

# ***THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & MANAGEMENT***

## **An Analysis of Causes of Corruption and Intervention Measures Being Employed to Curb It in the Zimbabwe Republic Police Traffic Branch: A Case Study of Harare Province: January to June 2015**

**Dr. Charles Makono**

Member, International Association of Chiefs of Police,  
Principal, Southern Africa Police Chiefs Conference Centre of Excellence, Harare, Zimbabwe

### **Abstract:**

*This study analysed the causes of corruption and assessed the effectiveness of corruption prevention strategies employed in the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Traffic Branch using Harare Province as a case study. The purpose of the study was to provide scientifically determined information base, which is vital for future development of organisational policies on combating corruption. The research took form of a survey where data were gathered from samples of 100 traffic police officers, 200 commuter omnibus drivers, and 10 police supervisors. Data were gathered using mail questionnaires and structured interviews. The following were identified as causes of corruption within Harare traffic police: poor conditions of service; excessive exposure to temptation; inadequate training on ethics; peer group secrecy and solidarity; absence of visible deterrence; and ineffective public appeal. An assessment of the effectiveness of current corruption prevention strategies revealed that while most of the strategies in place are good an ineffective management reduced their effectiveness. The study recommended that: an improvement in training of police on ethical behaviour; strict enforcement of ZRP ethical rules of conduct by ZRP supervisors; regular rotation of operational traffic officers and improvement on the ZRP public appeal for public assistance.*

**Keywords:** Police, corruption, solidarity, temptation, traffic

### **1. Introduction**

The need for public officials to be transparent and accountable to the citizenry as they discharge their duties has continued to receive growing interest of the citizenry in recent years (Punch, 1985; Matsheza and Kunaka (2000); Verbeeten, 2008; UNDOC Handbook on Police accountability and integrity, 2011). The police institution is one of the most visible public institutions, and in Zimbabwe it is known as the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). The major motivation for this interest is the fact that lack of transparency and accountability often leads to misuse of public powers, office and authority for private gain and is referred to as corruption (Ackerman, 1999).

While enormous powers are bestowed on the police by the law in various jurisdictions to interfere with freedoms of individuals, which include authority to arrest, detain and at times use force; they must be accountable if the public are to be protected from abuse (Berg, 2005; Sung, 2006; UNDOC Handbook on Police accountability and integrity, 2011).

The damage of corruption to society has long been established in that it deprives society of good, fair and orderly administration of its laws (Matsheza & Kunaka, 2000), however, the abhorrence for it is more acute when it involves a police officer. Judge of Appeal, Justice Gubbay, in the matter of *S. v NGARA* 1987 (1) ZLR 91 (SC), page 10; could not have put it better when he said:

Any form of corruption resorted to by government servants, especially police officers whose duty it is to uphold the law and by their conduct set an example of impeccable honesty and integrity, is rightly viewed by the courts with abhorrence. It is a dangerous and insidious evil in any country and in particular requires to be guarded against in a developing country.

Berg (2005:16) reiterates, "Lack of police accountability is fundamentally damaging to society, the public loses trust in the police and resort to alternative means of protection and justice." Random selection of reports in the Zimbabwean media on ZRP performance, however, revealed disturbing articles, which have implications on police integrity and accountability some of which are quoted below:

- Cop in Court for Extortion- where a police sergeant was arraigned in court in Harare for demanding a \$250 bribe from a driver who was driving with a fake licence. (Daily News, 14 March 2012).
- ZRP Most Corrupt in the Region –where the chief reporter of NewsDay newspaper, Everson Mushava reports that corruption by the ZRP traffic officers was worsening to the extent that culprits were shamelessly demanding bribes in public and had accumulated wealth which their salaries could not justify (NewsDay, 6 November 2012).

- Police Officers in Court on Extortion Charges – where 3 Beitbridge police officers were arrested for corruption after demanding for a ‘fine’ of \$40 from a motorist for an undisclosed offence. They then did not receipt the money in the official receipt book (Chronicle 14 July 2013).
- Zimbabwe Police Force Needs Serious Reformation- where Kimion Tagwireyi, on Sunday Opinion of the Standard newspaper, writes that it is generally agreed that Zimbabwean Police are corrupt, especially on the roads where their corruption is now viewed as the normal thing (The Standard, 1 December 2013)

The revelations by the media make a mockery of the frequent appeals by the ZRP to citizens for them to be law abiding. Police are seen as hypocrites who do something that they are paid by taxpayers to prevent. This study provided scientifically determined information to enable the development of policies encouraging honesty and integrity in the ZRP. The ZRP Traffic Department was selected for the study because police are most visible when enforcing traffic law along streets, roads, and highways.

### *1.1. Statement of the Problem*

This study sought to investigate the causes of corruption and to assess the effectiveness of corruption prevention strategies employed by ZRP Traffic Department using Harare Province as a case study.

### *1.2. Objectives*

The objectives of the study were:

- To analyse causes of corruption in the ZRP Traffic Department in Harare Province.
- To assess the effectiveness of current corruption prevention strategies being employed by the ZRP Harare Traffic department.

### *1.3. Justification of the Study*

The bulk of the literature on police corruption had been done in developed countries (such as United Kingdom and United States of America), where the social and cultural environment was different from that of a developing country like Zimbabwe; yet a clear understanding of its causes was required to be able to confront it. This study provided a scientifically determined information base on causes of corruption within the ZRP traffic department, and assessed the effectiveness of strategies used to combat it to enable the development of organisational policies on combating corruption.

### *1.4. Limitations*

The use of community relations officers in conducting structured interviews entailed accepting their interpretation to the answers to questions on the interview schedule.

### *1.5. Delimitation*

This study was carried out on the Police Traffic Department in Harare Province.

## **2. Review of Related Literature**

### *2.1. Conceptualisation of Corruption*

There have been divergent views as to the meaning and composition of corruption over the years. Barker and Roebuck (1973), Goldstein (1977); Sherman (1978; and Matsheza and Kunaka (2000) are in agreement that corruption is an illegal use of organisational power for personal gain. However, Punch (1985), Kleining (1996) and Newburn (1999) have criticised limiting the purpose of corruption to personal gain and instead expanded it to include group, departmental or organisational advantage. Punch (1985) broadens this definition by defining corruption as occurring:

When an official receives or is promised significant advantage or reward (personal, group or organisational) for doing something that he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, for exercising a legitimate discretion for improper reasons, and for employing illegal means to achieve approved goals.

The definition by Punch (1985) is adopted because its inclusion of the broad unethical elements of police behaviour. At also, to a large extent, addresses the contents of the Zimbabwean Prevention of Corruption Act, chapter 9: 16, section 3 which says a corrupt practice occurs if:

Any agent solicits or accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person a gift or consideration for himself or any other person as an inducement or reward for doing or not doing, or for having done or not done, any act in relation to his principal's affairs or business.

In the above definition under the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 9:16), the agent would be the public official (which includes a police officer). Paragraph 27 of the schedule to the Police Act chapter 11:10 (in the case of the ZRP), supports this broader when it says:

A police officer commits corruption if he/she solicits or accepts any bribe or present, reward or consideration whatsoever in connection with his/her position or duties as a member without the authority of the Commissioner General.

The Zimbabwean Police Act thus makes even receipt of unsolicited gifts given to a police officer given during performance of police work an offence if the officer concerned does not seek the authority of the Commissioner General before such receipt.

## *2.2. Forms of Police Corruption*

In their discussion of behaviour of police officers in the New York Police Department Barker and Roebuck (1973:35) quote the Knapp Commission (1972) which said:

There are three kinds of men in the department... I call them the birds, grass eaters and meat eaters. The birds just fly up high. They don't eat anything either because they are honest or because they don't have any good opportunities. The grass eaters accept a cup of coffee or a free meal or television set wholesale from merchant, but draw a line. The meat eaters are different. They are out looking. They are on pad with gamblers, they deal in junk, or they would compromise a homicide investigation for money.

The debate on what acts or behaviours constitute corruption is not centred on 'birds', but on 'grass eaters' and 'meat eaters'. 'Birds' are the police officers who are not involved in the unethical practices known as corruption.

The grass eaters take advantage of opportunities presented to them during the course of their duties. These police officers (street officers) view the undue advantage gained as 'extra packs' associated with police work; although aware of the illegality of receipt of such 'packs' (Sayed and Bruce, 1998; Quah, 2014) They are opportunistic and pounce only when a situation presents itself. Meat eaters, on the other hand, create the opportunities. The corrupt acts committed by these officers are not a result of pressures or opportunities presented in the nature or course of police work, but involve serious premeditation. Their actions include collection of regular 'protection fees' from commuter omnibus drivers and other criminals, and extortion.

Newburn (1999) identifies the following some of the forms corruption takes:

### 2.2.1. Favouritism

Favouritism is done mainly by looking the other way for family members or friends or work-mates in trouble with the law or using influence to provide illegitimate assistance to family, friends or any other persons to interfere with the due process of the law. Closely linked to instances of favouritism is the issue of gratuities. These are those unauthorised and unearned material benefits given solely because one is a police officer such as free meals, or other material inducement. Kleining (1996) in his arguments against acceptance of gratuities concludes that the acceptance of gratuities, detract from the 'democratic ethos of policing'. Newburn (1999) quotes Feldberg, 1985: 274 saying "gratuities are simply an inducement to a police officer to distribute the benefit of his presence disproportionately to some taxpayers and not others" and this is corruption.

