

RETHINKING THE USE OF SPECIALIZED CIVIL AFFAIRS

BY

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RETHINKING THE USE OF SPECIALIZED CIVIL AFFAIRS

by

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Specialized Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers are reservists who have contributed greatly to post-war operations throughout history. Recent efforts have shifted away from civil-military operations (CMO), typically led by CA, to more broad and advanced reconstruction and stabilization operations (R/S OPS) led by civilians with civil-sector expertise. The requirement for civilian expertise certainly exists, but the resulting move to more generalized CA operations brings about concern. This project examines several aspects of this situation to include the role of specialized CA in combat and post-conflict environments and adapting and improving specialized CA for interagency operations. The research reveals a gap that occurs during and immediately after combat operations. This acute period requires immediate R/S OPS to address critical services and maintain civil order; however, it may be too dangerous or occur too quickly for civilian entities to arrive and begin operations. While specialized reserve CA Soldiers may be poised to fill this gap, the requirement for improved training and utilization of these Soldiers to conduct sector-specific operations appears significant. Recommendations are provided that address DoD's approach to training and deploying

specialized reserve CA Soldiers. Additionally, doctrinal considerations are discussed in terms of redefining stability operations in comparison to more advanced nation building.

RETHINKING THE USE OF SPECIALIZED CIVIL AFFAIRS

“Military power cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee stable peace. It must, however, establish global, regional, and local conditions that allow the other instruments of national power – diplomatic, information, and economic-to exert their full influence.”¹

According to the Civil Affairs Association (CAA), in 2007 there were over 8,000 Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers in the Department of Defense (DoD) force structure.²

Although the situation is rapidly changing, a majority of these personnel are reservists, which at one point provided approximately 96% of CA Soldiers. This intentional focus on reserve CA was built upon the concept of bringing valuable skills from the civilian sector to provide the critical functional expertise needed to conduct specialized Civil-Military Operations (CMO).³ U.S. Army CA brigades contained specialized teams such as government, public facilities, special functions, and economics/commerce. Based on expertise and experience, the officers on these teams could qualify for additional skill identifiers in civil-sector functions such as public administration officer, public education officer, civilian supply officer, etc. U.S. Army CA units recently reorganized in a manner that reduced civil-sector functional specialties and increased CA generalists in response to additional support requirements from maneuver commanders. Additionally, the CAA notes that Joint and Army doctrine and personnel policies are deemphasizing CA specialties in favor of CA generalists.⁴ Interestingly, this shift from CA specialization to generalization is occurring at a time when DoD and the Department of State (DoS) are undertaking monumental efforts to bring specialized civilian skills into military actions via Interagency Operations (IO).⁵

Lessons learned have pointed to the importance of executing shaping operations (Phase 0) to prevent fragile states from descending into failed states. Post-conflict stability operations have also proven critical and as stressed in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, "...were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations."⁶ History has shown that reserve CA Soldiers have performed magnificently in these types of operations by providing specialized skills not readily available in the active component of the armed services and not feasible in terms of bringing civilians into a combat environment. To improve CA operations some have called for the full integration of DoD CA assets at the joint level to include creating a joint civil-military agency under combined interagency oversight and designating a joint command structure as the executive agent for CA and CMO.^{7,8} These recommendations also allude to the requirement for a flexible interagency approach to mobilizing and deploying reserve CA Soldiers and units for stabilization operations and supporting DoS led IO. DoS continues to progress with several programs aimed at improving IO and more specifically Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (R/S OPS) under its Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI).⁹

While there is ample evidence to suggest that structurally and operationally DoS needs better alignment with DoD, it is becoming increasingly clear that CA needs better alignment with some aspects of DoS as CA operations will invariably cross paths with DoS R/S OPS. A great opportunity exists for linking, augmenting, and maintaining continuity of the R/S OPS that both departments will either lead or support during complex post-conflict and irregular warfare (IW) scenarios. However, DoD should rethink its current approach to utilizing and training reserve CA specialists. The ability

to form and deploy flexible and tailored teams of specialized reserve CA Soldiers from all DoD services must be developed. Enhancement and further development of specialized skills as they relate to R/S OPS must go beyond traditional professional military education. Ongoing collaboration and integration into DoD partner agencies for planning and training must occur as part of a cultural paradigm shift that recognizes CA as a key component of interagency soft power. Failure to do so will result in the continued marginalization of CA functional specialties and the misappropriation of a large pool of specialized civilian professionals that happen to be DoD reservists.

