



World Bank

COUNTRY RE-ENGAGEMENT NOTE

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SOMALIA

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WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR

Not applicable

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AU-IBAR	African Union/Intergovernmental Bureau for Animal Resources
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
BDP	Bureau for Development Policy
CRN	Country Re-engagement Note
EC	European Commission
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDA	International Development Association
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LICUS	Low-Income Countries Under Stress
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSG	Operations Support Group
PACE	Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics
PCF	Post-Conflict Fund
RRA	Rahanweyn Resistance Army
RVF	Rift Valley Fever
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
SURF	Sub-Regional Resource Facility

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UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
VTC	Voluntary Testing and Counselling
WBI	World Bank Institute
WHO	World Health Organization

COUNTRY RE-ENGAGEMENT NOTE

SOMALIA

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Country Re-engagement Note for Somalia

Executive Summary

1. Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world, a situation aggravated by the civil war and the absence of a functioning national government for over a decade. The impact of state failure on human development in Somalia has been profound, resulting in the collapse of political institutions, the destruction of social and economic infrastructure, and massive internal and external migrations. Given these conditions, Somalia is at the extreme of the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) continuum of countries.

2. The joint Bank/UNDP Country Re-engagement Note (CRN) for Somalia sets forth the rationale for the use of their common resources, estimated at \$6.3 million with a \$4.6 million grant to be leveraged from the Bank's Post-Conflict Fund, to contribute to the provision of basic public goods, accelerate socio-economic recovery, and create an enabling environment for long-term institutional and policy change. The strategy for Somalia has therefore been articulated around three pivotal principles:

► *The strategy seeks to provide public goods in the absence of a fully functional national government in Somalia. It also embodies a strong regional public goods dimension, with potentially positive spillover effects for neighboring countries in all the proposed areas of intervention.*

► *The strategy recognizes the high degree of uncertainty in the country and therefore focuses on interventions which are not likely to be reversed in the event of instability. Such interventions include knowledge-intensive investments aimed at capacity and institution-building.*

► *The strategy has a strong income-generation emphasis through its support to the private sector in the livestock area with the aim of fostering important economic payoffs.*

3. In support of these principles, four strategic entry points have been identified: (i) Support to macro-economic data analysis and dialogue; (ii) Creation of an enabling environment for the livestock and meat industry; (iii) Coordinated action plan to address HIV/AIDS issues; and (iv) Capacity building for skills development/Centers of Training.

4. Following the preparation of this note, the Bank will jointly undertake a familiarization mission with UNDP to Somalia and activities will also proceed under the proposed areas of intervention. During implementation, the Bank and UNDP will collaborate closely with existing Somali authorities, the private sector, civil society, UN technical agencies, and the donor community.

5. Three possible scenarios can be envisaged in terms of re-engagement in Somalia. The low-case scenario would result if conflict increased, bringing to a halt all activities. The base-case scenario would focus on the continuation of the proposed activities in light of progress made and of the situation in the country. A high-case scenario would occur if the initial interventions are successful and/or if the Somali peace process progresses, thereby assisting any emerging state to position itself and setting the stage for longer-term Bank engagement in Somalia.

Country Re-engagement Note

SOMALIA

I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the World Bank Low-income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initiative is to provide more proactive and effective support through partnerships to countries with very weak policies, institutions and governance. The premise of the LICUS initiative is that the Bank cannot afford to neglect low-income countries under stress and that other forms of engagement besides lending may be possible to assist countries in breaking out of severe poverty and economic decline and move on the path to development. This Country Re-engagement Note (CRN) is the articulation of a joint UNDP/Bank strategy for operationalizing the LICUS approach in Somalia.

2. Somalia is at the extreme of the LICUS continuum of countries. There is no fully functional national government in Somalia. Policies, institutions, and governance are weak or non-existent. The security situation is difficult in many areas, making on-the-ground visits difficult. Although the challenge is great, the Bank and UNDP included Somalia as one of the four countries in the Africa region for piloting the LICUS initiative. It was agreed that a non-traditional approach, such as LICUS, was needed to address the multiple challenges in Somalia with the cooperation and collaboration of UN agencies and other development partners. Despite an uncertain environment in Somalia, the LICUS approach seeks to lay the groundwork for longer-term engagement in the country.

II. Current Situation in Somalia

➤ *Political Situation*

3. Following the peaceful formation of the Republic of Somalia in 1960, a military coup subsequently subjected the country to the leadership of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. By 1988, full-scale civil war had broken out in the northwest. Within two years, the regime fell in the face of multiple clan-based civil wars. Institutions collapsed and most of the economic and social infrastructure and assets were destroyed, resulting in a stateless Somalia with a highly militarised political environment, deep inter-clan hostility, and societal mistrust of any central government.

4. Since 1998, state fragmentation and factional politics have given way to a process of consolidation, where varied structures of governance and authority have emerged at the community, district and regional levels to fill the vacuum of the central government. In October 2000, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in Mogadishu but with only limited control. Different administrations continue to exist and

control various cities and regions of the country.¹ The United Nations respects the principle of territorial integrity of Somalia as sanctioned by member countries and therefore considers Somalia as a single nation.

➤ ***Somali Reconciliation Process***

5. Supporting broader moves to consolidation, the Somali National Reconciliation Process began on 15 October 2002 in Kenya and represents the fourteenth reconciliation effort on Somalia. As part of the ongoing negotiations, an agreement was signed on 27 October 2002, whereby the various political factions assembled agreed to suspend all hostilities for the duration of the Somali reconciliation conference, to abide by the final outcome of the conference, and to set up an all-inclusive federal system of government.

6. In support of the Somali reconciliation process, the Bank and UNDP jointly fielded an expert to provide technical advice to the committee on economic recovery and trade with the aim of developing a framework for longer-term development and rehabilitation. As such, a flexible approach is being advocated in implementing this joint strategy, allowing for revisions to the proposed interventions if the Somali reconciliation talks progress.

➤ ***Economic Situation***

7. Despite the absence of a Somali state and its financial, economic, and social institutions, the private sector has managed to grow impressively, particularly in the areas of trade, commerce, transport, remittance and infrastructure services and in the primary sectors, notably in livestock, agriculture and fisheries. However, most of these sectors are now becoming either stagnant or their growth is hindered due to the lack of investment, trained manpower and the absence of a relevant legal and regulatory framework to enforce rules and regulations, common standards and quality control. The scarcity of capital is mainly caused by the absence of any formal banking and financial services and regulatory bodies, making it impossible to encourage and harness domestic savings. The long absence of a national government has further prevented access to international capital markets as well as the establishment of economic management institutions and regulatory bodies. The remittances from the Somali diaspora and the growing participation of women in income-earning activities are two other factors sustaining current economic growth.

➤ ***Development Situation***

8. The civil war in Somalia has also led to a worsening of the poverty situation in the country. Levels of development vary widely between urban, rural and nomadic areas,

¹ The Somaliland Republic has been the most stable administration since declaring independence in 1991. There was a recent peaceful transition of power to the vice-president, and new presidential elections are scheduled to be held in 2003. The Puntland administration declared its autonomy in 1998, but has recently become embroiled in fighting between two rival factions following a contested presidential election. Since 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) has begun to establish an administration in the two southern regions of Bay and Bakol. However, the RRA recently split into two factions, leading to increased fighting and insecurity in the region. The level of popular, financial and administrative support and territorial control that these entities enjoy varies.

between males and females, and between different regions of Somalia. GDP per capita is estimated to have declined from US\$280 in 1989 to US\$266 in 2001. Somalia has the lowest GNP rate for the Horn of Africa and it is estimated that the vast majority of the population lives below the poverty line.

9. There have been modest gains in education in Somalia, with enrolment rates in primary schools almost reaching pre-war levels, and enrolment in secondary schools increasing since 1998. However, the primary school enrolment rate still only stands at 17%. Overall adult literacy is estimated to have declined from the already low level of 24% in 1989 to 17.1% in 2001.

