

## Chapter 2

# Archaeology, National Histories, and National Borders in Southeast Asia

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This chapter will examine how archaeology, the study of the material culture of past societies, has been used to define and critique national histories and borders in Southeast Asia. Archaeologists have reconstructed broad cultures identified as using similar artifacts and embracing common worldviews. These cultures (or “civilizations”) do not usually correspond with modern nation-states (or with ancient polities, for that matter). This is especially the case in Southeast Asia, a region long part of larger cultural units and open to border-crossing influences (the very concept of a border in fact having little resonance in the region until recent times). Southeast Asia has been described as a “crossroads,” and the description is not inaccurate.

The first section of the chapter will describe how Southeast Asia has historically been open to outside inputs; Hindu and Buddhist architecture, Chinese models of governance and trade, Chinese immigrant groups, the Islamic religion, and Western economic penetration and colonial rule have all marked the culture of the region. By 1900, virtually the entire area had come under some form of colonial control. Colonial authorities defined clear borders for their possessions, replacing earlier forms of state organization. A final foreign intervention came in the form of imperial Japan, which overthrew the European colonial order. Japanese victory paved the way for the emergence of independent Southeast Asian nation-states, which had the task of defining national borders and asserting common national histories.

The second part of the chapter will show how these tasks were facilitated by the earlier experience of colonial rule. Treaties between European powers defined borders between colonies, which largely remained intact after independence. Ancient symbols were presented as emblematic of a Southeast Asian past that glorified outside influence at the expense of local genius. Indonesia and Cambodia kept much of

the history unearthed by Dutch and French scholars and used it for purposes of nationbuilding. “National history” glorified such ancient civilizations as the Majapahit and Angkor and often linked present-day struggles to past triumphs. Thus, in freeing themselves from Dutch control and constructing a unified nation-state, Indonesians were simply building on the earlier work of Gajah Mada, the great 14<sup>th</sup>-century ruler of Majapahit. Cambodians were reminded that if their ancestors could build Angkor, they could do anything. Although partially constructed by rulers foreign to the region who, at least in the case of Cambodia, denigrated local achievements, national histories have been used by modern nation-states as a way to stress the uniqueness of their local cultures and to bolster national unity.

Not all Southeast Asians were satisfied with pasts handed to them by colonial rulers. Also troubling was that national histories often marginalized large segments (if not sometimes the majority) of a country’s population and instead glorified distant cultures that had little if any current resonance. This situation was particularly notable in Indonesia, where the Java-centric national history was felt by many to have downplayed the contributions of Muslims. The third part of this chapter looks at how some Indonesians have turned to archaeology in order to reconstruct a national history that emphasizes links to the Islamic world. Such a history might in fact also act as a reminder that Southeast Asia has always been at the center of larger currents, while at the same time having a strong tradition of autonomous development. The chapter concludes with some comments on whether such archaeological research, intended to reorient Indonesia toward the Islamic world, might also in fact strengthen a national identity or even a regional Southeast Asian one, rather than, as some have suggested, pave the way for some form of pan-Islamic caliphate.

### **Southeast Asia as a Crossroads**

Southeast Asia has seldom been victim to land invasion, as was often the case in continental Eurasia. Much more common was the arrival by sea of outsiders from China, India, the Middle East, and eventually Europe. Foreign visitors were chiefly motivated by trade rather than the desire to conquer, even though almost the entire region eventually lost its independence. The Indian Ocean long functioned

as a major trade corridor. Links to China, India, and the Middle East/Mediterranean world date to around the time of Christ. Trade networks also served as a conduit for ideas and religious beliefs, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity.

### **The Influence of India**

When Western scholars first began to study the archaeology of Southeast Asia, they were struck by an apparent Indian cultural influence. Sustained Indian contact or perhaps even some form of colonization best explained the impressive Hindu monuments found in the region. The *kshatriya* theory of a Southeast Asia settled by Indian warriors was supplemented by the Brahmin theory, which involved Hindu religious practitioners bringing high culture to the region. Brahmins were held to have strengthened local rulers by performing magical rituals, creating mythological symbols, and providing prestigious iconography. A few argued that Indian civilization was brought to Southeast Asia through the arrival of the *vaisya* caste of traders and craftsmen.<sup>1</sup> However, these models of Indian colonization or passively accepted “Indianization” are no longer tenable.<sup>2</sup> The scenario of an expanding Indian high civilization encountering a stone-age Southeast Asia with any local innovations such as metallurgy as late or derivative developments no longer stands up. Recent archaeological research has established that rice cultivation developed in the major valleys of mainland Southeast Asia between 2500 and 500 BCE. From 500 BCE until around 800 CE, agricultural intensification and centralization occurred, along with technological innovations in the use of bronze and iron. There was more local demand for prestige items from India, which helped enhance the status of local rulers, and that stimulated trade. The initial Indian impact acted as a catalyst; the Indian presence played a more direct and positive role with time and eventually resulted in the adoption of writing systems, political philosophy, and the Hindu and Buddhist religions. This helped nurture complexity in Southeast Asian societies; local chiefs attracted more retainers and employed craftsmen while mobilizing the local population in order to construct irrigation systems and temple complexes.<sup>3</sup> Whatever the exact dynamics of how India influenced Southeast Asian culture, it seems clear that imported concepts were accepted only as far as they complemented and reinforced local traditions.

**Islamization**

A similar process may have brought Islam to Southeast Asia. Muslims, making up about one-half of the population of the region, presently reside in a “Muslim zone” consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei, as well as the southern parts of the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia. There is no evidence of large-scale Muslim invasions or even immigration into the region. Instead, Islam developed in Southeast Asia as the result of peaceful interaction between Muslim visitors and the local population. Muslims came to Southeast Asia for trading purposes, from perhaps as early as the 7<sup>th</sup> century, as part of a well-established process of globalization focused on the Indian Ocean.<sup>4</sup> (The wreck of a 9<sup>th</sup>-century Indian or Arab ship recently discovered between Sumatra and Borneo attests to the existence of these early trade routes.<sup>5</sup>) With trade came religious change. Anthony Reid relates the Islamization of parts of Southeast Asia during this “age of commerce” (1450–1689) to the integration of the region into larger cultural and commercial systems.<sup>6</sup> But as Reid’s timeframe indicates, this was far from an overnight process. In fact, Muslims may have been visiting Southeast Asia for centuries before local inhabitants took a real interest in this new religion. Traders lived in separate communities and only slowly began to integrate themselves into the larger Southeast Asian society. Muslims often married into local ruling dynasties or held the important position of harbormaster, in charge of settling disputes among merchants. A shared religion also allowed access to trade and credit networks that transcended the region. By the late 13<sup>th</sup> century, some Southeast Asian rulers began to see advantages in converting to Islam, and Islamic polities become evident. Muslim states apparently first emerged in northern Sumatra, where such travelers as Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta noted their presence and early grave markers of Islamic rulers have been found. Fourteenth-century grave markers also have been found in Brunei and the Philippines. The 15<sup>th</sup> century saw the rise of a series of Islamic states in Malaysia and Java, although especially in the case of the latter, the process of Islamization was to take many centuries. The 16<sup>th</sup> century saw the penetration of the Moluccas; such Islamic polities as Ternate and Tidore were soon to encounter the aggressive Christian powers of Portugal and Spain.

It has been argued that the Islamization of island Southeast Asia is an ongoing process, or has not in fact occurred at all. Southeast

Asian Islam is held to be quite distinct from that of the Arab Middle East, which is held to be normative. Thus, Clifford Geertz chose to entitle his anthropological study of a small East Java town *The Religion of Java*, implying the existence of a unique Javanese worldview clearly distinguishable from Islam.<sup>7</sup> Earlier Dutch analyses, which for political reasons downplayed Islam's hold over the population, made a similar assertion: that Islam was somehow foreign to the natural culture of the archipelago. The real civilization of Indonesia, it was argued, had been an Indic one. When the Islamic presence in Indonesia was acknowledged, it was held to be a corruption of the "true faith" of the Middle East.<sup>8</sup> Geertz himself is apparently cited by some Indonesian Muslims as "scientific proof" that the nation's believers have strayed from Islamic norms.<sup>9</sup> But, as Mark Woodward points out, it is a mistake to identify a text-based version of Islam not only as normative, but also as the sole barometer by which one can measure what is and what is not Islamic.<sup>10</sup> Ignoring some of the more "ritualistic" and "mystical" elements of Islam in general and Islam as it is practiced in Java in particular, Geertz identifies a "real religion" as emphasizing texts; he has difficulty understanding the rationale for "chanting" of the Koran by non-Arabic speakers. But from a traditional Javanese perspective, it is quite problematic to claim that people are not pious simply because they cannot read Arabic.<sup>11</sup> Marshall Hodgson noted that when Javanese Islam is seen from the perspective of Islam as a whole, it exhibits many similarities to that of South Asia and the Middle East.<sup>12</sup>

That is not to say that Southeast Asian Islam does not have a unique character. Many local customs survived the process of religious change. The Islamic rulers of Java adopted earlier Hindu-Buddhist/Javanese models of governance, as can be seen in their use of Majapahit regalia and the fabrication of genealogies linking their houses to the Majapahit dynasty. Local belief may even have facilitated the acceptance of the Islamic religion; the *wali songo*, a semilegendary group alleged to have brought Islam to Java, are held to have drawn on Java's rich cultural traditions in order to convert the population. Sunan Kalijaga, for example, was said to have brought the *wayang* puppet play to the region and used it to explain Islamic doctrine and history, despite that fact that at present the most popular subjects for the *wayang* are two Hindu epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*. Sufism has long been held as instrumental in making Islam attractive to local sentiment. Anthony

