

Studies in Intelligence

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

Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

In Memoriam: Jack Downey

Counterterrorism Professionals Reflect on Their Work

The Struggle to Express Analytic Uncertainty in the 1970s

GIMIK and SKIFF: A Tale of Two Semi-Submersible Submarines



Book Reviews

- A Most Wanted Man: the Movie*
- A Cruel and Shocking Act*
- Russian Roulette*
- Mission R&AW*

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

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The mission of *Studies in Intelligence* is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.

The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA's History Staff, CIA's Lessons Learned Program, and the CIA Museum. CSI also provides the curator of the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection of Literature. In addition, it houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.

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Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of *Studies*' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

The Editorial Board welcomes readers' nominations for awards.



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The criterion for publication is whether, in the opinion of the board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

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Jack Downey
CIA Paramilitary Officer, Prisoner of the People's Republic of China (1952–73), Harvard Law (1975), Connecticut State Judge (1987–97)

Ambassador Donald Gregg

When a great tree in the forest falls, something needs to be said in remembrance.

Jack Downey was one of the tallest among us, in stature and in strength of spirit. I was one of his classmates, not at Yale, but at the Infantry School in Fort Benning, where in 1951 as young CIA officers under alias, we went through jump school, and special courses on sabotage and escape and evasion. We were all drawn to Jack, because of his athletic record, his sense of humor, and his quiet strength. In one exercise we were paired off by size, and told to carry each other on our backs for as far as we could go. I got about 50 feet with Jack aboard, while he carried me effortlessly until told to stop. "I certainly hope I don't have to rely on you to get me off the field if I'm wounded," he said with a grin as he dumped me gently on the ground.

We both wound up in Asia in 1952 with a war raging on the Korean Peninsula. Though we were assigned to different places, we still managed to get together for dinner in Japan just before he went to Korea, where he took off on his ill-fated and ill-conceived mission to drop supplies to an agent team (which had already been captured by the Chinese) and to "air-snatch" an agent off the ground and into the supply plane. Another CIA officer and I had dinner with Jack at a colorful Japanese restaurant, and we both recall it as a festive occasion, as Jack was excited about getting into action. The food was good, the waitresses were pretty, and we all felt that we would live forever.

Jack's plane was shot down. He and Dick Fecteau survived the crash. After a period of interrogation, the two were given a mock trial and convicted. Jack was deemed the "Chief Culprit" and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Dick was found guilty of being the "Assistant Chief Culprit." He drew a 20 year sentence and was released in 1971. Jack would be released two years later, having

spent 20 years and four months in prison trapped like a fly in amber, while my life progressed normally, into marriage and fatherhood. I thought often of Jack during those years and wondered how he was holding up. It was most reassuring to hear his first words as he left prison, entered Hong Kong, and was asked how it felt to be free. He said "I don't mean to sound chauvinistic, but I can't help noticing that skirts are a lot shorter today than when I went to prison." Once a Yalie, always a Yalie.

Shortly after his return home, Jack and I had a chance to talk about his time in captivity. The first two years had been by far the hardest. He said he had not been tortured, but that the interrogations had been endless and severe. As Jack put it "they never forgot anything I said, and I could not keep my lies straight, so in the end I told them what I knew." Things then gradually eased, and he could, as he put it, "focus on keeping myself alive."

Jack and I stayed in close touch over the intervening years. It was a joy to see his life resume and develop magnificently, through marriage, fatherhood and a distinguished legal career. CIA has gone out of its way to honor Jack. CIA historian wrote about Jack and Dick in this journal and CIA made a movie about their experience. (Both are available to the public at cia.gov.)^a Last year Jack and Dick were given CIA's highest honor, awarded only for valor. The two were cheered by a large crowd at CIA headquarters when the director spoke of their heroism and the roles they now play in CIA's history.

My high point with Jack took place at Yale Law School a few years ago, when Dean Harold Koh invited me to speak to a class on CIA and the legal issues it was

a. <https://www.cia.gov/library/video-center/#Z0Mh7EiXRJI> and <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no4/two-cia-prisoners-in-china-1952201373.html>

then tangled up in. I invited Jack to attend the class. He quietly slipped into the room and sat down. When I introduced him, the law students were literally bug-eyed with surprise and appreciation. One of the many things I loved about Jack was his sense of wry amusement about the fact that Yale Law School had turned him down, and that he had gone to Harvard. His acceptance of life as it came at him was astonishing. No complaining, no bitterness, only enduring strength, and a spark of humor that endured more than 7,000 days and nights of imprisonment.

I don't think we shall see his like again.

Donald P. Gregg

US Ambassador to Korea, 1989–93

CIA officer, 1951–82

Chairman, Pacific Century Institute

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Beirut, 23 October 1983: A shirtless, dust-covered and dazed US Marine lies half-prone on a stretcher as it is lifted over the rubble of the bombed barracks by fellow Marines, British troops, and local volunteers straining to get him to safety. (© Bill Foley/AP/Corbis)

Oklahoma City, 19 April 1995: A firefighter cradles a one-year old girl pulled from the rubble of a truck bomb attack, her curls stained with blood. (© Charles Porter IV/ZUMA Press/Corbis)



New York City, 11 September 2001: Three exhausted, grimy rescue and recovery workers in protective gear raise the US flag up a flagpole they place deep inside the pit of destroyed skyscrapers. (© The Record/Getty Images)

Arlington, VA, 11 September 2001: A group of military and civilian recovery workers stand at the edge of the Pentagon's roof and unfurl a large US flag near the damage inflicted in the building's side by American Airlines Flight 77. (© Ron Sachs/CNP/Sygma/Corbis)



Boston, 15 April 2013: Three city police officers, having come to the aid of an elderly marathoner thrown to the ground by the first explosion, react to a second blast farther down the course. (© John Tlumak/The Boston Globe/Getty Images)



Counterterrorism Professionals Reflect on Their Work

Dr. Ursula M. Wilder

Entering its 60th year of exploring the work of intelligence, this journal has served to illuminate many aspects of the profession and its people. Most often it has addressed the field's history, its methods, and future development. Less often have Studies authors examined the personal and psychological impact on intelligence professionals of the work itself.

In this article, clinical psychologist Dr. Ursula Wilder explores the impact on counterterrorism professionals of the high intensity and high stress environments in which most of them have functioned, often for many years. For some, the work has involved actual combat or engagement with terrorists and their violent acts; for others it has meant bearing the weight of making decisions that affect many lives; and for still another group it has involved the intellectual labor of piercing through masses of intelligence reports and great uncertainty to locate terrorists or to warn others of potential terrorist acts.

*While consideration of such questions may be relatively new to Studies, the examination of the effects on human psychology of violence and difficult decisions is as old as recorded history, appearing in the West, for example, in works attributed to Homer and Shakespeare. Addressing war's consequences, moral dilemmas for leaders and led, the continuing presence in human memory and behavior of experience in violence, and the interaction of combat veterans with those who stayed home, these masterworks would provide insights for Dr. Jonathan Shay, the prominent early US researcher on posttraumatic stress in the Veteran's Administration, whose books on the subject, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (1994) and *Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming* (2002), would have great impact on this editor's understanding of his own responses to service in Vietnam as a young Marine infantry officer nearly 50 years ago. Shay's work would also spearhead a great deal of new scientific study—some of it highlighted in the appendix to this article—that seeks to refine the understanding of trauma, both under conditions that resemble battlefields and in high stress workplaces that focus on the kinds of issues and events that CT professionals, including intelligence officers, follow.—Editor.*

Images of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Professionals

Most readers will readily recall the iconic photographs on the facing page. These images are part of America's collective memory, and they capture the two opposing faces of terrorism. One represents the calamitous, dreadful nature of terror strikes; the viciousness of the political tactic; the anguish it causes innocent victims; the broader destruction of the tangible and intangible products of civilization; and the loss of the expectation of security and peace in public spaces.

The second, contrasting face reflected in these photographs is seen in the responders—the professionals whose jobs prompt them to move toward carnage to protect and provide succor to the wounded, to recover the dead, to record what transpired, or, after the fact, to study what happened to prevent more such events.

This other face—of people doing their duty and performing their jobs while braving physical and emotional hazards and suffering—is not the aspect of the terrorism drama that its perpetrators want to highlight, but it is one they have learned to exploit. In fact, many terrorist events are

planned so that first responders—police, medical personnel, members of the press, and bystanders who step up to help—will be struck by a second blast timed especially to harm them.

The responders captured in these images are heroes in the classical meaning of the word, which does not imply perfection of character or of performance but the opposite. The classical heroes of our Western literary tradition transcended the negative possibilities within their human natures to accomplish extraordinary things. These photographs show a more subtle form of courage—otherwise ordinary people behaving with

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extraordinary bravery, intelligence, dedication, and perseverance for victims and for community. They also show us people who are struggling, afraid or in great pain, and are exhausted, physically and mentally.

This article is about the psychology of those who work to counter terrorism. It describes the complex responses to their work of people who labor across the range of counterterrorism (CT) vocations. Some had purposefully pursued work in CT, deliberately dedicating themselves to this work for a season or for a career. Many intelligence officers, academic experts, and professionals involved in political or policy work and various journalistic vocations fall in this self-selected group of CT professionals.

Other professionals found themselves thrown unexpectedly into CT because they became embroiled in

an act of terrorism near them that required the urgent deployment of their knowledge and skills. Local medical and emergency personnel, police, reporters, mental health practitioners, and morticians are examples of professionals who have increasingly been required since 9/11 to react to violence of this sort.

Whether CT professionals have been engaged in the work of counterterrorism by choice or by circumstances beyond their control, those who have stepped up to perform these jobs have been—and will continue to be—affected by their professional experiences, in ways subtle and profound and positive and negative. Often their loved ones have been affected, secondarily, but no less profoundly.

The author drew the reflections that follow this introduction from interviews with 57 CT professionals

from the main domains in the field. The interviews were conducted in 2012 while the author was an Intelligence Community Senior Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution.^a While those interviewed represent only a small, non-random portion of the CT enterprise, in which many thousands have worked, their personal reflections nevertheless provide an evocative picture of psychological trends that are likely to exist among their colleagues in the entire CT enterprise.

These reflections are also congruent with published research on the effects on people of violence, trauma, and highly stressful work. Relevant studies are detailed in an appendix beginning on page 13. These

a. Dr. Wilder is grateful for the generous intellectual and logistical support she received from Brookings while she conducted the interviews and research for this paper.

Scope and Method

The 57 counterterrorism professionals interviewed for this article came from many different CT fields, in both the public and private sectors. The interviews were conducted using a structured format, and, with one exception, the author interviewed everyone in person.

Participants were asked to reflect on their CT professions and their effects on them and to characterize their vocations' unique contributions to the overall CT enterprise. They were also asked to talk about their emotional, psychological, and interpersonal responses to their activities and to attempt to identify enduring effects of their work on themselves as well as on those closest to them, including colleagues, friends, and family. Finally, they described any deeper meanings—political, scientific, philosophical, spiritual—that this type of work evoked in them.

Interviewees in public service—at the federal and local levels—included former senior White House officials, Cabinet members, heads or deputy heads of federal agencies, ambassadors and other diplomats, intelligence officers from the covert collection and analytic arms of the Intelligence Community, as well as combat-seasoned military, federal, and local law enforcement officers and fire and rescue personnel. Private-sector interviewees included journalists

and war correspondents, emergency medical and private disaster relief personnel, members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who work in terrorism-prone regions of the world, scholars, and field researchers.

The people interviewed were diverse in age, CT experience, and station and rank within their professions and organizations. The group was ethnically and religiously mixed, and men and women were equally represented. Some had dealt with domestic terrorism only, but the majority had worked against both domestic and international terrorism. The majority had extensive international travel experience. Most were US citizens, but not all were born and raised within the US culture. Despite their diversity in professional vocation and experience, age, and background, they all had this in common: each man and woman had experienced direct and intensive professional experience with terrorism and its effects.

Each person interviewed was promised anonymity, and thus their specific stories cannot be recounted in detail for this article. Instead, this article includes text boxes describing publicly discussed analogous experiences of individuals in terrorist events in the United States.

include examinations of the effects on people not only of direct exposure to violence and suffering but also of persistent engagement for long hours in high stress conditions, such as those experienced by CT analysts and policymakers, even when they are physically far removed from terrorists and acts of terrorism.



The CT Framework

The counterterrorism profession mainly comprises three domains of activity: leadership and policy, field professionals, and knowledge workers/analysts.

Leadership and policy. This domain's work centers on developing national CT laws and policies, including devising strategy and tactics and leading the execution of these policies. The group is responsible for heading up responses to unexpected terrorism events, nationally and internationally. Those interviewed in this group included White House officials, leaders of federal agencies responsible for national security, and Cabinet members who helped shape CT policy.

Knowledge workers. The work of this domain is to research, study, learn, interpret, and teach about terrorism and CT to the government, to the public, and to private-sector audiences. Those interviewed for this study included government analysts, private-sector scholars, academics and researchers, and journalists. Although most of these intellectuals spend a great deal of time in the field, the core of their work is cognitive and internal, and they do

The interviews revealed many commonalities across all three groups of CT professionals, commonalities both positive and negative.

not usually directly drive events in the field. When they do affect events, it is by communicating "actionable" assessments and by engaging with CT professionals in the field.

Field workers. Field professionals focus on engaging directly with terrorists and the acts of terrorists "on the ground." Among the CT professionals interviewed were diplomatic, military, covert intelligence, and law enforcement personnel; first responders such as medical and emergency management professionals; and NGO professionals from relief and research organizations. This is the most diverse group in terms of the range of their vocations and functions and their professional training.

These are people routinely "on location" with terrorism and terrorists. And although two major differences divided these professionals—some were armed and some were not and some worked for government and others did not—they were united by their personal, direct engagement with terrorism's actors and the consequences of terror strikes.

The Findings: General Positives and Negatives

The interviews revealed many commonalities across all three groups of CT professionals, commonalities both positive and negative.

The common positives

Members of all three groups said their CT work enriched them on individual, personal psychological levels

and in their interpersonal relationships with colleagues, family, friends, and community.

Most of these professionals felt that CT work was the most important of their professional careers and said that knowing this was very rewarding psychologically. They described their work as demanding, intense, and of high impact. Many who had experienced other types of work placed CT work in a category of its own in terms of psychological demands and rewards. One professional—an analyst who had dedicated her 30-year career to CT—stated that she never personally experienced the "crisis of meaning" many of her non-CT colleagues appeared to suffer at some point in their careers, and she summed up with the following statement:

There are no mid-life, existential crises in this job; I know what I did with my one and only career is meaningful, and so do [the others] around me [doing the same work].

She did add, however, that there had been life crises in areas other than work because of the "obsessive" nature of her CT career.

Many noted that it was exciting to have a personal role, no matter how small, in historic events. Quite a few mentioned how performing their jobs inside of events that were playing on the "parallel universe" of TV and social media was both exhilarating and somewhat strange at the same time. Characterizing this aspect of CT work, one person said, "I felt I

These professionals noted that they came to appreciate the precious nature of life and of life's small pleasures because of the carnage of innocents and terrible, destructive nature of terrorism.

had a bit part in an international passion play that the whole world was watching.”

Believing that one's work had impact on specific events was a major reward for these professionals, a psychological positive that counterbalanced the parallel theme of tragic cynicism about the possibility of ever eliminating terrorism. Knowing that they were playing a role in preventing a recurrence of “terrible events traumatizing the nation,” as one put it, or in bringing the perpetrators of terrorism to justice, or in comforting victims, was highly meaningful to the professionals.

On an introspective level, these professionals noted that they came to better appreciate the precious and fragile nature of life and of life's small pleasures because of the terrible, destructive nature of terrorism. One described it this way: “I have just become much more mindful of the treasure that is life and how quickly it can be destroyed.”

Asked to identify examples of these “treasures,” interviewees offered a favorite hobby, walking a dog, and appreciating nature. As counterpoints to the grim work, many spoke of turning to and appreciating the positives of culture, such as faith and religious activities, music and art, patriotic and communal traditions, sports, and community events.

More spoke of the ways CT work had helped them go beyond developing professional expertise to gaining wisdom. They seemed to feel that

they had acquired insight into the full range of human capabilities and behavior—as opposed to idealizing or demonizing human nature. One described this theme as follows:

When you do this type of work you have to work out for yourself why people can be so evil, and also so good. We are all human, right? So you need to think through your personal philosophy about responsibility, right and wrong. There are no easy answers, but everyone in [CT work] is forced eventually to [address these issues] and hard though it was, I am glad I was forced to. I'm a deeper person, maybe a better one.

CT work also appeared to challenge some to review, and then revise, their more negative personal characteristics. Many noted that they had become more humble because they were inspired by the heroism of their colleagues or by other examples of human virtue. Some deepened their capacity for compassion as they studied terrorists whose lives appeared to drive them to profoundly distorted images of themselves and of the world around them. Some also said that—after seeing the negative examples of human behavior exhibited by terrorists—they vowed to control in themselves the attributes of arrogance, hubris, rigidity, and disregard for others masquerading as idealism, that characterizes terrorists.

One CT professional, having witnessed the consequences of

extreme versions of these attributes in terrorists—while at the same time witnessing the capacity for self-sacrifice and common decency in the first responders, in victims, and her fellow CT professionals—made the point that “personal egotism and narcissism seem immature” in contrast and perhaps dangerous. Another illustrated this theme by noting how, on 9/11, he noticed that rush-hour traffic patterns “for at least 24 hours” were sane and civilized because that day on the road, “no one wanted to add more aggression to the world after the planes.”

On social and interpersonal levels, the CT professionals described deep rewards in their relationships both at work and in their private lives. They universally spoke about the pronounced rewards of working with trusted, respected, and dedicated colleagues. The words “humbled” or “privileged to serve among them” were used a lot. This was a ubiquitous positive.

With respect to relationships in private lives, many spoke of relying heavily on the understanding, dependability, and love of family and friends who provided steady mental and emotional anchors into everyday realities. Many described incidents in which their most intimate friends and families stepped in directly to comfort or distract them after they had been dealing with particularly terrible events.

Many also spoke about how spouses and close friends told them when their work was changing for the worse their attitudes towards others, their outlook toward life, and their behavior, thus pulling them up short and preventing them from getting

“lost” in the thrilling but potentially destructive mindsets of work. One said of his wife:

She pulled me back from the brink of becoming obsessed, and not in a good way, with the terrorists [his team was tracking]. There was a whole world out there that was lost to me, for a while, because all I could think about was [the terrorists]. She used some very unflattering words to describe what I was like, told me I was becoming a complete [a...e], but she was right. It was my wake-up call.

Through both tender and challenging interactions, the CT professionals reported that they came to value, respect, and cherish their intimate relationships and the characteristics of their loved ones all the more because of their generous and loyal responses to the pressures the jobs had put on their relationships.

The Common Negatives

The dark, negative sides of CT work were experienced to some degree by most of those interviewed. The interviews strikingly revealed how many of the negative themes are simply the obverse of positive ones.

Relative newcomers to the work tended to remark on the negatives in people they saw as “old-timers,” perceiving in particular diminishment or distortions in their “outside” lives. For example, one young professional—still in her mid-20s—conjectured that senior CT leaders in the national security arena appeared to her to be “shadows of their former selves” after a post-9/11 decade in what she characterized as an “obsessive” focus on their jobs.

Interviewees observed that, however rewarding it is, the work is inexorable.

CT professionals with many years in the work tended to confirm her observation. Many who had moved on from CT to other work reported that they had chosen to leave CT because they felt that important aspects of their lives were being damaged or diminished, including their general outlook on life, on other people, and on humanity in general. Phrases these CT professionals used to allude to the dark side of the work included: “it takes a toll,” “there is a distinct price,” “loss of innocence,” and “you can’t go back to the way you were before.”

Interviewees observed that, however rewarding it is, the work is inexorable. One professional said his CT job “colonizes everything.” These jobs are capable of cannibalizing a professional’s entire waking awareness, and sometimes sleeping consciousness as well. One professional quipped that he called his work “my Pac-Man job,” referring to the classic video game of the 1980s in which voracious icons devoured everything in their paths.

“Colonizing” or “Pac-Man” jobs demand that other pleasurable or even essential elements of a well-rounded life yield to work requirements, sometimes overtly and sometimes more imperceptibly. Non-work routine activities can easily come to seem inconsequential in the face of the exciting, urgent, and relentless press of CT work, where claims of “life and death stakes” are not, in fact, exaggerations.

Essential over the long-term, but superficially fungible in the short-term, sustaining life activities such as

time spent with family, commitment to community activities and friendship networks, or upkeep of pleasurable hobbies attenuate or fall away entirely. A professional immersed in CT work may shirk from necessary personal routines of self-care and wellness, such as attending to dressing and grooming habits, getting health checkups, taking exercise, attending to routine housekeeping. Eventually, personal and home life becomes a shambles.

The younger people interviewed worried that they would never find life partners, unless they found them at work; married-with-kids people worried they were both neglecting and missing their children’s lives and being inattentive spouses; close-to-retirement people looked back on the costs and wondered if their golden years would be absent things that take decades to develop or maintain: longstanding friendships and established roles in the community, robust middle-age health, substantive contacts with extended families.

One professional in his 20s noted that, before he entered CT work—two years before the interview—he had been in the habit of spending an hour or so every evening sketching on what he described as a “really beat up” but treasured painter’s easel; since middle-school this had been his primary method to “decompress and go Zen,” but it stopped once he started an intelligence analyst’s job in CT with its extended hours and intense focus. He described how, a few weekends before the interview, he had experienced the rare treat of having “a few hours to myself” at

Similarly, professionals noted that while their work is exciting and stimulating, it is easy to become so habituated to stimulation that a non-excited mental state seems abnormal.

home, which he decided to use to draw. When he went to his easel, he found a layer of dust on the markers in the pencil tray and yellowed paper tacked to the easel. Though he knew he had drawn the old sketch on the yellowed paper, on an emotional level he did not immediately recognize it as his own product; he felt entirely “separated” from his previously treasured artistic activity to explore and express his inner world. He noted wistfully that his drawing since entering CT had been limited to quick doodles at work on scrap paper or erasable whiteboards when he can “steal a moment.” He wondered, “If I ever really try to get back to it, will there be anything left to draw with?”

Along the same lines, a female CT analyst noted that her houseplants had all essentially “withered” from inadequate care and that she had not planted her outside garden “for years...it’s just survivors [from previous years of carefully planned planting], volunteers [self-seeded wild plants], and weeds now.” A few of the analysts in CT mentioned not being able to indulge in reading novels for pleasure anymore; lightweight popular fictions could no longer engage and hold imaginations saturated with images, facts, or hypotheses about real violence and terrible deeds done or planned by actual villains.

Singly, such sacrifices of small personal pleasures and habits may seem incidental, but many small losses accumulated across multiple life domains over time shrink a person’s lifestyle and consciousness down to

work alone, with the possible retention of a few necessary and unavoidable self-maintenance chores that often themselves are experienced not as the elements of healthy self-care but as irritating interruptions from the “real action” at the core of one’s life—the CT job.

