

# The Idea of Eurasia

Max Ostrovsky



# Content

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Eurasianism</b>	<b>6</b>
<i>Russia-Eurasia</i>	6
<i>The Romano-Germans</i>	7
<i>The Mongolosphere</i>	8
The Geopolitical Foundation	10
<b>The Western Idea of Eurasia</b>	<b>11</b>
Mahan	11
Mackinder	12
Haushofer	13
Spykman	16
Brzezinski	18
<b>Neoeurasianism</b>	<b>20</b>
The Fusion of Eurasianism with the Western Geopolitics	20
From <i>Russia-Eurasia</i> to Continent Eurasia	21
From the <i>Romano-Germans</i> to the <i>Anglo-Saxons</i>	21
Dugin	22
<i>The Strategic Partnership</i>	27
The Trans-Atlantic Split	28
<b>Discussion</b>	<b>31</b>
The Origins of the Idea: <i>World's Final Image</i>	31
The Persistence and Viability of the Idea	33
The <i>Power Belt</i>	34
The Principle of Geopolitical Division	34
Implications for Eurasia	35
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>44</b>

## List of Maps

1. Haushofer's pan-regions	15
2. The first stage of US expansion	23
3. The second stage of US expansion	23
4. Pan-regions of Neoeurasianism	27

## Introduction

Several visions of Eurasia have recently evolved in Russia and the West. This work distinguishes three principal visions: *Eurasianism* (*Evracijstvo*) developed by Russian emigrants during the 1920s and 1930s; the Western geopolitical school, which emerged in the late nineteenth century; and *Neoeurasianism*, which was revived in Russia after the fall of the Communist ideology.

The three movements differ considerably from each other. Each has many features of its own. Nevertheless, all of them have one common feature: an explicit geopolitical context. Out of certain geopolitical considerations, all of them attributed the pivotal-world historical role to Eurasia or to some of its regions.

This attribution might be regarded as natural for the two waves of Russian Eurasianism thanks to simple patriotic feelings. However, such feelings cannot explain why Western thinkers took a similar view. It was noted that, for example, by Sir Halford Mackinder that the Eurasians “could find a complete complex of motives, repeating the ideology of the established Eurasianism” (Panarin 2003, 27). Curiously, Western thinkers began to focus on Eurasia several decades (in the late nineteenth century) before Russian Eurasianism emerged and, contrary to their Russian counterparts, never interrupted their endeavor.

That is not the only puzzle. The original Eurasianism and the related Western views appeared independently; the Russian emigrant thinkers and their Western counterparts either were not aware of, or completely ignored, each other’s works. The Russian Eurasians of the 1920s-1930s were generally hostile to what they called the *Romano-German* West and never adapted any ideas from their Western counterparts. Nowhere in their works can any reference to them be found.

The Russian post-Communist scholars and policymakers combined the theories of both the Russian and the Western traditions. However, this instance of the rise of the idea of Eurasia is no less, perhaps more, perplexing since it occurred in an environment traditionally deeply hostile to this kind of idea. Soviet society did not tolerate geopolitics. Nevertheless, twice in the course of the twentieth century the idea evolved among Russian thinkers, and a related school developed continuously in the West since the late nineteenth century. Both in the West and in Russia the school continues to exist. Indeed, in Russia today it is flourishing.

The main question of this research is *what explains the two independent origins – the Western and the Russian – of the related geopolitical philosophies of Eurasia and whence derives their persistence and vitality?* The thesis of the research is that this was due to the particular spatial development of the modern political system as the twentieth century approached.

I profoundly appreciate the sponsorship of Marjorie Mayrock Center for Russian, Eurasian and East European Research. I also thank my supervisor, Prof. Arie Kacowicz, for his valuable advice in pursuing this research.

## **Eurasianism**

The founders of Eurasianism were a group of Russian emigrants in Europe and the United States who fled from Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The Russian count Nicolay Trubezkoy (1890-1938) is commonly regarded as the founder of Eurasianism. The second in the ranks of the Eurasians is usually considered to be the economist Peter Savizky (1895-1968). In 1921, he and Trubezkoy published a book, *The Exodus to the East (Ishod k Vostoku)*, which for the first time presented Eurasianism as a movement.

Of all the Eurasians it was Savizky who specialized in geopolitics and hence is credited with founding the Russian geopolitical school: “Savizky is the founder of Russian geopolitics, the first scholar who defined its fundamental principles” (Dugin, 1997, 10). He is perhaps the first (and only) Russian author who in the full sense of the word can be called a geopolitician (ibid. 83).

### ***Russia-Eurasia***

According to the basic tenet of Eurasianism, Eurasia should be divided into three parts (Europe, Russia and Asia) instead of the traditional two (Europe and Asia). European Russia should be separated from the rest of Europe and integrated with Asian Russia as a *Middle Continent* or *Eurasia* as the Eurasians called it. Eurasia, in the Eurasianist definition, coincides with the present borders of Russia (Savizky, *Kontinent*, 41, 81). It is from the term Eurasia that the *Eurasians* received their name (ibid. 81).

This world, Eurasia, must be “separated both from Europe and from Asia,” the latter being composed of such countries as China, India and Iran (Fedorovsky, *V Poiskah*, 585). It was claimed, for example, that the empire of Chingiz Chan “spread beyond the limits of Eurasia” (Savizky, *Kontinent*, 45). In other words, it extended beyond the middle interior of Eurasia into peripheral regions not considered truly Eurasian. From the concept of the Middle Continent the Eurasians quickly came to the ethnocentric one of the Middle World, analogous to the traditional Chinese view characterized by extreme ethnocentrism, and reduced Europe to but a peninsula extending from their continent:

Russia has much more basis than China to be called the Middle Country (Chun-kuo). And the more time passes, the more will be prominent these foundations. Europe for Russia is no more than a peninsula of the Old Continent, lying to the west of its borders. Russia itself on this continent occupies its main space, its back. The territory of the USSR is four times larger than Europe. (Savizky, *Kontinent*, 295; idem, *Osnovy*, 799)

### **The Romano-Germans**

The Eurasian antagonism to the Romano-Germans is traced to Slavophilism (Slavyanofilstvo). A leading Slavophil, Nicolay Danilevsky (1822-1885), in his book *Evropa I Rissia (Europe and Russia, 1871)* envisaged a war between the Romano-Germans of Western Europe and the Graeko-Slavs of Eurasia. By Eurasia he meant a renewed Slavic-Orthodox civilization. Trubezkoy went along the same lines one step further and published a book *Evropa I Chelovechestvo (Europe and Humanity)* - a book that precipitated the Eurasian movement. There Trubezkoy extended the scale of the confrontation to the entire globe. He counter-posed the oppressing Romano-German Europe to the rest of humanity suffering under its yoke. European cosmopolitanism, for him, was essentially Romano-German chauvinism. Struggling against the malady of "Europeanization," Trubezkoy turned to all the peoples of the world with the appeal: "comprehend your very self" and "be your very self" (*Evropa*, 34). The rest of the world would, Trubezkoy dreamed, rise in a common struggle against the "spiritual enslavement of all the peoples of the world." This was to be a general and united battle. It would involve neither nationalism nor a "partial consolidation like Pan-Slavism" but the "true" opposition: the Romano-Germans versus all other peoples of the world, Europe versus humanity:

In this great and difficult work of the emancipation of the world's peoples from the hypnosis of the "benefits of civilization"...the intelligentsia of all non-Romano-German peoples...must act in accord and with a common goal.... It is unnecessary to divert attention into private nationalism or such partly solutions as Pan-Slavism and all the rest of the "Pan-isms"... It is always necessary to firmly understand that the opposition of the Slavs to the

Germans or of the Turanians to the Aryans does not provide the true solution of the problem and that there is only one true opposition: the Romano-Germans versus all the rest of the world's peoples. (*Evropa*, 198)

Trubezkoy thus appealed to all of humanity, the real humanity, its majority composed of the Slavs, Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Negroes and other peoples – in short, all those under the Romano-German yoke. They would succeed only if organized:

If humanity...mostly consisting of Slavs, Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Negroes and other peoples, all of whom, without distinction by the color of their skin, suffer and languish under the harsh oppression of the Romano-Germans and waste their national forces on procurement of raw materials needed for the European factories..., would rise, then, it seems, sooner or later it would succeed to overthrow the hated yoke and wipe these predators with all their culture off the face of the earth. But how to organize such an uprising, is it an unrealizable dream? (*Evropa*, 27).

### ***The Mongolosphere***

The legacy of the Russian Empire – Eurasia - was no longer to be found in Kievan Russia but in the great Mongolian Realm of the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries. This was, perhaps, the most prominent innovation of Eurasianism. All other Russian currents recognized *Kievan Rus'* as the cradle of Russia. Eurasianism challenged this traditional conviction:

The Russia of Kiev is not the beginning of Russia. It is but a group of petty kingdoms geopolitically not coinciding with Russia. Although the name *Russia* derived from *Rus'*, the geopolitical and economic-political content is completely different. (Trubezkoy, *Chingiz Chan*, 223-4)

In his *Nasledie Chingizchana (The Legacy of Chingiz Chan)*, Trubezkoy argued that Kievan Russia was but an East European kingdom, a religious colony of Byzantine and a political province of Europe. Similarly, Savizky argued that historically the



first Eurasian unity was not Kievan Russia, the Khazar kingdom or northeastern Russia but the empire of Chingiz Chan.