Johns sees the Mongol invasions of the Middle East in the 13<sup>th</sup> century as scattering many mystical practitioners across Asia, some of whom eventually arrived in Southeast Asia via the established trade routes.<sup>13</sup> Sufism's stress on mystical experience of the divine as well as ideas about secret wisdom reserved for the initiated may have appealed to a Hindu-Buddhist society built around semisacred rulers. It offered continuity; Islam need not have overturned all that had come before it. Islam was accepted in Southeast Asia because it fit in with local norms. Even the *pesantren* system of Islamic boarding schools, a crucial element in Islamic society in Indonesia to the present day, may have had Hindu-Buddhist antecedents.<sup>14</sup>

### **The Chinese Footprint**

The extent of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia varied considerably. Vietnam was a Chinese province until it won its independence in the 10<sup>th</sup> century. Subsequent Chinese military interventions were not uncommon, the latest occurring in 1979. Many Chinese cultural traits were adopted by Vietnam: the Confucian examination system, the institution of emperor, and styles of dress and architecture. These deep connections between China and Vietnam have led to the suggestion that the latter country should be more properly seen as part of a greater Chinese sphere (along with Korea and Japan) rather than as part of Southeast Asia.<sup>15</sup> Archaeology has been used to emphasize the uniqueness of Vietnamese cultural achievement and to stress that its development was not wholly dependent on outside impetus. This is particularly the case in regard to the Dong Son culture of the first millennium BCE.<sup>16</sup> Named after a site in northern Vietnam, the culture was held by European scholars to have originated in China. Postindependence Vietnamese archaeologists instead identified it as a Vietnamese culture that had emerged before the establishment of Han imperial hegemony.<sup>17</sup> However, the famous bronze kettle drums, emblematic of this advanced culture, were in fact produced in northern Thailand as well as in the Chinese provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan; it is hard to say how "Vietnamese" the objects are. And while Vietnam does historically have much in common with southern China (and vice versa), its distinctiveness rests less on its bronze age culture than on the fact that it continued to have strong contacts with the rest of Southeast Asia, even during the centuries of Chinese control. In any

event, the Vietnamese felt confident enough to establish their own system of rule, although one modeled after that of imperial China.<sup>18</sup>

Evidence for a Chinese presence in island Southeast Asia before 1000 CE is scant, consisting of a small amount of pottery found in southern Sumatra and the accounts of Buddhist pilgrims.<sup>19</sup> Direct Chinese control did not take place outside of Vietnam. Instead, the Chinese tried to impose a form of tributary control. Southeast Asian rulers would make occasional visits to the Chinese capital bearing gifts. They would pledge allegiance to China and agree to not act in a manner detrimental to Chinese interests. In turn, they would be offered Chinese protection and would be allowed access to Chinese trade networks. Srivijaya and Malacca both developed into thriving commercial centers under the umbrella of Chinese security. China seldom actually intervened militarily and the engagement of its merchants in the region was sporadic.<sup>20</sup>

A major exception to this pattern involved the voyages of Admiral Zheng He. In the early 15<sup>th</sup> century, the Ming dynasty sent out a series of huge fleets of up to 300 ships, which traveled as far as the coast of Africa and made many stops in Southeast Asia.<sup>21</sup> The fleets were meant to display Chinese power and to gather intelligence; the writings of the admiral's secretary Ma Huan have survived to this day.<sup>22</sup> Tribute was collected; Chinese gifts were left in return (the tributary system was a form of trade, but to the Chinese, commerce was to take place between equals, and as can be seen in the writings of Ma Huan, the Southeast Asians were deemed inferior). The voyages of Zheng He have been seen by historians as a great "might have been" (they took place mere decades before those of Columbus); they were shut down by the imperial authorities, perhaps because it was felt that they were too expensive and that China had little to learn from the outside world. But while Chinese ships did not reach the New World, contacts with Southeast Asia continued. The voyages may even have aided the spread of Islam; Zheng He was both a eunuch and a Muslim, and there is apparently a relationship between the Chinese presence and Islamic activity in northern Java in the 15<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>23</sup> An elaborate Chinese pagoda has been built in Zheng He's memory in Semarang, a seaport in northern Java. The shrine attracts Javanese Muslim pilgrims and is only a short distance from Demak and Kudus, the sites of the two oldest mosques in Indonesia. The cross-cultural popularity of this temple could be seen as emblematic of Southeast Asia's status as a crossroads; a foreign



visitor, representing an imperial power, remains a figure of devotion to a broad spectrum of local people. It is perhaps not surprising that Zheng He, long forgotten in China proper, is also celebrated in Singapore, where he is seen as an example not just of connections to China but also of an innate openness to trade and the outside world.

The Chinese of Semarang cannot be traced directly to these 15<sup>th</sup>-century voyages, but certainly by this time a Chinese immigrant presence was observable; it was to expand substantially in subsequent years. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, powerful Chinese commercial communities were present in Spanish Manila and Dutch Batavia (Jakarta). (The latter community was the target of a Dutch pogrom in 1740, the survivors going on to take part in the dynastic struggles then convulsing Java.) Chinese workers were encouraged to settle in British-controlled Malaya and in Siam in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Chinese authorities had an ambiguous attitude toward these overseas populations; the issue of whether they remained Chinese citizens or had in fact lost this status was a complicated one that in some cases was not really resolved until the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>24</sup> Local reaction was sometimes hostile; ethnic Chinese populations, who in many cases no longer spoke Chinese or used Chinese names, were subject to violence in Indonesia as late as 1998. Anti-Chinese actions were often fueled by the perception that the Chinese held an unfair economic advantage and were also perhaps more loyal to China than to their native country. While Chinese populations generally did better in Thailand and the Philippines, the government in Malaysia enforced discriminatory measures in order to bolster the status of the Malay majority. The justification given was that the Chinese were in a sense merely visitors who should not profit at the expense of the “indigenous Malays.”

Voyages on the scale of those made by Zheng He were never attempted again. Ironically, Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia were encouraged to settle by other imperial powers. From the beginning, Europeans acted somewhat differently than earlier visitors. The Portuguese had apparently heard of the great wealth and vast trade opportunities associated with Malacca, a port controlling the waterways between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. Rather than try to integrate themselves into the existing commercial routes connected to Malacca, they simply seized the city in 1511. This was part of a larger campaign to capture and maintain a network of fortified posts stretching into



the eastern parts of Indonesia in order to establish a monopoly on the spice trade. The Portuguese had the secondary motivation of wishing to spread the influence of their religion into regions that had not previously had much exposure to Christianity.

### **The European Impact**

In the long run, the ambitions of the Portuguese were not fulfilled. Trade simply moved away to other ports. The Portuguese by the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century had to come to terms with the local trading system and in some cases hired out their ships to local commercial interests (similarly, Portuguese mercenaries operated frequently in mainland Southeast Asia). Although some local rulers did convert to Christianity in the Moluccas, no Christian kingdoms survived for more than a few years. But some of the population of eastern Indonesia remains Catholic to this day. The influence of Portuguese on the languages of Southeast Asia might also be seen as significant. In addition to its use in East Timor (Portugal's last actual Southeast Asian possession), Portuguese has given many words to Malay, the language that for years competed with Portuguese and eventually surpassed it as the common tongue of the commercial ports of the region.<sup>25</sup>

If the Portuguese impact on the region was ephemeral, the same cannot be said of the other European powers. In 1602, the separate Dutch trading companies operating in the region joined together to form the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC, or United East Indies Company). A joint stock company operating under a charter from the Dutch government, it was given a monopoly over all trade in the Indian Ocean basin and was granted the rights of a sovereign state. Although in theory a board of directors in the Netherlands was in charge, in reality the governor of the VOC, from 1619 resident in Batavia, exercised almost total freedom of action, due to difficulties in communications. The company's plan was to establish a monopoly over the spice trade by forcing local rulers into restrictive treaties, barring any outside European or Asian competition, and actually going as far as destroying spice-producing plants and exterminating the inhabitants of several islands in the Moluccas in order to drive up commodity prices.<sup>26</sup>

This strategy was, in the end, a failure. Because of the vast distances involved, supply and demand could never really be controlled. The company was plagued by inefficiency, corruption, and low-quality

personnel who were often more interested in their private smuggling activities than in the organization's financial well-being. The VOC declared bankruptcy in 1799, its Indonesian assets being taken over by the Dutch government. These holdings were considerable; by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the VOC controlled all of the island of Java, having forced local rulers into the position of powerless vassals. This was the final result of a series of wars during which the Dutch intervened militarily to support various Javanese dynastic factions. The Dutch were initially motivated to do so by a desire to ensure their own supply of rice and timber; they had little interest in either the trade or the politics of Java itself. Later, as Java sank into chaos, they found they could get concessions from Javanese eager for their military aid.<sup>27</sup> The net effect was that the Dutch government inherited territories in Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra, which were later expanded upon until by 1910, all of present-day Indonesia was under colonial control. In addition to facilitating the colonial takeover of Indonesia, VOC activities also had an effect on the whole region, in that attempts to establish a spice monopoly, while ultimately unsuccessful, did largely drive Southeast Asians out of long-distance trade. With the loss of economic clout, perhaps the loss of political power was inevitable.<sup>28</sup>