Furthermore, the violent, gruesome, and disturbing nature of terrorist strikes and the disquieting nature of the minds that plan such strikes are difficult to “turn off” or “tune out” of one’s consciousness at will. Many of the professionals noted problems in shifting their attention away from the topic of terrorism, even when they needed or wanted to. The CT professionals said they felt like they are “always on”—for example, thinking about the next strike, or worrying if they had made the right calls or judgments to prevent future strikes or apprehend perpetrators, or just having problems letting go of memories of particularly gruesome and grim events.

Human beings exposed to such content need time to mentally and emotionally metabolize and come to terms with it. Even in situations where the professionals are not at work per se, CT may nevertheless occupy their consciousness; terrorist content pervades quiet moments where they should or want to be at ease, daydreaming or concentrating on other things.

This intrusion of work-related thoughts, memories, and worries is particularly bothersome during activities for leisure and respite—for

example, when attending worship events in their faith tradition or at a child’s school activity or party or during sports events—when the professionals’ minds should be free to relax. Instead, thoughts of work spoil intimate time with life partners or times when people want simply to be at ease or at peace within themselves.

This subliminal disquiet—which one professional termed “my mental tinnitus”—over time erodes creativity and vitality and the security of a stable lifestyle full of variety and psyche-sustaining relationships and activities. Like most aspects of the dark side, this invasive preoccupation with work is an obverse of one of the strongly positive aspects of CT described by the CT professionals: its enduring and inherent fascination and intellectual challenge. What is mentally engrossing becomes mentally intrusive.

Similarly, professionals noted that while their work is exciting and stimulating, it is easy to become so habituated to stimulation that a non-excited mental state seems abnormal—a feeling that leads some to inappropriate, sometimes reckless, behavior. In CT circles, phrases for this problem—though not always perceived as negatives—include “highly caffeinated” and “adrenaline junkies.” These phrases came up so often in the interviews that it became apparent that a frenzied, hyped-up pace is a given in the work. Here again, the downside of living at this pace is a chronic inability to relax and, after people have moved into new jobs, an equal inability to find rewards and different kinds of stimulation in new assignments. Other work simply seems tame in comparison.

Some in government positions reported that they found being part of a chain of action that led to violence—particularly if innocents were inadvertently harmed—very difficult to accept. This was not because of moral qualms about the actions taken; it was simply that they had been part of killing, which even in the most ethical circumstances is very difficult for many people.^a

Some who had experienced failure in their work, a category into which many of the generation of CT professionals who were working on 9/11 put themselves—described feelings of guilt. Every successful terror strike is experienced as a failure, in this view. This sense of failure and guilt is the dark side of a profession whose practitioners are acutely aware of (and rewarded by) its impact and their personal involvement. Thus, when faced with the possibility that they or their teams have failed, such professionals often respond with more frenzied efforts, further fueled by dread of repeated failure and its fatal consequences. Unfortunately, such fear can lead to unwelcome results, such as overcaution, a lack of imagination, and diminished capacity to take necessary risks.

a. A classic, though controversial, work on the psychological effect on people of killing other people, even for legitimate and lawful reasons, is Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Back Bay Books, 1996). However controversial, the book catalyzed many more studies conducted in a variety of contexts—from accidental death in traffic accidents, hospital emergency room failures, police and military use of lethal force, and correctional personnel involved in executions—which have supported Grossman's conclusions.

It should be evident that every element of this “dark side” will strain family relationships and friendship networks.

Many noted it was difficult to tolerate the public finger-pointing that ensued after successful terror strikes because these were interpreted as failure in the CT effort—whether on the policy, field, or scholarly sides of the enterprise. Others noted that listening to public debate and opinions about how “broken” any part of the CT enterprise was—while tolerable and entertaining before they started work in CT—became unbearable given the sacrifices they were making and watching their colleagues make to perform the work. This sense that listening to others discussing one's work is insufferable raises cognitive and social walls between individuals in the field and those outside of it, separating CT professionals from casual interaction with people around them.

Finally, the dark side of CT was especially salient in personal lives. One senior head of a federal agency noted that it “sombered [sic] my mood” and that his wife took steps to ensure he remained engaged in lighthearted activities, although she noted that it took awhile for him to “come back” after he left the work. Though many CT professionals reported that it was very rewarding to learn in more depth about people as they are—the good and the bad—through their work, one pays a price for daily, direct engagement with evil.

One price is that the work can breed cynicism, despair, melancholy, and self-loathing, especially in those who come to think that they, too, may have lurking within them the darker aspects of human nature. Many noted that they become more vigilant (“hyper alert” and “paranoid” were

terms frequently raised) to potential dangers in the environment, particularly in regards to their children; such vigilance can make lightheartedness impossible. This is the obverse of coming to appreciate the fragility of life and therefore relishing the precious moments as they arrive.

It seemed very difficult for many not to experience much of the stuff of life as trivial, either occasionally or more persistently. One CT professional described “lawn mowing” controversies in his neighborhood with contempt—the eco-friendly neighbors wanting natural fields “at war” with the traditionalists pursuing emerald carpets in front of their houses. What had seemed amusing before had become intensely annoying and small minded to his CT-oriented ear.

Another mentioned going after a particularly grueling day to a toddler's birthday party—as a peer and friend of the grandparents—and feeling disaffected—“over-sugared toddlers, stressed parents, and proud grandparents”—and thinking: “I have nothing in common with these people.” A third mentioned being at a sporting event and not being able to “get into it”—and being frightened and unsettled by both intrusive thoughts of how bombs in the crowd would be an effective terror strike and also by his general alienation from the fun and horseplay of the young family members around him. One summed this up by saying: “So much came to seem trivial to me, but I realize life is enjoyed in the precious trivial moments, which for a while were lost to me.”

Responses Unique to the Three CT Domains

While most in the CT profession share much of the foregoing, there were differences in the nature and depth of positive and negative responses among the three categories of CT work.

Leadership and Policy Professionals

Members of the leadership and policy group within the CT enterprise described their experiences using metaphors such as circus master, martial artist, and orchestra conductor. These captured the rewards of being at the center of events and directing large groups of competent professionals with a wide audience observing the action.

The political leaders interviewed for this study described many terrorism crises in which their leadership was completely engaged. (See right.) They spoke of the way in which meeting difficult challenges required their intense focus and of how their efforts provided the highest tests of their political acumen and skill. They also spoke of the extraordinary trust that developed among the members of their teams. Not surprisingly, successes brought enjoyment—even exhilaration—to them and their teams, together with the sense they had been rewarded above and beyond any public applause they might have won.


Psychologists use the word “flow” to describe the state of mind successful CT leaders described above. Mihály Csíkszentmihályi—a pioneer in “positive psychology,” the study of sources of human happiness, satisfaction, and creativity—characterized

Former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert Remembering 9/11

Speaking 10 years after 9/11, Hastert explained what the political and leadership vocation in counterterrorism involved on the day of the attacks and their aftermath, capturing the essence of this vocation’s responsibilities in the CT context:

*We had to get the country back going again. I mean, not only the airlines. We needed to get airlines and build buildings, but the stock market was down, and the telecommunications system was down because the AT&T building was right next to the World Trade tower. So people in Lower Manhattan didn’t have any communications. Our market system, the way we do business, was shut down. We had to get the subway going. We had to take care of the survivors of 3,000 victims. All those things. We had so much coming at us, we just took off our coats and rolled up our sleeves and went to work. You’re doing those things, and there wasn’t a lot of time to reflect whether you’re doing the right thing. I suppose in retrospect, Monday morning quarterback, there’s some things we could have done different. But we’re trying to get things done and having to get it done as quickly as possible. Because we didn’t have time to dawdle.**

* Dennis Hastert, “Remembering 9/11,” in http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/09/07/remembering_911_former_speaker_of_the_house_dennis_hastert_rill_111218.html; see also C-Span interview by Steven Scully, “Former House Speaker Dennis Hastert on September 11, 2001,” 12 July 2011.



Speaker Hastert addressing special joint session of the Senate and House in New York City’s Federal Hall on 6 September 2012. (Photo © Martin H. Simon/Corbis)

flow as the supreme human mental state because it is both deeply pleasurable and productive.^a

Negatives for this group included a heightened sense of threat; as one described it, “I came to see the world as bristling with threats—ones

a. Mihály Csíkszentmihályi, *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (Harper & Row, 1990) and *Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention* (Harper & Row, 1996).

I knew about, ones I did not.” They noted how difficult it was to shift attention to other important policy matters once they were aware of a terror threat. One White House official used the following hypothetical example: “If the president hears at 9:00 a.m. that there is good information that cargo planes carrying bombs are on their way to the United States, he is going to have trouble shifting his mind to education policy in the developing world.”

For leaders who have experienced failure to protect the public, the guilt and anger are profound; one noted that after a failure it became hard to keep an open mind to experimental and creative political solutions. Several noted that the ethical conundrums are particularly difficult in CT policy work, and leaders are often required to choose “the least bad option.” Terrorism can sap the optimism and buoyancy of those who lead the effort to counter it because they must always choose among negative options.

Finally, several noted the irony that the more power one has, the more helpless one feels. One reported, with some humor, that he was told by those tasked to execute his policy to “please stop calling and asking for updates” because it was distracting and interrupted their “flow.”

***Knowledge Workers—
Custodians of Truth***

Among those whose work is focused on research, analysis, and communication there are profound rewards in the challenge of intellectually grappling with terrorism as a topic of study. Moreover, because their work is unusually closely connected to CT actions in the world, they get both intellectual and more pragmatic rewards in seeing their endeavors lead to success.

Also rewarding to knowledge workers is the realization that their work requires steadiness of character and moral courage. They see themselves as responsible for finding the truth and speaking it to leaders or field professionals, at times when these partners in the CT enterprise may be disinclined to listen. For

Working through the Horrors: Two Photographers Remember

Boston Marathon photographer John Tlumacki said about his experience taking photos at the 2013 bombing at the site of the first of two explosions: “I was so shook up about it—I was speechless when I was there [on scene]. My eyes were swelling up behind my camera. We use a camera as a defense but I was shaken when I got back, just scanning the pictures. The other sad part was that I took my shoes off because they were covered in blood from walking on the sidewalk taking pictures...I always wondered what it would be like when I see photographers covering this stuff all over the world. You go to Israel and then there’s an explosion and photographers are there. It’s haunting to be a journalist and have to cover it. I don’t ever want to have to do that again.” Tlumacki captured the iconic shot of the three policemen hovering over the fallen marathoner at the moment the second explosion occurred (see frontpiece of this article).*

A second photographer, freelance Bill Hoenk, was on hand to document the chaotic aftermath at the site of the second explosion. One of his photographs, showing a Boston police officer carrying a wounded child, was the cover image of TIME’s 6 May 2013 tablet-only edition, “Special Report on the Marathon Bombing.” He was there to cover a peaceful community event; but as soon as the bombs went off he began photographing the scene around him, going “into a zone,” as he described it. “I was horrified by what I was seeing, but there was some sort of instinct that said, don’t worry about that, just keep shooting, because you’re the only person with a camera around that I could see and it needs to be done. So I kept shooting...I saw the cop lift up the baby. When I look at the photos, I cry. The baby was screaming.”**

Both of these photographers continued to do their jobs in the inferno, and both experienced very human, anguished responses while they did so.

* “Tragedy in Boston: One Photographer’s Eyewitness Account,” in LightBox <http://lightbox.time.com/2013/04/15/tragedy-in-boston-one-photographers-eyewitness-account>, 15 April 2013.

** “A Photographer’s View of the Carnage: “When I Look at the Photos, I Cry,” in LightBox <http://lightbox.time.com/2013/04/16/a-photographers-view-of-the-carnage-when-i-look-at-the-photos-i-cry>, 15 April 2013.

example, many saw themselves as instrumental in de-escalating hasty responses in crisis situations or after calamitous events by bringing into decisionmaking facts, perspective, and truth—in the form of longer views of history and cooler assessments of the future implications of actions—when others in the CT enterprise are under pressure to react decisively to acute threats or events.

The negatives for knowledge workers included suffering what quite a few described as “OCD” (obsessive/compulsive disorder),

meaning they constantly felt the urge to check and recheck data to make sure they had not overlooked something or missed new and important developments. Many noted they have lost sleep ruminating overnight about the subjects they were trying to make sense of.

It was striking how many CT analysts working in September 2001 felt guilt and blame, either for “missing” the imminent attacks or for being unable to make key leaders pay attention to the danger their instincts told them was approaching. Many noted

how they suffered from “anticipatory dread,” their intellectual instincts and expertise telling them that something was going to happen—often associated with the maddening phenomenon of “increased chatter.” Some analysts described the sense that serving as “custodians of the truth” in CT can be a curse—if no one will pay attention. They felt like Cassandra, the prophetess of Troy, cursed to see impending disaster but unable to get others to take her warnings seriously.

Field Professionals

This was the most diverse group of interviewees; it included those who bear arms—military people, police officers—and those who do not—emergency responders, medical personnel, diplomats, journalists and researchers, and charitable organizations. All had done most of their CT work on the battle ground of terrorism—directly dealing with terrorists, participating in strikes against terrorists, and dealing with the aftermath of terrorist events.

Like the knowledge workers who spoke of intellectual courage, many field professionals said their work involved tests of courage—in their cases physical courage—and they valued passing the tests. Some mentioned that they had come to better understand that courage was about being terrified yet persevering.

The field professionals expressed particularly strong affection and admiration for colleagues with whom they had shared hardships and victories; they noted that colleagues in CT teams forged lifelong friendships. Field work can be fun—irrespective of the grim contents of terrorism. It can bring a sense of adventure, of experimentation and spontaneous diversion with the unexpected—and,

Peter Stefan: Unintended CT Professional

After the Worcester, MA, undertaker Peter Stefan agreed to handle funeral arrangements for Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon terrorist killed as he attempted to avoid arrest, Stefan was besieged by criticism, picketers, and threatening phone calls. He was called a traitor and un-American.

In an interview he gave while he still had custody of the body and was contending with the hostility, Stefan stated that his funeral home was responsible for ensuring that the burial was conducted properly and he therefore would not simply ship the body away from the region: “I want to know for a fact that once I get him there, that someone’s going to do something and bury him, not go back and forth and hold the body there because he’s a terrorist or whatever they want to call him...I’m not just going to send the body out. I don’t care who it is. This isn’t what we do.”* In a later interview, he provided more reflections about his vocational ethics: “But you can’t bury only people who are on the straight and narrow. What are you going to do with the rest of them? We’re not barbarians here. We bury the dead.”

In maintaining his stand, Stefan provided another example of how average people—even when unexpectedly pulled into the terrorism vortex—manage to do their jobs with dignity and professionalism, irrespective of the adversity, anger, fear, and confusion terrorist acts create.

* NPR News, “All Things Considered,” 6 May 2013.

** Associated Press, “Book Planned on Burial of Marathon Bombing Suspect,” 30 April 2014.



from time to time, crackpot humor. One young field officer described enjoying singing at the top of her voice with fellow teammates—all in flak jackets, helmets, and heavily armed—whenever they were required to use military transport to move cross-country.

The sense of victory—of engaging the enemy and winning—was very strong and rewarding. One FBI special agent described the rewards of “bringing some justice to the victims and families” by tracking

terrorist perpetrators and seeing them either arrested or killed in action. What these field professionals described are what psychologists call “peak experiences,” unique, unforgettable, treasured events that affect all experiences after. Many noted that after their field work, life seemed more satisfying.

The negatives of field work were equally salient, occasionally reflected in the “thousand-yard stares” of those who have seen the horror, touched the carnage, heard the cries

of victims and families, and have smelled the stench of terrorist strikes, none of which can ever be expunged. Witnessing such things can haunt a person for life. They also reported experiencing three types of separation – from their past selves (“you can’t go home again”); from others around them in the present, including colleagues and family and friends (“you have to have been there to understand”); and from the future as they had envisioned it before their experiences in CT (“nothing will ever compare”; “I can’t let go of it and move on”).

Many noted that field work can be “addictive,” but not in a good way. For some haunted professionals it has become the only place they feel truly at home, because they crave the excitement or because every place else seems alien and tame. Such people have become detached from their own selves, mired in a present where they can only feel at home in the CT field while precluding many alternative possibilities for their futures. More generally, the author notes that the field professionals described the greatest incidence of psychiatric symptoms such as insomnia and nightmares, hypervigilance even in safe places, and emotional numbing.

A very senior diplomat described being the target of terrorists; he took

this in stride and learned to work with his protective detail wherever he went. What he could not easily let go of—long after his retirement—was that his wife and children were also explicit targets, as were most embassy personnel, who did not have protective details. His wife made a joke of how she learned to check under her car with a mirror before loading the kids for a drive and about having armed men around her family while they enjoyed the beach—but the husband, the CT professional, was unable to share the joke. Although more than willing to take on risks himself, he remained ambivalent about how his work had endangered those he loved most and those he was directly responsible for.

In Sum

The stories CT professionals tell invoke questions that ancient, classical storytellers explored in their tales of heroes in conflict. How do human beings flourish when their work takes them into the heart of darkness? How do they rise to meet challenges involving unspeakable cruelty and violence and yet remain unharmed psychologically? And, more specifically, what do their stories tell us about the price individuals pay psychologically,

emotionally, and interpersonally for the service and rewards of CT work? How can the costs be mitigated by institutional and other means of support? All the CT professionals whose insights have been reflected in this article confronted the very questions explored in the ancient stories.

Those outside the CT community who have observed the labors of these professionals have been reminded of the human capacity for common decency and sacrifice for the sake of others; of the individual’s potential to transcend typical human frailties and achieve great things; of our shared human ability to exercise leadership, show courage, demonstrate insight, and accrue wisdom. These professionals serve as reminders that the capacity for heroism lives within ordinary people, people who do not aspire to win trophies or become demigods.

And finally, perhaps their greatest act of “counterterrorism” may be the example they provide to others that the worst of human nature, as seen in the grandiose fantasies and atrocities of terrorists, will be met by the best in human nature as seen in those who step up to counter terrorists. In so doing they reveal the true quality of heroism.



Appendix: A Review of Literature on the Psychology of Trauma and Stress

Three research streams in psychiatry, clinical psychology, and organizational psychology and management science are particularly germane to psychological responses and the work conditions described by the CT

professionals who were interviewed for this project.

Psychological Trauma and On-the-Job Exposure to Violence and Suffering

A constellation of mental health diagnoses—most notably depression and anxiety, substance abuse disorder

ders, posttraumatic stress responses, and marital and family problems—are associated with jobs that expose personnel to violence and to seeing other human beings experiencing violence and danger. People who routinely encounter such exposure include US military service members in war and combat;¹ journalists, particularly war and violent crime correspondents;² “first responders” and rescuers, such as police and fire control personnel; and emergency room staff.³

The 2013 edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—Version 5 (DSM-V)⁴—expanded the triggers that may lead to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to include indirect exposure through media to violence and gruesome content, so long as this indirect exposure happens as a result of work and not by personal choice or happenstance. Examples would include police investigating online crimes of violence and exploitation, counterterrorism analysts studying terrorism imaging, and production and imagery personnel sorting through “raw” photo streams when preparing content for publication in journals and newspapers. This indirect psychological risk factor has now been judged to be a matter of occupational health, alongside the psychological risks that ensue from directly experiencing violence and its effects on victims.

In addition to the risks ensuing from direct and indirect exposure to trauma triggers, many professionals carry the risk of “vicarious” trauma—sometimes called “secondary trauma.” The trigger in this case is personal empathic engagement with victims, resulting in psychological immersion in their inner world of

pain and anguish. Unsurprisingly, caregivers, for example clergy, mental health counselors, teachers, and medical personnel, are most at risk for vicarious trauma. Journalists and scholars whose jobs require them to conduct one-on-one interviews and record the stories of victims are also at risk. The terms “compassion fatigue” or “caregiver burnout” are often used to capture some of the consequences of vicarious trauma.⁵

Families are also at risk for vicarious trauma, particularly children. Post-9/11 studies of children in and around New York City have established that many developed symptoms of traumatic stress and associated mental disorders through overhearing parents and other adult loved ones process with each other the events of that day, for example fleeing burning buildings or the city on foot after the twin towers collapsed.⁶

Whether trauma, stress, or other negative mental health responses are associated with direct, indirect, or vicarious exposure to triggers, these mental health effects are a drain on the vitality and quality of life of the professionals who endure them and those close to these professionals.

The Modern Icarus: The Effect of Extreme Jobs and Overwork

In the classical legend, Icarus was a young man who, equipped with magnificent wings made of feathers and wax, ignored advice from his father to keep a level course between earth and sky and instead flew directly toward the sun; his wings melted, and he fell to the ground and died. This cautionary tale of hubris and

pushing beyond human limits finds a modern incarnation in studies about the dangerous allure and injurious effects of so-called “extreme jobs.” Although employees and organizations alike may view extreme jobs and the dedication it takes to perform them as noble expressions of talent, ambition, and drive, the growing consensus of researchers is that their impact on individuals, groups, and institutions is destructive.⁷

Mental health practitioners often label chronic overwork as “compulsive” or characterize it as “the respectable addiction,”⁸ implying in the first case that the worker no longer drives the job but is driven by it, and in the second case that the job’s effects on the person are as dire as physical addiction to a substance.⁹ The CT professionals’ descriptions of being in the grip of intense, exhilarating, spellbinding work that over time depletes the rest of their lives echoes both the ancient tale of Icarus and the modern research.

Studies of “extreme jobs” look at “meta-conditions”—that is, the high number of hours-per-week they require, or the high degree of unpredictability and disproportionate level of responsibility inherent in them. Aside from their exposure to the psychological risks of confronting gruesome and terrible subject matter, CT work mimics these meta-conditions and confers the same risks found in any “extreme job.” These conditions include routine work weeks of 60 hours or longer—where 10-hour days are perceived as normal and expected—plus four other ubiquitous elements that create chronic intensity and pressure: unpredictability, fast pace with tight deadlines, work intru-

sion on personal time, and 24/7 client demands.¹⁰

People who have extreme jobs describe the following rewards: excitement, impact or prestige, and working with valued and similarly elite peers. All of these considerable rewards resemble those described by CT professionals.

The downsides of extreme jobs involve both physical and mental problems. Scholars in this domain have consistently found that their research subjects report the following cognitive and physical problems: memory loss, erosion of attention and concentration, insomnia, weight gain, fertility problems, stomach and gastro-intestinal issues, high blood pressure, and eye twitch. On the psychological or behavioral health side, subjects commonly report drinking too much and “crashing” at the end of the day, and that their job stress has a negative impact on their sex lives and also on their children’s behavior and adjustment. Just as the positives of extreme jobs parallel those reported by CT professionals, so too do these negatives echo the toll extracted by work described by those in CT.

Human Resilience and Transcendence

Over the past four decades, there has been extensive attention to a domain of behavioral study somewhat awkwardly termed “Positive Psychology.”¹¹ Proponents of this psychological framework—which incorporates personality, developmental, clinical, and social psychology—focus on defining and enhancing human strengths and positive behavioral health, as opposed to concentrating solely on psychopathology or on explicitly damaging or negative behavioral variables. Practitioners of positive psychology have developed methods to buttress psychological resilience in the face of adversity. These efforts have permitted scholars to explore what enables people to be psychologically hardy even in terrible circumstances and also to spell out psychological gains that might actually arise from bad experiences.¹²

The US military, in particular, has invested in formal resilience training. Although studies of military veterans suggest that as many as one third experience deleterious mental and emotional effects from experiences in

war, the majority function very well during and after their experiences, are proud of their service, and report that they would repeat their experiences again despite also acknowledging some adjustment issues, many centering on reentry into civilian life.¹³

US military data has recorded a set of positive psychological outcomes that ensue from war deployments, such as respect for one’s leadership abilities, competence, and character strengths; respect for one’s peers; and renewed appreciation for life and for new possibilities.¹⁴ Psychological gains from transcending traumatic stress responses—a constellation of mental health gains often labelled “posttraumatic growth”—are reminiscent of gains that accrue in what psychologists call “normal adult development” (in other words, increasing maturity).