10. Health indicators suggest that health standards in Somalia are among the worst in Africa. Life expectancy is 47 years and nearly one-quarter of all children die before the age of five. The available health facilities tend to be concentrated in urban areas so that rural populations have limited access to health services. The decline in the human development index from 0.30 to 0.28 places Somalia near the bottom of all countries in terms of human development.²

Table 1: Selected Social Indicators

Indicator	
Health	
Life expectancy at birth (years)	47 years
Under-five mortality (# of deaths per 1,000 live births)	224
Maternal mortality (# of deaths per 100,000 live births)	1,600
Access to health services	28%
Number of doctors (# per 100,000 persons)	0.4
Children 1-5 immunised against all childhood diseases (%)	27%
Education	
Adult literacy rate: Male	22.1%
Adult literacy rate: Female	12.0%
Primary school enrolment (6-14 years)	17%
Secondary school enrolment	1.1%

Source: Human Development Report for Somalia 2001 (UNDP, 2001) and UNICEF Indicator Multiple Cluster Survey and Primary School Survey 2001/2 (UNICEF, 2002)

➤ *Development Assistance*

11. Despite a certain level of instability in various parts of the country, the coordination and monitoring of humanitarian and development assistance is maintained through the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) mechanism, which regroups UN agencies, international and Somali NGOs, and donors (see Annex IV). The Bank recently became an active participant of the SACB and has been using this forum to ensure that the proposed activities in this strategy are coordinated with existing and planned efforts in Somalia.

² The data used in this note is taken from the *UNDP Human Development Report for Somalia* (2001, UNDP Somalia) and from UNICEF Indicator Multiple Cluster Survey and Primary School Survey 2001/2 (UNICEF, 2002). It should be noted that given the difficulty in gathering basic macro-economic data in Somalia, much of the data reported should be considered as tentative.

III. Current Programs

➤ *UNDP Program*

12. Building on established partnerships with Somali authorities, the UNDP program aims to support the development of key economic sectors and opportunities for diversification. It is focused on three inter-related thematic areas: (i) rule of law and security; (ii) governance, public administration and civil society; and (iii) poverty reduction and economic recovery. Particular attention is given to strengthening the priority areas of remittances and export of livestock and meat, which will provide both a means for improving the lives of the poor and other disadvantaged in Somalia, and a framework for longer-term economic and human development.

13. In support of these programmes, UNDP follows a participatory process and maintains a regular dialogue with administrations, civil society and private sector in Somalia. UNDP has established four regional offices in Somalia to implement and manage its programs, with overall coordination being managed from Nairobi. UNDP's programme resources for Somalia amounted to US\$22 million for 2001. UNDP Somalia will also utilise its global expertise and resources, including the Sub-regional Resource Facilities (SURFs), Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and Operations Support Group (OSG) in support of this joint strategy.

➤ *World Bank Program*

14. The Bank has not had an active portfolio in Somalia since 1991. Resumption of new lending to Somalia is prevented by: (i) the fact that Somalia is in "non-accrual" status with the Bank. At present, arrears to the International Development Association (IDA) are approximately US\$97 million. Somalia has not yet resumed paying its debt to international financial institutions; (ii) the lack of a fully functional national government; and (iii) the unstable security situation.

15. Currently, the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) is the only source of Bank financing available for Somalia through a Watching Brief, which was approved in February 2002 for a total of US\$1 million. The Watching Brief has had a two pronged approach: (i) to build a knowledge base through the collection and monitoring of key macro-economic and socio-economic data in partnership with UNDP; and (ii) to continue funding the third phase of a successful project, implemented by the Somali Red Cross, for the sustainable rehabilitation of basic health services in areas affected by conflict.

IV. Organizing Principles of Re-engagement

16. Due to the absence of a functional Somali government for over a decade, institutions, systems and procedures are yet to be established on a national level. The absence of such national governing institutions has been a major obstacle to growth, and most basic components of development, such as healthcare and education, are not being adequately provided to the Somali people.

17. By contributing to the provision of essential public services in Somalia, this strategy will utilise key entry points to accelerate socio-economic recovery and help move the country onto a path of sustained growth, development and poverty reduction. The strategy therefore aims at laying the initial framework for longer-term engagement in Somalia by facilitating institutional and policy change while improving basic social outcomes by focusing on four carefully selected areas of reform and by using key agents of change, particularly the private sector.

18. The strategy for Somalia has therefore been articulated around three pivotal principles:

- *The strategy seeks to provide public goods in the absence of a fully functional national government in Somalia. In addition, the strategy embodies a strong regional public goods dimension, with potentially positive spillover effects for neighboring countries in all the proposed areas of intervention.*
- *The strategy recognizes the high degree of uncertainty in the country and therefore focuses on interventions which are not likely to be reversed in the event of instability. Such interventions include knowledge-intensive investments aimed at capacity and institution-building.*
- *The strategy has a strong income-generation emphasis through its support to the private sector in the livestock area, with the aim of fostering important economic payoffs.*

19. Given the vibrant role that the private sector has played in Somalia since the fall of the Barre regime, and the limited capacity of administrations to raise resources, it can play an important role in promoting human development in Somalia. There is also a growing recognition by the Somalis themselves that the private sector has a vital role to play in strengthening governance in addition to generating economic prosperity and supporting social services in a more stable setting.

20. In addition, the proposed training centers and the decentralized community-based health structures will help promote an enabling environment that is more responsive to the legitimate needs and interests of Somalis.

V. Strategic Entry Points

21. The Bank and UNDP have jointly identified four strategic entry points for engagement in Somalia based on country specific characteristics, the relative comparative advantages of each institution, and the shared goals of: (i) improved policies, institutions, and governance; (ii) provision of service delivery; and (iii) capacity building. The strategic entry points outlined below provide a useful starting point for World Bank/UNDP engagement in Somalia in collaboration with other UN agencies and development partners:

- *Support to Macro-economic Data Analysis & Dialogue*
- *Creating an Enabling Environment for the Livestock and Meat Industry*

- *Coordinated Action Plan to Address HIV/AIDS Issues*
- *Capacity Building for Skills Development/Centers of Training*

22. The support for macro-economic data analysis and dialogue provides the underlying framework for the interventions on livestock and health. These two sectoral interventions will provide a means to increase the livelihoods of the poor in Somalia as well as a framework to promote longer-term socio-economic recovery. The capacity-building initiatives, in turn, will directly support the health and livestock interventions to ensure their long-term sustainability by building the skills of Somali constituencies. Most importantly, building a knowledge base by analysing key macro-economic and socio-economic data and promoting dialogue on key macro-economic issues provides a possible platform for a longer-term and expanded poverty reduction strategy if the initial interventions are successful and/or if the Somali peace process progresses, thereby assisting any emerging state to position itself and setting the stage for longer-term engagement in Somalia.

23. Taken individually and collectively, these four sectors represent the most feasible interventions in Somalia given the socio-political context. The strategy and each of the proposed interventions were conceived with a country-wide scope, ensuring that no region or area of Somalia was excluded. The lack of a centralized national government and the instability in many parts of the country favor knowledge-intensive interventions such as these. Furthermore, all of these interventions embody a regional dimension, with potential positive spillovers for the entire region. Lastly, all of these initiatives minimize capital expenditure by expanding and consolidating already available capacity and facilities and by building upon the efforts of other partners already working in Somalia.

24. In formulating the strategy, the Bank consulted extensively with donors and the SACB mechanism. UNDP consulted widely with UN agencies, including FAO, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIFEM and WHO as well as different Somali actors, including local authorities, the private sector and civil society. Further consultations were also carried out within the respective SACB sectoral committees. In addition, the strategy benefited from initial feedback from the Somali peace process, where the Bank and UNDP jointly fielded an expert. However, it should be noted that more intensive consultations on the strategy have been limited by a number of constraints, including the lack of a legitimate national government, prevailing security conditions, and the fact that Bank staff cannot currently travel to Somalia.³ In the implementation of the different strategic entry points, the same broad consultative approach will be followed, working with a variety of partners, including existing Somali authorities, civil society and SACB partners. Given the prevailing conditions in Somalia, these wide consultations will continue throughout the implementation of the strategy.

³ Following clearance from the security unit, a Bank team is planning to travel on mission to Somalia in May 2003.

■ Strategic Entry Point #1: Support to Macro-economic Data Analysis & Dialogue

25. The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted in the destruction of all governing and economic management institutions in Somalia, which have yet to be re-established. Rebuilding critical macro-economic and socio-economic data and statistics is essential to understanding and monitoring the macro-economic situation and for policy formulations and informed decision making in meeting the needs of the country.

