

# CHALLENGES FOR CIVIL- MILITARY INTEGRATION DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS

BY

COLONEL TIMOTHY A. VUONO  
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050



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STABILITY OPERATIONS**

by

Colonel Timothy A. Vuono  
United States Army

Mr. William J. Flavin  
Program Adviser  
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **ABSTRACT**

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The US military will continue to play the leading role in stabilization and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. Past efforts to achieve an effective integration of interagency capabilities for these missions have been limited at best. There is a critical need for fully integrated interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that go well beyond past attempts at mere civil-military cooperation or collaboration. This paper focuses on how the military can better integrate civilian personnel and capabilities when it has the lead in stability operations. It also explores how to effectively transition to a civilian leading role in these missions. The paper first provides context by reviewing select lessons from several US operations executed since the end of the Cold War. Next, it assesses recent initiatives and military doctrinal changes that are designed to address these issues. It then explores several new civil-military organizational innovations that address these issues, such as US Africa Command and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It also highlights the increasing reliance contractors who can fill the gaps in military and government civilian capabilities in these areas. Finally, it concludes with several recommendations for the Department of Defense to improve civil-military integration during stabilization missions.



## CHALLENGES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS

One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.<sup>1</sup>

-- Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

As Secretary Gates noted in his remarks at the University of Kansas in November 2007, successful accomplishment of US national security objectives will increasingly demand the effective leveraging of capabilities from all instruments of national power, not just the military services. This is particularly true in countries requiring assistance for stabilization and reconstruction following military interventions or natural disasters. Civilian professionals, both within the US government and contractors, are almost intuitively expected to have more appropriate skills and expertise to address these stabilization and reconstruction efforts as compared to uniformed military personnel. However, due to the lack of personnel in the civilian agencies of the US Government, the military has been forced to not only support stabilization and reconstruction efforts, but more often than not, to lead them.

In addition to traditional security related tasks, the activities required of US forces today include repairing critical infrastructure, developing and strengthening indigenous institutions and governance, providing essential services, promoting justice, and fostering economic development. In an explicit recognition of this reality, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a directive policy guidance in 2005 that states, “while many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S.

civilian professionals...U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”<sup>2</sup> Thus, military support to security, stability, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) became a core mission for the US military.

Historically, efforts to achieve an effective integration of interagency capabilities have been limited at best. Despite wide recognition of the importance of improving US Government civilian capacity for these requirements, only modest efforts have been made. The US military will continue to play the leading role in stabilization and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. Currently, there is a critical need for fully integrated interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that go well beyond past attempts at mere civil-military cooperation or collaboration.

This paper focuses on how the military can better integrate civilian personnel and capabilities when it has the lead in stability operations. It also explores how to effectively transition to a civilian leading role in these missions. The paper first provides context by reviewing select lessons from several US operations executed since the end of the Cold War. Next, it assesses recent initiatives and military doctrinal changes that are designed to address these issues. It then explores several relatively new civil-military organizational innovations, including initiatives such as US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also highlights the increasing reliance on contractors who can fill the gaps in military and government civilian capabilities in these areas. Finally, the paper concludes with several recommendations for the Department of Defense to improve the civil-military

integration in stabilization and reconstruction missions and more effectively transition to a civilian leading role.

### **Selected Lessons From Recent Operations**

The missions US military forces routinely conduct in today's complex security environment are not new. They have long been known as "nation-building."<sup>3</sup> Traditional civilian development efforts readily fall under this rubric, but when applied to US military operations the term has acquired baggage from a legacy of UN and multilateral "peace operations" during the 1990s. Although the term nation-building does not have a doctrinal definition, it effectively captures many of the essential tasks required of the US military today in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current doctrinal phrase for these tasks is "stability operations", which Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 describes as "military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions."<sup>4</sup>

The American military's role in nation building, or stability operations, can be traced to its earliest days, both in the expansion of the United States and throughout the world following conflict. Despite this reality, the military has an equally long tradition of reluctance to engage in the myriad of requirements in these settings. This reluctance has led to a mixed level of performance by the US military in these operations, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Of course, it is not just those in uniform who have sought to avoid these tasks. As James Dobbins notes in his review of America's role in nation building, "institutional resistance in departments of State and Defense, neither of which regard nation-building among their core missions, has also been an obstacle. As a result, successive administrations have treated each new mission as if it

were the first and, more importantly, as if it were the last.”<sup>5</sup> A brief review of some of the relevant lessons from such missions in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti is instructive to better understand the interagency challenges of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The invasion of Panama in 1989 was one in a series of international ventures that required the US military to become involved in nation building. The experience in *Operation Just Cause* demonstrated numerous shortcomings in planning and execution that would be repeated in subsequent interventions. In his detailed assessment of US support for reconstruction in Panama, Richard Shultz identified a number of lessons that appear quite prescient today:

One, do not allow senior DOD officials to ignore planning for post-conflict situations... Two, do not allow the planning process to be compartmented within DOD; post-conflict situations have to be planned in a civilian-military interagency setting. Three, do not bifurcate the process within DOD into war fighting and post-conflict compartments... Four, do not assign the task within DOD to those who lack an understanding of the situation and the historical and cultural context...Five, do not limit resources...<sup>6</sup>

The first two lessons are of particular relevance to today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Panama, senior military leaders and their staffs focused on preparations for combat operations and defeating the enemy at the expense of detailed analysis and effective planning for what would happen next. When asked about the post-invasion restoration plan, General Maxwell Thurman, the commander of US Southern Command and the operation, commented that “I did not even spend five minutes on *Blind Logic* [the restoration plan] during my briefing as the incoming CINC...We put together the campaign plan for *Just Cause* and probably did not spend enough time on the restoration.”<sup>7</sup>

