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26 ReferencesIs The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) being Globalized by China?
Abstract
The central market of Kinshasa, also known as Zando, is a site of convergence between flows of Chinese goods and migrants, and citizens of the DRC who generally benefit from the goods and services sold at the market. The rivalries between local shop owners and newly arrived ones who succeed thanks to their insertion in the Chinese Diaspora networks, to their low prices on merchandise and to their labour force that cannot strike are being exacerbated. However, social tensions and conflicts can also hinder the processes taking place.
Quarterly Journal of Chinese Studies
Editor-in-Chief
Tongtao Zheng
Xiamen University
Executive Editor
Yu Zhu
Xiamen University
Editorial Assistant
Amy Sung & Han Zhang
Xiamen University
Editorial Board
Lianghuo Fan,
University of Southampton, U.K.
Huanhai Fang,
Xiamen University
Shengli Feng,
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shui-Lung Fung,
BNU-HKBU United International College
Wei Hong,
Purdue University, U.S.A.
Rulong Li,
Xiamen University
King-Long Ling,
National Taichung University of Science and Technology
Hong Liu,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Jinghui Liu,
California State University, U.S.A.
Colin Mackerras,
Shiu-Kee Shum,
University of Hong Kong
Chung-Mou Si,
University of Hong Kong
Shek-Kam Tse,
University of Hong Kong
Ling Wang,
University of Minnesota, U.S.A.
Jie Xu,
University of Macau
Nora Yao,
University of Auckland, New Zealand
Linsheng Zhang,
Osaka Prefecture University, Japan
Tongtao Zheng,
Xiamen Uinversity
Zhen Zou,
University of Minnesota, U.S.A.
Jianchuan Zhou
, Albany State University, U.S.A.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES
Volume 2 • Number 1 • Autumn 2013
QJCS Articles
Promotion Mix and Consumer Engagement on Social Networking Sites: A Cross-cultural
Case Study of Starbucks Posts on Facebook (USA) and Kaixin (China)
JUSHENG YU 1
18
Hey, ‘Red China’ is Brand New: A Case Study of China’s Self-depicted National Identity
RUOJIE WANG 33
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese Language Classroom: A Qualitative Study
KA F. WONG 67
The Case of Small Commerce at Kinshasa Central Market
Nuah M. Makungu M. 89
Sovereignty and Identity in EU-China-Japan Political Dialogue. A Theoretical Analysis
102
The Word “Macao” and its Special Meaning in the British Colonial Records of Nine-
teenth-Century Malaya
WEI CHIN WONG 119
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES,
2
(1), 1-17
ISSN: 2224-2716
Copyright © 2012 Overseas Education College of Xiamen University
Promotion Mix and Consumer Engagement on Social Net-
working Sites: A Cross-cultural Case Study of Starbucks
Posts on Facebook (USA) and Kaixin (China)
1
Jusheng Yu
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, U.S.A.
This cross-cultural case study of Starbucks’ fan pages on Facebook (USA) and Kaixin (China) ex-
amined how the brand coordinates and controls the various promotion mix elements in its social
media communication and the cultural differences in the impact of such message manipulation on
consumer engagement with brand posts on these two SNSs. A total of 267 Starbucks posts, 190
manipulation of the promotion mix elements. Two types of consumer engagement, self-expression
and relationship-involvement, were measured by the number of “Likes” and by the number of
“Comments” and “Shares” respectively. The results showed that 1) building consumer relation-
ship is a major part of the brand’s message strategy on SNSs; 2) consumers engage more with
relationship-type posts than with promotion-type ones; and 3) compared to their counterparts of
Kaixin, Facebook users are more likely to engage in brand posts with in a self-expression manner,
whereas Kaixin users are more likely to engage in brand posts in a relationship-involvement man-
ner than their Facebook counterparts.
Keywords: SNS, promotion mix, cultural orientation, consumer engagement
INTRODUCTION
to the advent of social media. Social media marketing has become a global phenomenon
as myriad social media platforms attract and connect millions of consumers worldwide.
Among many social media applications, social networking sites (SNSs) might be the most
prominent with their connection and interaction power, and have entered the public con-
sciousness and permeated many people’s daily lives (Spiegler, Hildebrand, & Michahelles,
2011). Facebook, for example, hosts the largest online community in the world, with 901
million monthly active users and more than 125 billion friend connections across the globe
at the end of March 2012, according to the statistics released by Facebook (2012).
Although approximately 80 percent of Facebook’s monthly active users are outside the
United States and Canada (Facebook, 2012), this globally popular social networking site
is not accessible in China, which has the largest number of Internet users ironically. But
the marginal usage of Facebook does not cloud the popularity of SNSs in China. Rather,
according to a report by Synthesio (2011), a Paris France based global multi-lingual social
1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Jusheng Yu. E-mail: jyu@siue.edu
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media monitoring and research company, in 2011, about half of Chinese Internet users, or
600 million Chinese, use more than one social networking sites, and one-third connect at
least once a day. The two most promising SNSs in China are Renren (renren.com) with 120
million members and Kaixin (kaixin001.com) with 75 million, targeting different segments
of the population though. While the majority of Renren’s members are students, Kaixin’s
membership mainly consists of young employees (Synthesio, 2011).
Such rapid growth of SNSs in popularity across the globe has promoted many corpora-
tions to invest in marketing communications on SNSs (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). With their
social exchange and engagement functions supported by the Web 2.0 technology, SNSs
present marketers unprecedented media opportunities for customer relationship building,
not only peer to peer among consumers but also between marketers and their customers
(Harridge-March & Quinton, 2009). Therefore, SNSs provide brand marketers new plat-
forms to build their online brand communities through integrating a variety of communi-
cation tools, or promotion mix elements. For example, Starbucks has accumulated more
than 30 million fans on Facebook since it created its fan page in 2008 (Starbucks, 2012). As
Mangold and Faulds (2009) argued, social media is a hybrid element of the promotion mix.
In other words, SNSs offer marketers opportunities to manage and run integrated marketing
communications (IMC) programs all in one medium.
However, there is a lack of empirical studies of how brand marketers coordinate and
control the various elements of the promotion mix on social network sites in literature.
Marketers might be more interested in knowing and predicting the effectiveness of their
IMC programs on SNSs. The judgment of whether a marketing communication works is
directly related to the communication and media objective(s). By the same token, identify-
ing the measurement of the effectiveness of IMC on SNSs depends on what marketers want
to achieve. However, the objectives of using SNSs might be different from those of using
traditional media for IMC. Whereas traditional media is all about reach, in social media en-
vironment, the focus of marketing communications should be on capturing and continuing
attention via engagement (Hanna, Rohm, & Crittenden, 2011). Hoffman and Fodor (2010)
media: brand awareness, brand engagement, and word of mouth. The latter two that involve
unique connection and interaction features of social network sites. Thus, one of the purpos-
es of this study is to examine a possible relationship between the employment of the pro-
motion mix elements on social networking sites and brand engagement.
on SNSs is culture. A number of previous cross-cultural studies of consumer engagement
-
er motives for participation in online brand communities (Madupu & Cooley, 2010) and
on electronic word of mouth (Chu & Choi, 2011). So another research problem this study
seeks to solve is how brands manipulate the promotion mix elements on SNSs in different
-
ences. Starbucks posts on its public pages on Facebook in USA and Kaixin in China were
selected for this case study because of the opposite cultural orientations, the immense popu-
larity of SNSs, the similarity of SNS outlets, and the identicalness of the brand in these two
countries.
Promotion mix and Consumer engagement on soCial networking sites
3
Consumer Engagement on SNSs
As marketing managers become more comfortable with including social media as part of
their IMC, measuring the effectiveness or the return of investment (ROI) of social media
marketing has become the common interest of marketers across brands and product cate-
gories. Hoffman and Fodor’s (2010) article mentions that a quick Google search for “ROI
social media” returned over 2.5 million hits, many seemingly relevant (p.41). But the ques-
tion is how to measure the effectiveness of communication on SNSs.
It seems that audience engagement has become the major criterion for judging the
effectiveness of advertising campaigns in digital media (Russell, 2011). Because of new
technologies, consumer control, media fragmentation, and business pressures, the con-
cept of earned engagement, in which the audience engages with the message in a real or
imagined way because the message is perceived to merit interaction, is increasingly part
of advertising planning (Russell, 2011). Audience engagement especially matters in social
media marketing communications, because the major goal of using social media is to de-
velop long-term meaningful relationships that involve interactive conversations (Hoffman
& Fodor, 2010). Delahaye Paine (2011) gave three reasons why engagement is crucial to
its customers; customer engagement helps promote and protect the brand; and customer
engagement can make the products better. In other words, for social media, “engagement is
king” (Shih, 2011, p. 126).
Social media researchers have suggested some devices for measuring consumer en-
gagement on social networking sites. In their relevant metrics for social media applications,
Hoffman and Fodor (2010) suggested that engagement be measured by the number of ac-
tive users, number of “likes”, number of comments, number of user-generated items, etc.
On both Facebook and Kaixin, three consumer responses to the brand posts are recorded:
Likes, comments, and shares. Following this suggestion, a recent study used the number
of likes to measure consumer engagement with a brand’s posts on Facebook and used the
number of comments and the number of shares to measure eWOM (Yu, 2012).
However, eWOM behaviors such as comment giving and brand post sharing may be
considered as certain types of consumer engagement and the types of consumer engage-
ment behavior on SNSs are different in terms of response objects, motivation, and cogni-
tive effort. When clicking on the button “Like” under a brand post on Facebook or Kaixin,
the SNS user is expressing his or her positive attitude toward the post while the response
behaviors of giving comments on and sharing the post are toward the visitor’s friends in the
same SNS community. Motivations of these different response behaviors may also be dif-
ferent. Clicking the “Like” button is more about the user’s self-expression. That is, by do-
ing so, the person expresses his or her preference toward the post without expecting his or
her attitude to be seen by other users. In fact, whereas Facebook and Kaixin show the most
recent comments on each post on their public pages, people who “liked” the post cannot
be seen by the user unless the user clicks the “Likes” button. Also, most users are not ex-
pected to check who “liked” the post since there is no meaningful content. However, users’
comment giving and post sharing might be motivated by their needs to interact with other
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people in the SNS community and maintain the relationships with their Facebook or Kaixin
friends. Also, clicking the button of “Like” should require less cognitive effort than writing
comments or sharing the post.
Promotion Mix and Consumer Engagement on SNSs
The concept of integrated marketing communications (IMC) has been used by both market-
ing scholars and professionals for decades. Simply speaking, IMC strategically employs a
host of different marketing communication tools, or elements of promotion mix, including
advertising, sales promotion, public relations, direct marketing, interactive marketing, and
personal selling, to produce customer-focused messages and, therefore, achieve various or-
Traditionally, to develop an IMC strategy, the coordination of these promotion mix
elements is typically implemented by the company’s paid agents, such as advertising agen-
These elements require the paid agents to make strategic decisions on target audience, geo-
graphic budget allocation, message content, frequency, scheduling, and media mix for vari-
ous forms of communications. Basically, Shannon’s (1948) communication model can still
be applied to the traditional IMC process, which begins with the message sender and ends
with the message receiver. That is, the information is “pushed” from the marketer through
transmitting channels to consumers. The goal to reach a certain level of audience exposure
to the message largely depends on the selection of the right media that reach the target
audience, because audiences consume media primarily for information and entertainment,
not for advertisements. On the other hand, the information flow outside this traditional
among individual consumers, which has had minimal impact on the dynamics of the mar-
of IMC. Among the many social media applications, social network sites (SNSs) such as
Facebook in the United States and other English-speaking countries and Kaixin (aka “hap-
piness” in Chinese) in China have become part of many people’s daily life and attracted
sites as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public
a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others
within the system (p. 211).”
With such unique media characteristics from promotion mix perspective, on one hand,
SNSs still have the function of traditional advertising media, i.e., promoting the brand
and the company to the target audience. Through social media, advertisers have carried
of the interaction between brand marketers and their target audience has changed. First,
audiences are no longer passive information receivers. Instead, in the social media envi-
ronment, they become active participants. On a social network site, marketing messages
are consumed by audiences who visit the SNS rather than being “pushed” by the marketer
Promotion mix and Consumer engagement on soCial networking sites
5
to its target audience. So it is more like “pulling” audiences to the messages. Second, mar-
keters and consumers have become more equal in status in online brand communities. For
example, in Starbucks’ brand community on Facebook, both Starbucks and its fans have
-
friend networks on the SNS. Third, as some researchers argued earlier, “markets are not
about messages, but about conversations” (see Hanna et al., 2011, p. 267; Levine, Locke,
Searls, & Weinberger, 2001) and social network sites are about experiences (see Hanna et
al., 2011, p. 268; Wyshynski, 2009), which “arise when marketers are able to incorporate
reach, intimacy, and engagement into the company’s overall IMC strategy” (Hanna et al.,
2011, p. 268). Fourth, in the communication process of SNSs, audiences are not only active
participants but also content generators and information disseminators. Taking Starbucks on
Facebook for example, again, a visitor can leave comments on its fan page, share the posts
by the page with his or her friends, and discuss the brand in his or her own friend network
on Facebook.
Thus, building and maintaining intimate relationships with current and potential cus-
tomers rather than merely delivering promotional information is crucial to the success of
IMC on SNSs. From marketers’ perspective, SNSs give them abundant opportunities they
have never had before in traditional media environment to communicate with their custom-
ers because there is no medium cost for delivering messages on SNSs. This change makes
the marketer be able to afford to communicate a proportionately larger amount of non-prod-
uct-related or non-promotional information in their IMC effort, although strictly speaking,
any type of posts by the brand on a social network site is promotional because the ultimate
goal of social media marketing is still to sell the brand. Also, from the perspective of con-
sumer motivation, the literature of Uses and Gratifications suggests that individuals use
Gurevitch, 1973; Rubin, 1983). Indeed, consumers visit a brand’s fan page not for directly
promotional ads but for enjoyable experiences. The present study sought for answers to a
research question about marketers’ use of promotion mix elements in social media market-
ing followed by an examination of a hypothesis regarding the relationship between the use
of promotion mix elements and consumer engagement:
RQ: How consumer brands strategically use promotion mix elements in their social me-
H1: Individuals who visit a brand’s fan page on a social networking site engage more in
relationship-type posts than promotion-type ones
Cultural Orientations and Consumer Engagement on SNSs
Culture is an important factor that affects how people think and behave. Having provided
a conceptual and theoretical foundation for many subsequent cross-cultural research en-
efforts with regard to the impact of national culture on the values of the members in that
nation and the interpersonal relationship within them. His paradigm of national cultures
consists of five dimensions: individualism versus collectivism, small versus large power
distance, weak versus strong uncertainty avoidance, femininity versus masculinity, and
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long-term versus short-term orientation. The sixth and new dimension, indulgence versus
restraint, was added in the 2010 book written by Hofstede and his colleagues (Geert Hofst-
ede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).
Among these cultural dimensions, the individualism versus collectivism dimension
has been most widely used in cross-cultural research (e.g., G Hofstede, 2001; Jackson &
Wang, 2013; U. Kim, Trandis, Kagitcibase, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Oyserman, Coon, & Kem-
directly and indirectly in different societies (see Gudykunst et al., 1996). According to Hof-
stede (2011), “Individualism on the one side versus its opposite, as a societal, not an indi-
vidual characteristics, is the degree to which people in a society are integrated into groups
of the individual over group goals, whereas people in collectivistic cultures consider more
groups goals than individual goals (Triandis, 1988). On the continuum with individualism
-
alistic or more collectivistic in their cultural orientation (Trandis, 1994). Although People’s
Republic of China or Mainland China was not among the 40 countries in Hofstede’s 1980
As a result, the United States had the highest score (13.41) on the individualism-collec-
a collectivist country. Belonging to the same East Asian culture, China scored even lower
(10.38) than Japan (10.91), making it more collectivistic than Japan.
Cultural orientations in terms of individualism versus collectivism can impact individu-
als’ self-expression. As Kim and Sherman (2007) discussed, in Western individualistic cul-
tures such as the United States, the most prevalent view of the self is the independent self.
That is, “the individual is understood and practices as a separate or distinct entity whose
behavior is determined by some amalgam of internal attributes (p.2).” In contrast, in East
Asian collectivistic cultures, the individual exists not as an independent entity but primarily
viewed as connected with others (see H. S. Kim & Sherman, 2007; Markus & Kitayama,
1991; Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Trandis, 1989). Thus, in individualistic cultures, individ-
uals come to know their own internal traits through self-expression. For example, Higgins
and Rholes (1978) found that verbal expression of attitudes makes people believe in those
attitudes more. However, self-expression may not have the same implications for the self in
collectivistic cultures because the meaningful aspects of the self is social and external and
the self (H. S. Kim & Sherman, 2007). Thus, the person in collectivistic cultures may not
be motivated to express him- or herself if self-expression is not viewed as part of the per-
Applying this concept to understanding the consumer behavior on SNSs, it is assumed
that consumers in individualistic and collectivistic cultures may respond to the brand posts
on Facebook and Kaixin differently, depending on whether the responding behaviors are
viewed and understood in relationships or as self-expression. Having argued earlier that the
behavior of clicking the “Like” button on Facebook and Kaixin is more about self-expres-
sion, the author proposes the following hypothesis:
Promotion mix and Consumer engagement on soCial networking sites
7
H2: Facebook (USA) users are more likely to engage in brand posts with self-expres-
sion type of response behavior than Kaixin (China) users.
On the other hand, in collectivistic cultures, people stress group goals and activities so
that they may be more motivated to take actions if the actions contribute to group interac-
tion and relationships. Therefore, they tend to be willing to give information to or share in-
formation with their in-group (Chow, Deng, & Ho, 2000). This idea has been supported by
differences on the motives for consumer participation in online brand communities, Madu-
pu and Cooley (2010) found that giving information is a stronger motivation for members
in collectivistic cultures (Indian participants) than for members in individualistic cultures
(American participants). Another latter cross-cultural study (Chu & Choi, 2012) comparing
consumer engagement in eWOM between Chinese and American participants found that,
compared to their counterparts, Chinese SNS users were more likely to offer opinions, to
seek opinions, and to pass along opinion on SNSs. Based on this notion, two hypotheses are
posited as below:
H3: Kaixin users are more likely to engage in brand posts with relationship-involve-
ment type of response behavior than their Facebook counterparts.
METHOD
Promotion Mix Data Collection
A content analysis of Starbucks posts on Facebook and Kaixin was conducted to investi-
gate how the brand used the promotion mix elements on these two SNSs. Facebook is the
most popular SNS in the United States while Kaixin is one of the top SNSs in China. These
two SNSs have similar marketing communication features such as offering platforms for a
brand to set a public page to build up its online brand community and providing consumer
response mechanisms for visitors to respond to brand messages including “Like”, “Com-
ment” and “Share”. Starbucks is a popular consumer brand in both countries and has a
public page on both Facebook and Kaixin. Such characteristics of Facebook, Kaixin, and
Starbucks make the brand’s promotion mix strategy on its public pages and consumer en-
gagement on these two SNSs a good case for a cross-cultural study of social media market-
ing communication.
A total of 267 posts on Starbucks’ public pages, 190 on Kaixin and 77 on Facebook,
months from the beginning of December 2011 until the end of March 2012. To investigate
Starbucks’ promotion mix strategy in its social media marketing communication, all these
and Kaixin. In a recent study of a Swiss consumer goods brand’s posts on its public page
sample brand posts, including: product(s) announcement, information, designed question,
questioner, competition, advertisement, and statement (Cvijikj & Michahelles, 2011). De-
advertising, sales promotion, corporate information focusing on its own business, customer
service, corporate information focusing on good will, greetings/wishes, designed ques-
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tion, advocacy statement, and life experience sharing. Table 1 shows the post categories,
American college senior students enrolled in a Midwest university. Two Chinese graduate
students from another Midwestern university were recruited and trained for the task of cod-
ing the 190 Kaixin posts.
TABLE 1
Post Categories, Operational Denitions, and Examples
Post category Operational denition Example
Product
Advertising
Announcement of a
certain new product
or advertisement of
a certain existing
product
Facebook: 100% Kona is back. Reminds me of being
on vacation! (sorry, ower not included) http://sbux.
co/y7ZnBj. (A product picture is below the copy)
Kaixin (translated): Tiramisu is a cake with
stories. The name means “pick me up” in Italian.
The traditional Italian recipe perfectly mixed with
Mascarpone cheese and rich syrup made from
Frappuccino powder, makes this new classic
Tiramisu among the unique tasty Starbucks choices.
(A product picture is below the copy)
Sales Promotion Posts that offer an
extra incentive such
as a price deal to
promote a certain
product
Facebook: Yes, it’s true. A free 12 oz drink when you
buy a pound of tribute Blend (or Tribute Blend VIA).
Ends today! – US and Canada only.
Kaixin (translated): Dear friends: Do you have
afternoon-tea complexity? From today until Apr. 4,
buy a cumulative sum of two afternoon tea combos,
each including 2 newly introduced drinks and 1 piece
of cake, for a free Grande brewed coffee.
Corporate
Information/
Business
Information about
business growth, new
store opening, website
update, etc.
Facebook: We’re humbled to be on Fast Company’s
list of most Innovative companies.
Kainxin (headline translated): At the end of March,
we just opened the fourth store in Fushan – Nanhan W.
Guiping St.
Customer
Service
Information regarding
customer service,
customer courtesy,
and online service
programs such as
mobile apps
Facebook: Don’t worry your mom. Wait until the car is
stopped to use your phone. Starbucks drive-thru now
accepting mobile payments, idea #200 launched.
Keep the ideas coming!
Kaixin (translated): The New Year is around the
corner. Let’s warm every our customer with our
coffee and touch every our fan with our hearts. A
cup of fragrant coffee, courteous words, a smile from
heart, beautiful memories of everyday…All because
we have you!
Promotion mix and Consumer engagement on soCial networking sites
9
Corporate
Information/
Good Will
Good will and
philanthropy of the
company
Facebook: Here’s a Create Jobs For USA update -
in the rst 3 months we’ve distributed half a million
wristbands and raised over $7 million in donations
thanks to you! These donations will directly support
$50 million in new nancing to help create 2,300 new
jobs in America!
Kaixin (headline translated): Giving back to
community: Startucks will donate the rst day
turnover of a store to help improve the facilities of the
local Hope elementary school.
Greetings/
Wishes
Posts in form of
greetings or wishes
from the personalized
brand
Facebook: Happy Valentine’s Day!
Kaixin (translated): There is only 1 thing 2 do 3 words
4 you. I love you! Happy Valentine’s Day.
Designed
Question
Posts in form of
questions or polls
with a goal to engage
users in a dialog
Facebook: Coffee and snow go together like
_________ and ___________.
Kaixin (translated): If you have a cup of Mocha,
Cappuccino, Latte, Vanilla Spice Latte, Caramel
Macchiato, and Hazelnut latte. Which ones are for
your friends and which one is for you?
Advocacy
Statement
Posts in form of
statement, stating
opinion on a certain
topic or social issue
Facebook: We are proud to support Marriage Equality
legislation in the Washington State Legislature.
Kaixin (headline translated): Love earth! Let’s start
with ourselves!
Life Experience
Sharing
Posts showing that
the personalized
brand is sharing
his life experiences
such as stories, fun,
understanding of
something, feelings,
mood, sentiments, etc.
Facebook: Hey look, coffee cherries!
Kaixin (translatied): Everyday, right here, we
share our feelings with our customers and gain life
experiences together. Coffee connects you and me,
who used to be strangers. So we all are creating
stories at every moment.
Consumer Engagement Data Collection
Both Facebook and Kaixin provide platforms for consumers who visit the brand pages to
to express his or her preference toward the brand posts, comment on the posts and share the
comments with his or her peers in the same brand community through clicking the “Com-
ment” button, and/or share the posts with other users on his or her friend list on that SNS.
Facebook and Kaixin record the number of likes, comments, and shares. The present study
uses these numbers to measure consumer engagement. More specifically, the number of
likes is used to measure self-expression type of engagement while the number of comments
and the number of shares serve as the measure of relationship type of engagement. Thus,
the number of consumer responses rather than the number of visitors who responded to the
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posts serves as the unit of analysis. Although at an individual level single individuals might
have multiple types of responses to the same post such as doing both “like” button clicking
and giving comments, the aggregate data should give a picture of the relative popularity of
like, comment, and share.
RESULTS
posts on Facebook and two other coders whose native language is Chinese completed
Post Distribution across the Promotion Mix Categories
categories: product advertising, sales promotion, corporate information focusing on its own
business, customer service, corporate information focusing on good will, greetings/wishes,
designed question, advocacy statement, and life experience sharing. The proportions of
these 9 categories were calculated and then were rank-ordered for a comparison of these
two SNSs in terms of their post distributions across the categories. The result presented in
Table 2 shows the difference between the brand post distributions on Facebook and Kaixin.
For example, On Facebook, the number one category, sales promotion, has about 21 percent
of the posts, whereas on Kaixin it ranks as the 6
th
among the 9 promotion mix categories
with only 6.3 percent of all the Kaixin sample posts. A Spearman rank-order correlation
analysis was conducted in order to determine if the brand manipulated these 9 promotion
mix categories in a similar manner on these two SNSs. The test indicated that there was no
s
p
.19.
TABLE 2
Profortions of the Promotion Mix Elements Used by Starbucks on Face-Book and Kaixin
Facebook Kaixin Together
Post Category
(Promotion
Mix Elements)
Product
Promotion
Product advertising 14.3% 31.6% 26.6%
Sales Promotion 20.8% 6.3% 10.5%
Corporate
Information
Corporate information/Business 13% 5.3% 7.5%
Corporate information/Customer
service
3.9% 7.4% 6.4%
Corporate information/Good will 1.3% 1.6% 1.5%
Community
Relationship
Greetings/Wishes 18.2% 12.1% 13.9%
Design question 7.8% 14.2% 12.4%
Advocacy statement 3.9% 1.1% 1.9%
Life experience sharing 16.9% 20.5% 19.5%
Promotion mix and Consumer engagement on soCial networking sites
11
SNSs, these 9 categories were integrated into 3 broader categories, the categories of prod-
uct advertising and sales promotion into a new category “product promotion”, corporate
information/business, corporate information/customer service, and corporate information/
good wills into the second new category “corporate information”, and the rest 4 categories,
greetings/wishes, designed question, advocacy statement, and life experience sharing, into
the third category “community relationship”. After category integration, the aggregated
data indicate that the brand used the promotion mix elements in its SNS marketing com-
munication on Facebook and Kaixin in a similar pattern. That is, in term of the number
of posts, the category of community relationship sits on top, with 46.8 percent of all the
sample posts on Facebook and 53.7 percent on Kaxin, product promotion ranked as second,
with 35.1 percent on Facebook and 36.3 percent on Kaixin, and corporate information was
at the bottom, with 18.2 percent on Facebook and 10.0 percent on Kaixin.
Two one-sample chi-square tests were conducted to assess if Starbucks relatively put
more effort into building community relationship, promoting its products, or delivering
2
(2, N
p
community-relationship (PP
2
(1, N
promotion (P
2
(1, Np
2
(2, Np < .001. A follow-up test was
also conducted and the results indicated that on the Chinese SNS, the brand did produced
more community-relationship posts (PP
2
(1, Np < .05, and corporate-information posts (P
2
(1, N
p < .001.
Consumer Responses to Brand Posts Carrying Promotion Mix Elements
The numbers of total responses to each sample post including likes, comments and
shares were used to measure consumer engagement with the three types of brand posts
respectively. The descriptive response data are presented in Table 3. Two separate one-way
Fp
2
Post hoc tests were then conducted to evaluate pairwise differences among the three means.
A Dunnett’s C test, which does not assume equal variances among the three categories,
p < .05. The results
indicated that the mean of the number of responses to the community-relationship posts (M
promotion posts (M
information posts (M
latter two non-relationship categories.
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12
TABLE 3
Means & Standard Deviations for the Numbers of Fesponses to the Brand Posts on Face-Book
and Kaixin
Facebook Posts Kaixin Posts
M SD M SD
Product Promotion 11643.07 2521.18 23.23 2.41
Corporate Information 7781.29 3501.24 13.37 4.58
Community Relationship 23419.83 2183.41 26.55 1.98
Fp
2
-
ference between the mean of community relationship (M-
formation (M
the mean of community relationship and that of product advertising (M
These three categories were further integrated into two new categories, “promotion”
and “relationship”, by combining “product promotion” and “corporate information” to-
gether as corporate information was considered as corporate advertising, which is just
another type of promotion. Two separate independent-samples t tests were conducted to
network site engage more in relationship-type posts than promotion-type ones. The test
tp < .001. On the av-
erage, visitors responded more to relationship-type posts (MSD
than promotion-type post (MSDt test for
Kaixin posts revealed that there was a difference between the average number of responses
to relationship-type posts (MSD
promotion-type posts (MSD-
cant, tp
Cultural Differences in Types of Consumer Responses
To determine whether users, when responding to the post, are more likely to click the “Like”
button, give comments, or share it with their friends on SNSs, the relative popularity of
raw numbers to percentage by dividing the number of each type of responses by the total
number of responses (i.e., the sum of the numbers of likes, comments, and shares) to the
post. For example, on March 30 2012, because there were 12540 likes, 596 comments, and
692 shares for the Starbucks post posted by the brand on its public page on Facebook, the
relative popularity score is .91 for like, .04 for comment, and .05 for share.