26. Data collection and analysis has been severely affected by the fact that national institutions for data collection were one of the many casualties of the Somali civil war. Considerable gaps now exist in the type and quality of data collected and analysed, with a bias in the volume and quality of data collected towards more secure areas. There is an absence of comprehensive baseline statistics and the informalisation of the economy makes economic analysis difficult.

Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators

	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
GDP (US\$ billion)	1.0	---	1988
Export of goods and services (as % of GDP)	---	4.6	1992
Import of goods and services (as % of GDP)	---	17.1	1992
Total external debt (US\$ billion)	2.4	2.6	2000
External debt (as % of GNP)	185	---	1989
Average annual rate of inflation (%)	38.4	49.7	1992

Source: Human Development Report for Somalia 2001 (UNDP, 2001)

27. Supporting the current efforts of the Watching Brief⁴ to collect data on the macro-economic situation in Somalia, this intervention will focus on: (i) monitoring the macro-economic situation through further data collection, assessments, analysis and the production of relevant sectoral studies to examine potential sources of growth and constraints; (ii) maintaining and updating a database that contains basic socio-economic and macro-economic data, including poverty-related statistics, to improve the delivery and accessibility of social services, aid economic management and monitor socio-economic changes; (iii) assisting in the training of technical staff from relevant administrations and institutions to help rebuild Somali economic analysis skills; (iv) helping to strengthen local capacity to facilitate transfer of expertise in data collection, compilation and analysis at the regional level; and (v) consulting with and engaging existing administrations, technical staff, the private sector and Somali civil society in

⁴Other initiatives underway include: (i) the recently concluded socio-economic household survey covering all of Somalia with support from the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics; (ii) a joint UNDP/UNFPA survey to collect and compile gender and health statistics; and (iii) the proposed support from the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR/UNDP) and BIDP/UNDP Poverty Thematic Trust Fund (ITF).

regular workshops and dialogue to identify priority macro-economic and socio-economic issues and data requirements for Somalia.

28. The knowledge base, which would be created through these activities, would help the Bank to better understand the Somali macro-economic context and aid in monitoring socio-economic changes, which would be critical for any future Bank program. Over time, the data analysis and dialogue can also provide important forums for developing a poverty reduction strategy involving key stakeholders, which can help inform and guide donor assistance as well as Somali authorities.

■ Strategic Entry Point #2: Creating an Enabling Environment for the Livestock & Meat Industry

29. Arid and semi-arid rangelands make up a large part of Somalia's landmass, making pastoralism the most appropriate form of land use. The livestock sector, which accounts for 40% of GDP and 80% of exports in normal years, remains the main source of Somali livelihoods. Livestock exports from Somalia have been periodically interrupted by bans imposed by importing countries in the Gulf region due to outbreaks of livestock disease, including Rift Valley Fever (RVF). The latest ban in this series was imposed in late 2000 and is yet to be lifted by Saudi Arabia, which has traditionally accounted for 95% of the Somali livestock export.

30. Building on the ongoing efforts of UNDP, FAO and other agencies in this sector⁵, the strategy will aim to: (i) strengthen the diagnostic capacity and introduce recognised certification and disease control procedures, such as vaccination, in the short-term; and (ii) diversify progressively the livestock sector to export fresh and processed meat and other livestock products in the medium-term.

31. In support of the first aim, the intervention will help establish a new, independent Somali body that will develop standards for inspection and certification to be applied throughout the country. This initiative will build upon the ongoing efforts of Somali administrations, private sector and international firms having expertise in livestock certification and marketing, to extend such efforts to more parts of Somalia and to establish a suitable institutional framework to ensure its sustainability.

32. Diversifying the meat trade and supplying an ever-widening range of markets will reduce the current over-reliance of the Somali pastoralist on one commodity and a very limited market. However, processing and exporting meat also requires introducing stringent quality control measures and certification at all levels comparable to international standards, which will be supported through a training center for livestock health and research.

⁵ Specific animal health projects now being implemented include the Somali component of the Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics (PACE), which is carrying out countrywide surveillance for the major diseases of livestock; an European Commission (EC) funded AU-IBAR veterinary school, which will begin to restore capacity for skilled veterinarians; and a number of emergency projects in the delivery of veterinary services implemented by international and national NGOs.

33. In collaboration with the SACB livestock committee and relevant partners in Somalia, most notably the private sector, this intervention will also focus on producing a longer-term livestock strategy for Somalia as a framework for further coordinated initiatives in the sector. The strategy will also ensure that any support to independent services will be synchronized with public services when these are established. Recognizing the uncertain environment in Somalia and the lack of success of previous livestock interventions by the Bank in Africa, this strategy will also examine lessons learned from livestock projects that may be relevant in the Somali context.

■ Strategic Entry Point #3: Coordinated Action Plan to Address HIV/AIDS Issues

34. HIV/AIDS prevalence in Somalia is currently estimated to be low (0.9%).⁶ However, WHO and UNICEF suggest that Somalia should be classified as a country in a “Generalised HIV Epidemic”, based on other available proxy indicators.⁷ In addition, there is a lot of cross-border migration of Somalis within Somalia and the border areas in neighbouring countries—Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, which all have a high prevalence rate. Chronic conflict, poverty, and the return of refugees from neighboring countries all represent serious risks for an explosive expansion of the epidemic in Somalia in the near future.

35. HIV/AIDS control activities started in Somalia only in mid-1999 but have been largely confined to advocacy and awareness raising among the communities and building consensus and gaining support and involvement of local authorities. In general, little is known about what constitutes the most important factors that fuel the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Somalia, such as migration, conflict, ignorance or other vulnerability factors.

Box 1: Support to the Development of a National Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS

The SACB HIV/AIDS working group has decided to prioritise the development of a multi-sectoral strategy for HIV/AIDS awareness and control through a participatory process that ensures inter-sectoral collaboration, and involvement and ownership by key stakeholders: The objectives are:

- To develop a set of clear strategies and guiding principles in the prevention of HIV/AIDS and STDs in Somalia;
- To develop a broad framework that will assist in strengthening co-ordination mechanisms in HIV/AIDS and STDs programming both within the health sector and across sectoral boundaries.

This strategy will assist in efforts to develop the national strategic framework on HIV/AIDS.

36. The estimated low HIV/AIDS prevalence rate provides a unique opportunity to develop interventions geared toward maintaining a low rate through an appropriate strategy given the country conditions. As such, the SACB HIV/AIDS working group has

⁶ This prevalence rate was estimated in Northwest Somalia.

⁷ A 1999 study on antenatal clinics showed the prevalence rate of STDs to be 30% among the pregnant women. A study of TB patients in 2002 revealed that HIV prevalence has increased to more than 10 % from 6.7 % in 1999.

decided to prioritise the development of a multi-sectoral strategy for HIV/AIDS awareness and control. The strategy will form a portal for broader priority health issues to be addressed by focusing on the identification of vulnerability factors. The CRN will support such efforts in the following ways:

- ▶ Building on previous studies, undertake a dimensional analysis to highlight the possible scenarios of perceived impacts and resources needed to address them, including behavioural research to identify the high-risk sub-populations in Somalia, in terms of HIV infection, as well as risks to infant, child and maternal health;
- ▶ Assist in the epidemiological assessment of HIV prevalence in the general population and in at-risk groups;
- ▶ Support the development of a coordinated, multi-sectoral action plan to address HIV/AIDS issues by providing: (i) technical expertise in the formulation of the framework, and (ii) support for the operationalization of the framework and action plan;
- ▶ Strengthen advocacy and awareness at higher political levels through regional and global seminars/workshops and conferences, taking into consideration any political sensitivities; and
- ▶ Support Voluntary Testing and Counselling (VTC) as a means to promote prevention of HIV infection, counselling and care-seeking behaviour.

37. The strategic entry point will build on the community-managed health centres, which are being supported through the Post-Conflict-funded Watching Brief, and which are strategically positioned to deliver comprehensive health prevention and care interventions at the community level; and sensitize and educate communities about vulnerability factors that expose individuals to higher risks of HIV infection.