Kievo-centric concepts of Russian history were altered. The ancient definition of Russia as a “way from Varyangians to Greeks” was discredited. Russia was instead a continental state (Trubezkoy, *Chingiz Chan*, 268). The authentic Russia should not be imagined as Slavic or Varyangian-Slavic but rather as "Russo-Turanian Russia-Eurasia..." (ibid. 286).

The march on Constantinople by Kievan Russia traditionally was of great historic significance. Landlocked Russia was impelled for centuries by its “urge to the sea.” From Peter the Great until the Second World War, Russia attempted to break through to the Mediterranean shores. This was the main purpose of numerous wars with Turkey, including the Crimean War (1853-1855) when Constantinople (Istanbul) was again captured and only British and French intervention kept Russia from the Mediterranean. This version of history was discredited in favor of the continental East.

The Mongolians, it was suggested, fulfilled what had been predestined by geography: they laid the foundations for the political unity of Eurasia and thus became a fact of planetary history (Trubezkoy, *Chingiz Chan*, 227; Savizky, *Geographic Sketch*, 258). After Chingiz Chan, “the conscience of the necessity of such a unity penetrated into all parts of Eurasia” (Trubezkoy, *Chingiz Chan*, 230).

Savizky termed Eurasia the *Mongolosphere* – the region that back in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries was unified by Mongolian power (according to unbroken territorial extent, the greatest known power in history). *Pax Romana* was overshadowed by *Pax Mongolica*, when traders and kings traveled at will from Europe to China (Savizky, *Kontinent*, 340).

The Russia of the new era was born in the bosom of that Mongolian power and inherited its historic mission: Russia was the “successor of the Great Khans, the carrier of the task of Chingiz Chan and Tamerlane, the unifier of Asia...” (Savizky, *Continent*, 384-5; idem., *Geographic Sketch*, 221; Trubezkoy, *Chingiz Chan*, 230, 286-7; Gumilev 1992, 298). Trubezkoy concluded: “The legacy of Chingiz Chan is inseparable from Russia” (*Chingiz Chan*, 286-7) and proudly proclaimed: “And

rising over Russia is the shadow of the Great Chingiz Chan, the unifier of Eurasia” (*Chingiz Chan*, 286).

### **The Geopolitical Foundation**

The Eurasians were the first among Russian authors to use the term geopolitics, and they created the Russian school of geopolitics, a discipline that today attracts great interest. They turned to geopolitics as a discipline important for the formation of worldview, political ideology and even culture. “Establishing the link between historical factors and geographic ones...the Eurasians became the founders of the Russian ...geopolitical approach to Russian history” (Savizky, *Kontinent*, 126). “The Eurasian doctrine is a doctrine in many aspects geopolitical; it is possible to place the Eurasians in one rank with” the Western geopoliticians (Dugin 1997, 9-10).

Savizky particularly specialized in geopolitics and hence is commonly regarded as the founder of Russian geopolitics and the first to define its fundamental principles. In other words, he is seen as the first Russian geopolitician in the full sense (Dugin 1997, 9-10, 444).

The geopolitical aspect of Eurasianism was most vividly expressed by the shift of the origins of the Russian state from Kievan Rus’ to the Mongolian Empire. For geopolitical reasons the cradle of Russia was transferred from Kiev to Karakorum, from the European backyard to the Eurasian center and from petty Kievan Tsars to great and mighty Chans. Trubezkoy maintained that the authentically Russian, Eurasian state appeared when the "Muscovite kings adopted the Tatar *geopolitical* mission" (emphasis added, *Chingiz Chan*, 11), that is, the mission of “sustaining the backbone of Eurasia” (Klyuchnikov 1997, 32).

This geopolitical mission became the motto of Eurasianism. The Russian people, preached the teacher of Savizky, Historian and Eurasianist George Vernadsky, must constantly be aware of the *Eurasian mission* (1927, 36). The Russian geopolitical mission was expressed by such terms as *bridge* (Berdyayev 1924) or *knot*. The Parisian weekly newspaper *Eurasia* adopted as its epigraph: “Russia of our time rules the fates of Europe and Asia. She is the sixth part of the world – *Eurasia* – the *knot* and the spring of a new world culture” (emphasis added, Novikov & Sizemsky 1995, 8).

# The Western Idea of Eurasia

## Mahan

The American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) is called the founder of American geopolitical thought (Fifield & Percy 1944, 82) even though he did not use the term geopolitics. From 1885, Mahan was perhaps the most influential among the advocates of American expansion that indeed took place in the 1890s. A major convert to Mahan's basic ideas was the young Theodore Roosevelt, who in 1902 became U.S. president.

Mahan distinguished a key region of the world in the Eurasian context, namely, the *Central Zone* of Asia lying between 30° and 40° north and stretching from Asia Minor to Japan (Mahan 1920, 26-7). In this zone independent countries still survived – Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, Korea (conquered by Japan in 1895) and Japan (Mahan 1920, 26-27, 167-8, 172). Mahan regarded those countries, located between Britain and Russia, as if between Scylla and Charybdis.

Of the two monsters – Russia and Britain – it was the former that Mahan considered more threatening to the fate of Central Asia. Mahan was awed by Russia's transcontinental size and strategically favorable position for southward expansion (Mahan 1920, 25). Therefore, it was necessary for the Anglo-Saxon “sea power” to resist Russia.

In the Far Eastern part of the Middle Zone was China, which was about to be divided by Russia, Britain and other powers. Mahan strongly advocated the Open Door policy in China, which guaranteed its independence and integrity. This would mark the beginning of the American penetration into the key region of Middle Asia so as to prevent the Russian Empire from overrunning the whole of Asia.

Mahan extended the U.S. defensive perimeter to the Amazon River – the sphere he assessed as sufficient to guard the Panama Canal – but not further south. Mahan criticized the extension of the Monroe Doctrine southward of the Amazon Valley, since nothing there threatened either the United States or the Canal. The Monroe Doctrine south of Amazonia was “a waste of strength”; the Doctrine was applicable up until Amazonia but southward it “ceases to apply” (Mahan 1920, 202).

It was much more important, he claimed in one of his most curious and significant advises, to extend the Monroe Doctrine across the Pacific into the Yangtze Valley under the Open Door policy (Mahan 1920, 201-2). In this view, the Open Door policy was actually an extension of the Monroe Doctrine westward across the Pacific into what Mahan defined as the Central Zone of Asia.

## **Mackinder**

The British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder was not a military man who worked closely with the prime minister of his country like Mahan. He was, however, well associated with his government and also seems to have profoundly influenced policymaking. He was a Member of Parliament from 1910 to 1922, chairman of the Imperial Shipping Committee from 1920 to 1940 and Privy Councilor in 1925-1926; he also was Britain's High Commissioner for South Russia in 1919-1920.

Mackinder rose to prominence in 1902 when he presented to the Royal Geographic Society his famous article, "The Geographic Pivot of History." The article defined western Siberia as the pivotal region of the world. Undoubtedly Mackinder's concept of the *Pivot* (which he also later termed the *Heartland*) "has gained more widespread attention in the twentieth century than any other specifically geographical theory" (Hooson 2005, 165).

Mackinder's vision was revolutionary in that it gave priority to land power after some four centuries of the supremacy of sea power and just fourteen years since Mahan had theorized the latter power. Mackinder stressed that the modern potential of manpower and technology (railways) under the present geographic conditions would imminently elevate the pivotal state to power of unprecedented magnitude. Modern power in control of the Pivot could press simultaneously upon all the peninsulas of Eurasia, and the Western democracies would then be doomed:

What if the Great Continent, the World Island or large part of it, were at some future time to become a single and united base of sea-power? Would not the insular bases be out-built as regards ships and out-manned as regards seamen? (Mackinder 1919, 70)

In 1919, Mackinder coined another famous term, *Heartland*, which represented an expanded Pivot. The Heartland included the whole of the Pivot and in addition European Russia and adjacent Asian regions (1919, 74-5, 105). Atlantic peoples had to “penetrate” the threatening Heartland, “shaping political life in the direction of nationalities” (Mackinder 1919, 203-4). One area of such “penetration” was Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black seas, across which he suggested establishing a *cordon sanitaire*:

Securely independent the Polish and Bohemian nations cannot be, unless as the apex of a broad wedge of independence, extending from the Adriatic and Black Seas to the Baltic.... None the less, the League of Nations should have the right under international law of sending war fleets into the Black and Baltic Seas. (Mackinder 1919, 165-6)

To promote his idea, Mackinder revised his Heartland thesis of world domination to emphasize Eastern Europe:

Who rules East Europe, commands the Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland, commands the World-Island;

Who rules the World-Island, commands the world. (Mackinder 1919, 150)

When the East European states disappeared during the “warming” stage of the next war, Mackinder lamented: “What a pity that the alliance negotiated after Versailles between the United States, the United Kingdom and France was not implemented! What trouble and sadness that might have saved!” (1943, 275). Until today, Mackinder’s conception of the buffer in Eastern Europe is viewed as more realistic than Wilson’s conception (Heffernan 1998, 71).

