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By Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay

The Sangh Parivar has had internal differences on programmatic issues in the past. Self-destructive divergences had surfaced within the clan during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s tenure as prime minister. Much before Narendra Modi became the next BJP PM, speculations on an encore became rife.

The prime reason for this stemmed from Modi’s former persona of ‘Hindu Hriday Samrat’ being relegated to the background by the ‘Vikas Purush’ makeover. There were fears that die-hard economic nationalists within the parivar would not allow him a free hand to pursue reforms-oriented policies.

Any sign of disapproval from three main RSS affiliates in the economic sphere — the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), the Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS) and the Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM) — was perceived as the First Act of a sequel to those Vajpayee years.

Immediately after assuming office, Modi counterbalanced potential criticism by declaring his egalitarian intent, stressing that Deendayal Upadhyaya’s concept of Antyodaya — working for the last person in the line — formed the essence of his economic vision. The adoption of a pro-poor stance, while being selectively reformist, has so far been Modi’s primary strategy to contain hardline economic nationalists.

He agreed to infrequent consultations between leaders of affiliates and ministers. Yet, as recent interactions between key ministers and senior parivar functionaries suggest, beneath the calmness, fundamental fissures are becoming evident. This stems partially from Hindutva’s economic philosophy suffering from a lack of clarity giving different individuals or groups the right to claim their viewpoint as the fraternity’s official policy.

On economy, Hindutva still lacks an alternative narrative. The BJP adopted its economic policy statement in 1992 but has since restricted to development promises in election manifestos and economic resolutions at representative meetings. Because Hindutva drew from the ethos of Hinduism, economic views of founders were influenced by the denunciation of materialism in the spirit of renunciation. It resulted in the disapproval of the postindustrial global economic culture.

Small is beautiful, swadeshi, swavalamban (self-reliance) and vikendrikaran (decentralisation) became central principles without much elaboration. But the Jana Sangh, to adopt a stance different from that of the Congress, argued for abolishing the licence quota-permit Raj. Yet, leaders did not have the conviction to morph into a Swatantra Party 2.0.

The SJM’s formation corresponded with the BJP’s complete isolation among non-Congress parties after demolition of Babri Masjid. The campaigns against P V Narasimha Rao’s economic policies, Dunkel Draft and Gatt, permission to MNCs and globalisation in partnership with left-liberal groups and civil society greatly enabled political mainstreaming of the BJP. In 1998, unlike in 1996, it succeeded in attracting allies and formed a coalition government.

Irreconcilable differences over neoliberal economic policies of the government made Vajpayee’s tenure stormy. The presence of a Sangh stalwart, Dattopant Thengadi, BMS and SJM founder, added to his woes.

Modi does not face any challenge from a Thengadi-like figure among the economic nationalists. This is because of a conscious decision of the RSS leadership.

Modi’s market-oriented government will accept demands of the working class only to a limited extent. The struggle is to reach a point of agreement on vital issues, be it of FDI in different sectors, privatisation, labour reforms and continued mechanisation. Modi’s added burden is that his advocacy of egalitarianism has inherent similarities to both SJM’s viewpoint and also the left-liberal groups. He has to find avenues to wed his approach on development with that of Upadhyaya’s vision. This will be a challenging task.

Post-liberalisation India has seen successive governments pursuing right-of-centre economic policies. The same parties have shifted left-of-centre while in opposition. Modi’s challenge is that economic nationalists in his fraternity do not acquire the clout that the National Advisory Council had during the UPA’s tenure.

So far, the RSS leadership has played the role of adjudicator. The Nagpur secretariat does not have as rigid a viewpoint on economic issues as on cultural nationalism. At best, the economic vision of Mohan Bhagwat is that the nation’s development policies should be guided by national culture.

Because Modi’s reliance on the RSS cadre for winning polls is now greater than in 2014, he will have to walk a tightrope. Which, in turn, means he will have to exhibit hitherto unseen skills.