■ **Strategic Entry Point #4: Capacity Building for Skills Development/Training Centers**

38. There is currently an acute shortage of skilled human resources in Somalia. A large number of skilled personnel and professionals left Somalia during the civil war period. The ongoing conflicts for over a decade coupled with better economic opportunities abroad have discouraged most of them from returning. It is crucial to establish and strengthen the institutional capacity to expand appropriate training facilities and improve their quality in critical sectors, particularly livestock and health, to meet the demand for qualified human resources in Somalia.

39. In collaboration with local partners and through joint assessment missions, training centers will be identified in selected locations in Somalia. These training centers will directly support capacity-building efforts under the health and livestock intervention and as such, the establishment and activities of these centers will fall under the activities for those two sectors as noted in the attached workplan (see Annex I).

40. *Health and other para-medical professions:* After consultations with relevant partners in this area and building on other capacity-building efforts, a suitable existing institution will be identified to be rehabilitated as a national training center for offering refresher courses/short-term courses and normal training courses for health professionals, with a special focus on HIV/AIDS awareness.

41. *Livestock health and research:* The proposed training center for livestock health and research, with the accreditation and technical support from a reputed international livestock agency/research institute, will support the certification and quality control of livestock and livestock products as well as monitor animal health.

42. The strategy to be followed for the centers is to minimize capital expenditure by expanding and consolidating available capacity and facilities (infrastructure, equipment and human resources). These centers will support and complement other existing facilities, including those in the private sector, to improve their quality and introduce appropriate instruction and certification procedures in their areas of training. These centers will work together with relevant line ministries of the administrations and university departments where they exist. A joint Bank/UNDP mission will be fielded to help determine possible locations for the training centers in close consultation with local partners and organizations. If an appropriate institution cannot be identified at this stage, appropriate linkages and collaboration with similar centers in neighbouring countries or other parts of the world will be established for faculty exchange and quality improvement programmes, drawing in particular upon the expertise of WBI.

Table 3: CRN Activities for Somalia (FY03-FY05)

Strategic Entry Points	Proposed Activities
I. Support to Macro-economic Data Analysis and Dialogue	<p><i>Implementing partner: UNDP</i> <i>Resources: US\$1.5 million</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Establishment of a database for key macro-economic and socio-economic data ➤ Promoting national/regional dialogue and consensus building on key macro-economic issues ➤ Capacity building to rebuild Somali economic analysis skills ➤ Strengthening local capacity for data collection and analysis ➤ Production of relevant sectoral studies to examine potential sources of economic growth.
II. Creating an enabling environment for the livestock and meat industry	<p><i>Implementing partners: FAO and UNDP</i> <i>Resources: US\$1.9 million</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Establishment of certification body for livestock and livestock products ➤ Elaboration of Somali livestock strategy ➤ Improved capacity for diagnostics and disease control ➤ Establishment of centre of training for livestock health and research

III. Coordinated action plan to address HIV/AIDS issues	<p><i>Implementing partners: IFRC, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WHO</i></p> <p><i>Resources: US\$2.9 million</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support to formulation of national/regional HIV/AIDS strategy ➤ Dimensional analysis on perceived impacts of HIV/AIDS ➤ Epidemiological assessment/monitoring of HIV prevalence ➤ Advocacy and awareness building on HIV/AIDS ➤ Establishment of a centre of training for health professionals
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VI. Roles and Responsibilities

43. Under this strategy, both the Bank and UNDP will continue to strategize about the most effective areas of intervention and how best to monitor progress toward the goals. The Bank and UNDP will jointly supervise the activities, with UNDP and other UN agencies being responsible for implementation of the activities. The Bank will bring its expertise to bear on all activities as decided jointly by the UN/Bank country teams. A Bank advisory committee has also been formed to provide guidance with the implementation of the CRN.

44. UNDP undertakes regular monitoring for all its programs and will report on implementation progress every six months under this CRN. UNDP will also schedule regular tri-partite reviews with the functioning administrations and implementing partners in Somalia to review ongoing activities.

VII. Financing

45. The Bank will seek to mobilize a Post-Conflict Fund grant totaling US\$4.6 million, spread over three fiscal years (FY03-FY05), to cover the proposed activities under the different strategic entry points (see table on page 15). The PCF is currently the only source of Bank financing available for Somalia. UNDP and other UN agencies involved in the activities will be expected to cost-share with the Bank. Resources for the activities will be channeled through UNDP and it will therefore be accountable for the use of those resources. UNDP will channel the resources to implementing partners as necessary.

Table 4: Donor Contributions to Somalia (US\$ million)

DONORS	2000	2001	2002
BILATERALS	119	98	N/A
Denmark	4	3	5
European Union	45	23	47
Great Britain	3	4	N/A
Italy	21	19	N/A
Japan	3	8	N/A
Netherlands	5	3	N/A
Norway	4	5	2
Sweden	4	5	1
USA	26	25	N/A
Other bilaterals	4	3	N/A
MULTILATERALS			
UN organizations	36	40	N/A
Total	155	138	N/A

Source: SACB Donor Report for 2001 and UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia for 2001. The figures for 2002 are still being compiled and only some donor figures are currently available.

VIII. Partnerships

46. Key partners in this initiative will be local authorities, the private sector and Somali civil society. In addition, sister UN agencies such as the FAO, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WHO will also play critical roles in the activities proposed. The Bank will draw upon the global expertise and knowledge of the World Bank Institute. The involvement of other donors will also be sought under this strategy to widen the partnership for Somalia.

IX. Risk Considerations

47. In a context such as Somalia, a number of risk considerations have to be taken into account in proceeding with this strategy. Given that the conditions in Somalia cannot be predicted and are prone to reversals, a flexible approach is necessary, allowing for frequent revisions to activities in response to changing conditions. In particular, the outcome of the ongoing Somali reconciliation talks may affect some of the activities to be undertaken.

48. *Continued insecurity and instability:* Given the continuing insecurity in parts of the country, potential scenarios and activities will be reviewed periodically by UNDP and the Bank, paying particular attention to sensitive areas. In particular, the Bank with interested partners will conduct a Conflict Analysis to reflect on the causes and consequences of the Somali conflict and assess how the activities in this strategy relate to these, thereby ensuring that the strategy seeks to minimize potential causes of conflict in Somalia (see Annex V). UNDP and other UN agencies' staff, both based in Nairobi and

in the four regions of Somalia, will monitor the progress and impact of activities. The Bank and UNDP will also jointly undertake periodic program supervision and monitoring in Somalia.

49. *Risk-mitigating elements:* A number of risk-mitigating elements have been built into this strategy for Somalia. First, the ‘peace dividend approach’ will be followed in implementing the strategy, emphasizing the need for peace, security and the existence of Somalia authorities at local and regional levels as prerequisites for international assistance. Second, the interventions focus on irreversible investments, with the aim of building capacity and creating a knowledge base which would endure even if activities were to be halted. Third, the strategy was conceived with a countrywide focus, ensuring that no region or area of Somalia is excluded. Fourth, the strategy will rely on the extensive field experience of UNDP and the specialized UN agencies, who are familiar with both the country conditions and local partners.

50. *Possibilities for scaling up Bank activities:* In terms of the implementation of this strategy in Somalia, three possible scenarios can be envisaged. The low-case scenario would result if conflict increased to such a level that the United Nations and other organizations had to withdraw completely from Somalia, bringing to a halt all activities. A possible humanitarian intervention could be envisaged at that time but would have to be examined in light of conditions in the country. The base-case scenario would focus on the continuation of the implementation of the activities under this strategy, reviewing and updating them in light of progress made and of the situation in the country. A high-case scenario would occur if the Somali peace process resulted in a recognized government structure being established, allowing for the scaling up of the Bank’s involvement in Somalia through a Transitional Support Strategy.