## **Haushofer**

Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), a general turned geographer, was the founder of the German school of *Geopolitik* and its leader during the Weimar and Nazi periods. For more than twenty years Haushofer served as an army officer. One of his adjutants in the First World War was Rudolf Hess – “the channel through which Hitler sucked his

‘geopolitical’ ideas of eastern conquest” (Trevor-Roper 1985, 249). Haushofer would visit and tutor both Hitler and Hess at Landsdorf prison where they were detained after the Munich Putsch in 1923. Haushofer is usually referred to as Hitler’s geopolitical conscience (Pierce 1962, ix). It has also been suggested that he participated in the writing of *Mein Kampf* where it concerned certain geopolitical terms (Dugin 1997, 69). Besides Hitler and Hess, the Third Reich’s foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop “drew on Haushofer’s ideas and used Haushofer’s son, Albrecht, as an adviser” (Hefferanan 1998, 144, 158).

Haushofer was a contemporary of the Russian Eurasians and, being perhaps the most erudite of the relevant geopoliticians, mentioned the Russian “sect of the Eurasians.” In his *Pan-Ideas in Geopolitics* (1931, 265), he discussed Russian Eurasianism in detail in a chapter titled “Pan-Asia – Eurasia – Pan-Europe.” Haushofer called Mackinder’s “Geographic Pivot of History” (1904) a “genius’ scientific tractate” (1931, 312). He commented on it: “Never have I seen anything greater than those few pages of geopolitical masterwork” (Heffernan 1998, 134). Mackinder located his Pivot, in the words of Haushofer, on “one of the first solid, geopolitically and geographically irreproachable maps, presented to one of the earliest scientific forums of the planet – the Royal Geographic Society in London” (1931, 312).

Haushofer adopted both Mackinder’s Heartland thesis and his view of the Russian-German alliance – powers that Mackinder saw as the major contenders for control of Eurasia in the twentieth century. “Following Mackinder he suggested an alliance with the Soviet Union so that the vast resources of Eurasia could be used to support German ambitions on the world scene” (Blouet 2001, 59).


One of the significant differences between Mackinder and Haushofer was that the latter extended the German-Russian alliance to include Japan in his Eurasian design. Haushofer lived in Japan from 1908 to 1912. Then for the first time he envisioned a transcontinental bloc from the Rhine to Yangtze, and went on to advocate a triple German-Russian-Japanese alliance that became known as the *Eurasian Bloc* or *Inner Line* (Parker 1985, 67, 69).

On that bloc is founded the whole geopolitical doctrine of Haushofer and his Neoeurasian followers. “In such a bloc there was nothing accidental. It was the only complete and adequate response to the strategy of the opposing camp, which did not

conceal the fact that the greatest danger to it would be the construction of an analogous Eurasian alliance” (Dugin 1997, 71).

During 1940, Haushofer wrote an article titled “The Continental Bloc: Mittel Europa-Eurasia-Japan,” and published it in early 1941. At this stage the states mentioned in the title were cooperating. The nonaggression pact between Germany and Russia on August 23, 1939, and the neutrality agreement between Russia and Japan in April 1941, created a Four-Power Camp, and there were efforts to forge a Quadripartite Pact between the Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union. Haushofer referred to the Four-Power Camp as the “*becoming composed Eurasian bloc*” (emphasis added, 1941, 398). He stated: “The largest and most important shift in modern world politics is undoubtedly the formation of the powerful continental bloc, encompassing Europe, Central and East Asia” (ibid. 373).

In 1931, in his *Geopolitics of Pan-Ideas*, Haushofer divided the whole southern part of the Old World between the powers composing the Eurasian Bloc. Africa was supposed to belong to Germany and Italy; Central Asia to the Soviet Union; the Far East, Australia and New Zealand to Japan; and Latin America would be left to the United States (map 1).



**Map 1: Haushofer's Pan-regions.**

Later, the southern design became the policy pursued by Adolf Hitler and his foreign minister, Ribbentrop (Ribbentrop 1946, 177-8), who especially “drew on Haushofer’s ideas” (Hefferanan 1998, 144, 158). “Everything turns toward the south,” Ribbentrop used to say (Schmidt 1950, 212). This southward policy was labeled the *Southern Motif* (Schmidt 1950, 212). It is clear that had the Eurasian Bloc not split, it would have fulfilled the Southern Motif, that is, conquered the entire Eastern Hemisphere.

## **Spykman**

American of Dutch origins, Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943) began as a correspondent in the Middle East and later became professor of international relations at Yale University. With his major work, *America’s Strategy* (1942), he became regarded as the architect of the American Cold War strategy (1997, 66).

In the Second World War, the balance of Eurasian power was vital to the American (and Allied) victory. In *America’s Strategy*, Spykman noted: “As long as Stalin’s armies fight in Russia, Chiang Kai-shek’s troops resist in China, and British sea power rules the Indian Ocean, the Eurasian land mass will remain balanced and ours will be the deciding role in the power struggle of the Old World” (195). It was then that Spykman put forth his famous doctrine, which became the unofficial foundation of the U.S. strategy both during the Cold War and afterward:

If the New World can be united or organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced force are available for action across the ocean, it can influence the politics of Europe and Asia. And if the Old World remains divided and balanced that external force can play a determining role in its political life. If, on the other hand, the Old World can be united or organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced power can become available for action across the ocean, the New World will be encircled and, depending on its power of resistance, may have to submit to the dictates of the Old. The possibility of encirclement depends, therefore, on the power potentials of the Old and the New Worlds and the likelihood of their integration into single political units or coalitions.... Because of the distribution of land masses and military potentials, a balance of power in the transatlantic and



transpacific zones is an absolute prerequisite for the independence of the New World and the preservation of the power position of the United States. There is no safe defensive position on this side of the oceans. Hemisphere defense is no defense at all. The two World Wars will be lost or won in Europe and Asia. The strategic picture demands that we conduct our military operations in the form of a great offensive across the oceans. (Spykman 1942, 179-80, 457)

Spykman adopted major concepts of Mackinder but suggested an alternative to his Eurasian Heartland. In Spykman's *Geography of the Peace*, the chapter "Heartland" is followed and counter-argued by that of "Rimland" (1944, 39-41), where he wrote:

The Mackinder dictum "Who controls Eastern Europe rules the Heartland; who rules the Heartland rules the World Island; and who rules the World Island rules the World" is false. If there is to be a slogan for the power politics of the Old World, it must be "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." (1942, 124)

Almost half a century before Spykman wrote *America's Strategy* (1942), Mahan had suggested redirecting the Monroe Doctrine eastward across the Pacific into what he called the Middle Zone of Asia. Under McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, that advice was partly followed with the annexation of the Philippines in 1898 and the Open Door policy in China. That attempt proved to be abortive, but after two world wars Mahan's Eurasian idea returned with a vengeance. In 1947, President Truman introduced the doctrine that became known under his name. Spykman predicted the establishment of such a doctrine in 1942:

To the extent that geographic factors determine international relations, they will be present in both [the pre- and post-Second World War] periods.... [T]he post-war world is still going to be a world of decentralization of power with autonomous zones in the Far East, North America and Europe, and the relations between these three zones will continue to dominate world politics in which the interests of the United States will continue to demand the preservation of a balance in Europe and Asia. The same considerations of politi-

cal strategy that once led us to aid the Allies and that should guide our conduct of the war will continue to demand our participation in the political life of the transoceanic zones in peace time. (1942, 461)

The introduction of the Truman Doctrine might actually be regarded as an extension of the traditional Monroe Doctrine to Eurasia, as was noted by contemporary observers and later scholars: “Historically speaking, the Truman Doctrine was essentially an extension of the Monroe Doctrine across the Atlantic to non-Communist Europe” and further to non-Communist Asia. “The alliances forged by Dulles were based upon this premise....” (Steel 1967, 23). The “extended” Monroe Doctrine “renders” the Truman Doctrine (Parker 1985, 136). “The Truman Doctrine can be interpreted as a prescription for a huge expansion in the geographical scope of the strategic policy of the United States” (Sloan 1988, 132-3).

## **Brzezinski**

Zbigniew Brzezinski served during the later Cold War as President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser. Carter’s administration witnessed the last threatening move of the Heartland into Afghanistan. Following Mahan, Mackinder and especially Spykman, Brzezinski saw the Cold War as a geopolitical struggle for control over the *Eurasian land mass*. The Soviet Union would prevail if it could eject the West from the western and eastern fringes of Eurasia. The West would be preponderant if it contained the Soviet Union. Soon the West was preponderant and launched its strategic advance into the former Soviet sphere. In his *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (1997), Brzezinski wrote perhaps the best outline of the current American conception of Eurasia.