However, this neglect was even more evident among civilian leaders and agencies. In addition to compartmentalized planning for *Operation Just Cause* within the Department of Defense, the interagency response was slow to materialize and insufficient. Historical and social factors in Panama that may have been better understood by civilian experts were not sufficiently identified by military planners. This compounded post-conflict instability that was characterized by widespread looting, an ineffective Panamanian interim government, and general discontent. A tenuous security situation led the military force to take on tasks that normally would be better suited for civilians.<sup>8</sup>

Many of the problems with the US effort in post-invasion Panama were also seen in the “peace operations” of the 1990s, particularly in Somalia and Haiti. During operations in Somalia between 1992-1993, the missions given to US military forces ranged from providing humanitarian relief for a starving populace to combat in support of a major United Nations peace enforcement action. In addition to the challenges inherent in being part of a multilateral UN coalition with numerous civilian relief organizations, the environment in Somalia became increasingly unstable and violent. The security situation forced the US military to not only conduct extensive combat operations, but also to take on more and more civilian tasks. These tasks included building vital infrastructure such as roads and bridges, providing drinking water by digging wells, and establishing schools and hospitals.<sup>9</sup>

Although the humanitarian assistance aspects of the US military mission in Somalia were relatively successful, over time the mission evolved to require

support of an increasingly ambitious UN nation-building and stabilization mandate. This resulted in a series of clashes with local militias that ultimately led to unacceptable American casualties and their eventual withdrawal. A National Defense University report on Somalia lessons learned concluded in part that “while military power may well set the stage for such action, the real responsibility for nation-building must be carried out by the civilian agencies of the government better able to specialize in such long-term humanitarian efforts.”<sup>10</sup> It also emphasized the need for unity of effort in such operations to ensure military, diplomatic, and humanitarian actions are parts of a “common whole.”<sup>11</sup>

Many of the lessons from the Panama and Somalia interventions were further refined with varying degrees of success during the 1994 invasion of Haiti and operations in the Balkans later in the decade. These experiences also offered key parallels and lessons that should have better informed the planning and execution for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>12</sup> In the Panama and Haiti cases, the United States also sought “regime change,” planned for a quick restoration of stability, and hoped to rapidly transition control of the situation to a newly established friendly host government. These goals all required significant interagency coordination and synchronization. Even so, neither the military nor the other civilian agencies of the US government ever fully embraced the lessons or established effective mechanisms to institutionalize them.<sup>13</sup> When the Bush Administration arrived in 2001, there was even less interest in supporting nation-building activities. “In consequence, the slow improvement that had been registered in U.S. nation-building performance through the 1990s, from the low point of Somalia to the increasing professionalism shown in Haiti, then Bosnia, and

finally Kosovo, was reversed first in Afghanistan and then even more markedly in Iraq.”<sup>14</sup>

The missteps and shortcomings of both US military and civilian efforts in Iraq, and to a lesser degree in Afghanistan, over the early years of the wars are well documented.<sup>15</sup> Rather than attempt to summarize the many lessons from these two conflicts, four points highlight the continuing challenges of civil-military integration and transition. First, and possibly the most frequently identified, was the lack of detailed planning for reconstruction. According to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner who served as director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) following the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, “we missed an opportunity because we should have started the process earlier; we should have had a longer time to plan; and we should have had agreed-upon objectives that we were going to do in postwar.”<sup>16</sup> As in Panama, military leaders believed that they would be able to hand-off these tasks relatively quickly to US civilian agencies and the Iraqis themselves, and they would only have to deal with limited humanitarian relief activities. Faulty and overly optimistic assumptions regarding the expected level of Iraqi support and the ability of the Iraqi government bureaucracy to be reconstituted led to a continuous stream of changes in the plan to confront fluid and unanticipated circumstances.

Second, the planning shortcomings in Iraq were compounded by a severe lack of civilian personnel available to provide the critical expertise and agency support needed for the longer-term stabilization and reconstruction effort. In the early days after the invasion and throughout the tenure of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) from 2003-2004, “civilian agencies took a long time to send their representatives, since they

do not regularly reassign and redeploy their personnel the way the military does, and they had to seek volunteers since civilians could not be ordered to serve in a potential war zone.”<sup>17</sup> As a result, uniformed military personnel filled critical positions for civilians. Even at the height of the CPA’s tenure, only 56 per cent of its authorized civilian positions were filled.<sup>18</sup> Of those who did go to Iraq, most civilians were only there for a few months and many had limited experience with sustainable development programs. This constant change of civilian personnel led to a further lack of continuity and inability to provide the consistent support needed to help develop Iraqi institutions. As the military stepped in to fill the voids, taking on more and more of the responsibilities for reconstruction and long-term development, it became evident that most lacked the necessary expertise or experience to do it as effectively as would civilian professionals.

Third, this lack of US government civilian personnel available to operate in hostile environments also complicated and reduced effective interagency coordination. The goal of achieving “unity of effort” among the various personnel and agencies was hampered, particularly during the year of the CPA. There was a wide range of views regarding US objectives in Iraq.<sup>19</sup> Many civilians focused on implementing “policies that set out to change the politics, economy, and even the culture of Iraq,” while the military initially “thought of its mission as almost the opposite,” essentially just winning the conflict and then turning over responsibility for follow-on requirements to civilians.<sup>20</sup> Of course, establishing unity of effort must begin at the top, with the senior military and civilian leaders in agreement about goals and objectives.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, this was not the case in Iraq for far too long and the strategic inconsistencies rippled throughout subordinate levels.

