporic Web-presence was found during a Web search in mid-2000.

South African taxation department scrutiny, or to facilitate easy movement in-and-out of South Africa (sometimes to arrange transfers of capital out of South Africa), or simply to hedge their bets (making an easy return possible). A SANSA comparison of South African government migration statistics and the statistics of the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand reveals this "closet migration" phenomenon. Australian government figures indicated that 4,700 South Africa-born people settled in Australia in 1998 while South African government statistics recorded only 1,492 people migrating to Australia in 1998. South African government figures stated 82,811 South Africans officially migrated to the UK, USA, Australia, Canada or New Zealand between 1989 and 1997. However, official statistics from these five states suggested a total of 233,609 South Africans had permanently settled in these five countries between 1989-1987 (Kaplan et al., nd:1). It is also possible that data in the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand undercount the number of South African migrants because many South Africans misreport their intentions upon arrival in the host countries.

According to Kaplan et al. (nd) the five major recipient countries (UK, USA, Australia, Canada or New Zealand) collectively account for three-quarters of South Africa's emigration. This would mean at least 310,000 persons joined the global South African diaspora between 1989 and 1997. The rate of South African emigration has increased since then. For example, Australian figures on South Africa-born permanent arrivals have shown a consistent upward pattern: 3,211 in 1996-97; 4,281 in 1997-98; 5,024 in 1998-99; and 5,231 in 1999-2000. The huge backlog of migration applications waiting to be processed by the Australian High Commission in Pretoria suggest further increase in the flow of South Africans into Australia.

Significantly, those joining the South African diaspora tend to be the most skilled South Africans. The profile of South African Australians reveals this: 25 percent are university graduates, 12.7 percent have vocational qualifications and 29 percent are classified as "professionals" (Lucas, 2000:16-20). South Africans also avail of the "business migration" category — 20 percent of the 1994-95 business migrants to Australia were South Africans; with the equivalent figure for 1995-96 being 8 percent (*The Mercury Focus International*, 5 February 1999).

Philip Ruddock, Australian Minister of Immigration, noted the skilled nature of South African migrants in his foreword in the publication, *South Africa Born*: "Most South African immigrants arrived in Australia in the last 20 years. Despite being a relatively new immigrant group, they have been very successful. The South African-born profile illustrates the many positive features of this community. They are well educated, perform very well in the labour force and have highly paid jobs" (Lucas, 2000). The entry

requirements of destination-countries are selective of those with skills or capital, hence there is consequently a skewing in favor of those who are upper-middle class and above. The less affluent and less qualified WICs are generally excluded by entry requirements and report feeling "trapped."

In effect, South Africa is experiencing a major post-1993 brain drain. The SANSA project estimated that the emigration of professionals has been 56 percent higher after 1994 compared with the 1989-94 figures (Kaplan et al., nd:2). SANSA estimates that between 12 percent and 20 percent of South Africans with tertiary qualifications now reside outside South Africa (Kaplan, et al., nd:2). Furthermore, more than 77 percent of South African migrants to the USA have tertiary education, while New Zealand and Canadian government figures indicate that 10,000 South Africans in the occupational categories medicine, science, mathematics and engineering have migrated to these countries between 1989 and 1998 (Kaplan et al., nd:3-4).³⁰

Despite the limitations of existing figures on the fifth wave of South African migration, they suggest that a major post-apartheid exodus of WICs is underway. This is likely to continue during the first decade of the twenty-first century as South Africa is socially and economically transformed. Kaplan et al. (nd) cited a finding from a recent international survey of the highly skilled that the likelihood of remaining in their country was lower for South Africans than for any other country except Russia (*The Economist*, 10 July 1999:116). It appears that the fifth wave migration will generate by far the largest of South African exoduses in which Australia looms as a major destination. In 2000, South Africa had become Australia's third largest source for permanent migrants (after the UK and China): 6.5 percent of all migrants to Australia were from South Africa.³¹

"Packing for Perth" – Australia as the Preferred Destination

By the 1990s, the expression "Packing for Perth" (or PFP) had become part of the South African idiom, with the terms "emigration" and "Packing for

³⁰ Since the mid-1990s South Africa has faced two separate migration problems. Firstly, high rates of emigration of skilled professionals and managers. The other is the high rates of illegal immigration of unskilled people from the rest of Africa. The latter has generated a black nationalist xenophobia which has led to migrants from other African countries (now called *amaKweraKwera*) being routinely attacked (and sometimes killed) by mobs of South Africans because of perceptions that 'they are taking our jobs.'