The present study examined the cultural difference in two types of consumer respons-
es to brand posts, self-expression responses and relationship-involvement responses. The
relationship-involvement engagement was measured by the relative popularity of “com-
ment” and “share”. Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for the relative pop-
ularity scores of the three types of responses. An independent-samples t test was conducted
Promotion mix and Consumer engagement on soCial networking sites
13
to test the second research hypothesis that Facebook users are more likely to engage in
brand posts with self-expression type of response behavior than Kaixin users. The test re-
tp < .001. The average popularity score for “like” on
Facebook (MSD
“like” on Kaixin (MSD
To evaluate the third research hypothesis that Kaixin users are more likely to engage in
brand posts with relationship-involvement type of response behavior than their Facebook
counterparts, two separate independent-samples t tests for unequal variances were conduct-
ed, one for “comments” and the other for “shares”. The result of the t test for “comments”
indicated that Kaixin users (MSD-
ments on the brand posts than their Facebook counterparts (MSDt
-28.73, p < .001. The other ttp <
M
SDMSD-
ported.
TABLE 4
Means & Standard Deviations for the Popularity Scores of 3 Response Types on Face-Book and
Kaixin
Facebook Posts Kaixin Posts
M SD M SD
Popularity of Likes .88 .07 .16 .15
Popularity of Comments .06 .06 .51 .20
Popularity of Shares .06 .04 .33 .17
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The present case study investigated how the global coffee brand Starbucks uses the
promotion mix elements in its social media communication to engage consumers on its
public pages on Facebook and Kaixin, a popular Chinese SNS. It was found that the brand
corporate-information posts on Facebook, whereas on the Chinese SNS, in proportion, the
number of community-relationship posts was significantly larger than that of corporate-
information posts but the difference between the number of community-relationship posts
and the number of product-promotion posts was not significant. These research findings
indicated that building consumer relationship is a major part of the brand’s message
strategy on SNSs if the use of this promotion mix element does not overwhelm the use of
product promotion and corporate advertising.
Managers may reap the harvest of using this social media communication strategy.
brand’s fan page on a social networking site engage more with relationship-type posts than
with promotion-type ones. The results of the statistical tests showed that the average num-
-
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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14
of the second hypothesis with empirical data is consistent with the theoretical notions in
literature and may shed a little light on social media marketing practices.
The present study also examined the cultural influence on consumer engagement on
SNSs. Social media users respond to the same message in different ways and the amount
of cognitive effort they make in their responses are also different. Cross-cultural scholars
and behavioral psychologists believe that members of individualistic cultures highly value
self-expression. One important aspect of individualism is even called “expressive individ-
ualism” (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985), in which members express
collectivistic cultures, self-expression may be neither viewed positively nor particularly
encouraged because meaningful aspects of the self are social and external such as rela-
tionships (H. S. Kim & Sherman, 2007). This notion about cultural difference in term of
study that, compared to their counterparts on Kaixin (China), Facebook (USA) visitors are
more likely to engage in brand posts with self-expression type of response behavior, which
perspective of Chinese SNS users, they may be reluctant to respond to a brand post if their
responses are perceived as mere self-expression.
interdependence, value harmony, and in-group memberships (Singelis, 1994), and in turn,
they may see SNSs as a venue for them to maintain their social relationships (Chu & Choi,
2012). Previous studies found that Chinese and Indian SNS users are more likely to give
information than their American counterparts (e.g., Chu & Choi, 2012; Madupu & Cooley,
2010). In the present study, this view was examined through testing a research hypothesis
that Kaixin users are more likely to engage in brand posts with relationship-involvement
type of response behavior than their Facebook counterparts. Supporting the hypothesis, the
Facebook users.
To sum up, through answering the research question, the present case study implies that
social media has become a hybrid of various promotion mix elements (Mangold & Faulds,
2009). Unlike traditional media advertising in which promotional messages dominate the
communication, on social networking sites, much of companies’ marketing communication
effort goes to building and maintaining customer relationships. The evidence supporting the
research hypotheses indicates that, on the user side, SNS users engage in a greater level of
responding to the messages that are more about social relationships in the online communi-
ty than about product and corporate promotion and the way of such user engagement may
-
cations, although the consumer engagement data are aggregate data provided by Facebook
and Kaixin. The use of such aggregate data sacrifices control over some key variables
when measuring them. For example, the assumption behind the comparison of Facebook
and Kaixin users was that the majority of Facebook users are members of an individualis-
tic culture, mainly Americans, while Kaixin users are of a collectivistic culture, and they
are Chinese since the SNS is China-based and the language is Chinese. However, if the
research goal is to establish theoretical relationships among variables such as the relation-
Promotion mix and Consumer engagement on soCial networking sites
15
ship between consumer engagement and cultural orientation, this assumption can be easily
violated because many Facebook users who can communicate in English are not members
of individualistic cultures. Thus, designing a survey study or an experimental examination
wherein the key variables are measured by using valid and reliable measurement scales
may provide a more precise picture of cultural orientation’s impact on consumer engage-
ment on social networking sites in the future.
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Author’s Biodata:
Dr. Jusheng Yu is an assistant professor in the Department of Mass Communications at
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, USA. He received his Ph.D. in Mass Communi-
cation from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA, his M.A. in Journalism
from the University of Texas at Austin, USA, and his B.A. in Advertising and Journalism
from Zhejiang University, China. His primary research interests are in the areas of agenda
setting theory, consumer cognitive process of marketing information, and the effects of
marketing communication on consumer attitude and behavior.
First Author’s Address:
jyu@siue.edu
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES,
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ISSN: 2224-2716
Copyright © 2012 Overseas Education College of Xiamen University
1
Jingfei Liu & Gang Kevin Han
University of Missouri at Columbia, U.S.A.
This study examines news frames, source use, and the correlation between frames and sources,
CCTV News Broadcast in China from April 2009 to
October 2010. Attribution of responsibility is the dominant frame in CCTV. The most cited source
in CCTV is the domestic government, followed by foreign governments and international organi-
attribution of responsibility frame and domestic
government source. In addition, human interest frame and both the domestic government and cit-
conict frame and scientists, are positively correlated in CCTV.
Spring 2009 and spread globally through Summer 2010, has illustrated that different parts
of the international community may have to face and deal with the same health threat in the
-
had been reported in many countries. By the end of May 2010, 214 countries and territories
at least 18,138 deaths (WHO, 2010a).
On August 10, 2010, WHO declared that the global pandemic was over, and nevertheless
warned that H1N1 virus would continue to spread for years like a reg
virus (WHO, 2010b). Facing the challenges from the global pandemic, China is among the
countries that were hit hard by H1N1 (Han, Zhang, Chu & Shen, 2013). The total estimated
of the People’s Republic of China, 2010).
When a health risk broke out, the general public usually relies on mass media for relat-
ed information (Hayes & Grossman, 2006), as mass media are able to obtain accurate infor-
mation, relieve uncertainty and calm the audience (Graber, 1980). The large scale and the
media. This pandemic offers an appropriate opportunity to examine the latent attributes of
media coverage on certain health risk for a better understanding of the role the media play
in a “risk society” (Beck, see Ritter, 1993).
The notion of news framing arguably serves as a proper theoretical framework in this
endeavor. Mostly of previous framing analyses on media coverage of H1N1 outbreak
(Chang, 2010; Ibrabim, Mustaffa & Kee, 2010; Wang, Smith & Worawongs, 2010), nev-
1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Gang Han. E-mail: ghan@iastate.edu
Framing H1n1 inFluenza in CHinese TV news
19
ertheless, focus on print media and do not include television news coverage. The current
Central Television’s xinwen lianbo
2
(hereafter, CCTV News Broadcast), frame H1N1 over
its life span from April 2009 through October 2010, as well as how it uses a variety of news
sources when covering H1N1. This study also evaluates the possible correlations between
news frames and news sources in CCTV
Mass Media in China
As the agency of interest groups, mass media reflect the ideology of their owners that
control their financial or personnel resources or both. Generally speaking, major outlets
of Chinese mass media are still tightly controlled by the propaganda system of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP, hereafter the Party). According to Lee (1990), through
this “command” system, the Party exerts rigorous ideological control on mass media at
all levels, from content to page layout. Politics and politicians are deeply involved in the
running and daily operation of Chinese media. As a result, mass media help maintain the
status quo either actively or passively (see also Han, 2007).
Market-driven economic reforms since the end of the 1970s have loosened, to some
extent, the Party’s censorship on non-political media content. Mass-appeal contents are
contemporary Chinese mass media are suffering simultaneously from the pressure of ideol-
ogy and the pressure of market competition. His (2000) metaphor of “tug-of-war” describes
the dilemma of the “Party Press,” which is converting itself into a “Party Publicity Inc.” (p.
112). Pan (2000) uses “improvising activities” to explain the sporadic or occasional reforms
generated in the routine journalistic practice in China, as which are carried out under con-
tinual ideological control.
With regards to a health risk issue, the Party always faces a challenge between dis-
closure of disease information and avoidance of public panic. In some cases, government
restriction of media coverage alleviates public fear as assumed; in other cases, however,
blocking disease information leads to public anxiety (Ding & Liu, 2004) with severe con-
sequences (Fang, 2003). CCTV News Broadcast in this case must meet the needs of both
the Party and changing taste of Chinese news consumers, in order to survive the tension
between the ideological control and market force.
of H1N1, not the “framing setting” process, the characteristics of Chinese media system
may suggest a plausible prediction and explanation on the presence of news frames as well
as the pattern of source use in Chinese television news.
News Frames
The concept of framing has become an important theoretic approach in communication
2 《新闻联播》in Chinese.
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scholarship since Goffman (1974) and Bateson introduced the concept to social science in
the 1970’s (Han, 2007). According to Entman (1993), “to frame is to select some aspects of
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text in such a way as
treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). News frames provide a template
that guides journalists in assembling facts, quotations, and other story elements into a news
story, as well as orient the interpretations of the audience (Han, 2007, p. 41).
Entman (1993) states that frames can exist in every phase in the communication pro-
cess—news production, content, and reception of news. One line of research in framing
focuses on news frames or media frames, which examines how frames are present in media
the media level (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107).
There are a growing number of studies that have assessed news frames. For example,
economic, human impact, con-
ict and morality
attribution of respon-
sibility, conflict, human interest, economic consequences and morality—and apply them
to the examination of news stories on European politics. They further propose a deductive
-
tent analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the news ” (p. 94).
-
ies that aim to detect differences in framing between media outlets or within certain media
(e.g., Han, 2007). For example, Kamhawi’s study (2002) establishes the conict frame and
the blame/responsibility Li, Lindsay
and Mogensen (2002) and
Dimitrova, Kaid, Williams & Trammell (2005)
adopt the military conict, the human interest, and the responsibility frame in their study on
online news coverage of the Iraq War.
When it comes to topics about diseases, Luther and Zhou (2005) detect four of the
generic frames from SARS related coverage in both Chinese and U.S. newspapers, where
the former are less likely than the latter to present the responsibility, the conict and the
economic consequences frames. Meanwhile, there is no difference on the visibility of the
human interest frame in both countries. A following study by Beaudoin (2007) compare
frames in SARS news coverage from China’s Xinhua News Agency and the Associated
Press (AP), which illustrates that the attribution of responsibility frame and the economic
consequences frames are more visible in AP’s news items.
the news coverage in either print or online media. For instance, Ibrabim, Mustaffa & Kee
mainstream newspapers, where the responsibility frame is most visible, followed by the
morality, the human interest, the conict and the economic consequences frames. No prior
H1N1-related issues.
Along with this research line, the current study takes a deductive approach in identify-
Framing H1n1 inFluenza in CHinese TV news
21
The attribution of responsibility frame refers to “the manner in which news portrays
a problematic event or issue by focusing on blame and responsibility” (Beaudoin, 2007,
p. 511). It involves those considered to be responsible, such as government department,
-
tion of certain diseases in a public health crisis.
The human interest frame “brings a human face or emotional angle to a reported news
event or issue” (Beaudoin, 2007, p. 512). It is embedded in the news stories that portray
people’s emotions, living conditions, and touching aspect of everyday lives.
The conict -
The economic consequences frame focuses on the impact of the risk event on the econ-
and economic implications of H1N1.
Another original generic frame, morality, “puts the event, problem, or issue in the con-
frame is slightly revised and renamed as “humanity” frame, which is supposed to be more
considering the topic discussed is better related to humanity aid and
sympathies (Ibrahim, Mustaffa & Kee, 2010).
News Sources
The news sources, i.e., “a person or document that provides information for a story,”
(Beder, 2004; Gitlin,
1980; Tuchman, 1978). Scholars (e.g.,
news media heavily depend on official sources for information, since which can add
1998). Sigal’s research (1973) reports that three quarters of the news sources in Washington
Post and The New York Times are American and foreign government officials. Han,
Shoemaker, Lee, Zhang and Wang (2011) compare newspaper coverage of terrorism in
in both countries. This pattern is also visible under certain risk situations. Greenberg,
heavily related to reliable sources, which are considered the scientists and representatives
from government and industry.
Scholars maintain that examining news source helps better understand the formation
of news frames. Aiken’s comparison (2003) between The News York Times and Le Monde
on newspaper coverage of the September 11 attack finds, the human interest frame did
not, but the economic consequence frame indeed, require elite sources, such as corporate
executives, experts and professionals. In their study about the U.S. television coverage of
political frame is associat-
ed most with government sources, the disaster frame is associated mainly with witnesses,
and the criminal and terrorism
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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as news sources. Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) also try to connect source use and news
frames in their study of framing the Iraq War in newspapers. They notice that the articles
with the human interest -
cles with the military conict frame cite military sources more frequently. It is worth noting
that no sophisticated measures have been used in previous studies to test the relationship
between frame visibility and source use in health risk coverage.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
Based on above literature review, due to the explorative nature of the study, a research
RQ1: Which of the generic frames, i.e., attribution of responsibility, human interest,
conict, economic consequences and morality,
predicts that the attribution of responsibility frame will be the most visible frame through
which the accountability is assigned to non-government sectors or individuals involved in
risky situations, as creating positive publicity of the government is always the focus of the
coverage on risk events (Chen & Zhang, 2008).
H1: The attribution of responsibility
news than other frames.
In addition, this study discusses whether the frames changed over the 19 months period,
if yes, how. Two research questions are thus developed.
RQ2: How did the news frames vary from April 2009 through October 2010 in Chinese
RQ3:
One more research question is then asked to discuss the relationship between news
frames and news sources.
RQ4:
METHOD
Data source
News
Broadcast
through 7:30 every evening.
The transcripts for 203 items of CCTV News Broadcast with H1N1 as the main top-
ic
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic globally) in China.
Coding of Frame isibility
Framing H1n1 inFluenza in CHinese TV news
23
The unit of analysis is the whole news story with a news lead introduced by anchors.
aware of the correspondence between the questions and the frames. The questions were
given to coders in broken sequence. They evaluated each news item by giving a “yes”
(1) or “no” (0) to each question. For example, for the story entitled “The scientists of our
country have already developed a specific and sensitive diagnosis method of H1N1 flu”
(CCTV News Broadcast, April, 30, 2009), the coders answered “yes” to two questions
corresponding with attribution of responsibility frame, two questions corresponding with
human interest frame, and one question corresponding with humanity frame, whereas they
gave “no” to the rest of questions.
Coding of News Source
that provided data and interpretation to help the public understand the unfolding strip of
and the particular topic, the numbers for each of the following nine types of sources were
coded in the current project: (1) domestic government officials: domestic government
foreign government officials: government officials, departments, offices, and bureaus, at
scientists: scientists, researchers and experts from universities, research institutions, and
situations; (7) victims: victims of the H1N1 flu, including the patients, their families or
H1N1 flu, and (9) other:
other sources not listed above.
All sources were coded for each story. The frequency with which the sources were used
in each news program was counted.
Coding of frames and sources was conducted by one of the authors and a graduate stu-
dent who was trained per the coding protocols. Ten percent of all news stories from CCTV
News Broadcast were coded to check the intercoder reliability. For framing visibility and
news source, the intercoder reliability (Cohen’s kappa) is .90 and .95 respectively. Both are
acceptable for the content analysis (Wimmer & Dominick, 2004).
Data Analysis
frames, a principal component analysis with varimax-rotated factor solution was conducted.
humanity frame, were omitted, since they
up the score of each corresponding question and averaging it by the number of questions,
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a multi-item scales was constructed to indicate the visibility for each established frame
Independent samples t-test was used to compare frame visibilities as well as sources cit-
ed in the news program. General Linear Model (repeated measures) with Bonferroni adjust-
ment was used to examine the difference among visible frames within the program. Pearson
Correlation was used to assess the relationship between news frames and news sources.
TABLE 1
Varimax-Rotated Factor Solution for Framing Questions
Frames
Attribution of
Responsibility
Human
Interest
Conict Economic
Consequence
Does the story suggest that some
level of government has the ability to
alleviate the problem?
.520 -.066 .008 -.025
Does the story suggest that
some level of the government is
responsible for the issue/problem?
.484 .122 .266 .010
Does the story suggest solution(s) to
the problem/issue?
.512 .228 -.055 .199
Does the story suggest the problem
requires urgent action?
.591 .213 -.071 .031
Does the story employ the
relationship between two or more
individuals?
.158 .638 .132 .028
Does the story employ adjectives
or personal vignettes that generate
feelings of outrage, empathy-caring,
sympathy, or compassion?
.171 .442 .290 .113
Does the story go into the personal
or private lives of the actors?
.026 .767 .081 .110
Does the story provide a human
example or ―human voice on the
issue?
.140 .838 .087 .005
Does one party-individual-group-
country criticize another?
.157 -.037 .711 -.017
Does the story refer to two sides
or to more than two sides of the
problem or issue?
.026 .078 .515 -.003
Framing H1n1 inFluenza in CHinese TV news
25
Does the story reect disagreement
between parties/individuals-groups-
countries?
-.098 .243 .463 -.058
Does the story mention the reason
of the conict/disagreement?
-.059 .172 .939 -.042
Is there a mention of nancial losses
now or in the future?
.007 -.039 .012 .956
Is there a reference to economic
consequences of not pursuing a
course of action?
.019 .007 -.008 .400
Is there a mention of the cost/degree
of expense involved?
.065 .150 -.051 .424
RESULTS
in H1N1 coverage in Chinese evening news program, the factor analysis reports establishes
four of them as expected, except for the humanity frame, as aforementioned. Table 2 reports
the frequencies and percentages of the presence of news frames in CCTV News Broadcast.
TABLE 2
Frequencies and Percentages of the Presence of News Frames in CCTV News Broadcast
Frames
CCTV News Broadcast
N % within the program
Attribution of Responsibility 121 59.6
Human interest 43 21.2
Economic consequences 7 3.5
Conict 1 .5
H1 predicts the most visible frame within CCTV News Broadcast will be the attribution
of responsibility frame. Table 3 reports the GLM results. Within CCTV News Broadcast,
Bonferroni method demonstrates that, the score of the responsibility
higher than those of other three frames (p< .01). The value of the human interest frame is
economic consequence frame and the conict frames, although
TABLE 3
Visibility of News Frames and Bonferroni Test Within CCTV News Broadcast
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CCTV News Braodcast
Frames Mean Grouping
Attribution of Responsibility .27 (.29) A
Human interest .10 (.21) B
Conict .01 (.02) C
Economic .01 (.07) C
Total .39 (.40)
N=203; p <0.01
Note: The high to low means are marked with alphabetical order. Means with the same letter are
not signicantly different
With regard to RQ2, Figure 1 illustrates that the visibility of the attribution of respon-
sibility frame was always kept in top over the time period under this study. The visibility of
human interest frame was relatively high in May and December 2009. The visibility of the
economic consequence frame was high in October, while the visibility of the conict frame
reached its highest point in November 2009. Then all the frames tended to be invisible after
January 2010.
FIGURE 1
Frames Over Time in CCTV News Broadcast
RQ3 asks about the pattern of source use in CCTV News Broadcast. According to Table
Foreign governments is
CCTV News Broadcast when H1N1 being covered.
Framing H1n1 inFluenza in CHinese TV news
27
TABLE 4
Means and SDs for Sources Use in and Bonferroni Test Within CCTV News Broadcast
CCTV News Broadcast
Mean (SD) Grouping
Domestic government ofcials, departments, ofces, and
bureaus, at the central, provincial, and local levels
.60 (.81) A
Government ofcials, departments, ofces, and bureaus,
at the central, provincial, and local levels of the foreign
countries
.56 (1.61) A
International ofcial organizations .26 (.53) B
Scientists, researchers and experts from universities,
research institutions, and health administration agencies
.08 (.28) B C
Non-governmental organizations, including the Red Cross
or other global and local organizations that focus on lending
assistance during crisis situations
.04 (.23) B C
Media organizations and people who work in the media .02 (.16) B C
Ordinary citizens who were not victims of H1N1 u .00 (.07) C
Victims of the H1N1 u (including the patients and the
families or friends of the patient, and the people whose lives
are negatively affected by the u)
.00 (.00)
N=203; p <0.01
Note: The high to low means are marked with alphabetical order. Means with the same letter are
not signicantly different.
RQ4 asks whether certain sources and the news frames will be correlated with each oth-
er. In CCTV News Broadcast
of domestic government officials and the attribution of responsibility frame (r p<
.001), and the human interest frame (rp< .001). In addition, while the conict frame
and the source of scientists is positively associated (rp< .001), the human interest
rp< .01),
DISCUSSION
This study establishes predefined news frames embedded in the H1N1 coverage in the
Chinese premier television news program, CCTV News Broadcast. Findings reveal the
frame visibility and source use within the program, as well as the correlation between
frames and source use. This study partially supports the theoretical notions that the nature
and editorial stance of mass media, mainly derived from a particular media system, can
affect risk-related coverage. The state-owned media in China adopts a descriptive and
straight-line style to report the health-related risk, with low level of frame visibility and
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small numbers of sources cited in its coverage.
Specifically, the attribution of responsibility is the most visible frame. This frame is
mainly concerned about the positive aspects of government’s responses to the public health
crisis. There were a number of items approving the measures taken by the Chinese govern-
ment for dealing with H1H1 crisis. For example, “The Ministry of Health’s Mechanism of
-
vention and Control Was Highly Praised by Other Countries” (August 21, 2009). This is not
surprising though, since by nature, Chinese media serve as the publicity channel controlled
by the Party’s propaganda system.
The human interest frame also has the highest visibility next to the attribution of re-
sponsibility frame in CCTV News Broadcast, compared with other detectable frames. While
-
conflict frame’ visibility is relatively
low. Government’s censorship may restrict the ability of the media to dig into risk issues
or topics that may concern the public. On the other hand, journalists’ self-censorship may
play a vital role in news production (e.g., Beaudion, 2007, p.521). In many cases, they tend
-
ernment, social sectors and the public. This “rule of game” helps them bypass the punish-
ment from their ideological or administrative superiors, doing no harm to their job security.
Meanwhile, the visibility of the economic consequence frame is not highly visible in CCTV
News Broadcast-
nomic concerns relevant to this particular public health crisis.
Generally speaking, CCTV News Broadcast presented “government-granted” coverage
of H1N1 pandemic that turned a crisis situation into a positive publicity opportunity for the
on a “play-by-play” daily journalistic routine. The news stories about the pandemic pro-
unknown disease.
When shifting the light to source used in H1N1 coverage, we notice that domestic
dominant information source in this program, who are usually
regarded by the media and the public as the most important and reliable source in risky or
crisis situations. On the contrary, CCTV News Broadcast cited information from ordinary
people only once, making it the least used source.
In addition, CCTV News Broadcast adopted more institutional sources with rare alterna-
tive information sources. The top three sources included domestic government, foreign gov-
criticism and complains over media coverage of SARS in 2003 (Zheng, 2009), Chinese
sources to the public as much as they can at the early stage of a health crisis. Media select-
As for the correlation between news frames and news sources in H1N1 coverage in
Framing H1n1 inFluenza in CHinese TV news
29
CCTV News Broadcast
with both the attribution of responsibility frame and the human interest frame. On one
hand, when covering a personally relevant story in a health risk situation, the state-owned
as
the primary source. On the other hand, as already discussed, government and its agencies
may take advantage of being quoted in news to strategically respond to the public’s call for
-
inated the tones of Chinese news stories about H1N1, to a certain extent.
Limitations and Future Studies
of source use, the limitations should be noted here and be addressed in future studies.
First, this study focuses on “generic” frames proposed and repeatedly tested in previous
health issues, should be considered in next study. Likewise, in addition to those universally
applicable news frames, more literature reviews and theoretical elaborations are needed to
discuss the possible existence of unique frames only visible in Chinese news.
Moreover, this study chooses the state-level media outlet, and does not include more
market-oriented channels at regional or local level. Future studies must select more outlets
the U.S., whose people were also severely affected by H1N1, should be incorporated in
-
sis in framing analysis using a deductive approach, one frame, humanity, revised from the
moral
Finally, since a considerate part of the video footages for the program under study were
not available, this study examines transcripts instead. The information concerning news
frames that may be only available in visual materials cannot be reported for this study.
The next project should include an analysis based on both textual and visual materials to
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Author’s Biodata:
Jingfei Liu is a current doctoral student in educational psychology at the University of
Missouri, Columbia. Liu received her bachelor’s degree in broadcasting news from Com-
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32
munication University of China in 2008. She worked with China Central Television before
joining Iowa State University’s master program in journalism and mass communication in
2009, where she received her master’s degree in 2012. Email: jl6w5@mail.missouri.edu
Gang Han is Assistant Professor in Greenlee School of Journalism and Communication at
Iowa State University. Han previously was Assistant Professor at the Department of Com-
munication, SUNY at Fredonia. He studied mass communication in S. I. Newhouse School
of Public Communications at Syracuse University, where he received his doctorate in 2007.
Before coming to the U.S., Han taught in Journalism School at Fudan University from 2000
through 2004. Email: ghan@iastate.edu
Corresponding Author’s Address:
ghan@iastate.edu
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES,
2
(1), 33-66
ISSN: 2224-2716
Copyright © 2012 Overseas Education College of Xiamen University
Hey, ‘Red China’ is Brand New:
A Case Study of China’s Self-depicted National Identity on
1
Roujie Wang
Xiamen University
The Western representation of the others and the self-representation of the others have received
varying degree of scholarly interest, with the former being extensively explored and the latter
being largely ignored. Based on the social semiotic interpretation of Chinese visual showcase
‘Experience China’, this project attempts to contribute to the study of the self-representation of
non-Western countries. This dissertation intends to answer the question how China depicts its
national identity to both its internal and external audience. The exploration of the video is situ-
ated in the cross examination of nationalism and self-Orientalism. As demonstrated throughout
this research, nationalism, as the layered meaning of the video, is invoked by the government to
cement the national identity of its internal audience and brand itself to the global audience. By
stimulating the resonance of the global audience, awakening the national pride and highlighting
no threat to others. However, the further probe into the representation of Chinese women and
Chinese course of modernisation reveals a contrastive expression of Chinese national identity. On
one hand, by superimposing various traditional elements appealing to Western sensibility, women
image of China. On the other hand, the video portrays a modern China capable of alleviating pov-
erty and boosting technology. However, the representation of modern China is largely restricted
from Chinese immense yearning for achieving modernity and the Chinese Communist Party’s
concern of Western ideological threats. China, though with certain degree of resistance, slides into
self-Orientalism in depicting its national identity.
Keywords: National Identity, Nationalism, Self-Orientalism, Nation Branding
INTRODUCTION
‘Soft power’ coined by Joseph Nye (2004) refers to a country’s capability of achieving the
goals through attraction. Differing from hard power which closely ties to the military and
economic strength of a country, soft power emerges from the country’s attractiveness of
culture, political ideology, and policies. Soft power is often waived in the self-representation
of a country in the form of nation branding. In the era of information expansion, the global
spotlight is invariably on those who are capable of capturing global attention (Ding, 2011;
1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Roujie Wang. E-mail: roujiewang@xmu.edu.cn
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34
have actively participated in the new game of politics-a game ‘not about oil and trading
to those non-Western countries which are eager to represent themselves and keep their
national image at the same pace with their fast changing reality (Anholt, 2006; Gertner,
2007). However, compared to the investigations into the Western-produced representations
of others, the examination of how others represent themselves has largely been overlooked
(Yan, 2009).
With the acceleration of globalisation, a couple of scholars have been celebrating for the
believe that countries in the process of self-branding have casted aside the colonial dis-
course in perceiving self and others (Roy, 2007). With keen interest in testifying this state-
ment, I would like to probe into one particular branding case of China and critically look
into its self-representation. Self-representation is often entangled with the self-depiction of
national identity. Hence, ‘national identity’ will be the key term leading our investigation.
-
Nation branding is often endowed with multi-layered goals. Consolidating nationalism
-
national identity (Roy, 2007). To interpret the visual signs released, we are able to evalu-
ate whether nationalism has been incorporated into the branding narrative. However, my
research interest goes far beyond that. Inspired by Said’s (2003) Orientalism, the deeper
concern of this project is to unfold whether China, as one of the others, has portrayed itself
conforming to the self-Orientalistic discourse—seeing itself from the Occidental-centric
point of view. In particular, the end of the Cold War has rendered the First World as ‘the
apparently undisputed model of progress’ (Lee, 1997). Struggling for modernity, the Orient
thus viewed the achievement of the First World as the standard for prosperity and yielded to
the Western representation (Pletsch, 1981; Worsley, 1984; Yan, 2009). Hence, a probe into
Chinese self-representation might contribute to the unresolved debate upon the relationship
China has long been associated with negative impressions such as ‘a guarded image,
al., 2007). This stereotyped impression is resented by China since the backward image is
China’ (Xiao, 2002: 285). To redress the stereotype, China has devoted to displaying a new
national identity. Produced by the Information Office of the State Council of China and
to coincide with President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States, the national promotional
video named ‘Experience China’ was launched in the ‘World Crossroads’- Times Square of
New York on January 17
th
of 2011. With red as theme colour and emotive music as back-
ground, the 60-second video clip attempts to unfold a new image of China through the vi-
sual presentation of 59 celebrities from its various sectors.