Likewise, prior to 2003 in Afghanistan, virtually the same problems confronted the US mission. “Coordination between the military and interagency partners was hampered by a US Embassy and military headquarters separated by over forty kilometers. Unity of effort suffered; the military command and control situation was in flux; our tactical approach was enemy-focused and risked alienating the Afghan people; and the substantial draw of operations in Iraq had put severe limits on the availability of key military capabilities for Afghanistan.”<sup>22</sup>

A fourth and final point regarding Iraq and Afghanistan involves inadequate and inconsistent resourcing to effectively conduct stability and reconstruction activities. For example, in Iraq, despite the billions of dollars being spent, “problematic funding and contracting mechanisms that slowed the services and basic reconstruction” raised discontent and helped fuel the insurgency that further compounded the requirements.<sup>23</sup> Many standard, peacetime funding and resourcing systems were used by civilian agencies and the military even though they lacked the flexibility needed to respond to changing requirements on the ground. However, with the creation of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the military was given a tool designed primarily for small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects. Most commanders acknowledge that CERP funds are a critical tool for their operations. At the same time, it has not been institutionalized and projects are frequently not harmonized with longer-term development efforts.

Based upon these and other historical experiences, Dr. Conrad Crane noted that,

While there is universal agreement about who should ideally be rebuilding states, the harsh historical reality is that the world’s greatest nation-building institution, when properly resourced and motivated, is the US military, especially the US Army. American military forces would like to

quickly win wars and go home, but the United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended American military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.<sup>24</sup>

There appears to be no end in sight for the demands of stability operations. Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, frequently notes that for the foreseeable future, the United States and its military forces will operate in an environment of “persistent conflict.”<sup>25</sup> Complex and multidimensional conflicts will take place “among rather than around the population” and cannot be won by force alone. Rather, it will require the effective application of all instruments of national power in innovative and integrated systems.

### **Recent Developments**

The US military has now embraced “stability operations” in recognition of the frequent and increasingly important role they play in them, while simultaneously conducting combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, stability operations lie in the often gray and cloudy range of conditions between conventional war and traditional development. The 2005 DOD Directive on SSTR formally established that stability operations require an *integrated* civil-military approach for success and are critical to winning wars *and* securing the eventual peace. Coordination and cooperation alone are insufficient. Each military or civilian actor has vital skills or capabilities that must be fully leveraged through a thoughtful and balanced assessment of what the task requires and the circumstances that exist at the time. A commission sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Relations coined the term “Smart Power” to describe the development of such “an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power.”<sup>26</sup>

US military personnel must be prepared to execute all stabilization requirements when civilians are not able to do so. To ensure sufficient resources and training are applied to these areas, the Directive further states that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission” that shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership personnel, facilities, and planning.<sup>27</sup> Reflecting on his division and corps command experiences in Iraq, LTG Peter W. Chiarelli effectively captured this requirement:

Another reality the uniformed forces must accept culturally is that, like it or not, until further notice the U.S. Government has decided that the military largely owns the job of nation-building....Today, the U.S. military is the only national organization able to conduct some of the most critical tasks associated with rebuilding war-torn or failed nations. ... Unless and until there is a significant reorganization of U.S. Government interagency capabilities, the military is going to be the Nation’s instrument of choice in nation-building.<sup>28</sup>

At the same time, while military leaders are responsible for nation-building tasks, by default they also must constantly assess the impact on current and future operational capability as soldiers spend more time away from their primary warfighting skills. The effort must be rebalanced as necessary with the ultimate goal of civilians taking the lead. If such a shift to civilian responsibility does not occur, the risk of further overextending the military will increase as they continue these activities even though more traditional development organizations and systems would be more appropriate. “By defaulting to reliance on the military,” one report concludes, “the United States aggravates existing institutional imbalances.”<sup>29</sup> Additionally, by filling this void the military may actually undercut the incentives for other agencies to develop and sustain the needed capacity. Finally, uniformed soldiers performing long-term development

may eventually jeopardize the support of the local population as they have a sense of occupation. At such a stage, it is always better to have civilians with the appropriate expertise in the leading roles.


Although experience since the Cold War had taught the military much about stability operations, the debate about what soldiers should be expected to do has continued. To address this issue, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) developed a Joint Operating Concept (JOC) to help clarify the scope of SSTR tasks for the military. It identifies six major mission elements (MME) that are essential in order to help ensure that a threatened government can emerge from conflict as a viable and stable regime:

- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment;
- Deliver humanitarian assistance;
- Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services;
- Support economic development;
- Establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law.<sup>30</sup>

Figure 1 delineates the relationship between these tasks and the end state desired.<sup>31</sup>

Each can be further broken down for specific missions and include metrics to assess effectiveness. The allocation of responsibilities for each requirements between military and civilian organizations may also change over time as the security situation permits.

**Figure 1. Major Mission Elements of an SSTR Operation**




Several new US military doctrinal manuals attempt to capture this changing outlook on their role in stability operations. They also frame the missions in the context of a single continuum of operations, rather than sequential steps. The military should fully expect to conduct combat operations virtually simultaneously with stability and reconstruction activities. According to the Army’s recently revised manual on *Operations* (FM 3-0), while military “forces focus on achieving the military end state, they ultimately need to create conditions where the other instruments of national power are preeminent. Stability operations focus on creating those conditions.”<sup>32</sup> Thus, winning battles alone should not be the final measure of success in such complex operations. A longer, more thoughtful approach that effectively shapes the environment for future civilian-led and military supported efforts is critical.

