

Laboratory Types with Bio-Containment Facilities

- Pharmaceutical
- College & University
- Biochemical R&D
- Forensic
- Genomics / Proteomics
- Food & Beverages
- Environmental

- Nanotechnology
- Medical Examiner or Coroner
- Department of Health
- Clinical
- Biotechnology
- Consumer Products
- Agricultural



Federal

Public Law 107-56:

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001

Prohibits restricted persons from shipping, possessing or receiving select agents

Public Law 107-188:

Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002

Requires institutions to notify DHHS or USDA of possession of specific pathogens or toxins

42 CFR Part 73 / Part 1003: (Department of Health and Human Services)

Possession, Use and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins

Select Agent Act of 2002

Regulations



CDC List of Select Agents

Viruses

- Crimean-Congo Haemorragic
 Fever
- Eastern Equine Encephalitis
- Ebola
- Equine Morbillivirus
- Lassa Fever
- Marburg
- Rift Valley Fever
- So. American Haemorrhagic Fevers
- Tick-borne Encephalitis
- Variola Major
- Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis
- Hantavirus
- Yellow Fever

Bacteria

- Bacillus Anthracis
- Burcella Abortus
- Burkholderia Mallei
- Burkholderia
 Pseudomallei
- Clostridium Botulinum
- Francisella Tularensis
- Yersinia Pestis

Fungi & Rickettsae

- Coccidioides Immitis
- Coxiella Burnetii
- Rickettsia Prowazekii
- Rickettsia Rickettsii

Toxins

- Abrin
- Aflatoxins
- Botulinum
- Clostridium Perfringens Epsilon
- Conotoxin
- Diacetoxyscirpenol
- Ricin
- Saxitoxin
- Sigatoxin
- Staphylococcal Enterotoxin
- Tetrodotoxin
- T-2 Toxin

Biological Safety

Centers for Disease Control with National Institutes of Health

Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service (ARS)

Facility Design Standards

Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

Quarantine Facility Guidelines for Microorganisms

Quarantine Facility Guidelines for Weeds

Quarantine Facility Guidelines for the Receipt and Containment

Non-indigenous Arthropod Herbivores, Parasitoids, Predators

American Committee of Medical Entomology

Arthropod Containment Guidelines



Biological Safety

Guidelines for Containment at Biosafety Level 3

	CDC Select Agent	NCI Oncogenic Viruses	Human Pathogens	Prions	rDNA	USDA Restricted	Animal Pathogens	Zoonotic Pathogens	Small Animal Studies	Large Animal Studies	Plant rDNA & Pathogen	Arthropod-Borne	Large Scale	Insectary	Greenhouse
ARS Facility Design Standards		Х		Х	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
CDC with NIH - BMBL	Х		Х	X				Х	X			Х			
NIH RAC rDNA Guidelines					Х		X				Х		Х		Х
APHIS Quarantine Facility Guide											Х	Х		X	Х
ASM Arbovirus Lab Safety												Х		X	
American Mosquito Control Assoc														X	
NCI Guide for Oncogenic Viruses		X													

Biological Safety

National Institutes of Health

Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research
Laboratory Safety Supplement to the Guidelines

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Bloodborne Pathogens
Tuberculosis Standard

National Cancer Institute with NIH

Guidelines for Oncogenic Viruses

World Health Organization

Laboratory Safety Guidelines

Biological Safety within overall guidelines

AAALAC – Guide for Care and Use of Laboratory Animals

Local Building Code

National Building Code

NFPA Standards

Fire Protection Code

Mechanical Code

Plumbing Code

Electrical Code

Energy Code

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OSHA

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

Cost Premium for Facilities

Gross Area
Net to Gross Ratio
Net Usable Area
Cost per Sq. Foot
Estimated
Construction Cost