### 2.2.2. Bribery and Related Practice

Acts of bribery are usually the most common examples of what is meant by police corruption. Generally, they involve the payment of money (or some other material goods in return for protection from law enforcement, such as demanding payment for overlooking a traffic violation (Sayed and Bruce, 1998). However, bribery (which includes extortion) can graduate from a once off relationship to what Punch (2009) calls predatory corruption where the relationship between the police officer and the offender/s is more regular (graduation from grass eaters to meat eaters as where taxi drivers pay police to operate outside their legal routes).

### 2.2.3. Kickbacks

These practices relate, in general, to the more 'administrative' or 'bureaucratic' sides of police work (Sayed and Bruce, 1998; Punch 2009). They are usually in the form of giving favourable treatment in respect of the provision of a legitimate service and they take place in interactions with members of the general public or company employees in areas related to police functions and responsibilities. They include actions such as receiving payment from legitimate commuter omnibus operators for clearing a commuter omnibus rank of illegal operators.

### 2.2.4. Diversion of Police Resources

The practices in this group involve the use of police resources and powers and powers for private purposes and usually involve senior police officers. These are instances where the management/supervisory elements of the organisation abandon their accountability responsibilities as they seek to unduly benefit from police resources. One of the findings of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative & the Kenya Human Rights Commission Report, (2006) was that it was established that senior police officers in Kenya not only ordered illegal detentions to protect friends but abused State resources for personal gain; which included hiring them out for a fee.

### 2.2.5. Deceptive Practices

These practices involve tampering with evidence to secure a conviction and in the process enhance one's position in the organisation. The practices range from giving false evidence to planting 'evidence' on suspects. Sayed and Bruce (1998) argue that such conduct should be considered as corruption since it involves the undue taking advantage occupational credibility to mislead the court.

### 2.2.6. Pre-Meditated Criminal Activity

Here police officers actively participate in the commission of crimes they are supposed to prevent. The transition from acts of favouritism, receiving kickbacks or opportunistic stealing to this level is the distinction between 'grass eaters' and 'meat eaters' is clearest. These acts are not committed as a result of pressures or opportunities presented in the nature or course of police work; rather, like extortion, they are examples of criminal activities, which require an officer's planning, initiative and aggressive pursuit of opportunities (Sayed and Bruce, 1998; Punch, 2009).

#### 2.4. Causes of Police Corruption

Literature is reasonably consistent in identifying key causes of corrupt practices within police organisations but what tends to vary is the way in which the causes are compartmentalised. Sherman (1978)'s outline of what he refers to as the 'constant' and 'variable factors' in police corruption is used as a means of organising the discussion where constant factors regularly apply to police organisations while variable factors are largely dependent of the environment created.

##### 2.4.1. Constant Factors

###### 2.4.1.1. Discretion

The dichotomy between the need for the police to enforce all laws and the need for police discretion during law enforcement has not been easy to reconcile. While there is a practical need not to bog down the courts with small unintentional offences, where a warning would suffice; it is undeniable that discretion gives rise to the opportunity for decisions to warn or prosecute to be influenced by considerations of material or other gain rather than professional judgment (Kleining, 1996; Newburn, 1999; Punch 2009). The nature of traffic law enforcement is such that wide discretionary powers exist on whether to 'ticket' the offender or warn depending on the gravity and circumstances and this is a potential source of corruption.

###### 2.4.1.2. Low Managerial Visibility

The nature of police work, especially traffic law enforcement, is such that the operational officers operate in small teams either patrolling streets or at traffic check points; away from supervisors, thus enabling them to resist managerial edicts and policies. The problem is made worse by the discretion given to police officers by the law which makes junior officers make decisions away from their supervisors (Kleinig, 1996; Punch, 2009).

###### 2.4.1.3. Low Public Visibility

Linked to the inherent discretion available to police officers and apparent low managerial visibility is the fact that most people do not hold police officers accountable for their actions. Igbuzar (2008), then Commissioner in the Nigerian Police, referred to such accountability as acquisition of the ability to perform, obligation to provide explanations and justifications and absorbing the consequences of unaccountable actions including taking the necessary corrective action. Failure by the public to report police officers they see receiving bribes to their superior officers for corrective action to be taken is abdication of that moral obligation to make police officers accountable. This gives police officers considerable 'private spaces' to commit acts of misconduct, including corruption.

###### 2.4.1.4. Peer Group Secrecy

One of the major characteristics of police organisations is that primary loyalty is fraternal rather than institutional, thus making reporting unethical activity to superiors to have the same overtones as 'going public' (Kleinig, 1996, Newburn, 1999; Punch, 2009).The Knapp Commission Report (1972: 65) noted:

One relatively strong impetus encouraging grass-eaters to continue to accept relatively petty graft is, ironically, their feeling of loyalty to their fellow officers. Accepting payoff money is one way for an officer to prove that he is one of the boys and that he can be trusted. Group loyalty discourages the good police officers to report their corrupt colleagues to superior officers and eventually converts them to not just acceptance but active participation in corrupt activities.

###### 2.4.1.5. Managerial Secrecy

The code of silence is not simply something, which applies to the 'rank and file'. According to the Mollen Commission (1994: 1) quoted in Newburn (1999) corruption flourished in New York not only because of silence of honest officers too afraid to talk but also because of wilfully blind supervisors who feared the consequences of a corruption itself. Increased number of police officers being convicted of corruption may cause a supervisor of such officers to be censored and therefore such supervisor may deliberately overlook some cases of misconduct to avoid such censor.

###### 2.4.1.6. Status Problems – Level Of Remuneration

Police Officers wield a lot of power which they can use against citizens regardless of social status. Unfortunately, the high status given to police officers is not in line with the remuneration they get from the State. As the officers struggle to live up to the status given to them, some are tempted to achieve that status using illegal means. Tully (1998) quotes the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, Sir Paul Condon, as having said that if you're not paying your police officers a wage they live on, you are almost inviting them to indulge in malpractice. It was one of the findings of Quah (2014) that the Singapore Police had succeeded in minimising police corruption by improving salaries and working conditions. Though Singapore is a developed country human needs appear to be universal such that it may have the same effect on the ZRP.

###### 2.4.1.7. Association with Lawbreakers/Contact with Temptation

Criminals cannot carry out their business- at least with the freedom they would- without ensuring a minimum of interference from the police. They have a lot to gain and very little to lose from bribing police officers: in fact, the bribery gives them access to substantial sums of money and other benefits (Kleinig, 1996).For example, a commuter omnibus operator has little to lose when he/she gives a

police officer \$5 to enable him/her to operate on an illegal route that brings in \$100. Police officers, who are usually underpaid and overworked, and the situation is made worse when they receive daily offers of bribes.

#### 2.4.2. Variable Factors

##### 2.4.2.1. Community Structure

Mararike (1998) argues that the human factor can only be developed within the context of a people's culture, guided by principles such as honesty, truth, commitment, loyalty, integrity and respect. The materialistic values of the western world which emphasise individualism have seriously eroded the African culture which focus on group needs; thus paving way for unhealthy, competitive life styles. Police officers recognise that they are expected to adhere to standards that they know others in positions of power and responsibility do not necessarily observe (Kleinig, 1996 and Goldstein, 1975). Rubinstein (1973:400) neatly summarises it when he says:

Policemen see themselves as operating in a world where 'notes' are constantly floating about, and only the stupid, the naïve, and the faint-hearted are unwilling to allow some of them to stick to their fingers. Corruption then becomes a game in which every person is out to get his share.

##### 2.4.2.2. Organisational Characteristics

Sherman (1998) argues that police organisations, which do not have appropriate mechanisms to deal with corruption, are affected by it more than those who do. A management that is prepared to sweep cases under the carpet to protect its image encourages misconduct by its police officers. Commenting on the Kenya Police Force's system of internal accountability, the Kenyan Standing Committee on Human Rights remarked in 2002:

Despite public statements from Commissioner of Police on efforts to reform the Police Department and deal firmly and effectively with police officers who have committed abuses, the disciplinary sanction imposed on officers found guilty of brutality are frequently inadequate. Officers are rarely prosecuted for using excessive force. Investigations of numerous cases alleging torture revealed that the 'code of silence' in which officers fail to report brutality, destroy evidence or threaten witnesses in an effort to cover up abuses, commands widespread loyalty, contributing to a climate of impunity (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative & the Kenya Human Rights Commission Report, 2006:44).

##### 2.4.2.3. Legal Opportunities for Corruption

There are certain laws that are difficult to enforce. Restrictive laws, which seek to prohibit activities for which there is a substantial demand, which are very profitable, encourage the involvement of organised crime and corruption (Newburn, 1999). Most of these restrictive laws are also 'victimless' offences, which reduces the moral obligation to enforce them. Some of our traffic regulations fall into this category, for example prosecution of an offender for having no spare wheel. No one is really offended by non-enforcement and this gives the officers an incentive to engage in corrupt activities.

#### 2.5. Control of Corruption

The major goal of conceptualising and studying causes of corruption is to be able to eliminate it or at least to control its occurrence. The discussion on both internal and external control strategies, which can be used to fight corruption, is required. The internal controls centre on human resources management policies while external controls centre on collaboration with others in the operation environment.