Major Sub-Programmes, Key Partnerships & Resource Plan

ACTIVITY	ESTIMATED BUDGET			IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS & AVAILABLE RESOURCES	RESOURCE GAP
	FY03	FY04	FY05		
I. Support to Macroeconomic Data Analysis & Dialogue¹	--- ²	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$600,000 (UNDP, UNDP/BCPR, UNDP/BDP/TTF) ³	\$900,000
II. Creating an Enabling Environment for the Livestock and Meat Industry	\$1,000,000	\$500,000	\$400,000	\$700,000 (UNDP, FAO)	\$1,200,000
III. Coordinated Action Plan to Address HIV/AIDS Issues¹	\$1,100,000	\$850,000	\$950,000	\$400,000 (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO) ³	\$2,500,000
SUB-TOTAL	\$2,100,000	\$2,100,000	\$2,100,000	\$1,700,000	\$4,600,000
TOTAL	\$6,300,000			\$1,700,000	\$4,600,000⁴

¹ These two strategic entry points build on the activities undertaken under the Somalia Watching Brief, which is financed by the Post-conflict Fund. Currently, the Post-conflict Fund is the only source of financing available to the Bank in Somalia. The total financing from the Post-conflict Fund, including earlier and current contributions, in Somalia amounts to US\$1,982,156.

² UNDP is already receiving PCF financing for this activity and no further disbursement is anticipated for FY03.

³ These UN contributions are ongoing.

⁴ The resource gap corresponds to the PCF grant that the Bank is seeking to mobilize for Somalia.

ANNEX I— Project Results and Resources Framework

Strategic Area of Entry #1: Support to Macro-economic Data Analysis & Dialogue			
Intended outcome—Improved regional/national capacity to undertake macro-economic data collection, monitoring and analysis.			
Outcome indicator—National and local development plans and programmes incorporate socio-economic analysis based on statistical data.			
Partnership strategy—This will be implemented in coordination with the Watching Brief project supported by World Bank, the proposed support from BCPR/UNDP and Global Poverty Thematic Trust Fund (TTF/BDP) under the UNCT/SACB framework. WBI will also be a key partner.			
Intended Outputs	Output Targets	Indicative Activities	Inputs Budget estimate: \$1,500,000
1. Institutional capacity at national/regional level for macro-economic and socio-economic data collection and monitoring is strengthened.	1.1 National (1) and regional (3) fora with the participation of administration, civil society and other development partners to strengthen participatory approach to macro-economic and socio-economic monitoring and analysis.	1.1.1 Generate awareness and build initial consensus on the need and processes to establish the fora at national and regional levels 1.1.2 Arrange periodic meetings (quarterly/half-yearly) 1.1.3 Joint World Bank Institute/BCPR/UNDP/ workshop involving all partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nat. consultants (8 w/m) (\$ 24,000) • Workshops/seminars (\$ 200,000)
	1.2 Establishment and maintenance of a database to house key macro-economic and socio-economic data and statistics	1.2.1 Collection and review of relevant data and identification and assessment of data gaps (building on Somalia Watching Brief project) 1.2.2 Maintenance and building up of database 1.2.3 Training of technical staff in the database system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (6 w/m) (\$90,000) • Nat. consultants (24 w/m) (\$ 72,000) • Trainings/workshops (\$75,000)
	1.3 Strengthen local capacity to facilitate the transfer of expertise in data collection, compilation and analysis at the regional level.	1.3.1 Assessment of local capacity (administrations and NGOs) 1.3.2 Training for relevant institutions and administrations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (3 w/m) (\$ 45,000) • Nat. consultants (8 w/m) (\$ 24,000) • Training (\$ 140,000)

2. Analysis of key macro-economic and socio-economic data to examine potential areas of growth and formulate strategies in relevant sectors.	2.1 Report on key macro-economic and socio-economic data and trends for Somalia.	<p>2.1.1 Identification of relevant indicators to measure and track the changes in key macro-economic and socio-economic trends</p> <p>2.1.2 Surveys and assessments to fill the data gaps</p> <p>2.1.3 Compilation of key indicators</p> <p>2.1.4 Production of report and wide dissemination</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (4 w/m) (\$60,000) • Nat. consultants (4 w/m) (\$ 12,000) • Surveys and assessments (\$150,000) • Workshops/seminars (\$ 50,000) • Publications (\$12,000)
	2.2 Report on potential areas of economic growth within Somalia	<p>2.2.1 Collection and review of relevant data and identification and assessment of data gaps</p> <p>2.2.2 Surveys and assessments to fill the data gaps</p> <p>2.2.3 Compilation of key indicators</p> <p>2.2.4 Production of report and wide dissemination</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (4 w/m) (\$60,000) • Nat. consultants (4 w/m) (\$ 12,000) • Surveys and assessments (\$150,000) • Workshop/seminars (\$ 50,000) • Publications (\$12,000)
	2.3 Reports on key sectoral areas in Somalia	<p>2.3.1 Identification of areas where sectoral reports are needed</p> <p>2.3.2 Collection and review of relevant data and identification and assessment of data gaps</p> <p>2.3.3 Surveys and assessments to fill the data gaps</p> <p>2.3.4 Compilation of key indicators</p> <p>2.3.5 Production of report and wide dissemination</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (4 w/m) (\$60,000) • Nat. consultants (4 w/m) (\$ 12,000) • Surveys and assessments (\$128,000) • Workshops/seminars (\$50,000) • Publications (\$12,000)

Strategic Area of Entry #2: Creating an Enabling Environment for the Livestock and Meat Industry			
Intended Outcome: Improved and consistent earnings from the export of livestock and livestock products.			
Outcome Indicator: Uninterrupted export of livestock and livestock products.			
Partnership Strategy: This will be implemented by UNDP, FAO, Somali administrations, the private sector, and importers of Somali livestock and livestock products. The SACB livestock committee will also be a key partner.			
Intended Outputs	Output Targets	Indicative Activities	Inputs Budget Estimate: \$ 1,900,000
1. An institution recognized by importers for the certification of Somali livestock and livestock product.	1.1 The institution is established in the northeast, central and possibly southern zones of Somalia.	1.1 .1 Consultations with administrations, traders, entrepreneurs, trading partners and internationally recognized certifying agencies 1.2 .1 Drawing up the functions and organizational and management structure of the institution and its linkages to administrations, private sector, importers, etc. 1.3 .1 Support to establish the institution/ institutional framework 1.4.1 Formalisation of the management and administration of the institution with the administrations, private sector, trading partners, FAO and UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (6 w/m) (\$90,000) • Nat. consultant (12 w/m) (\$36,000) • Workshops/seminars (Northwest, Northeast, Central and South) (\$100,000)
2. Certification of livestock for export.	2.1 All animals exported from Berbera and Bosasso ports are brought under certification system.	2.1.1 Recruitment of international experts and national professionals 2.1.2 Training of national professionals 2.1.3 Technical support to establish supporting facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (6 w/m) (\$90,000) • Nat. consultants x 2 (12 w/m) (\$72,000)
3. Certification of livestock products for export.	3.1 Meat and other livestock products exported are brought under certification system.	3.1.1 Recruitment of international experts and national professionals 3.1.2 Training of national professionals 3.1.3 Technical support to establish supporting facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultants (6 w/m) (\$90,000) • Nat. consultants x 2 (8 w/m) (\$48,000) • Supporting facilities

		in the abattoirs	(\$200,000)
4. Improved capacity for diagnostics and disease control.	4.1 Regional and zonal systems for vaccination, diagnostics and treatment.	4.1.1 Assessment of available laboratory facilities 4.1.2 Equipping of laboratory/ies 4.1.3 Training of laboratory technicians 4.1.4 Training of field staff in the use of vaccines.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (3 w/m) (\$45,000) • Nat. consultant (6 w/m) (\$18,000) • Training/Workshops (Northwest, Northeast, Central and South) (\$100,000) • Equipment (\$251,000)
5. Support for implementation of livestock strategy.	5.1 Additional support for implementation of livestock strategy for Somalia developed.	5.1.1 Discussions with partners in Somalia and outside to develop and agree on the implementation of the strategy at the national/regional levels 5.1.2 Promote strategy within Somalia and with trading partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (2 w/m) (\$30,000) • National/regional workshops (\$30,000)
6. Establishment of a centre of training for livestock health and research.	6.1 A centre of training established in a suitable location in Somalia.	6.1.1 Identification of appropriate geographical location for center 6.1.2 Partnering with already available/willing institutions by expanding/diversifying their capacity/ or administrations/ communities 6.1.3 Prioritisation of courses to be introduced and training to be imparted 6.1.4 Building partnership with concerned administrative departments, universities (local and abroad), Somali diaspora, private sector and similar centres outside the country 6.1.5 Establish quality control and certification procedures 6.1.6 Provision of critical supporting facilities - equipment, lab, library etc. 6.1.7 Recruitment of additional faculty and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (12 w/m) (\$180,000) • Nat. consultant (24 w/m) (\$72,000) • Meetings/seminars (\$150,000) • Supporting facilities (\$298,000)