Brzezinski described the American triumph in terms of control over Eurasia: for the first time ever, a “non-Eurasian” power had emerged as a key arbiter of “Eurasian” power relations (Brzezinski 1997, 31). This continent did not lose its pivotal significance. Although the power configuration underwent a revolutionary change, Eurasia was still a *megacontinent* (idem 2000, 55). Like Spykman, Brzezinski acknowledges that: “Cumulatively, Eurasia’s power vastly overshadows America’s” (1997, 31).

Well after the Cold War, Brzezinski opened his *Grand Chessboard* (1997) with the attribution to Eurasia of crucial geostrategic significance: “The formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geostrategy is therefore the purpose of this book” (xiv). In that book Brzezinski, in classical Spykman terms, formulized his geostrategic “chessboard” doctrine of Eurasia, which aims to prevent the unification of this megacontinent:

Europe and Asia are politically and economically powerful.... It follows that... American foreign policy must...employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter.... Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played, and that struggle involves geostrategy – the strategic management of geopolitical interests.... But in the meantime it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America... For America the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia...and America’s global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained. (1997, xiii-xiv, 30-1)

## **Neoeurasianism**

With the fall of the Communist regime in the late 1980s, Eurasianist writings were dusted off and republished. This produced an explosive effect. Ilan Berman, a fellow of the American Foreign Policy Council and director of its Eurasia Program, observes: “The doctrine of Eurasianism, long relegated to obscurity, has returned with a vengeance, drawing a growing number of adherents to its call for a Russian revival” (Berman 2002). With the official Communist ideology gone, Neoeurasianism reached the “level of a mainstream ideology” (Berman 2001; Marketos 2007). Russian president Vladimir Putin himself seemed to embark on a path of Neoeurasian foreign policy:

The post-1999 foreign policy approach is based on an ideological infrastructure. Long relegated to ultranationalists and a handful of “new right” thinkers, the previously obscure doctrine of Eurasianism has emerged as a major force in Russian politics. It is noteworthy not only for its appeal as the basis for a renewed quest for national greatness, but also for the degree to which its tenets appear to have begun to animate many of President Putin’s international maneuvers. (Berman 2001; also Sangtu 2004; Zapolskis 2007)

### **The Fusion of Eurasianism and Western Geopolitics**

A prominent Neoeurasianist writer, Alexander Panarin, stated that “the characteristic feature of the Neoeurasian writings is an ardent concern of its authors with prophetic exercises in the holy sphere of geopolitics..., the largest innovation of the Russian geopolitical thought of the twentieth century” (2003, 13, 22). Of all Eurasianist motifs it is probably the geopolitical that became most popular and elaborated. Besides further evolution, the field was massively reinforced by the century-old Western geopolitical tradition. All its founding fathers (Ratzel, Kjellen, Mahan, Lea, Mackinder, Amery, Haushofer, Schmitt and others), who were either unknown to or ignored by the Eurasians, were urgently translated into Russian, widely published and much more widely referenced by the Neoeurasians. For them Mackinder (with

his Heartland) and Haushofer (with his Eurasian Bloc) filled the places left vacant by Marx and Engels.

### **From *Russia-Eurasia* to Continent Eurasia**

Eurasianism identified Eurasia with Russia and aimed merely to cement the Russian integrity. It warned against expanding beyond the present Russian limits, arguing that this would contradict the correct geopolitical instinct. It was this instinct that, for the Eurasians, led Chingiz Chan to his great achievement whereas his successors' failure to follow it, that is, to expand beyond the natural geopolitical limits proved fatal for them.

The Pan-Eurasian idea, however, became central to the Neoeurasians and especially the most famous among them, Dugin. Expanding the Russian sphere across all its land frontiers but refraining from overly abstract, worldwide aspirations, Dugin concentrated on the continent of Eurasia, which, as he often emphasizes, is the cradle of human culture and civilization (2004, 486).

Whereas the Russian geopolitical sphere was projected in all directions toward the Eurasian shoreline, the concept of the rival sphere contracted. The opposed Romano-German camp was reduced to the Anglo-Saxon one. The Neoeurasians defined continental Europe with all its Roman and Germanic (excepting the British) peoples as a part of continental Eurasia, confronted by the "Atlantist" world. The frontier of Eurasia on the west advanced from the Neman River to La Manche.

### **From the *Romano-Germans* to the *Anglo-Saxons***

The Eurasians wrote in the 1920s-1930s, when European power still held its sway over the world. Russia was "surrounded" by "European forts" and the "inevitable clash" was with "Europe" (Suvchinsky, *Sila*, 55). Meanwhile the United States retired to its traditional isolationism. Thus Russia's main enemies were still in Europe, as they had been since Peter the Great, in his words, "broke the window" into Europe. Eurasians, in accordance with their epoch's world order and revolutionary spirit, found common cause with colonial peoples oppressed by the same Europe:

The ideas of the Eurasians completely accorded with the revolutionary character of the epoch in which they acted. A part of this character was, for example, the thesis that Russia and the colonial peoples oppressed by the Europeans formed a kind of unity. . . . Visible here are striking parallels with the arguments of the Bolsheviks, who also wished to make Russia the center of the uprising against the European hegemony. (Lux 2003, 30)

From the early 1940s to the late 1980s, that is, the period from Eurasianism to Neoeurasianism, Europe declined and the United States rose to preeminence. After its spectacular series of triumphs in the international arena, culminating with that over the USSR in the Cold War, America became for the Neoeurasians the embodiment of evil, absorbing into itself the former Eurasianist hatred of Romano-German peoples: “Neo-Eurasianist anti-Westernism is almost wholly anti-American” (Hahn 2002, 12).


Consequently, the image of the rival camp contracted from the Romano-Germans to the Anglo-Saxons. Politically (as described in the previous section), the western Eurasian frontier was pushed from the Neman River to La Manche and continental Europe became part of Eurasia.

## **Dugin**

Alexander Gelyevich Dugin (born 1962) was trained as a historian and acquired knowledge in many languages. In 1998, Dugin became a top adviser to State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev, who was also director of the Duma’s Geopolitical Analysis Center. Hence Dugin remains an adviser in the Duma.


Like all epochal triumphs in international politics, Dugin wrote, the American one was due to their successful geopolitical performance. Hence, the Eurasian counterattack should be analogously designed. Only with geopolitics could one beat geopolitics. Dugin proceeds to a geopolitical analysis of the Atlantist challenge with the aim of formulating a no less effective response. In his magnum opus on geopolitics, *Osnovy Geopolitiki (Foundations of Geopolitics)* (1997), Dugin presented two maps of U.S. geopolitical expansion from the proclamation of the

Monroe Doctrine in 1823 until the post-Cold War era. The maps represent two main stages, the first represented by the Monroe Doctrine and the second by the Truman Doctrine.



**Map 2: The first stage of U.S. expansion.**

The above expansion Dugin calls the “first stage of the United States becoming a world power,” achieved through the Monroe Doctrine; an instance of “meridional expansion.” Below is Dugin’s “second stage of the United States becoming a world power” as achieved through the Truman Doctrine; an instance of “latitudinal expansion” leading to the “encirclement of Eurasia from the East, West and South” (Dugin 1997, 53).



**Map 3: The second stage of U.S. expansion.**

The two maps demonstrate that the Truman Doctrine is an aggressive extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the whole Eastern Hemisphere, concentrating on the encirclement of Eurasia. In Dugin's view, the post-Cold War Atlantist strategy is essentially the further extension of the Truman Doctrine now speedily entering the former Soviet sphere and contracting around Russia. Dugin summed up the American geopolitical performance from the colonial era to the beginning of the twenty-first century:

[T]he Atlantists have already achieved the integration of their continent's territories, have firmly consolidated their grip on the shore-zones of Eurasia, and it remains for them only to advance further, expanding these zones into the depth of the continent and destabilizing internal circumstances within the limits of the *Heartland*. [English in the original] (2005, 481)

Having thus profoundly researched the geopolitics of the Atlantist challenge, Dugin elaborated a mega-project of the Eurasian response. This combined the theories of his two favorite geopoliticians, Mackinder and Haushofer. From the former he adopted the Heartland idea, which would form the nucleus of the Eurasian alliance; and from the latter the notion of the Eurasian Bloc, along which would be united the very anti-hegemonic Alliance. In addition, Dugin supplemented the combined Mackinder-Haushofer model with his own conceptions, decorated in dramatic literary style and animated with the crusading spirit. The days of the Atlantist Mondialism appeared to be numbered.