##### 2.5.1. Internal Controls

###### 2.5.1.1. Sound Human Resources Policies

The importance of correct human behaviour to enable an organisation to meet its goals has already been alluded to in the introductory chapter. Human resource policies of an organisation should dovetail into the business plans of the organisation to ensure that it meets its goals (Armstrong, 1997). Torrington and Hall (1995) describe a human resource strategy as one involving the integration of decisions on employment, development and relationships with the goals of the organisation. Policies on recruitment and selection, supervision of personnel and advancement can play a key role in the control of corruption within any organisation, including a police organisation.

###### 2.5.1.2. Initial Selection and Training

In the selection process one has to remember that "leopards never change their spots and past behaviour is the best predictor of the future behaviour" (Tully, 1998:58). New recruits have to be vetted for past misdemeanours, especially those involving dishonesty before they are allowed to join the police service. During the initial training and subsequent training, it should be left to no doubt what conduct is acceptable or not acceptable within the organisation. Training should focus heavily on the importance of ethical conduct, honesty, and image of the organisation (Kleinig, 1996; Goldstein, 1975). The training should also impart skills that ensure efficient and effective discharge of duties. Lack of skills result in lack of pride in one's work and that can lead to corruption (Mukuka, 1988).

### 2.5.1.3. Supervision of Personnel

Lack of visibility of management has already been alluded to as a factor that encourages corruption. It was also stated that the nature of police work is such that operatives have to make instant decisions without recourse to seniors. Butler (1986) argues that given this situation police management system must seek to balance the need for an appropriate degree of control to maintain accountability with the greatest possible freedom of action and discretion for officers to plan and control their work. Good leadership is key to successful management of personnel which helps stop corruption. Drucker (1988) sums it well when he says while a manager can delegate everything that can be done by others he/she cannot delegate living in the organisation's culture. Police leadership must be exemplary in their conduct: it must not be a "do what I say, not what I do" situation.

### 2.5.1.4. Creation of Internal Policies That Make Corruption Risky

Janke (1998) argues that it is only when police officers are prepared to investigate themselves that integrity can be assured in police organisations. Policies, which reward resisting corruption temptation of corruption such as giving the police officer who resists corruption a monetary reward or promotion, would encourage ethical behaviour among the police officers. 'Whistle blowing' must not only be encouraged but also rewarded. Kleinig (1996) stresses that without effective protection for whistle blowers any anti-corruption effort is doomed to fail because it denies those seeking to root out corruption the most valuable source of information about its existence. Severe sanctions should be imposed on those convicted of corruption. Police officers should not be assigned to duties for protracted periods that bring them into contact with disreputable practices that concern vice and other corrupting influences (Punch, 2009).

### 2.5.2. External Environment Controls

External environmental controls depend on the co-operation of actors outside the police organisation for their success. They include forging a strong partnership against corruption with the public, mobilising political support and co-operation with the judiciary.

A study by Matsheza and Kunaka (2000) on anti-corruption mechanisms and strategies in Southern Africa established that failure to involve the public in corruption fighting strategies was a major cause of their failure. This is so because efforts of anti-corruption officials are dependent upon ordinary citizens reporting cases of alleged corruption. The study proposes strong public education campaigns to enhance the credibility of anti-corruption efforts through a greater understanding of existing efforts thus, closing the gap in the perception of corruption between the general public and government officials. In its Police Service Charter (1995) the ZRP appeals to the public to report any unethical behaviour by its officers to their superiors.

Successful prosecution of those involved in corruption is a great deterrent. However, Matsheza and Kunaka (2000) point out that the clandestine nature of corruption makes prosecution of the cases difficult because of the burdens of proof required in our laws. Forging a partnership between the police and the judiciary ensures speedy prosecution of cases when events are still fresh.

## **3. Methodology**

This discussion on the methodology used in the study enables one to understand how the data to reach the findings were obtained so as to evaluate the authenticity of the study.

### *3.1. Research Design*

The research took the form of a survey. A survey research is probably the best method available to a social scientist interested in collecting original data for describing a population too large to observe directly (Babbie, 2012). The study made use of samples taken from population groups instead of studying the whole population in each group.

### *3.2. Population and Sampling*

The population for this research comprised of 600 traffic police officers in Harare Province, 10 officers in charge of the 10 traffic stations in Harare, and 5000 drivers of commuter omnibuses in Harare Province. Because of the size of the population, data was gathered from samples in respect of police officers.

A sample is simply a representative of the population or universe from which it is taken (Leedy, 2002; Babbie, 2012). Random sampling was chosen as the sampling technique for selection of operational police officers into the sample. Random selection is based on laws of probability and each element's chances of being selected can be calculated mathematically (Leedy 2002; Creswell, 2009). To remove bias, the selection was done using nominal rolls for the members at the respective stations.

Convenience sampling techniques was used to select a sample of 200 (from a population of 5000 commuter omnibus drivers for the study. This technique involves selecting anybody who meets the characteristics of the respondent during a given time (Creswell, 2009; Sarantakos, 2012). The weakness of this technique is that the sample selected is not representative of the population. However, representativeness is not significant in the present study; what is required is an insight into the views of common road users on police corruption. Interviewers were sent to commuter omnibus ranks where they interviewed commuter omnibus drivers who were available.

The small number of officers in charge traffic stations (supervisors) allowed for the whole population to be studied.

### 3.3. Data Collection Methods

The main methods of gathering data used in this study were questionnaires and structured interviews. Standardised mail questionnaires were used on police officers and commuter omnibus drivers mainly because of the large sample sizes and they had the effect of removing variations in questions that are asked respondents, making it easier for comparisons (Creswell, 2009).

Mail questionnaires were used on chosen traffic police officers in Harare Province because it gave the respondents anonymity thereby encouraging them to truthfully answer questions without any imagined fears of reprisals (Leedy, 2002). The major weakness of a questionnaire, however, is that there is no opportunity to probe beyond the given answer (Nachimias and Nachimias, 1985). The researcher guarded against this weakness by making questions simple and straightforward. The questionnaires were hand delivered to officers in charge of stations of the respondents to reduce postage time. The researcher collected the responses after two days from a collection box in the public enquiry office. This was done to assure the respondents of anonymity.

Structured interviews were used on commuter omnibus drivers/conductors and police supervisors chosen for the study. Police Community Relations Officers in Harare Province carried out structured interviews on selected commuter omnibus drivers and conductors after first being trained by the researcher for two days to ensure uniformity in the approach. The researcher supervised the interviews and also interviewed police supervisors chosen in the study.

The major advantage of a structured interview is the ability of the researcher to probe where responses are not clear (Nachimias and Nachimias, 1985). Members of the public and the commuter omnibus drivers chosen came from different backgrounds which created a greater need for there to be a common understanding of the questions and the responses. The interview was also the only feasible means of getting responses from these two groups of respondents.

Police Community Relations Officers were used to interview the groups because of their perceived neutrality since they are not involved in active policing. The researcher also used structured interviews on police supervisors chosen for the study to allow for more probing on issues involved.

### 3.4. Data Analysis

Data collected were coded and categorised question by question. The data were both qualitative and quantitative. Therefore, both content and statistical analyses were used. Open-ended answers were transformed into meaningful information. Data were then interpreted and discussed.

## 4. Data Presentation and Analysis

The presentation and analysis of data is meant to answer the objectives of the study which were:

- i. To identify causes of corruption in the Harare Traffic Department of the Zimbabwe Republic Police.
- ii. To assess the effectiveness of the corruption prevention strategies currently being employed by the Zimbabwe Republic Police.

### 4.1. Responses from Police Operational Officers

100 questionnaires were sent out to traffic police operational officers in Harare Province. Each of the five traffic police stations in Harare Province got 20 questionnaires. A total of 90 questionnaires were returned completed which represents a response rate of 90%. This is a high response rate for a questionnaire and can be attributed to the high interest people generally have on issues relating to the subject of corruption. A copy of the questionnaire is attached as annexe "A".

4.1.1. Question one asked the respondents the length of period they had served in the Zimbabwe Republic Police. This question was meant to check on whether the respondents had been in the police organisation long enough to know how it operated. The responses are shown on figure one (1) below.




Figure 1: Length of Service

About 96% of the respondents had served in the Zimbabwe Republic Police for more than two years while 44% had served for more than 5 years. This is important because it shows that almost all the respondents were seasoned officers who were not only conversant with their duties as police officers but were also aware of the organizational culture.

4.1.2. Question two (2) asked the respondents to tick circumstances, which in their opinion amounted to corruption from a set of circumstances given. This question sought to find out the respondents’ perception of the term ‘corruption’. This perception may explain some of the behaviours of the officers when carrying out their duties. Table 4 below shows the responses obtained on this question.

(a)	Failure to pay for transport fare to a person who knows you as a police officer	20
(b)	Accepting a gift from a motorist you assisted after a traffic accident	45
(c)	Accepting money or gift after cautioning an offender for breaking the law	87
(d)	Adding false evidence to a case to convict a notorious bad driver	62
(e)	Demanding for a bribe	90
(f)	Use of police resources without express authority	30

Table 1: Circumstances which Amount to Corruption

All the respondents agreed that demanding a bribe from an offender constituted corruption while 97% said accepting a reward after cautioning an offender who would have broken the law was also corruption. This perception is in accordance with what is generally known to be corruption. However, about 31% of the respondents did not view adding false evidence to convict a notorious bad driver as corruption. Kleinig (1996) and Punch(2009), in their expanded definition of corruption, refer to such advantage sought (getting a conviction) as departmental and not personal but all the same amounts to corruption.