		training/quality improvement 6.1.8 Establishment of management arrangement	
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
Strategic Area of Entry #3 Coordinated Action Plan to Address HIV/AIDS Issues			
Intended Outcome: Impact of HIV/AIDS on sustainable human development are well understood and adequately addressed from a strategic and policy perspective.			
Outcome Indicator: National/regional rehabilitation and development policies and strategies incorporate HIV/AIDS issues and concerns.			
Partnership Strategy: The proposed initiatives are to strengthen the ongoing efforts of Somalis and international development partners (WHO/UNICEF/ UNFPA/IFRC) to address issues related to HIV/AIDS from an awareness and policy perspective. This will be implemented by UNICEF, WHO, UNIFEM and IFRC. The SACB HIV/AIDS committee will be a key partner.			
Intended Outputs	Output Targets	Indicative Activities	Inputs Estimated Budget \$ 2,900,000
1. Dimensional analysis highlighting perceived impacts of HIV/AIDS and resources needed to address them.	1.1 Analytical reports showing medium/long-term impacts under a wide range of scenarios.	1.1.1 Trends analysis of HIV/AIDS prevalence, including behavioural research to identify the high-risk sub-populations in terms of HIV infection, as well as risks to infant, child and maternal health 1.1.2 Analysis of the perceived impact of AIDS on demographic structure, economic growth and social development 1.1.3 Perceived impact of AIDS on progress towards MDGs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. consultant (6 w/m) (\$90,000) • National consultants (8 w/m) (\$24,000) • Publications (\$100,000)
2. Epidemiological assessment-monitoring of HIV prevalence in the general population and in at-risk groups.	2.1 Updated data with extended coverage on HIV prevalence available for technical monitoring and planning.	2.1.1 National HIV sero-prevalence study among pregnant women 2.1.2 National HIV sero-prevalence study among tuberculosis patients 2.1.3 National HIV sero-prevalence study among sex workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National lab technician (12 w/m) (\$36,000) • Training for lab technicians (\$200,000) • Equipment (HIV test kits) (\$200,000)
3. Greater advocacy and awareness at higher political and administrative levels, including	3.1 National/regional coordination units supported by the administrations established by early 2003.	3.1.1 National/regional seminars with participation of political leadership, administrations and civil society 3.1.2 Visit by selected Somali decision makers and planners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National/regional seminars (\$250,000) • Training (\$250,000)

through regional networking.		to neighbouring countries where the impact of HIV/AIDS is quite visible 3.1.3 Promote regional cross-sectoral networking on HIV/AIDS issues both within Somalia and between neighboring countries 3.1.4 Training 3.1.5 Provision of supporting facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supporting facilities (\$100,000)
4. Support to the formulation and implementation of a national/ regional strategy framework and action plan.	4.1 Technical assistance to the formulation of national/ regional strategy framework and action plans provided.	4.1.1 Technical inputs in support of the formulation of the national/regional strategy framework 4.1.2 Support to the implementation of the HIV/AIDS action plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Int. consultants (12 w/m) (\$180,000) National consultants (12 w/m) (\$36,000) Meetings/seminars (\$60,000)
5. Support to community-managed health clinics on HIV/AIDS intervention.	5.1 HIV/AIDS framework and action plan mainstreamed at community/district levels.	5.1.1 Support to community clinics in the implementation of the HIV/AIDS framework and action plan 5.1.2 Support to data collection on HIV/AIDS and related health issues in community clinics in three zones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Int. consultant (12 w/m) (\$180,000) Nat. consultants x 3 (12 w/m) (\$108,000) Training on data collection (\$112,000)
6. Establishment of centre of training for health professionals.	6.1 A centre of training established in a suitable location in Somalia.	6.1.1 Assessment of specific capacity-building needs and identification of appropriate geographical locations in consultation with relevant organizations 6.1.2 Partnering with already available/willing institutions by expanding/diversifying their capacity/ or administrations/ communities 6.1.3 Prioritisation of courses to be introduced and training to be imparted 6.1.4 Building partnership with concerned administrative departments, universities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Int. consultant (18.5 w/m) (\$280,000) Nat. consultants x2 (24 w/m) (\$144,000) Meetings/seminars (\$150,000) Supporting facilities (\$400,000)

		(local and abroad), Somali diaspora, private sector and similar centres outside the country 6.1.5 Establish quality control and certification procedures 6.1.6 Provision of critical supporting facilities - equipment, lab, library etc. 6.1.7 Recruitment of additional faculty and training/quality improvement 6.1.8 Establishment of management arrangement	
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ANNEX II—Somalia

Administrative Map



ANNEX III - Prior Engagement of the World Bank in Somalia

➤ World Bank Strategy in the 1980s

The World Bank's overall objective during the 1980s was to help Somalia get on a sustained growth path with more equitable income distribution through adjustment programs which included economic stabilization measures combined with a return to a deregulated market economy. This strategy was also supported by investment projects directed to overcoming Somalia's longer-term development constraints in agriculture, infrastructure, human resources and essential public sector institutions. These objectives were pursued by maintaining a policy dialogue through Country Economic Memoranda and public expenditure reviews.

Since the Bank extended its first credit to Somalia in 1964, US\$526 million of IDA credits were made available for forty projects as of June 30, 1990. Twenty-eight projects were completed and fully disbursed and eight Project Performance Audit Reports were distributed to the Executive Directors.

The sectoral distribution of Bank lending to Somalia has been 59 percent for agriculture, with an emphasis on improving livestock health services and management of rangelands, and improved irrigated farming. Twenty-two percent of total lending was extended for strengthening the country's infrastructure, namely roads, port facilities and water supply. The education sector absorbed about 11 percent of lending; the remaining projects were for the energy and finance sectors.

While the Bank's efforts to carry out its past assistance strategy had some positive results, the adjustment process became stagnant due to the Government's preoccupation with internal political and military concerns. In the absence of a meaningful adjustment program, the Bank subsequently reduced its support for Somalia to a "Core Program" of activities which was to include a lending program of one or two investment projects a year totalling about US\$20 million and a small economic and sector work program. The "Core Program" was to be directed at supporting human resource development and institutional capacity building, and to preventing further deterioration of Somalia's basic infrastructure and natural resource base through maintenance and improved environmental protection. The increasingly unstable economic and political situation made the attainment of these objectives difficult.

The Bank had also initiated a Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) program in the country and was assisting the Government to establish an institutional capability to screen and finance poverty-targeted projects which involve the community and NGOs. Under the SDA aegis, the African Development Bank was working closely with the Bank to strengthen the Ministry of National Planning's ability to collect and analyze socio-economic data, and was providing financing for this purpose. It was also financing policy studies which specifically address issues affecting the vulnerable groups.

➤ Donor Coordination

In the implementation of these activities, the Bank maintained close ties with major donors in Somalia, such as Italy, Germany, USAid, African Development Bank, EC and UNDP through periodic consultations and frequent exchanges of information among staff as well as through Consultative Group meetings. The last Consultative Group Meeting on Somalia was held in February 1987 and a Special Donors' meeting was held in London in September 1988.

➤ Activities with the IMF

A Policy Framework Paper (Sec M89-361), outlining the Government's 1989-91 macroeconomic program, which was approved by the Committee of the Whole in April 1989, was prepared jointly by the Government, the Fund and the Bank. Although the Fund had been unable to provide additional resources to Somalia as of 1986 because of Somalia's arrears with the Fund, the Fund staff nonetheless worked closely with the Bank to advise and monitor the macroeconomic program being implemented, through joint missions and continuous consultations. The Fund also took the initiative to form a Support Group for Somalia in 1989 to address Somalia's rising debt arrears problems, particularly to multilateral donors. However, it seems to have had little success.¹

➤ Emergency Assistance in 1992

In October 1992, the World Bank responded to the shortfall of the United Nations' 100-day Action Program for Somalia to bring urgent cash assistance to relieve the violence, misery and starvation brought on by political instability and conflicts. To address the magnitude of destruction (which had already killed thousands of people and threatened to annihilate a significant portion of the population) and in the absence of a functioning government that would qualify for traditional World Bank lending, a Special Emergency Assistance Grant was made available through three United Nations agencies for a total amount of US\$20 million. The funding was approved 27 October 1992 under three separate agreements with UNICEF, WHO and WFP to finance emergency food and non-food items under separate proposals submitted by the three agencies.