Observation of the publicity video demands an approach that is sensitive to the
multi-layered meanings of images and signs. Hence, visual analysis particularly social se-
miotic approach is adopted in unveiling the visual representation of China. The following
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
35
section starts with a critical review of the pertinent literature. A brief overview of the cur-
sets the scene. I then address the dynamics of national identity in the contexts of nation-
alism and Orientalism respectively, followed by a sketch of debates over nationalism and
national identity in socialist China. Drawing upon the literature, a conceptual framework is
established based on the perspectives of nationalism as enhancement of national identity,
self-Orientalism as consequences of Orient-Occident interaction and modernity-pursuing,
as well as an eye-catching strategy. The section ends by outlining the research objectives
and generating a general research question concerning the self-representation of China. To
-
cal design. An intensive interpretation of selected scenes and a comprehensive appreciation
of the video as a whole will be invited in the critical discussion of how China represents it-
self. This project then concludes with implications generated by the answers to the research
question as well as an outline of future study on the self-representation of the others.
THEORETICAL CHAPTER
Literature Review
Nation Branding and National Identity
Nation branding is an effort to adopt commercial strategies to manage or wield the soft
between national branding and the construction of national identity. On one hand, nation
branding is a part of foreign policy to distinguish us from others
identity (Kim & Dittmer 1993; Widler, 2007; Roy, 2007; De Chernatony, 2008; Kaneva
choices of elites as they re-imagine national identity’ (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). On
the other hand, political scientists nowadays are inclined to study identity as a political
resource which can be exploited in branding nations (Kim & Dittmer, 1993). However,
some tended to be sceptical of the effects of nation branding since the government-inspired
communications consisted of only ‘a tiny fraction of the information received by people’
about the branded nations (Blechman, 2005). Additionally, nation branding embraces
in exercising centralised control over communications (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011; Wang,
2008). Nonetheless, nation branding is still a common practice for countries especially
Pasquinelli, 2010; Lee, 2010; Bolin & Per, 2010).
Nationalism and National Identity
Opinions on the correlation between nationalism and national identity are contested.
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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Some state that national identity is an overarching emotion towards the nation and thus
nationalism is one of the consequences of national identity (Blank & Schmidt, 2003).
This sort of national identity approximates the discursive identity held by individuals.
To the contrary, some believe that an ideology of nationalism is the precondition, rather
than the consequence of national identity. And thus, national identity is not given and can
be ‘created, nurtured, and carefully promoted by state authorities’ (Watson, 1993). Some
have resonance with this idea delineating that nationalism is able to assist governmental
activities in polishing national images and sustaining the state by psychologically uniting
the people (Bolin & Per, 2010; Ng-Quinn, 1998). By instilling strong feelings of loyalty,
nationalism serves as the binding force between people and its territory and will reinforce
the national identity (Brinton, 1953; Kohn, 1955). The declination of nationalism would
result in people’s insecurity of national identity (Billig, 1995). This is particularly relevant
In addition to the disagreement on the relation between nationalism and national identi-
ty, doctrinal dispute over the construction of national identity remains unsettled. Berger and
collective identity, for instance, national identity. For them, imposing ‘identity’ on imper-
identity does exist in the reciprocal relations between individual and the nations (Oriol &
identity as two distinctive identities is unhelpful (Edensor, 2002). National identity will
not be generated without the constant interaction between individual and society. Similar-
ly, Melucci (1982) regarded national identity as a byproduct of collective actions, during
-
ero-recognition’. Sciolla (1983) further argued that the interaction between individual and
of the national identity. Schlesinger (1991a) instead situated national identity in the tem-
poral and spatial dimension. For him (1991a), identity construction is not a static process,
rather a dynamic and complex process of inclusion and exclusion. The process of inclusion
assists in identifying ‘us’ from ‘them’ while the process of exclusion sets boundaries be-
tween ‘us’ and ‘them’. Lastly, Anderson (1991) stressed media’s role in cultivating individ-
uals’ national consciousness by connecting people in a common discourse and facilitating
the creation of imagined community.
Orientalism, Self-Orientalism and National Identity
shaped the nationalism and national identity of the previous colonies (Gellner, 1983;
Frankenberg & Mani, 1993). The end of colonial occupation does not signal the end of
used to be colonised, national identity is not merely the country’s static and monotonic self-
perception of ‘who I am’ and inevitably includes a constant self-struggle of ‘who I was’,
totalisation of “heterogeneous ‘selves’ and ‘subjectivities’ ” (Radhakrishnan, 1993).
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
37
Orientalism is one of the most influential postcolonial theories concerning how the
West constructs the identity of the Orient. Said’s Orientalism is the milestone of this school
of thoughts. Mainly based on the works of Jacque Derrida, Antonio Gramsci and Michel
-
an-Atlantic power over the Orient’ and ‘a political doctrine willed over the Orient’ (Said,
2003: 6, 7). It is ‘a style of thought, based on an ontological and epistemological distinction
between Orient and Occident’ and an ideology to justify the subjugation of the deprived
-
sitional supremacy’ (Said, 2003). Concentrating on the ‘texuality and the body of writing
and representing, Orientalism in the eyes of Said is a Foucauldian discourse and a represen-
tation system able to construct an unchangeable Orient (Yan, 2009: 296).
Said’s Orientalism has nonetheless received wide-ranging criticism. Lewis (1982) and
Colley (1992) disprove Said’s ahistorical approach of viewing Orientalism as a mere dis-
course of power relationship. They challenged Said’s views by pointing out that Britain’s
largest others was not the Orient but France in the eighteen and nineteen century. Similar-
ly, Kopf (1980) contended that Said’s work was inadequate of historical precision. By the
-
stability of imperial culture. Siding with this idea, Bhabha (1994) disagreed on Said’s view
of colonial power as ‘signifiers of stability’ and suggested that the colonial system was
constantly challenged by ‘diachronic forms of history and narrative’ (p. 102). He further
pointed out that the asymmetric Foucauldian discourse also embraced logic of resistance,
-
ing on post-structuralism, Bhabha only attended to subaltern’s ‘rhetorical acts of resistance’
leaving the material level of colonialism untouched (Hassan, 2002: 49). Orientalism is
also challenged by Chinese intellectual Chen Xiaomei (2002) who put forward ‘Occiden-
the Occident. Occidentalism in China, from her perspective, aims primarily at serving for
Occidentalism. The former is utilised by the government to support the nationalism while
the latter regards Western others ‘as a metaphor for a political liberation against ideological
oppression within a totalitarian society’ (2002: 5). Although differing from Orientalism in
aims, Chen further admitted that Occidentalism is the product of Western Orientalism.
In response to some criticism especially those concerning the potential anti-Westernism
competing alter ego was a ‘mere academic wool-gathering’ aiming at unveiling the devel-
opment and maintenance of every culture (p. 332). Examining Orientalism as a discourse,
he stated, has enabled European culture to acquire a more clear understanding of the Orient.
Orientalism deals with Western construction of Orient’s identity and places the Orient
in a relatively passive position. On the other hand, self-Orientalism, as an extension of Ori-
entalism, suggested that the Orient itself has participated in the ‘construction, reinforcement
and circulation’ of its national identity (Yan, 2009: 297). Self-Orientalism looks at how the
Western representation of the Orient has been incorporated into the self-image of the East
self-Orientalism is the self-representation of the Orient to cater for the Western conception.
Orientalism discourse is produced and reinforced in the interaction with Western ideology.
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Secondly, self-Orientalism results from the Orient’s quest for modernity. The West is dei-
the opposite. Thirdly, self-Orientalism is utilised as a strategy to display a unique identity
and manipulated to reinforce the differences, hence, renders the Orient visible in the mod-
ern world. To illustrate strategic self-Orientalism, Mitchell (2004) took the music of a Sin-
gapore singer Dick Lee as an example. He pointed out that self-Orientalism was a ‘playful
form of identity politics’ allowing a self-representation of ‘exotic fetishisations and fasci-
nations’, and bypassing the previous stereotypes (p. 110). Lee’s attempts of Asian-Western
syncretic music was commented as a good balance between ‘the notion of a pan-Asian
identity with the use of clever parodying and inversion of Western imagery and musical idi-
oms’ (Iwabuchi & Muecke & Thomas, 2004: 5) Similarly, Asian director Ang Lee’s movies
discourses (Chan, 2004).
2
Chow (1995) further mentioned that the attitudes towards strate-
-
-
-
structing an exotic identity, merchant elites in New York City’s Chinatown have invoked
inevitable consequence in the process of the Orient-Occident interaction or consequence of
modernisation or even as an intentional strategy is nonetheless relevant to our study.
National Identity, Nationalism and Socialist China
between these two identities, the chief focus of our discussion will be on the former. In
nationalism to construct China’s national identity is burgeoning. A great number of scholars
believed that the role of CCP in constructing national identity has been largely weakened
1995). With communist ideology losing its global popularity, CCP found it even more
interests (Huang, 1995; Zhao, 1997; Zheng, 1999). Thus some held that CCP has resorted
to Chinese culture and tradition to ground the national identity (Scalapino, 1993). Hence,
identity (Wilson, 1998). However, some further argued that the primary focus of the state-
the economic modernisation (Clausen, 1998; He, & Guo, 2000). Cultural nationalism
2 Lee' s movie based on the traditional Chinese
‘
Wuxia
’
(Chinese Sword-Fighting movie)
Crouching Tiger,
Hidden Dragon
(2000) was a great success. Inspired by Lee, a group of Chinese directors has begun to explore
Wuxia films for Western audience waiving a global return of Wuxia films. Subsequently, academic debate has
been triggered over the possible self-Orientalism of Chinese Wuxia films.
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
39
2000). Gries (1999) disagreed with the reductionist view of regarding Chinese cultural
nationalism as elitism and the overlook of the popular sentiment stemming from Chinese
‘face nationalism’. Zheng (1999) challenged that the deep root of ‘face nationalism’ is not
about national dignity but anti-foreignism accompanied by the anti-invasion in Chinese
was instrumental for Chinese fulfilment of its national identity as a ‘victim’. Callahan
(2004) on the other hand, questioned the effects of relying external others on portraying
self since humiliation politics was not peculiar to China. Although scholars disagreed on
the relationship between CCP-sponsored nationalism and the construction of Chinese
possesses particular focus on patriotism which addresses ‘the loyalty to the existing
State’(Wu, 1991; Pye, 1993; Zhao, 1998; He, & Guo, 2000). It is true that national identity
of China at such complexity interwoven into its particular history and culture does not lend
state-led construction of national identity is our focus of study.
Conceptual Framework
The research project primarily addresses the national identity depicted by Chinese
government in its publicity video during its nation branding. Nation branding, as the
background of this project, takes two forms: beautifying a nation from top to bottom and
form -the governmental effort of constructing national identity. The analysis of the video
will be situated in the conceptual framework of nationalism and self-Orientalism.
Nationalism embraces two meanings. First it refers to the process of establishing an in-
dependent state based on share identity (Billig, 1995; Harris, 1997). Secondly, it describes
the authorities’ efforts in creating an assertive national self-awareness (Harris, 1997). In
this project, we only examine its second meaning. By drawing individuals’ attention to ‘the
(Billig, 1995). In the process of self-examination and recognition of others, individual’s
national identity is constructed and solidified gradually. However, the national identity
self-representation of the nation by state elites will shape both the internal and external
perception of that particular country. Hence, nationalism is often utilised by the elites as a
tool to cement the identity of its people and ensure that national identity held by people and
the authority remains congruent. Furthermore, once nationalism has been invoked, it has a
tendency to ‘project [projecting] itself back in time to some mythical origin to erase the dif-
ferent temporalities of the past, so that all history becomes a history of national emergence’
(Dirlik, 1996: 106). During this course, nationalism tends to be akin to Orientalism: trapped
in the ‘metonymic reductionism’ highlighting some particular traits but sweeping aside oth-
ers inconsistent with its self-image (Ibid.).
Especially for China, its nationalism and the construction of national identity has been
tied closely to its history of semi-colonisation (Gellner, 1983). The colonial power penetrat-
ing into colonies cannot easily be erased even after the end of colonial occupation. Hence,
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China, like other nation-states previously colonised, might be subject to a postcolonial
been produced and represented by the West based on its Orientalistic imagination (Said,
2003). However, not only the West but also the Orient has engaged in the representation
of themselves. As an integral part of Orientalism, self-Orientalism has offered a critical
perspective for this project to examine how China represents itself. The previous literature
review reveals that a self-Orientalistic discourse results from the long-standing interaction
between the Orient and the West, as well as the Orient’s assumption of Westernisation as
precondition of modernity (Yan, 2009). Furthermore, self-Orientalism was sometimes ad-
opted intentionally by the Orient as a strategy to highlight the exotic identity and attract
global attention (Ibid.; Iwabuchi, Muecke, & Thomas, 2004). By interweaving Chinese cul-
ture and history into interpretation, this project attempts to critically examine the self-rep-
resentation of China and see nationalism and self-Orientalism, if any, are embedded in the
visual presentation of national identity.
Research Objectives and Research Questions
The purpose of this research is to better understand the self-representation of the others
by examining the visual representation of Chinese national identity in its branding video.
Positioning Chinese self-representation in the theoretical examination of nationalism and
self-Orientalism, this project hopes to contribute to the understanding of how non-Western
displayed its national identity. This, in turn, will lead to a further study of how non-Western
overcomes the Orientalistic hurdles to construct their national identity ‘in full complexity,
heterogeneity, and dynamism’ (Hung, 2003: 276). This will not only be an attempt of the
forward for both the Orient and the West to look at diverse civilisations in full respect.
Additionally, with the rise of China, a revisit of Orientalism will shed some light on the
debate over the relationship between Western postmodernity and Asian modernisation
departure. However, this research distinguishes itself by taking a social semiotic approach
to uncover those impalpable behind the images, by both looking at the national identity
construction in nationalism and self-Orientalism, and by inviting Chinese culture and
history into the overarching interpretation.
The preceding background presentation and theoretical discussion have generated the
following research question:
In the campaign of nation branding, how does Chinese government depict its national
identity to the internal and external audience through its publicity video ‘Experience Chi-
na’?
This question can be further dismantled into two sub-questions:
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Representation, especially visual representation, both in its presentation and reception
plays a pivotal role in constructing identities (Woodward, 2002). Ferdinand de Saussure,
the founder of structural linguistics articulated that it is through language, a symbolic
system encompassing both words and images, that identity is constructed (Ibid.). The
a ‘particularly affective and direct ways’ of identity forming and expressing (Turino,
1999: 221). Hence, a close examination of visual resources would open up possibilities to
perceive how a particular country constructs its national identity through visual narrative.
However, the quantitative approach of visual analysis is inadequate in interpreting meaning
of a domain of representation (Bell, 2001) and thus, I take a qualitative approach, namely
social semiotic analysis, to unfold how China is represented. By studying the image
subjects, we are able to have a clear perspective about the idea of image makers (Bank,
2001).
Social Semiotic Analysis
Semiotic was defined as ‘the science of the life of signs in society’ (Saussure, 1974).
3
Hence, akin to verbal language, semiotic resource such as images, texts and music can also
be viewed as a form of communications operated within the meaning system (Hodge &
Kress, 1988). To exploit the semiotic resource, one is able to unearth the meanings hidden
beneath. Involving both description and interpretation of semiotic resources, social semiotic
approach is one of the most useful tools to facilitate this kind of exploitation. (Jewitt, &
Oyama, 2001).
Differing from the Paris school semiotics whose key word is ‘code’ rather than ‘re-
source’, social semiotic analysis allows meanings of visual language being examined with-
in a broader social and cultural contexts, and thus, renders meanings much more open-end-
ed (Ibid., & Silverman, 1983). To adopt social semiotic analysis, our investigation into
the promotional video will not necessarily conform to a thematic coding framework or a
rigid system of inter-textual references.
4
Instead, this approach invites a multi-dimensional
description and interpretation of the video. By weaving Chinese history and culture into in-
terpretation, this method will dig out the representational meaning, interactive meaning and
3 ‘The only difference between them being that semiology is preferred by Europeans, out of deference to
Saussure’s coinage of the term, and semiotics tends to be preferred by English speakers, out of deference to
the American Peirce’.
See
Hawkes, T. (1977).
4 For how codes are used in semiotic,
See
Eco, U. (1976). For the application and explanation of self-
referential intertextuality
See
Goldman, R., & Papson, S. (1996).
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compositional meaning of the images and signs in the video.
5
-
cation of visual meanings as denotation and connotation. For Barthes (1993), denotation
refers to the application of language to refer to what it says while connotation means the
application of language to refer to something other than what is said. By investigating
the denotation of the video, we are able to observe how the video producers depict China
through image and signs (photographic analogue). On the other hand, connotation encrypt-
-
al contexts. Hence, we might interpret the visual representation of Chinese national identity
within our theoretical framework of nationalism and self-Orientalism and in the peculiar
historical and cultural contexts of China.
The probe into the interactive meanings of the video is particular useful in this project
whose main content is the group presentation of Chinese celebrities. Studying the interac-
tive meanings of semiotic resource will facilitate the description of the ‘complex and subtle
relations between the represented and the viewer’ (Jewitt, & Oyama, 2001:145). In the pub-
Hence, by looking at the factors of ‘contact’, ‘distance’ and ‘point of view’, we are able to
uncover the relevant messages coded in the presenters in the video.
The compositional interpretation or ‘the good eye’ termed by Gillian Rose (2007) fo-
cuses primarily on the image itself and its compositional modality. By carefully analysing
the components of compositional interpretation such as mise-en-scene, montage and sound,
this research would unfold the real intention of the video producers (Monaco, 1981). In this
way, we are able to see whether nationhood or exotic differences are intentionally made sa-
Limitations of Social Semiotic Approach
However, this approach is not perfect and inevitably encompasses a slice of distinct
limitations. Firstly, the representativeness and replicability of the research results are often
questioned due to this method’s ‘preference for detailed readings of individual images’
of Chinese self-representation rather than an empirical generalisation of how the Orient
represents itself.
The second drawback of this approach also stems from its subjectivity. The selection of
selection of the scenes is guided by the research interest of nationalism and self-Oriental-
ism. Hence, special attention will be poured into images containing manifest signs relevant
to these two themes. I acknowledge that the selection process can hardly be free of my sub-
jectivity and assumption. However, as I previously put forward, the research results are not
meant to be a generalisation.
The third shortcoming concerns the balance between over-interpretation and under-in-
terpretation of the visuals. As Berger (2005: 27) stated ‘all texts are related to other texts,
5 The three meanings mentioned can also be called as
‘
representation
’
,
‘
orientation
’
and
‘
organization
’
.
See
Lemke (1989) and Lemke (1992) .
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
43
to varying degrees’, the connotation meanings of the images might vary with different in-
reasonable interpretation and locate the precise middle point between over-interpretation
and under-interpretation. This is where the most painful, as well as the most beautiful, part
of social semiotic-there is always academic potential waiting to be tapped.
and the viewers’ actual reading practice (McHoul, 1991; Iedema, 2001). Differing from ac-
tual readings, our project follows a set of strict rules in unfolding the layered meanings and
involves some degree of technical interpretation. The seemingly sophisticated way of visual
-
picion and intuitive response’ (Iedema, 2001: 200).
-
-
cumstance of the video making often falls beyond our investigation. Without the limitation
of time, I would welcome further interpretation taking full consideration of the video creat-
ing process.
Research Design
Selection of Scenes
The 60-second video clip involves fourteen distinct themes with respective captions of
‘Stunning Chinese Beauty’, ‘Leading-Edge Chinese Agriculture’, ‘Influential Chinese
Wealth’, ‘Extraordinary Chinese People’, ‘Aesthetic Chinese Design’, ‘Trend-Setting
Chinese Supermodels’, ‘Chinese Space Travel’, ‘Thriving Chinese Athletes’, ‘Thought-
provoking Chinese Scholarship’, ‘Enchanting Chinese art’, ‘Captivating Chinese Dialogue’,
‘Inspiring Chinese Bravery’, ‘ Award-Winning Chinese Talent’ and ‘Chinese Friendship/
China’. These themes have been further elaborated in 15 scenes and 23 shots.
6
Due to time
constraints and the length of the dissertation, examining all the scenes in full details is
virtually impossible.
Hence, my primary focus is on those scenes most pertinent to my research interest,
namely nationalism and self-Orientalism. Guided by this principle, I develop my two main
focuses into three sub-themes to facilitate the selection (See Table 1). In terms of national-
acknowledge that nationalism is a broad theme and the selection criteria vary from diverse
understanding of the concept. Our selection criteria are mainly based on Billig’s (1995)
articulation of nationalism as relationship between nation and the world. Hence, scenes
concerning international performance of China, and communication between China and the
world have been chosen. To investigate whether China’s self-representation has conformed
scenes depicting the past and/or present of China. The representation of Chinese women
is particularly pertinent to this project since Chinese women are the discursive representa-
6 The 60 second video is the combination of two 30-second version clips.
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readings because Orientalism can be an integral expression of modernity (Dirlik, 1996).
TABLE 1
Scenes Selection
Research Interest Relevant Themes Scenes Selected
Nationalism China in the World Thriving Chinese Athletes(international activity)
Captivating Chinese Dialogue(communication
between China and the world)
Award-Winning Chinese Talent (global
recognition)
Self-Orientalism Chinese Women Stunning Chinese beauty (2 different scenes)
Past/Present
Tradition/Modernity
Leading-Edge Chinese Agriculture (past/
present)
Chinese Space Travel (present/modernity)
Methodological Procedures
As previously mentioned, our analysis aims at answering the research questions
by unfolding the threefold meaning of selected scenes. The analysis starts with the
identification of the presenters’ social roles. This will be followed by examining the
representational meanings of the scenes. Denotation meanings of the scenes are acquired
by a general description of the visuals and background images. Special attention has been
poured into the dressing and makeup of the presenters and the selection of background
images since they usually contain symbolic meanings (Barthes, 1983; Emmison, 2000).
The analysis of connotation is contextualised in the vast background of Chinese culture and
history. In terms of interactive meanings, three facets namely ‘contact’, ‘distance’ and ‘point
the presenters and the viewers.
7
especially shots and angles, are closely examined. With regards toward the compositional
meanings, the analysis only attends to the use of montage (cuts) and sounds omitting the
overlapping part with interactive interpretation (shots, angles, point of view). Since all
the selected scenes contains only one shot respectively and the background sounds do not
vary with diverse scenes, the exploration of compositional meanings only tailors to the
perspective is rewarding for grasping the correlation between various scenes/themes and
impartially answering our research questions (Hawkes, 1977).
7 No repetition of interpretation will be addressed to the similar interactive meanings since same
‘
distance
’
and
‘
point of view
’
are applied to most of scenes in this video.
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
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TABLE 2
Design of Research Tools
Scene (Caption)
Social Identity of the P
Representational
Meanings
Denotation
Visuals: dressing, furnishings,
decorations
Background
Image
Connotation
Interactive Meanings
Body Language: pose/gesture/
facial expression
Contact Distance Point of View
Body Language:
pose/gesture/
facial expression
Shots:
e.g. long shot,
medium shot,
close shot,
zoom shot
e.g. low angle
eye-level
high angle
frontality
prole
reverse angle
Compositional Meanings
Montage(Cuts) Sounds
Type
Rhythm
Effects
Type
Relation to the
images
Effects
Note: the methodological procedures are inspired and developed upon the works of Jewitt and
Oyama (2001), Iedema (2001), Rose (2007) and Monaco (1981).
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
Nationalism is visibly manifested in the selected three scenes in the way of evoking the
internal audience’s sense of national pride and displaying a confident and independent
image of China to the global audience. In Scene 1(see Figure 1 in Appendices), sport has
been utilised to awaken nationalism, which is a common practice across continents (Tudor,
1992; O’Donnell, 1994). The powerful intersections of media have facilitated sports as a
binding force and identity enforcement in nation-making (Rowe, McKay, & Miller, 1998).
Five world-famous Chinese athletes are placed in front of the superimposed background
of the National Stadium of China and the Parthenon. The Birds’ Nest stadium is one of the
embodiments of the glorious present of China- a host of Olympics and a nation of strong
and athletics. The manipulation of background images intentionally connecting China
Athletes’ clearly reveals the presenters’ social identity and the use of descriptive adjective
‘thriving’ demonstrates a sense of national pride. The sport suits of outstanding volleyball
player Lang Ping and prominent diver Guo Jingjing further reinforce their social role.
Moreover, the sharp contrast of height between former NBA player Yao Ming (2.29/7’6’’)
and the Chinese professional snooker player Ding Junhui (1.76/ 5’9’’) has created a strong
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instance, with arms hidden behind, legs slightly apart and chests thrown out, Lang and Guo
unfolded the scene and guided the viewers into the group presentation. Furthermore, the
application of eye-level and frontal point of view has constructed an equal and interactive
relationship between the presenters and the viewers (Jewitt & Oyama, 2001). In this way,
the confident presentation of sports celebrities have enabled the cultivation of collective
1991b).
FIGURE 1 One Frame of Scene 1
of a 3 dimensional world map with prominent caption of ‘Captivating Chinese Dialogue’.
to maintain a benign interaction with the viewers. The selection of the world map as a back-
ground image highlights the link between China and the world: Chinese voice can be heard
and China has a say in the world affairs. The demonstration of Chinese voice is closely as-
sociated with its long history of ‘voiceless’. Although the People’s Republic of China was
found in 1949, its political rights of representing itself have long been denied by a couple of
admitted into the United Nations. In this scene, the video reshapes China’s national identi-
power. Nationalism is embedded in the intangible contrast between the present China and
the past China (Gries, 2001).
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
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TABLE 3
Interpretation of Scene 1
Scene
(Caption)
Social Identity of
the Presenter(s)
Representational Meanings
Subjects/
Layered
Meanings
Visuals Background Image
Thriving Chinese Athletes (See right column for caption indicating the name of the presenters)
(Left to Right)
Lang Ping: former
Chinese volleyball
player and former
head coach of
the U.S. women’s
national volleyball
team
Guo Jingjing:
Chinese female
diver, consecutive
champion at
Olympics
Ding Junhui:
Chinese most
successful
professional
snooker player
Yao Ming:
Chinese famous
professional
basketball player
used to play in the
NBA
Deng Yaping:
Chinese table
tennis player who
won six world
championships
and four Olympic
championships
Denotation
Five Chinese
athletes stand
together.
Lang, Guo,
Deng are in
sport suit.
Ding and Yao
in black and
white shirts
respectively.
Superimposition of National
Stadium of China and Parthenon
plus some watermarks of
Chinese ‘lucky cloud’
Connotation
Chinese sport
achievement
in the world;
Collective
moment of
national pride
Chinese sports spirit is in
consistence with that of the West
Harmonization between Western
civilization and non-Western
civilisation
Interactive Meanings
Contact Distance Point of View
Lang and
Guo have
their palms
rest on the
hips with
their elbows
bowed
outward.
Ding folds his
hands on the
chest. Yao
has one hand
on Ding’s
shoulder and
the other in
the pocket.
Deng lowers
her arms
with hands
crossed.
All of them
are wearing
smiles.
Type: Zoom-
out shot/
medium to
long shot
Effect: attract
attention of
the viewers,
and guide the
viewing
Type: eye-level,
frontality
Effect: equality
and engagement
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FIGURE 2 One Frame of Scene 2
TABLE 4
Interpretation of Scene 2
Scene
(Caption)
Social Identity of
the Presenter(s)
Representational
Meanings
Subjects/
Layered
Meanings
Visuals
Background
Image
Captivating Chinese Dialogu
(Left to Right)
Chen Luyu: famous
Chinese anchor
and host,
known as ‘China’s
Oprah’
Shui Junyi:
prominent Chinese
news
anchor afliated
with China Central
Television.
Jing Yidan: ibis.
Bai Yansong: ibis.
Denotation
Four famous Chinese
anchors stand
together. Two of them
are female.
Jing is in informal
attire. Chen is in
Business Casual. Two
male anchors are in
smart casual.
A 3-dimensional
map of the world
Connotation
the voice of China
the condent image of
present China
Communication
between China
and the world;
China has a say
in world affairs.
Interactive
Meanings
Contact
Chen folds her arms over the upper abdomen. Jing
lowers her arms with her hands crossed. Shui thrusts
one hand in his pocket and relax the other. Bai stands
with his arms folded.
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
49
Scene 3 (See Figure 3 in Appendices) is the presentation of two world-class Chinese
caption ‘Award-Winning Chinese Talent’ stresses on the global recognition of their works.