³¹ South Africans unable to meet Australian entry requirements have discovered they can use New Zealand as a back-door into Australia. Two-step migration has also been observed for South Africans who initially go to the UK, who later move on to Australia.

Perth" having become virtually interchangeable in everyday WIC conversation. This partly reflected the widespread perception that for those wanting to migrate, Australia was a good place to go because it was "like home" (due to a similar climate and cultural milieu). Whereas in the 1980s, "Packed for Perth" was a pejorative term (encoding strong disapproval for those joining the "chicken run"), the term has acquired other meanings by the mid-1990s.³² In the 1999 attitudes survey an interesting dichotomy emerged among South African students (which on two occasions caused tension among focus group participants) – one group of students expressed envy for those who had migrated to Australia while another group expressed hostility towards Australia "for stealing our people."

Ironically, although Perth has become associated with leaving South Africa, only some 18 percent of South Africa-born Australians actually live in this city. In fact, a much higher percentage of South Africans actually move to Sydney (or London). However, the South African diasporic presence is more strongly felt in Perth, because it is a smaller city (of 1.29-million) than Sydney, hence South Africans (and Rhodesians) form a higher and more visible percentage of the overall population. Lucas (2000:7) reports that 0.8 percent of Perth's population are South Africa-born, while it is 0.5 percent in Sydney. In reality, the notion of becoming, or wanting to become a PFP has actually become detached from Perth as a geographical locality and "Perth" has simply become a marker of impelled migration from South Africa, and of South Africans seeking to move to a place as similar to South Africa as possible. In a sense, what Australia (and Perth) have become is the "desirable other." In the 1999 attitudes survey, 61 percent of English-speakers and 58 percent of Afrikaans-speaker said they would like to migrate to Australia. For the students (and according to them, their parents), Perth and Australia had become an almost romanticized "promised land," to which they could escape, a place that would be "familiar" but which would not have the violence, crime, turmoil, racism, black empowerment policies, or sense of marginalization being experienced in South Africa.

As SANSa noted, a higher percentage of South Africa's diaspora is migrating to the UK than to Australia. The main reason for this is that many South African Anglos hold British citizenship and so it is easier for them to migrate to the UK than to Australia. The UK is not their first choice, but a route of least resistance. The question of what makes Australia the destination of choice has to do with perceptions of similarities between Australia

³² However, a new theme did emerge in the 1990s, namely the idea that those who did not migrate in spite of "the troubles" were tougher than those who did (*Style*, January 2000).

and South Africa. Geography for one, is something that Australia and South Africa have in common, according to the 1999 survey and ethnographic studies. Hence Australia both "looks" familiar and home-like. The two countries also share similar architecture and land use, again generating a sense of familiarity. Similar climates allow South Africans to continue their outdoors culture.