Corruption includes accepting a gift for doing something one is under a duty to do. Assisting a motorist after a traffic accident is a police duty and therefore a police officer should not accept a reward for it. The fact that half of the respondents (50%) did not identify it as a corrupt activity means that a significant number of police officers may not be aware of the full extent of what constitutes corruption. This is so despite there being a provision in the Police Act, Chapter 11:10 which makes it an offence to receive such a gift without authority of the Commissioner General of Police. This may be an indicator of a deficiency in the training on ethics given to police officers. Accepting being given regular transport and not paying for it amounts to a gratuity, which Kleinig (1996); Newburn (1999) and Punch (2009) argue creates a ‘slippery slope of corruption’. It is disturbing that 78% of the respondents did not see this ‘slippery slope’.

4.1.3. Question two (2) asked the respondents to rank incidents of corruption within the ZRP. The question was meant to solicit the full extent of the problem. Figure two (2) shows the responses received.




Figure 2: Incidences of Corruption

Most of the respondents said that corruption was a very frequent occurrence in the ZRP with 83% believing it occurs daily while 9% said weekly and only 8% monthly. None rated it as occurring half yearly or annually or none. The admission by all respondents that corruption was occurring was noteworthy. This confirms the public outcry in the media and means that ZRP is facing a serious corruption problem.

4.1.4. Question four (4) asked the respondents to indicate action they would take if they saw a fellow police officer engaging in a corrupt activity. This question was meant to find out the extent police officers are prepared to police themselves. The responses to this question are shown in figure three (3) below.






Figure 3: Action Taken if Fellow Police Officer Seen Engaging in Corruption

Only 20% and 17% of the respondents said that they would either arrest the offender or report the offender to superiors respectively; which actions are correct in fighting corruption. The majority of the respondents, 60%, said that they would privately warn the officer to desist from corruption, which confirms the listing of peer group secrecy as a major cause of police corruption by Newburn (1999) and Punch (2009). Whistle blowing or reporting fellow police officers is a key component of prevention of corruption and this finding confirmed the assertion in the Knapp Commission Report (1972) that one relatively strong impetus for ‘grass eaters’ to continue to accept petty graft is the feeling of group loyalty. Although only 3% went to the extent of saying that they would ignore the commission of corruption, altogether it exposes the ZRP to serious lack integrity issues, especially when considered together with the 60% who would ‘privately warn’.

4.1.5. Question five (5) asked the respondents to name police duties, which were prone to corruption. This was an open question, which allowed the respondents to name any traffic police duty, which they thought was prone to corruption. Figure 4 below show the responses from the respondents.




Figure 4: Police Duties Prone to Corruption

Road blocks and foot patrols were the duties rated as most prone to corruption as compared with other police traffic duties; 96% and 89% of the respondents respectively, mentioned the duties as being prone to corruption. What is interesting to note is that roadblocks are not conducted by a single officer but a group of police officers and yet corruption occurs there; and this confirms the existence of group loyalty and peer group secrecy mentioned in the discussion of question 4.

Motorised patrols and investigations were mentioned as being prone to corruption by 42% and 52% respectively. These are by no means small figures and indicate the existence of the problem in the areas. What is significant is that corruption in the area of investigations requires detailed planning for it to succeed. Borrowing from Roebuck (1973:35) quoted earlier; it requires ‘meat eaters’ to execute the plan. This is also viewed in the context that a few officers are attached to investigations as compared to traffic law enforcement duties.

4.1.6. Question six (6) asked the respondents to rank four common types of corruption in terms of their prevalence in the ZRP. Table 5 below shows the rankings of the types of corruption.

Element	Rankings			
	1	2	3	4
(a) Police accepting/demanding for a bribe	60	28	2	0
(b) Police falsifying evidence during investigations	30	50	8	2
(c) Abuse of Police resources for personal gain	0	7	50	33
(d) Police directly participating in commission of crimes	0	5	30	55
<b>Total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>90</b>

Table 2: Rankings of Prevalence of Types of Corruption

The most prevalent form of corruption in the ZRP, according to the respondents, is accepting or demanding for a bribe for a traffic law violation: 67% of the respondents rated it number one, 31% number two and only 2% number three. This validated the response to question 5, which rated police roadblocks and foot patrols as duties most prone to corruption because it is the common type of corruption for these duties.

Falsifying evidence in investigations was rated second by 56% of the respondents. It must also be noted that 33% had in fact rated it first. This also supports the fact that 52% of the respondents identified investigations as a police duty prone to corruption in answer to question 5. This casted doubt on the effectiveness of supervision of dockets within ZRP Traffic in Harare since it allowed falsification of evidence. The planning and effort required to falsify evidence make such perpetrators ‘meat eaters’.

Abuse of police resources was rated third most common form of corruption. Newburn (1999) refers to such abuse as organizational hypocrisy where leaders expect from subordinates behaviour, which they do not exhibit: i.e. subordinates caring for the limited resources while superiors feast on the resources on non-police activities.

Police directly participating in the commission of crimes was rated third by 33% of the respondents while 61% rated it fourth most prevalent. While this may indicate that this form of corruption is not prevalent in the ZRP, this must be understood in the context that the respondents were police officers who, naturally, would not want to paint the worst picture for themselves.

4.1.7. Question seven (7) asked the respondents to rank causes of corruption’ which Newburn (1999) considers as major, as they apply to officers in the ZRP in order to identify areas of focus in fighting corruption. Figure five (5) shows the rankings of the causes of corruption. Please note that each cause was rated (starting from left to right) as either very certain, most likely, likely, doubtfully likely, or for not likely to occur in the ZRP.




Figure 5: Causes of Corruption

The likelihood of each cause being applicable to the ZRP was considered in ranking the general causes; i.e. either being most certain, most likely or likely as a cause of corruption in ZRP. A total of 87 respondents (97%) ranked exposure as a cause of corruption in the ZRP, giving it the highest ranking. In fact 52% were very certain, 26% considered it a most likely cause, while 19% considered it as a likely cause of corruption in the ZRP. Temptation to engage in corruption is a daily occurrence for a police officer enforcing traffic law as bribe offers are frequently made by offending motorists.

Existence of police discretion and poor salaries received 84 (93%) ‘votes’ each as either being most certain, most likely or likely as cause of corruption in ZRP. Discretion is often used as a ‘cloth’ covering material considerations (or other gain) rather than professional judgement (Punch 2009). Discretion applied in an environment of poor salaries encourages the police officers to subsidise their salaries with proceeds from corrupt activities. Indeed poor salaries were listed by 51 (61%) respondents as the most certain thing that causes corruption. This confirms the finding by Quah (2014) that improvement of salaries and conditions of service reduces corruption in the police.

Poor supervision received 76 (84%) ‘votes’ as either being most certain, most likely or likely as cause of corruption in ZRP. This is a high figure when one considers the fact the respondents are operational officers who are likely to benefit from poor supervision.

Incompetent supervisors encourage corruption in that police officers see some of their colleagues engaging in corruption and getting away with it. Recruiting, on the other hand, 51 (61%) rated it as either doubtfully unlikely or unlikely to cause corruption. This confirms the belief that it is the organisation culture and systems that corrupts the otherwise upright officers (Cloete and Steven, 1991; Kleinig, 1996).

4.1.8. Question eight (8) asked the respondents to rank, in terms of effectiveness, the administrative measures in place to prevent corruption in the Zimbabwe Republic Police. This question enabled the operatives who are mostly affected by the administrative measures to evaluate them in terms of effectiveness. Figure six (6) shows the responses from the respondents. Please note that the bars show rankings of the remedies effectiveness (starting from left to right): first for excellent, second very effective, third effective, fourth below average effectiveness and fifth for doubtfully effective; and sixth for not effective.




Figure 6: Ranking of Corruption Control Measures

The existence of an anti-corruption unit was rated highest as a corruption prevention measure by 64 (71%) respondents when considering the cumulative ratings it got as either excellent, very effective or effective. An anti-corruption unit counters existence of fraternal rather than institutional loyalty (Punch, 2009) which makes self-policing difficult and also compliments for a weak supervisory element which may try to cover up for their juniors.

Disciplinary Procedures and Training were rated excellent, very effective or effective by 51(57%) and 52 (58%) respondents respectively. The high rating of disciplinary procedures as a corruption prevention strategy confirms then finding of Huberts, Kaptein and Lasthuizen (2007) that strictness by supervisors was particularly effective in controlling unethical behaviour such as fraud and corruption within the Dutch Police. Training and Disciplinary Procedures complement each other: after an officer has been given adequate training then non-compliance is enforced through disciplinary procedures. This recognition by operational police officers encourages the ZRP to invest more in the training of its officers on ethics.

Supervisory Structures were rated excellent, very effective or effective by 49(54%) of the respondents, with 27 (30%) rating them as an excellent way of preventing corruption. This should be analysed within the context that 76 (84%) had rated poor supervision as a cause of corruption within the ZRP. This makes the strengthening of supervisory structures important in their corruption prevention strategies. It was one of the findings of the Huberts, Kaptein and Lasthuizen (2007) that role modelling by supervisors encouraged ethical behaviour of juniors.