Moreover, to appeals to Western sensibility, the video has applied the English name ‘John
Woo’ instead of Chinese name ‘Wu Yusen’ to label of the director’s identity. The combined
Chinese culture to cater for the diverse. Moreover, the computer-generated background
entire scene implies the international attractiveness of Chinese culture and its potential
to contribute to the world diversity. Since national culture and national power is closely
connected, China is demonstrating its national power when addressing its cultural strength
(Morgenthau, 1985; Huntington, 1993). In this way, China portrays itself as a cultural at-
tractive entity throughout the narrative of cultural nationalism.
FIGURE 3 One Frame of Scene 3
China depicts its national identity in the selected scenes by waiving nationalism in var-
ious ways. In Scene 1, ‘sport’ has been employed as the embodiment of collective glorious
moments as well as the connecting point between China and the world. Sports serve as
the binding force of the ‘imagined community’ and the global communication channel for
nation-states (Anderson, 1991). Hence, China obtains the resonance of the global audience
by displaying itself as a sport super power. In Scene 2, the national identity of China is re-
-
past as a voiceless Third Country. Nationalism in this scene takes its effects by recalling the
past (Bolin & Per, 2010). In Scene 3, nationalism is entangled with the presentation of soft
power. In particular, culture is utilised as a manifestation of national strength and thus, to
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evoke the national pride of Chinese. On the other hand, culture provides possibility to be
shared and appreciated by a broader base of people. Hence, China is depicted as a cultural-
ly appealing country.
TABLE 5
Interpretation of Scene 3
Scene
(Caption)
Social Identity of the
Presenter(s)
Representational Meanings
Subjects/
Layered
Meanings
Visuals Background Image
Award-Winning Chinese Talent
(Left to Right)
John Woo (Wu
Yusen): a famous
Hong Kong-based
lm director with
widely known
Hollywood lms
such as Face/
Off and Mission:
Impossible 2.
Chen Kaike: a
leading gure of the
fth generation of
Chinese cinema
Denotation
Two lm directors
stand side by side.
Both of them are in
suits.
inside the cinema
Connotation
Chinese art is of
global recognition.
Chinese lms are
successful at the
box ofce.
Chinese culture
and art appeals
to the global
audience.
Strong soft power
Interactive
Meanings
Contact
Woo smiles and stands with his arms folded. Wearing
a serious look, Chen thrusts one hand in his pocket
and relaxes the other.
Chinese Women: Exotic Beauty of China
Figure 4 in Appendices). The painting appears to be yellow with age. All the presenters
Asian origin, is serene in a black strapless gown with little pink flowers on her drape.
The simple design of her dress reveals a beauty of mystery. Sitting in refined manner,
Chinese famous actress Zhou Xun is in a white short Qipao.
8
Although Qipao is Chinese
national costume for women, it is ‘today neither commonly worn nor very highly regarded’
(Finnane, 1996). Women wearing this gender-distinctive garment have been regarded as a
Ibid.). Yang Liping, famous for her peacock dance, follows a style
of Chinese ethnic minority wearing a red garment and a dark blue dudou inside.
9
Dudou
8 better known in the West as
‘
cheongsam
’
.
9 Dudou is literally known as
‘
belly cover
’
.
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
51
is a one-piece underwear with ‘cups and straps drawn over the shoulder and tied to the
girth seam at the lower back’ (Shanner, 1996). It used to be an ancient vogue but has been
out of fashion today.
10
Moreover, Yang is also wearing a pair of very long white nails.
Originating in ancient China, nail decoration was developed in accordance with Chinese
idea of women’s nails as symbols of status, good manners and temperament (Nail Art).
recently active in various international fashion shows, is wearing a full-length blue and
white porcelain style skirt. Chinese Blue and white porcelain is the embodiment of delicate
Chinese craftsmanship. When the blue and white porcelain ware was exported to Europe in
17
th
and 18
th
centuries, it was exceedingly popular among aristocrats and its technique was
even imitated by the Europeans (McCabe, 2008). Zhang Ziyi, widely known by the West
after starring in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), is in a green dress with peacock-
feather-like bodice and layered drape. Ancient Chinese believed that peacock is the
manifestation of the phoenix on earth (Wei, 2006).
11
As the counterpart of Chinese dragon
(Chinese pinyin: long), phoenix is widely employed to represent the queen and females.
It is also closely associated to Chinese feudal society. For instance, peacock feathers were
FIGURE 4 One Frame of Scene 4
10 Dudou was popular among rich Chinese women in Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and become common in
Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). See also Shanner (1996).
11 The phoenix which Zhao people (BC 403-BC 222) worshipped stemmed from the large peacock and
swan.
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TABLE 6
Interpretation of Scene 4
Scene
(Caption)
Social Identity of the
Presenter(s)
Representational Meanings
Subjects/
Layered
Meanings
Visuals
Background
Image
Stunning Chinese Beauty
(Left to Right)
Zhang Zilin: a beauty
queen and fashion
model, the rst Miss
World of East Asian
origin (Miss World
2007)
Zhou Xun: Chinese
actress and
singer, one of the
‘Four Young Dan
Actresses’ in China
Yang Liping: a
Chinese director,
choreographer,
famous for her
‘peacock dance’
Fan Bingbing: a
Chinese actress
Zhang Ziyi: a
renowned Chinese
lm actress. She
achieved wider fame
in the West after
starring in Crouching
Tiger, Hidden Dragon
(2000)
Denotation
Four Chinese stars
gather together. Zhou
and Yang are sitting
while the other three
are standing. Zhang
Zilin is in a long black
dress decorated with
little pink owers. Zhou
wears a short white
piece of Qipao. Yang
is in a red ethnic dress
with dark blue dudou
inside and wears a pair
of well-decorated long
nails. Fan is in a long
dress decorated with
Chinese elements of
‘blue-white porcelain’.
Zhang ziyi is in a
peacock style green
dress.
A traditional
Chinese Painting
of owers
with Chinese
calligraphy
Connotation
Diverse and exotic
Chinese beauty
representation of
Chinese history,
culture and arts,
and Chinese
taste of beauty
Interactive Meanings
Contact
Zhang Zilin stands crossing her arms on the chest. Zhou
sits crossing her legs. Yang sits with her hands crossing
on her knees. Fan stands holding one hand at her side
and the other relaxed. Zhang Ziyi slightly crosses her
arms on the upper abdomen. All of them are wearing
beautiful smiles.
In the following scene (See Figure 5), deaf and mute Chinese dancers are performing
the stunning dance of Guanyin (bodhisattva)
12
of the Thousand Hands in front of a mural of
-
ity and compassion: in each hand of Guanyin, an eye is watching over the suffering of the
12 known in the West as
‘
Goddess of Mercy
’
.
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
53
of India’s heaven in Hindu and Buddhist culture (Priest, 1949). In China, Apsaras has ex-
tended its religious meaning to the representation of femininity and good luck (Wang, Fan,
& Li, 2009). Dressing in shining golden costumes with exquisite ornaments on both hands
and heads, dancers appear to follow the style of Chinese Ancient Western Regions. Their
performance of Guanyin and the background mural of Dunhuang Fresco unfold the mem-
ories of glorious Chinese past. Dunhuang, a crucial junction of the Silk Road (BC 202-AD
1996). Apart from the crucial role in world history, the Silk Road is also the embodiment
of the prosperous Chinese past. In Sui and Tang Dynasty (AD 589-AD 896), the Silk Road
was further developed and flourishing, which facilitated the expansion of East-West ex-
change (Wood, 2002). A great deal of foreign merchants then gathered and even settled
down in Chinese east capital Luoyang and west capital Chang’an. In this scene, an image of
powerful, prosperous, joyful, and religiously mysterious ancient China has been portrayed
and presented in the visual spectacle of Guanyin dance.
FIGURE 5 One Frame of Scene 5
The selected scenes have depicted China as a feminine and ancient Oriental country
catering for the Western imagination. In Scene 4, Chinese women are dressed and pos-
Chinese elements such as qipao, dudou, blue and white porcelain and phoenix have been
scene remain smiling and wordless. They are presented by their social identity as beauty
queen or actress, and by the exoticism woven into their dressing and makeup, rather than
by themselves, as individual embodiment of truly diverse beauty. Saturated in a deep nos-
talgic emotion, Scene 5 reproduces a changeless China in its heyday. By invoking the reli-
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gious icons and highlighting the femininity, this scene has displayed China as a prosperous
and dreamy country. Making Chinese women as the epitome of China, Scene 4 and 5 have
constructed a Chinese identity as old and unchanged Oriental country with exotic feminine
TABLE 7
Interpretation of Scene 5
Scene
(Caption)
Social Identity of
the Presenter(s)
Representational Meaning
Subjects/
Layered
Meanings
Visuals
Background
Image
Stunning Chinese Beauty
Dancers (Principal
dancer: Tai Lihua):
deaf-mute dancers
famous for their
dance of Guanyin
of the Thousand
Hands.
Denotation
A group of dancers are
playing the dance of
Guanyin of the Thousand
Hands (but we can only
see their hands except
for the principal dancer
Tai). They are in the
shining golden costume.
Tai is also wearing a
gorgeous decoration on
her head.
A mural of
Dunhuang Fresco
depicting ying
Apsaras
Connotation
stunning Chinese art;
exotic and diverse
Chinese beauty;
femininity and
compassion
Delicate Chinese
craftsmanship;
Buddhist art from
the Silk Road;
glorious ancient
China;
Charming and
mysterious
Chinese culture
Interactive Meanings
Contact
Dancers are playing the dance of Guanyin of the
Thousand Hands with their hands making the rounds
across the net.
The Past and the Present: A Material Representation of Chinese Modernisation
out, Chinese agricultural scientist Yuan Longping seems to greet the viewers with a
slight inclination of his head. Sitting on a mahogany chair, Yuan conveys no distinct
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
55
background image portraying dropping ears of rice along with the caption ‘Leading-Edge
Chinese Agriculture’ reinforces his widely-known identity as ‘Father of Hybrid Rice’. Yuan
does not speak a single word just like other presenters in this video. However, as a crucial
figure in the development of Chinese agriculture, Yuan himself is a signifier of Chinese
modernisation. The scene is an entanglement of Chinese past and present. It demonstrates
and influential power. It also serves as a self-evident response to the query on China’s
capability of satisfying its future grain needs. For instance, Brown (1995) used to question
China’s ability to feed itself due to the dramatic reduce of croplands accompanying by
its ongoing industrialisation. The breakthrough of agricultural technology and the rapid
advancement of modernisation represented by this scene have provided the official
explanation to this doubt. The interpretation is furthered supported by the fact that although
a late comer in modernisation, China has achieved remarkable success in its course of
of the 20
th
century, the number of Chinese people living in absolute poverty has been
substantially reduced from over 250 million to about 50 million (Qian, 2003). Hence, the
to famine and its proud presentation of its achievement in modernisation.
FIGURE 6 One Frame of Scene 6
As another manifest representation of Chinese modernisation, Scene 7 (see Figure 7 in
Appendices) depicts a group of Chinese astronauts. Differing from Scene 6 focusing on the
past and present of China, Scene 7 unfolds both the present and the future of China. Dress-
the pose of soldiers and displaying Chinese military bearing. Wearing a serious look, Yang
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the third country to independently send people into space. The group presentation of astro-
nauts is indicative of the current development of Chinese space industry and the rising of
and waiting to be explored. The visual presentation of Chinese space achievement echoes
Chinese government’s belief that ‘science and technology are capable of pushing society
ever forward in a desired direction’ (Woei, 1993: 144).
FIGURE 7 One Frame of Scene 7
Although the proud claim of resolving the poverty conveyed by Scene 6 or the gratify-
ing achievement of Chinese science and technology presented in Scene 7 are miniatures of
of Western modernity, the video evades the presentation of modernity in the dimensions of
-
bivalence about modernity: an entanglement with eagerness and fear. On one hand, the tre-
mendous growth under Western pattern is a lure for developing China. On the other hand,
the incompatibility between socialist China and capitalist West generates concerns over the
possible political instability imposed by the indiscriminate acceptance of Western moder-
nity. As Leo Ou-fan Lee (2000) reveals in his exploration of Shanghai modernity, Chinese
modernity have more concerns about the utility rather than the rationality of science and
technology (Yeh, 2000). Shanghai model of modernity is further labelled as ‘colonial mo-
dernity’ by Dirlik (2002). Chinese emphasis on material modernity largely results from
Western Enlightenment ideology and social Darwinism (Yan, 2009). The West has been
placed on the higher and superior level of the linear scale of social development. To the
contrary, non-Western countries have been positioned as passive and inferior. Consequent-
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
57
ly, clinging to the next stage of development, the Oriental countries have to be subject to
the material representation of the West and thus, conform to self-Orientalism.
TABLE 8
Interpretation of Scene 6
Scene
(Caption)
Social Identity of
the Presenter(s)
Representational Meanings
Subjects/
Layered
Meanings
Visuals
Background
Image
Leading-Edge Chinese Agriculture
Yuan Longping:
a Chinese
agricultural
scientist and
educator, also
known as ‘The
Father of Hybrid
Rice’
Denotation
Yuan sits on a
mahogany chair. A
wooden containers
lled with paddy rice is
placed on the mahogany
table beside him. He is
wearing a short-sleeves
shirt of blue white
checks.
An image of
super hybrid rice
Connotation
Chinese agriculture
development is ahead of
the world.
China has
successfully
solved the
problem of food
and has made
contribution to
the resolution
of world food
problem.
Achievement
of Chinese
modernisation
Interactive Meanings
Contact
Yuan is sitting on the chair with no distinct facial
expression.
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TABLE 9
Interpretation of Scene 7
Scene
(Caption)
Social Identity of
the Presenter(s)
Representational Meanings
Subjects/
Layered
Meanings
Visuals Background Image
Chinese Space Trave
Chinese
Astronauts
From left to right:
Zhai Zhigang:
crew member
of Shenzhou 7,
the rst Chinese
citizen to carry out
a spacewalk
Nie Haisheng:
crew member of
Shenzhou 6
Yang Liwei: the
rst man sent
into space by the
Chinese space
program. Yang’s
mission Shenzhou
5 made China
the third country
to independently
send people into
space.
Fei Junlong:
crew member of
Shenzhou 6
Jing Haipeng:
crew member of
Shenzhou 7
Liu Boming:
crew member of
Shenzhou 7
Denotation
6 Chinese astronauts
stand side by side. All
of them are in dark
blue uniforms and
boots. There is a clear
red national ag on
each of their uniforms.
An image of space
portraying several
aerospace vehicles
and astronauts in
space suits
Connotation
A highly disciplined
image of Chinese
Military;
The rapid
development of
Chinese space
industry and
technology;
The achievement
of Chinese
modernization.
The potential
of technology
development
The bright future
of Chinese
modernisation
Interactive Meanings
Contact
Six astronauts stand at attention with Yang in the middle.
Their facial expression tends to be serious.
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
59
displays an updated China through the group presentation of Chinese celebrities. A piece of
exuberant music has run through the entire video parallel to each scene. The variations of
rhythms, beats and tones and the application of embellishments are indicative of traditional
China while the majestic symphonic music is suggestive of the modernity. The cross-
practice of traditional Chinese elements and the Western music factors have recreated a
sense of past and present crisscross. Furthermore, the application of red colour is utilised
to intensify the ancientness of China since red is the auspicious symbol for harvest and
passion long favoured by Chinese people across different classes (Yan, 2009). The jumping
rhythm of the background music and a series of dissolve cut in connecting different shots
are employed to draw the viewers’ attention. All the presenters in the video remain silent.
Thus, a ‘new’ China is presented by the smiling and silent celebrities in the visual and
auditory interlacing of past and present.
three scenes selected. Making use of collective activities and memories like sport, awaken-
ing national pride in presenting a contrastively current image, demonstrating the attractive
and adaptable Chinese culture, nationalism is penetrated in depicting an open-minded, po-
However, nationalism is only the literal meaning of the video. Self-Orientalism instead
-
tion of Chinese national identity. In early 20th century, China has fumbled for its national
identity by viewing ‘Chinese tradition and Western modernity as oppositional dichotomies’
(Shih, 2001). China was associated with cultural terms such as ‘traditional’ and ‘agricul-
tural’ while accordingly the West was linked to phrases like ‘modern’ and ‘industrial’. On
one hand, intoxicated with the glorious past and attempting to capture global attention,
China has again romanticised itself as the opposite to the West by inventing the traditional
elements appealing to Western imagination. By portraying China in this way, China has
brought an unchanged Orient to the Western learning, Western consciousness, and later,
embodiment of exotic beauty. On the other hand, China has depicted itself as a modern
nation. However, it only attends to the material representation of its modernisation. This
largely results from its dual feelings of intense longing for modernity and fear about the
undesirable political consequences generated by Western modernity. This ambivalence of
self-representation is closely tied to Chinese history. In the last century, the tangled warfare
among feudal warlords and the invasion of fascist Japanese has imposed miseries on China.
Lagging far behind the West, China is in desperate need for development. This is mani-
fested in its Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1961), which aimed at transforming
the agrarian country into a modern communist society through rapid industrialisation. The
socialist attempts resulted in catastrophe and the economic regression. Moreover, the sub-
sequent Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Zedong to safeguard the socialist economic
system and communist ideology has exerted further detrimental impacts upon Chinese so-
ciety (Lu, 2004). To speed up modernisation, China has adopted a reform and opening-up
policy since late 1978. Losing the ideological reference point for modernisation after the
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-
nity other than the Western paradigm to draw upon. However, China still hesitates to fully
follow the Western path. The Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 has rendered Chinese
government more cautious of the unfavourable consequences triggered by Western ideol-
ogy, for instance, the call for political liberalisation in this particular case. The desire for
growth and the fear for political instability have placed Chinese construction of its national
identity in torment. Though with ideological resistance, China still slips into the self-Orien-
talism in its quest for modernity.
CONCLUSION REMARKS
Aiming at adding insights to the self-representation of others and intrigued by the
hypothesis that the rising of nationalism in the non-Western countries is inclined to invoke
self-Orientalism, this dissertation employed a social semiotic approach to examine how
China displays its national identity in its visual showcase (Dirlik, 1996). The interpretation
of the representational, interactive and compositional meanings of the video is situated in
of nationalism and Orientalism.
This project reveals a struggling self-representation of China. Firstly, nationalism which
penetrates through the entire video is invoked by Chinese government to consolidate the
national identity of its internal audience and re-brand itself to the global viewers. By arous-
ing the collective memories, evoking national pride and demonstrating soft power, China
-
nese claim of ‘peaceful rising’ and gives a response to the concern about ‘China Threat’.
Chinese self-representation. Intensifying the exotic beauty of Chinese women and making
them as symbols of its glorious past, China presents an unchanged Oriental country full of
fascinations and miracles. However, the seemingly intentional shaping of a China catering
for Western imagination may be a branding strategy of China to make itself salient. Further-
as a modern country. This largely results from the Chinese persistent quest for modernity
and its perception of development as a liner process where the Western model appears to be
superior. However, China does not conform to the self-Orientalistic discourse without resis-
tance. With incompatible ideology with the West, Chinese authority is reluctant to refer to
the West in terms of non-material dimensions.
While non-Western countries seem to fall prey to Orientalistic representation, Chinese
ideological resistance of Western modernity opens up a possibility for the others to search
for a proper paradigm pertinent to their own conditions. As a number of scholars believed,
the eventual fate of non-Western countries would not be submissive and they are able to
make an original contribution (Radtke, 1993). The recent global revival of Confucianism
has reinforced this point by implying a new paradigm of modernisation transcending the
seemingly only available model of Western modernity (Lee, 1997). The question that lies in
extricating from Orientalistic representation of self is not if, but when. Thus, future research
might concentrate on the resistance of non-Western countries in reshaping the stereotyped
representation of the others as well as the appropriate paradigms of non-Western moderni-
Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new
61
sation other than colonial modernity. Aside from the limitation of subjectivity, the social
semiotic methodology also implies more than one interpretation of the video and allows
the video being examined in various contexts. Without constrains of dissertation length, a
comprehensive and in-depth investigation of each scene will surely generate more useful
insights.
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Author’s Biodata:
Roujie Wang, currently an English teacher in International College, Xiamen University,
holds the MSc. in Media and Communication Governance in London School of Economics
and Political Science (2011) as well as the double bachelor’s degree in Diplomacy and
English in Beijing Foreign Studies University (2010). Her research interest lies in the self-
representation and national identity establishment of China.
First Author’s Address:
roujiewang@xmu.edu.cn
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES,
2
(1), 67-88
ISSN: 2224-2716
Copyright © 2012 Overseas Education College of Xiamen University
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese Language Classroom:
A Qualitative Study
1
Ka F. Wong
St Olaf College, U.S.A.
The notion of integrating culture into the foreign and second language curriculum, with the aim
of enhancing linguistic competence as well as cross-cultural understanding, has become increas-
ingly important for Chinese language educators. However, such an undertaking is easier said than
in-depth interviews with members of the Chinese pedagogical community in the United States,
this study explores the perspectives of both teachers and students on incorporating culture into
-
gy, interests in cultural teaching and learning, limitations on cultural pedagogy, complications in
integrating culture, timeliness of cultural pedagogy, as well as training and background of the in-
dividuals. These categories enrich our understanding of the role of culture in the actual classroom.
Thus, this study hopes to initiate further discussion and development of cultural pedagogy in Chi-
nese language instruction.
Keywords: Chinese, culture, cultural pedagogy, second language acquisition
INTRODUCTION
Although Chinese pedagogues have widely acknowledged the call for an integrated
curriculum of language and culture, few agree on what constitutes, or ought to constitute,
the category of culture in the classroom. Everything in daily life somehow relates to
culture, of which language is an essential part. The inexhaustible array of materials offers
as many promises as problems for teachers. The dilemma is not about whether to teach
culture or not “but rather one of degree,” and “the challenge lies in teaching language in a
more culture-centered environment” (Allen, 1985, p.145). How culture and language are
linked in the classroom depends largely on how the notion of culture is interpreted. Despite
and partly, because the various academic views on these issues are so numerous and
diffuse. While some scholars highlight the so-called “Big C Culture”—such as philosophy,
art, and literature—to enhance instruction, others favor “small c culture” that focuses on the
communicative aspects of daily lives.
As the importance of culture in foreign and second language acquisition becomes an
1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Ka F. Wong. E-mail: wongk@stolaf.edu
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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increasingly studied subject, this study endeavors to further shed light into Chinese cultural
pedagogy through sixty in-depth interviews with members of the Chinese educational com-
acquisition, the perspectives of both teachers and students often remain unexplored. Sapir
(1994) maintains that the “individual is the bearer of culture”; where researchers should
start is the individual and his or her behavior (p.140). Accordingly, the actual classroom
experiences of teachers and students form the central thread of this article. The ground-
ed-theory based analysis produces seven categories of Chinese cultural pedagogy, which
the interview analysis, a brief overview of the extant literature about culture in the language
classroom is germane to the discussion.
CULTURE AND LANGUAGE IN THE CLASSROOM: A BRIEF LITERATURE RE-
The cultural nature of language pedagogy is nothing new. Yet the consensus that foreign
language students can fully “achieve communicative competence only if they learn to
understand the target culture at the same time” is a fairly recent development (Singerman
culture into the language curriculum. The seminal works of Brooks (1960), Hall (1959),
and Seelye (1981), to name a few, are pioneering examples. Many scholars since have
compellingly promoted the cause. Byram (1989) lays the groundwork for cultural
pedagogy, which he refers to as “cultural studies,” to claim a “rightful place” in language
practical resources from a variety of disciplines that pay special attention to the perspective
of the language instructor. Robinson (1985) extends the meaning of “cross-cultural
understanding” from the “behaviorist and functionalist” school to “cognitive and symbolic”
Her discussion on teaching culture from the “intercultural communication perspective”
merits special attention. Believing that “language expresses and embodies cultural reality,”
Kramsch (1998a) argues that “cultural awareness must be viewed both as enabling
language proficiency and as being the outcome of reflection on language proficiency”
(pp.3-8). Teaching culture thus not only makes students aware of speech acts, cultural facts,
connotations and etiquette but also grants them with the opportunity to think and act as
members of the target society.
Setting cultural teaching on the same track as cognitive and symbolic anthropology,
many experts further suggest that cultural pedagogy should expand beyond “national her-
itage” and conceive culture as a communal system of “thinking about and interpreting
The National
Standards for Foreign Language Learning: Preparing for the 21
st
Century (1996, 1999).
Culture, along with Communication, Communities, Connections, and Comparisons, are
dissemination of the products, practices, and perspectives of the target-language society.
Meanwhile, cultural knowledge is considered crucial to all three modes of communica-
tion—interpersonal, interpretive, and presentational. It is important to instill in students a
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
69
sense of cross-cultural awareness by providing them not merely with the facts of the for-
eign culture but also with the tools to formulate proper attitudes and empathic worldviews
Encouraged by advances in its Western counterparts, Chinese scholarship has, too, re-
cast language acquisition in the mode of cultural and communicative competence. Walker
(2000) puts forward a “performed culture approach,” in which the chief concern is the cul-
ture of everyday life, the socio-behavioral realm. Shepherd (2005) underscores aspects of
“performed culture,” especially culturally coded intentions in the second language, through
the studies of “banquet.” Another concerted effort is Tseng’s (2007) AP Chinese Language
and Culture Teacher’s Guide that develops a high-school Chinese curriculum within an en-
riched cultural framework. On the other hand, Wong (2008) proposes “4P’s of cultural ped-
agogy,” a new paradigm for incorporating the cultural dimension into the Chinese language
classroom.
Duiwai
Hanyu jiaoxue
对外汉语教学
) has also been advocated by scholars such as Xu Jialu
许嘉
璐
(2008), Zhang Zhanyi
张占一
赵贤州
Chinese Language Council International (
中国国家汉语国际推广领导小组
), also known
as “Hanban” (
汉办
), has made culture one of the basic tenets in Chinese language ped-
agogy. Book compilations on teaching culture in the language context have emerged as a
result. Xiaoqi Li’s (2006) Duiwai Hanyu wenhua jiaoxue yanjiu (
对外汉语文化教学研究
)
is one of the noteworthy editions.
METHODOLOGY
To better comprehend the issues facing cultural teaching and learning in the Chinese
classroom, sixty interviews were conducted in total with twenty teachers and forty students
in the United States. The participants came from diverse demographics and with various
experiences, including teachers from different age groups and ethnic origins, as well as both
heritage and non-heritage students who learned Chinese in college, high-school, weekend-
heritage school, intensive summer program, study-abroad and exchange program in a wide
range of Chinese communities. Their demographic information is provided in Appendices
1 and 2. All student interviews were conducted in English, and excerpts were presented as
of English and Mandarin), and the translations by the author are provided along with their
original Chinese transcriptions in the excerpts.
The transcripts were examined to extract a full range of responses and to identity all the
central ideas expressed by the participants. The initial coding of the data generated a set of
analysis—from which broader categories were derived. These labels were not identified
a priori and were allowed to develop from the participant’s responses rather than the re-
-
evidence to enrich its description until the category was “saturated” (Richards, 2003, p.17).
-
ing connections among them—was then performed. Finally, seven “theoretical sample” cat-
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-
gogy; 3) interests in cultural teaching and learning; 4) limitations on cultural pedagogy; 5)
complications in integrating culture; 6) timeliness of cultural pedagogy; and 7) training and
background of the individuals.
As each category is supported by many similar opinions, only selected quotes are pre-
sented here to illustrate the point. Although some citations are abbreviated with ellipses and
personal names are omitted, the quotes are reproduced as they were spoken, with their idio-
syncrasies and at times grammatical errors intact. To keep the identities of the interviewees
anonymous, the excerpts only mention their assigned codes with “T” for teacher and “S”
for student, followed by their session number as listed in the Appendices.
As the inquiry centers on cultural pedagogy, the first and foremost question seeks to
understand how the teacher and student participants interpret the meaning of culture in
the Chinese classroom. The interviewees all render their notions of cultural teaching and
learning rather differently. Still, they generally feel that culture, as a concept, covers a broad
scope of ideas, issues, and representations that often eludes simple definition. A teacher
states that “culture is a complicated phenomenon, but from a language teaching point of
view, we ought to simultaneously explain how that language turns out to be like this, or
why conversations are spoken in certain ways. And here within lies culture [
文化是一个
很复杂的现象。但是要是从语言教学来看的话
,
我们要解释语言为什么是这样子的
,
对话为什么要这样子的说
,
其中就是文化
Like this teacher above, most of the respondents relate culture to the collective behav-
practices of language, of living, and of customs [
文化就是语言的习惯
,
生活习惯
,
风俗
习惯
-
book” explanations, that is, the division of the “Big C” and “small c” cultures. One teacher
elucidates his idea:
Big C culture mainly includes… history, literature, art, and architecture, etc. This i s
probably easier to see through the accumulated products in history and through historical
records. Also, there are the small c cultures. Those are the principles for people’s daily be-
haviors, and then their customs and habits. This is related to the principles of our language
use, which is invisible and hard to grasp, but yet an important part of cultural pedagogy.
大文化主要包括那种
…
历史
,
文学
,
艺术
,
建筑
,
等等的。这个可能比较容易通
过历史的沉淀
,
记载下来的东西。还有一些小文化
,
就是说人们日常的行为规范
,
然
后是他们的习俗
,
这是跟咱们语言使用的一些规范性的东西
,
隐形的
,
不好把握的
,
但是文化教学中的一个重要的部分。
-
cult to conjecture. These cultural concepts are included in the common readings of language
pedagogy, and thus, would be a familiar part of their education and teaching guidelines. Of
course, the more traditional understanding of culture makes up many teachers’ conception
as well. When the participants were asked to name a few things that instantly come to their
minds regarding Chinese culture, the most typical answers were expectedly food, festival,
Confucianism, the language, and the color red.