By the mid-1500s, all of Luzon and the Visayas had been incorporated into the vast holdings of the Spanish Empire (Mindanao, populated by Muslim converts, resisted the Spanish advance, as it later did the authority of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines). In many ways, the Spanish ruled the Philippines in a manner similar to how they administered Latin America. At the top of the hierarchy was the colonial governor. Spanish soldiers and officials, many of the latter Catholic priests, collected taxes, dispensed justice, and kept order. Christianity spread rapidly through the local population; the Philippines are presently the only majority-Christian country in East or Southeast Asia. Until the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the majority of religious practitioners were foreigners, although low-level monks and nuns, along with lay workers, often had indigenous origins. The economy of the Philippines was based on large estates and peasant labor producing surpluses of rice. Cash crops such as sugar were not an important element of the economy until the late 18<sup>th</sup> century; much of the latter activity was developed by American and British investors as well as by indigenous Filipino entrepreneurs. Before this time, international commerce was conducted

on a much more basic level. Chinese merchants in Manila would trade Southeast Asian and Chinese products for silver brought to the Philippines from the mines of Mexico. Once a year, a “treasure ship” would return to Acapulco with the commodities purchased through these transactions. There was no large-scale Spanish immigration to the islands, although intermarriage was quite common. A *mestizo* elite eventually emerged, although real political power was always reserved for colonial officials sent from Spain. However, local elites adopted not just the religion of the Spanish, but also their language and in many ways their culture. Wealthy Filipinos received an education in Spain, and it was this Spanish-trained elite who in the final decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century agitated against continued Spanish rule. They demanded the independence of the Filipino nation, something that they were actually in the process of constructing from the country’s diverse ethnic groups, at the same time as the rest of Southeast Asia was only just falling under full colonial rule.

The advances of the French and British in securing colonial possessions in Southeast Asia took place somewhat later, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Political control followed military action, which was prompted by the desire to protect European economic interests. These differed in many ways from earlier Dutch commercial interests. Of prime importance were resources connected to European industrialization and urbanization: oil, tin, rubber, palm oil, copra, coffee, tea, as well as rice and tropical fruit to feed Europe’s expanding population. Colonial possessions were also to act as markets for European goods. Southeast Asians were important yet largely passive participants in these new economic arrangements: peasant farmers, small-scale traders, low-level functionaries, workers in the transportation sector. Southeast Asia did not industrialize; it was a component of an industrial transformation taking place elsewhere. Some Western theorists even advanced the concept of dual economies within the boundaries of colonial Southeast Asia: a modern one based on industrial capitalism run by and for Europeans, and a precapitalist one based on the village, where money was less important than traditional culture. European administrators tried to preserve in isolation traditional Southeast Asian ways of life. Administration and commerce were to be left to Europeans, and in the case of the latter, also to immigrant minority groups, the Chinese, Indians, and Arabs. With the British in Malaya, even “modern” agricultural products, such as

rubber, were to be harvested by imported laborers. Although French activities in Vietnam can be viewed as a partial exception, there was little interest on the part of European colonial administrators in imposing Christianity on Southeast Asians. Such sentiments were probably not motivated by European sympathy toward local religious customs; “fanaticism” (as Europeans labeled any religious manifestation with political or protonationalistic undertones) was always ruthlessly crushed. Instead, the working principle was that religion was integral to an inferior local worldview, but if practiced peacefully it would be left alone. In devising the Dutch response to armed resistance in Aceh, Dutch Islamic scholar and government official Christian Snouck Hurgronje went so far as to divide society into “good Muslims,” associated with local chiefs to whom religion was a matter of faith, and “bad Muslims,” many of whom had come under the influence of foreign Islamic scholars who resisted Dutch rule.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, the Dutch, along with the British, were very concerned over the increasing numbers of pilgrims, who because of improved transportation were able to visit Mecca for the annual *hajj*.<sup>30</sup> Such suspicions about, and sometimes open contempt toward, local custom was not, however, universal. Similarly, some Southeast Asians did break out of the constraints of the dualistic model, were able to function to a certain extent within European society, and did acquire a European education. It is these Southeast Asians who would eventually develop national identities that could replace the colonial models developed by the Europeans.

It may be easy to exaggerate the impact of Western colonialism on Southeast Asia. Thailand was never colonized, although its national sovereignty was certainly compromised. It had to allow Western economic penetration and had to cultivate British diplomatic support in order to avoid direct foreign control. Thailand acted as a buffer zone between French and British spheres of influence while giving up its traditional hegemony in Cambodia and Laos. The Americans, who after defeating the Spanish turned the Philippines into a protectorate, had a marked impact on local culture. Systems of administration and education were set up, and the independent Republic of the Philippines inherited an American style of government and politics. To this day, a large number of Filipinos speak English while retaining Spanish surnames (the saying “the Philippines spent 300 years in a Spanish convent and 50 years in Hollywood” does perhaps have an element of truth to it). But it is

difficult to separate the American transformation of the Philippines from larger currents of globalization; if the office towers of Manila look like those of Los Angeles, they also look like those of Tokyo, or of Jakarta, for that matter. Whereas previous observers have stressed the crucial importance of a Western presence, the consensus among many scholars today is that the character of the region is the result of an “autonomous history.”<sup>31</sup> Western colonialism was important (perhaps more important than some Southeast Asian nationalists wish to acknowledge) as were the previous contacts with India, China, and the Islamic world, but the region’s inhabitants always understood, adopted, and adapted to outside influences through the prism of local custom and belief. Southeast Asian ways proved remarkably strong in the face of foreign political, economic, cultural, and even military interventions.<sup>32</sup> This process was apparent in the newly independent nation-states of Southeast Asia; national histories had to reflect unique national identities, while acknowledging age-old connections to the wider world.

### **Archaeology, Modern Borders, National Histories**

Independent states had the task of building new identities and histories; new regimes drew on a mythic past to build a future. Each nation-state tried to emphasize its singular character. This task often involved the acceptance of colonial-era differences; older transnational identities were discarded. Colonial borders remained largely intact. The British possessions of the Malay Peninsula and Borneo eventually coalesced into the independent countries of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei; the French colonies became Cambodia, Laos, and (after 1975) a unified Vietnam. The Philippines, Burma, and Thailand remained intact, despite regional rebellions, based at least in part on religion or ethnicity. After the 1962 “Act of Free Union,” Indonesia was eventually able to claim possession of the entirety of the Dutch East Indies and even for a time (1975–1999) incorporate the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. The continued success of the imagined borders of colonial Southeast Asia might seem surprising in light of how radical a break with the past the modern nation-state system constituted. Benedict Anderson points out that prior to the rise of the colonial system, Southeast Asia was organized in a much different way, whereby power decreased in both a symbolic and an actual manner the

farther a subject was from the royal palace. Southeast Asian states could be pictured as a series of “concentric circles of power.”<sup>33</sup> Countries such as Cambodia and Thailand were not separated by fixed borders. Instead, indistinct borderlands marked the space where the area of influence of one royal court blended into that of its neighbor. Also surprising was the lack of any attempt to redefine Southeast Asia in terms of more “natural” cultural zones. Breaking down national borders in favor of bigger regional groupings was always advanced in terms of political alliances or vague cultural affinities (for example, *Malphindo*, an abortive scheme to merge Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia into a loose federation). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was devised as a defensive measure aimed at an expansive North Vietnam, rather than as a coming together of nations sharing the same basic identity. While Singapore might stress connections with China in terms of trade, or even put forward a type of “neo-Confucianism” as a good developmental model, no one has ever suggested that all Southeast Asian Chinese band together as a single entity. Blueprints for a transregional Islamic caliphate have remained the province of marginal extremist groups; no politician has ever campaigned on such a platform.

### **Majapahit**

One of the only real exceptions to the idea that the borders of Southeast Asia, as unfortunately defined by Western colonialism, should remain unchanged comes from Indonesia, where secular nationalists associated with Sukarno appeared to occasionally question the national borders inherited from the Dutch. They did so with reference to the empire of Majapahit. According to some readings of the *Nagarakertagama*, an epic 14<sup>th</sup>-century poem that described the activities of the monarch Hayam Wuruk, Majapahit may have included much of the territory of present-day Indonesia.<sup>34</sup> Controversy remains as to whether place names mentioned in the *Nagarakertagama* were actually part of a coherent empire or were simply loosely held tributaries. Dutch scholar C.C. Berg even argued, to largely negative reactions from Indonesian nationalists, that the “glory of Majapahit” was largely a fiction and that the text should be read as a magical exercise intended to bolster the prestige of an otherwise modest Javanese ruler.<sup>35</sup> But for Indonesian nationalists, Majapahit provided firm borders with which to define an independent state. In fact, nationalist writer Muhammad Yamin went further and

claimed that Majapahit included all of the Dutch East Indies, the British possessions of Malaya and Borneo, and Portuguese Timor, as well as parts of the Philippines, Cambodia, and even northern Australia. He consequently demanded in the immediate run-up to the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945 that all of island Southeast Asia be incorporated into the new nation, regardless of its current status. This “Greater Indonesia” idea was dropped on the insistence of such leaders as Muhammad Hatta, who recognized that it would in fact retard the granting of independence.<sup>36</sup> Little was heard of the concept later, although some observers interpreted the Indonesian *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation) campaign against the formation of an independent Malaysia as evidence of Indonesian expansion or even Javanese imperialism.