The grant was seen as a first step toward possible economic recovery with longer-term reconstruction under traditional IDA lending terms, upon the return of normalcy. The Bank appointed a task force to conceptualize a reconstruction program in coordination with other donors, pending the reinstatement of a legitimate government. A multi-donor task force, led by the Bank, prepared a report on a framework for the planning of long-

¹ This information is taken from the *Memorandum and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 14.1 Million to the Somali Democratic Republic for an Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project* (World Bank Report No. P-5202-SO, 14 September 1990).

term reconstruction and recovery in late 1993. Unfortunately, further violence made it impossible for any meaningful reconstruction to take place.²

➤ **World Bank Activities Since 1991**

The World Bank has not had an active portfolio in Somalia since 1991. Resumption of new lending to Somalia has been prevented by: (i) the fact that Somalia is in “non-accrual” status with the Bank. At present, arrears to IDA are approximately US\$96 million. Somalia has not yet resumed paying its debt to international financial institutions; (ii) the lack of a fully functional national government; and (iii) the unstable security situation.

Through the Post-conflict Fund, a Somalia Watching Brief for a total of \$1 million was approved in February 2002 to undertake two activities in Somalia. Short of lending, the Bank strategy for Somalia at present has therefore been two-pronged:

► *To build the analytical knowledge base through the collection, analysis and monitoring of key macro-economic and socio-economic data in partnership with UNDP; and*

► *To continue funding the third phase of a successful project, implemented by the Somali Red Cross, for the sustainable rehabilitation of basic health services in areas affected by conflict.*

Table: Arrears for Somalia

Source	US\$ (million)
African Development Bank	46
International Monetary Fund	296
World Bank	97
Total	439

² This information is taken from *the Implementation Completion Report on Somalia: Special Assistance Grant* (World Bank Report No. 14299, 5 April 1995).

ANNEX IV - Aid Coordination for Somalia

I. Somalia Aid Coordination Body³

Faced with the breakdown of the Somali state and the ensuing economic and humanitarian crisis, and in the absence of an overall unified national partner, the international community moved to develop new mechanisms for supporting operations in Somalia. The principal structure that emerged was the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), which was established in 1994. It is a voluntary coordinating body, which provides a framework to develop a common approach for the allocation of international aid to Somalia.

The SACB emphasises the need for peace, security and the existence of Somalia authorities at local and regional levels as prerequisites for international assistance. This 'peace dividend approach' aims to ensure that international aid is not only relevant to local efforts for reconstruction but also contributes whenever possible to peace building.

The international community assembled in the SACB is committed to the provision of humanitarian and development assistance to those in need, regardless of geographical location and social or political affiliation. The aims of the SACB are:

- To provide policy guidance and practical assistance to implementing agencies on issues of policy, security and operational constraints;
- To provide policy and operational coordination for rehabilitation and development activities particularly at the sectoral level;
- To develop recommendations for the allocation of resources to different regions;
- To provide a base for possible resource allocation.

Participants in the SACB include donors, UN agencies, and international NGOs. It operates through a network of committees. There are five main sector committees relating to key areas of rehabilitation and development assistance.

The Executive Committee comprises a limited and representative membership from amongst donors, UN agencies and NGOs. The committee is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the 'Code of Conduct', managing the international response to security situations and providing policy guidance to the Sectoral Steering Committee. It places emphasis on providing a longer-term policy framework for humanitarian relief and development.

The Sectoral Steering Committee is composed of the Chairs of the five sectoral committees – (i) education; (ii) food security and rural development; (iii) governance; (iv) health; and (v) water, sanitation and infrastructure. The Sectoral Steering Committee provides guidance and coordination on technical and programme issues that arise from

³ This information is taken from the SACB website, <http://www.sacb.info> (December 2002).

field operations.

The Consultative Committee acts as an open forum for all members to exchange information on the political, security and humanitarian situation in Somalia. It regularly debates issues of general interest and acts as an advocacy for the expansion of successful approaches to improving social and economic welfare of the Somali people. These different committees meet regularly in Nairobi and Somalia to provide programme coordination for Somalia.

II. UN System in Somalia⁴

A wide range of general and specialized UN agencies, funds and programmes are present in Somalia and constitute the UN system in Somalia. An inter-agency team, the UN Country Team, coordinates the activities of the different agencies under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. The head of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) serves as the Representative of the UN Secretary General.

The location of the country offices of the UN agencies and the majority of other humanitarian and development agencies operating in Somalia, outside the country, in Nairobi, has constituted a significant operational challenge. UN agencies have therefore been seeking to devolve programme management to offices inside Somalia, where possible. As a result, where security has allowed, a number of agencies have already decentralised programme management back into Somalia and established operational sub-offices.

The UN system recently formulated a UN Joint Action and Recovery Plan (JARP) for Somalia for 2002-2003, which is a common framework for the humanitarian and development of UN agencies operating in Somalia. It aims to strengthen UN coordination in programming, resource mobilisation and programme execution, and through this to increase the UN system's impact in Somalia.

The return of peace and stability in Somalia is of paramount importance for the avoidance of further humanitarian crises and for the development of the country and its people. The JARP sets out a strategy for the UN system for Somalia to use humanitarian and development assistance to build peace from the grassroots up, creating conditions that will help sustain an eventual agreement between warring parties.

The JARP is structured around four overall priority areas for assistance, which were formulated and developed by thematic working groups during 2001:

- Protection and integration,
- Primary-level and vocational education,
- Maternal and child health, and communicable diseases, and
- Food security.

⁴ This information is taken from the *United Nations Joint Action and Recovery Plan for Somalia 2002-2003* (Nairobi, September 2002).

These priority areas are supplemented by the cross-cutting themes of gender and human rights. Through the framework formulated around these themes, the UN system will aim to contribute to the broad overall goals for Somalia of the return of peace and stability; the respect and fulfillment of rights to education, health and freedom from want, discrimination and fear; and the improvement of livelihoods and human development, especially of the poor and vulnerable.

In protection and integration, the JARP defines the overall objective of UN assistance as: increased protection and sustainable integration of refugees, returnees, IDPs, demobilised militia and resident vulnerable populations, supported by improved governance and economic recovery.

In primary level and vocational education, the JARP defines the intended outcome as: increased and sustainable provision of quality primary and vocational education for children, youth and adults.

In maternal and child health, and communicable diseases, the JARP defines two overall intended outcomes: maternal and infant mortality decreased through provision of adequate reproductive health services; and mortality and morbidity of the major communicable diseases and vaccine-preventable diseases reduced, with emphasis on malaria, meningitis, tuberculosis and diarrhoeal and respiratory diseases.

In food security, the JARP defines the overall intended outcome as: increased food security, particularly for the most vulnerable communities, with improved nutrition and self-reliance as a result of food assistance and improved agricultural and pastoral production.

In the context of these four programming areas and in the absence of an overall national partner, UN agencies will seek to use and further develop partnerships with local and regional authorities. Agencies will likewise continue to build partnerships with Somali actors, such as community and civil society organisations and local NGOs, through the mechanisms of the SACB and with the broader aid community; and with regional and international bodies not represented in the SACB.

III. UN Agencies in Somalia

The following UN agencies operate in Somalia and would be directly involved in the implementation of LICUS activities. The respective mandates of the given agencies in Somalia are noted below.

➤ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

The Food and Agriculture Organization has the following mandate:

- To alleviate poverty and hunger by promoting agricultural development, and improved nutrition;

- To pursue food security by providing all people, at all times, access to the food they need for an active and healthy life; and
- To continue offering direct development assistance; collecting, analysing and disseminating information; providing policy and planning advice to governments and serving as an international forum for debate on food and agriculture issues.

➤ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

The United Nations Development Programme has the following mandate:

- To help achieve sustainable human development by devising projects that the poor can participate in and benefit from;
- To help people find peaceful solutions to conflict by creating opportunities for them to disengage from violence; and
- To help in consolidating peace and security, and to promote good governance.