Secondly, the 1999 survey revealed that white Anglo and South Indian African students believe that they share a similar culture with Australians. Afrikaans-speakers (white and colored), on the other hand, did not say they shared the same culture, but 70 percent said they thought Australians were similar to South Africans. This belief in sharing similar cultural forms is not surprising given that both cultures were built by transplanted northwest Europeans, colonizing similar climatic/vegetation zones, within the same political (British Empire) framework, and based upon economies involving pastoralism, dry-land farming and mining. Cultural connectivities between Australians and Anglo South Africans have been long-standing and many, reaching back to the original development of Australia's pastoral industry (founded upon imported South African merino sheep), the exchange of migrants during the nineteenth century gold rushes, and the settlement of Australians in South Africa following the Boer War. Further, the two founding fathers of a united Australia (Alfred Deakin) and a united South Africa (Alfred Milner) were contemporaries (who corresponded with each other) and who shared virtually identical visions for building colonial Anglo-derivative societies in the southern hemisphere. There has also been a long tradition of sports contact (cricket and rugby) between Australia and South Africa which has generated a sense of familiarity between the two societies. The theme of familiarity constantly came up during the 1999 survey and the Australian ethnographic studies. In the 1999 survey WIC South African students saw Australians as "sort of like us" (this was not true of the black students who participated in the focus groups and who were interviewed). South Africans interviewed as of the 1998 and 2000 ethnographic studies in Australia recognized that although there were differences between Australians and themselves, they said it was easy to blend into Australian society because of the many cultural similarities.

Thirdly, the 1999 survey and ethnographic studies revealed that South Africans see Australia as an underutilized resource-rich continent offering good career prospects. Moreover, because Australians are viewed as laid-back, many South Africans assume they will encounter less competition in the job market than would be the case in the USA or EU. This is not an unimportant consideration for push-migrants having to re-launch themselves mid-career in a new country.

Fourthly, since the 1980s, South African migrants have had to contend with a rapidly weakening South African currency. This has meant South African diasporics need to re-establish themselves in new locations with considerably less capital than they left South Africa with. In this regard, it is believed to be cheaper to re-establish oneself in Australia than in the UK or USA. Australia is seen to offer greater prospects for reconstructing a lifestyle similar to the one left behind but without the negatives of violent crime and the politics of race. In short, Australia appears to be a state far-removed from major conflict zones and a society with minimal internal problems, racial problems, political conflict or crime. This is a major pull-factor for many Southern Africans, following 25 years of violent conflict and turmoil in Southern Africa.

Thus, Australia is firmly established in the consciousness of South Africans as a place where many Southern Africans live. This has served to encourage more migration to Australia as more of South Africans now report knowing of someone living in Australia, as travel between the two societies increases, as knowledge of Australia becomes more widespread in South Africa. These factors make Australia seem more familiar, and make migration feel less threatening.

South Africans in Australia

The current profile of Australia's South African population differs from the South African population. In South Africa, white Anglos constitute four percent of the population; Indians, 2.6 percent; Afrikaners, 7.5 percent; and coloreds, nine percent (South Africa, 1998). There is no data on the ethnic groups or communities South African Australians come from, but there is data on the religious affiliation of South African (Lucas, 2000:29). Although it is recognized that inferring ethnicity from religion is far from satisfactory, it will be deployed here as at least indicative because religion is such a strong marker of ethnicity in South Africa. According to Lucas (2000:29) 20.6 percent of South African Australians are Anglicans; 13.5 percent are Jewish; and 7.5 percent Uniting Church. In South Africa, these three categories would be largely markers of white Angloness. In addition, 17.9 percent of South African Australians are Catholics, which in South Africa is a faith overwhelmingly professed by Anglo-whites and black people. Some 6.2 percent of South African Australians are either Hindu or Muslim. This would generally be a marker of being a member of the South African Indian community, although 13 percent of coloreds are Muslim. The majority of Afrikaners and colored are members of Dutch Reform churches or are Baptists. Only 3.5 percent of South African Australians profess Reformism and only 2.7 are Baptists. The 19 percent of South African Australians

professing no religion would be less likely to be Afrikaners or coloreds (as opposed to Anglos). In short, if religious affiliation is used as a marker, 71 percent of existing South African Australians can be assumed to be white Anglos.

Another indicator of ethnicity can be gauged from the language spoken at home. In the Lucas report (2000:2), 90 percent of South Africa-born Australians spoke only English at home; six percent spoke Afrikaans; and one percent spoke an Asian language (e.g., Tamil). Language also indicates that the great majority of South African Australians are white Anglos.