The campaign to take possession of the western part of New Guinea could be seen as simply making all of the Dutch East Indies independent. The invasion and eventual annexation of East Timor were apparently motivated more by immediate Cold War worries about the emergence of a potentially hostile, possibly communist neighbor than by the desire to rework colonial borders. The event is somewhat comparable to the 1979 invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam, an action prompted by Khmer Rouge attacks rather than part of a long-held desire to create a “Greater Vietnam.” Of course, some had identified North Vietnam as a “Southeast Asian Prussia” gleefully tumbling “dominoes” as it annexed South Vietnam and brought Laos and Cambodia into its sphere of influence. South Vietnam had existed as an independent state from 1954 until its collapse under North Vietnamese military attack in April 1975. Its viability and legitimacy as an independent state have been questioned, but it is a fact that most of northern and southern Vietnam has long been a single political and cultural entity. Attempts to separate from larger states in Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand by distinct ethnic groups have all been failures. While the British territories of Malaya and Borneo were eventually turned into three separate states, their borders with neighbors have been little changed.

### **Borobudur**

Similarly, independent Southeast Asia kept much of the history developed by colonial scholars. Archaeology as a discipline practiced in Indonesia dates back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The Dutch colonial administration set up museums and organizations to study the material remains of



the Indonesian past. Before independence, the Dutch also began to train a few Indonesians in archaeological excavation and restoration techniques. The Dutch and the Indonesians who followed them generally concentrated on researching the archipelago's pre-Islamic past, whether prehistoric or classical (Buddhist and/or Hindu in orientation).

Emblematic of this interest was the attention paid to the study and restoration of the 9<sup>th</sup>-century Buddhist site of Borobudur, located in central Java. Originally revealed to the outside world by Lieutenant Governor Sir Thomas Raffles during the British occupation of Java, it was cleared, studied, and rebuilt by Dutch archaeologists.<sup>37</sup> It became and remains to this day one of Indonesia's top tourist draws. Borobudur was a powerful symbol for the Republic of Indonesia; Sukarno made a point of showing the site to foreign dignitaries, while the New Order Suharto regime, with help from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, embarked on a massive restoration project. Almost every museum in Indonesia contains a scale model reproduction of Borobudur. The monument has become almost an icon, grouped with the *wayang* puppet play and *gamelan* music into a vague classical/Javanese past from which all Indonesians are to draw inspiration. Majapahit was also subject to a similar process of cultural endowment. After Dutch historians discovered the Majapahit of the *Nagarakertagama*, Dutch archaeologists such as Henri Maclaine-Pont excavated and restored the Majapahit capital of Trowulan. This site remains an important source of Indonesian national pride; the Suharto government spent a great deal of effort on reconstructing its gates, temples, and sacred pools, and augmenting it with modern museum facilities.

In contrast, less attention has been paid to the material remains of Indonesia's Islamic past. Dutch scholars never developed the passion for Islamic antiquities that they had for those of ancient Hindu Java. In fact, the Archaeological Service of the East Indies was specifically mandated to restore Hindu antiquities. Such attitudes remained strong among outside researchers. Timothy E. Behrend notes that works by Claire Holt and F.A. Wagner leave the impression that "monumental building, or any significant building of any sort, ended in Java with the 15<sup>th</sup>-century temples Suku and Cetha on Gunung Lawa." He also notes that even foreign experts in Indonesian Islam are more familiar with Borobudur than with Islamic grave complexes.<sup>38</sup>

The situation is not much different among Indonesian researchers. The *Hasil Pemugaran dan Temuan Benda Cagar Budaya* (“The Results of the Restoration and Discovery of Cultural Heritage”) describes research and conservation work done on Indonesian archaeological sites from 1969 to 1994.<sup>39</sup> This report, while not comprehensive, gives a good representation of the type of archaeological work carried out in the country during the New Order. The only Islamic site of note that was the focus of actual excavation work appears to be the mosque and palace complex at the West Java port of Banten. Certainly, there is no Islamic equivalent of the work on Trowulan or Borobudur.

Such attitudes are reflected in what Anthony Reid has described as the “nationalist orthodoxy.”<sup>40</sup> This national past stressed a “golden age” during which Indonesia was a prosperous, unitary state, whose territory stretched across the archipelago. This time of power, justice, and order was associated with Buddhist Srivijaya (centered in Sumatra during the 7<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup> centuries) and especially Majapahit. Subsequent Islamic kingdoms and the role of Islam in national development were downgraded in importance. Islam, it was even implied, might have been one of the factors that had allowed Indonesia to succumb to Dutch aggression. Little attention was paid to links with the worldwide Islamic community. The argument was made that Indonesia had a unique identity that set it apart from the larger currents of Islamic history. Indonesia’s national history was developed by such figures as Sukarno and Muhammad Yamin as part of the independence struggle.<sup>41</sup> It drew at least partially on the work of Dutch historians and archaeologists, who had reconstructed Majapahit as a powerful empire in line with the description provided by the *Nagarakertagama*.<sup>42</sup> This orthodoxy continued after Indonesia won its independence. National history was reflected in textbooks, monuments, museums, and historical research.<sup>43</sup>

### Angkor

Ancient Cambodia, like Java, was home to a sophisticated, Indian-influenced civilization based on wet rice cultivation that has left behind many impressive ruins. The empire of Angkor, which flourished from around 800 to 1400 CE, for a time dominated present-day southern Laos, eastern Thailand, all of Cambodia, and southern Vietnam.<sup>44</sup> Angkor Wat, a massive temple complex in the interior of Cambodia, has been consciously used as a symbol by every modern Cambodian regime. Political

leaders, including Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, saw this Khmer society as an inspiration, if not a possible model, for modern Cambodia. Yet as late as the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Angkor was largely forgotten by Cambodians themselves; no one really knew why the monument had been built or by whom.<sup>45</sup> In 1959, David J. Steinberg wrote that for most Cambodians, history was “the subjective experiences of their ancestors rather than the more or less factual record of events usual in the West.”<sup>46</sup> The ruling Cambodian dynasty claimed direct descent from ancient Khmer sovereigns; this was a source of some national pride. But at the same time, many Cambodians rejected the Khmer as the builders of Angkor; popular memory and belief contained a different tradition involving a now-vanished group of ancients.<sup>47</sup> Cambodians could neither name Angkor’s rulers nor decipher its inscriptions.<sup>48</sup>

It was not this poorly remembered Angkor that inspired the likes of Sihanouk and Pol Pot, but one more recently discovered and popularized by the French colonial authorities. For Sihanouk, “The past was a *recently discovered* talisman, which offered an assurance that Cambodia and its population might have a more glorious future than seemed possible in the uncertain and troubled present.”<sup>49</sup> The French naturalist Henri Mouhot had been shown the ruins of Angkor in 1860; starting in the 1870s, French scholars deciphered numerous ancient Khmer and Sanskrit inscriptions. Hong Lysa has noted that the recovery of ancient Southeast Asian civilizations like Angkor was very much a part of the colonial enterprise. Colonial states were interested in proving a noble ancestry for the space they now occupied and in demonstrating their own superiority in recovering the physical remains of such a past. The French contrasted ancient splendors with a weak Cambodian society that, as far as the French were concerned, had lost its capacity for greatness. In any event, any greatness it had enjoyed had been the product of “Indianization” rather than native talents. An outside force had transformed Cambodia a millennium earlier, and another one, the French, would do so again.<sup>50</sup> The grandeur of Angkor’s rulers made the apparent impotence of Cambodia’s kings, who were handpicked by the French, even more obvious. These contradictions later proved a catalyst for all varieties of Cambodian nationalism.<sup>51</sup>

The resurrected symbol of Angkor was used by all Cambodian regimes. Cambodians responded to the mixed messages put out by the colonial authorities by relating the past to the present and by identifying

with Angkor.<sup>52</sup> Educated Cambodians, while proud of their country's past, were ashamed of its present condition.<sup>53</sup> Sihanouk may have shared some of their doubts, although in visiting the Cambodian countryside he often identified the peasantry, the "little people," with the builders of the great Khmer temples.<sup>54</sup> Benedict Anderson mentions November 1968 celebrations commemorating the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Cambodian independence from the French. For this event Sihanouk had a garish wooden replica of the central tower of Angkor Wat displayed in the national sports stadium in Phnom Penh. This model acted as an immediately recognizable logo, linking current political achievements to an impressive medieval empire.<sup>55</sup>

The Khmer Rouge also glorified Angkor. In a September 1977 radio address, Pol Pot stated that "we all know the Angkor of past times. Angkor was built during the slave period. It was all slaves who built it under the exploiting classes, for the enjoyment of the king. If our people were capable of building Angkor we can do anything."<sup>56</sup> Despite the fact that Angkor might be seen as a symbol of royalist exploitation, Pol Pot far from condemned this period of Cambodian history; in many ways, the Khmer Rouge looked back to the height of the Khmer Empire as Cambodia's golden age and even tried in a sense to resurrect this period. If the French had revived the memory of Angkor, perhaps Pol Pot wished to rebuild, at a terrible cost, its reality. Foreign scholarship had once erroneously noted that the ancient Khmer, through elaborate irrigation systems, had been able to cultivate rice intensively on a year-round basis. This historical misinterpretation was to have tragic results. The Khmer Rouge regime was convinced that they could duplicate the agricultural productivity of ancient times. Through a doubling of rice production, Cambodia could finance an industrial expansion.<sup>57</sup> When these results inevitably failed to be achieved, the leadership blamed not themselves and their shaky grasp of past and present realities, but rather the treason of the Cambodian people. Under the Khmer Rouge, ill-fed laborers in work camps were forced to build "an ill-conceived irrigation system meant to propel Cambodia into a rich future by copying the methods of the past."<sup>58</sup> The Khmer Rouge leadership tried to show that their rule was directly descended from that of Angkor and combined their belief in the innate greatness of the Khmer people with a violent hostility toward outside powers, which were routinely blamed for economic and political disasters. Despite no longer seeing Angkor as proof

that Cambodia really had no need for the outside world, the Vietnamese-sponsored regime that succeeded the Khmer Rouge still stressed the importance of the ancient empire in school texts and worked to restore the site.<sup>59</sup> Today, the site continues to draw tourists and remains emblematic of Cambodia.