DoS Begins to Transform for IO

There have been consistent calls for DoS to improve its ability to execute “operational” foreign policy. A report from the National Defense University opens by stating, “The United States today manifestly lacks adequate civilian capacity to conduct complex operations—those operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field.”¹⁰ Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently suggested that it was time for DoS to increase its presence in Afghanistan with a “commensurate surge of diplomats and U.S. government civilians to reinforce stability operations and reconstruction.”¹¹ In response, interagency elements such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), and more recently teams from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) continue to increase their efforts. Yet, as Ambassador Edward Marks points out, a “whole of government” or “integrated agency approach” to foreign policy is still lacking.¹² The primary reason is that DoS currently lacks the structure and expeditionary capability to lead and prosecute operational foreign policy.

Thus, the focus of interagency integration has been the readily available geographic combatant command as indicated by the innovative approach to the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM).¹³

Largely heralded as a success, many see USAFRICOM as DoD's future path for IO. However, considerable debate has erupted that questions the wisdom of unifying national power under a military command.^{14,15} Admiral Mullen acknowledges these concerns and points to a cycle of willingness and dependency that could overlook situations where the military may not be the best choice to lead a particular foreign policy effort, but would be great in providing support.¹⁶ As DoS continues to transform for IO, one can only hope that the realization of structural capacity for expeditionary operations may eventually occur. The foundation is beginning to form with the DoS S/CRS Civilian Response Corps, which "provides the U.S. Government with a pool of qualified, trained, and ready-to-deploy civilian professionals to support overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations."¹⁷ Unfortunately, reports indicating that DoS may ask DoD to fill hundreds of civilian positions in Afghanistan with military reservists highlight significant shortcomings and suggest years of capacity building lie ahead.¹⁸ Nevertheless, at some point in the future the current focal point for interagency integration will shift away from DoD and with it the recognition that DoD should integrate certain assets into DoS as they lead the "whole of government" approach for unified action. DoD needs to envision a future where it supports DoS R/S OPS instead of leading it. Along these lines, comes the suggestion that DoD may want to eventually refine and narrow its definition of stability operations and "focus on its strengths – providing civil security and control – and work to create the conditions for

civilian counterparts to operate more effectively on the ground....”¹⁹ This suggestion stems from the recognition that DoD “lacks the capacity to follow through on the governance and development-related tasks.”²⁰ These are long-term operations consistent with nation building and advanced R/S OPS, which National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 directs responsibility to DoS for execution. In terms of post-invasion or post-liberation requirements, DoD still needs specialized capacity to initiate immediate R/S OPS that lay the foundation for civilian entities to build upon.

Redefining Specialized CA

Several reports recognize the importance of CA and propose significant structural and operational changes to better support IO.^{21,22} Yet, as USAFRICOM and S/CRS continue to move forward with new and innovative approaches, DoD appears to have left CA on the sidelines. The CAA’s 56th Annual Conference in November 2008 seemed to agree and held discussions on issues such as “the need for a vision” and “ways to improve the interagency value of civil affairs.”²³ The CA community also recognizes the need for improvement internally, particularly when it comes to functional specialties. One could argue that CA may have oversold its capacity to deliver much needed civilian skills with some suggesting that most reserve CA Soldiers are actually generalists.^{24,25} A review of CA Soldiers assigned to a functional team would most likely reveal that many lack the specific civilian skills required for a particular civil-sector. This can lead to some misperceptions as civilian counterparts may assume that members of an Infrastructure Section or Economic Stability Section come with the required expertise. A report published by the United States Institute of Peace addresses this issue:

Post-conflict intervention is not a game for amateurs. It is important to end the practice of using civil affairs soldiers to fill civilian vacancies where highly skilled civilians are required. A reservist who teaches high school in civilian life is not qualified to advise on establishing the school system for a province.²⁶

Yet, others point to the invaluable skills that reservists or National Guard personnel can provide to address more immediate and fundamental concerns. John Nagl illustrates how Army National Guard members drawn from farming communities provided one of the most effective tools of U.S. policy in Afghanistan - "Wise in the ways of irrigation and bioengineered seed stock, they make a huge difference in that impoverished and overwhelmingly agricultural country."²⁷

While you will find Soldiers within the CA ranks that have extensive civil-sector experience and skills, as a whole CA does not have the institutional knowledge required for the more complex aspects of nation building that typically occur in the late stages of a "post-conflict" scenario. For example, the capacity to reengineer an entire financial or health services sector does not exist in the current CA construct. This recognition of a significant need for post-conflict civilian expertise led to the formation of S/CRS and the CSI. Two questions come to mind in this regard: (1) what defines post-conflict and (2) can "highly" skilled civilians operate in an environment that requires R/S OPS, but is still subject to significant hostilities? S/CRS is working to close the gap in terms of civilian capacity; however, the premise is an environment where advanced R/S OPS are feasible. The transitional period that occurs after combat operations and before post - conflict operations (Phase III to IV) provides a potential area of concern. Furthermore, an IW environment persistent with conflict will contain varying time-periods and areas exclusive to military capabilities. From this perspective, it is reasonable to expect that

most operations requiring the use of significant hard power (boots on the ground) will more than likely require DoD to initiate immediate R/S OPS until the situation becomes appropriate for civilians to enter a particular area. The expertise for rehabilitating and modernizing government institutions may not be required for initial DoD R/S OPS; however, the need for specialized civilian skills does exist. In this context, the requirement is not to establish a technologically advanced school system, but to use existing capabilities to get schools and other key facilities open as quickly as possible. The reservist who is a schoolteacher, police officer, mayor, etc. can provide the insight and skills needed to resolve immediate and basic civil-sector specific issues. One of the first persons a local police chief or schoolmaster wants to talk to is a police officer or teacher from the U.S. to compare and discover new approaches to their occupation. There is also a natural preference to interact with a peer when it comes to providing the technical information and historical methodologies needed to address immediate concerns. This sort of “occupational diplomacy” across all key-sectors could prove extremely advantageous in the initial efforts to reestablish local governments.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT): A Precursor to DoS Expeditionary Elements?

PRTs first began appearing in January 2003 in Afghanistan. In general, they are civil military organizations designed to operate in semi-permissive environments that require security and are subject to hostile interactions. There has been significant discussion and analysis concerning PRTs and their roles; however, the consensus is that they have made important contributions to very challenging problems. PRTs vary in size, organization, and methods of operation. The current trend suggests that they are moving away from a military-centric organization to an interagency organization led

by a senior civilian and supported by the military. One report provides a model PRT as having six DoS personnel, three senior U.S. military officers, twenty U.S. Army CA Soldiers, one person from the Department of Agriculture, three contracted governance experts, two USAID representatives, and a military or contracted security force.²⁸ There have also been significant challenges in recruiting the required civilian expertise for PRTs, which in many cases resulted in any available CA officer, qualified or not, stepping in to fill the void.

In general, PRTs are a brigade level asset and operate independently, when possible, as in Afghanistan or embedded with a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as some are in Iraq. They are ad hoc organizations, which thus far have formed and begun working after the completion of major combat operations and the start of stabilization operations (Phase IV). With the continued push for IO and additional civilian expertise, it seems that PRTs may serve as the platform for civilian led operations and will continue to expand beyond basic stabilization into long-term DoS R/S OPS that work towards nation building. One could envision an evolving structure that enlarges with civilians as operations move away from combat. An embedded military-oriented PRT would serve as the initial structure that expands into an independent DoS-led PRT and finally transforms to provide technical and government advisory support to the host nation as operations progress to the late stages of enabling civil authority (Phase V). Civilian experts would focus on long-term institutional programs and policies and would serve more as provincial advisory teams that could possibly develop and use host nation PRTs to execute operational requirements.