Public education was rated excellent, very effective or effective by 45(50%) of the respondents, with 31 (34%) rating it as an excellent and very effective way of preventing corruption. While this confirms the Matsheza and Kunaka (2000) research on the importance of public education in fighting corruption, it also casts doubt on whether officers in the ZRP considers it important since 45 (50%) rated it as below average, doubtful or ineffective in preventing corruption.

The majority of the respondents 59(66%) rated recruiting as an insignificant remedy to fighting corruption. This may indicate a realisation by the respondents that other factors influence the behaviour of the individual officer once recruited.

4.1.9. Question Nine (9) asked the respondents to comment on the determination of their managers in fighting corruption. A total of forty (40) said that their management was determined to weed out corruption while the remaining fifty (50) said they were not. The major fact pointed out by the 44% who said management was determined to fight corruption was that supervisors spoke against it at

parades almost daily. However, as Newburn (1999) points out a hypocritical leadership cannot expect subordinates to be upright; more than just talk is required. The 56% who said management was not determined to fight corruption sight the following as indicators:

- Supervisors are not exemplary in their conduct. Some also engage in corrupt practices.
- Supervisors are seen abusing the few police resources while juniors endure the hardships of shortages.
- Those caught doing corrupt practises are suspended from duty for long periods while continuing to earn their salaries for doing nothing. The cases often die a natural death and the individuals concerned are reinstated and at times even promoted.

Management plays a key role in preventing corruption and prevention strategies would not be effective if it is not seen to be determined to fight the menace. The 56% who had the courage to say their management is not determined to fight corruption is too large a number for comfort.

4.1.10. Question10 asked the respondents to suggest ways of preventing corruption in the Zimbabwe Republic Police. This question enabled comparison of actual ways being used with the suggested ways of fighting corruption. Table seven (7) below shows the responses received.




Figure 7: Corruption Prevention Strategies

Improved salaries/conditions of service were mentioned by 81 (90%) respondents as a strategy of preventing corruption. This confirms the quotation by Tully (1998) of Sir Condon of London Metropolitan Police when he is said to have remarked that if you are not paying your police officers a wage they can live on, you are almost inviting them to indulge in malpractice. It also confirms the finding by Quoh, (2014) that improved salaries and conditions of service reduces corruption. The government, through the Police Service Commission determines conditions of service for police officers and in doing so it should consider the fact that police officer have a high exposure risk to corruption.

Exemplary punishment was mentioned by 49% of the respondents as a deterrent of corruption. Writers on police corruption, who include Sherman (1978), Kleinig (1996), Punch (2009) view successful prosecution as a great deterrent. However, the clandestine nature of corruption makes successful prosecution difficult (as observed by Matsheza and Kunaka, 2000). Prosecution in the Zimbabwe Republic Police is no exception. Transfers or rotation of officers also entails reduction of period of exposure to corruption. 23 (26%) respondents identified it as a deterrent of corruption.

It is note-worthy that 35 (39%) respondents mentioned improved supervision as a deterrent. The response becomes important if viewed in the context that the respondents were operational officers on whom supervision may have negative effects. Their recognition of supervision as a deterrent gives credibility to effective supervision as a major corruption prevention strategy.

Provision of better resources was viewed by 32(36%) respondents as a corruption deterrent. Provision of resources to the police prevents them from being dependant of the public (some of whom are law breakers) for resources to effectively discharge their mandate. Education/Training on ethics was viewed as a prevention strategy by only 17(19%) respondents. While this response appears on face value not to support the response to question 8 the fact that it was mentioned is important since this was an open question.

#### 4.2. Responses from Commuter Omnibus Drivers

Five trained research assistants interviewed a total of 200 commuter omnibus drivers. The commuter omnibus drivers were chosen because of the frequency of their interaction with traffic police officers and therefore likely to give more insight into issues concerning corruption among traffic police officers. The interviews were guided by an interview schedule guide, which is attached as Annexe 'B'.

4.2.1. Question one asked the respondents to state the period they had been in the transport business as driver. This question was meant to find out whether the respondents had been in the business that long to supply answers which could be relied upon. Figure eight (8) below shows the responses from the respondents.




Figure 8: Period in Transport Business

A total of 85 % of the respondents have been in the transport business for not less than one year, with 44% having been there for more than 5 years. This means that the majority of the respondents are well vested with what goes on in the transport business.

4.2.2. Question two (2) asked the respondents to describe their relationship with traffic police officers. This question sought to find out whether the answers that were provided by the respondents would have biases caused by nature of relationship. Figure nine (9) below shows the responses received.




Figure 9: Relationship with Police

A total of 41% of the respondents rated the relationship as fair while 19% rated it poor, bring to 60% the combined rating of fair and poor. The remainder rated it as either excellent (4%) or good (36%). This is to be expected considering that traffic police officers issue tickets to traffic law violators who include commuter omnibus drivers. This compliance with the expected norm may be a reflection of truthful answers to other questions.

4.2.3. Question three (3) asked the respondents to indicate action they would take if a police officer asked for a bribe from them to avoid being ticketed for a traffic law violation. This question was meant to establish the extent of the willingness of the respondents to participate in corruption. Figure 10 below shows the responses.




Figure 10: Reaction if Police Officer Asks for Bribe

A total of 69% of the respondents said they would pay the bribe while 13% said they would negotiate for a reduced fine, which appears to be a diplomatic way of accepting to make an offer for a bribe. A person prepared to pay a bribe is most likely also to make an offer to pay a bribe. Newburn (1999) quoting from Sherman recognises exposure to temptation as a key factor in corruption causation. Only 11% said they would refuse to pay the bribe and ask to be ticketed while another 9% said they would report the officer to his/her superiors. Failure by the commuter omnibus drivers to report police officers they see receiving bribes to their superior officers creates considerable ‘private spaces’ for the police officers to commit acts of misconduct, including corruption.

4.2.4. Question four (4) asked the respondents to indicate the frequency they pay police bribes. This question sought to find out the extent of corruption as a problem in the organisation. Figure 11 below shows the responses.




Figure 11: Frequency Bribes Paid Chart Title

A total of 140 (70%) respondents paid bribes either daily or weekly, with 89 (45%) paying daily. This confirms the majority answer to question 3 of the questionnaire of operational officers where 92% said that it occurred either daily or weekly. 37 (19%) said they paid monthly, which is still frequent. The 10% who either paid quarterly or annually may be an indicator of the existence of a much more organised form of corruption where periodic payments are made. Only 6 (3%) said they never paid bribes. This casts doubt on the 19% who said they would either refuse to pay a bribe and ask to be ticketed or refuse to pay a bribe and report to superiors in answer to question 3 earlier. It may mean some of the respondents were not honest and may actually pay a bribe, contrary to the opposite impression.

4.2.5. Question five (5) asked the respondents to tick duties they felt were most prone to corruption from a given list. The question sought to link nature of duties with causes of corruption in the ZRP. Figure 12 below shows the responses received.




Figure 12: Duties Prone to Corruption

Roadblocks duties were listed by 185 (83%) respondents as being prone to corruption followed by foot patrols 128(64%), motorised patrols 55 (28%) and investigations 45 (23%). This confirms the answer by traffic police officers to question five of Annexure “A”. Exposure to temptation combined with group loyalty appears to be a major cause of corruption in the ZRP. Though it appeared a few police traffic officers took bribes during investigations, the figure represents a few cases which are not dealt with by way of payment of cases at police stations but have to be referred to the criminal courts.

4.2.6. Question Six (6) asked the respondents to rank forms of corruption in terms of prevalence in the ZRP. This question was meant to find out if strategies employed by the ZRP focused on major forms of corruption prevalent in the organisation. Figure 13 shows how the respondents ranked the different forms of corruption. The bars show the rankings starting from left for most prevalent, prevalent, doubtfully prevalent and not prevalent for each type of corruption.




Figure 13: Ranking of Forms of Corruption

Demanding/accepting bribes from traffic law violator was ranked most prevalent by 150(75%) respondents and prevalent by 30. The willingness to pay bribes by respondents shown in answer to question 3 indicates that the strategies to prevent corruption should include public education cited by Matsheza and Kunaka (2000) and pragmatic supervision noted by Butler (1986).

Favouring friends was ranked the second most prevalent form of corruption by 103 (52%) respondents and prevalent by 69 (35%). This form of corruption is closely linked to accepting bribes. Punch (1985) has already pointed out in his definition of corruption that the reward need not be monetary but may be some other advantage. It was the general perception of commuter omnibus drivers that traffic police officers did not enforce the traffic law on their friends and relatives.

Although only 51 (26%) respondents rated falsifying evidence most prevalent, this figure should be viewed together with the 93 (47%) who rated it prevalent. It means that 144 (72%) respondents viewed the occurrence of this type of corruption as prevalent, which makes traffic police officers not just ‘grass eaters’ but ‘meat eaters’(Sayed and Bruce, 1998; Punch, 2009). This raises question marks on the quality of supervision of case files to be taken to court by ZRP supervisors.

Abuse of police resources was ranked most prevalent and prevalent by 101(51%) respondents. The public is concerned when they see police officers on duty using police resources engaging in their own private affairs such as shopping or transporting their family members. The responses to this question appear also to have been linked to the fact that when police officers are doing patrols or roadblocks they would be using police resources and when they accept bribes during such duties they would be using the resources for personal gain.

