Edwina, an acute observation! An "outline" is a Kantian "schema" so
important in Eco's demonstration of Kant's influence on Peirce and vastly
important - and completely ignored - in Heidegger's KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF
METAPHYSICS where if you read expecting to find the 'mystical' or Nazi
Heidegger one is only confused by all the reference to "schematism". Eco,
appreciating both, shows there relevance to Peirce - predominantly Kant who
is far less controversial to the point of being a philosophical 'saint',
something that would have revulsed him. -x-". . . and points to the
question of 'attention'" demonstrates how "points" IS "attention",
illustrating a 'point' of "illumination" against the very obscure
"background" you call "pure chance" and "beginning" which indeed is a
"process of habit-taking" that is also such a "habit" itself. These
synonyms of "attention" are the automatic focusing Philoponus talks of
when he says human beings simply cannot conceive of a truly "eternal"
universe. The whole problem of Zeno of Elea, Eco demonstrates, is the
confusion of different kinds of "attention" where simply to "focus
attention" on something means to literally shut out any attention to the
"background" which is absolutely necessary to "present" what is being
"focused on".  This is what Eco means by referring to his examination of
what he calls Peirce's "primary iconism".  
Gary C. Moore
       From: Edwina Taborsky 
 To: Gary Moore ; Jon Awbrey ;
Peirce List ; John N. Deely  
 Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2014 7:37 AM
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
   
Eco has a very nice outline - and points to the question of 'attention'.
Peirce suggests that such, in the beginning, was pure chance. In 'A Guess
at the Riddle' he outlines the process of habit-taking, where a 'flash' (of
material existence) would be followed by another 'flash' and "there would
have come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the
habits and the tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves"....with
this followed by 'different flashes might start different streams' (and
habits)...1. 411, 412).  So, 'attention' is possibly caused by both the
internal reality of 'habits' in the system which constrain what can be
focused on and even guide that focus,  and also, pure chance.  Edwina
 

----- Original Message -----  From: Gary Moore  To: Jon Awbrey ; Peirce
List ; John N. Deely  Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2014 6:39 AM Subject: Fw:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos 
   Part 324** MURDER MYSTERY! **ECO ON PEIRCE!**27 Dec 2014 9:55 am CST
REVISE, READ ORIGINAL   (Who killed truth?)    FROM THE TREE TO THE
LABYRINTH by Umberto Eco CHAPTER 15: THE THRESHOLD AND THE INFINITE: PEIRCE
AND PRIMARY ICONISM * correlate with KANT AND THE PLATYPUS  [page 525] -x-
We can construct a semiotics without a subject or (what amounts to the same
thing) in which the subject is everywhere. In this semiotics there will
never be a “priman” because interpretation will proceed by “mise en
abyme”. But, if from the cosmological point of view the inferential
process is infinite, because there are no intuitions, then we cannot ignore
the cognitive instance, that is, that edge of semiosis that is formed when
a subject (any instance capable of saying “I” that somehow inters into
the semiosis from the material and corporal outside – what I am speaking
about is a brain) installs itself and touches off a chain of inferences
under the stimulus of something that, from its own point of viewand only in
this precise spatiotemporal segment, ATTRACTS ITS ATTENTION [footnote 7: At
this point we might be tempted to open up another can of worms: Why does
one thing attract my attention at the expense of another? But
reconstructing a theory of attention in Peirce lies beyond my capabilities,
and beyond the scope of this chapter.] The “I” in this case stands on
that edge where on the one hand there stands, let us say, the dog – the
thing that interests him at the moment – and, on the other hand,
evcerything else – which does not interest him.¶ -x- In this phase
Firstness, as we saw, is a presence “such as it is”, nothing but a
positive characteristic , like a purple color perceived without any sense
of the beginning or end of the experience, without any self-awareness
separate from the sensation of the color; it is potentiality without
existence, the simple possibility of a perceptual process. In order to
contest these “qualia” [page 526] that precede any inference, we must
take as our point of departure the principle that they constitute an
intuitive moment, without our being able to conceive further inferential
processes behind it, in a sort of infinite fractalization. But I would like
to remind the reader that the infinite fractalization of a sea coast does
not prevent a human subject, who has a molar view compared with the
molecular view of an ant, from covering in a single step what would be for
the ant an extremely long and tortuous trajectory.¶ -x- We are back, if
you will, to the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, in which we must
take into account the distinction between POTENTIAL INFINITY and INFINITY
IN ACT, already present in Aristotle.¶ -x-
    ----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Gary Moore 
To: Jon Awbrey ; Peirce List ;
John N. Deely  
Sent: Saturday, December 27, 2014 6:22 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
 