DoD CA Reconstruction and Stabilization (D/CRS) Teams


While there has been considerable discussion concerning PRTs and IO in a “post-conflict” environment, there has been limited dialogue concerning R/S OPS during the fluid and uncertain period that occurs immediately after and in some cases adjacent to major combat operations. For example, PRTs do not exist during deter and dominate operations (Phases II and III), yet as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan, areas of operation (AO) are very much heterogeneous in nature with certain areas ready for immediate R/S OPS while others are still experiencing major combat. During these operations, a BCT typically has one CA company attached to provide tactical support and execute general CMO aimed at engaging the civil component of the operational environment in a manner that supports the primary military mission. Augmentation of the CA company can occur, but the baseline is usually an officer in the rank of major (O-4) with 28-30 generalists supporting a colonel (O-6) that typically has five battalions and a Calvary Squadron and covers a significant amount of terrain. Interacting with and addressing the needs of the local populace is critical in terms of countering insurgency movements. Yet, CA, the only entity in the military dedicated to interacting with the indigenous population appears limited and, as per doctrine, has no specialized personnel assigned at the BCT-level. Meanwhile, interagency entities are steadily growing to push civilian expertise down to the BCT or provincial level, which is where the “rubber meets the road” in terms of IO and engaging local governments, tribal/religious leaders, and civilians. The jump from a small CA company to a PRT with 60-80 personnel and senior DoS and USAID civilians is large with respect to both capacity and time. It does not appear feasible or realistic to expect the formation of

standing PRTs that deploy directly into a combat zone with a BCT. Therefore, BCT Commanders (CDR) will take needed actions with available resources to address the immediate concerns of the local population. Subordinate CDRs and staffs will engage local leaders marking the onset of diplomatic interactions. Combat Arms Officers will enter newly liberated cities and begin the initial process of establishing some type of basic governing entity to maintain civil order and provide essential services. The CA company will take direction from the BCT and do its best to provide general support where it can. Thus, it seems that long before the arrival and establishment of a functional PRT, a BCT CDR will most likely have a need for specialized support to conduct immediate R/S OPS.

Specialized R/S support should be organic and readily available during combat operations. It is not a PRT with expertise on how to establish a judicial or health care system; instead, the need exists for a specialized but more operationally oriented team. A parallel approach to DoS S/CRS teams, but with a focus on more immediate needs may provide the format. In this construct, you would have DoD CA R/S teams (D/CRS) teams, consisting of CA specialists, deploying with a BCT and setting the conditions for the arrival of DoS S/CRS teams and the formation of PRTs. Ideally, during the pre-combat phases, DoD D/CRS in conjunction with members from the follow-on DoS PRT would develop a city specific post-liberation plan aimed at quickly establishing the basic structures needed to maintain civil order and essential services. The D/CRS team would have reach back capability to consult with civil sector managers in cities throughout the U.S. as well as communications and data feeds to the DoS PRT as it prepares to enter the AO when post-conflict operations commence under permissive or

semi-permissive conditions. Figure 1 provides an example of D/CRS teams in direct support to a BCT, supporting an embedded PRT, and then assisting an advanced S/CRS PRT as conditions improve. D/CRS teams would be multifunctional and tailored to an AO with senior and field grade officers integrated into brigade and battalion staffs to assist and advise with sector specific planning/coordination and capture key information/data requirements for higher level reporting. They would also provide officers and enlisted personnel with sector specific experience to execute missions and respond to requested support from BCT elements as they operate throughout a city. The existing CA company would support the D/CRS team and both would receive and then integrate into the S/CRS PRT when it arrives. Of importance is the recognition that D/CRS teams are intended for immediate sector specific R/S OPS. Once a PRT arrives and begins operations, D/CRS teams remain flexible for reassignment to another AO, remaining in support of the PRT, or redeploying to train/prepare for future missions.