It was disturbing to note that 56 (28%) believed that participation by police officers in the commission of crime in general was either most prevalent or prevalent. Such perceptions are dangerous to the general maintenance of law and order since people would have lost faith in the police and are likely to resort to self-help. The low percentage may however also indicate that the majority of corrupt traffic police officers are 'grass eaters' who take advantage of tempting environment and strategies should therefore focus on reducing opportunities for corruption.

4.2.7. Question seven (7) asked the respondents to list what the public can do to control corruption in the police. This question was meant to solicit for help that can be given by the public to control corruption. This information enables one to check whether the current strategies are utilising help from the public. Table three (3) below shows the responses received from the respondents.

	Action	Respondents
(a)	Report corrupt officers	85
(b)	Comply with the law	74
(c)	Stop offering bribes	68
(d)	Do nothing and gain from corrupt activities	49

Table 3: What the Public can do to curb corruption

What was most striking on the responses to this question was that 49 (25%) respondents said that nothing could be done since they benefit from police corruption. They indicated that paying traffic police officers to keep defective vehicle on the road was cheaper than the bribes they are expected to pay at the vehicle inspection department once the vehicle had been impounded. This indicates that a multi-sectorial approach required in designing strategies to fight corruption. The remaining 151 (75%) said they would do one or more of the following positive activities: (a) report corrupt officer; (b) comply with the law; and (c) stop offering bribes. This response showed that public education could play a significant role in corruption reduction.

#### 4.3. Responses from Police Supervisors

The researcher interviewed ten (10) police supervisors who are officers in charge traffic stations in Harare Province, guided by questions on the Interview Guide attached as annexe 'C'. Open questions were used to allow the managers to expand on their responses.

4.3.1. Question one (1) asked the respondents the number of reports they received on corruption in a month. This question meant to find out the willingness of the public to report corrupt police officials. The respondents indicated that they received an average of three (3) cases per month. The reports received by officers in charge of police stations were mainly from the general members of the public while very few reports were from drivers of commuter omnibuses. It can be said members of the public were reluctant to report cases of corruption involving police officers to their supervisors since the number of report contradicts the 83% of the operational police officers who said that corruption was a daily occurrence and the 70% of commuter omnibus drivers who said they paid bribes daily.

4.3.2. Question two (2) asked the respondents to explain the procedures adopted on receipt of a report of police corruption. Knowledge of the procedure to be followed was important in the evaluation of strategies in place to deal with corruption. The respondents indicated that the following steps are followed:

- A police officer senior in rank to the officer complained of was appointed to investigate the matter.
- The investigating officer investigated and submitted findings to the officer in charge of the station indicating whether a criminal, disciplinary or no case was disclosed.
- The officer in charge would then adopt the following procedure:
  - a) If no evidence of wrongdoing was disclosed, the complainant was advised.
  - b) If a criminal case or breach of the police disciplinary code was disclosed the following is done:
    - i. A criminal docket was compiled and forwarded to the prosecuting authority for prosecution (just like any other criminal case); and/or
    - ii. A police disciplinary hearing was conducted for breach of the disciplinary code.
- If the accused officer was tried and convicted by either the criminal court or the police disciplinary court or both then the Commissioner General of Police could appoint a suitability board in terms of section 50 of the Police Act, Chapter 11:10 to determine the suitability of the member either to remain in the organisation or retain his/her seniority. The disciplinary trial and suitability board did not have to await the conclusion of a trial where the misdemeanour was a crime.

The procedure appeared to be straightforward and easy to follow.

4.3.3. Question three (3) asked the respondents to indicate problems if any associated with the procedure of dealing with complaints against police officers. The respondents mentioned challenges at the investigations and prosecution stages. At the investigation stage, the following were the challenges:

- i. Refusal of fellow police officers to give evidence against colleague.
- ii. Difficulty in obtaining 'eye witnesses' testimonies due to the secretiveness of corruption.

At the prosecution stage, the following were mentioned as challenges:



- i. Collusion between the offender and prosecutor due to past work related connections. This had caused delays of up to two (2) years thereby weakening the State case and often resulting in acquittals.
- ii. Inexperienced prosecutors caused the State to lose cases, which could otherwise have resulted in convictions.
- iii. The above challenges seriously erode the capacity of the ZRP to fight corruption if serious efforts are not made to address them.

4.3.4. Question four (4) asked the respondents to state reasons advanced by those caught engaged in corruption for their involvement in the illegal acts. The question sought to solicit some of the causes of corruption. The respondents indicated that in the majority of the cases police officers would deny engaging in corruption (even those caught red-handed). The few who admitted their cases gave the following reasons:

- Facing serious financial problems due to the burden of extended family.
- Being heavily in debt and failing to service the loans from private moneylenders whose interests are very high.
- Being tempted because the officer had seen some doing it and getting away with it.
- Being troubled by ancestral/evil spirits.

The responses confirm the findings Quah (2014) in his research on Singapore Police that improved salaries minimised corruption. The low salaries lead to debts, which eventually lead to corruption to pay off the debts. However, there is no standard which can be said to be that of a police officer and as a result greed makes individual officers aspire for something beyond their reach. If the officers see others daily, engage in corruption and getting away with it then corruption becomes a game where the clever ones win (Rubinstein, 1973). It is difficult to comment on the issue of some officers being troubled by ancestral/evil spirits because it belongs to the spiritual world where proof is difficult to find. However, it may not be farfetched to say it is an excuse for those motivated by greed who fail to find any other rational excuse.

4.3.5. Question five (5) asked the respondents for their opinion on what they thought were major causes of corruption in the ZRP Traffic department. They listed the following as major causes of corruption:

- Officers living beyond their means resulting in financial stress. This has resulted in some heavily borrowing from private moneylenders.
- Poor conditions of service for junior officers most of who now live in rented accommodation instead police camps, which are now overcrowded.
- The motorists, especially commuter omnibus drivers, made frequent offers of bribes to police officers thereby tempting the police officers to accept.
- Some officers have overstayed in traffic stations to the extent that they have built relationships with commuter omnibus drivers.
- Cases of corruption are taking too long to be finalised and most of them are ending in acquittals due to lack of evidence.

The major causes given confirm the responses of police operational officers and commuter omnibus drivers, and correspond with the causes found in researches in other police organisations (Sherman, 1978; Newburn, 1999; Punch, 2009).

4.3.6. Question six (6) asked the respondents to rank, in terms of effectiveness, the administrative measures in place to prevent corruption in the ZRP. This question enabled the supervisors to evaluate the measures in terms of effectiveness. Figure 14 shows the responses from the respondents. Please note that the bars show rankings of the remedies effectiveness (starting from left to right): first for very effective, second effective, third for doubtfully effective; and fourth for not effective.




Figure 14: Ranking of Corruption Control Measures by supervisors

An anti-corruption unit existed at provincial level to carry out periodic patrols at the different traffic stations within Harare province. The unit was based at Harare police provincial headquarters and was controlled by the provincial command, which increases its effectiveness because the local officer in charge does not control it. The existence of an anti-corruption unit was rated very highly as a corruption prevention measure by nine (90%) respondents as being very effective and one as effective. None rated it as either doubtfully or not effective. An anti-corruption unit counters existence of fraternal rather than institutional loyalty (Punch, 2009) which made self-policing difficult and complimented for a weak supervisory element, which might try to cover up for their juniors.

Disciplinary Procedures and Supervisory structures were each rated very effective or effective by nine (90%) of the respondents. The high confirmed the two findings of Huberts, Kaptein and Lasthuizen (2007) that: strictness by supervisors was particularly effective in controlling unethical behaviour such as fraud and corruption within the Dutch Police, and role modelling by supervisors encouraged ethical behaviour of juniors. This recognition by police supervisors of their role in combating corruption was a key factor to the war against corruption and made the strengthening of supervisory structures important in corruption prevention strategies.

Training and public education were rated as either very effective or effective by six respondents each. Training of the police officers on ethics clears some misconceptions on what constitutes corruption as was shown in the responses of the operational officers in answer to question two of their questionnaire. Matsheza and Kunaka (2000) research confirmed the importance of public education in fighting corruption. Half of the respondents (five) rated recruiting as an insignificant remedy to fighting corruption. This may indicate a realisation by the respondents that other factors influence the behaviour of the individual officer once recruited.

4.3.7. Question seven (7) asked the respondents to comment on the problems that they experienced in their efforts to curb corruption. The following were the responses:

- Material resource constraints, such as shortage of transport, caused erratic supervision of personnel. Deployment of police officers on enforcement duties dispersed the officers over a large area, it difficult for supervisors to check personnel without use of motorised transport. Supervision is a key element in curbing corruption (as established by Newburn, 1999).
- The input of supervisors on transfers of officers was often ignored by senior management resulting in officers of questionable character having an extended stay at traffic stations.
- Disposal of cases of corruption involving police officers was taking too long to finalise due to unwarranted postponements caused by corruption at the criminal courts. This tended to reduce the fear of criminal sanctions on those caught engaged in corruption.
- There were no incentives for honest officers who refused to accept bribes.