These gains parallel many of the positives reported by the CT professionals who were interviewed for this study. They include: a sense of mastery and wisdom, growth in skill, in knowledge, in confidence, and in agility in dealing with the challenges of life.¹⁵



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A Tale of Two Semi-Submersible Submarines

Jim Anderson, LCDR USNR (ret), and Dirk A.D. Smith

**“Codenamed
‘GIMIK’ and ‘SKIFF’
these vessels were the
infiltration assets for a
clandestine operations
program...”**



In the summer of 1986, a reader of *Warship International* posed a question to the well-known naval historical journal seeking to confirm the identity of a small vessel on display at the Battleship Cove Naval Heritage Museum in Fall River, Massachusetts. Back then, the museum was describing the boat as a Japanese suicide motor boat that had been found abandoned in Okinawa. But a number of anomalies made this unlikely: the boat had US-manufactured fittings, instruments, and motor, and it had no components that could readily be identified as Japanese.¹

Twenty years later, I happened across a remarkably similar vessel on display at CIA Headquarters in McLean, Virginia. Hundreds, possibly thousands, of people pass this vessel daily without giving it much thought, but my happening upon it brought to mind the one at Battleship Cove and spurred me to try to answer the question of its provenance posed in 1986. Coincidentally, my coauthor was researching the vessel as well, following the passing of his father, a former CIA officer. Together we discovered that the boats at CIA and Fall River are actually the same design.

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The agents would exit the boat's escape hatch while it was submerged at shallow depth, float to the surface, inflate a nylon boat, and row ashore.

GIMIK and OSS Project NAPKO

The question of the provenance of the boat on display in Fall River has proven to be one of the more enduring mysteries of World War II. As it turns out, the boat is one of a pair of two-man submersibles designed and built for the OSS (Office of Strategic Services, CIA's precursor) in May 1945.² Code-named "GIMIK," these vessels were the infiltration assets for a clandestine operations program called Project NAPKO, devised and headed by Colonel Carl Eifler.³

NAPKO's purpose was to recruit and train 55 Korean Americans and Korean prisoners of war for infiltration into Japanese-occupied Korea, and ultimately into Japan itself.⁴ Their mission was to collect intelligence and conduct sabotage in advance of Operation Olympic, the planned US invasion of the Japanese home islands in November 1945. Korean POWs were targeted because Korea was then under Japanese occupation (and had been since 1905⁵), and Colonel Eifler correctly believed that Korean nationals who had been inducted into the Japanese military—and subsequently captured by US forces during the Pacific campaign—would be inclined to turn against their colonial masters in order to help shorten the occupation of their country.⁶

NAPKO's Concept of Operations

NAPKO was an ambitious plan. It envisioned the creation of 10 teams of Korean-born agents (one

to five per team) that would penetrate into Korea. Once in place, each team would establish an agent network—built on their own pre-existing relationships and contacts—to collect intelligence and transmit this information back to US radio stations established in Manchuria and the Philippines specifically for Project NAPKO.

Because these agents were Korean natives, the teams were largely free to choose their own penetration points and operating areas.⁷ It should be noted here that according to OSS veteran former US Navy Ensign George McCullough, pilot of the first GIMIK boat, these teams believed they were training for infiltration missions into Japan; however, all OSS documentation the authors have reviewed only discusses plans to infiltrate the Korean Peninsula.⁸ Nevertheless, based on ENS McCullough's memoir, the authors believe OSS planners intended to infiltrate Japan as well, and that further research may provide documentary evidence.

In the initial phases of the plan, the agent teams were to be given thorough OSS training. The teams were kept separate from each other, and no group was to know of the others' existence. Eifler and his planners assumed that some of these teams would be lost by enemy action; based on previous OSS experience, they anticipated that about 70 percent of them would remain undetected. Assuming that seven teams managed to become operative, Eifler further expected that one or more would surpass the others in developing their operation. The group showing the

greatest progress would be exploited the most.⁹

Eifler further assumed that after the teams became operational, some of them would come to the attention of Japanese intelligence, with the possibility that elements of or possibly entire teams would be apprehended and eliminated. However, with enough teams operating, some would surely gain sufficient hold over the infiltrated territory such that Japanese counterintelligence could not be effective against the overall operation.¹⁰

Following training and the issuance of equipment, the NAPKO teams were to be moved to a forward base designated by the US Navy, from which point they were to embark in a submarine. The submarine would then transport the team to the immediate vicinity of the area selected for landing. The Korean agents were to be landed via one of two methods, both of which were designed to minimize the recently developed threat of radar.

- In the first method, the agents would disembark from the submarine while it was still submerged. One of the agents would carry a small nylon boat as part of his equipment load. The agents would exit the boat's escape hatch while it was submerged at shallow depth, float to the surface, inflate the nylon boat, and row ashore;
- In the second method, the agents would be landed from a submersible craft transported by the submarine, i.e., GIMIK. In the words of the original plan proposal, "A small powercraft is being developed with a range of approximately one hundred miles, which can

carry an operator and two agents. This craft can be submerged in its entirety to the water's surface, whereby producing a minimum surface to reflect radar. This craft can be carried by submarine to the general vicinity of landing." The submarine would then surface outside the intended landing area to allow the team to embark GIMIK, and would then submerge to allow the infiltration craft to float off the submarine and then proceed to the landing site.¹¹

Immediately upon landing, agents' equipment, radio, and money, which had been packed in a watertight container, was to be buried. In missions using the inflatable boats, the boats were to be buried in a different location from where these items were left; however, if additional water obstacles such as rivers and swamps were anticipated, the team could carry the boats for the first few days into the mission.¹²

The agents' next move after arrival in the area of operations was to contact underground members already known to them. Once contact was established and it was safe to do so, the buried items would be retrieved. As soon as possible thereafter, encrypted radio contact was to be established with listening stations established to support the NAPKO project. Two such stations were to be established to provide redundancy and backup in case of technical failure, which was a common problem with long-range radio at the time—one was to be in northern China, and the other in the Philippines.¹³

Intelligence or other information of urgent significance to the Allied command or to OSS operations was

Of the ten initial missions contemplated under NAPKO, only two actually made it to the operational planning stage.

to be immediately communicated to the OSS. The agents were then to establish a contact point whereby personnel already in Korea could be withdrawn to Allied forward areas, trained, and then re-infiltrated back into Korea, or where scientists or other personnel with high-value information could be withdrawn from Korea for debriefing. This line of withdrawal could also be used for smuggling out of Korea American fliers who had been shot down.¹⁴

After initial set-up, the agents were to locate an area that was heavily anti-Japanese, screen it, eliminate any person in the vicinity who was not anti-Japanese, and then set up training schools. The more isolated this district, the better. Prime consideration was to be given to small islands just offshore, with the rationale being that many of these islands were sparsely inhabited by poor fishermen who, it was believed, would be very anti-Japanese due to the oppression reportedly directed against them at the time. Mountainous areas of the country were another target, on the thinking that large areas of territory could be brought under the agent network's control or influence. Once schools were established in these areas, Koreans from all walks of life were to be recruited, trained, and put into operation.¹⁵

It was envisioned that this organization might ultimately control whole areas inside Korea, particularly rural areas and coastal offshore islands. Once the first areas were established and controlled by the Korean agents, American officers would move in

to act as liaison between the agents and US military authorities and to guide and run the organization inside Korea for the OSS. Once set up, the organization was to transmit actual sabotage orders as well as orders for the introduction into Korea of guns and ammunition in quantities sufficient for active or underground resistance, in the same manner as had occurred in other occupied and enemy countries, up to and including actual revolution.¹⁶

Operational Mission Plans

Of the 10 initial missions contemplated under NAPKO, only two actually made it to the operational planning stage. These were code-named "Kinec" and "Charo."¹⁷ Both were very similar in concept, differing primarily in intended points of penetration and operating areas. Kinec envisioned landing five agents at Chemulpo Bay, about 20 miles outside Seoul on the country's west coast; Charo was focused on Pyongyang following penetration via Wonsan and utilized three, rather than five, Korean agents.¹⁸ Typical of NAPKO missions, the teams were to carry minimal equipment and supplies: 100,000 yen, a radio, appropriate clothing for passing as locals, and a Japanese-manufactured shovel for burying the team's equipment after landing.¹⁹

Once ashore, the team was to commence activities in Seoul, where a team leader, native to that city, had an established business in place

and numerous business contacts that could serve as a ready-made agent network. After the first contacts in Seoul were made, word was to be sent through the entire agent network that contact had been made with the United States. The system was then to be expanded with additional contacts established through key employees in the team leader's branch offices. In cases of emergency, the team leader's business agent in Seoul could furnish additional finances and equipment for operations. Additional personnel were to be recruited by the original group and then formed into multi-celled operating units.²⁰

The Boats


NAPKO's original plan called for three boats; however, only two were actually built, codenamed GIMIK, and nicknamed "Gizmo #1" and "Gizmo #2" by their operators.²¹ They were almost certainly built by John Trumpy and Sons of Camden, New Jersey, a well-known yacht builder famous for wooden boat designs and high quality workmanship. Each cost \$20,000 (approximately \$266,000 in 2013 dollars).

GIMIK had an operating radius of only 110 miles and was intended to be transported as deck cargo on a submarine to a point off the enemy coast. From there, its operator and a single infiltrator passenger would go ashore. To facilitate their carriage as underwater deck cargo, a boxlike hangar was constructed on the submarines, each of which served as a mothership. These hangars, rectangular and made of two-inch thick steel, were nicknamed "coffins"—much to



GIMIK under construction (above) and after launch (left) (CIA photographs, 1945).

Below: "Gizmo #1," as piloted by ENS. McCullough; photo by George McCullough (1945), courtesy of Michael McCullough.



the discomfort of the boats' operators.²²

The boat had three operating modes—surface, semi-submerged, and fully submerged. When operating in the infiltration mode, the craft ran as a semi-submersible with its deck awash until reaching a point close to the landing area. To further reduce detectability, the boats' snorkel masts were wrapped in steel wool to break up possible enemy radar returns.²³ Upon arrival, the crew would submerge the empty vessel to a depth of up to 30 feet, where it could remain underwater for a period of three to four weeks while its crew was ashore carrying out their mission.²⁴

The two GIMIK boats were delivered to the OSS on 10 June 1945. Following delivery, they were used to train Project NAPKO crews at the OSS training facility at Catalina Island, off the coast of southern California.²⁵ The boats were assigned a staff of five US Navy personnel to operate and maintain; "Gizmo #1" "Gizmo #2" were piloted by ENS George McCullough and ENS Robert Mullen, respectively. Maintenance of both boats was the responsibility of Chief Machinist's Mate Carlos Sandoz, supported by two seamen whose names have been lost to history. Over the summer of 1945, NAPKO's GIMIK crews—with Korean operatives as passengers—made weekly runs to penetrate the harbor defenses of both Newport Beach and Los Angeles, remaining undetected every time. They also landed agents at Newport Beach and San Clemente during operational workups.²⁶

Preparations to execute NAPKO continued until the scheduled departure date of 26 August, when

Following the end of hostilities, the OSS was disbanded and both GIMIK boats were turned over to the US Navy.

Colonel Eifler and his teams were to depart for their overseas base, probably located at Naha, Okinawa.^{27,28} In summer 1945, Okinawa was the closest Allied-held territory to Japan; following occupation, it served as a major advance support base for Allied forces in preparation for the intended invasion of the Japanese mainland.

After arrival at Okinawa, Eifler and his Korean agents would board a US Navy submarine and rendezvous off the coast with GIMIK and its mothership, which had been previously staged at Okinawa for the operation. At the drop-off point, Eifler would presumably remain onboard the submarine while the agents would board a GIMIK boat and depart the mother submarine when it submerged beneath them, then head toward the landing site on the Korean coast. Japan's surrender announcement on 15 August 1945, of course, put an end to NAPKO's deployment.²⁹

Postwar

Following the end of hostilities, the OSS was disbanded and both GIMIK boats were turned over to the US Navy. ENS McCullough states in his memoir that both boats were last seen sitting on a dock at the US Naval facility at Naha, Okinawa. At least one GIMIK lay forgotten until it was found in 1972. Based on the 1986 *Warship International* article, it was originally thought that only this boat survived. Recent research, however, leads us to believe the other was in storage at the US Naval Base in Newport, Rhode Island. It is current-

ly unclear to the authors which boat is on display at Battleship Cove.

CIA's SKIFF Semi-submersible

After inheriting GIMIK, the Navy had no interest in further developing the project. Although the boats themselves were forgotten and abandoned, documentation pertaining to GIMIK and Project NAPKO was not. When the CIA was created in 1947, documents and records pertaining to the OSS were incorporated into the new agency's body of corporate knowledge. The documentation lay dormant for a few years then was resurrected by CIA's TSS/WAD (Technical Support Staff/Water-Air Division) sometime in the early 1950s. Two further craft, known by the project name of "SKIFF", were built by Trumpy Marine (formerly John Trumpy and Sons, by then relocated to Annapolis, Maryland). Both SKIFF prototypes were complete by 1953 and water-tested on Chesapeake Bay.

Even in the benign environment of the Chesapeake Bay, testing the SKIFF was a fairly dangerous operation. One might expect the greatest risk to come from the actual clandestine operation conducted while the SKIFF was secreted at the bottom of some remote cove (a notion reinforced by the provision of machine guns in the boats' loadout), but according to SKIFF Project Manager Dawson C. Smith, this was not the case. Rather, the SKIFF itself was dangerous, using, as it did, a gasoline engine rather than a diesel one. Gasoline fumes are heavier than

There was a moveable obstruction: the crewman, who was shot through the air. He went straight up, like a missile from a submarine.



SKIFF in trial run; undated CIA photograph.

air, whereas diesel fumes are lighter; thus, should a fuel leak occur in the SKIFF, gasoline fumes would settle in the bilge (lowest area of a boat) and collect there, producing a risk of explosion.

At the time it was constructed, all small marine engines were gas-powered; safer marine diesel engines would not take over the small marine engine market until the 1980s. Those involved in the SKIFF project developed procedures and provided warnings throughout the SKIFF's documentation to prevent a gas fume explosion. One procedure, for example, was to open valve #15 "for thirty seconds until the gas odor disappears," which caused compressed air to flush any fumes from the engine compartment through a tube that exited the boat.³⁰ As Smith explained, "I wrote the evaluation of the tests I ran on these submers-

ibles and recommended that they *not* (emphasis his) be used operationally, except for highly special missions. They were much too hazardous, even though technically remarkable."

During one test, a single crewman was in SKIFF, standing in the open deck hatch. Unbeknownst to all present, a fuel leak had occurred and fumes had gathered, but the crewman had neglected to turn valve #15. With the flip of a switch, the ignition of the engine, or some other spark-generating event, the fumes ignited. Due to the vessel's small size, there was little space for the explosion to expand—except for the open deck hatch. Thus, as powder ignited deep in the breech of a cannon that expands dramatically through the barrel, the force in the small SKIFF sought the open hatch—and, as with a cannon, there was a moveable obstruction: the crewman, who was shot

through the air. He went straight up, like a missile from a submarine, and eventually landed in the water nearby. Remarkably, he was plucked from the water unharmed, except that he had lost all his body hair. As Smith described the scene, other than his swim trunks, he was "nude as a sausage." Smith also noted how fortunate it was that he had been standing straight up and well centered in the opening, which was exactly the same width as his shoulders; if he had been lower, perhaps with one shoulder under one side of the opening, he "would have left more than his hair in the hatch."

Operational Mission Plans

A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) inquiry associated with this article provided no details on the intended missions and operational planning for this vessel. That SKIFF was intended for the same sort of mission as GIMIK is beyond dispute, and the fact that the boats' normal equipment loadout included two machineguns supports the notion that they were intended to operate in hostile waters.³¹ One SKIFF was kept on the US east coast, while the other was deployed to Far East (FE) Operations in Saipan.

Available evidence indicates SKIFF came close to operational use on at least two occasions. An internal CIA memorandum dated 18 August 1959, stated "One of these boats was shipped to FE for operational use. It is understood that it was never used operationally, and has since been scrapped in the field. The other boat has been stored and maintained by WAD (Water-Air Division) and

recommissioned on two occasions for actual operations. The boat was shipped to the field, but on both occasions, the operation was cancelled.”³²

One intriguing possibility that did appear in the FOIA documents was the title “Bay of Pigs,” which appeared at the top of an otherwise completely redacted briefing slide. There is currently no historical documentation available to support the notion that SKIFF was intended to support that operation, but—had it been used—it would likely have been well-suited for the task.

OSS GIMIK and CIA SKIFF Compared

In terms of actual design, GIMIK and SKIFF are almost identical in every respect, save a few small details. Their hulls, layout, and dimensions are virtually identical, visually distinguishable mainly by differing cockpit canopies, snorkels, and small external fittings.

Crew Compartment

The crew compartment is amidships (middle) with a bolted access hatch on the after (rear) bulkhead (wall) leading to the engine compartment. Access to the crew compartment is through a quick acting hatch operable from above or below. A Plexiglas dome is installed on SKIFF to provide vision for the operator is located in the after end; GIMIK utilizes a framed Plexiglas hood. A 34” and a 47” snorkel are provided for fresh air, the longer for operation in heavy seas (over six feet high). GIMIK has a single steel snorkel pipe.

SKIFF also appears to have come close to operational use, but at least two missions for which it was deployed were cancelled.

Engine Compartment

The engine compartment on both vessels contains the engine and battery with the gasoline tank at the after end. The engine is sealed in a large steel pipe with an access hatch in the upper surface. The forward end of this pipe forms part of the aft crew compartment bulkhead. The entire compartment is watertight, a critical aspect of the design since it protects the engine when the ballast and crew compartment are flooded and the vessel is cached (hidden) underwater, awaiting return of the operator and agents. The fuel tanks are aft of the engine, while a small stack aft of the cockpit provides both air intake and exhaust for the engine. The air pump is operated from a 3-belt V-type drive attached to the propeller shaft. Trim tanks are located at each end of the boat and can be operated while underway, the boat being designed to run awash.

Ballast Compartments

The ballast system has three components: the forward trim compartment, the main ballast compartment, and the after trim compartment. A ballast pump, belt-driven from the shaft, is located in the after end of the main compartment. The purpose was to admit sea water to increase its weight, which would cause it to settle lower in the water, changing the SKIFF from surfaced to semi-submerged mode. On each side of the engine compartment is an air flask for blowing ballast, thus raising it back to buoyant mode. A third air flask for purging explosive gases from the engine compartment is fitted in a wall at the after end of main ballast compartment. A watertight aluminum hatch

is fitted over the engine compartment on SKIFF; the hatch on GIMIK is made of steel.

Power Plant

SKIFF was powered by a Universal Atomic 4 gasoline engine. At 64.46 cubic inches and 25 horsepower, it was no “muscle machine.” The engine was, however, a reliable and proven four-cylinder engine that was used in close to 40,000 sailboats between 1947 and the end of production in 1984 (the author’s last sailboat was also equipped with one of these engines) and perhaps 20,000 are still in use today.³³ Another aspect that attracted the CIA was that the Atomic 4 was a descendent of the earlier Utility Four—used heavily by the US Navy during World War II, before it was replaced by the Atomic Four in 1947.³⁴ GIMIK was powered by a Gray Marine 4-cylinder very similar to the Atomic Four.³⁵

How They Worked


Both vessels were operated similarly, the primary difference being the type of mothership employed to transport them to their drop-off point. GIMIK was to have been transported by submarine while SKIFF was to have been carried on a surface ship, hidden on its deck. In both cases, the mothership transported the vessel to within 50 miles of the objective. GIMIK was launched by simply submerging the parent submarine to allow it to float off, while SKIFF was lowered into the water by a crane. The boat’s operator, one or two agents, and equipment would then motor off. If the risk of detection was

low, the boat could be operated in a surfaced mode, thereby increasing speed and range. If risk of detection was assessed to be high, the operator would trim the boat lower in the water to the point of running with its deck awash in a semi-submerged mode, which took about 14 minutes.

While underway, the operator had to monitor the attitude of SKIFF much as an aviator does an airplane. To ensure proper trim—neither up nor down at the bow, nor listing to port or starboard—he had to work a system of valves to shift water ballast between four trim tanks as needed. According to the manual, SKIFF had to be run between zero and two degrees “up” angle at the bow.³⁶




Once the crew and gear were unloaded on shore at the landing site, the operator would take SKIFF to a location offshore that was deep enough—up to a depth of 30 feet—that tidal variations would not permit its detection. The procedure to then secure SKIFF for caching underwater was a 19-step process.³⁷ Additional suggestions included securing a line to SKIFF and swimming ashore to then secure the other end with a spike, something of a Hansel-and-Gretel approach to finding one’s way home again, and to secure SKIFF to the bottom so it would still be there a month later.

To retrieve SKIFF from the bottom, someone had to jump in and swim down 30 feet without scuba gear, locate it, and raise it by purging water from the ballast tanks and crew compartment with compressed air from the tanks mounted in the stern. When SKIFF rose high enough for the crew hatch to be above water, the crew could re-enter, start the engine, and then make their way back to the



GIMIK (on top) comparison with SKIFF

Below: SKIFF’s three operational modes.

<p>Buoyant A mother ship would carry the CIA Semi-submersible Skiff to within 50 miles of the landing point and lower it into the sea. When the risk of detection was low the Skiff could be operated in buoyant mode, much like any small motor boat. In this mode it could travel 150 miles (round trip) with a cruising speed of 5 knots (6.5 mph) carrying an operator, two agents and 120 lbs. of equipment.</p>	 <p><i>Running in buoyant mode</i></p>
<p>Semi-submerged To avoid detection the Skiff could submerge by flooding the ballast and trim compartments with seawater until it flowed over the decks. In this mode travel was reduced to 110 miles with a cruising speed of 4.1 knots (4.7 mph). However, when running semi-submerged it was almost impossible to detect with eye or radar. The Skiff’s operating manual stated (for load calculation purposes) to allow 34 lbs. for two sub-machine guns.</p>	 <p><i>Running semi-submerged</i></p>
<p>Cached After the operator, two agents, and their gear were unloaded the Skiff could be hidden by flooding the crew compartment with seawater (Note the engine compartment is always dry). The Skiff would then sink to the bottom where it could remain for up to four weeks while the agents did there works of intrigue somewhere onshore. Anchors would be set to hold the Skiff in place so tides and currents wouldn’t sweep it away...so it would still be there when the agents returned for it. A diver would swim down to release air from a pressurized tank, thus pushing the water out and raise the Skiff to the surface for the return to the mother ship.</p>	 <p><i>Hidden under 30 feet of water</i></p>

OSS GIMIK and CIA SKIFF Specifications Compared		
	GIMIK	SKIFF
Builder	Almost certainly John Trumpy and Sons, Gloucester (Camden), New Jersey	Trumpy Marine, Eastport (Annapolis), Maryland
Length	19 feet, 2 inches	19 feet, 0.5 inches
Beam	5 feet, 3 inches	5 feet, 3 inches
Height	6 feet, 9 inches	6 feet, 9.5 inches
Displacement	3,650 lbs.	3,650 lbs.
Engine	Gray Marine 4-cylinder gasoline-type with Autolite sparkplugs, 25 h.p.	Universal Atomic 4, 25 h.p.
Performance		
Speed, surfaced	4.1 knots	5 knots
Speed, surfaced, emergency	unknown	5.3 knots
Speed, surfaced, economical	2.5 knots	5 knots
Speed, awash	4.7 knots	4.7 knots
Speed, awash, emergency	unknown	4.7 knots
Speed, awash, cruising	unknown	4.1 knots
Range, surfaced	unknown	150 nautical miles
Range, awash	110 nautical miles	110 nautical miles
Crew	1 agent-operator, plus 1 or 2 agent/passengers	1 agent-operator, plus 1 or 2 agent/passengers
Cargo	110 lbs. of equipment	120 lbs. of equipment

mothership—a trip that could take 10 hours or more.³⁸

Why were they not used?