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
71
The student interviewees also describe culture as a mixture of material and cognitive el-
family, and history. It is interesting to point out that a number of non-heritage students (as
well as a Caucasian teacher) identify “money” as one of their strongest perceptions of Chi-
nese culture, yet none of the ethnic Chinese teachers or heritage students do so. A Cauca-
sian student who has studied Mandarin in Taiwan mentions “saving money, being frugal…
Whether Chinese culture overtly concerns money is a topic more appropriate for a sociol-
ogist. Nevertheless, the different observations among the so-called insiders and outsiders
suggest that culture is above all subjective, and the two groups often hold dissimilar Chi-
nese cultural images.
The precarious nature of understanding culture, together with the potential issues that
may result from it, is best summed up by this teacher. “In reality, seldom can teachers really
practice what these theories entail; in term of cultural pedagogy, it’s generally more about
“discussing military strategies on paper [
实际上很少老师能够真正地实践这些理论上
的东西。对文化教学来说
,
大概一般都是
“
纸上谈兵
”
比较多
challenging task of integrating it into the Chinese classroom. In spite of the disparate views,
there is little disagreement on the importance of culture in Chinese language acquisition,
which forms the second category of the discussion.
Importance of Cultural Pedagogy
All interviewees share the premise that culture is intricately linked to language learning. It
is, hence, vital for teachers to bring cultural elements into the classroom. A teacher believes
that “culture is absolutely a part of the language class,” and “language and culture cannot
be separated” [
文化绝对是语言课的一部分
...
因为语言跟文化不能脱离
A different teacher affirms the necessity of incorporating culture into language courses,
especially when one aims to take the student-centered and communicative approach. She
student-centered pedagogy, situational dialogue, and communication. Culture is surely
embedded within [
文化是肯定要包含在语言教学中的。因为我们就是强调学生为主的
这种方式
,
强调情景对话
,
强调这个
communication
。那就肯定有文化在里面
Other teachers support the idea of cultural pedagogy because cross-cultural awareness
may not come automatically to most foreign and second language learners. Thus, additional
cultural explanations are needed.
For example, we Chinese people like to repeat certain words when expressing polite-
ness, like nǎli nǎli and such. If we don’t explain them, the students would have no idea
what they mean and also wouldn’t know how to use them.
比如说像我们中国人喜欢表示客气的时候就会
repeat
一些
words,
哪里哪里什么
的。如果不跟他们讲
,
他们就不知道是什么意思
,
他们也不会用。
Likewise, learners see culture as an integral part of their language acquisition experi-
ence. All student interviewees believe that cultural knowledge should be taught along with
linguistic skills in the classroom. Culture is important, as one of the students argues; “be-
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cause you can’t really get a good sense of what the Chinese language is without knowing
the language, it’s not useless, but I think… you don’t embody the experience to the full-
est… The point of learning another language is to be able to connect with people of differ-
Every time you go to your house [in China] you had to take off your shoes... Westerners
don’t do that… Westerners really value keeping the house clean, we do; we just don’t take
off our shoes. So like the core principle of the issue is really the same… but just the way
they put them into practice can be a little different… what else… I think polite, sometimes
[Chinese act] in ridiculous ways, like rejecting things before accepting them. It’s also very
Similarly, a student acknowledges the importance of cultural learning since “people
who take [Chinese classes] probably want to use the language to go to China, so they don’t
voice that the Chinese that they learned in the classroom would inevitably be applied to real
life situations; therefore, appropriate language use and adequate background knowledge,
education.
Interests in Cultural Teaching and Learning
That culture is imperative to second language learning is not the sole reason for its
importance. Culture is essential to the language classroom because it can also generate
students’ interest. Almost all students mention that culture makes their classes more
“interesting” and “feel more connected to the language.” Answering the question whether
culture should be taught in the Chinese classroom, one student replies: “The grammar and
sentence structures and all of that are interesting in an academic sense, but what really
linguistic aspects of the language can be “monotonous”; adding cultural discussion can
Not surprisingly, many teachers have the same view. A teacher opines that “when
talking about culture, the class would become more interesting because it incites students’
interests [
我觉得讲文化的时候会让课堂比较有意思
,
因为他们的兴趣就上来了嘛
]”
reactions are generally very enthusiastic. Basically, when we start talking about [culture],
there will be no end to it. They become extremely excited [
学生的反应一般都很热烈
,
基本上一讨论起来就没完没了
,
他们非常兴奋
many teachers have incorporated cultural elements into their instructional agenda with
warm appreciation from the students. Furthermore, some teachers have turned the class-
room into a Chinese “cultural island,” making culture an explicit element of the learning
experience. A teacher remarks:
Our department chair is very keen on the decoration inside the classroom. For example,
we will hang red lanterns, dragons, decorate for the Chinese festivals, letting the students
experience Chinese culture. In terms of color, red is the main palette… In fact, students are
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
73
very interested.
我们的系主任非常重视在教室里面的布置。比方说我们会挂上大红灯呀
,
龙呀
,
中国的节日呀
,
让他们感受到中国的文化。颜色上就是以红色为主色调
…
其实学生
很感兴趣。
From cultural differences to appropriate etiquette, the students are keen on knowing a
out more about the traditions behind the cultural topics that she learned in class. “Not just
tradition and history, most participants believe popular cultures and contemporary lifestyles
in Chinese communities are the most intriguing aspects for learners. A student maintains:
Most students are very interested in the daily life in China, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong... what it’s like to buy things, take a taxi cab, bargaining, food in the markets, order
In addition, a teacher discovers that the more spontaneous the cultural discussion, the
more interested the students become.
Every time I talk about culture, they are pretty interested... But if the teacher intention-
ally talks about a lesson-related topic that is not accidental, but a specially designed unit,
then they would lose their interest. For example, we teach a special… story from an idiom,
is accidental, something like naturally emerged conversation, this is how we Chinese are;
the students are particularly interested and listen with great delight.
每次讲到文化他们都挺有兴趣的
...
可是老师故意地跟课堂内容有关的
,
不是
ac-
cidental
的
...
而是有特定的一个
cultural unit ,
他们反而就没有兴趣。比如说我们今天
特意教
…
一个成语的故事
“
精卫填海
”
什么的
,
他们就没有什么兴趣。我觉得很奇怪
...
如果是
accidental,
好像是
naturally emerged
的
conversation,
我们是这样子的
,
他们就
特别有兴趣
,
听得津津有味的。
Teaching and learning culture in the Chinese classroom, according to the interviewees,
is both important and interesting. However, it may not be an easy undertaking. The suc-
cessful outcome of cultural pedagogy depends on numerous institutional, situational, and
personal factors. The following categories present some of the major concerns put forward
by the participants.
Limitations on Cultural Pedagogy
Although the interviewees value the role of culture in successful language acquisition, they,
too, voice reservations about its implementation. A teacher expresses her concern:
The direction of including culture is surely not wrong. It’s because, putting it in con-
crete terms, language is a form of vehicle for culture... But even the direction is right, how
要包括文化这个方向肯定是没有错的。因为具体来讲
,
就是说语言是文化的一种
载体
...
但是就是说方向对
,
具体要怎样操作
,
我觉得是比较难的一个东
西。
including the language of instruction, the constraints on time and other resources, as well as
the integration of cultural materials.
The language of instruction is one of the obvious problems, especially for elementary
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level classes. Since the class is above all a “language” class, the instructional language
should be in the target language. However, beginners have very limited linguistic skills.
They can barely command the basic language itself, needless to say, comprehend or discuss
complex cultural issues in Chinese. As the employment of English seems unavoidable in
teaching culture, how to strike a balance becomes an issue. Different teachers ostensibly
learners. A teacher mentions:
For the lower level students, it is probably not appropriate to discuss too much because
of their limited language ability. When we introduce the material culture, there will be a lot
of special terms, which they won’t be able to take them all in.
对低年级的学生可能还是不适合过多
,
因为他们的语言能力有限
,
因为在介绍到
物质文化的时候
,
你会碰到很多很多的专有名词
,
他们可能一下子就接受不了。
While the students’ lack of language skill poses a challenge, limited class time generates
another problem. Comparing her Chinese teaching experiences in high school with college,
environment to cultural teaching.
I felt the biggest problem is that we have this time constraint. Chinese classes, espe-
cially elementary classes, have embedded such a packed target within the curriculum. Then
culture, because you have to really explain it, and explanation is only secondary, the key
is action, for example, to do some small presentations, or a song, look at some calligraphy
and paintings, this kind of activities. I always feel that there is no time.
我觉得最大的问题就是我们有这个
time constraint
。中文课
,
尤其是基础中文课
,
就有这么一个繁密
target
在里面。然后因为文化
,
你真的要解释
,
而且解释是次要的
,
关键的是要做
,
譬如说让他们去做一个小小的
presentation,
或者学一首歌呀
,
看一些
书画呀
, appreciation
这一类东西
,
就经常的觉得没有时间做。
Although many students wish to seek a deeper understanding of the culture behind the
language, the lack of class time often discourages their pursuits. “As far as learning culture
my biggest question is always why,” one student asserts; “the why question takes a lot lon-
-
sponses. “We don’t even have enough time to learn the language,” another student claims;
Time is not the only resource that is lacking. The preset teaching materials may also
limit the ways in which teachers can bring culture into the classroom. A teacher laments
pedagogy with little effort to actually promote it. He says: “There is no curriculum that
said you did not need to teach culture. But almost all curriculums require you to teach so
much stuff in so little time that when it comes to making a choice, very regrettably, teachers
would neglect the cultural part [
没有一个课程说你不用教文化
,
但是几乎所有的课程都
要你在极少的时间内教太多的东西
,
在取择之间
,
很遗憾都会把文化舍弃掉
All the restraints have reduced cultural teaching and learning to a secondary footnote
in the instructional agenda. Even if teachers aspire to engage in culture, in whatever form
it may take in the Chinese classroom, they often fall short in securing the much needed re-
sources or support from their schools. To successfully create and conduct cultural friendly
trips, for instance, requires resources that exceed the grasp of the teachers alone.
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
75
Almost all participants—both teachers and students—believe that “going abroad to
China or Taiwan” is the best way to learn Chinese language and culture. While the effect
classroom remains unresolved. Many language students do not have the opportunity to visit
or live in a Chinese-speaking community for a substantial period of time, and the re-cre-
A student from the Midwest states: “It’ll be nice to have hand on experience to actually see
China, or Peking Opera... but you can’t do things like that when you’re in the middle of
Some teachers, accordingly, opine that culture should be excluded in the language
classes. Ideally, Chinese language students should also take a variety of Chinese content
classes, which can both deepen their specific knowledge on Chinese culture and benefit
their language learning. A teacher notes; “I think students should be encouraged to take
Whether college language learners take extra cultural classes is out of any teacher’s control,
however. Not many schools can demand that language students take other Chinese-related
classes. In many cases, the language class is the students’ only source of Chinese cultural
knowledge. It is, hence, important for teachers to incorporate at least some cultural aspects
into their instructional agenda. The problem eventually boils down to how cultural elements
can be successfully integrated into the classroom. Both teachers and students have their
opinions about the complications involved, which is the subject for the next section.
Complications in Integrating Culture
cultural teaching in the Chinese classroom lacks consistency, and at most, touches only on
Culture, sometimes it is a component, but other times, it isn’t that consistent… You dis-
cuss whatever you can think of, but it lacks consistency like sentence structure, from simple
-
那文化呢
,
有的时候作为一个
component,
有的时候就不是那么
consistent…
你是
想到什么就讲
,
不是给学生一个
consistent
像句型一样
,
从简到难
...
就是说你教学生
文化你只教给他
…
一些属于
factual
的
,
或者是一种表象的东西。更深层次的就是说
怎样给他融进语言的教学
,
这个挺难的。
To extend the cultural materials from the textbooks and to stimulate the students’ inter-
Last week we went to the museum… and the topic is popular religion in China. The dif-
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-
-
tural knowledge and reinforcing cultural stereotypes. To avoid the adverse outcomes of the
latter requires extensive explanations on the teacher’s part, especially for elementary level
students with little or no background. Assessing a cultural activity in which his teacher
brought in traditional Chinese food, a student comments:
I don’t know how useful [making dumplings] was... I was there, and that’s great. But in
terms of interacting with my teachers and other students, there wasn’t any emphasis placed,
The introduction of the cultural dimension must have a clear objective, careful plan-
ning, and corresponding links to language instruction. Only then would it become a reward-
ing experience for both teachers and learners; otherwise, the excitement and exotica wear
off quickly, and the students end up learning little.
The question of how to teach culture and to what extent it can purposefully advance
language acquisition is a complicated one. Speaking from a sociolinguistic perspective, a
classroom setting. “The main problem is how to effectively combine language form with
最
主要的问题就是说
,
语言的形式如何跟语言应用的功能
,
场景
,
等等有效地结合起
来
,
这是第一个原因
teaching materials:
The second one is that our teaching materials... their character designs are rather sim-
ple. They are always classmates... or, they are Chinese friends, or with their own teachers.
These three types are the most frequently appearing characters... But one often runs into
other characters in daily life. If the characters lack variety, it will lead students to fixed
patterns in language use.
第二个就是说咱们的教材
...
人物角色的设计比较单一
,
往往就是同学
...
要嘛就是
中国朋友
,
要嘛就是跟自己的老师。这三种可能是最常见的
...
但是日常生活中还是
会遇到其他的
,
如果人物角色没有这种丰富性的话
,
就会使学生使用语言产生一种定
型。
The concern of this teacher is shared by many students, who seek more than just lin-
guistic skills in their Chinese class but also cultural insights that can prepare them for
real-life encounters. A student, who has study-aboard experiences in China, observes that
“aspects of the culture like interpersonal relationships are much harder to get across.” He
offers an example:
Restaurants in China are not like restaurants in the United States... service usually goes
to the loudest and most aggressive customers… students who have never been to China be-
fore, and whose only experience has been Chinese language classes go to China, they have
a hard time getting service in a normal Chinese restaurant. They usually gravitate to the
Western orientated kinds of restaurants... because there, they understand how to be served
One teacher recites a story that even explicit teaching of the communicative and cultural
patterns may not necessarily warrant the students’ complete understanding and correct use
of the language.
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
77
If you know a Chinese person well enough, you would probably ask the obvious ques-
tions in greeting. Knowing what they are going to do and then ask exactly that. This is
greeting. Then one day, a student who just learned that ran into the teacher at the bottom of
to teach this kind of culture. You told them to ask the obvious, and that is not wrong. But
when he student saw the teacher going up the stairs and asked “you are going up the stairs,”
it sounded very strange.
你要跟中国人熟的话
,
你可能在打招呼的时候就明知故问
,
知道他要干什么你就
问什么
,
这个就是打招呼。然后有一天学生学了以后
,
在上楼梯的时候碰到老师就说
:
「老师
,
您上楼梯呢
」所以有时候这种文化
,
就是说不好教就是在这里
…
非常难
去把握这个度
,
你告诉他们明知故问这个没有错
,
可是他看到他上楼梯他就问「您上
楼梯呢」
,
听来就觉得很奇怪。
The search for better paradigms and practices to incorporate various cultural factors
into Chinese language instruction has become a pressing issue for educators. One particular
issue that constantly appears in many participants’ accounts is the timeliness of cultural ma-
terials, which is presented in the next section.
Timeliness of Cultural Pedagogy
All teacher and student interviewees are aware of how culture is connected to the
contemporary context where Chinese language is used. According to the participants,
language pedagogy needs to catch up with the ever-changing and dynamic nature of culture.
For language instructors, China’s time-honored history and cultural achievements can be
both a blessing and a burden. There is an enormous amount of cultural sources, perhaps too
much and too rich for the purpose of the language class. At the same time, the long history
of China often makes a large portion of its culture seem antiquated in comparison with
relatively young societies such as the American one.
“Regarding the so-called Chinese culture,” a teacher stresses, “you need not immediate-
ly think of ancient things whenever it was brought up, such as the Great Wall, the Imperial
Palace, or such things. Contemporary China is also very Chinese, [
所谓的中国文化
,
你不
需要一提到中国文化
,
你就想到是古代的东西
,
一想到文化就是中国的长城故宫这些
东西。现代中国也是很中国
about studying historical or geographical knowledge in rigid ways; in fact, greeting is also
an example of cultural pedagogy [
学习文化不是读一些很古板的历史知识
,
地理知识
,
比如说你在问候
,
实际上也是说文化教学
To be pedagogically forwarding-looking does not mean to abandon the traditional as-
pects of culture. As long as the contents are helpful to the students’ understanding of lan-
guage use and social behavior, even if they are historical topics, they should be incorporat-
ed into the language module. Relevance is the key. Traditional culture, for example, often
demonstrated through language and communication. A teacher attests:
The most important thing is to let students know how history and culture manifest in
female. That is indeed also a major problem in contemporary Chinese society, as everybody
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Chinese only say nánnǚ [male-female] as a term and not the other way around, then fùmǔ
[father-mother], bàba māma [dad-mom], fūqī [husband-wife], always the male goes before
the female.
最重要的是让学生知道那些历史文化如何在语言和语用上呈现出来。比方说中国
传统是重男轻女的。那这个其实也是现在中国社会的一个大问题
,
大家
都要男孩子
,
对不对
这种传统也可能会表现在语言上
,
譬如说
,
中国人只说男女
,
不说女男
,
然
后父母
,
爸爸妈妈
,
夫妻
,
往往是男的先女的后。
To a number of teachers, the concern for timeliness in cultural presentation leads to the
question of whether they should set the pedagogical focus on China or their local communi-
ties. While both areas are important in their own right and listed as components of the 5Cs
in the National Standards, some teachers believe that one must be distinguished from the
I feel that teachers must clearly define how they teach culture, whether you want to
teach this native, target culture, or you want to use Chinese as a medium… Or, simply put,
whether to use Chinese to understand Chinese culture, putting your emphasis on the far
away realm, your heritage and cultural origins. Or you use language as a tool… to apply to
the current living situation, to express and describe things in your life.
教文化我觉得老师一定要分清楚你是想要教这个
native
的
,
这个
target culture,
还
是你想用
Chinese
做一个
medium
的
….
或者就是说用中文了解中国的文化
…
看你
的重点是这个遥远的国度
,
你的
heritage,
你的文化的起源。还是你用语言
…
作一个
tool,
用在现在的生活中
,
表达描述你自己的生活中的东西。
Although many students appreciate the historical aspects of culture, the most pressing
issue for them is to learn how to understand contemporary Chinese culture, and eventually,
to communicate effectively with native Chinese people in daily situations. This aspect of
communicative culture is closely tied to sociolinguistics. Many teachers have shared their
stories about the shifting nuances of the Chinese language and their pedagogical implica-
tions. The meanings of “xiǎojie” (Miss) or “tóngzhì” (comrade), for example, have changed
over time; the understanding of these words in contemporary cultural setting can help stu-
dents to avoid awkward or embarrassing situations.
Whether the cultural topics or materials used in the classroom are kept up to date de-
pends greatly on the people involved in the process. As many teachers attest, it is often a
sums up how the different backgrounds of the participants may have an impact on the cul-
tural experiences in the Chinese classroom.
Cultural Background and Training of the Individuals
Any discussion of cultural pedagogy ultimately comes down to the individual actors—the
teachers and students themselves. Their beliefs, presuppositions, and experiences affect the
dynamics of the class. “I think every teacher’s style is different [
我觉得每一个老师的
风格不一样
],” a teacher says; “In fact, you can use the same pedagogical method, but as
each teacher brings to class his or her own personality and accent, the whole atmosphere
wouldn’t be the same [
其实说你用同一个教学法
,
可是每个人的个性呀
,
他的口音呀
,
带进去的时候
,
整个气氛就不一样
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
79
pedagogy] on the teachers themselves, talk about what they know, because it is not about
the materials accounted for in the textbooks [
最理想的方式就是按这个老师本身来说
,
就是说就他的所知来讲
,
因为教文化不是课文里交代的东西
-
ing is carried out in the classroom. The individual differences are noticed on the student’s
side. A student asserts: “it really varies from teacher to teacher and what they think is
diverse dialects, customs, and practices, the locales where the teachers come from may lead
to different understandings of Chinese culture. A teacher in Hawaii recalls the experience in
teaching heritage Chinese students whose ethnic origins are from Southern China.
When I first taught Chinese New Year, I asked the students what kind of foods we
eat during Chinese New Year. I expected people to say niángāo [New Year Cake], jiǎozi
[Dumplings], yú [fish], etc, but I only got zhāi (jai) [vegetarian dish]. At the time, I didn’t
know what the students were talking about… I think it’s important to understand that there
are many types of Chinese culture, like the difference between Taiwan, Hong Kong, Main-
Evaluating her take on Mainland Chinese culture, a teacher from Taiwan states:
I guess a problem is that since I... have never been to China, sometimes students ask
me things about China, I really have to say I don’t know, or I get it from my friends [from
Likewise, many teacher interviewees originally from Mainland China had never visited
Taiwan. One of the teachers explains:
Sometimes the textbook mentions something about Taiwan, I have no way to know
whether they were authentically Taiwan or not, since I have never been there... My under-
these kinds of indirect sources, so I wouldn’t say much in class.
有时候课本会提到有关台湾的东西
,
我真的不知道台湾到底是不是这样的。
我没
有去过
...
我对台湾的理解大概也就是一些电视节目
,
音乐呀
,
也有一些台湾朋友
…
也就是这么一些
…
比较间接的东西
,
所以在课堂上也不会多说。
Of course, the ethnic and cultural identities of the Chinese teachers extend beyond the
border of Mainland China and Taiwan. A teacher from Singapore offers this opinion:
Our living experiences are probably quite different from most Chinese people. Singa-
pore, in term of ancestral worship, has preserved better than China. Then there are those so-
called cultural factors, how to celebrate the New Year, the Dragon Boat Festival. But these
follow a different set of rules in Mainland Chinese culture.
我们的生活经验可能跟一般的中国人可能不太一样。星加坡
,
在这个祖先崇
拜这
一环比中国保留得好。然后可能一些所谓的文化因素
,
新年要怎么样呀
,
端午节要怎
么样呀
,
但是这些在中国的文化又是另外一套了。
A Caucasian teacher concurs that being a non-ethnic Chinese has given him a rather
different outlook on Chinese culture, which can be put to good use in cultural teaching. He
reckons: “Since I’m outside of Chinese culture, I might be more objective about what Chi-
materials presented by a native Chinese teacher and a non-native one. Some learners weigh
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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the native status as a valuable and necessary credential for teaching culture. A student
shows her preference for “a teacher from China instead of someone who is Caucasian”
because “they can explain things within context whereas the Caucasian teacher would just
In contrast, not everyone sees having an ethnic Chinese background as an advantage.
The argument that native speakers possess uncontested authority over their language and
It’s nice to have someone who has looked at the culture from the outside in a similar
way like us, he obviously [is] someone who had the experiences and could kind of tell
without necessarily having an emotional reaction… without being biased for one way or
Many participants believe that the ethnic backgrounds of the students also make a dif-
ference in their cultural learning. All heritage students reveal that they have access to a
variety of authentic resources and personal contacts with Chinese culture. Their family and
friends are said to be the two most important ties in keeping them close to Chinese cultural
On the other hand, non-heritage students often regret that they have no or little face-
to-face interaction with Chinese people. Especially for the elementary-level students, they
their own; the Chinese classroom is their sole opportunity for exposure to Chinese culture.
For example, a Caucasian student remarks: “I think that the teachers might have taken other
The different ethnic background and cultural experiences of the students may create
certain problems for teachers. A teacher states:
-
and say, “Teacher, if it happened in the United States, [they] would have been caught and
and emotional. But upon hearing these stories, those American students don’t think like
that.
有的时候你讲到中国的二十四孝
,
什么「卧冰求鲤」
,
什么「凿壁偷光」
...
学生也笑。
他们说
:
「老师
,
凿壁偷光
,
如果在美国的话
, [
他们
]
早就被抓到监狱去了
!
」
...
就
是我们讲的都是一些古老的我们自己觉得很感动的一些孝顺的故事
,
可是那些老美的
学生听起来
,
他们不这么认为。
on cultural pedagogy remains a matter of opinion. Still, background alone is inadequate to
explain all the differences. Culture is intricately woven into the cognitive and social fabric
of a community. Hence, most teachers agree that their upbringing and training are far more
prominent factors in gearing their practice than ethnic origins. Describing her own back-
ground, a teacher notices how these personal elements have shaped her perspective on cul-
tural teaching:
I did not originally come from the field of Chinese pedagogy; I’m from ESL. I had
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
81
some students who had studied Chinese in high schools. They would say: “our previous
teachers taught us to sing this song; some students who had studied abroad in China could
sing “dropping the handkerchief.” I couldn’t teach such things because they are too distant
from my background and teaching style. I am not a very social person either. So, I guess it
depends on the individual.
我原来并不是中文教学出身
,
我是
ESL
。我以前有学生他们在
high school
上过
中文课
,
他们说
: “
我们以前的老师教过我们唱过这首歌。
”
有的学生在
China study
abroad
会唱「丢手绢儿」
,
我不会教这样的东西
,
因为它跟我的
背景
,
跟我的教学差
得太远。我个人也是不太容易跟别人打交道
,
所以还是跟个人有关。
Some teachers may also be unfamiliar with some of the common sayings or practices
“wearing a green hat” [
戴绿帽子
] in Chinese culture, but when she is pressed whether
she knows the origin of this saying, she admits that she has no idea where, when, or how it
came about.
The individual backgrounds and practices of cultural pedagogy usher in the question
of uniformity. One teacher argues that “it is necessary to add cultural lessons and cultural
Chinese teachers can understand “how different methods can combine with language activ-
ities” and “when culture can be brought into the lesson [
任何中文老师的
之
类的
,
我觉得都必须加入文化课呀
,
文化的
methodology,
了解不同的方法能够这么样
跟语言的活动结合起来
, culture
什么时候可以进来
Another teacher envisions that “the ideal situation is we all reach a consensus that Chi-
nese culture has these components, and they must be taught to students. If we have such a
frame, such a format, that probably will work [Ideal
的状态就是大家达成共识
,
中国文化
有这些
component
的
,
一定要给学生的。如果有这样一个
frame,
这样一个
format,
那
倒是可以的
-
sity level, which return to the problems created by institutional and individual differences.
CONCLUSION
Whether by a deliberate effort or not, language acquisition comes hand in hand with
cultural pedagogy. Like with any other pedagogical endeavors, there is a gap between
theory and practice in cultural teaching in the classroom. Teaching culture often fares well
multifaceted definition of culture can be a contributing factor. Most participants clearly
distinguish communicative culture from informational or material culture and stress that the
culture” (jiaoji wenhua
交际文化
) also at times claim that they do not have much chance
of teaching culture—which they refer back to “Big C” cultural items.
-
as “what” to teach. The complication of integrating cultural elements into the language
classroom with an already heavily-loaded curriculum and limited time is an issue. The
-
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plex cultural topics and interacting in deeper cultural discussions. Even if the pedagogical
community can come up with a list of cultural topics, there is hardly any consensus on
how or in what order these topics should be taught. Many teachers also feel that the task of
practice leaves the decision to the instructor’s own discretion, that is, if time and resources
even allow. The cultural aspects, moreover, need to keep up with the pulse of contempo-
rary Chinese society in order to be relevant. At the same time, the “who” question cannot
be overlooked. The backgrounds of both teachers and students can steer the direction of
in the teaching agenda.
Based on sixty in-depth interviews, this study explores the perspectives of Chinese
teachers and learners on cultural pedagogy in the language classroom. Examining their
personal and professional experiences opens a window onto the complexity of culture in
the postmodern world. With increasing interest in culture, one can expect that many of the
current notions and beliefs will be altered, perhaps radically, in years ahead. Not only is
among Chinese, culture, and pedagogy are, and perhaps always will be, developing, evolv-
ing, and changing. The seven categories presented here by no means exhaust the problems
faced by the educational community. Rather, they serve merely as referencing anchors for
further discussion so as to solidify a better understanding of teaching and learning culture
in the Chinese context.
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Shohamy (Eds.), Language policy and pedagogy (pp. 221-236). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins
Publishing.
Wong, K. F. (2008). 4P’s of cultural pedagogy: A new paradigm for the cultural dimension in Chinese Lan-
guage Instruction. Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association,
43
(3), 1-24.
Xu, J.
许嘉璐
许嘉璐
谈孔子学院和汉语国际推广
:
已现
“
汉语热
.” Retrieved from www.china.com.cn/book/txt/2008-
12/25/content_17003587.htm
Zhang, Z. - Y.
张占一
. (1992). Jiaoji wenhua suotan
交际文化琐谈
. Language Teaching andLingusitics
Studies
语言教学与研究
, 4, 96-114.
Zhao, X. - Z.
赵贤州
关于文化导入的再思考
. Language
Teaching and Lingusitics Studies
语言教学与研究
, 3, 31-9.
APPENDIX 1
Gender Ethnic
Background
Years of
Teaching
Institutions Regions of
Teaching
T1 F Chinese
(Mainland)
More than
10 years
College, Community College,
University, Middle school, High school,
Heritage/Weekend school
U.S. Taiwan
T2 M Chinese
(Mainland)
1-3 years College, Community College,
University, Intensive/summer language
program
U.S., Mainland
China
T3 F Chinese
(Mainland)
3-6 years College, Community College U.S., Mainland
China
T4 F Chinese
(Taiwan)
More than
10 years
College, Community College,
University, Middle school, High school,
Heritage/Weekend school, Intensive/
summer language program, Private
tutoring
U.S., Taiwan
T5 F Chinese
(Mainland)
3-6 years College, Community College,
University
U.S.