## 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

### 5.1. Conclusions

After an analysis of the responses of police operational officers, police supervisors and commuter omnibus drivers the following conclusions were drawn:

#### 5.1.1. Causes of corruption

(a) Poor conditions of service were a major cause of corruption in the ZRP Harare Traffic branch. The perceived poor salaries in a struggling economy have made it difficult to police officers to resist the daily temptation to engage in corrupt practices to make ends meet.

(b) Excessive exposure to temptation was a cause of corruption within the traffic department of the ZRP traffic officers in Harare. Police officers interacted daily commuter omnibus drivers who dangled rewards in front of them to avoid arrests for the various traffic offences.

(c) Inefficient handling of corruption cases resulted in perceived invincibility of corrupt police officers and encouraged the 'honest officers' to be hooked in the practise. The poor supervision coupled with prosecution delays removed important deterrents to corruption: i.e. the fear of being caught and fear of being punished. Police supervisors admitted that they had difficulty in visiting personnel in the field to check their performance due to lack of resources.

(d) Peer group secrecy and solidarity was a cause of corruption in the ZRP. It was noted that most of the corruption was taking place during enforcement patrol and at roadblocks which duties were done by more than a single officer at a time. The nature of police work was such that members often got common vilification from the public and this tended to bind them against outsiders. The majority of the operational officers said they would rather warn a colleague they observe engaged in corruption than reporting him/her.

(e) Inadequate training on ethics was a cause of corruption within Harare Traffic police department officers as shown by the inadequate knowledge of most of the officers on what constitutes corruption.

(f) Public complacency as shown by its ineffective engagement in the fight against corruption was a cause of corruption in the Harare Traffic police. There was a huge discrepancy between reported cases, and perceptions of occurrence of corruption by operational officers and commuter omnibus drivers. While an average of 2 cases of corruption per month were reported at police stations, 83% of operational officers and 70% commuter omnibus drivers said it was a daily occurrence. A study by Matsheza and Kunaka (2000) proposed strong public education campaigns to enhance the credibility of anti-corruption efforts through a greater understanding of existing efforts thus, closing the gap in the perception of corruption.

### 5.1.2. Evaluation of Current Corruption Prevention Strategies

(a) The major strategies currently being employed by the Zimbabwe Republic Police to fight corruption are:

- Supervision using police rank structure
- Efficiency in investigation of cases
- Transfers
- Use of Provincial Anti-Corruption Teams
- Involvement of the Public; and
- Training on the job.

(b) Analysis of the responses of the respondents on utilisation of current corruption prevention strategies produced the following conclusions.

(i) The weaknesses of the Harare traffic police supervisory element encouraged the operational police officers to engage in corruption without fear of being caught. Acts of corruption were perceived to be rampant at work places, which were supposed to be supervised. Drucker (1998) asserted that a manager could delegate everything except inculcating organisational culture into the subordinates. The comments by the operational officers and commuter omnibus drivers indicated that police supervisors were not inculcating the culture of honesty and integrity in their subordinates. The majority of the operational officers (56%) believed that their management was not committed to fighting corruption.

(ii) Although the procedures adopted on receipt of a report of police corruption are clear, the system itself had been corrupted. Cases referred to court for prosecution were taking too long to finalise (and often resulted in acquittals) thereby causing the public to lose faith in it ultimately resulting in too few people being prepared to report cases of corruption.

(iii) Transfers reduce the period of exposure of an officer to temptations. Both operational police officers and their supervisors admitted that police officers were exposed daily to temptations yet the officers were not being periodically rotated. The police supervisors, while admitting that officers overstayed in their posts admitted that they had little say on transfers. Use of transfers as a means of reducing over exposure to corruption was therefore not being fully utilised to reduce incidents of corruption.

(iii) Provincial anti-corruption teams carry out periodic patrols at the different traffic stations within Harare province. The unit was based at Harare police provincial headquarters and was controlled by the provincial command, which increases its effectiveness because the local officer in charge does not control it. Operational officers (71%) and supervisors (83%) acknowledged its effectiveness.

(iv) Participation of the public, including commuter omnibus drivers, is critical in the fight against corruption yet the majority of commuter omnibus drivers (69%) would rather pay a bribe than accept being prosecuted for a traffic law violation. It must be noted that 50% of operational officers who are affected by negative reports from the public, conceded that public education was an effective way of fighting corruption. While the police are receiving some reports from members of the public on corruption, the disparity with the perceptions on its frequency is too big; thereby making one question the faith the public had in its police officers.

(v) Police training on ethics help to build a culture of integrity as already stated by Kleinig (1996) and to that extent requires emphasis throughout one's career in the organisation. While lectures at parades were commendable, more structured training programmes on ethics could be the missing link to yield better results.

(c) One might conclude that the strategies, which were being used to combat corruption had great potential of reducing corruption, yet they were not being effectively implemented hence the magnitude of the problem.

### 5.2. Recommendations

In light of the discussions and conclusions made, the following recommendations are made.

5.2.1. The ZRP should focus on development and implementation of training programmes, which encourage ethical policing, and develop the supervisory capacities of its first line management.

5.2.2. The anti-corruption unit, which exist at provincial level, should be expanded so that its presence is felt all the time at police stations.

5.2.3. The ZRP should re-examine its public communication strategy to regain lost faith and encourage 'whistle blowing' on its corrupt officers.

5.2.4. The ZRP must continue lobbying the government for better conditions of service for its members to reduce the temptation to 'fill in the gap' with proceeds of corruption.

5.2.5. The study centred on attitudes and orientations of operational officers and commuter omnibus drivers from their answers to questions on questionnaires and interview guides. The responses may have been affected by desire to protect "trade secrets". It is recommended that future studies add observations as a data collection tool.

### 5.3. Concluding Remarks

Corruption within the Zimbabwe Republic Police Traffic stations was a major problem, which required urgent attention for the organisation to regain public trust. In analysing the causes one should not lose sight of the cumulative nature of risk factors. While one factor might not result in corruption, a combination of factors could. Police supervisors are key to the successful implementation of corruption prevention strategies such that their weaknesses would render irrelevant all other supporting efforts to control corruption.

**6. References**

- i. Ackerman (1999). *Corruption and Government, Causes, Consequences and Reform*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
- ii. Armstrong (1997). *Strategies for Human Resource Management: A Total Business Approach*. Kogan Page Ltd, London.
- iii. Babbie (2012). *The Practice of Social Research*, 13<sup>th</sup> Edition.
- iv. Barker and Carter (1986). *Police Deviance*. Anderson Publishing Company, Cincinnati.
- v. Barker and Roebuck (1973). *An Empirical Typology of Corruption: A Study in Organisational Deviance*. Springfield, III. Thomas.
- vi. Berg (2005). *Police Accountability in Southern African Commonwealth countries*. Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town
- vii. Butler (1986). *Police Management*. West Midlands Police Printers, Birmingham.
- viii. Chronicle, 14 July 2013: *Police Officers in Court for Extortion*.
- ix. Cloete and Stevens (1991). *Criminology*. Southern Book publishers (pty) Ltd.
- x. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and the Kenya Human Rights Commission Report (2006). *The People, The Politics: Police Accountability in Kenya*
- xi. Creswell (2009), *Research Design, Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*, third edition, Sage publications Inc.
- xii. Daily News, 14 March 2012: *Cop in Court in Court for Extortion*.
- xiii. Drucker (1988). *The Effective Executive*. Heinemann Professional Publishing Ltd, London.
- xiv. Goldstein (1977). *Policing the Free Society*. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger.
- xv. Janke (1998). *Misconduct to Corruption, Avoiding the Pending Crisis*. U.S. Department of Justice, Idaho.
- xvi. Igbuzar (2008), *Strategies for Effective Oversight and Police Accountability in Nigeria*. <http://www.psc.gov.ng>
- xvii. Kleining (1996). *The Ethics of Policing*. Cambridge Press, Cambridge.
- xviii. Knapp, W. (1972). *The Knapp Report on Police Corruption*. New York, Braziller.
- xix. Leedy (2002). *Practical Research*. Macmillian Publishing Company, New York.
- xx. Mararike (1998). *Zimbabwe's Human Factor Balance Sheet: An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption*. In: Adjibolosoo (ed) *The International Perspective of Human Factor Development*, Westport, C.T. Praeger.
- xxi. Matsheza and Kunaka (2000). *Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Strategies in Southern Africa*. Human Rights Research and Documentation trust of Southern Africa, Harare.
- xxii. Mukufa (October 1988). *Towards an Understanding of police Corruption*. *The Outpost*, p. 14-18.
- xxiii. Nachimias and Nachimias (1985). *Research Methods in Social Sciences*. Edward Arnold (Australia) Pvt. Ltd
- xxiv. Newburn (1999). *Understanding and Preventing Police Corruption*. Research and Development Statistics Directorate, London.
- xxv. NewsDay, 6 November 2013: *ZRP Most Corrupt in the Region*
- xxvi. *Police Act, Chapter 11:10. Statute law of Zimbabwe (1996) Volume 2*. Government Printers, Harare.
- xxvii. *Police Service Charter (1995)*. Zimbabwe Republic Police Printers, Harare.
- xxviii. *Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 9:16 Statute Law of Zimbabwe (1996) Volume 1*, Government Printers, Harare.
- xxix. Punch (1985). *Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control*. Tavistock publications, London.
- xxx. Punch (2009), *Police Corruption, Deviance, Accountability and Reform in Policing*, Cullompton: William Publishing.
- xxxi. Quoh, (2014) "Curbing police corruption in Singapore: Lessons for other Asian countries", *Asian Education and Development Studies*, Vol.3Iss:3,pp186-222
- xxxii. Radelet and Carter (1994): *The Police and the Community*. Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
- xxxiii. Rubinstein (1973). *City Police*. Ballantine, New York.
- xxxiv. Sangweni and Balia (1999). *Fighting Corruption: Strategies for Prevention*. Unisa, Pretoria.
- xxxv. Sarantakos (2012). *Social research*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Macmillan Press Ltd, London.
- xxxvi. Sayed and Bruce (1998). *Inside and Outside the Boundaries of Police Corruption*. [http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No2/Sayed and Bruce. Html](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No2/Sayed%20and%20Bruce.html)
- xxxvii. Sherman (1978). *Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption*. University of California Press, California.
- xxxviii. Sithole, Kunaka and Klein (2001) *Corruption in Southern Africa: A Public Survey*. Human Rights trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT), Harare.
- xxxix. *The Standard*, 1 December 2013: *Zimbabwe Police Force needs Reformation*
  - xl. Torrington and hall (1995). *Personnel Management: HRM in Action*, Prentice Hall, London.
  - xli. Tully E.J. (1998). *Misconduct, Abuse of Power: Misconduct to Corruption Avoiding the Impending Crisis*. Selected view points, Federal Bureau of investigations, Idaho.
  - xl.ii. UNDOC Handbook on Police Accountability and Integrity (2011). *Criminal Justice Handbook Series*, United Nations, New York.
  - xl.iii. Verbeeten (2008), *Performance Management Practices in the public sector organisations*. *Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal* Vol.21 No 3. 2008 pp 427-454, Emerald
  - xl.iii. *Zimbabwe Law Reports 1987 (Part 1)*. S.V. Ngara 1987 (1), ZLR91 (SC), Legal Resources Foundation, Harare.