The strongly white Anglo nature of South African Australians is one feature of this community that may likely to undergo some change. Since 1994, the fifth wave migration includes an increasing number of Indian South Africans, coloreds and Afrikaners among the migrants. Our ethnographic investigation also confirms press reports and anecdotal evidence that South African migration to Australia is becoming more diverse. The migration of Afrikaans-speakers is an interesting fifth wave development because this is a Southern African *ethnie* that has traditionally not been inclined to emigrate for four reasons. Firstly, Afrikaans is spoken nowhere outside Southern Africa, and hence migration is seen to involve abandoning one's language (and cultural practices). Secondly, Afrikaners were politically dominant between 1948 and 1990. Thirdly, Afrikaner identity has become strongly enmeshed with the (nationalist) notion of being rooted in Africa (encoded in the very act of self-naming as Afrikaner/'African').³³ Fourth, this *ethnie* has traditionally not been inclined to emigrate because Afrikaner identity emerged from a long-standing struggle not to be anglicized. This makes joining the South African diaspora (mostly located in Anglo countries) psychologically difficult for Afrikaners. As one politician said of the emergence of 1990s Afrikaner migration: "It's a big step, because in effect an Afrikaner ceases to be an Afrikaner outside the country. It's not fair to the children to try and sustain the language and the culture in isolation. So Afrikaners must be prepared to make big sacrifices to emigrate. Yet I know of several professional families who have already taken that step" (*Style*, August 1996:50). In part, those increasingly taking this step are

³³ This attitude of 'African-ness' has produced one rather interesting (if minor) form of post-apartheid migration, namely the 1990s migration of white Afrikaners to other African states (after the governments of Mozambique, Zambia, Congo and Uganda began recruiting 'Boers' because they were seen to be good farmers who could rejuvenate agriculture in these countries). One such departing Boer-farmer said in an interview by SA-TV news in 1995 that he would never consider moving to Australia because he was "an African," but he was leaving South Africa because he believed blacks in other African countries would not treat his children as badly as he expected them to be treated in the new South Africa.

responding to a growing perception that the ANC's language policy will, over time, destroy Afrikaans – Anglicization is coming to be seen as inevitable, whether one stays or leaves South Africa. In the 1999 survey, Afrikaners were still the South African group least keen to emigrate from South Africa: 67 percent of black university students said they would like to Australia as did 61 percent of Anglos and 58 percent of Afrikaners (Louw et al., 2001:125).

However, despite the arrival of non-Anglos, the South African Australian community, white Anglos and Anglo South African culture is likely to dominate within this diasporic community. Non-Anglos joining it will inevitably become Anglos, a process already seen in the way Afrikaners were Anglicized within three generations of migrating to Rhodesia, where Afrikaans was never an official language.

Australia's South African community is also not representative of the overall South African population in terms of its class composition. In 2001, most South African Australians still have their roots in South Africa's upper-middle classes or the affluent business sector. In particular, those arriving in Australia between 1976 and 1990 tended to be comprised mostly of business migrants or professionals. In this regard, it is especially striking how affluent Jewish South Africans relocated themselves from suburbs in Johannesburg's north and Cape Town's south to equivalent suburbs in Sydney's north and east. In the process, Sydney suburbs like St. Ives (now locally called "St. Africa") have become significantly South Africanized.

The migration of South Africa's most skilful and educated to places like Australia and Canada has been driven by several factors. In addition to the factors cited in earlier sections – the host countries' preference for migrants with more skills or capital, the post-apartheid climate in South Africa and its impact on the more educated South Africans – Anglos also tend to be most comfortable in migrating to other Anglo societies. Thus, self-selection and Australian's immigration policy have skewed the profile of South African migrants in favor of those most likely to join the upper-middle classes or the affluent in Australia.³⁴

In 1996, the occupational structure of South African Australians fared favorably compared with the Australian population (Lucas, 2000:20-21) – 29.7 percent of employed South Africa-born were professionals, 11.5 percent were managers, 4.1 percent were laborers and 3.6 percent were produc-

³⁴ Not surprisingly (if somewhat exaggeratedly), South Africans have come to be called Australia's new "boat people" because it is claimed that they buy a boat soon after arriving in Australia.

tion-workers. The corresponding percentages for the Australian population were 17.6, 9.5, 9, and 8.9.