	BSL-2	BSL-3	BSL-3	BSL-4	BSL-4
	Standard	Standard	Enhanced	Cabinet	Suit
5	1,538	2,000	2,800	3,778	6,857
ı	65%	55%	50%	45%	35%
ı	1,000	1,100	1,400	1,700	2,400
L	\$310	\$450	\$520	\$880	\$1,200
	100				
	\$476,923	\$900,000	\$1,456,000	\$3,324,444	\$8,228,571






Cost Premium for Facilities

Diagram of Containment Concept



Cost Premium for Facilities



Biosafety Planning Issues



Biosafety Cabinets


Gas Tight Room Tested/Certified

Air Locks with air pressure doors

Electrical Outlets

Floor/Sink Drains

Window Frame



Waste Management
All waste rendered
harmless

- autoclave waste from lab
- decontaminate effluent waste
- HEPA filter air

Biosafety Planning Issues

- Design of containment barriers
- Quality research = containment
- Ventilation requirements

Sealed pipe penetrations

BSL-3 lab in Canada





Biosafety Planning Issues

Containment Barriers

- Primary barrier
 - Biological safety cabinet
 - Personal protective gear
- Secondary barrier
 - Room enclosure
 - Engineering systems
- Tertiary barrier
 - Containment around systems





BSL-2 Planning Issues

Agents	Practices	Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers)	Facilities (Secondary Barriers)
Suitable for work involving agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel and the environment	 BSL-1 plus: Controlled access Hand washing Keep lab clothing within lab, do not wear outside lab Baseline serum levels of staff Needles/sharps precautions 	 Class II BSC's or other physical containment devices used for all open manipulations of agents PPE: protective gear as needed Eyewash available Sink for hand wash Autoclave available 	 Physical separation, & locked, self-closing doors from access corridors Sturdy, easily cleaned furniture and work surfaces Exhausted air not recirculated Negative airflow into laboratory Insect screens on windows

BSL-3 Planning Issues

Agents	Practices	Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers)	Facilities (Secondary Barriers)
Indigenous or exotic agents with potential for aerosol transmission; disease may have serious or lethal consequences	 BSL-2 plus: Controlled access Work in certified BSC Decontamination of all waste Decontaminate lab clothing before laundering Baseline serum levels of staff 	 Class II or III BSC's or other physical containment devices used for all open manipulations of agents PPE: protective lab clothing, gloves, respiratory protection as needed Autoclave in lab suite HEPA filter vacuum lines 	 BSL-2 plus: Physical separation from access corridors Locked self-closing, double-door access Exhausted air not recirculated Negative airflow into laboratory Room penetrations are sealed Room surfaces are water resistant for

Goals of a BSL-3 Facility

- Protect personnel in the laboratory
- Provide productive scientific environment
 - Protect research, samples, and products
- Protect staff who operate and maintain systems
- Protect environment
 - Surrounding personnel and functions
 - Outside environment, adjacent communities










Definition of a BSL-3 Facility

Suitable for work with infectious agents which may cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of exposure by the inhalation route

- Exposure potential to pathogens spread by aerosol
- Infection serious, possibly lethal

M. Tuberculosis, St. Louis Encephalitis, Coxiella Burneti



BSL-3 Facility Planning Issues Concentrate and Minimize

- Limit number of individuals and processes that must work under BSL-3 conditions
- Provide appropriate service support outside
- Provide appropriate functional support inside
- Estimate capital and life cycle costs for operating facility: (BSL-4 estimates are \$750 million per year!)

Capital cost includes design, construction, commissioning, and equipment fit-out of the laboratory

Life cycle cost includes utility expense for ventilation and electric power, filter testing/replacement, inspections, insurance/liability

BSL-3 Facility Planning Issues Plan for Future Expansion

- Connection and redundancy
- Advantage of immediate adjacency
- Cons of immediate adjacency
- Economies of redundancy

BSL-3 Facility Planning Issues Plan for Flexibility Regulatory and research changes New pathogens New equipment