All available documentation indicates that the NAPKO Project would have been executed and GIMIK would have been deployed in November of 1945 had the Second World War not ended when it did, two months before. SKIFF also appears to have come close to operational use, but at least two missions for which it was deployed were cancelled. Although technically feasible, SKIFF appears to have been

overtaken by technological advances in intelligence collection in the late 1950s as well as proven highly undesirable by basic safety considerations.

By the time SKIFF terminated as a program in 1959, Project AQUATONE, the U-2 aerial reconnaissance program, was already well-established, providing high-quality photographic intelligence of Soviet targets to US decisionmakers.³⁹ Project OXCART, CIA's A-12 developmental program to replace the U-2 (which would evolve into the US Air Force's SR-71) was also well underway.⁴⁰ Finally, CORONA, the United States's first successful photoreconnaissance satellite, would become operational

in 1960.⁴¹ Each of these carried a far lower level of risk (or so it was thought) of detection and compromise than would have been the case with SKIFF, and with the advent of CORONA, the inevitability of exposing a human operator to potential capture inside denied territory was rendered moot. And, when the need came for in/ex-filtration of human assets, it was hard to argue with the logistical, financial, and safety benefits of a rubber boat with an outboard motor.

Beyond potential operational security risks, the gasoline engines that powered both SKIFF and GIMIK presented inherent safety hazards to

their operators. The dangers posed by gasoline engines in a submarine operating environment had been well known since the first decade of the 20th century; by the First World War, most operational submarines were already diesel-powered.⁴² While the OSS may not have been aware of the dangers presented by gasoline engines in submersible craft, CIA certainly was, having learned this lesson the hard way, as mentioned above.

According to SKIFF Project Manager Dawson Smith, while the agency certainly took advantage of technology, often the best option was what was readily available to the public; such devices tended to be less expensive and less likely to draw attention. The table on the preceding page compares the characteristics of the semi-submersible SKIFF to those of the RB-12 (12' inflatable rubber boat) powered by an 18 HP Special Outboard engine. Though far less exciting, the RB-12 cost a fraction of the SKIFF, took less manpower to maintain, was easier to handle

during an operation, and, if seen by the public, would draw no interest because they were (and remain) commonplace. Then there was the near elimination of the risk of explosion. Granted, there were clear advantages to the semi-submersible such as crew's arriving warm and dry, but simple economic and safety concerns seem to have prevailed.

Lingering Questions

With publication of this article, GIMIK's identity and story is largely settled. Not so with SKIFF. Despite the wealth of technical information made available by CIA concerning SKIFF, remarkably little is known about its intended use. What were the specific missions for which SKIFF was deployed? Who were its intended operators—Americans or, as with GIMIK, nationals of the intended target country or of some other nation?

Finally, there remains the issue of accounting for all the vessels. We can

account for both SKIFFs: one was scrapped and the other preserved for posterity, at CIA. One last question remains concerning GIMIK, and that is the final disposition of the GIMIK craft that had reportedly been stored at Newport Naval Station but which seems to have disappeared from public sight.

Final Thoughts

GIMIK and CIA SKIFF represent an interesting era—actually two eras—in our nation's history: World War II and the Cold War, dangerous times with equally critical potential outcomes. And while many visitors to Battleship Cove or the CIA website see two odd, old wooden boats, they represent much more. These vessels are examples of American ingenuity, of pushing the bounds of what was possible at the time. They recall the heroism of American and Korean nationals who were willing to risk their own lives to affect the outcome of critical conflicts.



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“If the Weatherman Can...”: The Intelligence Community’s Struggle to Express Analytic Uncertainty in the 1970s

James Marchio

There “was a sense of general dissatisfaction with the level of ‘sophistication’ of intelligence production.”

—Andrew Marshall, 1971

When Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Lt. Gen. Samuel Wilson wondered why his analysts couldn’t address the likelihood of future outcomes in percentages as weather forecasters did, he spoke volumes about initiatives launched during the 1970s to more effectively express uncertainty in the Intelligence Community’s (IC) analytic products.

Spurred in part by general dissatisfaction at the time with the overall quality of intelligence provided to the White House and other senior officials, the IC’s efforts culminated in an “experiment” by DIA in January 1976 to incorporate percentages—reflecting the probability that a given judgment was valid—in two of its major product lines. Lessons from the IC’s and DIA’s struggle nearly four decades ago should be of considerable value today as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) revises IC Directive (ICD) 203 (*Analytic Standards*) and seeks better ways to convey analytic uncertainty about judgments in the community’s products.^{a1}

a. Currently the IC has no agreed upon definition for analytic uncertainty. *Wikipedia* defines “analytic confidence” as “a rating employed by intelligence analysts to convey doubt to decisionmakers about a statement of estimative probability.”

This article first examines the environment that pushed the IC to re-think its treatment of analytic uncertainty. It then explores DIA’s uncertainty experiment and its aftermath. The article concludes by discussing lessons offered by the IC’s 1970s experience.

The Environment

The Nixon White House’s dissatisfaction with the IC is well known. Some trace this troubled relationship to Nixon’s belief that his narrow defeat to John Kennedy in 1960 was partially due to intelligence estimates concerning the so-called missile gap.² Other consumers expressed dissatisfaction with the IC’s work for other reasons. For example, a March 1971 Office of Management and Budget study led by future Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James Schlesinger titled “A Review of the Intelligence Community” identified a number of problems. It asserted the IC’s analysis and production had failed to keep pace with gains in technical collection. Then DCI Richard Helms acknowledged there were grounds to criticize the IC’s performance on some issues, “especially for failure explicitly to acknowledge uncertainty (though for this consumers seldom show gratitude).”³

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Nixon's directive drove IC actions and programs for the next five years and shaped the environment in which the discussion of analytic uncertainty arose.

Andrew Marshall, a key member of Dr. Henry Kissinger's staff who later headed the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, noted there "was a sense of general dissatisfaction with the level of 'sophistication' of intelligence production." In fact, Marshall recalled that Kissinger once remarked that "analyses and commentaries in the newspapers were superior to anything he read in intelligence publications."⁴ President Nixon moved to address these perceived shortcomings in November 1971, issuing a directive covering the organization and management of the IC and noting "the need for an improved intelligence product and for greater efficiency in the use of resources allocated to intelligence is urgent."⁵

Nixon's directive drove IC actions and programs for the next five years and shaped the environment in which the discussion of analytic uncertainty arose. The directive laid out multiple objectives, including improving the "quality, scope and timeliness of the community's product."⁶

To advance these efforts, the directive established the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC—Andrew Marshall was made its chairman). The committee was to "give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer."⁷ The DCI was given additional community responsibilities and an augmented staff to discharge them.⁸

In the ensuing months, the DCI created the Product Review Group (PRG—renamed Product Review Division [PRD] in 1974) to undertake studies and conduct surveys to evaluate the quality of the community's intelligence products and their worth to the consumer.⁹

Consumer Dissatisfaction with IC's Treatment of Uncertainty

The way in which the IC conveyed analytic uncertainty became a key element in the overall effort to improve the quality of the IC's products and its analysis. Dissatisfaction with what consumers perceived as the IC's lack of analytic rigor and transparency, its presentation of unqualified conclusions, and its failure to quantify uncertainty contributed to the pressure that led to DIA's 1976 experiment with numeric probabilities.

As the head of the NSCIC, Andrew Marshall was one of the earliest and most vocal critics of IC treatment of analytic uncertainty. In a June 1973 memorandum to the heads of CIA, DIA, and the deputy director of central intelligence for the IC (D/DCI/IC) and others entitled "Displaying Uncertainty to Decisionmakers," he noted: "I remain interested in this method of analysis—especially improving the communication of appropriate levels of uncertainty in intelligence judgments. Current methods are unsatisfactory in my view."¹⁰ Beyond expressing his dissatisfaction with the IC's practices, Marshall forwarded a RAND paper

that described how uncertainty could be expressed using a variety of different, largely quantitative methods.¹¹

In commenting on Marshall's memorandum, the deputy chief of the PRG acknowledged past efforts by the IC and the PRG to address uncertainty:

This is a matter which has been discussed at one level or another in the intelligence community for more than ten years to my own knowledge, and some experimentation has taken place, but the results are not thus far impressive.... We attempted last year to get a PRG effort going on this problem, to no avail, but perhaps the time is ripe to form a working group and charge it with coming up with some recommendations for application standards and/or a community R&D effort which will result in a set of accepted probability applications and/or methods.¹²

Whether the PRG actually chartered a working group to address analytic uncertainty is unclear, but what is certain is that consumers—especially those in the Department of Defense—continued to express frustration with the IC's methods and called for change. The NSCIC's agenda for 1974 and 1975 included multiple sessions focused on analytic uncertainty. A draft PRD memorandum noted a potential agenda item for the November 1974 NSCIC session submitted by DoD on "Intelligence Uncertainty."¹³

In submitting the proposal, an assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs observed:

The consumer of most intelligence products dealing with complex subjects generally has an uneasy feeling about many of the unqualified conclusions or estimates that are often presented. He knows that we can't have high confidence in the answers to some of his questions. He would like a synopsis of the intelligence background and evidence or, if possible, a full scale development of them, so that he can draw his own conclusions. Where this is not possible...a well defined statement of the uncertainty is needed to permit the consumer to understand the uncertainty perceived by the intelligence analyst who made the estimate.¹⁴

The new year brought more calls for action. A February 1975 internal PRD memorandum to then D/DCI/IC General Wilson discussed potential NSCIC Working Group projects that again included “intelligence uncertainty,” attributing the proposal to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth.¹⁵ Ellsworth’s proposal was apparently advanced at the November 1974 Working Group session where he argued that “more qualifications and limitations should be applied to particular analytical judgments (i.e., measuring uncertainty).”¹⁶

In April, in providing comments on the first draft of an IC staff product *Review of National Intelligence*—a publication that included the results of PRD reviews of intelligence products—the same DoD officer who had proposed uncertainty as a topic for discussion the previous November remarked: “Very little or no attention is paid to the quality of

“Very little or no attention is paid to the quality of quantitative analysis or to the reporting on uncertainty. The whole style of the product evaluation is more journalistic than analytic.”

quantitative analysis or to the reporting on uncertainty. The whole style of the product evaluation is more journalistic than analytic.”¹⁷

How analytic uncertainty should be addressed was again a major topic of discussion at the May 1975 meeting of the NSCIC’s Working Group. Anthony Cordesman, chief of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Product Evaluation Division, forwarded extensive comments and suggestions pertaining to the problem of expressing uncertainty in intelligence estimates on behalf of the deputy secretary of defense.¹⁸ Cordesman went on at length about what he and Ellsworth saw as the shortcomings of IC products, noting they often failed to:

- *Explicitly state the limitations of the intelligence available or the methods of analysis used and present them in summary form for quick review. In many cases, even those limitations that are listed are buried in the text or listed only in footnotes or annexes.*
- *Explicitly describe the methodology used when hard intelligence data is lacking.*
- *Clearly distinguish reasonable conclusions or logical views from conclusions based on intelligence.*
- *Describe the uncertainty present in given data, methods of analysis, or conclusions.*

- *Quantify uncertainty...describe the method used to quantify uncertainty, or...show a range of numbers.*
- *List the explicit intelligence data on which a conclusion is based, and provide only a broad or vague rationale.¹⁹*

Cordesman concluded by stressing that the IC Staff paper apparently proposed to address these shortcomings “must not be generated in the form of a ‘broad brush’ treatment, or gloss over the problems involved.”²⁰

During the next six months analytic uncertainty continued to generate interest by the NSCIC and action by the IC Staff. A memorandum to General Wilson noted that as a follow-on action to a July NSCIC Working Group meeting, “we owe the Group one or two papers on the problem of quantifying uncertainties,” adding that “Ellsworth is especially interested in this.”²¹

In October, Cordesman reminded the IC Staff of Ellsworth’s interest in the topic and the importance of properly conveying analytic uncertainty:

I am certain that you both agree that the lack of proper uncertainty data represents a critical problem in current national intelligence production. In far too many cases, consumers have no way of knowing the reliability of the data they are given.²²

Cordesman suggested that it would be useful if the IC Staff could provide

The push to use numeric probabilities benefited as well from the promise of new social science techniques and the willingness to use them.

a progress report at the next meeting, in October, of the NSCIC Working Group, paying particular attention to the extent to which “explicit quantitative statements of uncertainty” were used in figures shown in the NIEs and other national-level products and whether “explicit summary statements of the major limitations and uncertainties in the intelligence” were included as well.²³

In preparing for the October meeting, the IC Staff advised General Wilson that the latest, 1975, version of NIE 11-3/8, *Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s*, reflected “considerable improvement” in expressing uncertainties.²⁴ The memorandum to the D/DCI/IC also noted that in response to his request the CIA’s deputy director for intelligence had launched a study on analytic uncertainty.²⁵

Other Factors Pushing for DIA Experiment

Some of the criticism voiced in the Working Group on the treatment of analytic uncertainty resonated with the community’s analysts and leaders. Sherman Kent’s “Words of Estimative Probability” and David L. Wark’s “The Definition of Some Estimative Expressions”—both published in the same 1964 edition of *Studies in Intelligence*—superbly captured this perennial challenge and how “poets” and “mathematicians” in the IC differed on how best to meet it.²⁶

In the decade following the Kent and Wark articles, one finds evidence

that efforts were made in IC products to quantify the probabilities associated with specific judgments.²⁷ However, the record shows that estimative language such as *probable*, *unlikely*, and *almost certain*—albeit aided by the work of Kent and Wark—remained the IC norm for expressing analytic uncertainty.²⁸ Nonetheless, one of the speakers at the August 1975 seminar “Intelligence Analysis Today in CIA” argued that “intelligence analysis would be improved if the analyst would make a greater effort to assess and express the probabilities he attaches to his analysis.”²⁹

The push to use numeric probabilities benefited as well from the promise of new social science techniques and the willingness to use them. *Studies in Intelligence* published two articles on the use of the Bayesian theory in one issue in 1972. The first, attributed to former intelligence analyst Jack Zlotnick, described the result of a study CIA had conducted on the use of the Bayes Theorem for intelligence analysis, in which he wisely observed, “The very best intelligence can do is to make the most of the evidence without making more of the evidence than it deserves.” The second, by Charles Fisk, a CIA economic analyst, described an experimental application of the theory in the case of the warning of a crisis in the Sino-Soviet relationship late in the 1950s.³⁰

Policymakers as well as IC members saw potential benefit from employing more rigorous methods.³¹ Andrew Marshall, for one, urged CIA analysts in an advanced intelligence seminar to try “new forms of presen-

tation and new techniques,” subsequently citing DIA’s own project in 1972 to produce an experimental product using Bayesian analysis.³²

CIA’s *Handbook of Bayesian Analysis for Intelligence Analysis*—published in June 1975—offers even better insight into the perceived value associated with these new methods. In identifying the capabilities and benefits provided by Bayesian statistics, the handbook noted:

*The use of quantified judgments allow the results to be displayed on a numerical scale, rather than through the use of terms like “probable,” “likely,” “unlikely,” or “possible.”...OPR’s [Office of Political Research in CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence] experience suggests that it is relatively easy to induce analysts accustomed to qualitative expressions of probability to shift to numerical assessments.”*³³

It is not surprising that the IC Staff provided the NSCIC Working Group members a copy of the *Handbook of Bayesian Analysis* following the October 1975 session.³⁴

DIA’s Uncertainty Experiment: Why DIA and What Did It Entail?

In addition to the foregoing pressures, the outlook and experience of DIA’s leadership were important factors in the agency’s decision to pursue an experiment in expressing analytic uncertainty. DIA’s director in the 15 months leading up to experiment in January 1976 was Lt. Gen. Danny Graham. Before taking command, General Graham had extensive

experience in drafting and directing intelligence estimates in Army intelligence, CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE), and DIA's Estimates Directorate.^a Graham's multiple assignments under Sherman Kent's tutelage at ONE made him familiar with the challenges of determining and conveying analytic uncertainty. Indeed Kent took note of Graham's decision to commit his agency to the use of his estimative vocabulary:

*The most willing followers of my recommended vocabulary were our military colleagues. Years later when the DIA reorganized its estimates work under General Daniel Graham, my table of values was printed on the inside cover of DIA estimates and the vocabulary rigorously used in the substance of the document.*³⁵

Graham received additional exposure to these ideas when he served as chief of the PRG and then as D/DCI/IC from May 1973 through September 1974.

Although neither of Graham's immediate successors shared his experience as an estimator, both were familiar with the problem of effectively conveying analytic uncertainty. Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., served as DIA's deputy director for 14 months before taking over as acting director from January through May 1976.³⁶ Tighe was also DIA's representative to NSCIC Working Group and had been involved in the

a. Graham served in Army's Estimates Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence as a major. He served in the Office of National Estimates from 1963 to 1965 and then again from mid-1968 until January 1970. Graham was DIA's deputy director for estimates through May 1973.

In January 1976 DIA launched the experiment with the objective of achieving "more precise statements of confidence and probability of intelligence judgments."

discussion of analytic uncertainty. General Wilson was similarly well acquainted with the IC's efforts to appropriately caveat its judgments.

Following his tour as DIA's deputy director for estimates, Wilson replaced Graham as the D/DCI/IC, serving in that position until he took over DIA in May 1976.³⁷ In a telephone interview with the author, General Wilson credited Graham with the idea for a DIA experiment, noting that both he and Graham were frustrated with the estimative terms used in most products and agreed that "if the weatherman could use numbers and be more precise," intelligence analysts could do better in this realm as well. He concluded that "if the analyst and estimator could be more precise in their judgments, consumers could have greater confidence in their assessments."³⁸

The most important and immediate factor leading to the experiment was the criticism of Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth, who, with Cordesman, had been a vocal critic of the IC's efforts in expressing analytic uncertainty.^b As noted in the August 1976 *Review of National Intelligence* article describing DIA's uncertainty experiment: "This experiment received its initial impulse from high-level DoD consumers—principally Deputy Secretary Ellsworth—who have repeatedly indicated dissatisfaction with vague language

b. General Wilson stressed during my phone interview the important role played by Anthony Cordesman of Ellsworth's staff in pushing for greater precision in the estimates coming from the IC.

of the 'it is believed...' or 'hostilities possibly will...' character."³⁹

In January 1976 DIA launched the experiment with the objective of achieving "more precise statements of confidence and probability of intelligence judgments." The trial run involved the incorporation of both percentages (e.g., 30%, 50%, 90%) and letters (A, B and C) in the texts of selected Defense Intelligence Notices (DINs) and Defense Intelligence Appraisals and some Defense Intelligence Estimates. (See sample on next page.) The percentages reflected the probability that a given judgment was valid; the letters represented the analyst's confidence in the source material: A= high confidence; B = medium; C = Low.⁴⁰

At the end of the trial, 750 DIN readers were asked about the usefulness of the experiment; 128 responses were received from a broad spectrum of DoD consumers. A majority favored the use of quantified expressions of probability, believing that they helped to increase their confidence in the information provided and in DIA's judgment and, in particular, helped to give greater credibility to briefings based on the DIA material.⁴¹ However, there was "little enthusiasm for the alphabetized expressions of confidence in sources" and "the respondents as a group indicated that expressions of uncertainty would be most useful in current intelligence, somewhat less so in estimative intelligence, and of least value in basic intelligence."⁴²

Based on the survey results, in July 1976 DIA began to quantify the

Opening page of DIA, *Military Significance of Soviet Developed Facilities in Somalia*, 20 February 1976, DIE SOV 2-76.

~~SECRET~~

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET
DEVELOPED FACILITIES IN SOMALIA (U)

This estimate assesses trends in the establishment of Soviet-developed facilities in Somalia, their future expansion and significance in terms of general Soviet interests in the area, and the probable impact they will have on the Soviet military presence in the area.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. (S) A July 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and other agreements concluded at that time apparently have formed the basis for the expansion of Soviet activities in Somalia. The Soviets have acquired special access rights to Somali facilities, including the strategically located port of Berbera.

B. (S) Despite countervailing external pressures on Somali President Siad, the Soviet presence will almost certainly continue (90 percent chance). We expect construction in Somalia for Soviet Navy use to be concentrated at Berbera, where anticipated expansion may include secure and exclusive military berthing and repair facilities for Soviet naval units separate from the commercial port.

Declassified and available in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, Vol. E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973–76, Doc. 155.

probability (in percentages) of all major judgments and projections in DINs but dropped the alphabetized evaluation of sources. It also decided to experiment with similar procedures for selected order-of-battle products and Defense Intelligence Estimates.⁴³ This practice continued at least through August 1977 and probably in some fashion for at least another two years.⁴⁴

The evidence available suggests that some consumers were pleased with the change. A May 1978 OMB report on intelligence production

and customer satisfaction noted that Office of Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs customers singled out DIA's "use of quantitative confidence statements" as one element of support worthy of praise.⁴⁵

Beyond the changes in its product lines, DIA also had the Defense Intelligence School and the Intelligence Community's Information Science Center, located in CIA's Office of Training, develop courses for its personnel in the assessment and expression of uncertainty. This training, which covered theory and practice,

was intended to provide analysts and supervisors with "greater confidence and consistency in the use of expressions of uncertainty."⁴⁶

A year later the Information Science Center announced a new course called "Statistical Concepts for Analysts and Managers." According to the course description, topics covered included descriptive statistics, combinatorial analysis, probability, confidence interval estimation, hypothesis testing, Bayesian analysis, probability diagram construction, and use of decision trees.⁴⁷ A DIA graduate of the course confirmed that the training was geared toward helping analysts and managers apply numerical estimates to their judgments.⁴⁸ A CIA graduate of the course agreed with that description but observed that on returning to his office he found no support for the application of anything taught in the program to the political analysis in which he was engaged. That latter reaction would be a harbinger of the experiment's future.⁴⁹

Why Did It End?