It should be mentioned that the 1990s has seen ever-greater numbers of less-affluent WICs trying to migrate, and succeeding in reaching Australia either because they are prepared to use the New Zealand back-door, or because Australia required a particular category of artisans in a particular year. Hence, the class profile of South African Australians may shift to some extent as the fifth wave migration proceeds.

Becoming South African Australians

Until the arrival of the second and third wave migrants there were not enough South Africans to form a distinct South African Australian community. But by the mid-1980s, ABS statistics revealed that geographically identifiable South African Australian communities existed in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth. The 1990s saw these communities expand and new communities take shape in Brisbane and the Gold Coast. There is still a tendency for South African communities to be clustered in the more affluent areas of Australia's cities because of the skewed selection processes discussed above. This counters the Australian perception that all white South Africans are affluent.

South African migrants tend to blend easily into Australian society. The ethnographic studies suggested that this is partly because of shared Anglo roots and partly because South Africans, as diasporics, feel unable to "return home" and so make an extra effort to become Australian. This attitude is reflected in the unusually high percentage of South Africans who become Australian citizens (Lucas, 2000:12-13). By 1996, 90.1 percent of South Africans who arrived before 1991 were Australian citizens; and 77.6 percent of South Africans were Australian citizens (compared 67.3 percent for all overseas-born) among the 1991-96 arrivals. Many of the remaining 22.4 percent had not become citizens because they did not yet qualify in 1996.

It is not yet clear whether the children of South African migrants will continue to identify with a South African diaspora, or simply merge into the broader Australian community. There are two factors strengthening the possibility of an identifiable South African diaspora sustaining itself as a distinct subculture. Firstly, the numbers involved in the fifth wave exodus are substantial and large enough to produce and sustain South African diasporic communities in many cities around the Anglo world. Secondly, the admixture of South Africans who are not white Anglos into this fifth wave would tend to strengthen the differentiation of South African diasporics from other Australian communities. On the other hand, because South

African diasporics have a culture so close to mainstream Australian-Angloness, there is a very good chance that no separate South African community will be identifiable within three generations. By then, possibly the only residues left will be some non-Anglo (Afrikaans and Indian) names, and perhaps (in places like Perth) some culinary residues associated with *braais*, *boerewors*, *biltong*, *boboetie*, *breedie*, *koeksusters*, pronutro, milk tart, rusks and Mrs. Balls chutney.³⁵

REFERENCES

African National Congress (ANC)

2001 "New Deal for Institutions of Higher Learning," *ANC Today*, 1(7):3-5.

Bridgland, F.

1990 *The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent*. Johannesburg: Ashanti.

Clifford, J.

1997 "Diasporas." In *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration*. Edited by M. Guibernau and J. Rex. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Davenport, T.R.H.

1977 *South Africa: A Modern History*. Johannesburg: Macmillan

De Klerk, W.

1976 *The Puritans of Africa. A Story of Afrikanerdom*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

De Kock, C.

2000 "The Crime Situation at National, Provincial, Area and Station Levels," *Crime Research in South Africa*, 1(1):1-9.

³⁵ In Southern Africa many Afrikaans words have become common currency and are now used by all language groups. Because these terms are used by all South Africans, in most cases no translations exist. For example, a barbeque or "barbie" is called a *braai* (which literally means "burning"). *Boerewors* ("Boer sausages") is a popular sausage associated with cultural forms like *braais* and events approximating the Australian "sausage sizzle." *Biltong* is dyed meat with some similarities to American jerky. *Boboetie* is a curry-based dish with Indonesian origins. Much South African food has Indonesian roots, derived from the Dutch colonial period. *Breedie* is a tomato-based stew with Indonesian roots. *Koeksusters* are a sweet pastry with a cultural connotation similar to Australia's Lamington. *Pronutro* is a popular breakfast cereal. Milk tart (also called *melkertert*) is a form of custard tart. *Rusks* (also called *beskuit*) is a dried biscuit commonly dunked in coffee. Mrs. Balls chutney has Indonesian roots.