T6 F Chinese
(Mainland)
3-6 years College, Community College,
University
U.S.
T7 M Chinese
(Mainland)
1-3 years College, Community College,
University
U.S.
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
2
(1), 67-88wONg
84
T8 F Chinese
(Mainland)
More than
10 years
College, Community College,
University, Intensive/summer language
program, Study-aboard program,
Private tutoring
U.S., Mainland
China
T9 F Chinese
(Taiwan)
1-3 years College, Community College,
University, Middle school, High school,
Heritage/Weekend school, Intensive/
summer language program, Private
tutoring
U.S.
T10 F Chinese
(Mainland)
Less than
1 year
College, Community College,
University, Intensive/summer language
program
U.S.
T11 F Chinese
(Mainland)
Between
3-6 years
College, Community College,
University, Intensive/summer language
program, Private tutoring, Study-
abroad program
U.S., Mainland
China
T12 F Chinese
(Taiwan)
Between
3-6 years
College, Community College,
University, Intensive/summer language
program, Private tutoring, Study abroad
program
U.S., Mainland
China
T13 M Caucasian Between
3-6 years
College, Community College,
University, Intensive/summer language
program, Private tutoring
U.S.
T14 F Chinese
(Mainland)
Between
6-9 years
College, Community College,
University, Study-aborad program,
Professional training
U.S., Mainland
China
T15 F Chinese
(Mainland)
Between
3-6 years
College, Community College,
University, Professional training
program, Private tutoring
U.S.
T16 F Chinese
(Mainland)
Between
3-6 years
College, Community College,
University, Intensive/summer language
program, Private tutoring
U.S.
T17 F Chinese
(Mainland)
More than
10 years
College, Community College, High
school, Private tutoring
U.S.
T18 M Caucasian Between
3-6 years
College, Community College,
University
U.S.
T19 M Chinese
(Singapore)
Between
6-9 years
College, Community College,
University, Middle school, High school,
Intensive/summer language program,
Private tutoring
U.S.,
Singapore
T20 F Chinese
(Taiwan)
More than
10 years
College, Community College, Private
tutoring
U.S.
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
85
APPENDIX 2
Gender Age
Group
Ethnic
Background
Class
Standing
Years of
Studying
Chinese
Class
Level
Institutions
S1 F 18-20 Chinese
(Hong Kong)
Sophomore Between 2-3
years
1
st
Level University,
Heritage/
Weekend
school
S2 F 18-20 Caucasian Junior Between 3-4
years
3
rd
Level University,
High school,
Study-aboard
program
S3 M 20-22 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University,
High school,
Middle school
S4 M 25 or
above
Chinese Graduate More than 4
years
Above 4
th
level
University,
Intensive
summer
program,
Study-aboard
program
S5 M 20-22 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University,
Elementary
school
S6 M 20-22 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University
S7 M 20-22 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University
S8 M 20-22 Chinese
(Taiwan)
Junior Between 2-3
years
3
rd
Level University,
Middle school,
Elementary
school
S9 M 20-22 Caucasian Junior Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University,
Study-aboard
program
S10 F 20-22 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University
S11 F 20-22 Chinese Junior Between 2-3
years
3rd
Level University,
High school
S12 F 20-22 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
2
(1), 67-88wONg
86
S13 F 20-22 Chinese
(Vietnam)
Junior Between 2-3
years
3
rd
Level University,
High school
S14 M 20-22 Chinese
(Hong Kong)
Junior Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University
S15 M 18-20 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2
years
1
st
Level University
S16 M 25 or
above
Caucasian Graduate Less than 1
year
1
st
Level Intensive
summer
program
S17 F 20-22 Asian
(Japanese/
Korean)
Unclassied/
other
Less than 1
year
1
st
Level Intensive
summer
program
S18 M 20-22 Caucasian Junior Between 2-3
years
3
rd
Level University,
Intensive
summer
program
S19 M 18 or
under
Caucasian Unclassied/
other
Between 2-3
years
3
rd
Level Intensive
summer
program,
study- abroad
program
S20 F 18 or
under
Caucasian Freshman Between 2-3 1
st
Level High school,
Intensive
summer
program
S21 M 25 or
above
Caucasian Unclassied/
other
Less than 1
year
1
st
level Intensive
summer
program
S22 F 18 or
under
African Sophomore Less than 1
year
1
st
Level Intensive
summer
program
S23 F 22-25 Caucasian Graduate Less than 1
year
1
st
Level Intensive
summer
program
S24 F 20-22 Caucasian Junior Between 2-3
years
3
rd
Level University,
Intensive
summer
program,
Study-abroad
program
Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom
87
S25 F 18-20 Asian (Thai/
Caucasian)
Junior Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University,
Intensive
summer
program
S26 F 20-22 Caucasian Senior Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University,
Intensive
summer
program,
Study-abroad
program
S27 F 25 or
above
Caucasian Graduate Between 3-4
years
3
rd
Level University,
Intensive
summer
program,
Study-abroad
program
S28 M 18 or
under
Asian (Thai/
Caucasian)
Freshman Less than 1
year
1
st
Level Intensive
Summer
Program
S29 M 18-20 Chinese Sophomore Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University
S30 M 18-20 Chinese Sophomore Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University
S31 M 18-20 Chinese/
Caucasian
Sophomore Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University
S32 M 20-22 Caucasian Sophomore Between 1-2
years
1
st
Level University
S33 F 20-22 Chinese
(Taiwan)
Sophomore Between 2-3
years
3
rd
Level University,
High school
S34 F 18-20 Chinese Sophomore Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University
S35 F 18-20 Caucasian Sophomore Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University,
Summer
Intensive
program
S36 M 18-20 Chinese
(Taiwan)
Sophomore Between 1-2
years
2
nd
Level University
S37 F 18-20 Chinese Sophomore Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
2
(1), 67-88wONg
88
S38 F 22-24 Caucasian Senior Between 3-4
years
3
rd
Level University,
Summer
Intensive
program,
Study-aboard
program
S39 M 20-22 Chinese
(Hong Kong)
Junior Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University,
Elementary
school
S40 M 18-20 Chinese Sophomore Between 2-3
years
2
nd
Level University
Author’s Biodata:
Ka F. Wong is Assistant Professor of Chinese and Asian Studies at St Olaf College, USA.
He received his PhD in Chinese from the University of Hawaii. His research explores the
symbiotic ties and tensions between individual identity and cultural discourse across a wide
range of topics. Integrating culture and technology into the Chinese classroom is also one
of his pedagogical focuses. His publications include Visions of a Nation: Public Monuments
in Twentieth-Century Thailand as well as various journal articles and book chapters on
First Author’s Address:
wongk@stolaf.edu
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES,
2
(1), 89-101
ISSN: 2224-2716
Copyright © 2012 Overseas Education College of Xiamen University
The Case of Small Commerce at Kinshasa Central Market
1
Nuah M. Makungu M.
University of Ottawa, Canada
services sold at the market. The rivalries between local shop owners and newly arrived ones who
succeed thanks to their insertion in the Chinese Diaspora networks, and to their low prices on
merchandise and labour force that cannot strike are being exacerbated. However, social tensions
Keywords:
DRC- China, Kinshasa, Small business, Social Networks, migrants, Global-
INTRODUCTION
Global flows do not just exist, they have to be set in motion- goods, people, finance
and information have to be carried from one end of the globe to the other. Effective
globalisation is hard work. In the process of transnational circulation of goods, Chinese
people and companies move particular objects from China (Asia) context to DRC
of global production, free movement of goods, migrations and movement of populations
and real time information.
This article aims at providing a better understanding of Chinese migrants in small
businesses in the present era of globalisation. Chinese presence in the DRC since 2005
is diversifying in term of diplomatic services, mining groups, forestry groups, fossil fuel
groups, telecommunications groups, as well as establishment of small businesses. This
to be properly analysed. Chinese immigrants are mostly from Zhejiang, Fujian provinces,
etc. (Interviewee n°11). It is common that migrants coming from the same sending areas
form communities in the receiving societies, in which members are linked by social and
economic networks. These networks usually extend to people who remain in the sending
small family businesses, which are often interconnected (Hugon, 2001; Putnam, 1993). In
1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Nuah M. Makungu M. E-mail: nmakungum@uottawa.ca
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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(1), 89-101MakuNgu
90
recent decades, marked by increasing globalisation and the rise of China as an economic
superpower, the role of Chinese migrants, in particular that of Chinese entrepreneurs (espe-
economic, social and political contexts of both the sending and receiving areas. Despite the
trends, success and failure).
Small Chinese shop owners (or small entrepreneurs) are opening stores that sell shoes,
bedding, and other marketable items. The continuing transformation of the Chinese busi-
ness landscape is obvious. Meanwhile, their Congolese counterparts, West Africans, Indi-
ans, and Lebanese who were important small commercial actors are now losing grounds
due to this Chinese breakthrough. There are growing rivalries between local shop owners
and the newly arrived Chinese entrepreneurs. On July 26 2012, local shop owners protested
by taking to the streets to claim their exclusive right to small commerce in Kinshasa:
In our memo, we claim that small commerce be secured. It has to come
-
clared one of the protesters (Radio Okapi, 2012).
success of Chinese shop owners in small businesses, which leads to the decline of local
To answer this question, I formulate the following hypothesis: small Chinese entre-
strong internal and external ethnic networks (associations and other effective family and
community structures) of distribution that local shopkeepers (Congolese, West-African and
Lebanese) lack. The Chinese shop owners also have low prices on average; their prices are
lower by a third when compared to the local prices. Also, they have a docile labour force
imported from China that is unable to protest or strike.
The study uses semi-structured interviews (Beau, 1998), participant observation of
-
ence of small Chinese shop owners as well as the “Made in China” proliferation of goods
in Kinshasa central market. Kinshasa is a city of 6 million and the capital of Congo with
estimated population estimated of 69 million (Saint Moulin, L., 2010:274).
As White notes:
Kinshasa is overflowing with automobiles, billboards and neon signs,
tall buildings, satellite dishes, and cellular phones. People in Kinshasa
show their urban colors through a whole series of cultural markets such
as language (Lingala with bits of French is the language of choice), dress
(women combine high heels with three-piece traditional dresses made of
local or imported wax cloth; men wear dress slacks, dress shirts, and im-
ported leather shoes” (White 2008, 21).
I interviewed ten Congolese (male and female, customers coming from the Chinese
shops) and one Chinese worker (who speaks French). The interviewees live and work in
Is the DemocratIc republIc of congo (Drc) beIng globalIzeD by chIna
91
Kinshasa, and exhibit characteristics of other people living in this town.
First I examined the Congo’s political economy context, and the Sino-DRC cooperation
since 1973. I then examine the accomplishments of small owners of Chinese shops in Kin-
shasa and explain how they are succeeding. I take account of the constraints and opportuni-
ties of globalisation in shaping Chinese businesses in DRC. I conclude by examining likely
-
nomic context of DRC; recent history of Sino-DRC relations; visible Chinese advancement
in the DRC and small commerce at Kinshasa central market; unrivalled or more competi-
tive prices; Chinese ethnic labour force (Chinese); a brief conclusion.
POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF DRC
Since November 1996, the political situation in DRC has become increasingly volatile.
After overthrowing Mobutu’ regime and after assuming control of the country, Laurent
eastern provinces of DRC plunged deeper into political insecurity and violence. Beginning
in August 1998 the Rwanda-backed rebel movement RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour
region. This threat is not for the Congolese government and military only, but for the local
Even with support from several other Africans countries such as, Zimbabwe, Namibia,
leading to a bloody stalemate. The Lusaka Accord, July 1999, resulted in the establishment
of an extended United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission (MONUC), and a call by the
continued in the region, much of which was fueled by the ongoing threat of Hutu militias
Since hostilities broke out, there have been 3.5 millions deaths and of more than
500,000 refugees and displaced persons (UN 2013). In the meantime, the population has
dealt with an outbreak of endemic diseases such as malaria, AIDS (
a syndrome caused by
), alongside the privatisation of public health services (Ndaywel, 2002; Persyn, et. al.,
2004). In addition, there are illnesses caused by natural calamities, such as the volcanic
In this context, Kinshasa and capital cities of provinces experienced a population in-
par excellence. It facilitates
-
of poverty. Since the 2000’s, malnutrition of young children has reached worrying levels,
in the outskirts of Kinshasa, especially during the rainy season when provincial roads and
even the rivers are impassable. Consequently, more than a third of the population was ex-
posed to food insecurity (PNUD 2009 ; Makungu 2008).
The disastrous effects of malnutrition have already appeared after the 1991 and 1993
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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(1), 89-101MakuNgu
92
riots by the Zairian army in Kinshasa and across the whole country, as a result of non-pay-
Most city dwellers did not earn the equivalent of US$ 1.00 a day (PNUD, 2009 ; Makun-
gu, 2008; Trefon, 2004). The few people who were employed were spending the whole
offs following the destruction of the country’s industries. Redundancies imposed by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) within the framework of the
implementation of structural adjustment policies destroyed the nascent social state: lack of
social injustice. The implementation of the neo-liberal model, the economic and state crisis
aggravated the misery of the poorest.
In July 2006 and in December 2011, multi-party elections were finally held. Joseph
Kabila “won” both elections despite contestations. Despite this alleged political break-
conflict in eastern Congo as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis”. Several reports by
-
mated at six million (CARITAS). The 2013 UN/African Union
2
report published in Addis
Ababa reveals that over two million people are internally displaced persons and an evi-
dence of widespread sexual violence against women and children.
The year 2012 was marked by a series of confrontations in the North Kivu region of
DRC between the Congolese national army and the Rwanda-backed rebel movement M23.
The DRC government and M23 initiated an agreement which failed on April 14 2013.
As state structures and market mechanisms of the 1990s fell into further decay, Kinsha-
sa increasingly came to be known as a place of violence and crisis. People have become
accustomed to the state of dirt and dust that resulted from years of political neglect. With a
is not enough to enable them to pay even for shared private taxis. “People often say, “Mboka
eku” (the country is dead), and for some time now “Kinshasa la Belle” has been known
as “Kinshasa la Poubelle” (Kinshasa the Garbage Can) (White 2008, 23-24). A city which
used to be a beautiful place is now all dust and noise. Also, people’s needs are not being
met.
current 2013 Human Development Report – “The Rise of the South: Human Progress in
-
work, mastering hyperinflation and relaunching several of its economic activities. The
report further adds that thanks to external support, public investments have almost doubled
and its part in the GDP has gone up. As the trends suggest, they should continue to in-
crease.
World economic expansion stimulated demand for oil and raw materials from the coun-
try and caused the increase of prices. The increase of public development assistance and the
2 United Nations/African Union (2013). Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the region, Addis Ababa, 24 February.
Is the DemocratIc republIc of congo (Drc) beIng globalIzeD by chIna
93
the country. More aid, fewer debts equal more growth. With a little bit of creativity, Con-
golese in particular could transform socio-economic problems into development projects.
Despite the optimistic tone of the human development report, public development assis-
programs. Unemployment has reached worrying proportions. More and more, thousands
of people live on below US $ 1.00 a day per day (PNUD, 2009). The only sign of hope
comes from the development of new information and communication technologies. Urban
dwellers facing increasing misery are better informed. If they have some money to invest,
they can either individually or collectively undertake productive activities. In Kinshasa and
-
velopment ends in an international context where, for two decades, decision-makers tend to
The following section focuses on recent history of cooperation between the DRC and
China.
RECENT HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DRC AND CHINA
Under the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko, the Chinese became popular in the DRC
by building the presidential domain of N’sele, the presidential palace of Gbadolite, the
palace of the people (the parliamentary seat, “palais du people”) and the immense stadium
of the Martyrs in Kinshasa. These are the fruits of the Sino-Congolese friendship that began
Kinshasa which was at war against rebellions instigated by the Kigali and Kampala regime
since August 1998.
Ever since 2007, under the regime of President Joseph Kabila, the Chinese have been
invested in others sectors of the Congolese economy, such as the Chinese operated Con-
go-China Telecom (CCT). The CCT was taken over by France Telecom in 2011). It controls
a considerable share of the wireless market with its unrivalled prices. The companies Exim
Bank of China, China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC), etc. are all involved in
increasing their numbers. They exploit copper, cobalt, etc. in Katanga. On the basis of the
agreement signed on September 17 2008 between Kinshasa and Beijing, the GECAMINES
-
by which foreign direct investments arrives in this country. Arguably, this is not what we
ordinarily call investment to promote local development. Focusing on the elements of glo-
China has been remarkably stepping up its involvement in DRC over the recent years.
It does not view its close ties with Congolese government as the donor-recipient relation-
War. Rather than aid projects, China focuses on trade and direct investment. This approach
provides the Congolese government with greater economic and political room to manoeu-
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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(1), 89-101MakuNgu
94
vre while China pursues a wide range of investments. China does not set any conditions in
terms of democracy, good governance or human rights. These three conditions do not play
any role in its policy towards DRC (or any country in South).
This South-South cooperation calls into question many aspects of the approach taken by
traditional donors and uses economic partnerships to create a counterbalance to the North
and reduce DRC’s dependence on northern donors. But, at the same time, new dependen-
cies are being created through China’s emerging power. According to Congolese experts,
In a country where everything is lacking and where everything must be rebuilt after 32
years of Mobutism (1) and 15 years of Kabilism, the Chinese propositions to rebuild roads
and railways or to improve existing ports are taken seriously by ordinary Congolese.
In fact, China has been represented in the DRC by its development aid for about 40
years (Davies, 2008) especially through the construction of the projects cited earlier in this
paper. Ally to the DRC, China is considered as an opportunity for this country. The typical
Congolese thinks that this cooperation will help the country reclaim its tarnished image
through economic and social development (Malingumu, 2008).
A Congolese customer who was questioned after leaving a Chinese shop stated that:
The economic propositions from China to rebuild the Congo can help
us negotiate a better power relation with regards to our traditional part-
ners from Europe and America. Yes, welcome to the Chinese (Inter-
viewee n°1)
.
A romantic view of Chinese is quite common among Congolese imaginations. This
Congolese “admiration” for Chinese is based on a vision of China as a model and a source
of hope. They do not see Chinese as competitors. Chinese are doing business in a particular
-
tory of DRC, it has never had the opportunity to choose and work with multiple partners in
order to deliver on its own agenda. The Sino-DRC relationship presents an opportunity for
the country to get the most out of international partnership. Whether that partner is a tradi-
tional donor (i.e. Belgium, France, the EU, the US) or a so-called emerging partner (China,
However, China is the largest BRICS country trading partner in DRC. But many critics are
its calculated strategic ambition to suck out African natural resources on a long-term basis,
cultivate African markets as dumping grounds for its cheap manufactured goods and grad-
ually impose its hegemony over the continent. The policy of “non-interference” is said to
dictators and secure lucrative long-term contracts for raw materials. Therefore,
Congolese
have to be smart with Chinese small or big business owners.
KINSHASA CENTRAL MARKET
Is the DemocratIc republIc of congo (Drc) beIng globalIzeD by chIna
95
In Kinshasa central market, one can see a long line of Chinese shops, reminiscent of the
North American “Chinatowns”. They are installed in cement block buildings and have
coloured glass windows. They are permanently guarded by policemen who are paid by the
shop owners.
-
t-shirts, locks of hair, jewellery, wireless telephones, medicine, electronic watches, video
recorders, television sets, belts, kitchen utensils, farming tools, skirts, pants, underwear,
shirts printed with the latest trends in African style, etc. It is a real boom in commodities
and services, which consumers enjoy.
merchandise made in and imported from China. The free circulation of this merchandise
The only Chinese person who speaks French in Kinshasa central market provides the
answer with the following explanation:
The parents stay in China, the cousins and friends living in Singapore
and Hong-Kong send them to us by containers as soon as we give
them our lists of orders. This allows us to avoid spending money on
travelling. The merchandise is sent by containers by sea and it takes
three months to arrive to the port of Matadi (Interviewee n°11).
This story illustrates how social networks and the Chinese diaspora fully participate to
the success of small Chinese shop owners of Zando
-
preneurs have become essential partners in the urban landscape of Kinshasa through their
low priced merchandise.
A Congolese customer was asked about the prices in one of the Chinese shops in the Zando
and answered by saying:
At the prices that they sell their products, they do not need to advertise
on the television or radio to attract clients! The client who later speaks to
news of unrivalled prices gets around and everyone rushes to the store to
no choice (Interviewee n°6).
The success of small Chinese shop owners can also be explained by a proven method:
inferior prices by a third on average when compared to the local competition.
Another client who was interviewed upon leaving a shop declared that:
The low prices of their textile products have almost destroyed the local
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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(1), 89-101MakuNgu
96
industry. The
textiles
CPA factories and Utexafrica have seen produc-
tion slow to a crawl (Interviewee n°7).
Arguably, Chinese merchandise is in competition with merchandise produced in Kin-
reports that a 50 kilograms bag of cement imported from China costs US $ 4.00, but the
We can also note that the price of shirts imported from China in a Chinese shop is less
than half the price of those manufactured in Congo. Due to the low prices, Chinese shops
have advantage over the local shop.
Other examples of Chinese successes are as follows. Established and prosperous small
Chinese shop owners are now engaging in the small local industry, setting up movable units
that do not require complex skills. In Barumbu, a neighborhood of Kinshasa, a small Chi-
neighborhood, another small entrepreneur from Zando invested in the production of bottles
and plastic tubs. In Limete, another neighborhood of Kinshasa, another Chinese business-
man working in the importation of drug and medical equipment has opened a clinic. All
of them continue with their previous business activities and diversify into new activities.
Increasingly, Chinese are buying shops and businesses in Kinshasa. The development of
small industrial investment is welcome according to the comments heard locally because, it
implies the creation of jobs. Success is not always spontaneous. At least 3 out of 10 Chinese
trying to start business in Kinshasa fail and go back to China or elsewhere, either because
-
vironment.
The industrial sector is being battered by cheap Chinese imports. The boom in com-
modities and consumer spending has coincided with the failure of Congolese manufactur-
ing (especially textiles industries). What will the DRC government and policy makers do
answer to this question is a job that someone in the government is paid to do. The govern-
ment and policy makers must avoid another form of “neo-colonialism”, which describes
the socio-economic and political control exercised by the old colonial countries and others
to perpetuate their economic dominance in the former colonies through their multinational
corporations and other cultural institutions. “Neo-colonialism” is also the worst form of
imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those
who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned co-
abroad back at home. In the colony, those who served the ruling imperial power could at
least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. Is there Chinese
Chinese are good economic players. China is in Africa in full force with traders, in-
vestors, lenders, builders, developers, laborers and others. But there are hidden obstacles,
particularly in terms of transferring expertise to the local economy when they bring all their
workers and want to just operate in a bunker environment. The DRC can't blame China for
its own problems. The DRC needs its own strategy in promoting a healthy and balanced
Is the DemocratIc republIc of congo (Drc) beIng globalIzeD by chIna
97
economy. It should allow Chinese companies and small shop owners to make money while
goal by promoting China and its people as partners as well as competitors. In this way, it
Sanusi
(2013)
argued:
cheap labour costs. It is losing that advantage as its economy grows and
shift from consuming Chinese-made goods to making and consuming our
own. We must add value to our own agricultural products…I cannot rec-
ommend a divorce. However, a review of the exploitative elements in this
marital contract is long overdue.
Another interesting fact that explains the success of small Chinese entrepreneurs in
Kinshasa central market is the Chinese ethnic labour force.
CHINESE ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE
Small Chinese shop owners do not always hire the local Congolese labour force. It is
estimated that 10,000 Chinese workers are in the DRC (Michel & Beuret, 2008). The
young, legal and illegal Chinese immigrants constitute a very affordable labour force that
is also docile for the owners of Zando shops. This labour force works seven days per week,
for up to 12 hour shifts, while the locals only work six days per week, and do not work
more than eight hours per day. It is also impossible for the imported labour force to strike.
This labour force is under a lot of pressure and brings back a considerable amount to the
shop owners. Working conditions and forced labour in some Chinese businesses are not
DRC government and policy makers do to ensure that Chinese entrepreneurs hire local
workers, Chinese entrepreneurs should hire local labour. When they hire them, why do
Congolese elites (i.e., African elites) allow the Chinese entrepreneurs to pay local labour
are challenges that Congolese can overcome with their own clear principles.
As China works on its immigration policy, it would appear that DRC, as well as several
other African nations, are trying to reform their own policies. With the growing complaints
in many African countries about Chinese migrants competing to sell “fat cakes” and grocer-
ies as well as cheap China-made consumer products, good immigration policies combined
with industrial policies – properly implemented – might attract the kinds of Chinese mi-
grants who would contribute to job creation and economic growth.
Once again, Congolese can not blame Chinese for their own mistakes. Congolese (as
other Africans peoples) need their own strategy to stop this to happen again in the future.
However, it is known that “lower standards, lack of “corporate social responsibility” (social
and environmental) in business practices, poor labor relations, competition with substitu-
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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98
tion industries (especially textiles), and not enough hiring local labor are the downside of
China’s increasingly prominent presence in Africa” (Brautigam, 2011).
-
-
er, not all Chinese in Kinshasa are rich.
According to what we observed in Kinshasa, the poor Chinese workers (handy men)
from rural area, interact with Congolese daily. They are accustomed to high levels of pov-
erty and societal instability. They can not isolate themselves in a Chinese “ghetto” (like the
elites, the managers and the entrepreneurs), these immigrants live right alongside Congo-
lese in urban communities across the town. Out of sheer necessity, they are often highly
assimilated in both language and culture. For the Congolese, this is good news. Frequent
interpersonal interactions can help reduce misunderstanding between people. Cultural un-
derstanding is something that does go a long way in promoting friendship and peaceful
-
ple. It has also brought with it challenges in understanding the different communities and
These Chinese migratory patterns are a proof of the globalisation taking place in the
DRC and the rest of Africa by this Asian giant. This migratory dynamic presents one of
their lives to enter Europe, Chinese workers are migrating everywhere in Africa. These
-
acterise globalisation (Hugon, 2005: 158). We argue that for the Chinese government, this
migration of workers is considered to be an outlet for an eventual dissatisfaction resulting
Several young Congolese entrepreneurs, with the help of networks through friends,
-
they run good business, they make money. In the end, they can afford to feed their families
and build a house in the suburbs of Kinshasa. They continue to believe in what they are do-
ing and their customers are happy. The free movement of travelling around the world helps
few Congolese to pursue their business dream. However, the Congolese government has
not clearly enabled Congolese corporate or small entrepreneurs to go into China.
The conclusion analyses the lessons learned from this case study.
CONCLUSION
the sales and distribution of goods and services. In this case study, small Chinese shop
owners have gained an unprecedented economic importance in the small urban commerce.
labour compared to the DRC labour. Also, the low prices of merchandise, small Chinese-
shop owners. However, social tensions are arising between these groups. Chinese, Lebanese
Is the DemocratIc republIc of congo (Drc) beIng globalIzeD by chIna
99
and Indians, who are migrants, continue to have dominated retail trade. This domination is
a violation of DRC rules, which limits them to import and wholesale trade. According to
the DRC rule existing for more than 40 years, the retail sector is reserved to the Congolese.
Congolese accept Chinese goods. Chinese entrepreneurs do not have to import their labour
for market then goods. Congolese can equally market these goods and quite ably do.
Considering the population of China, if they continue importing labour, they will crowd out
the Congolese labour force.
with a goal of doubling its per capita income for both urban and rural residents, as well as
with China’s new policy agenda, the DRC and others countries will be a source of econom-
ic boom for Chinese enterprises. There are no indications that Chinese migration to DRC is
slowing. Based on these experiences, as DRC’s economy continues to grow, we should ex-
pect even more Chinese migrants to make the long journey across the Indian Ocean. It may
of DRC’s demography. Recent developments in Chinese migration to DRC and its relation
to China’s rise on the world stage call for further research and methodological innovation
in order to develop a holistic view and an in-depth understanding of the process, trends and
impacts of Chinese immigration into DRC in the next decade.
Based on my analysis, DRC must not only be serious about Congolese-Chinese ties, it
-
The DRC has grown a strong sense of initiative in its development. It has witnessed fast
economic development. But, one of the big hurdles for development in DRC has been the
rampant external interference. Considering the DRC natural and human resources, if there
is less foreign interference and a real commitment to development from Congolese leaders,
there is no reason why the country can not out perform in terms of economic growth. The
advantage of such approach is that DRC will be able to forge a development path that is
independent of others, and will also draw on lessons from successful paths followed by oth-
ers. What the DRC really needs are economic agreements and partnerships complementary,
not one-sided agreements. If the country gets assistance from others, it must be used for the
right purposes to satisfy people’s needs. The country does not have to focus only in food,
know better about laws, regulations, investment environment and market channels, have
to start setting up joint ventures with BRICS or committed Western partners. With more
Chinese consumers getting interested in African products, I believe there will be even more
opportunities for Congolese and Chinese businesses to work together. I know that DRC is
one of the right places for many entrepreneurs from the BRICS countries to expand their
businesses, because of its human and natural resources.