Although the definitive answer has yet to emerge from the archives, among the most important factors bringing the experiment to an end was the departure of officials who had pushed strongly for greater precision in conveying analytic uncertainty. The abolishment of the NSCIC in 1976 and the departure of critical consumers and leaders like Ellsworth in January 1977 and General Wilson seven months later undoubtedly reduced the impetus for and receptivity to such efforts.⁵⁰

In fact, consumer surveys and IC studies conducted at the time suggested that many consumers did not

consider the use of numeric probabilities a critical issue. According to an April 1977 Center for the Study of Intelligence monograph—based on interviews with 97 consumers and producers—there

did not appear to be much concern with the present style of estimative writing, or with the lack of some explicit scale of probabilities. The use of traditional expressions such as “probably,” “likely,” and so forth seemed satisfactory, though they admittedly do not convey the same meaning to all readers.

The study concluded:

The experimental efforts to provide explicit quantitative rating scales for probability apparently have not struck any very responsive chord with users. They were never mentioned as examples to be emulated.⁵¹

The challenges associated with quantifying uncertainty also may have contributed to DIA’s decision and the reluctance in the IC to regularly employ numeric probabilities. General Tighe, DIA’s director from September 1977 to August 1981, likely spoke for many when commenting about a paper on the explicit expression of uncertainties prepared for the NSCIC in 1975, he expressed his skepticism that “it could be done or would be useful.”⁵²

Don Mathis, a DIA analyst who produced DINs during this period, voiced similar sentiments, acknowledging that “putting percentages on judgments did not always work well.” Mathis attributed this to insufficient training in some cases and the failure to consistently track the

accuracy of analytic judgments, an element essential to providing valid probability or confidence assessments.⁵³

Others were concerned that the use of percentages and “over-reliance on new techniques” in writing estimates might imply greater precision in judgments than the facts warranted.⁵⁴ Several analysts involved in DIA’s experiment warned that “the statement of percentages could convey to at least some readers a degree of precision not justified by the data at hand or the subjective nature of an analyst’s ‘hunch’ regarding future events.”⁵⁵ Similarly, even Bayesian advocates acknowledged: “An ever-present danger, however, is the tendency to attribute more precision to the numbers than is warranted, and it should be stressed that the numbers are always only approximations.”⁵⁶

Finally, the IC was preoccupied with issues other than analytic uncertainty in the late 1970s. Its agenda during this period was dominated by fallout from the Church and Pike Committee hearings and budget cuts. These same years witnessed a rash of foreign policy crises—from the collapse of South Vietnam, growing unrest in Eastern Europe and turmoil in Iran to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—all of which further distracted the IC from analytic trade-craft issues.

Expressing Uncertainty in the Ensuing Decades

The end of the experiment neither ended the debate within the IC nor consumer demand for better expressions of probability. For example, in December 1978, DCI Stansfield Turner sent a memorandum to the CIA’s Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment—the CIA/DDI’s name during part of the Carter administration—addressing an academic’s recommendation to introduce probabilities into NIEs. Turner wrote that he and the deputy director needed to convey that “we’re trying to bring out uncertainties as much as produce categorical predictions if we force the use of probabilities no matter how subjective.”⁵⁷

Four years later the national intelligence officer (NIO) for general purpose forces sent a copy of Sherman Kent’s 1964 article “Words of Estimative Probability” to the chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) that he had cited at a NIC staff meeting. In the cover note the NIO remarked,

The charts on page 55 [reproduced below] and [page] 59 came for a time to represent general guidance for drafters and negotiators of estimates. My impression is that the “poets” have returned to the ascendancy in the estimates business in more recent years,

100 % Certainty			
General Area of Possibility	93 %	give or take about 6 %	Almost Certain
	75 %	give or take about 12 %	Probable
	50 %	give or take about 10 %	Chances about even
	30 %	give or take about 10 %	Probably not
	7 %	give or take about 5 %	Almost certainly not
0 % Impossibility			

leaving their “mathematician” colleagues in the shade.

The NIO, however, concluded by citing a DIA publication that demonstrated that “quantification remains a popular art.”⁵⁸

Some organizations and topics seemed more amenable to quantifying probabilities than others. The July 1983 NIE, *The Soviet Space Program*, is a case in point. In its scope note, the NIE warned consumers that “we have judged the likelihood of various Soviet space developments as ranging from very low to very high.” The note went on to explain that these judgments would be stated in terms of probability of occurrence and would be done in accordance with a five-step scale ranging from “Very Low = less than 10 percent” to “Very high = more than 90 percent.”⁵⁹

Most assessments in the 1990s continued to employ estimative language to address analytic uncertainty, but several used “bettor’s odds” or percentages to express the probability or likelihood of a key judgment. At least four NIEs between 1992 and 1994, including high-profile products on Croatia, Iraq, and Russia, conveyed key judgments with such odds.⁶⁰

The 9/11 attacks and the IC’s failure to correctly assess weapons of mass destruction in Iraq two years later re-energized the issue of expressing analytic uncertainty. The WMD Commission’s March 2005 report made clear that the IC needed to do better in this area. In finding 6, the report cited the failure of analysts to “adequately state the basis for or the assumptions underlying their most critical judgments” concluding that “this analytic shortcoming is one that we have seen in our other studies

What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language

We use phrases such as *we judge*, *we assess*, and *we estimate*—and probabilistic terms such as *probably* and *likely*—to convey analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are not facts, proof, or knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on collected information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on previous judgments. In all cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have “proof” that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.

In addition to conveying judgments rather than certainty, our estimative language also often conveys 1) our assessed likelihood or probability of an event; and 2) the level of confidence we ascribe to the judgment.

Estimates of Likelihood. Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic language to reflect the Community’s estimates of the likelihood of developments or events. Terms such as *probably*, *likely*, *very likely*, or *almost certainly* indicate a greater than even chance. The terms *unlikely* and *remote* indicate a less than even chance that an event will occur; they do not imply that an event will not occur. A term such as *might* reflects situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally because relevant information is unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as *we cannot dismiss*, *we cannot rule out*, or *we cannot discount* reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose consequences are such that it warrants mentioning. The chart provides a rough idea of the relationship of some of these terms to each other.

Remote	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Even chance	Probably Likely	Very Likely	Almost certainly

Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe *high*, *moderate*, or *low* levels of confidence to our assessments, as follows:

- *High confidence* generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong.
- *Moderate confidence* generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
- *Low confidence* generally means that the information’s credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.

as well, such as Iraq, and it points to the need to develop routine analytic practices for quantifying uncertainty and managing limited collection.”⁶¹

Soon after the NIC began including in estimates the now well-known *What We Mean When We Say* textbox (above), which explains the paper’s estimative language.

Calls for change came from elsewhere within and outside the IC. Steven Rieber, in a paper titled “Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence” presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, provided an insightful look at the community’s struggle with the problem. His examination pointed out that despite sporadic attempts at standardization, the IC had never

reached agreement and thus the problem of how to minimize or eliminate miscommunication in intelligence products remained unsolved.⁶²

Rieber’s proposals received further attention within the ODNI’s Office of Analytic Integrity & Standards in 2007 and 2008, when standards for assigning uncertainty were drafted but ultimately were never approved for IC policy. The 2011 National Research Council Report for the Director of National Intelligence on ways to improve US intelligence analysis drew additional attention to how analytic uncertainty should be conveyed. The report recommended that the IC routinely evaluate the performance of its analytic methods, urging it to “attach whenever possible numeric probabilities with uncertainty

estimates for the events that analysts assess and forecast.” Continuing, the report warned

*Without explicit quantifiers, analysts cannot communicate their conclusions clearly or evaluate the accuracy of their analyses over time. Policymakers need to know how confident analysts are and how well they understand the limits to their knowledge.*⁶³

Partially in response to these kinds of pressures, the ODNI launched in 2010 an experimental “prediction market,” both to engage a wider range of analysts and to test the utility of a system that offers a kind of precision in estimative outcomes.⁶⁴

Lessons for Today

The historical record shows that effectively conveying analytic uncertainty has always been difficult. Many of the challenges faced by the ODNI staff and IC members remain largely unchanged four decades later. Lack of agreement on the meaning of estimative terms and debate over whether words or numeric probabilities are the best way to express analytic uncertainty continue within the IC. Even the arguments for and against quantifying the likelihood associated with judgments are virtually the same. To use Sherman Kent’s characterization of competing camps, the “poets” continue to warn of conveying false precision while the “mathematicians” stress the clarity in using numeric probabilities.

The NSCIC’s vigorous examination of how best to convey analytic uncertainty and DIA’s experiment with numeric probabilities also suggest that the manner in which analytic uncertainty is conveyed

Ultimately the IC’s experience of the 1970s reminds us there are no “silver bullets” or one-size-fits-all solutions.

should be flexible, driven by the nature of issues addressed, the types of judgments advanced, and consumer requirements and preferences. The historical record as well as recent doctrinal publications demonstrate that, in general, DoD intelligence consumers are more supportive of efforts to convey estimates of analytic uncertainty in numeric terms than are other consumers of intelligence.⁶⁵ At the same time the experience of the 1970s highlights the need for a common and intuitively clear lexicon for the IC products. The NIC’s *What We Mean When We Say* has served NIE consumers well since its introduction in 2005.

The ODNI is now revising ICD 203 (*Analytic Standards*). A major element of the revision addresses expression of analytic uncertainty. ODNI has proposed to incorporate a “likelihood” spectrum in the revised ICD that would include the option to use numeric probabilities or commensurate estimative language. This adaptation of Sherman Kent’s probabilities table (page 37) would provide an IC-wide lexicon and the flexibility to address varied requirements and consumer preferences.⁶⁶

DIA’s experiment and interest in and use of Bayesian analysis in the 1970s also reinforces the point that structured analytic techniques can help, but they are not a panacea nor are they appropriate or desired in every instance. Thus, application of methods like prediction markets should be supported, but they are only one part of what should be a larger IC effort to better express analytic uncertainty.

Ultimately the IC’s experience of the 1970s reminds us there are no “silver bullets” or one-size-fits-all solutions. As the IC Staff advised General Wilson in October 1975, the “D/DCI/IC should promise to keep at the problem, but warn the Working Group that there will never be a single, perfect key to fit all types of intelligence products.”⁶⁷

Still, certain verities continue to hold true:

- The IC has a responsibility to continuously seek better ways to convey analytic uncertainties and their bases.
- “Poets” and “mathematicians” can argue about estimative expressions, but identifying the bases for judgments and the underlying uncertainties is most important.
- Tradecraft, including the identification and evaluation of basic assumptions, the assessment of the nature and quality of sources, and the search for alternative hypotheses, must not be overlooked.

IC analysts may never be able to convey all their judgments with the precision of weather forecasters, but current consideration of revisions to ICD 203 provide an opportunity to bring Sherman Kent’s vision of uniform, clearly understood means of expressing estimative probability to fruition and improve the IC’s ability to accurately convey its analytic judgments.



Acknowledgments:

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A Most Wanted Man: the Movie

Directed by Anton Corbijn, screenplay by Andrew Bovell, 2015, 122 min.

Reviewed by James BurrIDGE and John Kavanagh

A Most Wanted Man is the eighth John le Carré novel adapted for the screen; the ninth, *Our Kind of Traitor*, is scheduled for cinematic release in 2015. In addition, the BBC produced three Masterpiece Theatre miniseries: *Tinker, Tailor, Smiley's People*, and *A Perfect Spy*. Philip Seymour Hoffman's wonderful performance as a world-weary Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, the German Federal Intelligence Agency) case officer is in the tradition of Richard Burton and Sir Alec Guinness in other adaptations.

The film is actually better than the book. The novel follows the well-established le Carré formula: a burned out German case officer tries to do the right thing but is ultimately betrayed by his own managers, who are seduced by the power and money of the CIA. There is also the de rigueur assertion that HUMINT is the only worthwhile intelligence discipline; here, the technical intelligence disciplines produce "fodder" without the clarifying human asset.

Günther Bachmann, the veteran BND case officer managing a dedicated counterterrorism operations team in Hamburg, has set his sights on Dr. Abdullah, a charismatic imam suspected of funneling funds to terrorists through a Yemeni shipping company. Drawing on his network of established informants and newly recruited assets, Bachmann sets in motion a chain of carefully orchestrated "small fish luring big fish" steps designed to put Abdullah in such a compromised position that he must become an asset himself.

From the outset of the operation, Bachmann is dueling with the BND's rival service, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). Their parallel pursuit of Abdullah exemplifies the classic conflict between intelligence and law enforcement: intelligence wants to exploit the individual until he can no longer provide new information, while law enforcement prefers to take expeditious and conclusive action, break down doors, and spirit away hooded suspects. In the limited

grace period in which he has to execute his plan, Bachmann's talented team—employing traditional streetcraft and surveillance tactics—moves the operation steadily forward, complemented by Bachmann's own asset handling skills. He demands, coerces, praises, and even plays the sensitive father figure to a reluctant asset, convincing the young man to betray his true father. In his dealings with his own team, Bachmann again displays his mastery of human nature: he is a passionate, confidence-building leader who trusts his team's tradecraft and judgment. His regard and affection for his colleagues is palpable.

Two speeches in the book are completely or partially omitted from the movie. In the book, Bachmann delivers a lecture—known in the BND as "the Bachmann cantata"—to his team that relates German foreign policy, German intelligence shortfalls, counterterrorism, and the post-9/11 operational environment. It is a terrific piece of writing, and sadly, in the movie, only a fragment of it survives, and it is delivered instead to attendees of a joint BND-BfV-CIA operational planning meeting.

The other omission is a wise one. In the book, after the CIA has snatched the Chechen and Abdullah, a minor CIA character delivers an obscenity-filled end-zone dance of a speech to Bachmann. He crows that the Chechen and Abdullah are now in for American justice—torture, no lawyers, "justice as retribution." It shows le Carré's complete lack of faith in his readers. It's as if he's saying, "You perhaps didn't get it—that the CIA is a renegade service staffed by brutal and crude people—so I'm going to spell it out for you."

This film, with its realistic depictions of tradecraft and meticulous operational planning, would be a worthy addition to CIA training courses. The opaque nature of liaison relationships is also on display. In addition, Bachmann's creative management of his limited resources would complement leadership and management training. Finally, le Carré's novels and the films adapted from them have had a profound impact on the CIA's public image, here

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and abroad. This film and the latest revelations about CIA activities in Germany likely will merge in the public consciousness, and for many, the film's main CIA character—an arch, stiletto-sharp, malevolent female case officer who ultimately reverses Bachmann's tactical victory—will, for a time, be the face of the CIA.



A Cruel and Shocking Act: The Secret History of the Kennedy Assassination

Philip Shenon. (Henry Holt, 2013), 625 pp., bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey

“Within hours of the return of the President’s body to Washington, evidence about the assassination began to disappear from the government’s files.” So begins *A Cruel and Shocking Act*, a detailed and insightful history of the most renowned entity ever to investigate the murder of President John F. Kennedy, the Warren Commission. a Philip Shenon, a New York Times reporter and author of a book on the 9/11 Commission, gives a comprehensive rundown of the commissioners, their staffs, and how they dealt with the facts and conspiracy theories surrounding the Kennedy assassination. He does a better job than most of sticking to the topic (with one big exception), limiting the tangents many authors succumb to when writing about the assassination. In the process, he leads this reader to conclude the commission did an adequate, if not necessarily thorough, job in concluding Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone gunman, finding “no evidence” of a conspiracy.

The book relies on interviews with the younger staffers of the commission, many of whom, unlike their commission bosses, were still alive during the drafting of the book. These staffers are critical of the commissioners, some of whom are depicted as either lazy or stupid while the staffers are the real brains and principled souls behind the investigation. The commissioners naturally are not in print to defend their actions. Arlen Specter’s accounts come off as especially smug, with him taking cheap shots at Allen Dulles as a foolish, doddering old man. Specter describes Warren as “not much of a lawyer, and not even really smart.” The book at times reflects the view of young men frustrated with the actions of politically and socially constrained Commissioners.

a. The Warren Commission was a seven-member bipartisan board including the chief justice of the United States, Earl Warren; two members each from the Senate and House of Representatives, Richard Russell, John Sherman Cooper, Hale Boggs, and Gerald Ford; and former banker-diplomat John McCloy and former DCI Allen Dulles.

President Johnson viewed these commissioners as vital to countering conspiracy theories, which only proliferated when nightclub owner Jack Ruby shot Oswald two days after the assassination. The president urged Earl Warren to head the commission, telling the Supreme Court chief justice its work would help avert a world war, presumably by finding no foreign conspiracy. The book underscores how Johnson also saw the commission as a way to preempt Congressional hearings that would only inflame an already volatile situation.^b The commission was given a tight deadline, the better for Johnson and his administration and the nation to move on.

Even without Congressional hearings, the commission still competed against other investigations, with each separate inquiry affecting the work of the other. Shenon notes how commission members initially hoped to act as a coordinating body for other government investigations, but they decided to do some of their own detective work once its members suspected the FBI and CIA either were withholding information or could do so undetected. Commission members made a point of examining and sometimes responding in the finished report to press articles claiming to uncover the latest conspiracy, written by reporters who suspected the commission was a white-wash. It really irked members that William Manchester was getting more cooperation than Warren ever did from Jacqueline Kennedy and Robert Kennedy for his authorized book on the assassination.

As the opening sentence in *A Cruel and Shocking Act* warns us, the bureaucratic impulse towards self-preservation proved shockingly immediate and durable. The FBI and CIA tried to limit the release of information detailing

b. Considering how the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1979 that there was a “probable conspiracy,” despite being unable to determine its nature and its participants, President Johnson’s decision appears farsighted.

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how both agencies had Oswald under surveillance and yet he was still able to kill the president. Only hours after Oswald was shot, the chief of the FBI Dallas office ordered one of his agents to destroy a note from Oswald delivered in person in early November telling the agents to leave his wife alone. The CIA chief of station in Mexico City, Winston Scott, revealed in his draft memoir keeping a good deal of information from the commission, including his suspicion Oswald was an agent for the Soviets or Cubans. (544) Deputy Director Richard Helms instructed his staff to give direct answers to direct questions and to not volunteer anything. DCI McCone, Helms, and Allen Dulles failed to disclose CIA plots to kill Castro—Helms later said this was the White House’s responsibility. This nondisclosure avoided a line of inquiry possibly suggesting the Kennedy brothers and the CIA compelled the Cuban leader to take preemptive lethal action.^a

Finger-pointing aimed at receiving favorable treatment in the commission report was another effective means of bureaucratic self-preservation. The Dallas police were quick to blame their inability to protect the President and Oswald on the FBI, claiming an FBI agent told a Dallas police officer hours after the assassination the FBI suspected Oswald was capable of such a thing. FBI officers were not shy about expressing frustration about the Dallas police’s poor protection of Oswald. Secret Service officers, whose drinking the night before made headlines, blamed the FBI for not warning them about Oswald’s presence in Dallas.

The CIA comes off relatively unscathed in the commission report, an impression Shenon seeks to correct in the last part of the book. “Senior US officials, most especially at the CIA, have lied about the assassination and the events that led to it...and bear special responsibility for the conspiracy theories that are likely to plague us forever.” Besides naming Helms for not telling the commission about the plots to kill Castro, Shenon cites James Angleton, CIA’s counterintelligence chief, for seizing Scott’s draft memoir. Angleton also refused to look into a “twist party” in Mexico City allegedly attended by Oswald, with a guest list including a Mexican woman and leftist sympathizer, Silvia Duran, who worked in the Cuban consulate. (555)

The twist partly appears to be Shenon’s major contribution to our knowledge of Oswald’s circumstances. And it is here where the author goes off on a tangent, from Ruby and his ties to the mafia or Cuban intelligence re-directing its surveillance towards Dallas hours before the assassination. In this case, a number of the guests insist Oswald was at the party, even going as far to claim Kennedy’s assassin was having an affair with Duran. Shenon suggests an American diplomat was run out of the Foreign Service after pressing for an investigation of this matter. Other requests to look into it were turned down.

These “Oswald was seen in the company of...” sightings are a staple of many Kennedy assassination books. The assumption implicit in these examples is that Oswald was some passive recruit of Havana or Moscow. However, Oswald was not some easy mark under the control of communist handlers. He actively tried to work for the Soviets or live in Cuba and help consolidate the revolution. He was probably with these people at the party to ingratiate himself with Castro sympathizers, not the other way around. He was a wanna-be, and read lots of Marxist texts while in the marines.

And like the authors of many of these tangents, Shenon is unable or perhaps reluctant to tell the reader the implications of the new information or its cover-up. Assuming the counter-factual, with Helms and Angleton revealing to the commission and future investigations all the CIA knew about murder plots against Castro or the company Oswald kept, it is hard to tell what difference it would make to the enduring verdict Oswald was the sole gunman. Shenon himself credits commission member Gerald Ford with debunking most theories by examining the Oswald as a “plant” idea integral to most conspiracies. Oswald could not have been a plant because he got the job at the Dallas Book Depository through a family friend and just happened to be assigned to work at the Dealey Plaza location, one of two warehouses. All this happened weeks before the announcement of a Texas trip for Kennedy and months before the addition of Dallas to the itinerary. Oswald got lucky, being in the right place at the right time to kill the president. A disconcerting verdict like this is bound to dismay some researchers, as Shenon suggests, as long as new, previously hidden, information surfaces.

In short, the book is a jumble of findings despite Shenon’s best efforts to delineate information found in the commission report, its supporting documents, subsequent authors’ discoveries, and his own discoveries.



a. Reaction in CIA to the assassination is discussed in David Roberge, “Death of a President: DCI John McCone and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy,” in *Studies in Intelligence* 57, No. 3 (September 2013), slightly redacted and approved for release on 2014/09/29 and located in <https://www.cia.gov/library/foia>.

Russian Roulette: How British Spies Thwarted Lenin's Plot for Global Revolution

Giles Milton. (Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 378 pp., illustrations, maps

Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

In *Russian Roulette*, Giles Milton provides an entertaining and well-researched introduction to the “Great Game” between Great Britain and the Soviet Union during the last years of WW I and the early years of the Bolshevik Revolution. Milton is a prolific writer of histories that center on the activities of individuals—for example, *Nathaniel's Nutmeg: Or the True and Incredible Adventures of the Spice Trader Who Changed the Course of History* (1999), *Samurai William: The Englishman Who Opened Japan* (2011), and many in between. But this is his first foray into the world of intelligence operations. Overall, it is an excellent work, one that should be considered for any intelligence officer's personal library.

As we enter the centenary of the beginning of WW I and approach that same milestone for the Russian Revolution, a number of books have been published about the war and the intelligence operations of allies and adversaries on all fronts. Milton's work fits easily in this genre as he describes British intelligence operations through the period—first, those designed to keep the Russians in the war against Germany, and second, those that supported White Russian forces fighting the Bolsheviks after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. Still later, these operations would involve a mix of collection, covert action and paramilitary disruption operations against the Communist International (COMINTERN), actions Milton describes at the culmination of his book. The British operations were designed to combat the COMINTERN's stated plan to expand beyond Central Asia into South Asia and to eventually destroy British political and military control of all Southwest and South Asia.