### **Alternate Histories in Waiting**

Not all were satisfied with these new national histories. A version of the past not just approved by foreigners but in fact partially constructed by them was problematic for many Indonesian Muslims. National history tended to isolate Indonesia from larger Islamic currents; it also tended to ignore connections with the rest of Southeast Asia, India, China, and Europe (the Dutch were seen as either largely irrelevant to Indonesia's story or cartoon villains). The emphasis on Majapahit clearly marks national history as Java-centric. Although millions of Indonesians practice Buddhism and Hinduism, the ancient versions of these religions have little resonance today; this is especially the case with the larger Muslim population. A history that underlines Indonesia's past Islamic character (and possible Islamic future) might be more compatible with contemporary tastes. Majapahit was organized according to a rigid hierarchy and ruled by a semi-divine king, which made it particularly popular with New Order ruler Suharto. The New Order could be seen (and perhaps saw itself) as a "New Majapahit" fulfilling Gajah Mada's goal of unifying the nation and protecting it from outside threats, while ensuring the prosperity of a grateful population. In this view of history, Suharto was an incarnation of Gajah Mada, and the suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 was a restoration of the nation to its natural state of passive obedience to directives issued from a Javanese *kraton* (royal palace).

Archaeology might actually be a good place to start in constructing "counter-histories," despite the fact that the discipline usually requires government support. Some Indonesian archaeologists have focused on the nation's Islamic past. Of particular note are Uka Tjandrasasmita and Hasan Muarif Ambary. Tjandrasasmita was long the head of the Islamic section of the Indonesian Archaeological Service.<sup>60</sup> Ambary received his training under the direction of French scholar Denys Lombard of the *Annales* school of Fernand Braudel. He has published many works on Islam and archaeology as well as studies on Srivijaya and Banten.<sup>61</sup>

Both these scholars have put forward reconstructions of the Indonesian past that differ somewhat from a nationalist orthodoxy that sees the modern, unitary Republic of Indonesia as the direct descendant of Majapahit. From this viewpoint the most important event in pre-modern Indonesian history was Gajah Mada's taking of the *palapa* oath in which he refused to rest until the archipelago had been unified. Such events as the arrival of the Islamic religion (which is practiced by at least 85 percent of Indonesians today, although not of course by Gajah Mada) are considered less important. Islamic (and non-Javanese) rulers such as Aceh's Iskander Muda are also less celebrated. Although many Islamic figures, such as Diponegoro, Iman Bonjol, and Teuku Umar, are celebrated for battling the Dutch (as are Christian and Hindu Indonesians), Gajah Mada, his patron Hayam Wuruk, and Majapahit's last monarch Brawijaya are really the only personages who are venerated simply for their efforts in forming the nation. Other heroes contribute in a purely negative fashion, not by building a nation but rather by opposing colonial domination. The only possible exception to this pattern may be the *wali songo*. However, while they are celebrated on a popular level, they find little place in official nationalist narratives.<sup>62</sup>

In contrast, Tjandrasasmita and Ambary are concerned with the arrival and development of Islam in Indonesia as an historical phenomenon. In doing so, they continue in the tradition of a series of seminars held in 1963 in Medan, in 1978 and 1980 in Aceh, and in 1986 in Palembang that attempted to shift the focus of Indonesian historical research from Majapahit to the place of Islam in Indonesia.<sup>63</sup> Many of the papers presented at these seminars debated when and where the Islamic religion first arrived in the archipelago. The notion is entertained that Islam arrived in Sumatra relatively early, perhaps within a century after the death of Mohammad, and directly from the Arab Middle East. This is in contrast to the general consensus of Western scholars that Islam arrived in Southeast Asia via India and was not really visible until the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century. These alternate scenarios regarding Islam's birth in Indonesia draw on different sources of data than Western researchers, who had relied on gravestone inscriptions and the accounts of European and Arab travelers, such as Marco Polo, Tome Pires, and Ibn Battuta.<sup>64</sup> Evidence for the early establishment of Islamic kingdoms includes Malay manuscripts, archaeological remains from northern Sumatra, and references in Chinese texts to Arab migrants to the region.

Uka Tjandrasasmita included some of this evidence in a presentation at one of these seminars as well as in an English-language article he produced for a book intended for foreign visitors to Indonesia, but in general he treats it with some skepticism. He notes the rather mysterious Ta-Shih, mentioned in Tang dynasty sources as planning to attack the kingdom of Ho-Ling (Java) around about the year 674. Other Chinese sources from the 12<sup>th</sup> century, and Japanese sources from the 8<sup>th</sup> century, mention colonies of the Ta-Shih in Southeast Asia. This group might have been Arab Muslims who settled in the region in the 7<sup>th</sup> century; another group, the Po-sse, may have been local Malay converts. But Tjandrasasmita does not wholeheartedly embrace the theory that Islam arrived in Indonesia soon after the death of the Prophet Mohammad. His description of how Islamic kingdoms emerged on the coasts of Sumatra and Java in many ways aligns with that developed by Western scholars. He notes the late 13<sup>th</sup>-century gravestone of Sultan Malik al-Shah, found at Samudra, the accounts of Marco Polo, and the importance of economic factors in the spread of the Islamic religion. Although he does acknowledge that evidence for an early arrival for Islam has mostly been ignored, he admits that this evidence is rather sketchy. Instead, he outlines how Islamic polities emerged in north Sumatra. After the 13<sup>th</sup> century, this process is more visible as a variety of Malay and foreign sources become available. This stage can be distinguished from an earlier period during which Islam may have arrived in the region.<sup>65</sup> The debate over a 7<sup>th</sup>- or a 13<sup>th</sup>-century date for the arrival of Islam may simply be a matter of semantics. Arab Muslims may have visited, or even settled in, Southeast Asia at an early date, but the founding of kingdoms or the conversion of the local population may have taken place much later.<sup>66</sup>

In a more general article intended for a non-Indonesian audience, Tjanrasasmita emphasizes a process of development very similar to that of Western scholars. Initial contacts, perhaps as early as the 7<sup>th</sup> century, occurred around the Strait of Malacca; in the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries, Islam emerged on the north coast of Java and from there spread to the rest of the archipelago. This dissemination process was helped by both foreign Muslims and local converts.<sup>67</sup> Conversion was facilitated by trade, marriage, and the activities of the local aristocracy, although Islam was not only an aristocratic religion but also one practiced by the population as a whole. Also of importance were the development of such institutions as the *pesantren* and the work of charismatic figures such as the



*wali songo*. The latter drew on the fact that Hindu-Indonesians had “a predilection for mysticism” and “a strong concept of God” and used Sufism as a means to reach potential converts. Hindu art forms such as the *wayang* and Hindu architecture could also be put to use; Tjandrasasmita sees many motifs in Indonesian Islamic structures such as mosques that can be traced back to earlier Hindu-Indonesian norms.

At the center of the Islamization process appears to be the city. New Muslim cities arose under the impetus of foreign contact, and from these sites the religion spread to such distant points as the Moluccas.<sup>68</sup> Tjandrasasmita presents a story of Islam in Indonesia that seems to be above all an Indonesian one. There is little hint of conquest or foreign domination. Instead, Indonesians are exposed to the activities of fellow Indonesians who happen to have converted to Islam. As the new religion spreads, it gains converts and absorbs earlier practices that remain apparent today every time a Javanese goes to mosque. An Islamic history thus complements a nationalist history and in a sense becomes a part of it.

It should not be surprising that Tjandrasasmita was also involved in writing the third volume of the central nationalist history text *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, which describes the rise and character of Indonesia’s Islamic kingdoms.<sup>69</sup> He entertains the possibility of this process starting at an early date, but in general comes down in favor of it not happening until the 13<sup>th</sup> century. The spread of Islam is seen as a process in which Indonesians fully participated. He describes it as being a peaceful process encouraged by trade and associated with Islamic mysticism, evident in both cities and the countryside. Muslim kingdoms are shown as the equal of any previous Hindu ones. Although the volume ends rather ominously by noting that Dutch power had increased considerably by the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the work is clearly “Indo-centric”; foreign colonialists are simply important players in a larger Indonesian game.

In narrating the emergence of Islamic Indonesia, Tjandrasasmita provides a large amount of background information on warfare, the technology of ships and shipbuilding, navigation, trade routes, trade goods, harbors, customs and tolls, and ship ownership during the early modern era. He also discusses urban life and the governance of the various Islamic kingdoms in considerable detail. In general, he offers a strong portrait of an “Age of Commerce” world. For him, there seems to be no contradiction between high-quality academic analysis and a

nationalist narrative that celebrates the contributions of Indonesian Muslims to their country's history.