The distribution of responsibilities for specific tasks between military personnel and civilians is in large part directly dependent on the level of violence and hostilities in

an area. One key challenge is to effectively identify the most appropriate transition points to adjust levels of effort. A report co-chaired by Brent Scowcroft and Sandy Berger described how this balance might ideally shift over time as conditions change:

The armed forces will necessarily play a lead role in providing initial security. As security improves, civilian agencies and international financial institutions will move to the forefront. At all stages, close coordination between military and civilian agencies is essential to success, which may be judged by the development of an indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, and...healthy civil society.<sup>33</sup>

Figure 2 represents this process, but it also highlights one of the key challenges of these transitions -- who should have the lead responsibilities across the spectrum of SSTR.<sup>34</sup> It is important to note that the graph is not time dependent and is based upon events as violence ebbs. This could take months or years. Regardless of the length of time, however, a critical gap arises at the dashed line as the military role begins to decrease and civilian personnel are not capable of taking over the leading role for the situation. This is potentially the most challenging period across the spectrum.



**Figure 2. Military and Civilian Transitions in Stability Operations**

Of course, such transitions do not actually occur all at once with a final concluding ceremony. Rather, they are a “rolling process of little handoffs between different actors along several streams of activities. There are usually multiple transitions for any one stream of activity over time.”<sup>35</sup> For the military, transitions are a routine part of all operations and many of their standard hand-off approaches can be applied to those between soldiers and civilians. However, all of them require detailed planning to ensure conceptual unity is maintained. Additionally, they must always consider the relationships established with local actors in order to sustain an “atmosphere of cooperation, collaboration, and enfranchisement” for them.<sup>36</sup>

## **Ongoing Organizational Innovations**

Traditionally, the primary interagency coordination venue for the US government occurred at the strategic or national level through the National Security Council (NSC). Today's NSC, however, is primarily a policy formulation body and does not actually oversee management of the interagency process or provide a planning or operational coordination system. "As a result, the departments are bereft of a team concept, and have little interdepartmental consensus on problems, causes, or the systems environment."<sup>37</sup> As the previous historical examples demonstrate, there is a critical need for civil-military integration processes and organizations institutionalized at all levels to ensure effective execution of stability operations. Ad hoc arrangements and piecemeal approaches are insufficient. A June 2007 Department of Defense report to Congress highlighted three key requirements to successfully integrate current military and civilian capabilities:

- Civilian agencies must focus on becoming more operational, expeditionary, and capable of planning for and executing contingency responses.
- Military forces and civilian agencies must make use of joint strategies, plans, and operational approaches to ensure reinforcing effects at all levels.
- Military forces must become more capable of supporting ... and performing non-kinetic missions when necessary.<sup>38</sup>

In recognition of such requirements, the US government has developed several new organizational innovations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that have met with varying degrees of success.

In December 2006, the Bush Administration issued National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), "Management of the Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization." This directive is an attempt to improve overall

coordination by focusing on changes required in the State Department and other civilian agencies. It directs the State Department through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to be the lead US government agency for harmonizing all US government efforts for future stabilization and reconstruction requirements. While S/CRS has potential for developing much needed civilian capacity through initiatives such as the Interagency Management System (IMS) and the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), it is still several years away from full capability and must continually struggle for adequate resources.<sup>39</sup> S/CRS has worked closely with the Department of Defense to develop civilian organizations that can “plug in” to the different levels of military organizations during stability operations.

A promising development and potential model for greater civil-military integration at the operational level is the recent establishment of US Africa Command (AFRICOM). This new headquarters seeks to reach beyond mere interagency coordination and “holds the potential for channeling more attention and resources—as well as fostering from the bottom up an integrated ‘whole-of-government’ approach — problems of state fragility, internal conflict, and extremism.”<sup>40</sup> For example, AFRICOM has a senior State Department diplomat as one of two deputy commanders.<sup>41</sup> In addition, plans call for numerous Regional Integration Teams staffed with experts from throughout the US government agencies. However, to date, “the command has only just begun to integrate other US departments as well as to reach out to critical nongovernmental organizations operating on the continent—so far with only limited success.”<sup>42</sup> A key objective for AFRICOM is to help build local institutions in African countries so that they can address the drivers of instability before hostilities develop. It is also hoped that

AFRICOM's new structure and concepts will enable more effective execution of stability operations if required. However, if other US government agencies fail to support AFRICOM with the required personnel, as now appears likely, this goal is uncertain.

Another new organization that operates on the ground, but that can affect strategic and operational level issues is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). They are a creative development in the search for an effective civil-military integration model to address the requirements of stability operations.

PRTs are useful innovations, but should be seen as works in progress. They extend America's and its allies' presence and connections while providing unique insights. They can be agile and catalytic, and at their best they address local opportunities in an integrated fashion.<sup>43</sup>

PRTs were first established in 2002 to support US and Coalition stability efforts in Afghanistan and a variation of their design was eventually extended to the US effort in Iraq. According to the 2007 version of the Army's "PRT Playbook," they are only "interim" or transitional civil-military organizations that are "intended to improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation's legitimacy and effectiveness in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services."<sup>44</sup> Ideally, they would have a balanced composition of civilian and military experts from throughout the US government working in "partnership" to achieve unity of effort toward stabilization objectives.

While there are some similarities between the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are also significant differences.<sup>45</sup> In Afghanistan, the PRTs have a military commander (currently all Navy or Air Force officers) and they range in size from 50-100 personnel. A security force of up to a platoon of soldiers is included in these numbers. They also may have 3-10 civilian team members who are either professionals from the

Department of State, USAID, and other agencies or contractors hired on their behalf. Afghanistan PRTs have focused primarily on managing reconstruction projects and extending Afghan central government visibility beyond the traditional base in Kabul.