Russian Roulette is at its best when Milton focuses on the UK's audacious intelligence operations in Russia proper—especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow. The book begins with a vignette suggesting direct British involvement in the murder of Grigori Rasputin in December 1916 and describing the cover-up by both the British

and the Russian Imperial governments that followed. For details of this case, Milton draws on Richard Cullen's *Rasputin: The Role of Britain's Secret Service in his Torture and Murder*,^a which used forensic sciences to create a plausible argument for British involvement at a time when London was concerned that its Russian ally was near collapse.

Following this chapter of true cloak-and-dagger, Milton takes the reader through a brief description of the British Secret Service (MI6) during WW I, its charismatic and eccentric commander, Mansfield Cummings, and the team he assembled to collect political and military intelligence in Russia as the Imperial government collapsed and the revolution began in earnest. Each chapter contains one outrageous tale after another of British officers assigned to St. Petersburg (soon to be Petrograd) and Moscow, including well-known characters such as Sidney Reilly and Robert Bruce Lockhart,^b and some less well known (at least to this reviewer), such as George Hill, Arthur Ransome, and Paul Dukes.^c

While Lockhart and Ransome used their true identities throughout the revolution, Reilly, Hill, and Dukes used multiple identities, multiple safe houses, and passports from several different countries to conduct collection operations as the newly established Soviet secret police hunted them. Probably the most amazing discussion of these operations is the story of Dukes's exfiltration from

a. Richard Cullen, *Rasputin: The Role of Britain's Secret Service in his Torture and Murder* (Dialogue Books, 2010).

b. For details on Lockhart and Reilly, see Robin Bruce Lockhart's *Reilly: Ace of Spies* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1967) or Andrew Cook's *Ace of Spies: The True Story of Sidney Reilly* (History Press, 2004).

c. Sir Paul Dukes, *Red Dusk and the Morrow: Adventures and Investigations in Red Russia* (Doubleday, 1922).

the Russian coast by a motor boat, involving multiple couriers, chance encounter, and his eventual recovery.

Milton demonstrates his scholarship in the chapter on British covert support to the White Russians, a program that was part of a larger effort to defeat the Red Army and support regional resistance leaders in states trying to establish themselves after the war. For this chapter, Milton's extensive research started with a report from the Imperial War Museum and moved to detailed work in the British National Archives in Kew, where he went through nine file collections from the War Office, covering the years 1919–20. Among other things, he learned the program included delivery of chemical weapons to the White Russians. As minister of war, Churchill had authorized the delivery of an arsenic-based gas weapon known as the "M Device." Milton describes the delivery of 2,718 separate chemical devices in a single month (from August to September 1919) and the results reported through British military intelligence officers assigned to the White Army.

Russian Roulette is less successful in describing British intelligence operations in Central Asia. Milton focuses his attention almost exclusively on the operations of a famous Indian Army officer, Frederick Bailey, who traveled to Tashkent to determine if the Soviet government in "Turkestan" would be a threat to British India. Once in Tashkent, Bailey determined the Soviet commissars were hostile to Britain, and he used multiple identities to obtain intelligence on COMINTERN efforts to equip and train an Indian resistance force under the command of Manabendra Nath Roy. While the details in *Russian Roulette* are well written and the COMINTERN operations well researched, Milton's work in these chapters is less detailed than Peter Hopkirk's seminal works, *Setting the East Ablaze* and *On Secret Service East of Constantinople*.^a In the second, Hopkirk describes an equally important part of the MI6-COMINTERN conflict in Baku, which involved another British Indian Army intelligence officer, Reginald Teague-Jones, who had to live under the assumed name of Ronald Sinclair for the rest of his life as a result of his actions.^b

Milton uses his closing chapters to demonstrate how the operations of British intelligence officers in the early days of the Russian revolution resulted in a strategic success for London as it negotiated with the Soviet Union during the 1920s. Soviet economic failures in the 1920s forced the Kremlin to negotiate with the British for economic assistance, and the British were able to use intelligence from Dukes, Hill, and Bailey to demand a quid pro quo from the Soviets—shutdown of COMINTERN support for Indian resistance training in Tashkent. The detailed intelligence reports allowed the British to come to the negotiating table with powerful evidence to force the Soviets to end their plans to undermine British authority in South Asia.

Milton's book is an excellent introduction to the conflict between the United Kingdom and the early Soviet Union. The book is filled with stories underscoring the courage and intrepidity of British agents and the commitment of MI6 to defeat the Bolshevik threat. *Russian Roulette* has excellent endnotes and a very detailed bibliography, so further academic research on this era will be easy to accomplish for any intelligence professional. For individuals interested in early 20th century history of European intelligence and those not familiar with this era of the *Great Game*, Milton has done a great service.



a. Peter Hopkirk, *Setting the East Ablaze* (Oxford University Press, 1986) and *On Secret Service East of Constantinople* (Oxford University Press, 1994).

b. Reginald Teague-Jones and Peter Hopkirk, *The Spy Who Disappeared* (Gollancz, 1991).

Intelligence in Public Literature

Mission R&AW

R.K. Yadav (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2014), 543 pp.

Reviewed by Ryan Shaffer, PhD

In this book, R.K. Yadav, a former R&AW officer who joined the agency in 1973, examines the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) of India's foreign intelligence agency. He writes of R&AW from first-hand experiences and through recollections of conversations with senior agency leaders. He reviews the history of India's external intelligence since Indian independence, and he argues that R&AW now needs reform because the quality of its intelligence has diminished to a dangerous level and the agency is rife with corruption and unprofessional behavior at all levels.

The work highlights territory familiar to scholars of intelligence in general, most notably the power struggles between elected government officials and the external and internal intelligence agencies, R&AW and the Intelligence Bureau, respectively. Yadav writes that the "absence of legal sanction has resulted in the misuse of power" by both agencies. (26) Ultimately, Yadav has tried to do too much with this book. He might have done better had he focused on his own first-hand experience in R&AW rather than retelling second or third-hand claims. Even so, the book contains insight into a rarely-written-about agency and discusses events that are of interest to scholars.

Mission R&AW opens with a history of Indian intelligence before R&AW's creation. Yadav explains that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi started R&AW in September 1968, with a staff of 250 people, because she wanted a foreign intelligence agency similar to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Nearly half the book details, unevenly, events during the five years before Yadav joined R&AW. Examples of this unevenness include, a six-page chapter about Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Intelligence Bureau's involvement in setting up Ghana's intelligence services; a chapter of 70 pages offering historical background on China and Tibet and the Sino-Indian War, which includes details of shortcomings in translations of Chinese wireless messages, faulty

maps, reporting on the Aksai Chin road construction, and the Indian government's turning the Intelligence Bureau into a scapegoat for the massacre of Indian policemen; and the outcome of his "long discussions on this subject with R.N. Kao . . . and K. Sankaran Nair, his deputy and many other R&AW officers," who "were of the opinion that overall intelligence with regard to the strength, armaments and potential threat was conveyed to the Army Headquarters," but the "Army generals morally lost the war before it actually started." (167–68)

With respect to Pakistan, Yadav reviews operations leading to war with Pakistan in 1965. He does not, however, discuss the particulars of intelligence, simply concluding that Indian intelligence "was not adequately utilized." (183) With the liberation war that led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, Yadav explores R&AW information gathering just three years after its creation from Pakistani sources and learned about the planned military action in East Bengal. He details R&AW's involvement with the Mukti Bahini, the Bengali guerilla forces, against the Pakistan Army and gives a daily account of the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971. Yadav writes that the war was short and explains that a large number of Pakistani troops surrendered "because Indian Army and intelligence strategists had meticulously planned this war well in advance." (260)

Moving to internal issues, Yadav discusses Indira Gandhi's imposition of emergency rule from 1975 to 1977, when she suspended the constitution and elections. He denies Kao and R&AW were involved in suppressing Gandhi's opponents, despite numerous media reports to the contrary. Yadav claims to have found "only one instance of R&AW's involvement in internal affairs of the country," and that issue was a "kickback" from the Indian government funneled by R&AW through a Swiss bank account. (333) When Gandhi lost power and Morarji Desai became prime minister in 1977, he reduced R&AW

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to two-thirds of its strength under a new R&AW director, N.F. Suntook. Those dismissed were field officers, technical experts, economists, scientists and staff involved in cryptography, which severely hurt Indian intelligence. R&AW employees started protesting low wages, and organized a union Yadav led. Soon articles in the press began reporting the problems and Suntook was replaced by G.C. Saxena in 1983. Saxena, in turn, took a leading role in advising Gandhi on terrorism in Punjab, and resigned following her assassination by Sikh bodyguards in 1984. Subsequently, S.E. Joshi became head of R&AW and began meeting with Yadav to resolve the labor dispute in the midst of a series of intelligence failures. Yadav argues this struggle still affects R&AW morale and culture.

The aspects of the book touching on corruption and misbehavior come near the end in chapters titled, “Bizarre R&AW Incidents,” “Denigration of R&AW,” and “Sex Escapades.” Yadav argues that R&AW needs to be held accountable to the Indian Parliament and writes that the R&AW hierarchy has been involved “in corruption” and has a “total lack of devotion and sincerity.” (384) In writing about “bizarre” events, Yadav discusses the disruption of an assassination plot in New York City and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence’s associations with Indian politicians. He also writes that S.B.S. Tomar, an R&AW

officer, was warned about the notorious 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814, but he ignored the tip, which was not passed to R&AW headquarters. Tomar then traveled on the flight days later when it was hijacked. In another case, Ashok Chaturvedi, R&AW chief, was accused of “twisting” facts to clear his name in the media over the 26/11 attack in Mumbai. In a chapter about the decline of the agency, Yadav discusses every R&AW chief from the start of the agency to the present, and argues that it is now faced with rampant corruption, incompetence and a lack of discipline.

Mission R&AW is a difficult book to analyze because it has no footnotes, no endnotes, and no bibliography, which means there are no citations from secondary sources, archives, or documents to support the claims. The book is strongest when Yadav discusses what he witnessed and experienced, but the sections that contain historical narrative lack independent sources necessary to document the events. As an R&AW officer, Yadav could have laid some myths to rest, but this would have required verifiable citations and references. However, a book by a former R&AW officer will be in demand because there are not many works published on the subject and his first-hand observations provide a useful source for information about Indian intelligence.



Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Historical

Assassins of the Turquoise Palace, by Roya Hakakian

Britannia and the Bear: The Anglo-Russian Intelligence Wars 1917-1929, by Victor Madeira.

Hoover's Secret War Against Axis Spies: FBI Counterespionage During World War II, by Raymond J. Batvinis.

Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain, by Alfred A. Reisch.

KLOP: Britain's Most Ingenious Spy, by Peter Day.

The Lawn Road Flats: Spies, Writers and Artists, by David Burke.

MI5 in the Great War, edited by Nigel West

The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee - Volume 1: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis, by Michael Goodman.

–Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936—2013, edited by Richard J. Aldrich, Rory Cormac and Michael Goodman.

On Paper: The Everything of its Two-Thousand-Year History, by Nicholas Basbanes

Russian Roulette: A Deadly Game; How British Spies Thwarted Lenin's Global Plot, by Giles Milton.

Spies, Patriots, and Traitors: American Intelligence in the Revolutionary War, by Kenneth A. Daigler.

Stalin's American Spy: Noel Field, Allen Dulles & the East European Show Trials, by Tony Sharp.

Tales from Langley: The CIA from Truman to Obama, by Peter Kross.

The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle Over a Forbidden Book, by Peter Finn and Petra Couvée.

Memoir

Go Spy The Land: Being the Adventures of IK8 of the British Secret Service, by George Alexander Hill.

Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story, by Jack Devine with Vernon Loeb.

Spy Lost: Caught Between the KGB and the FBI, by Kaarlo Tuomi, edited by Sakari Määttänen

Fiction

The Red Cell, by André Le Gallo.

A Spy's Lonely Path, by Gene Coyle.

Historical

Assassins of the Turquoise Palace, by Roya Hakakian (Grove Press, 2011), 322 pp., sources, bibliography, no index.

While Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then president of Iran, was delivering a message “of reconciliation to the diaspora” (185) on 17 September 1992, two men entered the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin, shot dead four members of the Iranian opposition, and wounded a fifth. The German police reacted swiftly and arrested five suspects—one Iranian and four Lebanese—not associated with the Iranian émigrés. They were not the killers, and the German authorities knew it. The arrests, however, pleased the Iranian government and protected German-Iranian economic relations. In *Assassins of the Turquoise Palace*, a book only recently brought to our attention, Iranian émigré Roya Hakakian reveals who ordered the assassinations and how the real killers were identified and the accused exonerated.

After seizing power in 1979, writes Hakakian, the Ayatollah Khomeini ordered preparation of a list of “enemies of Islam” who had fled Iran. They were to be hunted down and killed. (36) At the time of the Mykonos killings, at least 60 had already been shot. Hakakian tells two parallel stories of those involved. The first describes the he-

roic efforts of Bruno Jost, the German prosecutor assigned to the case and who quickly realized the wrong men had been arrested. The second follows an independent investigation conducted by the sole survivor of the attack and a number of journalists. Overcoming attempts by the Iranian minister of intelligence, Ali Fallahian, to influence the German government to convict those originally arrested, Jost used evidence compiled by these journalists, along with the results of his own investigation, to exonerate the innocent and place blame where it belonged.

The investigation and tumultuous trial lasted nearly four years; 176 witnesses were called. (281) The most important was former Iranian president Abulhassan Banisadr, then in exile in Paris; his name appeared on the Ayatollah’s death list. (247) How he was found and persuaded to testify makes for stirring reading.

Assassins of the Turquoise Palace is an important story well told. When the German judge ruled that the “the orders for the crime... came from Iran’s Supreme Leader” (287) the Iranian revolution was placed in proper perspective.

Britannia and the Bear: The Anglo-Russian Intelligence Wars 1917–1929, by Victor Madeira (Boydell Press, 2014), 317 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, appendix, index.

Cambridge University (founded in 1209) has a modern reputation as the academic womb of many intelligence officers, spies, and espionage historians. Canadian Victor Madeira of Gonville & Caius College (founded 1348) is a recent example of the latter. *Britannia and the Bear*, based on his PhD dissertation, presents the first detailed study of a Soviet espionage network that penetrated the English establishment long before the better-known Cambridge Five.

The espionage and subversion in *Britannia and the Bear* occur in an atmosphere of conflict among political parties,

labor unions, and government institutions during a period of dire, post-WW I economic conditions and the emergent perception of a communist threat. The four agencies charged with combating various aspects of that threat—the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, MI5, MI6, and the Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS)—were themselves engaged in bureaucratic power struggles. Madeira weaves a complicated story while attempting to draw lessons that apply to today’s world.

The principal Soviet agent involved was William Ewer, also a Trinity College graduate and founding member of

the Communist Party of Great Britain, who “in time became a distinguished journalist...[for] the socialist *Daily Herald and Tribune*, the BBC, and the *New York Times*.” (39) Ewer used the London office of the Federated Press of America as cover for operations penetrating each of the UK’s security and intelligence organizations. Madeira describes Ewer’s contacts with his Soviet handlers and the agents he recruited in England and abroad; his recruited agents included St. John Philby (Kim’s father), although it is not clear the elder Philby realized Ewer

was working for the Soviets. (179) The Federated Press of America operated for at least five years before Ewer’s espionage activities became known to MI5. (187) What happened then is both shocking and unexpected. Madeira does not explain why Ewer was never prosecuted.

Britannia and the Bear is not easy reading. It is chronologically muddled, topically confusing, and saturated with awkward syntax. But it does establish that the Soviets penetrated the British establishment years before the Cambridge Five made their contribution.

H*oover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies: FBI Counterespionage during World War II*, by Raymond J. Batvinis (University Press of Kansas, 2014), 334 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, maps, index.

During the 1930s, Nazi Germany recruited a number of spies in the United States. By 1940, the FBI had established a domestic counterintelligence capability and a limited foreign intelligence role focused on that threat. Former FBI special agent Ray Batvinis told that story in his first book, *The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence*.¹ That book did not consider the FBI’s intelligence contribution to WW II, but *Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies* deals with it at length. In Batvinis’s view, his book is “not a story of international competition,” but it comes close. (3)

For the 18 months preceding 7 December 1941, the FBI’s relationship with British intelligence in America—designated British Security Coordination (BSC)—was fruitfully cooperative. Headed by William Stevenson, the BSC included members of MI6, MI5, and the Special Operations Executive. But as William Donovan worked—with support from Stevenson—to create an independent foreign intelligence service, “a complicated (and poisonous) relationship between Hoover and William Stevenson” developed. One complication was the Bureau’s view that the BSC had begun running unilateral operations in the United States; this was Hoover’s domain, and he reacted aggressively—with mixed results—to limit the BSC to liaison status. (3-4) But once the United States became belligerent, the British recognized “improved sharing relationships with the FBI” (43) would be es-

sential, and Hoover likewise took steps to make the FBI an operational player. Batvinis tells how Hoover did it.

Taking advantage of the FBI’s foreign intelligence responsibilities in Latin America and its domestic counterintelligence mission, Hoover demanded that the British work through the Bureau when their agents entered North or South America. The TRICYCLE double agent case is a good example. When the BSC proved less than responsive to Bureau requests, Hoover sent “legal attachés” to London for direct liaison with MI5, MI6, and Bletchley Park. As a result, “valuable information concerning espionage, sabotage, controlled enemy agents, [and] Double Cross techniques...began flowing to Washington.” (90)

Batvinis covers each of these topics in varying detail. He gives detailed attention to the FBI handling of its own German double agents as part of the British Double Cross deception system and the anticipated operations against Japan. The Bureau had to manage acquisition of the planted information and its communication to the Abwehr. Of equal interest is how the FBI arranged to receive Bletchley Park decrypts—code-named OSTRICH—that mentioned anything in the Western Hemisphere.

Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies adds a new dimension of operational detail to the FBI’s role in WW

II, but he does not cover Soviet espionage in wartime America. That will be the subject of Batvinis's next study.

Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program behind the Iron Curtain, by Alfred A. Reisch (Central European University Press, 2013), 549 pp., footnotes, bibliography, photos, indices.

The late Dr. Alfred Reisch was a political scientist and historian specializing in international relations. He held many prestigious academic and government positions in the United States and Europe, including 12 years with Radio Free Europe (RFE). He also participated over a 15-year period in the CIA-run "surreptitious distribution of books in Hungary" (xii). *Hot Books in the Cold War* tells that story.

Hot Books is an important contribution for two main reasons: it is the first detailed study of a CIA political warfare program that remained secret during its operational life during 1956–91, and it has a valuable introduction by Dr. Mark Kramer, Director of the Cold War Studies Program at Harvard University and an expert in East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. Kramer identifies areas that are, for various reasons, excluded from Reisch's account, and he analyzes the book's objectives and the distribution criteria Reisch describes.

Reisch documents the origins of this clandestine program; most of the data available covers the period through 1973. He also describes the principal players, the various cover organizations, and the numerous administrative issues that arose during the program's implementation. The program targeted the "news eager masses," (45) "the

thinking elites and students of Eastern Europe," (50) plus libraries, research organizations, and universities. Propaganda was scrupulously avoided. The program's purpose was to stimulate thought, not violent revolution.

The target countries were in the Soviet Bloc; a pilot project directed at China was attempted and then stopped. (79) Unlike RFE and Radio Liberty (RL), the book distribution program was controlled from the United States, and although West European publishers participated, the CIA's role was kept secret through the use of cover organizations. Reisch discusses the distribution methods used—mainly direct mail—and provides, by country and individuals, data on books mailed and received. Five chapters of letters from readers in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria illustrate the program's value. There is a separate chapter on efforts aimed at the Soviet Union and non-satellite countries. But for reasons not explained, Reisch does not mention the Zhivago project.

Hot Books in the Cold War is a meticulously documented study of a successful CIA covert action program that has received little scholarly attention until now. A very valuable contribution to the intelligence literature.

Klop: Britain's Most Ingenious Spy, by Peter Day (Biteback, 2014), 352 pp., photos, index.

In his book *My Russia*, British polymath Sir Peter Ustinov wrote, "it is difficult for me to understand how anybody can become a spy."² Coming from the son of one of Britain's most valued and respected secret agents, this is a curious comment. Known to his friends as "Klop" (Russian for "bedbug," a nickname given to him by his wife, according to author Day), Jona von Ustinov

served both MI5 and MI6 before, during, and after WW II. Of Russian, Armenian, German, Polish, Jewish, and Ethiopian noble descent, the multilingual Klop was admired professionally by all with whom he served.

British journalist Peter Day is not the first to write a biography of Klop Ustinov. Ustinov's wife, Nadia, a successful artist in her own right, published *Klop*

and the Ustinov Family in 1973. She wrote mainly of their social life in Britain, Klop's hobby of collecting paintings, his love of the good life, and his extramarital affairs, which she tolerated with grace. Although Klop was nominally a journalist, she acknowledged that he worked for a ministry and his "job was a 'hush-hush' one and I am not going to tell more."³

Day's account provides the "more" Nadia left out. He describes the complex Ustinov family origins and how Klop came to serve Germany in WW I, both in the trenches and as a Luftwaffe pilot. Day also explains Klop's recruitment as a German spy and his assignments, first to Russia and then to England under journalistic cover. Klop's allegiance to Germany rapidly diminished as Nazi propaganda attacked the Jews. When questioned about his own Jewish background, he severed his links to Germany with a cable to his superior, stating, "If Herr Goebbels would like to prove his ancestry, then I will do the same." (76) Klop was sacked and promptly "applied for British citizenship." (79) His application was facilitated by Robert Vansittart, a high Foreign Office

official under whom Klop had served as an unofficial agent. Klop's recruitment by MI5 followed in 1935.

MI5 used Klop in a variety of operations that drew on his language and interrogation skills. At one point, MI6 co-opted him to go on a mission to Lisbon for Kim Philby. Day includes long descriptions of several well-known operations—the Venlo Incident, the Rote Kapelle network, and the Noel Field case—where Klop's involvement was peripheral at best. His postwar services included debriefing Germans and fostering ties to Moura Budberg, a suspected Soviet agent and friend from his days in Russia, who was by then living in England. Guy Burgess and Anthony Blunt had attended her parties, and in 1951, she told Klop that Blunt was a member of the Communist Party. Day writes that this information was not added to Blunt's file, but he provides no source for that claim.

Klop Ustinov retired in 1957, and Day describes his partially successful attempts to rebuild his family life and adjust to a lack of activity and deteriorating health. He died in 1962, on the eve of his 70th birthday. *Klop* is the story of a dedicated agent who served his adopted country with distinction.

The Lawn Road Flats: Spies, Writers and Artists, by David Burke (Boydell Press, 2014), 270 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

A recent article in the *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*⁴ celebrated the 1934 opening of the "fearlessly modern and conspicuous...Lawn Road Flats in Hampstead, London." The author, Jill Pearlman, a senior lecturer at Bowdoin College, noted that an "illustrious roster of tenants took up residence...among them artists, architects, writers, critics, academics, journalists."⁵ But the central to her essay were four lesser-known tenants, each a Soviet spy, who came to live in "the Flats." In *The Lawn Road Flats*, historian David Burke expands on this, naming seven Soviet agents and one retired OSS officer—Charles Fenn—who lived there between 1934 and the late 1940s. Burke also includes many of their colleagues who lived nearby or visited during that period.