Ambary's *Menemukan Peradaban: Jejak Arkeologis dan Historis Islam Indonesia (Discovering Culture: The Archaeological Trail of Islam in Indonesia)*, while not discounting the possibility of early Islamic kingdoms, does not emphasize it.<sup>70</sup> Instead, it appears to have the more ambitious motive of using archaeology as a basis for writing a generally more Islamic history of Indonesia. It starts by describing the background to the rise of Islam in Southeast Asia, noting that it was through trade that the region first entered the age of "globalization." Southeast Asia was long open to outside influences: Hindu and Buddhism in the 1<sup>st</sup> through the 5<sup>th</sup> centuries, Islam from the 7<sup>th</sup> through the 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, and European colonialism from the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The Hindu-Buddhist tradition had a great impact on local culture, as can be seen in remains of monumental architecture. In a similar manner, the people of Indonesia became familiar with Islam. Muslim traders took up residence in the region, and knowledge of Islam began to intensify within the local population. Religious conversion was associated with political change and the emergence of a common, refined culture. This process can be followed through an examination of archaeological and textual data.<sup>71</sup> It took place in three phases of cultural and social contact between outsiders and the native inhabitants of Southeast Asia. The first stage involved Arab traders and took place within a few centuries of the death of Mohammad. This phase can be documented from gravestones and the writings of Arab geographers. The second stage involved the formation of Islamic kingdoms in the 13<sup>th</sup> through the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. Evidence involves the gravestone of Malik al-Saleh, Malay chronicles, and the writings of Marco Polo. The final stage involved a process of institutionalization, whereby Muslim traders spread out from Aceh, Demak, and Gresik to Borneo, Lombok, and elsewhere. Gravestones are the most important piece of evidence for this latter phase.<sup>72</sup> This reconstruction of the arrival of Islam is not much different from that put forward by Western scholars; Ambary identifies Samudra-Pasai as the first city in Indonesia to accept Islam and places this development in the 13<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>73</sup>

Ambary pays much more attention to specific manifestations of Islamic culture in Indonesian history, as reflected in material evidence. Beyond a region-by-region description of the archaeology of Islam in

Indonesia, Ambary deals with specific elements of Islamic culture, such as mosque and *kraton* architecture, epigraphy, and gravestones.<sup>74</sup> He sees archaeological research as a vital contribution to understanding Islam's place in the past, present, and future of the country. He describes how the discipline is presently carried out by the Jakarta-based National Archaeological Research Center,<sup>75</sup> which has studied migration patterns and how the local cultures of Indonesia have interacted with "great traditions" such as Hinduism, Islam, and Western civilization to produce a culturally diverse and integrated nation. In presenting a reconstruction of Indonesian history based on archaeological evidence, Ambary points to the overall purpose of his book: to counter a narrative that downplayed Islam's importance in the nation's development. *Menemukan Peradaban* presents a total picture of an Islamic Indonesian culture, a culture whose historical dynamics are as valid and important as one that sees the Republic of Indonesia as but the latest manifestation of Majapahit. The archaeological analysis presented in the book can be interpreted as evidence that an Islamic version of the past is as scientifically rigorous as the earlier histories developed by Western and nationalist-Indonesian scholars and writers. Ambary's work can be placed in a larger context and viewed as an example of "ummat-oriented" history, which takes as its starting point the arrival of Islam in Indonesia rather than Gajah Mada. Ambary's work offers a direct challenge to those who would write Islam out of Indonesia's story.

Both Tjandrasmita and Ambary provide analyses that might present a different view of the Indonesian past than one of a "golden age" of Javanese domination. Tjandrasmita describes an Indonesia open for trade with the rest of the world and receptive to new ideas, whether in regard to technology or religion. Religious innovations spread through the archipelago mostly through the actions of Indonesians themselves by means of traditional art forms and in harmony with local modes of social organization. Thus, local rulers adopt Islam and found trading centers, the *wayang* is used to explain and propagate Islamic doctrine, and mosques resemble Hindu temples. Ambary attempts a comprehensive history of Islam in Indonesia as reflected in the archaeological record. This is an antidote to the nationalist orthodoxy that tended to downplay Islam's place in the nation's history. He seems to be saying that historical inquiry of the same quality as that carried out in writing the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* and of the Dutch in excavating Trowulan,

restoring Borobudur, and interpreting the *Nagarakertagama* will produce a version of Indonesian history that does not marginalize Islam. In the alternative history, offered by these two archaeologists, Indonesia was part of a larger Islamic world and was in fact open to many outside influences from India, China, and the West. Local genius adopted and adapted the best of these influences while retaining a strong local identity. Islam's arrival in Southeast Asia is seen as a positive event. As Gajah Mada helped unify the Indonesian Archipelago politically, Islam helped build a unified Indonesian culture of interest to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The modern Republic of Indonesia is the latest manifestation not necessarily of Majapahit but of a crossroads where trade and religious currents met and produced a vibrant society. The notion that an Indonesia seen as historically open to the *ummat* might also have to be open to other influences is evident in some recent comments of the Indonesian historian Asvi Warman Adam, who calls on Indonesians to acknowledge the contributions of Chinese visitors and residents to the nation's development.<sup>76</sup>

The idea that Indonesia has perhaps been more "Islamic" than many outside observers have maintained might also lead to a reassessment of how isolated and unique Indonesia really has been historically. Indonesia as part of the *ummat* is also part of a wider world; Islam aids Indonesia in the process of globalization.<sup>77</sup> Majapahit, an archipelago-wide, Java-centered, hierarchical, Hindu Empire with a god-king ruling over masses of obedient peasants, might be actually a bit of an aberration.<sup>78</sup> But this questioning of the standard nationalist narrative need not lead to increased divisions and conflict among Indonesians. A new view of the Indonesian past does not imply that the traditional interpretation is obsolete and that Indonesians can no longer take pride in the accomplishments of Gajah Mada. There is no real contradiction between being a Muslim and an Indonesian. Indonesia can retain a national history, while taking pride of place in the *ummat*. Stressing Indonesia's Islamic past and Islamic connections need not separate Indonesian Muslims from their fellow citizens, nor imply continued hostility to a larger non-Islamic world. In creating an Indonesian past that pays more attention to Islam, scholars such as Tjandrasmita and Ambary might perhaps remove some of the fear associated with anything that is driven into involuntary exile. Observers both inside and outside of Indonesia might start to understand

that the broad historical forces that brought Islam to Indonesia are the same ones that continue to link this nation with Asia, the Pacific, the West, and, of course, the *ummat*.

### Conclusion

Archaeology has been used by independent Southeast Asian nation-states to foster national unity, establish political and cultural boundaries, and legitimize regimes. The problem with using archaeology to make nationalistic claims is not that it is any more scientific or any less biased than historical writings and thus more difficult to manipulate (it is not), but that it tends to show that any modern nation is in fact a recent construct. “Civilizations,” as defined by archaeologists, seldom coincide with modern nation-states in regard to borders, religions, languages, supposed ethnicities, material culture, or anything else. Instead, regional and transnational identities seem more apparent. The uniqueness of a regional identity (for example, Balinese over Indonesian) as expressed in particular artifacts (such as dress, architecture, or food) might indeed be corrosive of central power, although this might be less of a danger today than it was at the time of independence, when national languages and identities were in a sense foreign to much of the Southeast Asian population. For example, in his study of life in Modjokuto (Pare), Clifford Geertz describes a town where only a few “intellectuals” spoke the national language and where knowledge of political developments was largely restricted to the visits of outside speakers from the major political parties. Fifty years later, East Java is much less isolated, and the people—whatever their religious or ethnic backgrounds, or first language for that matter—by and large accept, and are indeed proud of, a national identity. In the current context of globalization, the populations of Southeast Asia are exposed to numerous new ideas and styles (the films of Hollywood, Bollywood, and Hong Kong, along with the Internet providing much of this material), while retaining a firm commitment to national cultures they have grown comfortable with, through standardized educational systems, national languages and media, as well as recently shared histories. Similarly, national identities coexist with loyalties to larger worldviews. Howard Federspeil describes the sea routes (which met in Southeast

Asia) as “the linkage between the primary civilizations of Asia—that is, the Islamic world, Brahman India, and Middle-Kingdom China—when all three were at the height of their development and influence between the 7<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries.”<sup>79</sup> In later years one might add Western civilization to this Southeast Asia blend. None of these civilizations were or are the monopoly of a single country (even “China” consists of two modern polities, Taiwan and the People’s Republic; the Indic world consists of the Subcontinent and a much larger cultural zone; and the Islamic world has not been a unified political entity since the 8<sup>th</sup> century). However, the geographic scope of these civilizations might indicate the existence of substantial tensions between national borders and transnational ideological ties. A modern state might have more difficulty in favoring a national identity over older, larger, and more nebulous ties on the part of its citizens than in suppressing or at least managing loyalties to a village, a city, or a region, especially as the latter might lessen as populations become more urban and mobile. A pertinent question involves the role archaeology might have in favoring broader transnational identities over recently constructed national ones. Can archaeology in fact invalidate national borders by emphasizing transnational linkages?

The answer might indeed be *yes*, if such links are assumed to be more culturally valid than national borders, identities, and histories. Since the fall of Suharto in 1997, there has been some discussion of the desirability of a pan-Southeast Asian, or even worldwide, caliphate, a structure that would logically nullify the concept of an independent Indonesian nation-state, Islamic or secular. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a loosely structured organization deemed responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing and several other attacks, supposedly had the construction of a Southeast Asian caliphate as its goal. There may be a large constituency among Indonesian Muslims for a wholesale rejection of the Indonesian national project in favor of a solely Islamic mode of political organization. Instead of trying to bring Islam back into Indonesian history (a goal many Indonesians would feel is overdue), groups like JI might be aiming to take Indonesia out of Islamic history.