**ANNEXTURE ‘A’**

**Self Administered Questionnaire for Operational Police Officers on Causes Of Corruption and an Assessment of the Effectiveness of Current Corruption Prevention Strategies in the Zimbabwe Republic Police.**

**BACKGROUND**

I am carrying out a study on causes of corruption and an assessment of current corruption prevention strategies in the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). You are kindly requested to complete this questionnaire honestly and sincerely. The information you provide shall be treated as confidential hence your name or address is **not required**. The study shall provide a scientifically determined information base on causes of corruption within the ZRP for the future development of organizational policies on combating corruption. You are requested to put the completed questionnaire in the collection box at the **‘charge office’**.

**Please answer all questions by either ticking in boxes provided or writing in the space provided (as the case maybe). Use the back of the questionnaire if the space provided is not sufficient.**

1. How long have you been in the ZRP?
 

(a) Under two years	<input type="checkbox"/>
(b) Between two and 5 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
(c) Between five and ten years	<input type="checkbox"/>
(d) Between 10 and 20 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
(e) Over 20 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
  
2. Please tick which of the following circumstances amount to corruption
 

(a) A police officer regularly asking for transport to and from work from a commuter omnibus driver without paying.	<input type="checkbox"/>
(b) A police officer accepting a thank you gift for assisting motorist after a traffic accident.	<input type="checkbox"/>
(c) A police Officer accepting money for lunch from a motorist he/she has just pardoned for a traffic law violation.	<input type="checkbox"/>
(d) A police officer adding false evidence to secure conviction for a notorious bad driver, he knows is guilty.	<input type="checkbox"/>
(e) A police officer asking for ‘something’ from a motorist so as to avoid being ticketed for a traffic offence.	<input type="checkbox"/>
(f) A police officer using police resources to supplement meager salary e.g. carrying passengers for reward.	<input type="checkbox"/>
  
3. How would you rank incidences of corruption within the ZRP?
 

(a) Daily	<input type="checkbox"/>
(b) Weekly	<input type="checkbox"/>
(c) Monthly	<input type="checkbox"/>
(d) Half yearly	<input type="checkbox"/>
(e) Annually	<input type="checkbox"/>
  
4. What action would you take if you witnessed a fellow police officer engaging in a corrupt act?
 

(a) Ignore/do nothing	<input type="checkbox"/>
(b) Warn/talk to him /her privately	<input type="checkbox"/>
(c) Report him/her to superiors	<input type="checkbox"/>
(d) Arrest him/her	<input type="checkbox"/>
  
5. What areas of policing are more prone to corruption?
 

(a) Road blocks	<input type="checkbox"/>
(b) Foot patrols	<input type="checkbox"/>
(c) Motorized patrols	<input type="checkbox"/>
(d) Investigations	<input type="checkbox"/>
  
6. The following are some of the most prevalent types of corruption in other police organisations in the world. Please rank which types of corruption are most prevalent in the ZRP: stating from one for most prevalent.

Element	Rankings			
	1	2	3	4
(e) Police accepting/demanding for a bribe				
(f) Police falsifying evidence during investigations				
(g) Abuse of Police resources for personal gain				
(h) Police directly participating in commission of crimes				
(i)				

(e)any other (state).....  
 .....

7. Please rank the following causes of corruption as they apply to the ZRP. Please rate each cause (starting from left to right) as either 1-very certain, 2-most likely, 3-likely, 4-doubtfully likely, or 5-for not likely to occur in the ZRP.

Element	Rankings				
	1	2	3	4	5
(a) Poor supervision of personnel					
(b) Poor salaries					
(c) Excessive exposure to temptation					
(d) Too much discretionary power on whether to arrest or warn.					
(e) Poor recruiting standards					

(f)Any other (state) .....  
 .....

8. The following are administrative measures within the ZRP for preventing corruption. Please rank the measures in terms of effectiveness in curbing corruption. Please note (starting from left to right): first for excellent, second very effective, third effective, fourth below average effectiveness and fifth for doubtfully effective; and sixth for not effective.

Element	Rankings					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
(a) Existence of disciplinary procedures to deal with cases of corruption						
(b) Supervisory structures for monitoring conduct of personnel during duties						
(c) Sound recruitment and select ion processes to weed out undesirable						
(d) Existence of a Provincial anti-corruption unit to investigate cases of corruption.						
(e) Public education to enlist public support						
(f) Training on dangers of corruption						

9. Please comment on your management’s determination to fight corruption.

.....  
 .....

10. How can corruption within the police service be prevented?

.....  
 .....

**ANNEXTURE 'B'**

**Interview Schedule for Commuter Omnibus Drivers on Causes of Corruption and an Assessment of the Effectiveness of Current Corruption Prevention Strategies in the Zimbabwe Republic Police**

**BACKGROUND**

We are carrying out a study on causes of corruption and an assessment of current corruption prevention strategies in the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). You are kindly requested to complete this questionnaire honestly and sincerely. The information you provide shall be treated as confidential hence your name or address is **not required**. The study shall provide a scientifically determined information base on causes of corruption within the ZRP for the future development of organizational policies on combating corruption. You are requested to put the completed questionnaire in the collection box at the **'charge office'**.

**Please answer all questions by either ticking in boxes provided or writing in the space provided (as the case maybe). Use the back of the questionnaire if the space provided is not sufficient.**

1. How long have you been in the transport sector as commuter omnibus driver?

- (a) less than one year
- (b) Between one and 5 years
- (c) Over 5 years

2. How would you describe your relationship with traffic officers?

- (a) Excellent
- (b) Good
- (c) Fair
- (d) Poor

3. How would you react if a police officer asked for a sum of money in return for not being issued a traffic ticket for violating a traffic regulation?

- (a) Refuse to give him the money
- (b) Plead for forgiveness and reduction of amount
- (c) Pay amount Asked and avoid being ticketed
- (d) Refuse to pay and report the incident to police superiors

4. Please indicate the frequency you pay bribes to police.

- (a) Daily
- (b) Not more than 5 times a week
- (c) Not more than 4 times a month
- (d) Not more than twice in 3 months
- (e) Never

5. What duties tempt police to be corrupt?

- (a) Road blocks
- (b) Foot patrols
- (c) Motorized patrols
- (d) Investigations

6. The following are some of the most prevalent types of corruption in other police organisations in the world. Please rank which types of corruption are most prevalent in the ZRP: stating from one most prevalent, prevalent, doubtfully prevalent and not prevalent.

Element	Rankings			
	1	2	3	4
(a) Police accepting/demanding for a bribe				
(b) Police falsifying evidence during investigations				
(c) Abuse of Police resources for personal gain				
(d) Police directly participating in commission of crimes				

(e) any other (state).....  
 .....

7. What role can be played by the public in curbing corruption in the police.

.....  
.....  
.....

**ANNEXTURE ‘C’**

**Interview Guide for Police Supervisors on Causes of Corruption and an Assessment of the Effectiveness of Current Corruption Prevention Strategies in the Zimbabwe Republic Police**

1. How many reports of corruption do you receive per day/week/month/year?
2. Please explain the procedure followed upon your receipt of a report of corruption.
3. What problems (if any) do you face in the procedure mentioned above?
4. What are the reasons advanced by those caught engaged in corruption for their involvement?
5. What do you think are major causes of corruption in the police?
6. What administrative measures are in place to curb corruption in the police?
7. What are the problems associated with effectiveness of administrative measures?
8. How can corruption in the ZRP traffic branch be prevented?