The days of Eurasia, on the contrary, seemed to be beginning: "The fight for the world domination of the Russians did not end!" (Dugin 1997, 213). The present paralysis caused by the strenuous efforts in the centuries-long world historical struggle was about to end and the mighty people would come back:

In the course of the last centuries the Russian people was the foundation of the Eurasian citadel. It gave all its forces, all its energies to the great begin-



ning... It overstrained its efforts. Now it is in a state of shock, of temporary historical paralysis... The Russian ethos is young, energetic, messianic, penetrating and contemplative. On earth there are few like this. But at the given moment its sleep is deep, the weariness seems insurmountable. However, we have not completed our historic path, our role in the world constellation of peoples. We are simply taking a breather. And tomorrow, well, at least the day after tomorrow, we will wake up. (Dugin 2004, 485)

However, even if the former Heartland's strength might be restored or even surpassed, the experience of the Cold War made clear once and for all that Russia *alone* was unable to confront the Atlantic Bloc. The global "alternative" to the unipolar world order "cannot be a matter of only *one country*, one people" (1997, 124). The auxiliary mobilization of the entire Eurasian Rimland into a single "empire" is absolutely vital for the new *Eurasian Empire* in the *Endkampf*: "This Empire according to geopolitical logic, this time must strategically and spatially surpass the preceding variant [the USSR]. Therefore, the New Empire must be Eurasian, pan-continental and global in perspective" (Dugin 1997, 213). The Russian Heartland would only be the nucleus of the Eurasian citadel:

By contrast to previous epochs, the axis of such a bloc must be neither world view nor specifics of economic and political structures but *geopolitical and strategic principles*. Russia must wholly recognize herself as the *geopolitical Axis of history*, as the *nucleus of Eurasia*.... (Idem 2004, 127-8)


Thus, Dugin combines Mackinder's Heartland with Haushofer's Eurasian Bloc:

On the strategic level it means maximally integrating Eurasian spaces around the "geographic pivot of history," thereby creating a powerful and strategically united *Continental Bloc*.... [It is necessary] to spread control of the internal continental spaces of Eurasia (disposed in Russia and around it) as far as its natural frontiers, which coincide with the seashores.... It means that the foremost aim of the Order of Eurasia is the attainment of complete

control over the “shore zones” of the continent, the *rimlands* [English in the original] and transformation of the whole continent into a sole geopolitical space with the pivot and center in...the *Heartland*. [English in the original] (Dugin 2005, 476)

Dugin openly resurrects the model of Haushofer, “Mittel Europa – Eurasia – Japan.” Two chapters in Dugin’s *Osnovy Geopolitiki* are titled, “The Western Axis: Moscow-Berlin. The European Empire and Eurasia” and “The Axis Moscow-Tokyo: The Pan-Asian Project” (1997, 217, 224). Correspondingly, two chapters in Dugin’s *Proekt Evrazia* are titled: “The Axis Moscow-Berlin” and “The Axis Moscow-Tokyo” (2004, 374, 383).

Following Haushofer, Dugin projects that the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo [add Washington?] Axis, having gotten rid of the Atlantist tutelage, would establish each one’s own *Grossraum* or pan-region along the pan-American one – the framework of the desired and forthcoming multipolar world (2004, 174-5). These four pan-regions are southward-oriented – the only direction with an outlet, since on three other fronts they face each other. Thus, the Southern Motif formulated by Haushofer and shared by many Axis and Soviet leaders (but not by Hitler) is completely resurrected. Logically, Haushofer’s map of expected pan-regions drawn in 1940 became almost a duplicate of that on the website of the International Movement Eurasia (IME) presented in 2003. Both maps anticipate a quadripolar world order in which each of precisely the same four poles – Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo and Washington – rules its own zone extending southward; and even the meridional frontiers of the four pan-regions almost coincide:



Map of multipolar world. Four zones - four poles

**Map 4: Pan-regions of Neoeurasianism.**

The Dugin phenomenon entails two problems, one minor and one major. The minor trouble is that Dugin marches straight and fast toward the Third World War. The major concern is that since 1998 he has become part of the Russian government and his ideas were reflected in Russian foreign policy.

***The Strategic Partnership***

Russia’s main countermeasures to the encirclement occur in the context of the so-called *strategic partnership* policy with powers beyond the line of the encirclement. This partnership involves geopolitical Neoeurasianist projects. In contrast to the previous Soviet epoch, alliances are no longer sought on a socioeconomic basis but instead on that of geography. The *socialist* camp is replaced by the *Eurasian* one.

In 1996, Moscow and Beijing announced that they would devote themselves to establishing and developing a *strategic partnership* (Jingjie 2000, 527). Also that year the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was set up, also known also as

the Shanghai Five. Those five were the leaders of Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.

In 1998, following the Anglo-American Desert Fox campaign in Iraq, which had been protested by Russia, France, China and consequently by the United Nations, Russian foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, designed his *Triangle*, supplementing Russia and China with India. The Eurasian strategic partnership became tripartite.

Putin energetically pursued his Asian policy, especially concentrating on China and India. In New Delhi in October 2000, Putin and Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership between their countries. Vajpayee said it was a “milestone in Indo-Russian ties” that “will give a major impetus to bilateral relations at the beginning of the new millennium” (*Asian Political News*, 09/10/2000). The *Primakov Triangle* – the strategic partnership between Russia, China and India – was fulfilled.

Dugin’s crucial level of the Eurasian consolidation is Eurasia with its two developed, industrialized flanks – continental Europe and Japan (Dugin 2004, 132-3). The next section demonstrates that the configuration of the third stage became a real possibility in the post-Cold War era.

## **The Trans-Atlantic Split**

The relevance of NATO, established to confront the USSR, became somewhat vague with the latter’s dissolution. Moscow’s sphere on the west was pushed back to the seventeenth-century frontier prior to Peter the Great. The threat from the east drastically decreased. Correspondingly, the American protectorate became a heavier burden.

The 2003 Iraq war brought about the deepest transatlantic crisis so far. It provoked a strong urge for anti-American consolidation among several European states. French president Jacques Chirac proclaimed:

France will not accept Europe remaining unfinished.... Europe must realize the need to express its own vision of the world’s problems and support this vision with a credible common defense. France is calling on its partners in the

European Union and those [partners] going to join it [the EU] to fulfill this ambition in the service of peace and prosperity. (*Herald Tribune*, 21/3/2003, 3)

Michèle Alliot-Marie, the French defense minister, predicted that “in a few years, the United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, will have opposite him a united Europe” (*Herald Tribune*, 18/7/2003, 1). Three months later the former French finance minister, Dominique Kahn, stated: “On...February 15, 2003, a new nation was born on the street. This new nation is the European nation” (ibid. 2/9/2004, 6).

The French anti-American reaction to the 2003 Iraq war was shared by Germany, also no longer a convinced ally of the United States. During the session of foreign ministers in March 2003 devoted to the war, German foreign minister Joschka Fischer “broke into extemporaneous English: ‘Excuse me, but I’m not convinced’” – a phrase that in German newspapers “quickly acquired an almost Delphic significance” of a “declaration of independence from the United States, the end point of a half-century of nearly automatic compliance with American wishes” (*Herald Tribune*, 4/5/2004, 2). “There is too little Europe,” Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany told *Die Zeit*. “The target of the process of emancipation is: more Europe” (ibid. 1/4/2003, 1). Fischer called for an EU that was a “strategic” entity, a continental-type power comparable to the United States, Russia, China or India, able to pull its weight in confronting threats to stability in the world (ibid., 13/4/2004, 2). Suddenly Dugin’s words changed from surreal to quite real:

In general, I could say that I am on the side of a greater Europe. It could be a kind EU [unclear] possibly turning into a geopolitical pool [unclear], or a power balancing the American hegemony. An independent, powerful and united European Union is a unique opportunity to create a multipolar world. (2004)

The French former prime minister and foreign minister, Alain Juppén, designated Russia as one of the poles and talked about the idea of the strategic partnership between Russia and the European pole and the dialogue with other poles – the

American and the Chinese: “The world of the next decades will function this way” (*Herald Tribune*, 18/7/2003, 1). Putin was well ready to join the endeavor. Opposition to the 2003 Iraq war brought Chirac and Schroeder together for two days of discussion in St. Petersburg in April 2003. Significantly, on this occasion the initiative came from Schroeder, not from the traditionally anti-American leaders of France and Russia:

It was Schroeder, not Chirac or...Putin..., who crystallized what came to be called the Moscow-Berlin-Paris anti-war axis.... Worst of all, perhaps, Schroeder did this not by leading German public opinion but by following it at a time when anti-American sentiment had reached a postwar peak.... If anti-Americanism pays domestically, how reliable is Germany as an ally when the moment of truth finally comes? (Bernstein 2004, 2)

## Discussion

### The Origins of the Idea: *World's Final Image*

The idea of Eurasia originated at a time of peculiar geographic development of the modern political system. Toward the twentieth century, the world map attained its *final image*, as Mackinder called it in his epochal "Pivot" paper in 1904 and in his later (1919) book:

Of late it has been a common-place to speak of geographical exploration as nearly over.... In 400 years the outline of the map of the world has been completed with approximate accuracy.... The missionary, the conqueror, the farmer...have followed so closely in the traveler's footsteps that the world, in its remoter borders, has hardly been revealed before we must chronicle its virtually complete political appropriation. In Europe, the North America, the South America, Africa, and Australia there is scarcely a region left for the pegging out of a claim of ownership.... From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall again [as in the pre-Columbian age] have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world-wide scope. (1904, 30-1; also 1919, 39-40)

The established geographical completeness of the world, Mackinder supposed in 1904, allowed formulizing a general geopolitical causation in universal history:

It appears to me, therefore, that in the present decade [1900-1910] we are for the first time in a position to attempt, with some degree of completeness, a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations. For the first time we can perceive something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage of the whole world, and may seek a formula which shall express certain events at any rate, of geographical causation in universal history. If we are fortunate, that formula should have a practical value as setting into perspective some of the competing forces in current international politics. (1904, 31)

The final image of the world revealed the outstanding size of Eurasia. It became evident that any power or coalition of powers that would gain the whole of Eurasia under its rule and accumulate all its potential would subsequently dominate the world. The Eurasian Bloc of Haushofer, despite its evanescence, managed to prove this hypothesis. Fortunately for the Atlantic camp, that bloc was a coalition of powers that could split and, indeed, soon split, pushing its middle part to the opposite camp and allowing the latter to win the war.