To succeed, this calls for collaboration between policy markers and local entrepreneurs
need to ensure they maximise benefits from relations with their leading external trade
partners. They must act instead of cloaking their concerns in speeches, to shift them from
rhetoric to action. What Congo needs to be doing as a country, is to be ready to engage with
China as equal partners. They have the power of freedom in their hands and in their spirit.
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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Locally-owned shops and other Congolese have to stop complaining about small Chi-
nese-owned shops, and rather consider excessive migration of Chinese to take jobs that
get accurate on the rising number of Chinese migrants. The Congolese Parliament can ad-
dress problems that may arise, but exaggerating of the problem is a worse option. Can the
local shop owners learn from the Chinese to structure their social networks based on local
NOTES
(1) The “ism” refers to the ideologies of dictators such as Mobutu and Kabila.
and movement of populations and real time information.
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Author’s Biodata:
the International Development Program (School of International Development and
Ottawa (Canada). From 1993-1997, he served as the ONG supervisor and Policy Adviser’s
“Jardins et Elevages de Parcelle (JEEP) in Kinshasa (DRC). His expertise and areas of
research are Development Sociology; Sociology of cooperation; Agricultural development
on Social Development and Economic Development impacts of DRC-China cooperation
(projects and trade).
First Author’s Address:
nmakungum@uottawa.ca
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES,
2
(1), 102-118
ISSN: 2224-2716
Copyright © 2012 Overseas Education College of Xiamen University
Sovereignty and Identity in EU-China-Japan Political Dia-
logue. A Theoretical Analysis
1
Oliviero Frattolillo
University of Napoli “L’Orientale”, Italy
The “images” which have commonly distinguished Brussels’ relations with Beijing (starting from
the 1990s) and Tokyo (since the Cold War years) appear to actually be the result of the concur-
rence of events and of structuring factors that denoted trade problems on the surface, or dysfunc-
tions generated by the systemic variable. Nonetheless, in this paper I try to explain that these
problems are fundamentally based on a much more complex and inherent divergence of two uni-
verses of values and different political cultures. Zhao Tingyang’s theory on “relation rationality”
inscribe and construct modern historical relations between China and Japan towards Europe into a
narrative by bringing - in Carol Gluck’s words - “the outside in”.
occurred after the end of the bipolar system and especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, try-
ing to highlight the potential of their political dialogue.
Keywords: China; Japan; Europe; Politics; Identity.
The theme that forms the backdrop to my analysis is the sovereignty. Starting from
this has been changed and re-interpreted over time. It is widely accepted that the same
concepts can often be interpreted in different ways by different people: my analysis has
focused in particular on some conceptual and interpretative gap that even today generate
misunderstandings in their relationships.
Historically, the concept of sovereignty was coined by Western Europe during the six-
teenth and then the eighteenth century. The ongoing bloody conflicts and especially the
Thirty Years' War certainly promoted the introduction of this concept, and with the Peace of
-
tional relations, as the cornerstone for the maintenance of peace and international security.
As it is well known, the concept of sovereignty was based on two dimensions, external
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of the other states, acknowledging the
existence of anarchy of the international system. Internally the sovereignty of a state coin-
cided with the supreme authority of jurisdiction: the right of a nation to decide its internal
1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Oliviero Frattolillo. E-mail: olivierojap@yahoo.com
Sovereignty and identity in eU-China-Japan politiCal dialogUe
103
political system and its structure.
We could perhaps say that China today still feels the "guardian" of the Westphalian sov-
concept dates back to the nineteenth century when the country was penetrated by Western
powers. After being defeated in both the First and the Second Opium War, China’s Qing
Dynasty was forced to sign unfairl treaties and to make further concessions to the Western
imperialist powers. After suffering a strong humiliation, China went from being a victim,
because it was obliged to accept foreign domination, to the rebuilding of its internal and ex-
ternal sovereignty lost because of the “barbarians” (Pan, 2010, p. 239).
Indeed, China went from being an ancient empire, with its own universal order based
on the principle Tian Xia, to a nation-state. The Chinese Tian Xia, or “All-under-Heaven”,
described the universal Chinese empire from which the neighbors might learn the values of
Conceptually, the Tian Xia preferred the notion of "local" to that of "national", the "fam-
ily" to the "nation-state", the "relations" to the "truth and mind", the "communalism" to "in-
but in its complexity and uniqueness, taking into account cultural diversity. The cohesion of
Tian Xia: harmony between peoples. Here we
while the West sees the "other" from a subjective point of view, the Chinese assume that the
"other" is part of the 'otherness, that is, as an alternative and as the possibility (Zhao, 2009, p.
9-p. 11).
China was forced, therefore, to adapt itself to the European concept of sovereignty,
becoming a nation-state. But this path was abrupt. The encounter between the Chinese im-
perial system and the European countries in the second half of the nineteenth century was
not painless. The idea of sovereign states equal to each other, having Europe as a model,
was spread to China through the gunboat diplomacy, and with the spread of Western con-
cepts with an alleged universal character. This naturally led to the creation, by the Chinese,
of a distorted notion of the concept of Westphalian sovereignty. In fact, after the establish-
ment of the PRC in 1949, China made many efforts to try to regain a sovereignty that was
brought this to strive for the rights which it incorporated. China wanted to give the concept
of sovereignty a strong sense of nationalism, intended as territorial integrity and national
dignity: an absolute sovereignty.
with the Westphalian sovereignty, trying to modify and overcome it, while China defends
this concept, preserves and most strongly asserts it.
As argued by some scholars, sovereignty, as a concept, is in a state of ux (Jacobsen,
Sampford & Thakur, 2008). Over time, the re-interpretations have been given to this con-
cept are many, as numerous are the changes occurred at the international level. Relations
system and the new wars have strongly contributed to the need of reinterpreting the classi-
cal concept of sovereignty, enriching it with meanings and perspectives which have been
renovated. Issues such as human rights and democracy have gained priority, and there is
therefore the need to see the states, not only as independent and autonomous, but as actors
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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able to cooperate with each other.
The traditional concept of sovereignty is certainly inadequate to express the complex-
ity of international relations today, for which sovereignty is pooled, shared, perforated.
The creation of the European Union is just a mirror of this new way of conceiving sov-
ereignty: states have voluntarily transferred their rights of sovereign nation-states in a
234-p. 235).
The post-9/11 also marked a moment of deep change in EU-East Asia relations. As a
result, forms of technical and functional cooperation dominated, while the political and
strategic dialogue was partly withdrawn at the bilateral level - as evidenced by the growing
importance of the EU’s relations with Japan, China and India (ASEM Infoboard, 2002).
These changes in inter-regional dialogue highlighted the different realities and strategies
that marked the positions of both parts. In an unprecedented moment in history, Asia and
Europe committed themselves to the construction of an intensive political dialogue, and
these differences gave rise to criticisms and worries throughout the second half of the 1990s
(Santander & Ponjaert, 2009, p. 296). The divergences of European and Asian countries
rooted in deep differences in terms of backgrounds, beliefs and historical experiences sur-
faced when setting the ASEM agenda (Fitriani, 2011, p. 43). On the one hand, the Southeast
Asian countries (many of which were former colonies that only gained independence a few
years before and were still under economic recovery) were strongly imbued with the notion
of national sovereignty, which they believed to be the best guarantee for stability, security
and development (Sukma & Nathan, 2009, p. 111). On the other hand, the EU member
of achieving effective cooperation and sustainable development. The comments presented
in this respect by Busse and Maull (Busse & Maull, 1999, p. 227) are elucidative, as ac-
cording to them the history of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in terms of security is, to
some extent, “one of the rejecting European role models”.
The explanations given by the two authors focus mainly on issues related to security
as well as to geopolitical aspects of the two areas. While many Asian countries were still
affected by internal security and economic development problems - frequently as a result of
a still incomplete nation-building process – the European states had already become “well
consolidated nation-states” (Busse & Maull, 1999, p. 227). In addition to this, from a geo-
political point of view, compared to a mainly “land-oriented” Europe, Southeast Asia and
geo-strategic landscape was markedly bipolar during the Cold War years, the situation in
removed from European experiences. Today the situation is such as it could be said that
the diplomatic games played by both parties show the presence of some “structural limits”
-
an political interests in East Asia proved to be a dismissed expectation, while many Asian
countries were not able to articulate their vision of the role that the EU could take in their
region. Different security priorities, divergent sources of terrorism and a thorough heteroge-
neity in economic and social development, as well as in sovereignty and jurisdiction issues,
seem to be among the main reasons attributed to this by the Asian countries (Kang, 2003, p.
73).
Sovereignty and identity in eU-China-Japan politiCal dialogUe
105
Moreover, an excellent study recently conducted by the European Studies in Asia (ESIA)
consortium revealed important aspects related to the perception of the EU in Asia, not re-
stricting the analysis at the institutional perspective, but rather exploring the cultural impact
Ryan, 2009). On the basis of results achieved from the empirical research undertaken here,
the surprising reality is that “what information did exist tended to be impressionistic, hap-
media saw the European Union” (Chaban, Holland & Ryan, 2009, p. 2). The phenomenon
appears even more pronounced when the EU’s involvement is considered both in terms of
for the Commission, “Europe does not exist without non-Europe” and “Europe can only be
Although several years elapsed since the enunciation of the European Security Strategy
(ESS), the debate on the EU’s international identity is still open. Alongside the notion of
receded at all, as it is the conceptual framework on which the dominant discourse tending to
construct the European international actorness during the 1990s was established (Whitman,
2006, p. 1-p. 20).
In light of the new EU framework that clearly shows its global aspirations, it would be
problematic to evaluate how the notion of civilian power can be still feasible. While that
image could be now questioned, prominent scholars like Maull (Maull, 2000, p. 56-p. 80),
referring to Germany’s participation in the Kosovo War in 1999, argue that the recourse to
the military instrument did not invalidate, in that case, the notion of Europe as a civilian
power. According to him, the ESS clearly stated that this was compatible with the EU’s
interests and security priorities, which must be safeguarded in the face of global threats,
through the pursuit of strategic goals (including the construction of a safe environment).
on its potential to exercise power worldwide by promoting democracy and development
through trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping operations (Moravcsik, 2002, p. 27). This view
goes beyond the traditional dichotomy between civil and military power. While there is
it from any hegemonic approaches, it is less clear whether the rejection of the classical
models of power politics produce a distinctive vision of international relations. At any rate,
the assistance measures and trade conditions at the base of the ESS and the use of military
force as a last resort, unambiguously demonstrate the EU’s inclination to soft approaches in
the sphere of global politics.
The notion of normative power plays an important role in the debate on the EU’s inter-
national identity and on its external perception. The theoretical foundations of the CSDP
and of the ESDP, for example, are regulatory as well as constitutive rules as they seek to
create a European identity for collective actions. These frameworks provide new institu-
tional and normative ground in order to put the EU’s global presence into practice (Cheba-
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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106
kova, 2008, p. 2-p. 14). Some authors, however, acknowledged more than a single Europe-
an identity as a result of its international projection. They also suggest that the application
of the constructivist approach could help to explain how the perception of European iden-
tity is socially constructed in East Asia. According to this approach, the reciprocal beliefs
and expectations of the states determine the character of the international life. They are the
product of social rather than materials structures, largely constructed by the people’s ideas.
The existence of social realities depends on the interweaving of the concepts, theories and
beliefs expressed by the actors. The sharing of ideas, or the culture of an anarchic system,
represents its structure, or at least an important part of it. In his theory of social constructiv-
-
tory and constitutive factors of the reality, but he asserts that their meanings and effects de-
the ideas and norms that have a constitutive function in determining the means, the purpose
-
petitive or cooperative. This is exactly what Wendt called the “dominant cultural structure
of the international system”, which may be predominantly Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian.
Each of these cultures is included in a context of anarchy, but it does not exhaust all the
possible forms that anarchy may take. When the Hobbesian culture is dominant in a system
it is considered a kind of “war of all against all”. The central idea, however, is that the state
of war is formed on the basis of shared ideas, rather than caused by the state of anarchy, or
power. The representative type of practice produced by the enemy is the Realpolitik, which
Other.
Lockean culture, by contrast, is framed around a rivalry that is tied to the right to sov-
it as a right. The state-actors are not enemies but rivals, according to the Hobbesian princi-
ple of “live and let live”. As it is obvious, the subjective beliefs regarding the Self and the
Other at the base of Lockean logic are not immutable, and this allows us to presuppose that
the rivalry may also change. At the macro level, however, the rivalry forms part of a collec-
tive representation of shared knowledge that overcomes the ideas of individual states. By
combining these phenomena, we arrive at the idea that the war is, at the same time, accept-
ed and contained. While Lockean culture has been dominant over the last three centuries,
“Hobbesian disputes”, such as World War II, have undermined the status quo, or at least
attempted to.
Kantian culture, lastly, is structured around the role of friendship. It can be composed
of rivals and friends, or just that of friends. Two rules of friendship are shared by the states:
the refusal of the use of force in the conflicts resolutions and mutual aid between states
when a state’s security is threatened by a third actor.
-
posed by Zhao Tingyang, currently the leading figure among Chinese intellectuals, and
based on the cardinal Confucian values of “harmony” and “universal cooperation”. Zhao
-
-
Sovereignty and identity in eU-China-Japan politiCal dialogUe
107
resents a collective or social identity. This instils in the actors a collective interest towards
the preservation of their own culture, which will tend to defend itself in case of external
threats.
The discourse on the identity, or rather on the identities, of the EU may offer an expla-
nation, in the constructivist sense, for its political weakness in East Asia, and its inability to
play a role in the local resolution of hard issues without the support of both Japan and Chi-
na.
The EU is integrated into two of the most important political and security networks in
Asia, the ASEM and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Union is also in the privi-
-
fords it greater power to affect regional political developments. However, despite its coop-
eration with East Asian countries in economic and cultural terms, the EU has been excluded
from high political discourse in the region, such as the Taiwan issue and the Six Party Talks
on the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, though the Union is formally involved
into East Asia’s political structure and security, in reality it has little impact on hard security
concepts of identity and perception (Pardo, 2009, p. 265-p. 280). The European collective
consideration the cultural and political implications of its compatibility and understandabil-
ity by third actors. Taking into account factors such as identity allows us to gain a better
idea of how the conduct of a state is perceived by other states in different ways, depending
on the actor with which it interfaces and the manner in which its actions are implemented.
As regards the case of Japan, the history of political and diplomatic relations with Europe
have been marked since the Cold War years by a clear misevaluation of their respective
identities (Frattolillo, 2013). This has impeded a proper understanding of the dynamics
-
tance of the role of identity in the history of Japanese-European political and diplomatic
relations certainly does not imply a lack of focus on other equally important factors, such as
the nature of the international system, the distribution of power, and interdependence. How-
when they have occurred. As stated by historians such as Akira Iriye (Iriye, 1990, p. 101),
their inquiries by raising serious questions about one country’s behaviour and attitudes
toward others”; thus, “the question of mutual understanding or antagonism among nations
cannot be fully examined so long as one focuses exclusively on security or trade issues; one
will also have to consider the mind-sets of leaders and peoples”. International relations, as
well as international history, take place within a world that is understood not only as geopo-
litical interplays or in terms of economics, but also on the basis of normative structures as
perhaps be parochial to ignore this. According to Iriye, “at certain times and in certain
circumstances, ideas and assumptions are crucial”, and then “the study of those times and
circumstances may provide a fascinating area of inquiry for diplomatic historians” (Iriye,
1990, p. 101-p. 102).
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
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THE TIAN XIA LEGACY
The term “identity” is inherently multidimensional, since it includes a wide range of
discourse will be limited, especially in the Japanese case, to the country’s normative beliefs
relating to its orientation towards the Other, as it may be clearly explained by some aspects
of its own politico-philosophical culture. However, we deemed it appropriate to start with
a brief digression about Zhao’s theoretical perspective - which we term here “relational
rationality” – that aims, without compromising the overall coherence of our analysis, to
serve as introduction to the discourse on the “relational coexistence”, properly concerning
Japan. Through a careful reading, in fact, the two dimensions have considerable political
and philosophical similarities and they merge into a unique theoretical framework that may
relate to some extent both to Japan and East Asia which, in the analysis of EU policies, may
sometimes be misleading to consider as fully separated entities.
According to Zhao (Zhao, 2009a; Zhao, 2006, p. 29-p. 41), the US has a Kantian cul-
ture when they interact with the Anglophone allies, a Lockean culture towards Europe and
a Hobbesian approach with other countries, especially towards the “rogue states” and the
“failed nation-states”. The EU would rather show itself to have a Kantian culture within
itself and a Lockean approach towards the outside world, and this would result in a great
the case of Asia. Ontologically, the Lockean approach arises in opposite terms if related to
Zhao’s position. Even the Kantian identity fails to converge towards forms of communitar-
ianism going beyond the mere cooperation if we consider that this last does not necessarily
imply the mutual improvement of the actors involved. As a direct result, the entire West is
imbued with a vision that Zhao believes is anchored to principles that have been overcome
in the Westphalian model of the international relations, based on the state dimension and
without any supranational institution that could ensure stability at the global level. The per-
spective in which Zhao’s political philosophy of Tian-xia (“all that is under heaven”) must
be framed is indeed placed on a global level (Callahan, 2008, p. 749). It should exceed the
human history, the various and vain attempts to unify the world have often followed one
another through the construction of world empires and state-alliances. Their failure is main-
ly due to the absence of a stable model of cooperation, which relied on the Kantian idea
of “perpetual peace” or on the notion of “universal harmony” between people of Chinese
origin. This implies that the world system should be framed within the Tian-xia theoretical
system, which is conceptually open, even if this does not imply its automatic and timeless
extensibility (Zhao, 2009a, p. 5). It is an open network focused on a sort of world govern-
ment and on a large number of sub-state entities that are extremely divergent in geograph-
ical and cultural terms. The world government presides over the universal institutions, the
laws and the global order, but it may lose its own legitimacy if it betrays the justice it is
supposed to uphold, or if it abuses its powers. In both these cases, it would be reasonable
to expect a revolution by the people and the revocation of the “Mandate of Heaven” (Gao,
Sovereignty and identity in eU-China-Japan politiCal dialogUe
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which relies on the world government’s control over armed forces, which is proportionally
increasing compared to the military power of the sub-state entities.
As it has been conceived by Zhao, there are three senses in which the Tian-xia can be
understood: the earth and all the lands under heaven; a common choice made by all the
peoples of the world, or a universal agreement in the ‘hearts’ of the individuals; and a po-
litical world system that includes a universal institution aimed at maintaining the order at
every level. The world would therefore consist of three notions: the physical world (the
earth), the psychological world (people’s feelings) and the institutional world (global insti-
tution) (Zhao, 2009a, p. 9). Political governance must be transferable in a descending order,
from “All-under-Heaven” to the nation-states and to the families - and never in the opposite
way. However, the political legitimacy of a universal institution must be provided by its
ethical justice. Then, unlike the political transposition, the ethical transposition should be
developed according to an ascending order that goes from the families to the states, up to
“All-under-Heaven”, because it is assumed that the ethics is rooted in the true essence of
humanity (Zhao, 2003, p. 4).
Ultimately, the combination of the political transposition - channelled by the Tian-xia’s
theory towards the states and the families - and the ethics turns into a relationship of mutual
the concept of harmony is a principle of co-existence that presupposes the existence and, in
of ‘relations’” (Zhao, 2009a, p. 10). This philosophical logic is extremely important to un-
derstanding the concept of harmony as the principle that substantiates the relations between
Western tradition where the win-lose approach, based on the idea of strenuous opposition,
in order to understand the EU’s disinterest towards East Asian security issues. As stressed
by Wendt (Wendt, 2003, p. 337-p. 338), in fact, both these cultures may clash with egoistic
type identities.
“In Lockean culture, states identify with each other’s survival, so that
“death threats” to one are seen as threats to all, but this does not extend to
respects it is still a self-help culture. In the Kantian culture, the scope of
response to any military threat, not just death threats. [...] even within a
relationship and issue covered by a collective identity, it will often be in
involves the formation of a collective identity should not blind us to the
possibility that egoistic identities may still be important. The picture here
is one of “concentric circles” of identification, in which the nature and
effects of collective identity vary from case to case, not one of altruism
across the board.”
Zhao’s theory of Tian-xia
in its formulation of the idea of “relational rationality” (Zhao, 2009b, p. 35-p. 49). In the
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philosopher’s words, “the Chinese philosophy considers that [...] the variability of the facts
is a better premise than the certainty of things” since committing an act involves introduc-
ing a form of relation between individuals (Zhao, 2009b, p. 43). In other words, human
people entertain with regard to one another.
“In the world of facts, the formula “x is in relation R to y” (xRy) acquires
a meaning quite different from what it has in the world of things. […] In
other words, the presence of x and y depends on the relations between
them. […] According to this relational point of view, what is the relation
that determines the existential situation and the value of the facts that con-
stitute the world of life” (Zhao, 2009b, p. 43).
Relational rationality is conceived in dichotomous terms if compared to modern indi-
vidualism, which is founded on the assumption of an absolute individuality, and “exalts the
44). The conceptual framework that underlies the discourse on relationality directly intro-
duces the crucial question of “coexistence”, which makes the classic debate on the ontolog-
ical existence unnecessary, or even out-dated. This is because “the co-existence precedes
the existence” (Zhao, 2009b, p. 45).
discrimination or of “exclusions of other cultures”, implying a politics that rejects the cat-
egory of the “enemy”. According to the second principle, instead, the universally accepted
The third is based on the assumption that an action or a strategy which entails no negative
reward is a “representation of the universal values”. Military competition, trade protection-
ism and the war of markets are highly dangerous strategies. Similarly, the individualism is
2009b, p. 45-p. 46).
THE NINGEN AIDAGARA PARADIGM
The relational rationality theory bears a remarkable similarity and a commonality of
principles with Japanese relational ethics, the maître-à-penser of which was Watsuji
Japanese case, Zhao’s theory of Tian-xia is expressed in terms of a “relational coexistence”,
which bases its ontological sources on the central concept of ningen aidagara, intended as
a “human inter-relationality”, which was analytically presented in a work published in 1935
and entitled Ningengaku toshite no rinrigaku
Man”) (Watsuji, 1997, p. 9).
Western philosophical tradition, which has its roots mainly in Aristotelian, Cartesian,
and Christian concepts, had developed social ethics that were hopelessly anthropocentric.
Sovereignty and identity in eU-China-Japan politiCal dialogUe
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The concept of ningen aidagara aims to offer a “renewed” interpretation of ethics, which
seeks to relate the Western concept of the self with the Japanese concept of the self as in-
ter-being. In fact, the reasons for this fundamental cultural divergence can be found within
the framework of a more profound and complex diversity of cultural context: an anthropo-
centric West and a communitarian East. The relational ethics of Watsuji, the idea of a hito
to hito to no aidagara is unquestionably the result Confucian universe:
“In ancient China, parent and child, lord and vassal, husband and wife,
young and old, friend and friend, and so forth constituted “the grand rin
of human beings,” that is to say, the most important kinds of human fel-
lowship (Watsuji, 1996, p. 11).”
The Confucian matrix implicit in Watsuji’s ningen is inseparable from the communitar-
ian ethics of kazoku seido (Japanese “family system”), and more so from the concept of ie,
in its social and spiritual dimension. As is well known, the fundamental importance of the
“home/family system” in the Japanese ethics of social relationships was one of the main
topics analysed as part of Japanese social studies in recent decades.
As observed by Nakane Chie, who provided one of the most interesting contributions to
the system of the ie as a pervasive structural element in Japanese society, group conscious-
ness in Japanese society is expressed through this traditional and ubiquitous institution that
has come to penetrate, from within, every corner and every aspect of Japanese society. The
“outside” - which embraces the distinction indicated by Kimura Bin, the space between ex-
istential iru-being and the physical spatiality of aru-being. Once again, Nakane shows how
tate shakai
(vertical society), in which each type of group is organised in a direct, personal and hierar-
chical relationship (known in anthropological literature with the dichotomy oyabun-kobun
(“parent/child”).
This kind of relationship order was to have permeated the culture of the country, in all
its social groups, to embrace the concept of State, in a kazoku kokka sense, which is the
level on which the concept of ieTennō and the imperial family
their lord converge.
Nakane’s theory is shared and further developed in informative terms that relate to ni-
honjinron literature, by the psychiatrist Takeo Doi in his famous essay Amae no kōzō (The
structure of the amae), in which he analysed Japan’s collective “group consciousness”.
From a sociological and psychological standpoint, Doi interpreted these relationships as
amae expressions, which he called “infantile dependency syndrome”. The amae syndrome
helps to understand the psychological underpinning interpersonal communication within
the Japanese group. A much deeper and academically pertinent approach is represented by
the ponderous study on the ie carried out by Murakami Yasusuke.
With respect to communitarism, in which the meaning of “group awareness” is felt
through the ningen aidagara (LaFleur, 1978, p. 237-p. 250), there is the opposite traditional
meaning of Western individualism (kojin-hugi); according to this, mankind is the measure
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of all things (homo mensura, according to Protagoras’s theory). In Rinrigaku we can read:
“The understanding of the individual is itself, as such, an achievement of
the modern spirit and bears an importance that we must never be allowed
to forget. However, individualism attempts to consider the notion of the
individual that constitutes only one moment of human existence and then
substitutes it for the notion of the totality of ningen. This abstraction is the
origin of many sorts of misconception. The standpoint of the isolated ego,
which constitutes the starting point of modern philosophy, is merely one
such example (Watsuji, 1996, p. 9).”
For Watsuji, the kojin-shugi tendency was the consequence of the fact that:
“Such words as anthropos, homo, man, or Mensch cannot denote anything
but an individual human being. If we take such a stance, we have no alter-
native but to explain such things as the relationships between person and
person, communal existence, society, and so forth by appealing to terms
somewhat different from that of human being. But if a human being is,
basically speaking, a social animal, then social relationships cannot be
separated from her (Watsuji, 1996, pp. 13-14).”
The question of ethics is not a matter of individual conscience, but of all the relation-
ships between men and reciprocity between them. Any kind of ethical analysis can only
succeed if it goes to consider the historical realities of human existence through a proper
understanding of its expressions. The final item, which probably led to one of the most
heartfelt debates between Heidegger and Watsuji, concerns the “being-for-death” concept.
As already mentioned, Watsuji conceived the ningen sonzai as an expression of a “totality”,
believing that such a “totality” must be sought “behind the totality of the individual,” and
that the totality of the ningen is a totality that goes beyond death, although it includes ‘“being
in its death” (Watsuji, 1996, p. 224). In his Ethics
“The total possibility of ningen sonzai must be found not in “being in
its death,” but in the nondual relationship between the self and other as
disclosed in the direction of absolute totality. This nondual relationship
cannot properly be called into question unless we give heed to subjective
spatiality in a basic way. However, Heidegger puts this subjective spread
his eye focused on the total possibility of the “self” only as comprehended
with the aid of the phenomenon of death. This derivation entirely converts
his view of the authenticity and inauthenticity of ningen sonzai (Watsuji,
1996, p. 224).”
Spatiality becomes central to the process of understanding the concept of death: if inter-
personal relationships are located in the spatial dimension, it is only possible to understand
death in relation to that spatiality. On the other hand, Heidegger wrote: “The existential
project, in which anticipation has been delimited, has made visible the ontological possibil-
Sovereignty and identity in eU-China-Japan politiCal dialogUe
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ity of an existential, authentic being-toward-death” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 246).
He made it clearer by arguing that “Indubitably, the fact that one Da-sein can be rep-
resented by another belongs to the possibilities-of-being of being-with-one-another in
the world” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 222). If in this context Heidegger described being as
“thrown-projecting being-in-the-world”, and therefore of Being open to emotions (which
undoubtedly emphasises the process of self-perception of the Self), he also explained
how Being usually dies in a detritus manner, in other words, in its daily relationship with
the world. Moreover, although it is in its dimension of ‘“Being-thrown,” Being is always
moment that “Being for” inevitably assumes a nature that is both spatial and temporal, the
Da-sein, in its most authentic moment of “being-for-death,” is not found to be completely
isolated, since dying is merged into Taking Care.
Therefore, for Heidegger, as well as for Watsuji, the experience of death is tied to ‘“be-
ing-in-the world”, and thus to the ningen, in a context that is strongly permeated with rela-
tionality and inter-subjectivity, or aidagara, in other words of “being-for”.
In this regard the positions taken by some scholars, such as the aforementioned Yuasa
the only point in common between the two philosophers lies in the so-called “understand-
ing of everyday life” (nichiyō tekina sonzai ryōkai), which consists of the “ways in which
human beings achieve an understanding of their relationships, based on the dynamics of
cooperation, in the daily existence of the ningen and the spatial dimension of the world”.
The basic difference that separates and distances the concept of “human being” formulated
by the two philosophers, is to be found in the concepts of Men (mask) and person (character),
which Watsuji developed in his Men to perusona (Watsuji, 1963, p. 289-p. 295)
2
.
Sakai, who had a rather conciliatory position, argued that “many people have tried to
distinguish Watsuji thinking from Heidegger’s philosophical ideas, separating the concept
of In-der-Welt-sein and that of aidagara. However, as demonstrated by the opinions on the
concept of death, both reached the same conclusions” (Sakai, 1999, p. 100).