De Villiers, R.

1971 "Afrikaner Nationalism." In *The Oxford History of South Africa II*. Edited by M. Wilson and L. Thompson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Giliomee, H. and C. Simkins

1999 *The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Dominance and Democracy*. Rending and Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Horowitz, D.

1985 *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jesudason, J.

1995 "The Ethnic Factor in Development." In *Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia: The Philippines and Thailand. Vol II*. Edited by John Ravenhill. UK: Aldershot.

Jordan, P.

1997 "The National Question in Post 1994 South Africa." A discussion paper for the ANC's 50th National Conference, Mafikeng, 16-20 December.

Kaplan, D.E.

1997 "Reversing the Brain Drain: The Case for Utilising South Africa's Unique Intellectual Diaspora," *Science, Technology and Society*, 2(2).

Kaplan, D., Meyer, J. and M. Brown

nd. "Brain Drain: New Data, New Options." South African Network of Skills Abroad. (<http://www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa>, accessed on 26 April 2000).

Kunz, E.F.

1973 "The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement," *International Migration Review*, 7(2):125-146.

Louw, P.E.

2000 "South Africa's Second Post-Apartheid Elections: A Reaffirmation of Racial Politics but a Loosening of Ethnic bonds," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 54(2):217-238.

1994 "Shifting Patterns of Political Discourse in the New South Africa," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 11(2):22-53.

Louw, P.E., N. K. Rivenburgh, E. Loo and G. Mersham

2001 "Oh Australia! It's the Bush: A Comparative Study of Foreign Perceptions," *Media International Australia*, 99:119-133.

Lucas, D.

2000 *Community Profiles 1996 Census: South Africa Born*. Canberra: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

Mandela, N.

1997 Report by the president of the ANC to the 50th National Conference of the ANC, Mafikeng, 16 December.

Mbeki, T.

2000 "Where are they now?" Second National Institute for Economic Policy Oliver Tambo Lecture, Johannesburg, 11 August.

1999a Speech at the Annual National Conference of the Black Management Forum, Kempton Park, 20 November.

1999b Speech Closing the Debate at the Opening of Parliament, Cape Town, 30 June.

1998 Statement at the Opening of the debate in the National Assembly on "Reconciliation and Nation Building," Cape Town, 29 May.

Meyer, P. J.

1966 "Nasionalisme: Die Onsigbare Vlam." In *Die Republiek van Suid-Afrika: Agergrond, Onstaan en Toekoms*. Edited by F. A. Van Jaarsveld and G. D. Scholtz. Johannesburg: Voortrekkerpers.

Milne, R. S. and D. K. Mauzy

1999 *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir*. London: Routledge.

O'Meara, D.

1983 *Volkskapitalism: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism*. Johannesburg: Ravan.

Petersen, W.

1958 "A General Typology of Migration, *American Sociological Review*, 23(3):256-266.

Rex, J.

1997 "The Nature of Ethnicity in the Project of Migration." In *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration*. Edited by M. Guibernau and J. Rex. Cambridge: Polity Press.

South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)

1994 *Delivering Value I*. Johannesburg: South African Broadcasting Corporation (June).

South Africa

1998 *Census in Brief*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

Strangeways-Booth, J.

1976 *A Cricket in the Thorn Tree: Helen Suzman and the Progressive Party*. Johannesburg: Hutchinson.

Van Jaarsveld, F. A.

1971 *Van Riebeeck tot Verwoerd, 1652-1966*. Johannesburg: Voortrekkerpers.