A more dangerous scenario for the Atlantic world was the consolidation of Eurasia under any single power. The final image of the world, besides the magnitude of Eurasia in the world, revealed the outstanding size and central position of Russia in Eurasia. This was the basic geographic fact noted by Russian Eurasians and developed in our days by their followers, the Neoeurasians (Dugin 2004, 57).

Naturally, the Russo-centric view of a Russian observer is at least partly fostered by his patriotic feelings. However, these feelings cannot explain why previously Mahan, Mackinder and Kjellen had perceived the world map in a similar way. Mahan was awed by the transcontinental size of Russia and its strategically favorable central position for outward expansion:

Upon a glance at the map one enormous fact immediately obtrudes itself upon the attention – the vast uninterrupted mass of the Russian Empire, stretching without a break in territorial consecutiveness from the meridian of western Asia Minor, until to the eastward it overpasses that of Japan. In this huge distance no political obstacles intervene to impede the concentrated action of the disposable strength.... To this element of power – central position – is to be added the wedge-shaped outline of her territorial projection into Central Asia. (Mahan 1920, 25)

The same aspect of observation of the world's final image stands behind Mackinder's famous Pivot/Heartland theory. For Kjellen Russia was a "central figure" of world politics, ideally posed to play an intermediate role between two cultural worlds – Western Europe and East Asia. Thus, besides the Eurasians, three Western thinkers, the American Mahan, the British Mackinder and the Swede Kjellen were impressed by Russia's size and central position in the greatest



continent, and the former two concluded that it was an urgent necessity for their countries to contain Russia from breaking out of its Pivot and reaching the warm seas. Otherwise the Russian worldwide empire would be in sight.

### **The Persistence and Viability of the Idea**

The idea of Eurasia did not immediately take firm root. On the contrary, Mackinder's and Mahan's works were laid to rest in libraries for some three decades while their countries embarked on different courses. Britain disregarded all of Mackinder's ideas in favor of Lloyd George's One Russia policy and the United States abandoned all of Mahan's designs and returned to the traditional isolationism. Both Mahan and Mackinder made their decisive "comeback" with two events, more precisely the two pacts – between Germany and the USSR in August 1939 and between the USSR and Japan in April 1941. Mackinder's "Pivot" paper was literally unearthed the day after the first pact was concluded. The two pacts turned Haushofer's project of the Eurasian Bloc into reality.

Moreover, the idea of Eurasia was constantly revitalized by the subsequent behavior of Eurasia. The remnant of the Eurasian Bloc – the Tripartite Bloc – also came close to conquering Eurasia. Subsequently the Cold War brought the third Eurasian challenge, with its apogee occurring in the 1950s. And after the Cold War, the Eurasian tendency to unification remains evident in the phenomena of strategic partnerships and the transatlantic split. It indeed seems that Eurasian politics strives to coincide with geography, that is, there is a constant probability that a single power or coalition of powers will make the Eurasian shoreline its political frontier. Today, both American geopoliticians and the Neoeurasians never tire of stressing this fact.

Thus, the idea of Eurasia was kept alive by two factors. The first was the revelation of its physical magnitude in terms of the final world image; the second was that Eurasia, indeed, constantly tends to political unification. The latter was the reanimating factor of the idea. Hence the idea did not shape development; instead development kept the idea alive and vivid. However, the development itself – the centripetal trend of Eurasia – had its own reasons, which seem to inhere in the geopolitical structure of Eurasia and the place of Eurasia in the world geopolitical structure.

## **The Power Belt**

The political formation of Eurasia as a whole occurred in two main stages. The first took place in the so-called Axial Age in the first millennium BC. Then appeared a continuous *power belt* – the belt of high civilizations and great empires – stretching from the Mediterranean to the Yellow Sea. The next stage came in modern times with the rise of the European states, Russia, Manchuria and Japan. These powers also formed a continuous power belt from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

Having moved from its initial setting northward, the Eurasian power belt penetrated to the New World where it similarly remained restricted to the northern part. Toward about 1900 it reached the North American *last frontier* – the Pacific shore – and “jumped” over the Pacific to “close” in the Far East. The United States occupied Hawaii, Guam, Samoa and the Philippines in 1896-1898, and proclaimed the Open Door policy in China in 1900; Japan occupied Korea in 1895 and clashed with Russia in 1904-1905. These events marked the “closing” of the power belt. That belt, formed in Eurasia in antiquity, spanned the globe and eventually “closed” to become the *Industrial North*.

The closing of the power belt marked the end of the era of the European supremacy. The Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were the first indications that new great powers were beginning to emerge outside Europe. However, the Eurocentric system was not replaced by a *spherical* global system. Political power was not evenly distributed over the globe. New powers that shared the European supremacy at the end of the nineteenth century – the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan – were located in the Northern Hemisphere as well. Instead the European supremacy was replaced by the supremacy of the belt spanning the Northern Hemisphere.

## **The Principle of Geopolitical Division**

In history, political divisions of international systems were conditioned by their geographic structure. Geographically *compact* systems were characterized by alternating divisions while geographically *stretched* systems by more permanent divisions.

The Chinese world represents one of the most compact systems. In this system the confrontation between east and west was as common as between south

and north. During the *Warring States* era (475-221 BC) the west-east division prevailed; during the *Nanbeychao* era (220-589 AD) a dual division of north and south occurred. The same north-south division reappeared during the Song and Churcheu dynasties (960-1279).

The Mediterranean system offers an example of a more extended system, being narrower from north to south and wider from west to east. Accordingly, its north-south divisions were less characteristic than west-east ones. The rare instances of north-south divisions were the Punic Wars and the First Triumvirate War between Caesar and Pompey (49-45 BC). The west-east splits of the Mediterranean were more frequent. They took place with the contests between Rome and the Seleukian Empire (198-189 BC) and in the second and third wars of the Triumvirates (44-42 BC and 32-30 BC, respectively). The final split of the Roman Empire in 395 AD was also west-east (Byzantium), and survived for centuries as manifested by the division between the Catholic and Orthodox worlds.

Egypt of the Bronze Age represented an extremely narrow system, extending along the Nile Valley. This system experienced dual divisions exclusively between north and south, the Upper and Lower valleys. This duality remained absolutely pervasive throughout Egypt's history as an independent political system (from circa 3000 to 525 BC). There was not a single instance in the two-and-a-half-millennia history of the Egyptian system when it was divided between east and west.

To sum up the lessons of history, the more a political system was geographically compact, the less spatially constant were its main political divisions; the more a system was extended the more constant were its political divisions. And the spatially permanent divisions of extended systems were along their narrower axis. This observation seems to explain the phenomenon of the modern Eurasian tendency to unification.

## **Implications for Eurasia**

The modern political system is global. But, as described at the beginning of this section, the political power of the global system is not evenly distributed over the

global sphere. The concentration of the world's political power forms a belt stretching *latitudinally* throughout the Northern Hemisphere. Thus the modern political system is an instance of an extended system with the narrowest axis from north to south. Hence its major divisions are considered to be *meridional*.

Indeed, this is what really happens. The Southern Motif of Haushofer-Ribbentrop is a striking expression of the meridional division of the world. The Japanese government had been striving for years “to draw a line in the Pacific at the 180th meridian, that that part of the ocean lying eastward of that line be regarded as the sphere of the United States navy, and that that part lying westward of that line be regarded as the sphere of the Japanese navy” (*FRUS*, 1940, vol. 3, 135-6). The Southern Motif was virtually resurrected in 2003 on the website of the Neoeurasian Movement. The meridional division of the world, manifested by that motif, seems likely to reappear in any project to restore *multipolarity*.