3
If the concept of ningen aidagara distances Watsuji from Scheler’s archetypes, the same
cannot be said about the relationship between Watsuji and Heidegger. In some ways the two
thinkers appear very close, and the objections raised by Watsuji perhaps end up underesti-
mating the ideas of the German philosopher, which, thanks to his friendship with the afore-
several times during his life-time, in particular, Sino-Japanese thinking and culture. The no-
tion of yo no naka seems close to that of Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world, and one might be
surprised that Watsuji didn’t actually become aware of it. This does not mean Heidegger’s
work was wrongly interpreted by Watsuji. Probably, with the notion of yo no naka, the Jap-
anese philosopher intended to give a far greater ontological weight to the ‘“Being-between”
2 The notion of
perusona
would make the role, or function, that each individual plays on the common di-
mension of the
aidagara
;
Men
is to indicate, however, the role that the
perusona
carries out within the group to
which it belongs.
3 Sakai presented in his contribution also the point of view of Jean-Luc Nancy, who argued in his book,
La
communauté dés
œ
uvrée
, that the notions of subjectivism and individualism in Heidegger have led to a
complete subjection of the individual to the whole through the logic of communitarian identification.
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dimension, convinced that Da-sein was essentially temporal, to the contrary of its ningen,
which seems to be centred on the spatial dimension. However, yo no naka makes the idea
of “in-the-world’ and not “Being-between” (which would otherwise be called yo no aida),
little different from In-der-Welt-sein.
As opposed to Isamu Nagami’s (1981) opinion, Watsuji was not looking for a purely
ontological structure (at least not in the Heideggerian sense of the question), but rather a
purely ethical system. While Heidegger was carrying out an ontological and phenomeno-
aidagara, primarily as a moral
element (Bernier, 2001, p. 151). According to Bernier, “the insistence of one of them on
ethics and the other on ontology is one of the major differences between the two authors. A
difference based, at least in part, on the dominant German philosophical traditions (Hegelian
ontology etc.) and the dominant positions in Japan (Confucian morals). However, he soon
added that “the difference is, in fact, less strong than it sounds, since Heidegger develops
ethical considerations that start from his ontological ideas, while Watsuji starts from meta-
It is clear that, as Wu noted, it is necessary to use a hermeneutical method to obtain ad-
equate answers (Wu, 2001, p. 98-p. 99). What is irrational -even in different historical reali-
ties - cannot be understood and interpreted by a common and universal logic. It is necessary
to use a method that will pursue an understanding of historical reality through the herme-
neutic interpretation of the various “human expressions”. The pragmatism stemming from
the tendency to adapt itself to current circumstances, giving more importance to the partic-
Japanese, sono ba sono ba
and economic behaviour, and more generally that of East Asian peoples. This leads to the
assumption of an attitude that is more intuitive than deductive, more contextual than ratio-
nal, and more relativist than absolutist. While in the West, an ethics based on the Kantian
categorical imperative prevails, Japanese ethics is atomised, as it is composed of a variety
of rules governing how to act at a given time. If, since the distant past, the Western dialectic
has continued to be structured on the Cartesian dichotomy of res cogitans/res extensa, in
Confucian Asia this was offset by the yin/yang, namely by the dialectic between comple-
mentary forces (good/evil; light/dark; day/night), which alternate and counterbalance each
logos has no raison d’etre, leaving
space for that of relationality. It is exactly within this dialectical relationship that one may
the individual and society, or in other words, the overcoming of the Subject/object opposi-
tion which is inherent in the ningen aidagara based relational coexistence. Conversely, the
EU’s corporate identity is widely shaped around the sharing of individual and political hu-
man rights, on democracy and the rule of law. Hence, it appears clear that the EU “strongly
them the attribute of universality” (Pardo, 2009, p. 270).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In foreign policy, China is going through a transition era: if until recently, Beijing refused
politically and ideologically the idea of a global governance, suggested-imposed by
Sovereignty and identity in eU-China-Japan politiCal dialogUe
115
the West, now the country has pragmatically accepted and actively works to carve out
a role within the world. But the Chinese leadership is called, in particular, to rethink
its attitude to the principle of non-interference, traditional cornerstone of its foreign
policy. Until today the defense of this principle had three purposes: to preserve Chinese
sovereignty from external interference; to keep the political affinity with the countries
in the developing world; to avoid any involvement in international crises that directly
touch its own national interests. Since the end of the Cold War, China has started to
increase its participation in peacekeeping missions under the UN mandate, and while
Beijing has not yet entirely accepted the European idea of the “Responsibility to Protect”,
it is gradually sharing this attitude, aiming at a balance between the demands of
humanitarian intervention and the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference.
In the Japanese case, it seems that Tokyo’s expectations of the EU are lower than they
be interpreted as a phase of disillusionment preceded by excessive expectations. If Chi-
na’s expectations of the EU are actually higher than before, it is above all because Beijing
believes that Brussels can counter-balance US unilateralism in order to promote a multi-
polar international system (Tsuruoka, 2008, p. 111-p. 113). According to the EU, the set
of values that it tries to promote at the global level are also shared by Japan. Nonetheless,
partnership, which can be described as “comprehensive” but still weak. Once again, it is
the difference of perceptions and interpretations between the actors involved that makes
the difference. In Wetterqvist’s words (2009), “perceptions matter, because they are a basis
for understanding and a foundation upon which actors make choices and decisions. Under-
standing the perceptions and perspectives of the “other” side can provide a basis for im-
proved communication and give guidance on policy adjustments”.
The overcoming, or rather, the management of these conceptual gaps would be today
more necessary than ever. The contribution that the two extreme Eurasian peripheries would
be able to provide for the creation of a global governance is of the greatest importance. The
problems that the international community currently faces are no longer manageable with-
in the boundaries of the Westphalian state, since the processes of cultural and economic
and fragmentation of the international arena (Zolo, 2002, p. 180). In other words, the eco-
-
-
Western security is undermined by asymmetric threats produced by transnational terror-
ist networks armed by authoritarian regimes. The gap between the North and the South of
the world seems to grow dramatically and give way to a planète des naufragés (Latouche,
1991). So, a model of global governance, focusing on the concept of human security, al-
though wishful thinking, is obviously the only way to guarantee a comprehensive manage-
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the individual states make it necessary to rethink the classic political dilemmas of collective
today by new actors such as China and other rising powers will affect, in a decisive way,
Europe, China and Japan have, in this sense, a huge potential. Nonetheless, it would be
undeniable that the ability to achieve concrete progress in building a ‘global multilateral-
ism’ can not do without from the cooperation of the American side. The U.S. should work
to create a global system in which international law sets standards of legitimacy for the
search of the national interest. In this case, the American soft power will play a major role
(Nye, 2003). If, in fact, China, Japan and Europe have become key players on the interna-
tional scene, both politically and economically, and their partnership could now potentially
be able to handle the issues of the new global agenda, they could continue to deal with the
From this point of view, the strengthening of the political dialogue of Europe with Chi-
na and Japan would be a mostly reactive type, the product of this imbalance of power in an
consolidation of Eurasian axis should therefore provide an appropriate contribution to a
changing global environment that has never known the “end of history” predicted by Fran-
cis Fukuyama or the ‘New International Order’ proclaimed by President Bush Senior. To-
day more than ever, key-players such as China, Japan and the EU should actively engage in
the construction, which can no longer be postponed, of a more inclusive global governance.
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Author’s Biodata
Oliviero Frattolillo is an Assistant Professor at the University of Naples “L’Orientale”
in the Department of Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean where he teaches Political and
Diplomatic History of East Asia and History of International Relations of Asia and Africa.
Diplomacy in Japan-EU Relations (London-New York: Routledge 2013) is among his
most recent works.
First Author’s Address
ofrattolillo@unior.it
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES,
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ISSN: 2224-2716
Copyright © 2012 Overseas Education College of Xiamen University
The Word “Macao” and its Special Meaning in the British
Colonial Records of Nineteenth-Century Malaya
1
’
2
Wei Chin Wong
University of Macau
Based on a judicious examination of British colonial records and indigenous newspapers, this
paper demonstrates that the meaning of the word “Macao” in the nineteenth century colonial Ma-
layan context was once known as one of the major Chinese communities besides the “Hokkien”,
“Cantonese”, “Teochew”, “Hakka”, and “Hailam”. Interestingly, Chinese that constituted the
“Macao” community in British Malaya were not from the Portuguese Macao, but the natives from
Canton area. The reason why they were bound together after they arrived in Malaya was because
their points of embarkation to British Malaya were similar: Macao. The analysis of the British
colonial records also shows the organising principles of the Chinese communities in Malaya be-
tween 1810 and 1870 were largely depend on three major factors: (1) common spoken dialect; (2)
common native birthplace; and (3) common point of embarkation to British Malaya. In sum, this
paper offers fresh insights into the process of how the Chinese migrants adapted themselves to the
foreign context of colonial Malaya in the nineteenth century. Moreover, this paper also restores
the visibility of the word “Macao” before it became invisible in the British colonial records in the
nineteenth century.
Keywords: Chinese, Macao, British Malaya
INTRODUCTION
In contemporary Macau, we know that the word “Macao” indicates a Portuguese spelling
of “Macau” since the Portuguese colonial period in the sixteenth century. We do not know,
however, the meaning of the word “Macao” used in the nineteenth-century British colonial
interesting. However, the meaning of the word “Macao” in the colonial Malayan context
has not been fully recognised and answered by scholars. For this reason, my paper will
explore the meaning of the word “Macao” based on a judicious examination of nineteenth-
century British colonial records. The aim in doing so is to restore the visibility of the word
“Macao” before it became invisible in the British colonial records in the 1870s.
1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Wei Chin Wong. E-mail: wongweichin24@gmail.com
2 This paper was presented at the 2013 International Graduate Conference on
“
Asia in a Global Context
”
in
Shanghai University, June 29, 2013. The author is grateful to the College of Liberal Arts, Shanghai University,
and the Department Head, Prof. C.X. George Wei at the University of Macau, for giving her the opportunity to
present this paper in Shanghai.
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
2
(1), 119-127wONg
120
“MACAO” IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH COLONIAL RECORDS
The earliest British colonial record that tells us about the “Macao” in Malaya was John
Leyden’s article in 1811. John Leyden (1775-1811) was a Scottish linguist who joined
the British East India Company (hereafter EIC) as a medical staff in Madras in the early
nineteenth century. In 1805, Leyden’s visit to Penang had inspired him to study the Chinese
and the Malays in the Malay Archipelago. As a result, he published an article, which was
entitled “On the Language and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations”, in the Asiatick
Researches in 1811.
In this article, Leyden (1811, pp. 266-267) pointed out that there were two major Chi-
the spoken Chinese languages of the “Macao” and the “Chin Chew” into six different types,
including: Hyong-san (
香山
), Sun-tukk (
順德
), Nam-hói (
南海
), Pún-ngi (
番禺
),Tòng-
khún (
東莞
) and Fo-khín (
福建
). According to Leyden, the dialects spoken by the “Macao”
Hyong-san, Sun-tukk, Nam-hói, Pún-ngi, Tòng-khún; while
the “Chin Chew” commonly spoke Fo-khín in their daily life. This meant that the way that
spoken languages.
Unfortunately, Leyden did not explain why were the “Chin Chew” and “Macao” spoken
different kinds of dialects in Malaya. He also did not discuss, however, that these languages
were transcribed from the Cantonese pronunciations of the names of Guangdong districts
and Fujian province, where Hyong-san was xiangshan (
香山
), Sun-tukk was shunde (
順
德
), Nam-hói was nanhai (
南海
), ; ), Pún-ngi was panyu (
番禺
), Tòng-khún
was dongguan (
東莞
), and Fo-khín was fujian (
福建
). Despite the lack of detailed infor-
mation, Leyden’s investigation nevertheless was an important early result that shows about
plurality of Chinese languages in British Malaya.
The second British colonial record that tells us about the “Macao” in British Malaya
was Siah U Chin’s article, entitled “the Chinese in Singapore” (Siah, 1848, pp. 283-290).
This paper was published in 1848 in the Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern
Asia. During the nineteenth century, Siah U Chin (1805-1883) was known also as Seah
language skills and trading knowledge.
3
Amongst the respectable Chinese merchants, Siah
he estimates that the population of “Macao” people, numbering 6,000, was the third larg-
est Chinese group in Singapore. At that time, the largest Chinese group in Singapore was
the “Teochew”, which constituted nearly 48 percent out of the total Chinese population in
Singapore, followed by the “Hokkien” (23%), “Macao” (15%), “Kheh” (10%), the “Mala-
ya-born Chinese descendants” (3%), and the “Hailam” (2%). Table 1 below shows the Chi-
nese population that Siah estimated in 1848:
TABLE 1
Estimated Population of the Chinese Groups in Singapore, 1848.
3 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser,
“
Seah Eu Chin,
”
8 October 1935, p. 6. See also: Song,
1967, pp. 19-21.
The Word “Macao” in The BriTish colonial records of Malaya
121
Chinese Groups Population Percentage (%)
Hailam 700 2
Hokkien 9000 23
Kheh 4000 10
Macao 6000 15
Malaya-born Chinese Descendants 1000 3
Teochew 19000 48
Total 39700 100
Source: Siah, 1848, p. 290.
According to Siah, the “Macao” people in Singapore were commonly called as “Macao
Chinese” in the Malayan context. These “Macao Chinese” were, however, not originally
from the Portuguese Macao, but they were composed almost entirely of the natives from
Canton, and the neighbouring villages near Canton. Besides the “Macao”, the other Chinese
groups, such as the “Kheh” were men came from the inland areas of Guangdong; the “Teo-
chew” were predominantly Chinese migrants from Swatow; the “Hokkien” were composed
In addition, Siah also divides the Chinese occupations in Singapore into six major cat-
egories: (1) businessmen, i.e. shopkeepers, petty traders, vendors, opium, pepper and gam-
bier dealers, etc.; (2) agricultural workers; (3) craftsmen, i.e. tailors, shoemakers, bakers,
(6) the unemployed people. Particularly, according to Siah, the “Macao Chinese” in Singa-
pore generally worked as coolies, shopkeepers, gambier and pepper planters, tailors, shoe-
makers, boat makers, carpenters, wood cutters, bakers, barbers, and brick makers. Some of
the “Macao Chinese” were hired as male domestic servants by the upper class Singapore
residents in the 1840s, such as the Europeans and the Malaya-born Chinese (Siah, 1848, p.
290; Logan, 1855, p. 116).
The third British colonial record that tells us about the “Macao” community in nine-
1891) was one of the EIC servants who had lived in British Malaya for 45 years, where
4
Similar to
-
did not focus on the spoken languages, but the native birthplaces of the “Macao” and the
“Chin Chew”.
-
nantly from the Fujian province, especially Amoy; while the “Macao” migrated to Malaya
mainly from various parts of Guangdong, such as: “Sin Neng” (
新寧
), “Hiong Shan” (
香
4 For the detailed background of Jonas D. Vaughan, refer to: Blythe, 1971, pp. v-vii.
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
2
(1), 119-127wONg
122
山
), “Ka Yin Chew” (
嘉應
), “Nam Hoi” (
南海
), “Sen Tak” (
順德
), “Poon Ngwi” (
番
禺
), “San Wi”(
新會
), “Howi Peng” (
開平
), etc.
5
-
siders the “Kheh” people (or the “Hakka”) as part of the “Macao” community in the 1850s
Chew” was dictated partly by their points of embarkation to Malaya. In the following pas-
sage he clearly illustrates that the reason why the “Macao” was called as “Macao” in the
Malayan context:
新客
; lit-
erally new guest or new arrival in Hokkien pronunciation] or new man or
new friend, by the Chinchew, and “Sin Hak” [a term
新客
in Cantonese
pronunciation] by Macao men. These immigrants are thus obtained. One
or more of the Chinese merchants charter a vessel and leave Pinang in
April and May for Macao and Amoy. On arriving at the detained port,
the charterer, who usually proceeds in the vessel as super-cargo, sets a
number of agents to work….The natives of Quang-tung [Guangdong] are
more robust and hard working than the Fuh-kien [Fujian] or Chin-chew
From the above quote, it is observed that in British Malaya the Chinese migrants em-
barked from Portuguese Macao were called as “Macao men”, while those embarked from
Fujian, especially Amoy, generally bound themselves as “Chin Chew” after they arrived
in Malaya. This statement also demonstrates that the organising principles of the Chinese
communities in British Malaya were coinciding not only with the native birthplaces of the
Chinese migrants, but closely tied to the migration networks, as well as the points of em-
barkation they came to Malaya.
Other nineteenth-century British colonial records also tell us that the port of Macao was
the busiest embarkation port for the Chinese migration to Malaya in the late 1840s. Numer-
from Macao to Singapore between 1847 and 1849:
TABLE 2
The Number of Chinese Junks, Square-Rigged Vessels, and Chinese Passengers from China to
Singapore, 1847-1849.
China Ports Chinese Junk Square-Rigged Vessel No. of Passengers Percentage (%)
Amoy 11 11 3369 24
Canton 17 0 3098 22
Macao 29 0 6374 45
Swatow 4 0 830 6
Teochew 2 0 505 4
Total 63 11 14176 100
Source: Compiled from Siah and
TST
.
6
5
“
Sin Neng
”
( 新寧 ) was an old name of today
’
s Taishan ( 台山 ).
6 Siah, 1848, p. 286; Straits Settlements Original Correspondence,
“
Chinese Emigrants,
”
9 May 1849, p. 6.
The Word “Macao” in The BriTish colonial records of Malaya
123
This table indicates that between 1847 and 1849 there were 29 Chinese junks, which
were carried 6,374 Chinese passengers, had sailed from Macao to Singapore. Compared
to the numbers and percentages of the passengers sailed from Amoy, Canton, Swatow
and Teochew, it is apparent that the passengers sailed from Macao (45%) was the highest
amongst the China ports.
The mechanism of the Chinese migration system from China to Malaya also deserves a
notice in this paper. Some doyens have pointed out that the “kinship-based system” was the
earliest migration method that brought Chinese to work in Malaya. The sojourning Chinese
merchants, who established small shops and businesses throughout Southeast Asia, were the
relatives from China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This migration movement
also became popular when the numbers of Chinese workers grew consistently in Southeast
Asia over many generations (Yen, 1986, pp. 4-5; Wang, 1991, pp. 4-6; Song, 1967: 96).
However, according to the nineteenth-century British colonial records, the majority
of Chinese migrants in Malaya were brought to Malaya usually by means of “labour bro-
kerage system”. The British colonists also called this labour brokerage system the “credit
ticket system”. In a practical sense, this system became popular mainly because there were
high demands on Chinese labour in British Malaya, which in turn provided a major impetus
to Malaya in the nineteenth century. At that time, besides the labour brokers, there were
also “sub-labour brokers” based in China to help recruited young bachelors from Fujian
and Guangdong provinces (Yen, 1985, pp. 40-41). In fact, according to the British records,
this labour brokerage system was established upon a chartering system from the hong mer-
chants in Canton. Labour brokers must pay the hong merchants a certain amount of money
before they could send Chinese passengers to British Malaya from Fujian and Guangdong
provinces.
7
In Malaya, these labour brokers were commonly called “kheh-taos” (ketou;
客頭
), lit-
erally “the leading source of labour”, as they were the ones who hires a ship for a voyage
to migrant labourers. Meanwhile, the newly arrived Chinese labourers were called as “sink-
heh” (xinke,
新客
; literally new guest or new arrival).
8
Because many prospective sinkhehs
could not afford to pay for their passage overseas, the passage money provided by sink-
hehs were generally transferred to local Chinese secret societies, which known commonly
amongst the Chinese as “hoey” (
會
; literally gathering or society) in Malaya. The quote
below illustrates how the sinkhehs transferred their passage money to local Chinese secret
societies in Malaya during the 1850s:
The immigrants are usually over-crowded on shipboard but treated
well on the whole. They arrive in the months of January, February and
March….The charterer [kheh-tao] gets for a master workman, either
tailor, goldsmith or carpenter, 10 to 15 dollars, for a cooly 6 to 10, for a
7 The Chinese labour brokerage system was discussed in the Legislative Council: CO 273/69,
“
Legislative
Council,
”
9 September 1873, p. 7.
8 Newbold, 1839, Vol.1, p. 11-12 and CO 273/69,
“
Legislative Council,
”
9 September 1873, p. 6.
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
2
(1), 119-127wONg
124
12 months, receiving food, clothes and a few dollars for his services….
Their agreements are generally faithfully fulfilled; at the end of the 12
From the above quote, it shows that the interrelationship of supply-and-demand be-
tween the kheh-taos and the local Chinese secret societies quickly bound the sinkhehs to
Chinese secret societies after they arrived in British Malaya. The sinkheh needed the local
Chinese secret societies not only to help them to pay off their passage money, but they also
needed these local organisations for the immediate needs such as food, habitation, clothing,
and other basic necessities after they landed in Malaya. At that time, the passage moneys
that the sinkhehs owed to secret societies ranged from about 3 to 15 Spanish dollars, based
on their manual skills and health conditions upon their arrival. The debts of sinkhehs would
9
By this migration practice, a very cheap source of Chinese labour was introduced to British
Malaya throughout the nineteenth century.
According to the Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements, the “Macao” people had
formed their own form of Chinese secret society, “Macao Ghee Hin”, in Malaya during the
nineteenth century. When the British colonists began to control all the Chinese secret soci-
eties in Malaya after the 1870s, two “Macao Ghee Hin” (one in Singapore, another in Ma-
The total members of the “Macao Ghee Hin” in Malacca, according to the British colonial
556-567, 618, 683; Wong, 2010, p. 91).
Interestingly enough, in the 1870s, Chinese migrants who spoke a common language
(Cantonese dialect) and came from a common native birthplace (the Guangdong area) had
been divided into two different communities in British Malaya: the “Cantonese” and the
“Macao”.
10
According to a British record, the “Macao” was separated from the “Cantonese”
because their points of embarkation to Malaya were different. The “Macao” embarked to
Malaya mainly from the port of Portuguese Macao, while the “Cantonese” were sent to
Malaya mainly in British ships from the Chinese ports of Hong Kong, Canton, Amoy, and
Swatow. Because the British policies to the coolie trade in Portuguese Macao changed in
1873, from this year onwards the word “Macao” was no longer could be used as a generic
9 During the nineteenth century, when the sinkhehs paid off their debts, they would automatically become
“
laukhehs
”
(laoke, 老客 ; literally
“
old guest
”
). This was a vernacular term of old and experienced settlers in
British Malaya, particularly those who entitled to receive a monthly salary from the Chinese secret society they
had joined in Malaya.
10 Straits Times Overland Journal,
“
Friday, 13
th
April
”
, 19 April 1877, p. 12.
The Word “Macao” in The BriTish colonial records of Malaya
125
name for the Chinese community in British colonial records.
11
As a result, the “Macao”
both groups were similar in their spoken language and their native birthplaces. This was
how the “Macao” community became invisible in British Malaya after the 1870s.
CONCLUSION
nineteenth-century British Malaya shows an indication not only as a place name of Macao
on the Pearl River Delta, but it was known also as one of the major Chinese communities
in Malaya besides the “Hokkien”, “Cantonese”, “Teochew”, “Hakka”, and the “Hailam”.
Furthermore, the meaning of the word “Macao” was also special in the colonial Malayan
context because the people that constituted the “Macao” community were not from Macao
but from the Canton area. The reason why they were bound together was primarily because
their points of embarkation to British Malaya were identical: Macao.
bind their people together in the colonial Malayan context. Between the 1810 and 1870, the
on three broad principles: (1) common spoken language; (2) common native birthplace; and
(3) common point of embarkation to Malaya. These organising principles also demonstrate
that the Chinese settlers in British Malaya were largely dependent on the self-supporting
networks after they arrived in Malaya. In other words, without the self-organising Chinese
communities that hinged on common spoken language, common native birthplace, and the
common point of embarkation, it was hardly possible that the Chinese population could be-
come widespread in British Malaya in the nineteenth century.
This paper is a preliminary attempt to outline the organising principles of the Chinese
migrant communities after they settled in British Malaya. Detailed research is needed
to compare and analyse the processes of how the Chinese settlement had arisen in nine-
teenth-century British Malaya, as well as the ways the Chinese formed their communities
in relation to the colonial development of British Malaya in the nineteenth century.
REFERENCE
12
Blythe, W. (1971). Introduction to the manners and customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements. Kua-
la Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Chinese Emigrants. (1849, May 9). The Straits Times (TST
Kong Chian Reference Library, National Library Singapore.
Friday, 13
th
April. (1877, April 19). Straits Times Overland Journal
Lee Kong Chian Reference Library, National Library Singapore.
Jarman, R. L., (comp.). (1998). Annual reports of the Straits Settlements, 1855-1941
11 My recent paper has studied the subject on the formation and the emigration of the
“
Macao
”
community
in British Malaya, and the subject of how the
“
Macao
”
community became invisible in British Malaya. Refer to:
Wong, 2013 (January).
12 Abbreviations: CO stands for Colonial Office Records. Straits Settlements Original Correspondence
(CO273), EIC for British East India Company, LP is for Lat Pau, SFPMA is for The Singapore Free Press and
Mercantile Advertiser, STOJ is Straits Times Overland Journal, and TST represents The Straits Times.
Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS,
2
(1), 119-127wONg
126
Archive Editions Limited.
Legislative council. (1873, September 9). Colonial ofce records. Straits Settlements original correspon-
dence,
Leyden, J. (1811). On the language and literature of the Indo-Chinese nations. Asiatick Researches, 158-
290.
Logan, J. R., (ed.) (1855). Notes on the Chinese in the Straits. Journal of the Indian Archipelago and East-
ern Asia, 109-24.
More people travelling abroad (
出洋人眾
). (1888, April 14). Lat Pau, (pp. 2). Retrieved from http://
www.lib.nus.edu.sg.
More people travelling abroad (
出洋日盛
). (1888, June 12). Lat Pau, (pp. 2). Retrieved from http://www.
lib.nus.edu.sg.
Newbold, T. J. (1839). Political and statistical account of the British settlements in the Straits of Malacca,
viz. Pinang, Malacca, and Singapore; with a history of the Malayan States on the Peninsula of Malac-
ca
Seah, E. C. (1935, October 8). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, (pp. 6). Extracted
Siah, U. C. (1848). The Chinese in Singapore. Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, 283-
290.
Song, O. S. (1967). One hundred years’ history of the Chinese in Singapore. Singapore: University Malaya
Press. (Original work published in 1923).
Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern
Asia, 1-27.
The manners and customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements. Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press. (Original work published in 1879).
Wang, G. Wu. (1991). Pattern of Chinese migration in historical perspective. In China and the Chinese
overseas (pp. 3-21). Singapore: Times Academic Press.
Wong, W. C. (2010). The connotation of ‘Hakka’ in Southeast Asia: the classication process of Chinese in
British Malaya. (Master’s thesis). National Central University, Taiwan.
Wong, W. C. (2013). “Macao” in British Malaya: the emigration and the formation of the Chinese com-
munity in Malaya, 1810-1870. Paper presented for the IIM Young Researcher Award 2012 (of which I
was the recipient), International Institute of Macau: Macau.
Yen, C. - H. (1985). Coolies and mandarins: China’s protection of overseas Chinese during the late Chʻing
period (1851-1911). Singapore: Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore.
Yen, C. - H. (1986). A social history of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya 1800-1911. Singapore: Ox-
ford University Press.
Author’s Biodata
Wong Wei Chin is currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of History at the Uni-
versity of Macau. She received her bachelor’s degree in Communication at the University
Putra Malaysia, and her Master’s degree in Social Science at the National Central Univer-
sity, Taiwan. Her master’s thesis, entitled The Connotation of “Hakka” in Southeast Asia:
the Classication Process of Chinese in British Malaya, received two outstanding master’s
thesis awards in April and October 2010; one by the Taiwan Association of Southeast Asian
Studies, another by the Council for Hakka Affairs, Executive Yuan of Taiwan. Recently,
“Macao” in British
Malaya: The Emigration and the Formation of the Chinese Community in Malaya, 1810-
1870
The Word “Macao” in The BriTish colonial records of Malaya
127
doctoral thesis, entitled Interrelations between Chinese Secret Societies and the British Co-
lonial Government, 1786-1900, will examine how the interrelations between the British co-
lonial government and the Chinese secret societies changed from 1786 up to 1900, and how
these changes affected the social structure of the Chinese community in British Malaya.
First Author’s Address
wongweichin24@gmail.com
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Article
The Chinese company, CREC-7 (China Railway Engineering Company), succeeded in reconstructing roads in Kinshasa thanks to its social networks and finance access that it has. The Chinese national solidarity and trust among the Chinese played an important role in providing different services and in enforcing their informal norms. For the Chinese, the national image was the most important national... [Show full abstract]
Article
Monsieur M. est muluba. Ne en 1950, il est arrive a Kinshasa (Congo-Zaire) en 1969, apres l’Ecole normale, et a habite chez son oncle au quartier Yolo. Il fut engage comme enseignant a l’ecole municipale. Apres avoir travaille pendant un trimestre, il alla louer un studio au quartier Mombele. A cette epoque, le niveau de vie de l’enseignant etait appreciable. Avec son salaire verse le 20 de... [Show full abstract]
Article
L’auteur illustre avec les récits de vie recueillis auprès des commerçants
du marché central de Kinshasa (Zando) le dynamisme et les formes économiques de la
Chinafrique.
Article
Is there any significant international thought in antiquity beyond the West? If there is, why has there as yet been no meaningful conversation between the expanding enterprise of theorizing International Relations (IR) today and ancient Chinese political thought? This extended version of my Martin Wight Memorial Lecture addresses these questions through a critical exploration of how a pivotal... [Show full abstract]
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