The best-known Soviet agent in the mix was Arnold Deutsch—the principal recruiter of the Cambridge Five—who lived in #7 with his wife during 1935–38, not far from the flat later owned by Agatha Christie (a resident during 1941–47), who wrote her only spy novel there. (2) By far, the largest group of communist agents linked to the Flats was the 10-member Kuczynski family. Jürgen Kuczynski was instrumental in recruiting atom spy Klaus Fuchs. Jürgen's sister, Ursula Kuczynski—better known as SONJA—was a frequent visitor; she later handled Klaus Fuchs and Melita Norwood for the GRU. Norwood's mother had suggested the Flats to the Kuczynskis. Four family members lived in the Flats, some resided across the street, and others regularly visited.

Prominent among other visitors was the communist photographer and Soviet agent Edith Tudor-Hart. She took publicity photos for the Flats when the owners, Jack and Molly Pritchard, advertised its opening. For all of the agents he identifies, Burke includes background data on personal relationships and espionage activities. In Tudor-Hart's case, he tells how she met Kim Philby in Vienna and later introduced him to Arnold Deutsch in London.

In addition to the spy tales, Burke discusses the Flats' modernist architectural significance and weaves in stories about many other tenants, some famous, like Nicholas Monsarrat, author of *The Cruel Sea*.

With presumably unintentional irony, *The Lawn Road Flats* shows how dedicated communist agents lived well among the upscale bourgeois as they recruited traitors in their midst.

MI5 in the Great War, edited by Nigel West (Biteback, 2014), 320 pp., bibliography, index.

In his now-classic history of British intelligence, *In Her Majesty's Secret Service*, Cambridge professor Christopher Andrew described the establishment of Britain's modern intelligence services amidst "invasion and spy scares [and] a public mood bordering on mass hysteria." Many popular fiction writers and public figures demanded action to "awake a sleeping nation to a nonexistent peril... imaginary invaders and imaginary spies."⁶ (37) The irony, of course, was that there were some German spies operating in Britain at the time, just not the "50,000 waiters" functioning as secret agents. (43) And by the start of the war, most of the real peacetime agents had been arrested. But the Kaiser sent more, and many of those wartime agents have since come to light in various works. In *Spies of the Kaiser*, Thomas Boghardt discussed German agents involved in naval espionage.⁷ Andrew's 2009 authorized history of MI5 took a broader view and added more cases.⁸ Nigel West's recent study of WW I intelligence (part of the *Historical Dictionary* series) included still more cases not mentioned by the others.⁹ *MI5 in the Great War* summarizes the original 10 volume official assessment of the Security Service's WW I operations, which was the major source for all three of these works.

often referred to as "the G report" or by its British National Archive file designations KV 1/39 and KV 1/44, doesn't refer to any sources. After brief comments on G branch organization and methodology—mainly monitoring agents' mail—Farrer's narrative describes cases chronologically from the prewar period up until 1918.

In editing Farrer's work, West has selected many of Farrer's interesting accounts. Farrer's version provides in-depth treatment of cases that other published studies have only briefly summarized. For example, Andrew covers the Hentschel-Parrott case in three pages, 10 while Farrer's account requires 24 pages (32-56) and includes agents Andrew omitted. Likewise, Boghardt only briefly mentions Norwegian spy Alfred Hagn,¹¹ while Farrer provides a more comprehensive story (380-89). She explains how spies operated and were finally caught instead of just saying that they were arrested.

While *MI5 in the Great War* presents many new cases and much new data, it suffers a major deficiency: no index. Readers wishing to find a particular case must scan the entire book or rely on the Kindle edition. But this work does reveal the magnitude of MI5 WW I security operations like no other source.

The original study was written by Dr. Lucy E. Farrer at the request of then MI5 Director-General Colonel Vernon Kell. Farrer was a historian who worked for MI5 during the war. Kell had been instructed to include all important material relative to G Branch (the investigative element of MI5) so that the voluminous files could be destroyed, and that is what happened. Thus her report,

The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee - Volume 1: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis, by Michael Goodman (Routledge, 2014), 471 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, appendices, index.

The controversial “September Dossier,” which justified the British decision to join the United States in war against Iraq, was produced by the Joint Intelligence Committee. (JIC) Until then, the JIC was “one of the less talked about and least understood of Whitehall committees.” (1) As a first step in remedying this circumstance, King’s College professor Michael Goodman was appointed Cabinet Office historian and tasked with preparing *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee – Volume 1*.

For this first volume in what is expected to be a multi-volume effort, Goodman was given access to the JIC archives. The result is an extensively documented account of the JIC, from its origins as a military subcommittee before WW II to its performance in the Suez Crisis. The level of detail is impressive compared to the relatively brief account found in *Spying on the World*, which Goodman coedited. (See following review.) In this more in-depth treatment, Goodman covers the need for the JIC, its organizational evolution, the personnel involved in its management and the assessments produced, and the impact of important international events on its development. Of particular interest are its prewar performance—influenced by the Spanish Civil War—its role in WW II, and the organizational changes that followed.

By the end of WW II, the JIC had attained “elder statesmen” status in the British intelligence community, and the British hoped it would be adopted as a model in other nations, especially the United States. (205) Goodman writes, that “to the British, the great originator and purveyor of modern intelligence...it was desirable to educate the United States departments in

our views.” And he goes on to explain how “the backbone of the Anglo-American intelligence partnership was forged” by passing information to elements of the emerging US intelligence community—sometimes resulting in controversy—and to other allies. (207)

Goodman covers the role of the JIC during the Cold War in detail, with special emphasis on the effectiveness of Soviet agents and Allied intelligence service efforts to identify and diminish the damage. The Soviet Union was not the only adversary of interest. Goodman discusses JIC performance—deficient in certain respects—during the Korean War and during what he terms “the Asian Cold War” as the communist threat there increased. At the same time, events in the Middle East—Iranian nationalism and the Palestinian conflict—were of growing concern to policymakers. There is a separate chapter on the JIC performance in the Suez Crisis, which strained US-UK political relations. But, Goodman shows, “more positive messages were emerging from the CIA ... [due] to Dulles’ willingness to continue to cooperate with us on the intelligence side.” (406)

In his conclusions, Goodman notes the JIC “was responsible for the invention of the all-source intelligence assessment...and the development of intelligence analysis as a function government as a whole,” not just the military. (429) And he emphasizes the importance of “liaison,” which “can be best demonstrated by the turbulent relationship with the US intelligence community.” (429)

For those interested in the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, this official history will be a valuable source.

Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936–2013, edited by Richard J. Aldrich, Rory Cormac and Michael Goodman (Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 448 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, appendices, index.

Richard J. Aldrich (Warwick University), Rory Cormac (University of Nottingham) and Michael Goodman (King's College London and the Cabinet Office) have done more than edit this work. In addition to valuable introductory and summary chapters, they have contributed documented prefatory analysis to each of the 20 chapters that examine the functions of the JIC since its origin in 1936.

Why is the JIC history of interest to the US Intelligence Community? The authors advance one reason: "It represents the highest authority in the world of intelligence." (1) But there are other possible reasons why the US community might be interested. The United States had a JIC during WW II that is "the least studied of the US wartime intelligence organizations."¹² So useful comparisons would be possible, should this shortcoming be addressed by historians. Then there is the issue of American representation on the British JIC, another seldom-examined topic.¹³ Finally, the close relationship between the US and UK intelligence communities requires that each understands the organization and functions of the other. *Spying on the World* provides a basis for improving that understanding.

The JIC assigns requirements and produces the final assessment of the British intelligence community to policymakers on any given topic. After a discus-

sion of JIC origins before WW II, the book's chapters provide examples of JIC products up through 2013. These include assessments that were right and some that weren't. It is important to note that, unlike US National Intelligence Estimates, in which dissenting views are noted, British JIC products are "defined by a quest for consensus." The authors recognize that this leaves the JIC open to charges "of 'lowest common denominator' assessments" but it works for them. (3)

Examples of the topics assessed are SIGINT targeting, the Berlin Blockade, Chinese entry into the Korean War, Soviet capabilities, the Suez Crisis, international terrorism, and the war in Iraq. The editors note, "The British government refused to release for this volume any JIC document related to the end of the Cold War." (381) To partially fill that gap, they include a parliamentary committee report.

When the current British government was formed in 2010, it created a National Security Council. Besides adding another layer of bureaucracy, the NSC modified the JIC's operations. The authors discuss these changes and their implications.

Spying on the World provides essential background and insight for those seeking a better understanding of the British intelligence role in the complex "special relationship" with the United States.

On Paper: The Everything of Its Two-Thousand-Year History, by Nicholas Basbanes (Knopf, 2013), 430 pp., end-notes, bibliography, photos, index.

Journalist, bibliophile, and author Nicholas Basbanes ranks paper alongside the wheel, gunpowder, the magnetic compass, and printing as singular revolutionary technological breakthroughs. He has written *On Paper* to make his point, beginning with two basic questions:

who invented it, and how did it become the ubiquitous product that is so much a part of everyday life?

The short answer to the first question can be found on Wikipedia: paper was invented in China by Cai Lun in AD 105. But Basbanes wanted to know *how* it

was discovered and made. So he went to China, where ancient papermaking practices are still employed. After describing the Chinese processes, he traces its slow evolution and application throughout the Arabic world, Europe, and the New World. For background, *On Paper* also explains other methods of recording history—stone, clay tablets, papyrus—and how paper gradually assumed the dominant position.

What does this have to do with intelligence? After discussing the uses of paper for passports and security documents, Basbanes notes that the paper-based “ingenious utensils of espionage in general have been the stuff of awe and amazement.” (158) He reached this conclusion after a visit to the CIA Museum, where he viewed “some of the more imaginative tools of this highly specialized trade.... What I found informative was evidence indicating how so much of what has been done to support various clandestine activities over the years has relied on paper.” (159)

In addition to one-time-pads and edible paper, Basbanes discusses the paper documents used in establishing cover and legends for operatives. While studying the OSS exhibit, he learned that the first task undertaken by Stanley Lovell, Donovan’s director of research and development, “was the organization

of a plant for documentation” to produce the papers necessary for operations behind enemy lines.¹⁴

Basbanes then reviews the extensive use of paper in WW II propaganda and deception operations, including Operation Mincemeat, which was popularized in *The Man Who Never Was*.¹⁶ (160) He goes on to discuss a ‘special version’ of Laotian currency printed for propaganda purposes during the Vietnam War. There is also a lengthy review of techniques used by CIA officers Tony and Jonna Mendez. These include “splitting paper to put in a microdot,” (164) and, as they did during Operation ARGO, producing false identity documents.

Basbanes goes on to provide a detailed examination of the importance of archival paper in preserving history. Examples include Beethoven manuscripts, Thomas Edison notebooks, Nuremberg war crime trial evidence, Katyn massacre documents, the CIA MKUltra project records, the Pentagon Papers, and the WikiLeaks disclosures. He also discusses the extensive use of paper by the Stasi for domestic security and how NSA uses paper before committing its work to the digital domain.

On Paper concludes with numerous examples of how paper is currently used in every phase of daily life. He adds, “[as] a student at Harvard...I took paper for granted.” (352) Few who read this book will do the same.

Russian Roulette: A Deadly Game; How British Spies Thwarted Lenin’s Global Plot, by Giles Milton (Bloomsbury, 2014), 378 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

If the Russian Nagant revolver is not held vertically when the cylinder is spun, the chamber with the bullet will come to rest at the bottom, thus minimizing risk when playing Russian Roulette. When Vladimir Lenin assumed power in 1917, he acted quickly to minimize the chance of counterrevolution, make peace with Germany, and spread the revolution throughout the world. Great Britain and the other Western powers worked to keep Russia fighting, and when that failed, to overthrow or constrain the new government. The story of their efforts has been told before in biographies and memoirs

of the principal agents involved—Sidney Reilly (“Ace of Spies”), Paul Dukes, George Hill, and Arthur Ransome.¹⁵ Likewise, the postwar British-American military support for anti-Bolshevik forces and the actions to counter the spread of communism to India are the subject of separate studies.²² In *Russian Roulette*, historian Giles Milton has, for the first time, tied them all together in a geo-intelligence version of the notorious game.

From the moment of the Czar’s abdication, Mansfield Cumming, the first head of the Secret Intelligence

Service, was pressed by the Foreign Office to find out what was going on. Milton tells how Cumming accomplished the task with inexperienced agents, several of whom he personally recruited. Their operations in Russia required complicated covers, disguises, and communications channels using couriers to Sweden. They provided the intelligence needed and protected their agents—and their mistresses—all the while under suspicion by Felix Dzerzhinsky's secret police, the Cheka. Only when Reilly and Hill decided to try to overthrow the government, in what became known as the Lockhart Plot, were their efforts compromised—by a French journalist—and they were forced to make daring escapes. Cumming reacted by sending in Dukes and recruiting Ransome. Both spoke Russian well and were productive. Ransome, a left-wing journalist not popular in London, maintained especially close contacts with the Russians; Trotsky's secret personal secretary was his mistress.

Cumming then sent Reilly and Hill to Southern Russia to determine whether the anti-Bolshevik forces would be able to defeat the Red Army. Despite their reports indicating the poor capabilities of the anti-Bolshevik forces, Churchill advocated continued support.

Spies, Patriots, and Traitors: American Intelligence in the Revolutionary War, by Kenneth A. Daigler (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 317 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendix, glossary, index.

Before CIA operations officer Ken Daigler retired, he wrote a pamphlet, *The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence*,¹⁷ which was provided to visiting dignitaries and other guests who were unfamiliar with the roots of American intelligence. *Spies, Patriots, and Traitors* is a major expansion of that work but is not the first book to cover the topic. Historian Carl Van Doren's *Secret History of the American Revolution*¹⁸ and John Bakeless's *Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes* are two of the best, though both are out of print. Daigler adds a new perspective—that of an intelligence officer.

After explaining how George Washington learned the value of intelligence the hard way as a young British officer, Daigler considers the role of the Sons of Liberty, the Committees of Correspondence, and the Mechan-

Milton, citing an Imperial War Museum article, then records a seldom-mentioned event: to accomplish his military goals, he writes, Churchill “took the highly controversial decision to sanction the use of chemical weapons against the Bolsheviks,” (250) and some so-called “M Devices” were used. (252–55)

At the same time, Cumming ran operations in the Tashkent region of Russia. Lenin had annulled the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which had established borders along Afghanistan and Persia as a safeguard for British interests in India. When Frederick Bailey, the SIS officer in Tashkent, reported that “the Bolshevik plans... were to start disturbances by any means possible... in India and Afghanistan and compel them to adopt Communism,” the British government took effective action. (255ff) Milton describes the difficult consequences for Bailey.

Aside from entertaining readers with exciting, well-told spy stories, *Russian Roulette* documents the coming of age of the fledgling British secret service. The government had found its product absolutely essential and thus its future was secure. (See also J. R. Seeeger review on page page 47.)

ics in influencing the decision to go to war and in early battles that followed. He also addresses covert efforts in Europe that supplied much-needed gunpowder and other materials. On the homefront, he reviews the contribution of intelligence to key battles, the Christmas Eve attack on Trenton being an important example. Daigler challenges two other historians on their interpretation of a key point in the preparation for that battle: Was John Honeyman a spy who provided General Washington data on the Hessian garrison at Trenton? One of those other historians, David Hackett Fischer, does not mention Honeyman in his description of events.¹⁹ The other historian, Alexander Rose, argues Honeyman was not a spy.²¹ Daigler makes a good case that he was.

Daigler goes on to discuss the significance of the Nathan Hale mission and Benedict Arnold's defection. He also assesses the importance in New York of the Culper Ring, the key contribution of intelligence and deception operations throughout the war, and the intelligence roles played by African Americans. He places special emphasis on Washington's intuitively skillful use of tradecraft.

Determining the tactical or strategic value of intelligence is a subjective matter, but Daigler does not hesitate

to render his judgments in the final chapter. What may surprise some is his conclusion that the "most important intelligence activity undertaken by Washington" didn't involve his agents, although they were of value. It was the offensive use of "his assets mixed with his military deception activities" that made the biggest difference.

Spies, Patriots, and Traitors provides a good review of intelligence in the Revolutionary War as viewed by a professional.

Stalin's American Spy: Noel Field, Allen Dulles & the East European Show Trials, by Tony Sharp (Hurst, 2014), 410 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Noel Field was born in England in 1904—his father was an American Quaker, and his mother was English. He grew up in Switzerland, came to the United States with his mother after his father died, and attended Harvard. After graduation, he joined the State Department, eventually drifted into communism, and was recruited as a spy. He left the State Department in 1938 and found work at the League of Nations in Europe. During 1941–47 he worked as the head of the American Unitarian Service Committee in France and Switzerland, where he sought to aid leftist groups during and immediately after the war.

In 1949, Field and those close to him disappeared, one by one. That May, Field went to Czechoslovakia seeking new work. When his wife, Herta, then in Geneva, sent him telegrams, they went unanswered. Herta and Noel's brother Hermann went to Prague to find him. When they failed, Hermann went to Warsaw on planned business, while Herta stayed in Prague. On 22 August, Hermann was dropped off at Warsaw's airport for his return flight to Prague, but he never arrived at his destination. Herta called Hermann's wife, Kate, in London, but she had not heard from him. A few days later when Kate tried to contact Herta, she, too, had disappeared. Kate's call to the Fields's foster daughter, Erica Wallach, a communist herself who spied while in the OSS, did not initially raise concern; after all, they had gone behind the Iron Curtain, and communication was difficult. But after several months, Erica, too, became concerned and went

to Berlin, where she asked a communist friend for help. When Kate tried to contact Erica in Berlin, she couldn't be found. Kate heard nothing more from any of them for five years. *Stalin's American Spy* explains why.

British author Tony Sharp is not the first to try and tell the Fields's story, but he is the first to get it right—well, mostly right. Journalist Flora Lewis reported the basic story in her 1965 book, *Red Pawn*.²⁰ Conspiracy theorist Stewart Steven published *Operation Splinter Factor* nearly ten years later.²⁵ Lewis did not have access to the Cold War files released in Hungary that answered key questions. Steven, relying on a leak from a putatively reputable source behind the Iron Curtain, blamed the disappearances on a CIA operation orchestrated by Allen Dulles, who was not at the CIA at the time he and Lewis allegedly had made contact in Switzerland. Sharp gives too much credence to Steven's dotty conspiracy.

Sharp's clever title has a double meaning, which, when understood, explains a lot. When Field was still at the State Department, NKVD recruiter Hede Massing convinced him to spy for Stalin. Field also knew his friend in the Department, Alger Hiss, was spying for the GRU. Field continued his spying in Europe during and after the war, first with the League of Nations and then with the Unitarian relief group. At some point, Field contacted Dulles, a family friend, in Bern seeking

help for American Spanish Civil War veterans. Dulles could not help, but the Soviets learned they had met.

After Massing testified against Hiss, Field knew he could not return to America or he, too, would be indicted. So, having been a loyal Soviet spy, he sought work behind the Iron Curtain. Sadly for him, he did so at a time when Stalin was arranging purge trials for several Hungarian Communists with whom Field had had contact. The Czechs arrested Field and turned him over to the Hungarians as Stalin's duplicitous American spy. The Hungarian documents show that he was tortured and confessed before testifying at the purge trial of his former contacts. Herta, Erica, and Hermann were arrested to assure their silence.

In 1953, Józef Światło, the Polish officer who had arrested Hermann at the airport, defected to the West. He had attended the purge trial and revealed the status of the Fields and Erica Wallach. The State Department worked to secure their freedom. Noel and Herta were released after Stalin died but remained in Hungary for the rest of their lives. The Czechs released Hermann, who returned to his wife and became a professor at Tufts University. In 1955, Erica was finally released from the Soviet Vorkuta Gulag, moved with her American husband to Warrenton, Virginia, wrote her memoir, and became a teacher.

Stalin's American Spy is a good, thoroughly documented, hard-to-believe spy story.

Tales from Langley: The CIA from Truman to Obama, by Peter Kross (Adventures Unlimited, 2014), 378 pp., footnotes, bibliography, photo, appendix, no index.

Tales from Langley gets off to a dreadful start. The first five chapters are about the OSS and the FBI. The remaining 50 chapters mention the CIA and have two characteristics in common—the stories in them have all been told before, and they are a murky mix of fact and error. The latter dominate.

For example, President Truman did not create the CIA solely to inform him “and his top advisors as to what was going on in the world.” (9) James Murphy was not one of three men heading the OSS; Donovan was it. (12) Nor was the OSS “the first national intelligence organization fielded by the United States;” the FBI has that honor. (13) And Donovan was not appointed Coordinator of Information (COI) as a result of Ian Fleming and Admiral Godfrey meeting with the president; the president had made his decision before the meeting. (22) MI5 was not “about to arrest Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean” before they defected to the Soviet Union; MI5 doesn't have arrest powers, Burgess was not under suspicion, and

Maclean was only going to be interviewed. (44) The U-2 didn't “watch every Soviet military installation without being detected”; its coverage was necessarily selective, and the Soviets were aware of its flight from day one. (101) Pyotr Popov was a major—not a colonel—in Vienna, and his first assignment in East Germany was not at Karlshorst, a post-WW II entity. (109) It is inaccurate that “Richard Helms wanted British intelligence to get Penkovsky first”—whatever that means; the CIA made the first attempts to contact him. (176) Yuri Nosenko was not “at the time of his defection...one of the highest ranking Soviet KGB officers to come westward.” He was a captain. (199) Aldrich Ames was not a “double agent” and it was not the FBI that correlated his bank deposits with his operational meetings; the CIA did that. (281)

Tales from Langley is a scholarly disaster. It might have been a worthwhile summary of espionage cases had basic fact-checking been done. But that is hard work, and there is no app for that.

The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle Over a Forbidden Book, by Peter Finn and Petra Couvée (Pantheon, 2014), 352 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In September 1958, a month before the Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to Boris Pasternak, a Russian-language edition of his *Doctor Zhivago* was distributed at the Brussels World Fair with the help of the Vatican. The title page indicated the publication was the work of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, the Italian publisher who defied the Soviets and released the book in 1957. Feltrinelli furiously denied his firm was responsible for the Russian edition. Other publishers followed with French and English editions in 1958, and they, too, denied involvement with the Russian version. (154) But there were a few other clues. The dust jacket and hardcover binding suggested that Mouton, a publisher based in The Hague, played a role, but it declined comment. When readers noticed the book was riddled with grammatical and typographical errors, it was clear it had not been published in Russia. So who was responsible? And how had the book made it out of the Soviet Union in the first place? *Washington Post* journalist Peter Finn and coauthor Petra Couvée, a teacher at St. Petersburg State University, supply answers in *The Zhivago Affair*.

It didn't take long for the CIA to become a suspect. It was "first mentioned...as [the] secret publisher in November 1958." But it wasn't until 2013 that it "acknowledged its role." (17) The word "role" is appropriate since many other parties contributed, and each one maintained the secrecy of the CIA connection. Britain was a crucial player. MI6 delivered a copy of the Russian manuscript to the CIA on microfilm on 2 January 1958. (294) Finn and Couvée explain how publication was integrated into the CIA's clandestine program for distributing Western books behind the Iron Curtain (see review of *Hot Books in the Cold War* on page 54), and how variations in delivery

routes masked CIA links. After a false start with the University of Michigan and warnings from "British intelligence...not to publish in the United States," (130) the assistance of the Dutch intelligence service (BVD) was solicited. The BVD, dealing through a cutout, arranged a special printing by Mouton. (136) The CIA handled distribution through the Vatican pavilion at the Brussels Fair.