In contrast, the Iraq PRTs are usually led by a State Department Foreign Service Officer and are focused on building capacity in local Iraqi government institutions. They are smaller than the Afghanistan PRTs with 30-75 team members. In part this difference is because they live on large forward operating bases or other secure compounds and do not need to provide as much of their own logistical or security support. However, the key staff on Iraq PRTs tends to include more civilians than military personnel. Another variation of these models in Iraq is the recently developed “embedded PRTs.” They are much smaller, with fewer than 20 personnel, and operate jointly as part of an Army or Marine brigade sized unit. As a result, their efforts are also much more aligned with and attuned to the counterinsurgency objectives of the brigade commander.

As with any new approach, PRTs have become the subject of numerous critiques. One recent study summed up several of these shortcomings as follows:

PRT effectiveness has sometimes been hampered by ambiguous mandates, the absence of interagency doctrine, the lack of metrics for success, inadequate baseline assessments and strategic planning, insufficient civilian agency personnel and resources, minimal pre-deployment training, and uneven coordination with other agencies.<sup>46</sup>

Of particular concern is the continued lack of US civilian government capacity to sustain the required number of personnel. For example, one 2005 estimate indicated that the composition Afghanistan PRTs averaged more than 97 percent military personnel with “only a smattering of interagency representation, [from] DOS, USAID, and the

Department of Agriculture.”<sup>47</sup> Additionally, as the US military “surged” additional forces to Iraq beginning in 2007, the hope of a comparable civilian surge for more PRTs failed to materialize. The State Department turned to the Department of Defense to fill over a third of the 350 required positions with military personnel or DOD civilians. A Pentagon official stated that the planned three to four month “stopgap measure would give the State Department time to identify Foreign Service officers to serve in political and economic development jobs in Iraq.”<sup>48</sup> However, in March 2007, the State Department had to turn to civilian contractors to replace the military personnel and DOD civilians.<sup>49</sup>

PRTs have the potential to become “truly integrated civil-military structures and not just military organizations with ‘embedded’ civilian advisors or bifurcated organizations with two separate components...that operate separately from one another.”<sup>50</sup> However, with no formally approved organizational structure or well-defined doctrine for guidance, PRTs continue to evolve. Although such adaptation is useful to deal with changing requirements, the uncertainty leaves open the possibility that they will not be institutionalized even after seven years of use.

A final area of concern regarding PRTs involves the differing theater-level control organizations in each country. In Afghanistan, a Joint Task Force military chain of command is responsible for directing the PRTs. Alternatively in Iraq, the State Department-led Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) within the Embassy is “tasked with synchronizing governance, reconstruction, security and economic development assistance to the PRTs.”<sup>51</sup> Unfortunately, for the most part PRTs lie somewhere between the purview of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, which results in ad hoc and inconsistent training, guidance, oversight, and coordination across

(and often within) the differing theaters of operations.<sup>52</sup> Thus, there is no consistency across all efforts to provide operational guidance, ensure adequate resources are expeditiously available for the PRTs, and effectively synchronize and harmonize the various team initiatives across different theaters of operations.

The previous discussion identified the increasingly important role of contractors in stability operations. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) formally recognized the critical impact of commercial industry in meeting all US National Security objectives, describing the Department of Defense's warfighting capability and capacity as including "its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors."<sup>53</sup> Further, DOD policy "now directs that performance of commercial activities by contractors, including contingency contractors and any proposed contractor logistics support arrangements, shall be included in operational plans and orders."<sup>54</sup> Thus, when operating alongside the US military and government civilians in stability operations, private sector contractors are a critical resource.


The US experience Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that contractors are an integral part of almost all US operations and will surely remain so for the future. A 2005 Defense Science Board captured this fact by describing the private sector as the "fifth force provider" and noting that "in future stability operations, the fraction of the 'force' from the private sector may be greater or lesser, but will inevitably be significant."<sup>55</sup> The use of contractors by the US government in stabilization and reconstruction efforts goes well beyond the more publicized roles of private security companies such as Blackwater, USA or large logistic companies such as KBR, Inc. Civilian agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), have

long relied on contractors. For example, a 2007 USAID briefing on US capacity for current operations also notes that while USAID has only 1,095 Foreign Service Officers, it also routinely has over 624 US personal service contractors. Of these, it relies on over 495 of them to fill critical positions overseas.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, according to Ambassador John Herbst at S/CRS, even if the plans to develop greater civilian capacity in the US government are fully instituted, “there will still be a substantial need for contractors” in stabilization and reconstruction activities for the foreseeable future.<sup>57</sup>

The use of contractors by civilian agencies to support humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and development has been rather uncontroversial. However, any contractor role in unstable environments can raise common issues regarding oversight, reliability, cost effectiveness, legal status, and clarification of inherently governmental functions.<sup>58</sup> Additionally, ongoing concerns both about the US government’s ability to manage and oversee service contracts, as well as the role private security contractors may affect how the private sector is used in other areas. While it is important to resolve these issues, the concern here is how contractors can best support stability tasks.<sup>59</sup>

In many ways, contractors are ideally suited for these requirements and have been involved in such missions for years. One company heavily involved in supporting US stabilization missions points to several important contributions they routinely make in stability operations.<sup>60</sup> The first includes expertise with unique skill sets and methodologies, particularly for building the institutional capacity in the struggling government the US is supporting. The second is long-term continuity and staying power that are critical for enhancing personal relationships with local leaders. Lastly, the private sector provides a “bridge” for transitions. Figure 3 highlights the particular

importance of this role.<sup>61</sup> In both Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors hired by the US government are working with local leaders to help build critical institutions and systems filling key gaps in expertise for the military. As civilian agencies begin to assume the lead in these tasks, contractors are providing continuity. Even after civilian agencies take full responsibility, some of the same contractors will continue working as “consultants” to the host nation until it is fully capable of taking on the responsibilities.