Figure 1: D/CRS and PRTs in multiple environments**



**e-PRT – embedded into a BCT

** Adapted from Fig. 3-6 in U.S. Army FM 3-05.40

Specialized CA assets are poised to fill the R/S gap that exists prior to the establishment of PRTs. CA functional specialty cells in CA commands (CACOM) and CA brigades provide the framework and resources for building D/CRS teams. Typically, these cells provide regional level support across multiple cities and provinces. While there is certainly a need for specialized civil-sector support at the regional level, the drastic differences between cities and provinces across Iraq and Afghanistan point to the need for more of a localized approach as indicated by the contrast in issues and challenges encountered by PRTs. CA battalions (BN) should continue providing companies to BCTs and division level support via a civil-military operations center (CMOC) while CACOMs and CA BDEs push specialized support down via the proposed

D/CRS teams. The general framework for a D/CRS team should consist of a 10-member specialized planning and civil information cell (CIM) at the BCT headquarters with 10-12 member sector teams at each BN that has a significant city in its AO. To provide the appropriate level of emphasis, leadership, and interaction, the D/CRS team should be led by a colonel (O-6) with the BN teams led by either a lieutenant colonel (O-5) or senior major (O-4). Leadership positions on a D/CRS team require policies that make them prestigious and key routes to promotion. The management and selection of Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) that lead small teams and interact at the FEMA regional level provides an example where these positions are considered equivalent to BDE commands and reserved for talented officers, which have usually graduated from a senior service school. D/CRS teams should have members from various services and interact across the joint spectrum. Coding these positions as joint billets could also prove beneficial in requiring officers to attend Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME) and work towards becoming "Joint Qualified". Viewing the 10-12 member BN level teams as CA special operations teams and providing them with enhanced technology (e.g. satellite communications and data collection) needed to operate independently and work sector issues could present significant value to both the BCT and the interagency PRT. The Army's 96th CA BN, an active unit, provides a model with enhanced capability and technology.

Prestige and technology will not overcome deficiencies in leadership. The leadership on a D/CRS must align with both the immediate command climate and longer-term culture normally found in an active duty BCT. D/CRS leadership must also have the flexibility to shift into an interagency environment that requires a significantly

different approach and excellent interpersonal skills. Based on his observations as a CA officer, COL Jeffery A. Jacobs notes that significant leadership issues have surfaced as reserve components integrate with active components.

The culture in the AC [active component] is focused on mission accomplishment. The prevailing culture in many RC [reserve component] units, for too long, has been focused on keeping soldiers comfortable and contented and avoiding necessary interpersonal and organizational conflict. This focus stems in part from the unmitigated pressure on RC commanders to maintain unit strength and from the misguided notion that enforcing standards and instilling discipline will cause soldiers to leave.²⁹

There is little doubt that the D/CRS concept will fail miserably without a comprehensive approach that addresses leadership shortcomings within the reserve CA community.

The first step may be recognizing that substandard leadership exists only because another leader has allowed it to exist. Thus, a cultural shift to improve leadership throughout CA may require external mitigation.

Adapting and Aligning CA for IO

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.13, Civil Affairs, provides specific requirements regarding specialized CA capability, training, and education. The following excerpts suggest the policy for adapting and aligning CA for IO is already in place:

The Department of Defense shall maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs activities necessary to support DoD missions and to meet DoD Component responsibilities to the civilian sector in foreign areas in peace and war throughout the range of military operations.³⁰

Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement DoD policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.³¹

Conduct specialized civil affairs education and individual training for assigned officers and noncommissioned officers and non-assigned DoD and non-DoD personnel.³²

