The 100 Hour War

The Salvadoran Invasion Plan

Named as the Plan de Campaña, Capitán General Gerardo Barrios, (Captain General Gerardo Barrios Campaign Plan), the plans for invasion had been under preparation since 1967 by the Salvadoran Staff, and included the utilization of four Infantry and one artillery Battalions distributed in four fronts or Theaters of Operations, these being the North (TON), Chalatenango's (TOCH), Occidental (TOOC) and Oriental (TOO). At the same time, the plan ordered the implementation of the so-called Expeditionary Force conformed by nine National Guard companies that would operate under the command of the Theater of Operations North (TON). At that time, Salvadoran troops were equipped with G-3 rifles and HK-21 machine guns, supported by 105mm artillery pieces, two M3A1 Stuart tanks and several vehicles that had been armored locally, called by the members of the Motorized Cavalry Squadron, as las niñas (the girls).

Contrary to what has been repeated by several sources, the Salvadoran plan did not include a total invasion of Honduras, nor did it include taking Tegucigalpa within 72 hours in order to establish a puppet government. El Salvador simply did not have the capabilities to launch such a campaign. On the contrary, what was intended was to effect a movement distributed in multiple fronts, allowing the taking of Honduran territory and the capture of the main border towns and then, request the intervention of the Organization of American States (OAS) to force a negotiated solution to the problem. The plan however, did not discard some opportunistic advances beyond those towns, as long as the troops' supplies allowed it. This way, the main actions of the ground campaign of the Salvadoran Army would take place almost simultaneously in three fronts, these being the Theater of Operations North, Chalatenango and Oriente.

Regarding the Salvadoran Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Salvadoreña - FAS) at the beginning of the war, it was equipped with a TF-51 Cavalier Mustang Mk.II, four F-51 Cavalier Mustang Mk.II, an F-51D Mustang, six FG-1D (a variant of the F4U-4 built by Good Year), an SNJ-5, a DC-4M, five U-17As, six T-41s and four C-47 transports, all conforming the Grupo de Combate (Combat Group) which in turn, was organized in three squadrons: Fighter-Bomber (Caza-Bombardeo) (F-51 / FG-1D), transport (C-47s / Civilian Aircraft) and Reconnaissance (Reconocimiento) (SNJ-5 / U-17A / T-41 / Civilian Aircraft). During the conflict, the FAS would acquire more airplanes, especially Mustangs, but at the time of beginning of hostilities this was its order of battle. It also had an Airborne Squadron (Escuadrón Aerotransportado) conformed by parachutists, a Maintenance Group, a Communications Group and another for Security and Base Services, for a total of one-thousand men of which, only 34 were pilots.

Military Situation in Honduras

Since 1935 the High Military Command has based Honduras' national defense methods on air power. For this reason their army, during peace times, is kept at the minimum personnel level necessary for its functioning. In case of conflict however, the number of troops can be increased with civilian militia, who are incorporated for purely defensive operational purposes. In fact, the Honduran army is the smallest in size in Central America and lacks important offensive capabilities.

At the beginning of the war with El Salvador, the Honduran army was conformed by three infantry battalions, six Zone battalions, an engineer battalion and two batteries of 75mm howitzers. Their men were armed with Garand and Mauser rifles, and did not have the support of tanks or any other armored equipment. The Honduran army was to establish two fronts or operational theaters, these being the Teatro de Operaciones Sur (Southern Operations Theater) or (TOS) that matched the Salvadoran army's Oriental theater in El Amatillo, and the Teatro de Operaciones Sur-Occidental (South-Western Operations Theater) facing the Northern Salvadoran theater of operations in Nueva Ocotepeque.

In contrast, the FAH was relatively better organized and equipped than its Salvadoran counterpart. Its order of battle by mid-July 1969 listed six F4U-5N, five F4U-4, five C-47 transports, a single four-engined C-54 transport, a C-45, three Cessna 185Bs, five T-28A armed trainers and six AT-6 trainers, also armed. Regarding personnel, the FAH was composed of over 20 pilots and approximately 750 specialized personnel who conformed the maintenance, armament, security and base services elements. They also had a parachutist section.