**Figuring 3. The Private Sector as a “Bridge” for Sustaining Stability**

This last point offers a more subtle consequence of using civilian contractors to fill gaps in government civilian capacity rather than turning to uniformed military personnel for some stabilization and reconstruction tasks. “Local communities may be keener to work with civilians or personnel without uniforms, especially in countries where people do not trust national militaries and police services. Likewise the local government may be more willing to accept suggestions and share information with consultants who do not have direct ties with any foreign country’s policy.”<sup>62</sup>

## **Recommendations**

With broad directive guidance to execute all stabilization tasks when civilian professionals cannot, the US military has made many organizational and conceptual changes to ensure success in these missions. However, the Department of Defense should pursue several additional steps to improve civil-military integration, as well as more effectively prepare for the eventual transition to civilian leading roles.

First, the Department of Defense should establish a distinct organization to focus (lead, advocate, synchronize, & orchestrate) all DOD actions to meet the requirements for stability operations when the US military has the lead responsibility. It would serve as the DOD proponent for the leading role envisioned for Stated Department under NSPD-44. It would not replace S/CRS and would be fully consistent with the intent of the presidential directive. However, it would provide a consistent and coherent single structure within DOD to support the integration of S/CRS, USAID, and other civilian organizations into military led stabilization efforts as the situation permits. It would thus provide the key DOD vehicle for transition of the stabilization effort from a military lead to other US government civilians at the strategic to the tactical level. While the organization would focus support to the Combatant Commanders for the execution of operations, it would also be the lead DOD agent for synchronizing with S/CRS and other interagency planning processes for stability operations.

A useful structural model and framework for this proposal is the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).<sup>63</sup> The Secretary of Defense established JIEDDO in 2006 to address the daunting threat to US forces from

improvised explosive devices. Like JIEDDO, the new stability organization should report directly to the Secretary (or Deputy Secretary) of Defense, preferably with a civilian director possibly hired under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) to ensure appropriate experience with both military operations and reconstruction and development activities. It should also have a relatively lean headquarters staff. At the operational level, it would have elements similar to the current Office of Provincial Affairs in Iraq.<sup>64</sup> The field teams for the new organization would be based upon the current PRT model, but would better be described as “civic engagement teams” to capture the broader scope of their activities beyond those of post-conflict reconstruction projects. Ideally, essential US government agencies would provide a core group of civilian experts for each level of the organization to serve as a vanguard for those planned to join such missions through the S/CRS system. However, in their absence, DOD would hire contractors under standing contract vehicles. By consolidating the planning and operational control under one entity, DOD would ensure consistent guidance, standardized procedures, coherent resourcing, and systematic “reach-back” capability for field teams. It would also enable a smoother integration of civilian experts into an established architecture rather than into ad hoc and changing organizations.

Second, the critical role of contractors supporting military stability tasks should be fully embraced and institutionalized within the Department of Defense as was highlighted in the 2006 QDR and the 2005 Defense Science Board (DSB) study. Contractors provide critical expertise that can fill gaps between civilians and the military for these operations, and they serve as a critical bridge for transitions to civilian control. The DSB study’s call for an organization to exploit the “fifth provider force” would go far

to providing coherence to the contracting process.<sup>65</sup> The creation of prearranged personal service contracts with detailed position descriptions and requirements to ensure the private sector provides the right people in a timely manner. If neither the DSB proposed organization nor the one proposed in the recommendation above are established, DOD should assign the Army as the executive agent responsible for contracting personnel for stability operations.

Third, military planning processes and training for stability operations must better integrate interagency participation at all levels. As highlighted by the GAO in October 2007, DOD must give specific guidance to the Combatant Commands on how to integrate civilians in the planning process.<sup>66</sup> DOD must also establish a process to facilitate the sharing of planning information with non-DOD agencies and develop a means for better understanding of planning processes and capabilities between civilian and military agencies. Whenever possible, military training and exercises should routinely include civilian participation from the expected organizations that will operate with them in the field. Ideally, the actual civilian personnel will be available for key events to maximize familiarization with one another and to ensure smoother integration.

Lastly, support for Provisional Reconstruction Teams should be institutionalized within DOD and “improvisation should be replaced with an agreed concept of operations.”<sup>67</sup> This would require the establishment of consistent and formalized roles, missions, and authorities for the teams. A recent interagency workshop noted that that the PRT concept is becoming institutionalized in civilian agencies through the developing Interagency Management System, but they also recommend that PRTs have “an integrated chain for command, planning, and support at all levels.”<sup>68</sup> They

also note that PRTs need a framework for “top-down direction on roles and missions.” Military commanders involved in reconstruction and stabilization efforts must also understand and consider longer-term development priorities of civilian agencies. This will help ensure they set the conditions for the PRTs and future interagency efforts.<sup>69</sup>

## **Conclusions**

The US military has now embraced stability operations as a core mission. Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to broad acknowledgement among military leaders that these tasks are essential to win the peace, as well as the war. As the Army counterinsurgency manual notes, today’s operations occur “among the populace” and therefore, “political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of the conflict.”<sup>70</sup>

It is clear that the US military will play the leading role in stability and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. Uniformed personnel will have significant responsibilities long after the security situation improves and civilian professionals take over these nation-building efforts. Lasting success can only come through a truly “whole of government” effort that leverages capabilities from all instruments of national power including the military, government civilians, and the private sector. However, the military must refine systems and organizations to more effectively integrate civilian organizations as they join the fight. Decisions and actions by military leaders should help set the conditions for subsequent development efforts by civilians. Finally, the transitions between

military and civilian professionals as they transfer lead responsibility must be thoughtful, thorough, and always focused on the ultimate political objectives.

#### ENDNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Robert M. Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power," lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2008.

<sup>2</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Directive 3000.05, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 28 Nov 2005), 2; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007.

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed analysis of the concepts inherent in "nation-building" see James Dobbins, et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 2.

<sup>5</sup> James Dobbins, et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), xxviii-xxix.

<sup>6</sup> Richard H. Schultz, Jr. *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, August 1993), 70.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>8</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters*, Vol. 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), 109. For example, without an established US embassy team in place after the invasion, a Military Support Group (MSG) was formed that attempted implement an overall post-conflict plan that coordinated the interagency community to address these problems. Although the MSG was ad hoc and often stumbled through a trial and error learning process, it was fairly successful in assisting with the re-establishment of governance in Panama.

<sup>9</sup> Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 30 January 2006), 6.

<sup>10</sup> Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 90.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>12</sup> See Margaret Hayes, *Interagency and Political-military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – A Case Study*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995). Also, see Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds. *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004). For the Haiti operation, a national level interagency planning team developed what many consider to be the first-ever integrated political-military plan that synchronized all US government agencies. However, there were several problems: internal policy debate caused delays in issuing the final plan that affected operation coordination; civil-military command arrangements were ad hoc; and interagency coordination was often incomplete. Although the military tasks in Haiti were executed rather successfully, this was not the case for many key nation-building requirements.

<sup>13</sup> President Clinton did issue PDD-56 that established new interagency coordination planning and implementation mechanisms to better integrate all US efforts, but this directive was not adopted by the Bush administration. See Presidential Decision Directive 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, (Washington, DC: White House, May 1997.); available from <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc2.html>.

<sup>14</sup> Dobbins, et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, v.

<sup>15</sup> For example, see: Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate*, (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2005); Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); and Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

<sup>16</sup> LTG (Ret.) Jay Garner, "The Lost Year in Iraq," interview on PBS Frontline, 17 October 2006; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html>: Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

<sup>17</sup> Nora Bensahel, "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, no. 3, (June 2006), 460.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 463.

<sup>19</sup> According to *Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action*, "Unity of Effort" across the entire civil-military team is critical and "requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, and among nations in any alliance or coalition," as well as contractors.

<sup>20</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 210.

<sup>21</sup> While unity of effort implies action, "conceptual unity" is the common vision that is the glue by which military and political leaders hold it all together. This involves establishing and maintaining a harmony of the diverse aims of the various players that arise from their unique perspectives for requirements and priorities.

<sup>22</sup> David W. Barno, "Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency," *Parameters*, Vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 32-33.

<sup>23</sup> Joseph J. Collins, "The Perils of Planning: Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq" in *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 2007), 100.

<sup>24</sup> Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," *Military Review* (May-June 2005), 28.

<sup>25</sup> George W. Casey, "Maintaining Quality in the Force," lecture, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 4 December 2007.

<sup>26</sup> Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., co-chairs, *CSIS Commission Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 7.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> LTG Peter W. Chiarelli and MAJ Stephen Smith, "Learning from Our Modern Wars: The Imperative of Preparing for a Dangerous Future," *Military Review* (Sep-Oct 2007), 6-7.

<sup>29</sup> Rep. Robert Andrews and Rep. Mark Kirk, Co-chairs, *Integrating 21<sup>st</sup> Century Development and Security Assistance*, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, January 2008), ix.

<sup>30</sup> US Joint Forces Command, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 2.0, (US Joint Forces Command, J-9, December 2006), iii.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>32</sup> US Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0, (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), vii.

<sup>33</sup> Samuel L. Berger and Brent Scowcroft, Co-chairs, *In the Wake of War: Improving US Post-Conflict Capabilities* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), 4.

<sup>34</sup> Association of the United States Army, *Torchbearer national Security Report: The Army's Role in Stability Operations*, (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, October 2006), 8.

<sup>35</sup><sup>35</sup> US Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, December 2006), 2-10.

<sup>36</sup> US Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, FM 3-05.401, (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, July 2007), 6-4.

<sup>37</sup> Robert B. Polk, "Interagency Reform: An Idea Whose Time Has Come," in *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction*

*Roles*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 2007), 327.

<sup>38</sup>Department of Defense, *Report to Congress on Improving Interagency Support for US 21st Century National Security Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* (June 2007) available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/downloads/Signed\\_1035\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/downloads/Signed_1035_Report.pdf); Internet; accessed 10 January 2008; 7.

<sup>39</sup>Ambassador John E. Herbst, remarks to the US Institute for Peace Conference, "The Challenge of Participation in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations," 12 Sept 2007.

<sup>40</sup>Rep. Robert Andrews and Rep. Mark Kirk, Co-chairs, *Integrating 21<sup>st</sup> Century Development & Security Assistance*, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, January 2008); 29.

<sup>41</sup>The US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) plans to have a similar organizational structure with a senior State Department officer as a civilian deputy to the commander and other foreign service officers in key director positions. See <http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/index.php>

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>43</sup>Testimony of Frederick D. Barton to the, House Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee hearings on, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 5 September 2007; 1.