First, it might be important to remember that although Indonesia has been an integral part of the Islamic world, it has never been part of any larger Islamic polity. Sultan Agung sent to Mecca for a title, numerous Indonesian pilgrims and scholars visited the Hijaz, and pleas were made at various times for military help from the Ottomans, but Indonesia was

never conquered, ruled, or colonized by any outside Muslim power. Nor was there ever any form of trans–Southeast Asian or even Indonesian polity that could be deemed Islamic. Also, though Indonesian Muslims have historically had some interest in the concept of a caliphate, looking with concern on the abolition of the institution by Atatürk in 1924, they have since at least the 1930s been more interested in *Indonesian* independence and unity.

Jl members have spoken of a caliphate, but this might simply be the way in which their organization is set up (or even how observers see their group).<sup>80</sup> Talk of caliphates might also be a way in which Jl demonstrates its Islamist credentials, a way to distinguish a future Indonesian society from Western forms of knowledge and organization.<sup>81</sup> Jl does have, according to some outside reconstructions, connections, especially in terms of personnel, with the Darul Islam (House of Islam) movement, which violently challenged Indonesian national authority, especially in West Java, into the early 1960s.<sup>82</sup> But while the radical Darul Islam rejected nationalist ideology and perhaps the republican form of government, it did not reject Indonesia as a separate entity. In fact, Darul Islam could be seen as simply a more pious version of the “regional rebellions” of the late 1950s. The case of Jl is more complicated; it may have indeed started to question the viability of Indonesia as a distinct state; its transnational links—perhaps with al Qaeda, certainly with militants in Malaysia and the Philippines—have been well documented.<sup>83</sup> Of course, these associations may merely be good tactics. On the other hand, there does not appear to be on the part of the group a firm rejection of an Indonesian identity.

Local backing, or at least sympathy, for Jl (and by extension any pro-caliphate views the group might harbor) may paradoxically be an issue of Indonesian nationalism. At the time of the Bali bombing in 2002, memories were still fresh in regard to the activities of Laksar Jihad, an armed group with which many Indonesian Muslims, some quite close to the political mainstream, sympathized. The group was perceived as defending Muslims under attack in the Moluccas (accurate or not, many Muslims analyzed the complex local Christian-Muslim conflict in this manner); the sentiment seemed to be that Indonesian Muslims could not be terrorists, only victims, and that foreigners were simply interfering in Indonesia’s internal affairs (as they had over East Timor in 1999 and before) in claiming that Jl was an armed terrorist organization.



The name itself simply meant “Islamic Organization,” and politicians were reluctant to ban or even acknowledge the existence of such an apparently innocuous group. Indonesians denied any domestic terrorist threat up to the 2002 attack, and Vice President Hamzah Haz even met with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the group’s leader. After the attack, many Indonesians refused to believe that Indonesians were evil or skillful enough to carry out such an attack and instead thought it was some form of foreign conspiracy.<sup>84</sup> While outside observers would be wise to note the strength of ties that seem to cross borders, such as the sympathy exhibited by most Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims toward the plight of their coreligionists in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine, such sympathies should not be exaggerated. JI remains tiny in terms of numbers, and while its attacks can be quite devastating, it has garnered little lasting support from the Indonesian public that might be converted into usable political capital.<sup>85</sup> If it wishes to dissolve the national borders or even radically change national policies, it seems to have little immediate prospect of doing so. That being said, the group has deep roots; many members share close family and educational ties. JI remains committed to a long-term agenda of an Islamic state, and it will continue to take great skill and patience on the part of Indonesian authorities before the group can be neutralized.<sup>86</sup>

Indonesian Muslims do sometimes feel that political and societal arrangements do not always acknowledge the country’s Islamic presence. Very occasionally, this feeling is reflected in violent activity, as was the case with JI and, before that, Darul Islam. However, the success of any group or individual in moving Indonesia in a more Islamic direction has more to do with adapting to local conditions and forming useful alliances than to constructing a narrative that does not contain Indonesia.<sup>87</sup> In fact, transnational linkages, as described in the archaeological works of Tjandrasasmita and Ambary, may actually strengthen national identities by showing that historically they have not been incompatible with larger religious ones, nor with particular regional loyalties. There may even be the possibility that focusing on narratives outside of a particular nation-state, in favor of a larger history, might bolster the concept of Southeast Asia as a unified cultural zone. ASEAN is a long way from political integration (or even economic cooperation), but one is reminded of Anwar Ibrahim’s comment of feeling closer to a Buddhist Thai than to a Saudi Muslim.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Dougal J.W. O'Reilly, *Early Civilizations of Southeast Asia* (New York: Altamira Press, 2007), 186–187.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Higham, *The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia: From 10,000 BC to the Fall of Angkor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 308.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 308–313.

<sup>4</sup> There is a large body of literature on the arrival of Islam in Southeast Asia. Of note are S.Q. Fatimi, *Islam Comes to Malaysia* (Singapore: Malaysia Sociological Institute, 1963); Anthony Reid, “The Islamization of Southeast Asia,” in *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1999), 15–34; and M.C. Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Norwalk, CT: East Bridge, 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Michael Flecker, “A Ninth Century AD Arab or Indian Shipwreck in Indonesia: First Evidence for Direct Trade with China,” *World Archaeology* 32, no. 3 (2001), 335–354.

<sup>6</sup> Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680, Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), chapter 3.

<sup>7</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

<sup>8</sup> Mark Woodward, “Talking across Paradigms: Indonesia, Islam, and Orientalism,” in *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought*, ed. Mark Woodward (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1996), 25–28.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>10</sup> Mark Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989), 2, 60.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 117, 264. Similarly, Benedict Anderson points out that in the worldview of the traditional *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), it may be *because* the Koran cannot be understood by its readers that it is all the more powerful as a religious or even a magical text. See “The Languages of Indonesian Politics,” in *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 127.

<sup>12</sup> Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 3, 551.

<sup>13</sup> See A.H. Johns, “Sufism as a Category in Indonesian Literature and History,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 2 (1960), 10–23.

<sup>14</sup> See Koentjaraningrat, *Javanese Culture* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).

<sup>15</sup> Milton Osborne, *Southeast Asia: An Introductory History*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed. (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2003), chapter 1.

<sup>16</sup> See Peter Bellwood, *Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1985), 269–271.

<sup>17</sup> Ian C. Glover, “Some Uses of Archaeology in East and Southeast Asia,” in *An Archaeology of Asia*, ed. Mariam T. Stark (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 25–26. See also “Letting the Past Serve the Present—Some Contemporary Uses of Archaeology in Viet Nam,” *Antiquity* 73, no. 291 (1999), 598–599.

<sup>18</sup> David G. Marr, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 6 (1981), 46; Peter Bellwood, “Southeast Asia before History,” in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume One: From Early Times to c. 1800*, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 129–132.

<sup>19</sup> Bellwood, *Prehistory*, 275.

<sup>20</sup> For a description of Chinese attitudes and actions toward the region, see Martin Stuart-Fox, *A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2003).

<sup>21</sup> Louise Levathes, *When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

<sup>22</sup> Ma Huan, *Ying-yai Sheng-lan: "The Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores" (1433)*, ed. and trans. J.V.G. Mills (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

<sup>23</sup> See *Chinese Muslims in Java in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Century: The Malay Annals of Semerang and Cerbon*, ed. M.C. Ricklefs, trans. H.J. Graaf and Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud (Melbourne: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, 1984). The veracity of these documents has been questioned.

<sup>24</sup> Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Leiden: KITLV, 1986); Donald Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900–1958* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961); Leo Suryadinata, *Chinese and Nation-building in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997).

<sup>25</sup> C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1973).

<sup>26</sup> M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, 3<sup>d</sup> ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

<sup>27</sup> M.C. Ricklefs, *War, Culture, and Economy in Java, 1677–1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993).

<sup>28</sup> Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: Volume Two*, 326–330.

<sup>29</sup> See Harry J. Benda, "Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," *Journal of Modern History* 30, no. 4 (1958), 338–347.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 339.

<sup>31</sup> See John Smail, "On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 2, no. 2 (1961).

<sup>32</sup> For a recent study of the complexity of Southeast Asian responses to colonial rule and borders, see Eric Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865–1915* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

<sup>33</sup> *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1990), 170–173.

<sup>34</sup> Stuart Robson, *Desawarnana (Nagarakertagama) by Mpu Prapanca* (Leiden: KITLV, 1995) or *Java in the Fourteenth Century: A Study in Cultural History: The Nagara-Kertagama by Rakawi Prapanca of Majapahit*, 5 vols., ed. and trans. Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960–1962).

<sup>35</sup> "Javanese Historiography: A Synopsis of its Evolution," in *Historians of Southeast Asia*, ed. D.G.E. Hall (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 87–117.

<sup>36</sup> Delia Noer, "Yamin and Hamka: Two Routes to an Indonesian Identity," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid and David Marr (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), 258. There had in fact also been some minor interest in the idea outside of the Dutch East Indies, among Malays worried about any future independent state falling under Chinese domination. See Angus McIntyre, "The Greater Indonesia Idea of Nationalism in Malaya and Indonesia," *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 1 (1973), 75–83.