➤ **United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)**

The United Nations Population Fund has the following mandate:

- To assist in providing quality reproductive health and family planning services on the basis of individual choice, and in formulating population policies that support sustainable development;
- To advance the strategy endorsed by the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD); and
- To promote cooperation and coordination among United Nations organizations, bilateral agencies, governments, NGOs and the private sector in addressing issues of population and development, reproductive health gender equality and women's empowerment.

➤ **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**

The United Nations Children's Fund has the following mandate:

- To protect and promote the rights of children and women - both of whom are among the most disadvantaged;
- To work within maintained lines of political neutrality, and to respect local culture, values and self-reliance; and

- To promote close collaboration with other UN agencies and NGOs, honesty, transparency and accountability.

➤ **World Health Organisation (WHO)**

The World Health Organization has the following mandate:

- To give guidance in the field of health;
- To set standards for health;
- To cooperate with governments in strengthening national health programmes; and
- To develop and transfer appropriate health technology, information and standards.

IV. The European Commission in Somalia

Since 1995, the European Commission (EC) has been largest multilateral donor to Somalia, channelling resources from a number of bilateral partners. The recently released EC strategy for Somalia for the next five years seeks to focus its efforts on a multi-sectoral approach built on the pillars of: (i) enhancement of good governance; (ii) reduction of widespread vulnerability; (iii) access to social services; and (iv) economic growth and diversification. In addition, it should be noted that the Commission has played an important advisory and supportive role in the Somali peace process since 1993, promoting dialogue among the concerned political entities and encouraging regional peace initiatives.

ANNEX V - Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)⁵

I. Introduction

Conflict is inherent to all societies. Differences in interests and opinions between groups are natural, but the *method* by which such differences are expressed and managed determine if conflicts manifest themselves in primarily *political* (non violent) or *violent* ways. When significant groups within the society (including the government) pursue their objectives through processes that are in accordance with the specific laws and established norms of the society, conflict is predominantly political in nature.⁶ Political manifestations of conflict are not a subject of concern in CAF. When a group turns to violence to pursue its goals, and the use of violence outweighs the use of political means, the conflict is predominantly violent. Violent conflict takes on a host of forms.⁷ It is the violent conflict that is of concern to poverty reduction and development, and is addressed in the conflict analysis framework.

Global events in the post-second World War era demonstrate that violent *internal* conflicts pose a major challenge to development.⁸ Moreover, with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the diffusion of the international technology of destruction, it becomes even more critical to focus on violent conflict. Conflicts tap resources that could otherwise be used for social and economic development, thus having a negative impact on poverty. In the final analysis, it is important to prevent the occurrence, escalation, and resurgence of violent conflicts, since they constrain development, undermine poverty reduction efforts, and weaken a country's social fabric along with its physical, economic and human capital.

II. Purpose of Conflict Analysis

In accordance with OP 2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict, the Bank will use its instruments to promote economic growth and poverty reduction through assistance that minimizes potential causes of conflict. To achieve this, the operational policy mandates the integration of *sensitivity* to conflict in Bank assistance through analytical work, including conflict analysis. The conflict analysis framework intends to contribute to enhancing the Bank's capacity to support country and regional efforts to analyze and address conflicts in the framework of poverty reduction strategies and other development

⁵ This chapter is taken from the *Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)* document prepared by the World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Team (CPR) on 21 August 2002.

⁶ In some cases, the state laws themselves are structured in such a way as to promote exclusion and prevent participation, making groups feel that they have no peaceful, political alternatives, and that violence is their only option.

⁷ While it is difficult to determine when conflicts undergo transformation from being primarily political to being primarily violent, indicators highlighting that conflicts have turned predominantly violent include: political unrest with violent clashes on the rise; clampdown on opposition and violation of rights; lawlessness in the form of armed robberies, street crimes.

⁸ Rudolph Rummel, 1994. In the time period, 1900-1987, deaths from intra-state conflicts were 169.2 million while deaths from inter-state conflicts were 34 million.

strategies. This implies a recognition that the probability of success of development assistance is adversely affected without a complementary analytical framework identifying the sources and opportunities for outbreak and escalation of violent conflicts. It also implies the recognition that poverty reduction strategies and development assistance may contribute to ameliorate as well as exacerbate underlying causes of violent conflict. The purpose of conflict analysis is to ensure that Bank support to a country's poverty reduction strategy and development programs enhances sensitivity to conflicts and their sources in the poverty-reducing measures, and thus reinforces a country's resilience to violent conflict.

The purpose of conflict analysis includes:

- examining the sources and consequences of conflict;
- determining the factors that can be addressed through Bank assisted strategies, and the modalities through which they can best be managed;
- examining a country's resilience to outbreak or escalation of violent conflict, and its ability to de-escalate violent conflict;
- determining how resilience can be strengthened through development assistance.

III. Strengthening Country Resilience to Conflict

Poverty reduction and development strategies and interventions can have positive as well as negative effects on conflict. In a negative scenario, development interventions may (inadvertently) strengthen underlying causes of conflict, the actors who are pursuing conflict, and/or opportunities for violence. In a positive scenario, development interventions may contribute to weakening such factors, and help violent (or potentially violent) conflict de-escalate. It is important to be aware of the limitations of development interventions in de-escalating conflict and contributing to peace—they can only complement, never replace, direct peace-building measures such as political transformation or preventive diplomacy.

The Bank's focus on the prevention of conflict emphasizes the formulation of strategies that can help countries become more *resilient* to the eruption and escalation of (large-scale) violence. Conflict resilience is understood as a situation where conflict issues are dealt with through political and social processes rather than through the employment of violence. It includes creating and supporting institutions in a country which allow for the management of conflict in a non-violent and inclusionary manner. The key characteristics of a society resilient to violent conflict include:

1. Political and social institutions which are largely inclusive, equitable, and accountable.
2. Economic, social, and ethnic diversity rather than polarization and dominance.
3. Growth and development that provide equitable benefits across the society.
4. Culture of dialogue rather than violence.

IV. Other Agency Conflict Analysis/Assessments

The Bank's increasing emphasis on conflict prevention conforms with developments within other agencies (DFID, USAID, FEWER⁹), who see conflict analysis as a key element in program development. There is an increasing consensus that developmental "business as usual" often exacerbate the situation, particularly in ethnically (broadly defined to include differences in religion, caste, religion, ethnicity) fragile situations. Agencies have come to hold that in a situation of emerging or ongoing violent conflict, assistance as usual is not enough—it is important to develop a strategy which is sensitive to the conflict environment, and takes into account the underlying causes of conflict and how they can best be addressed.

USAID, DFID and FEWER have developed frameworks that assess the level of conflict risk, so that apt peace-building strategies can be formulated, and the impact of development programs on the dynamics of peace and conflict can be appropriately assessed.¹⁰ While building on prevailing work on conflict analysis, CAF also includes:

- key variables relating to poverty and conflict are identified in CAF — these cover wide areas such as social and ethnic relations; governance and political institutions; human rights and security; economic structure and performance; environment and natural resources; and external factors.
- CAF attempts to unwrap the factors affecting conflict, and highlight their components. By making explicit the components, CAF allows for replication and consistency.
- CAF is an operational framework—it specifically relates variables to conflict and poverty, to determine linkages and impact. The aim is to arrive at a list of factors that most critically affect conflict and poverty, so that priority areas can be identified.
- CAF focuses on both conflict and poverty. It examines the impact of variables on conflict and their link with poverty.

Conflict analysis is still a fledgling field, and currently, there is no consensus on what good conflict analysis entails. Yet, the fact that organizations have accepted that such analysis is critical is a step in the right direction.

⁹ FEWER is the acronym for Forum for Early Warning and Early Response.

¹⁰ For details on the main approaches to conflict analysis advanced by USAID, DFID and FEWER, refer to Appendix A.

ANNEX VI - World Bank Advisory Committee for Somalia CRN

- Mr. Ian Bannon, Manager, Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction Team
- Ms. Sarah Cliffe, Coordinator, Low-Income Countries Under Stress Initiative
- Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed Elbadawi, Lead Economist, Development Research Group
- Mr. Paul Collier, Director, Development Research Group
- Mr. Markus Kostner, Lead Social Development Specialist, Africa Region
- Mr. David Potten, Adviser, World Bank Institute