<sup>44</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned, "PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," September 2007, linked from the *Center for Army Lessons Learned Home Page* at "Handbooks," available from <https://call2.army.mil/toc.asp?document=3820>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2008; 1.

<sup>45</sup>For a detailed description of PRT organizational differences see Nima Abbaszadeh, et al., "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations," January 2008, linked from the *IET-COP Home Page* at "Items of Interest," available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ietcop/documents/Princeton%20University%20-%20PRTs%20Lessons%20and%20Recommendations%2026%20FEB%2008.pdf>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2008.

<sup>46</sup>CSIS Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, *Integrating 21<sup>st</sup> Century Development and Security Assistance*, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, January 2008), XII.

<sup>47</sup> Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry and Robert B. Oakley, "Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations," *Defense and Technology Paper*, (Ft. McNair, Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, September 2005), 18.

<sup>48</sup>Thom Shanker, "Pentagon to Fill Iraq Reconstruction Jobs Temporarily," *The New York Times*, 20 February 2007 [newspaper on-line], available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/20/world/middleeast/20military.html?\\_r=3&...ountries%20and%20Territories](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/20/world/middleeast/20military.html?_r=3&...ountries%20and%20Territories); Internet; accessed 11 February 2008.

<sup>49</sup>Robert Perito, "Embedded Reconstruction Teams," March 2008, linked from the *US Institute of Peace Home Page* at "USIPeace Briefing," available from [http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace\\_briefings/2008/0305\\_prt.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0305_prt.html); Internet; accessed 6 March 2008.

<sup>50</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned, "PRT Playbook," 24.

<sup>51</sup> Testimony of Ginger Cruz, Deputy Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, US Congress, House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, *The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 5 September 2007; 9.

<sup>52</sup> Prepared Statement of Eric T. Olson for the US Congress, House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Historical and Current Perspectives on Doctrine and Synergy*, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 5 December 2007; 7.

<sup>53</sup> United States Department of Defense. (6 February 2006). Quadrennial Defense Review Report. from <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>, 75.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 81

<sup>55</sup>Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2005), 14.

<sup>56</sup> Matt Cordova, "Creating New Capabilities for Response," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization, 2007.

<sup>57</sup> Ambassador John Herbst, remarks at the "USIP Conference: The Challenge of Participation in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations," available from [http://www.usip.org/events/2007/0912\\_peace\\_stability\\_operations.html](http://www.usip.org/events/2007/0912_peace_stability_operations.html); Internet; accessed 25 November 2007.

<sup>58</sup>For a detailed review and critique of the use of contractors see: P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004) and Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.)

<sup>59</sup> For a detailed industry perspective see the Prepared Statement of Doug Brooks, "Security Sector Reform in Iraq: Enhancing the Role of the Private Sector", Testimony of the International Peace Operations Association before the House Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, *Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces*, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 25 April 2007 available from [http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Brooks\\_Testimony042507.pdf](http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Brooks_Testimony042507.pdf); Internet; accessed 10 October 2007.

<sup>60</sup> Prepared Remarks by Gen. Carl Vuono, USA (Ret.) for the Eisenhower

National Security Series Symposium, *Resourcing Stability Operations & Reconstruction: Past, Present and Future*. ed. Shannon A. Brown, (Washington, DC: n.p., March 23, 2006), 67.

<sup>61</sup> Adapted from MPRI, Inc., “MPRI Overview to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces Privatized Military Operations Industry Study,” briefing slides with unscripted commentary, 22 February 2008, cited with permission of MPRI.

<sup>62</sup> Francesco Mancini, *In Good Company? The Role of Business in Security Sector Reform*, (London, Demos, 2005), 64.

<sup>63</sup> For a detailed review of JIEDDO, see William G. Adamson, *An Asymmetric Threat Invokes Strategic Leader Initiative: The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization*, unpublished student research paper (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces), 2007 and see the JIEDDO Home Page at <https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/>; Internet.

<sup>64</sup> Michèle Flournoy has propose the establishment of “a standing [Interagency Task Force] IATF headquarters core element that is ready to deploy to an operation on short notice...[that] would be the foundation for building the rest of an IATF once an operation was anticipated. See Prepared Statement Michèle A. Flournoy, “Achieving Unity of Effort in IA Operations” for US Congress, House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, *Prospects for Effective Interagency Collaboration on National Security*, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 29 January 2007

<sup>65</sup> Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD*, 31.

<sup>66</sup> US Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization & Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning & Capabilities for Future* (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office, 30 October 2007), 15.

<sup>67</sup> Robert M. Perito, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” March 2007, linked from the *United States Institute for Peace*, Home Page at “Special Reports,” available from <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr185.pdf>; Internet; accessed 5 February 2008

<sup>68</sup> NSPD-44 Best Practices and Lessons Learned Working Group, *PRT Lessons Learned Workshop, 11-12 March 2008, Gettysburg, PA* draft briefing slides used by permission from Ms. Susan Merrill, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. The working group recommends that PRTs be organized in response to the environment and that PRTs act as a model in many ways for the Field Advanced Teams (FACTs) under the S/CRS IMS which are to become the “decentralized field presence” under that system.

<sup>69</sup> Christine Adamczyk, USAID Foreign Service Officer, interviewed by author, 11 February 2008, Fort Bragg, NC. Also, see Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” *Parameters*, Vol. 35, no. 3 (Autumn 2005). The principles include: Ownership, Capacity building, Sustainability, Selectivity, Assessment, Results, Partnership, Flexibility, Accountability.

<sup>70</sup> US Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, 2-9.