<sup>37</sup> See Daud Tanudirjo, "Theoretical Trends in Indonesian Archaeology," in *Theory in Archaeology: A World Perspective*, ed. Peter Ucko (London: Routledge, 1995), 62–70. See also Jacques Dumarçay, *Borobudur*, ed. and trans. Michael Smithies (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1978).

<sup>38</sup> Timothy E. Behrend, "Kraton, Taman, Mesjid: A Brief Survey and Bibliographic Review of Islamic Antiquities in Java," *Indonesia Circle* 35 (1984), 29. See also Claire Holt, *Art in Indonesia: Continuities and Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), and Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud, trans. and ed. F.A. Wagner, *Indonesia: The Art of an Island Group* (London: Methuen, 1962).

<sup>39</sup> *Hasil Pemugaran dan Temuan Benda Cagar Budaya* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1994).

<sup>40</sup> See Anthony Reid, "The Nationalist Quest for an Indonesian Past," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid and David Marr (Singapore: Heinemann Educational

Books, 1979), 298. Indonesian scholars such as Sartono Kartodirdjo prefer the term “national history.” See *Indonesian Historiography* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2001), 15.

<sup>41</sup> See especially, Sukarno, *Indonesia Accuses! Sukarno's Defence Oration in the Political Trial of 1930*, ed., ann., and trans. Roger K. Paget (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), 79, and Muhammad Yamin, *Gadjah Mada: Pahlawan Persatuan Nusantara* (Gajah Mada: A Hero of the Unity of the Archipelago), 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (Jakarta: Dinas Penerbitan Balai Pustaka, 1960).

<sup>42</sup> S. Supomo, “The Image of Majapahit in Later Javanese and Indonesian Writing,” in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, 180–181.

<sup>43</sup> See Michael Wood, *Official History in Modern Indonesia: New Order Perceptions and Counter-interviews* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

<sup>44</sup> David Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 6. The use of a term such as “ancient” to describe a civilization contemporary with Baghdad and the Magna Carta might seem odd. Colonial-era European scholars looking at Southeast Asia often sharply distinguished between “ancient” societies such as Angkor, which would not have had any contact with Europeans, and “degenerate” modern societies fit for colonization.

<sup>45</sup> Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 42.

<sup>46</sup> David J. Steinberg, *Cambodia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), 7.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>48</sup> Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 6.

<sup>49</sup> Osborne, 42; italics added.

<sup>50</sup> Hong Lysa, “History,” in *An Introduction to Southeast Asian Studies*, ed. Mohammed Halib and Tim Huxley (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 49–50.

<sup>51</sup> David Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 12–13.

<sup>52</sup> Chandler, *The Tragedy*, 6.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 284–285.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>55</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 183. The original description cited by Anderson appeared in the Cambodian newspaper *Kambuja*, December 15, 1968.

<sup>56</sup> Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 142.

<sup>57</sup> Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 8.

<sup>58</sup> Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution* (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), 200.

<sup>59</sup> Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 7. Restoration of the site involved the persistent problem of landmines and continued Khmer Rouge activity; the time and money expended may indicate the importance of Angkor as a symbol. However, the site may simply be seen as a useful source of tourist dollars (echoing Silberman’s “touristic archaeology”). See Neil Asher Silberman, “Promised Lands and Chosen Peoples: The Politics and the Poetics of Archaeological Narrative,” in *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*, ed. Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 261.

<sup>60</sup> See John N. Miksic, “Indonesian Publications on Archaeology, 1975–82,” *Indonesia Circle* 34 (1984), 45–50.

<sup>61</sup> See, for example, “Recent Archaeological Discoveries at Srivijaya Sites,” in *Studies on Srivijaya*, ed. Satyawati Suleiman et al. (Jakarta: Puslit Arkenas, 1980), and *A Preliminary Report of the Excavation of the Urban Sites in Banten (West Java)* (Jakarta: P4N, 1977).

<sup>62</sup> For an analysis of how the tombs of the *wali songo* were treated during the late New Order, when despite regime efforts to reach out to Indonesian Muslim sentiment, the nationalist

orthodoxy could be considered to be in full force, see Michael Wood, "The Historical Past as a Tool for Nation-Building in New Order Indonesia," in *Good Governance: A Workable Solution for Indonesia*, ed. Andi Faisal Bakti (Jakarta: Logos Press, 2000), 81–83.

<sup>63</sup> See A. Hasmy, ed., *Sejarah Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Indonesia* (The History of the Entrance and Growth of Islam in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Almaarif, 1993), and K.H.O. Gadjanata and Sri Swasono, *Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Sumatera Selatan* (Entrance and Growth of Islam in South Sumatra) (Jakarta: University of Indonesia, 1986).

<sup>64</sup> See Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, chapter 1, and Fatimi, *Islam Comes to Malaysia*. See also L.F. Benedetto, *Travels of Marco Polo*, trans. Aldo Ricci, intro. E. Denison Ross (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1931), 281–282; Amando Cortesao, ed., *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), 137, 143, 182, and *Travels in Asia and Africa 1325–1354*, trans. H.A.R. Gibb (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1929), 272–276.

<sup>65</sup> *Proses Kedatangan Islam and Munculnya Kerajaan-Kerajaan Islam di Aceh* (The Process of the Arrival of Islam and the Emergence of Islamic Kingdoms in Aceh), in *Sejarah Masuk*, 360–365.

<sup>66</sup> The reliance on textual evidence in reconstructing early Islam in Southeast Asia is problematic for many reasons. Because of the tropical climate, most manuscripts will not have survived to the present and those that have would present the biased views of a local elite (which might lead scholars to assume that Islamization must have been a top-down process). Foreign sources would have their own sets of assumptions (including simple ignorance of local culture). Archaeology may thus be useful in illuminating the origins of Islam in Southeast Asia. Excavations in Banda give a much earlier date for the arrival of Islam than previously thought (around 1200 as opposed to 1450) based on a paucity of pig bones discovered at various sites. However, such work on sites connected to Islam is not carried out very often. See Peter Lape, "Focus on Islam IV: Archaeological Approaches to the Study of Islam in Island Southeast Asia," *Antiquity* 79, no. 306 (2005), 829–836.

<sup>67</sup> "The Introduction of Islam and the Growth of Moslem Coastal Cities in the Archipelago," in *Dynamics of Indonesian History*, ed. Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. du Marchie Sarvas (New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978), 143–145, 148.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 149–157.

<sup>69</sup> See Marwati Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto, eds., *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (National History of Indonesia), 6 vols., 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan RI, 1990). This set of books functioned as the basis of school textbooks during the New Order period.

<sup>70</sup> Hasan Muarif Ambaray, *Menemukan Peradaban: Jejak Arkeologis dan Historis Islam Indonesia*, ed. Jajat Burhanuddin (Jakarta: Logos, 1998).

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 53–54.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 58–59.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 128–129.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 163–170, 191–202.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 337–339.

<sup>76</sup> Asvi Warman Adam, "The Chinese in the Collective Memory of the Indonesian Nation," *Kyoto Review* 2 (March 2003), 1–12 (online edition).

<sup>77</sup> The writer and politician Roeslan Abdulgani refers to Islam as coming to Indonesia "bearing civilisation [or progress]." Dutch colonialism had, in his opinion, interrupted Indonesia's historic path of development under the guidance of Islam. See *Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Indonesia* (The History of the Development of Islam in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara Kota, 1983), 7, 28. Abdulgani, who was close to Sukarno and later worked on developing government ideological training under Suharto, was considered a very secular figure, although he later showed a great deal of sympathy to Islam. As early as the Guided Democracy period, outside observers such as Justus M. Van der Kroef, suspicious of a "nationalist orthodoxy" that emphasized

an inherent Indonesian unity and an Indonesian uniqueness even in the manner of the country's exposure to Islam, called for a history that paid more attention to the importance of outside influences. See "National and International Dimensions of Indonesian History," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 6, no. 1 (1965), 17.

<sup>78</sup> Anthony Reid points out that historically, centralization was unusual in Southeast Asia; even Majapahit, according to visitors, was quite loosely structured. See "Political 'Tradition' in Indonesia: The One and the Many," *Asian Studies Review* 22, no. 1 (1998), 23–38.

<sup>79</sup> See *Sultans, Shamans and Saints: Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 7.

<sup>80</sup> See Clinton Fernandes and Damien Kingsbury, "Terrorism in Archipelagic Southeast Asia," in *Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*, ed. Damien Kingsbury (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 21–22. See also International Crisis Group, "Indonesian Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," Asia Report No. 43, December 11, 2002.

<sup>81</sup> Fernandes and Kingsbury, 20.

<sup>82</sup> International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," Asia Report No. 92, February 22, 2005. See also Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Southeast Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002), 117–154.

<sup>83</sup> Fernandes and Kingsbury, 22.

<sup>84</sup> Dewi Anggraeni, *Who Did This to Our Bali?* (Victoria, Australia: Indra Publishing, 2003).

<sup>85</sup> International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Current Status," Asia Briefing No. 63, May 3, 2007.

<sup>86</sup> See International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia Damaged but Still Dangerous," Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003, and "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks," Asia Report No. 114, May 5, 2006, for some recent assessments of how successful Southeast Asian governments have been in dismantling JI and what long-term prospects the group might have.

<sup>87</sup> Or in a more leftward direction for that matter; the Indonesian Communist Party owed much of its success to adapting Marxist doctrine to Indonesian norms and through an alliance with Sukarno, who had an uncanny ability to understand and tap into local sensibilities. Similarly, liberal democracy's long-term prospects of flourishing in Indonesia are probably related to how well it can adapt and make itself relevant to local conditions.