The story of the book's origins—it was Pasternak's only novel, begun in 1945—and its escape from the Soviet Union is less complicated but offers its own puzzles. In the telling, Finn and Couvée probe Pasternak's complicated family life, his international fame as a poet, and the reasons he survived the Soviet purges of the 1930s, when so many other authors went to their deaths or the Gulag. The authors conclude Pasternak was protected by Stalin, himself "a poet in his youth [and] a voracious reader of fiction" who "once telephoned Pasternak to discuss whether a particular poet, Osip Mandelstam... should receive...the Stalin Prize." (15) Finn and Couvée also include Pasternak's often quarrelsome sessions with his Soviet editors and the government officials who forced him to decline his Nobel Prize. But it was his international reputation that was the key factor in getting his manuscript to the West after it was clear it would not be published in the Soviet Union. Pasternak merely gave a copy to an Italian Feltrinelli representative, who carried it to Italy. Pasternak would later send copies to Britain and France, somehow managing to communicate by letter with secret meanings only the recipients would understand. Finn and Couvée never explain how he managed to avoid the ever-present KGB.

The Zhivago Affair is a great story, wonderfully told.

Memoir

Go Spy the Land: Being the Adventures of IK8 of the British Secret Service, by George Alexander Hill (Biteback, 2014), 303 pp., appendix, index.

George Hill (1892–1968) was born in Estonia to a timber merchant. Educated at home by governesses, he learned Russian, French, and German. Hill was vacationing in British Columbia when WW I broke out. He promptly joined a Canadian infantry regiment. He was seriously wounded when his unit fought at Ypres in 1915. Unfit to continue in the infantry, he transferred to military intelligence, where he added Bulgarian to his languages. He trained as a pilot and was sent to Greece, where he flew agents behind enemy lines. In 1917, he was sent to Petrograd as a member of the “Royal Flying Corps.” There he helped Leon Trotsky organize the Red Air Force and a military intelligence service. At the same time, he worked with Sidney Reilly—and later Arthur Ransome and Paul Dukes—to build an agent network that kept the Foreign office informed of events in Russia. (See reviews of *Russian Roulette* and *Britannia and the Bear* above). Hill provides extensive detail on how he recruited and handled his agents.

After the British landed troops in Murmansk and Hill’s network was exposed, he escaped Russia in the aftermath of the Lockhart Mission—a failed attempt to unseat the new Bolshevik leadership—and returned to London, where he met Mansfield Cumming (“C”) for the first

time. He spent the next three years in southern Russia with Reilly reporting on attempts by Russian monarchists to overthrow the Bolsheviks. When he returned to London, he was awarded the Military Cross and the Distinguished Service Order, and then was dismissed from the service owing to budget cutbacks. He lived in a trailer while seeking employment and began work on this memoir. It was finally published in 1932. Hill wrote a second memoir, *Dreaded Hour*,²³ in which he told of his service in southern Russia. Recalled to service with the SOE during WW II, he trained new officers—including Philby—in the use of demolitions before being sent to Moscow, where he became a brigadier in the British army. After the war, he became a director of the British-owned German mineral water company Apollinaris.

This new edition of *Go Spy the Land* not only makes available again an important work that has long been out of print, but it adds an appendix with Hill’s recently released official report on the Lockhart Plot. Hill was one of a kind. With no training, he became an effective intelligence officer by applying common sense. His firsthand account of British secret service operations in Russia is good reading.

Good Hunting: An American Spymaster’s Story, by Jack Devine with Vernon Loeb (Sarah Crichton Books, 2014), 324 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

In 1966, when Jack Devine was teaching social studies in suburban Philadelphia, his wife gave him copy of *The Invisible Government*,²⁴ —the very controversial book DCI John McCone tried to suppress. In one of life’s subtle ironies, instead of “being shocked and outraged by its revelations of a vast and secret intelligence bureaucracy,” (11) he wrote asking for employment. A year later, he began a 32-year career with the CIA. *Good Hunting* tells how it went; it is not a quotidian memoir.

While the format of *Good Hunting* is conventional—a roughly chronological progression—the career experiences and policy messages it conveys are not. After recounting his initial training, where he encountered Aldrich Ames, Devine describes his initial overseas assignment as a case officer in Chile during the Allende years. His firsthand account of CIA’s role in supporting opposition forces there establishes a theme that surfac-

es in his discussions of subsequent assignments—covert action done properly can be a force for good.

Devine rose rapidly at the CIA, serving six presidents during his career. He was directly involved in the decision to provide shoulder-fired antiaircraft weapons to the mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. And he challenges critics who allege that “CIA’s covert war in Afghanistan created al-Qaeda.” (104) His disagreement with those who supported actions that led to the Iran-Contra Affair is equally instructive.

In addition to his covert-action assignments, Devine served as chief of station in Italy, Argentina, and other countries. While in Rome, he met the Pope, who asked, “Where do you work?” Devine finessed his answer with the conventional response, “for the US Government,” and the Pope understood. (114) Covert action also became an issue in Rome when the flap over the ‘Gladio’ stay-behind network surfaced. Devine’s explanation of the program should silence any lingering critics, but it probably will not. It was also in Rome that he encountered Aldrich Ames for the second time, and he later comments on Ames’s treachery. Wherever Devine was station chief, he supervised espionage operations, and

he describes recruitments, defections, technical operations—planting bugs—and surveillance procedures. (138-9) His comments on these are illuminating.

The principal senior positions Devine held at CIA included chief of the Counternarcotics Center, chief of Latin America Division, associate deputy director of operations (A/DDO), and briefly, acting DDO. Besides his comments on day-to-day events, he adds incisive remarks on the management and bureaucratic issues that often complicated what should have been straightforward decisions. His relationship with former DCI John Deutch is interesting in this regard.

In 1998, after his tenure as A/DDO, Devine decided to retire and enter the world of business intelligence. While the final portion of the book is devoted to how this worked out, he also offers his views on the Iraq war, the CURVEBALL disaster, and the value of “CIA directed... Special Operations Forces” (as opposed to DOD-led missions) to accomplish national objectives.

The term “Good Hunting” was often attached to cables that referred to “relentless pursuit of... intelligence.” (4) The book *Good Hunting* embodies that concept in the story of Jack Devine’s career as a CIA case officer.

Spy Lost: Caught Between the KGB and the FBI, by Kaarlo Tuomi, edited by Sakari Määttänen (Enigma Books, 2014), 151 pp., index. With an introduction by John Earl Haynes.

Kaarlo Tuomi was born to Finnish parents in Michigan on 30 November 1916. He died eighty years later in Florida. In between, he served in the Red Army during WW II, was a prisoner of war, and taught English in Russia. In 1954, he was recruited by the GRU to become an illegal. After training, he was sent to the United States via Canada in 1958. Promptly caught by the FBI, he was offered the chance to become a double agent. He accepted. But in his first controlled message to his GRU handlers, he included a signal that he was under control; his true loyalty remained with the Soviet Union. In 1963, when Tuomi was about to be recalled to the Soviet Union, he suspected that Oleg Penkovsky may have identified

him as a genuine GRU agent. Tuomi changed sides again and asked the FBI to let him remain in America. *Spy Lost* is the story of his early life in the United States, why he went to the Soviet Union, and his work as a double agent.

In his introduction, John Haynes adds further background to the story, including Tuomi’s involvement with the Polyakov case. Haynes also notes that the FBI never revealed how it learned about Tuomi so quickly in 1958. He adds that Tuomi believed an uncle in the United States had given the FBI a letter from Tuomi in which he asked to have his birth certificate sent to him in Russia. He assumes he was then placed on a watch list.

Looking back, Tuomi concluded, “The spy’s life is worthless. He is everybody’s spittoon.”(143)

Fiction

***The Red Cell*, by André Le Gallo (Amazon Kindle, 2014).**

André Le Gallo’s latest novel, *The Red Cell*, is distinguished first by a foreword written by a CIA colleague and former deputy director of operations, Thomas Twetten, who explains André’s unusual credentials as a CIA case officer. Second, one of the characters in the book battles ALS, a disease Le Gallo himself knows firsthand. And third, it is an exciting story well told.

Following a thematic thread established in his two previous novels, *The Caliphate* and *Satan’s Spy*, protagonists Steve Church and his fiancée, Kella Hastings, struggle to foil Iranian Islamic terrorists. Their leader seeks revenge against Church personally, the result of previous encounters, and the United States

in general, especially its economy. The story begins in Washington, DC, but soon expands to Europe and to San Francisco. Along the way, LeGallo provides realistic descriptions of terrorists, agents, and moles seeking to accomplish their missions while pursued by a team assembled by Church and Hastings.

National Clandestine Service officers are well known for their storytelling gifts, but few are able to write espionage stories that are realistic, clever, and entertaining. Le Gallo is one of those few and has done it again with *The Red Cell*. It is enjoyable reading but only available in digital form from Amazon Kindle.

***A Spy’s Lonely Path*, by Gene Coyle (AuthorHouse, 2014), 288 pp.**

Gene Coyle spent 14 of his 30 years with the CIA abroad working undercover. Now a professor at Indiana University Bloomington, he has combined experiences from his former profession to answer a long latent “literary itch.” *A Spy’s Lonely Path* is his fourth and most recent espionage novel.²⁶

Coyle’s protagonist, Robert Hall, is a young CIA operations officer who meets Alexander Golovin, a Russian diplomat, at an arms negotiation conference in Vienna. When Hall learns Golovin is also a professor at Moscow University who has developed a sophisticated risk assessment algorithm relied on by the Russian president, Golovin becomes a potentially valuable target for recruitment. When Golovin learns Hall is CIA, the recruitment takes a surprising turn. But Hall is not the only one interested in Golovin; the Russian security service (the FSB) is monitoring him closely because

of his contacts with the president and thus becomes aware of his contacts with Hall. The recruitment is complicated by Golovin’s relationship with his graduate assistant, Elizaveta Petrvicha, as his marriage fails.

Coyle lets the reader follow the recruitment by including Hall’s cables to headquarters and the responses that both encourage his efforts and reveal attempts by a headquarters superior to take undeserved credit. The operation ends in a series of events engineered in part by the FSB without realizing they have endorsed the inaccurate results produced by the risk assessment algorithm, which embarrasses the president on the world stage. *A Spy’s Lonely Path* is both entertaining and informative—a pleasure to read.



Endnotes

1. Raymond J. Batvinis, *The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence* (University Press of Kansas, 2007).
2. Peter Ustinov, *My Russia* (Little, Brown, 1983), 13.
3. Nadia Benois Ustinov, *Klop and the Ustinov Family* (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1973), 191.
4. Jill Pearlman, "The Spies Who Came into the Modernist Fold: The Covert Life in Hampstead's Lawn Road Flats," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 72, No. 3 (September 2013): 358–81
5. *Ibid.*, 359.
6. See also Christopher Moran and Robert Johnson, "In the Service of Empire: Imperialism and the British Spy Thriller, 1901–1914" in *Studies in Intelligence* 54 no. 2 (June 2010) for an examination of the impact of the espionage novels written during the period.
7. Thomas Boghardt, *Spies of the Kaiser: German Covert Operations in Great Britain during the First World War Era* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
8. Christopher Andrew, *Defend The Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (Knopf, 2009)
9. Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of World War I Intelligence* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014)
10. Andrew, 44-46.
11. Boghardt, 96, 107, 115.
12. Larry A. Valero, "The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947," *Studies in Intelligence* 9 (Summer 2000), <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/summer00/art06.html>.
13. Chester Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956* (Harper & Row, 1978), 70.
14. Stanley Lovell, *Of Spies and Stratagems* (Prentice, 1963), 23.
15. Andrew Cook, *On His Majesty's Secret Service: The True Story of Sidney Reilly Ace of Spies* (Tempus, 2002); Harry Ferguson, *Operation Kronstadt: The True Story of Honor, Espionage, and the Rescue of Britain's Greatest Spy, the Man with a Hundred Faces* (Overlook, 2009); and Roland Chambers, *The Last Englishman: The Double Life of Arthur Ransome* (David R. Godine, 2012).
16. Ewen Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was* (J. P. Lippincott Company, 1954).
17. P.K. Rose, *The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/the-founding-fathers-of-american-intelligence/art-1.html>. P.K. Rose was the pen name for Kenneth Daigler.
18. Carl Van Doren, *Secret History of the American Revolution* (Viking, 1941); John Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes* (J. B. Lippincott, 1959).
19. David Hackett Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (Oxford University Press, 2004).
20. Flora Lewis, *Red Pawn: The Story of Noel Field, The Strange History of an American Caught Up in an International Communist Intrigue* (Doubleday, 1965).
21. Alexander Rose, "The Strange Case of John Honeyman and Revolutionary War Espionage," *Studies in Intelligence* 52, no. 2 (<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol52no2/the-spy-who-never-was.html>).
22. See, for example, Frederick Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent* (J. Cape, 1946).
23. George A. Hill, D.S.O., *Dreaded Hour* (Cassell, 1936).
24. David Wise and Thomas Ross, *The Invisible Government* (Random House, 1964).
25. Stewart Steven, *Operation Splinter Factor* (Lippincott, 1974).
26. Gene Coyle's previous novels are *The Dream Merchant of Lisbon: The Game of Espionage* (Xlibris, 2004); *No Game For Amateurs: The Search for a Japanese Mole on the Eve of WW II* (AuthorHouse, 2009), and *Diamonds And Deceit: The Search for the Missing Romanov Dynasty Jewels* (AuthorHouse 2011).



Books Reviewed in Studies in Intelligence 2014

Reviews can be reached at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/index.html>. Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake. Some titles are repeated in the sections at the end listing memoirs and books specifically about intelligence services in other countries

CONTEMPORARY TOPICS

Leaks/Disclosures

Fixing Leaks: Assessing the Department of Defense's Approach to Preventing and Deterring Unauthorized Disclosures, by James B. Bruce and W. George Jameson (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

No Place To Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State, by Glenn Greenwald (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy, by Rahul Sagar (58 3 [September], Jason Manosevitz)

The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World's Most Wanted Man, by Luke Harding (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Snowden Operation: Inside the West's Greatest Intelligence Disaster, by Edward Lucas (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

This Machine Kills Secrets: How Wikileaks, Cypherpunks, and Hacktivists Aim to Free the World's Information, by Andy Greenberg (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Terrorism

Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11, by Michael Allen (58 1 [March], Roger Z. George)

Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror, by Erik Prince (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD's Secret Spying Unit and Bin Laden's Final Plot Against America, by Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman (58 1 [March], Bookshelf; 58 2 [June], Richard T. Willing)

Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012, by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.

Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God, by Matthew Levitt (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warlord Who Led US Special Forces to Topple the Taliban Regime, by Brian Glynn Williams (58 2 [June], J. R. Seeger)

Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, by David Kilcullen (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

The Terror Courts: Rough Justice at Guantanamo Bay, by Jess Bravin (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Under Fire: The Untold Story of the Attack in Benghazi, by Fred Burton and Samuel M. Katz (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Policy/Tradecraft

Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism, by Lt. Gen. Ion Pacepa and Ronald J. Rychlak (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy, by Kenneth M. Pollack (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

HISTORICAL

Pre-20th Century

Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency, by Rory Cormac (58 3 [September], Ryan Shaffer, Ph.D.)

The Cuckoos' Nest: Five Hundred Years of Cambridge Spies, by Christopher Catherwood (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Dr. Benjamin Church, Spy: A Case of Espionage on the Eve of the American Revolution, by John A. Nagy (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

George Washington's Secret Six: The Spy Ring That Saved the American Revolution, by Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Spies, Patriots, and Traitors: American Intelligence in the Revolutionary War, by Kenneth A. Daigler (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

20th Century

America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East, by Hugh Wilford (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Assassins of the Turquoise Palace, by Roya Hakakian (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Britannia and the Bear: The Anglo-Russian Intelligence Wars 1917-1929, by Victor Madeira (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

- The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War***, by Stephen Kinzer (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)
- The Burglary: The Discovery of J. Edgar Hoover's Secret FBI***, by Betty Medsger (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)
- Chapman Pincher: Dangerous To Know—A Life***, by Chapman Pincher (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)
- Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA***, by John Rizzo (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)
- Covert Capital: Landscapes of Denial and the Making of US Empire in the Suburbs of Northern Virginia***, by Andrew Friedman (58 2 [June], John Ehrman)
- Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House***, by Peter Baker (58 2 [June], Thomas Coffey)
- Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War***, by Robert M. Gates (58 2 [June], Nicholas Dujmovic)
- The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power***, by John Prados (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)
- Fool's Mate: A True Story of Espionage at the National Security Agency***, by John W. Whiteside III (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)
- Go Spy The Land: Being the Adventures of IK8 of the British Secret Service***, by George Alexander Hill (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story***, by Jack Devine with Vernon Loeb (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Intelligence Tradecraft: An Art of Trapping the Enemy***, by Uday Kumar (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)
- KLOP: Britain's Most Ingenious Spy***, by Peter Day (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- The Lawn Road Flats: Spies, Writers and Artists***, by David Burke (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East***, by Scott Anderson (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)
- MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 (revised and updated)***, by Keith Jeffery (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)
- Mission R&AW***, by R.K. Yadav (58 4 [December], Ryan Shaffer, PhD)
- My CIA: Memories of a Secret Career***, by Christopher David Costanzo (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)
- The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee - Volume 1: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis***, by Michael Goodman (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)
- Proceed to Peshawar: The Story of a U.S. Navy Intelligence Mission on the Afghan Border, 1943***, by George J. Hill (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)
- Re-energising Indian Intelligence***, by Manoj Shrivastava (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)
- Russian Roulette: A Deadly Game; How British Spies Thwarted Lenin's Global Plot***, by Giles Milton (58 4 [December], J. R. Seeger and Bookshelf)

Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918–1989, edited by Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA, by Randall Woods (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Siege: 68 Hours Inside the Taj Hotel, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

SIGINT: The Secret History of Signals Intelligence 1914–45, by Peter Matthews (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Spy and Counterspy: A History of Secret Agents and Double Agents From the Second World War to the Cold War, by Ian Dear (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Spy Lost: Caught Between the KGB and the FBI, by Kaarlo Tuomi, edited by Sakari Määttänen (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936–2013, edited by Richard J. Aldrich, Rory Cormac and Michael Goodman (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Story of a Death Foretold: The Coup Against Salvador Allende, September 11, 1973, by Oscar Guardia-la-Rivera (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle Over a Forbidden Book, by Peter Finn and Petra Couvée (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

WW I

Dark Invasion: 1915—Germany's Secret War and the Hunt for the First Terrorist Cell in America, by Howard Blum (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of World War I Intelligence, by Nigel West (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

MI5 in the Great War, edited by Nigel West (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

WW II

"A" Force: The Origins of British Deception During the Second World War, by Whitney T. Bendeck (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Atom Spy and MI5: The Story of Alan Nunn May, by John H. Smith (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Brave Genius: A Scientist, a Philosopher, and Their Daring Adventures from the French Resistance to the Nobel Prize, by Sean B. Carroll (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Hoover's Secret War Against Axis Spies: FBI Counterespionage During World War II, by Raymond J. Batvinis (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

How Long Till Dawn: Memoirs of one of the Charter Members and Original Founders of the Resistance Movement in Algiers and a Member of OSS during World War II, by Daphne Joan Fry (Tuyl) Knox (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Mrs Zigzag: The Extraordinary Life of a Secret Agent's Wife, by Betty Chapman and Ronald L. Bonewitz (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America, by Annie Jacobsen (58 3 [September], Jay Watkins)

Reflections of Honor: The Untold Story of a Nisei Spy, by Lorraine War and Katherine Erwin, with Yoshi-nobu Oshiro (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort, by Raffaele Laudani (ed.) (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Secret Rescue: An Untold Story of American Nurses and Medics Behind Nazi Lines, by Cate Lineberry (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Secret War for the Middle East: The Influence of Axis and Allied Intelligence Operations during World War II, by Youssef Aboul-Enein and Basil Aboul-Enein (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Tales From the Special Forces Club: The Untold Stories of Britain's Elite WW II Warriors, by Sean Rayment (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Useful Enemies: John Demjanjuk and America's Open-Door Policy for Nazi War Criminals, by Richard Rashke (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Cold War

A Very Principled Boy: The Life of Duncan Lee, Red Spy and Cold Warrior, by Mark A. Bradley (58 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Against All Enemies: An American's Cold War Journey, by Jeffrey M. Carney (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Extorting Peace: Romania, The Clash Within the Warsaw Pact and The End of the Cold War (Volume 2), by Larry L. Watts (58 2 [June], Christopher D. Jones)

Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain, by Alfred A. Reisch (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World, by Evan Thomas (58 1 [March], Nicholas Dujmovic)

James Jesus Angleton: Was He Right?, by Edward Jay Epstein (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Meeting the Challenge: The Hexagon KH-9 Reconnaissance Satellite, by Phil Pressel (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and His Influence on US Counterintelligence, edited by Bruce Hoffman and Christian Ostermann (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case, by Allen Weinstein (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

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Spymaster: Startling Cold War Revelations of a Soviet KGB Chief, by Tennent H. Bagley (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

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With Friends Like These...The Soviet Bloc's Clandestine War Against Romania (Volume I), by Larry L. Watts (58 2 [June], Christopher D. Jones)

Vietnam War

Cold War Southeast Asia, by Malcolm H. Murfett (ed.) (58 3 [September], Timothy Castle, Ph.D.)

Hog's Exit: Jerry Daniels, the Hmong, and the CIA, by Gayle L. Morrison (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Unlikely Warriors: The Army Security Agency's Secret War in Vietnam 1961–1973, by Lonnie M. Long and Gary B. Blackburn (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

GENERAL HISTORICAL

Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence, by Nigel West (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence, by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (58 2 [June], John Ehrman and Jason Manosevitz)

On Paper: The Everything of its Two-Thousand-Year History, by Nicholas Basbanes (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Prisoners, Lovers, & Spies: The Story of Invisible Ink from Herodotus to al-Qaeda, by Kristie Macrakis (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

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Tales from Langley: The CIA from Truman to Obama, by Peter Kross (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

FICTION

The Man Who Loved Dogs, by Leonardo Padura, translated by Anna Kushner (58 3 [September], John Ehrman)

A Most Wanted Man: the Movie, Directed by Anton Corbijn, screenplay by Andrew Bovell, (58 4 [December], James Burridge and Paul Kavanagh)

An Officer and a Spy, by Robert Harris (58 3 [September], John Ehrman)

The Red Cell, by André Le Gallo (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Red Sparrow, by Jason Matthews (58 1 [March], James Burridge and Michael Bradford)

A Spy's Lonely Path, by Gene Coyle (58 4 [December], Bookshelf)



MEMOIRS

The titles that follow also appeared in the above sections.

Against All Enemies: An American's Cold War Journey, by Jeffrey M. Carney (58 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Chapman Pincher: Dangerous To Know—A Life, by Chapman Pincher (58 3 [September], Bookshelf)

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INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

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With Friends Like These... The Soviet Bloc's Clandestine War Against Romania (Volume I), by Larry L. Watts (58 2 [June], Christopher D. Jones)