    
   Part 323** MURDER MYSTERY! **ECO ON PEIRCE!**27 Dec 2014 9:55 am CST
REVISE, READ ORIGINAL   (Who killed truth?)    FROM THE TREE TO THE
LABYRINTH by Umberto Eco CHAPTER 15: THE THRESHOLD AND THE INFINITE: PEIRCE
AND PRIMARY ICONISM * correlate with KANT AND THE PLATYPUS  [page 524] -x-
15.5. PEIRCE AND THE TORTOISE When reading Peirce, we must not confuse
cosmology and gnoseology. As I already remarked in K & P, two different but
mutually interdependent perspectives are interwoven in Peirce’s thought:
the metaphysical-cosmological and the cognitive. Unless we read them in a
semiotic key, Peirce’s meyaphysics and cosmology remain incomprehensible.
But we would have to say the same thing of his semiotics with respect to
his cosmology. Categories such as Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness and the
concept of interpretation itself not only define “modi significandi”,
that is, the ways in which the world can be known: they are also “modi
essendi”, ways in which the world BEHAVES, procedures through which the
world, in the course of evolution, interprets itself. [page 525] In K & P,
I cited Matteo Mameli, “Synechism: Aspetti del pensiero di C. S.
Peirce”, 1997: 4: “Given that Peirce thinks and demonstrates that
intelligibility is not an accidental characteristic of the universe, that
it is not, that is, a mere epiphenomenon of how things are, but a
characteristic that ‘shapes’ the universe, it follows that a theory of
intelligibility is also a metaphysical theory of the structure of the
universe” K & P, p. 399, n. 28). The theory of intelligibility and
metaphysical theory, however, must sometimes be kept separate.¶ -x- Kant
said that the fact that we believe we know things on the basis of the mere
evidence of our senses depends on a “vitium subreptionis” or
subreption: we are so accustomed from childhood to grasp things as if they
appeared to us already given to us in intuition that we have never
thematized the role played  by the intellect in this process. Therefore
even what were for him even empirical intuitions were already the result of
a work of inference.¶ -x- We can construct a semiotics without a subject
or (what amounts to the same thing) in which the subject is everywhere. In
this semiotics there will never be a “priman” because interpretation
will proceed by “mise en abyme”. But, if from the cosmological point of
view the inferential process is infinite, because there are no intuitions,
then we cannot ignore the cognitive instance, that is, that edge of
semiosis that is formed when a subject (any instance capable of saying
“I” that somehow inters into the semiosis from the material and
corporal outside – what I am speaking about is a brain) installs itself
and touches off a chain of inferences under the stimulus of something that,
from its own point of viewand only in this precise spatiotemporal segment,
ATTRACTS ITS ATTENTION [footnote 7: At this point we might be tempted to
open up another can of worms: Why does one thing attract my attention at
the expense of another? But reconstructing a theory of attention in Peirce
lies beyond my capabilities, and beyond the scope of this chapter.] The
“I” in this case stands on that edge where on the one hand there
stands, let us say, the dog – the thing that interests him at the moment
– and, on the other hand, evcerything else – which does not interest
him.¶ -x-    

   From: Jon Awbrey 
To: Helmut Raulien  
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 10:20 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
  
Thread:
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15230
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15235
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15236
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15237
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15238
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15239
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15240
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15241
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15243
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15244
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15246

Helmut,

One should not take that illustrative example too literally.
I was simply making another try at clarifying my use of the
word "cosmos" and replying to Sung about anthropocentricity.

Regards,

Jon
 

 
Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Hi! I do not think, that my point of view or my argumentation has
anything to do 
> with celestial spheres or bearded father figures. I am a left wing
anarchist 
> liberal communist feminist anticapitalist antifashist and so on. I am
against 
> any authorority, except the authority of God. And, what this is, I am
trying to 
> find out. Best, Helmut.

-- 

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