Since the power belt became *round* circa 1900, great powers feared a war on the two meridional fronts – western and eastern – but never on any significant latitudinal scale, either southern or northern. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, four fronts of the war were formed. All of them crossed the power belt along meridians – one stretching along the Atlantic shores of Europe, one from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further to Alexandria, one from Sakhalin to Burma and one from Kiska in the Aleutians to Guadalcanal in the Solomons. Again, the Japanese defined the new western limit of their sphere in terms of a meridian. The newly drafted military covenant (to which neither Ribbentrop nor Hitler raised any obstacles) said that “west of the meridian of 70° east, Germany and Italy would operate; all the world east of that line, including British India, would fall to Japan” (Irving 1977, 354). The main battles of that war – Midway, Stalingrad, Al-Alamein and Kursk – were clashes of two armies or navies, one coming from the west and the other from the east. The division of the Cold War was similarly meridional – the European Iron Curtain crossed Europe from north to south and the Pacific one passed through the Bering Straits and the straits between the Kuryl Islands and Japan.

Meridionally, the modern power belt is separated on two continents – Eurasia and North America – by two vast oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific. Spykman used to stress regarding his continent: “The most significant fact is that our continent lies between the European and the Asiatic power centers of the Old World and is

separated from them by oceanic distances” (1944, 18). These vast natural barriers preordain the dual division of the world on the two northern continents. This geographic causation seems to explain Eurasia’s tendency to unification as far from accidental.

The crucial feature of the world map completed circa 1900 was the *closure*, that is, the completion, of the power belt in the western Pacific. Once this belt became closed and complete, the trend toward global duality based on North America and Eurasia began. This trend implies the political consolidation of Eurasia. Today, both the American geopoliticians and the Russian Neoeurasians are in complete agreement in their views on Eurasia. The difference between them is that the former attempt to prevent the unification of Eurasia so as to preclude confrontation with it, whereas the latter attempt to consolidate Eurasia so as to pave the way to a confrontation with North America. The ideas of Eurasia departed from independent origins and proceeded by various courses but, being bound to the political development, finally became identical.

## Conclusion

Two different origins of the similar ideas of Eurasia in Russia and the West seem to be explained by the end of the modern political system's spatial expansion in about the year 1900. Geographically, the world was completely explored and politically settled; world's remaining *sovereign void* was filled. Around 1900, first complete global political maps were drawn, the world's *final image*.

The same image revealed the same facts to observers in different places. The magnitude of the Eurasian *megacontinent* loomed large for all of them, as well as Russia's portion and position in this land mass. There were probably more than two independent origins of the idea of Eurasia and its Heartland, as several Western scholars – Mahan, Mackinder and Kjellen – arrived at such origins independently.

The basic idea of Eurasia in both the West and Russia is that if any single power or coalition of powers is allowed to gain control over the whole Eurasian land mass, such a power would dominate the world. In terms of the geopolitical tradition, Eurasia is a megacontinent. “Cumulatively, Eurasia's power vastly overshadows America's” (Brzezinski 1997, 31).

Contemplating the pacification of Eurasia in the twentieth century and the present relative tranquility, Brzezinski is optimistic: “Fortunately for America, Eurasia is too big to be politically one” (1997, 31). Nevertheless, the experience of the past century undermines this conclusion. The Eurasian Bloc of Haushofer during its evanescent appearance from 1939 to 1941 almost unified this continent and, had it not split, would certainly soon have conquered the whole Eastern Hemisphere.

The split of the Eurasian Bloc does not seem to be an inevitable development as it is often presented in Western research. Instead it appears to be caused by the factor of human agency. Had the *human decision* been made the other way, the world could have been dominated today by a certain Eurasian power or coalition of powers.

The Tripartite and Communist camps represented the second and third, respectively, challenges that would have unified Eurasia had not the North American power intervened. It took two world wars and the Cold War to keep the worst-case scenario of Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman from materializing. In the short post-Cold War era there were many indications that Eurasia preserves its centripetal

potential. This seems to explain why the Pentagon develops its geopolitical positions mainly in and around Eurasia.

The physical geography of the world determined the basic geopolitical duality – Eurasia versus North America. This geopolitical structure seems to explain the centripetal tendency of Eurasia. The centripetal trend, in its turn, seems to be responsible for keeping the idea of Eurasia alive and vivid. The classics of geopolitics were good scholars with penetrating insight. They managed to decipher basic factors at work in world politics and, thus, foresee developments. Their writings were hewn from the geographic rock of timeless truth. As Spykman used to state: “Geography does not argue: it simply is.”

The tectonic "non-arguing" basis of the world order revealed by the geopolitical idea of Eurasia seems to pre-determine a particular political pattern. The present world order is regarded by many as *unipolar* or *hegemonic* centered on the United States. This belief is regularly expressed by leaders of France, Germany, Russia, China and other states and explains their common aspiration to multipolarity and many other elements in their policy and mutual relations. Naturally, the dominant power finds itself in the status of the *common enemy* wielding against it most diverse fractions (Dugin 2004, 370-1; also idem, 1997, 216). It appears that simultaneously with the hegemonic era began the era of the anti-hegemonic resistance. And it looks as if presently we are well advanced along both lines.

Both hegemony and anti-hegemony are as old as history. The first known in history hegemony – of the Mesopotamian city-state Kish – is from the very dawn of history around 3000 BC. Legends say that the state Kish was the first to receive the "supreme rule" immediately after the "flood" (Kramer 1963, 43). The striking historical fact is that the resistance to hegemony dates from the same dawn of history too. Uprisings against hegemonic rule were exalted in Mesopotamian epics. One of

the oldest literary legacies of mankind, *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, recorded for us the attitude to hegemony from the very beginning of history:

The Lord Gilgamesh... put the matter, seeks out the word:

"Let us not submit to the house of Kish, let us smite it with weapons!"

The convened assembly of the fighting men of his city answers Gilgamesh:

"Do not submit to the house of Kish, let us smite it with weapons".

At the word of the fighting men of his city his heart rejoiced, his spirit brightened (Kramer 1963, 32).

Afterwards, Gilgamesh won the anti-hegemonic war and imprisoned the hegemonic king of Mesopotamia (*Gilgamesh*, 41-47, 90-98). Hence onward, in the broad sweep of history hegemony as a rule was accompanied by anti-hegemony. Consequently, hegemonies which project its domination over the whole of the contemporary system and persist for several generations were rare occasions in history.

One of such rare instances was the hegemony of the Chinese state Ch'in established in 364 BC. Then it emerged victorious from the contemporary war and its Duce Xian was named *hegemon* (*pa* or *ba*) by the King of Chou, whose status parallel to that of the Roman Pope in the medieval Europe (Ssu-ma Ch'ien, 4:160). Simultaneously with the rise of hegemony in China, began the era of the anti-hegemonic resistance. The following century was characterized by confrontation between the hegemonic *horizontal* and the anti-hegemonic *vertical* or *perpendicular* axes (Ssu-ma Ch'ien, 6:279). Regularly occurred dreadful anti-hegemonic wars (Han Fei Tzu, 1:5-12; Ssu-ma Ch'ien, 4:167; 5:208, 211, 219; 6:224) unsurpassed in their scale until the days of Napoleon, not even by the Roman Civil Wars. The Ch'in armies



repeatedly crushed the anti-hegemonic "wicked" (Han Fei Tzu, 1:5) alliances in at least fifteen (!) major campaigns. Of course, those anti-hegemonic alliances were "wicked" from the hegemonic perspective. The Grand Historian summarized in retrospect:

The [other] Six Kings [of China]... covertly sent agents,

Thus to work [anti-hegemonic] alliance:

These actions deviated from the [right] path.

At home they conspired in artful schemes...

(Ssu-ma Ch'ien, 5:220).

Thus in the Chinese history, as in the whole world history, hegemony was bound with anti-hegemony. In our days, many symptoms show that neither the present hegemony is an exception. Probably, "wicked" anti-hegemonic alliances are going to be repeatedly formed in the closest future. And Eurasia is the only space capable to mount a counter-balancing coalition as argued by the fondest theory of geopolitics – both the Western and the Neoeurasian.

In the post-Cold War era the trend of Eurasia to political unity opposed to the North America is mainly expressed by the phenomena of the strategic partnership between Russia, China and India, growing political cooperation between Russia and other Eurasian countries, the trans-Atlantic split, the theme of multipolarity popular across the whole Eurasia and the rise of Neoeurasianism in Russia. The evident post-Cold War tilt of the "Old Europe", China, Turkey and Iran towards Moscow means that, speaking in geopolitical terms, the *Rimland* and the *Heartland* – the two main components of Eurasia - drew closer. As the Eurasian gross-master, Brzezinski notes,

numerous recent developments across Eurasia represent "warning signs on the horizon" that the "underlying geopolitical structure of global power might begin to crumble" (1997, 197).

Cumulatively, Eurasia is capable not only to counter-balance the North America but even to out-balance it. Naturally, Eurasia looms large in the minds of Pentagon's geopoliticians who develop strategic positions mainly in and around Eurasia. Towards 1776, it used to be argued that "an island is not supposed to rule a continent". Today, the greatest worry of Washington is that it might similarly be argued by some Eurasian peoples that a continent is not supposed to rule a mega-continent.

The complicating fact is that we are in the Nuclear Age. The first nuclear confrontation between North America and Eurasia - the Cold War - presents significant implications. That confrontation reached its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, which became known as the nuclear *brink*. The most implying element of that Crisis is, perhaps, the fact that it was settled by *unilateral* retreat by one side – the Soviet. One side feared nuclear war more than the other. That is, both sides in October 1962 knew that this confrontation is not a matter of *mutually assured destruction* but of *individually* assured one. It was the factor of *individually assured* destruction which is responsible for the imbalance of terror and the unilateral compromise by one side that peacefully settled the crisis. This was the pattern throughout the Cold War. The most warning point is that the history of the Nuclear Age does not yet know state of the balance of power and terror.

However, it is reasonable to assume that soon it will know. The challenge to the US' military supremacy is only a matter of time, indeed of short time, for no nation in history managed to preserve its logistic superiority for long. Probably, the

moment is close when a certain Eurasian bloc emerges to establish a real balance. That moment, and only that moment, would be the *first* in history test to the theory of the mutually assured destruction as a war-precluding guarantee. God help mankind to delay that day.

## Bibliography

*FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers)*, 1940, vol 3.

Berdyaev, Nicolay, *Novoe Srednevekovje (New Middle Ages)*, Moscow, 1924.

Berman, Ilan, "Putin's Problem: The War on Terrorism Gets in the Way of the Eurasian Dream", *National Review Online*, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/2002>.

Berman, Ilan, "Slouching toward Eurasia?" *Perspective*, <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/12/1> (2002).

Bernstein, Richard, "Trans-Atlantic Dispute over Arming China", *Herald Tribune*, 4/5, (2004), 6.

Blouet, B., *Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century*, London, 2001.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Perseus Books, New York, 1997.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia*, The CSIS Books, Washington, 2000.

Danilevsky, Nicolay I., *Rossia i Evropa (Russia and Europe)*, [1871], Kniga, Moscow, 1991.

Dugin, Alexander G., *Osnovy Geopolitiki (Foundations of Geopolitics)*, Arctogaia, Moscow, 1997.

*Evracijstvo: Deklarazii, Formulirovki, Tezy (Eurasianism: Declarations, Formulations, Theses)*, *Eurasia Net Partner Post*, <http://www.eurasianet.org>, 2001.

Dugin, Alexander G., *Manifest: Evrazija Prevyshe Vsego (Manifest: Eurasia over All)*, (2002), <http://newright.il.if.ua/evrazia.html>

Dugin, Alexander G., *Proekt Evrazia (Project Eurasia)*, Jauza, Moscow, 2004.

Dugin, Alexander G., *Konspiologia (Conspirology)*, Arctogaia, Moscow, 2005.

Fedorovsky, Nicolay, *V Poiskah Svoego Puti: Rossia meghdu Evropoj I Aziej (In Search of Its Own Path: Russia between Europe and Asia)*, Agraf, Moscow, 1997.

Fifield, Russell H. & Percy, Etzel G., *Geopolitics in Principle and Practice*, Ginn and Company, Boston & New York, 1944.

- Florovsky, Nicolay, "Evrazijsky Soblazn" ("Eurasian Temptation"), *Mir Rossii Evrazia (Eurasia: The World of Russia)*, eds. Novikov, L. M. & Sizemsky I. N., Vysshaja Shkola, Moscow, 1995.
- Gilgamesh, *The Epic of Gilgamesh. The Babylonian Epic Poem and Other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian*, tr. George, Andrew, Penguin Books, London, 1999.
- Gray, Colin S., *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimland and the Technological Revolution*, Crane, Russak & Company, New York, 1977.
- Gray, Colin S., *The Geopolitics of Superpower*, Harper, Kentucky, 1988.
- Hahn, Cordon M., "The Rebirth of Eurasianism", *CDI Russia Weekly*, <http://www.cdi.org/russia>, 14, (2002), 12-18.
- Han Fei Tzu, *Complete Works*, tr. Liao, W. K., Columbia University Press, London, 1959.
- Haushofer Karl, *Pan-Ideas in Geopolitics* [1931], tr. Usachev I. G., Mysl', Moscow, 2004.
- Haushofer Karl, *The Continental Bloc: Mittel Europa – Eurasia – Japan*, [1941], tr. Usachev I. G., Mysl', Moscow, 2004.
- Heffernan, Michael, *The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics*, Arnold, London & New York, 1998.
- Hooson, David, "The Heartland – Then and Now", *Global Geostategy: Mackinder and the Defense of the West*, ed. Blouet, Brian W., Frank Cass, London & New York, 2005.
- Hooson, David, *A New Soviet Heartland?* D. van Nostrad Company, Toronto, New York, London, 1964.
- Irving, David, *Hitler's War*, Hodder and Stoughton, London & Toronto, 1977.
- Jingjijie, Li, "Pillars of the Sino-Russian Partnership", *Orbis*, 44/4, (2000), 527-539.
- Klyuchnikov, Sergey, *Russky Uzel Evrazijstva (The Russian Knot of Eurasianism)*, Belovodje, Moscow, 1997.
- Kramer, Samuel Noah, *History Begins at Sumer*, tr. Mendelson, F. A., Moscow, 1963.
- Lux, Leonid, "Notes on the Revolutionary-Traditional' Cultural Model of the 'Eurasians'", *Voprosy Filosofii*, 7, (2003), 23-34, <http://ec-dejavu.ru/e/Eurasianism.html>

- Mackinder, Halford J., *Democratic Ideals and Reality* [1919], Baltimore, New York, 1962.
- Mackinder, Halford J., *The Geographical Pivot of History*, J. Murray, London, 1904.
- Mackinder, Halford, "The Round World," *Foreign Affairs*, 25/4 (1943). 344-56
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, *The Problem of Asia and the Effects upon International Politics*, Kennikat Press, Washington and London, 1920.
- Murphy, David Thomas, *The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933*, Oxford, London, 1997.
- Novikov, Lilia M. & Sizemsky I. N., *Mir Rossii Evrazia (Eurasia: The World of Russia)*, Vysshaja Shkola, Moscow, 1995.
- Panarin, Sergey, *Evrazijstvo: Ljudi I Mify (Eurasianism: People and Myths)*, Nathalis, Moscow, 2003.
- Parker, Geoffrey, *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century*, Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1985.
- Pierce, Anthony J., Introduction", *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Mackinder, Halford J., Norton, W.W. Company, New York, 1919.
- Ribbentrop, Joachim von, *Between London and Moscow: Memoirs and Last Notes*, [1946], tr. Rudov, G.J., Moscow, 1996.
- Sangtu, Ko, "Russia's Choice of Alliance: Balancing or Bandwagoning?" *Security Research*, (2004), src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp
- Savizky, Peter, "Geografichesky Obzor Rossii-Evrazii" ("The Geographic Sketch of Russia-Eurasia"), *Mir Rossii Evrazia (Eurasia: The World of Russia)*, eds. Novikov, Lilia M. & Sizemsky I. N., Vysshaja Shkola, Moscow, 1995.
- Savizky, Peter, "Osnovy Geopolitiki Rossii" ("Foundations of the Geopolitics of Russia"), *Russky Uzel Evrazijstva (The Russian Knot of Eurasianism)*, ed. Klyuchnikov, Sergey, Belovodje, Moscow, 1997.
- Savizky, Peter, *Kontinent Evrazia (Continent Eurasia)*, Agraf, Moscow, 1997.
- Schmidt, Paul, *Hitler's Interpreter*, ed. Steed, R. H. C., W. Heinmann, London, 1950.
- Sloan, Geoffrey R., *Geopolitics in US Strategic Policy, 1890-1987*, Wheat Sheaf Books, Sussex, 1988.
- Spykman, Nicholas John, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, Baltimore, New York, 1942.
- Spykman, Nicholas, *The Geography of the Peace*, Archon Books, New York, 1944.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien, *Records of the Grand Historian*, tr. Watson, Burton, Columbia University Press, Hong Kong, 1962.

Steel, Ronald, *Pax Americana*, The Viking Press, New York, 1967.

Suvchinsky, Peter P., "Sila Slabyh" ("The Power of Weak Ones"), *Mir Rossii Evrazia (Eurasia: The World of Russia) (Eurasia: The World of Russia)*, eds. Novikov, Lilia M. & Sizemsky I. N., Vysshaja Shkola, Moscow, 1995.

Trevor-Roper, "Hitler's War Aims", *Aspects of the Third Reich*, ed. Koch, Hans W., Macmillan, London, 1985.

Trubezkoy, N., *Nasledie Chingiz-Khana (Chingiz Chan's Legacy)*, Moscow, 1999.

Trubezkoy, Nicolay, *Evropa I Chelovechestvo (Europe and Humanity) [1920]*, Rossijsko-Bolgarskoe Knigoizdatelstvo, Sophia, 1972.

Vernadsky, George, *Istorija Evrazii (History of Eurasia)*, ed. Kuzmin, S.L., KMK, Moscow, [1938], 2005.

Zapolskis, Martynas, "Russian Geopolicy: Between Atlantism and Neo-Eurasianism", <http://www.geopolitika>, 22/01, (2007).