CA does not need a drastic transformation for IO. Instead, DoD should institute flexible policies and improved training to adapt and develop existing specialized reserve CA Soldiers for interagency and R/S OPS. A key constraint is the lack of visibility on reserve Soldiers with specialized civil-sector skills and experience. DoD Instruction 7730.54 established the Civilian Employment Information (CEI) Program designed to capture basic employer information to promote better communication between the Armed Services and civilian employers. Expanding the existing database could provide a cost-effective approach to capturing the civilian skills and experience of DoD reservists. Of importance is a thorough method that catalogues both the expertise and myriad of skills valuable to R/S OPS. For example, an individual with business experience may have expertise in project management as well as good negotiation skills. The resume databases that human resource managers use to scan for key words and specific skills allow for detailed talent searches and could provide an initial screen to identify potential Soldiers to either fill shortages or build a D/CRS team.

A prospective model would begin by identifying reserve Soldiers with sector related occupations or specific skills and assigning them to related functional areas for tracking and career/training management. Additionally, training and professional development in crisis management as it relates to the reestablishment of sector specific functions in a combat or transitional hybrid environment is required. The expertise for this training exists in municipalities throughout the U.S. as well as the civilians and training programs within DoS S/CRS. The Department of Homeland Defense also conducts training in 15 emergency support functions (ESFs), which “serve as the primary operational-level mechanism to provide assistance in functional areas such as

transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing, human services, public health and medical services, search and rescue, agriculture and natural resources, and energy.”³³ Domestic crisis management training within the ESFs could prove beneficial for CA specialists as well. However, specialized training must combine with operational-level staff training, particularly in terms of integrating CA specialists into a BCT. Several reports indicate that CA reservists are often inexperienced, unprepared, and have limited knowledge of the operational technologies used by BCT staffs.³⁴ Initial impressions such as this may result in the perception of limited value and significant marginalization when it comes to integration and full utilization of reserve CA specialists. The bottom line is that a BCT CDR must have the confidence to “plug and play” CA reservists into multiple points within his unit. The only solution is better training as it relates to applying specialized CA skills in a tactical environment at the BCT-level. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is the platform for this type of training. As MAJ James R. Ahern points out, “...CMO training at JRTC’s mock villages such as Suliyah, Mosalah, and Al Mawsil could be significantly enhanced by allowing CA Warrior-Citizens to demonstrate ingenuity and analytical decision-making methodologies gained from the civilian sector.”³⁵ This also suggests the requirement for a dual approach in providing training for reserve CA specialists that improves sector-specific civilian skills and tactical/operational skills needed to function at various points in a BCT. The only way this can occur is altering the current one weekend/month- two weeks/year reserve training model for CA units. Significant concern already exists when it comes to executing training during a typical weekend battle training assembly (BTA). An

assessment would most likely reveal an excessive amount of time completing administrative requirements (shots, urinalysis, updating records, etc.) and non-mission essential or reoccurring training requirements (suicide prevention, information assurance, legal briefings, etc.). A better approach is reducing BTA's to one weekend per quarter and using the remaining 16 days to send reserve CA Soldiers to sector-specific training. This would result in one weekend per quarter dedicated to administrative and non-mission essential training with 14 days of annual training to send D/CRS teams to JRTC and 16 days of individual duty training to send Soldiers to sector specific training with DoS S/CRS or civilian experts within municipalities. This model could also prove beneficial in recruiting civilians into CA. A city manager who receives training and experience in military leadership/operations, crisis management, and sector-specific emergency response in a combat environment has certainly increased the potential for career advancement.

Conclusion

The haphazard manner in which CA utilizes and deploys personnel with specific skills must improve; however, to do so requires a great deal of initiative and flexibility in terms of utilizing and assembling specialized CA assets throughout DoD. Additionally, CA must look internally and change the way it conducts business with respect to training, leadership, and most importantly revamping its culture to align with active duty combat units while also retaining the flexibility needed to execute IO. Cultural changes are challenging long-term endeavors that involve changing values, norms, and beliefs among the CA community to improve performance. This requires strategic vision and leadership with constant reinforcement. Lip service will not work. CA must get serious

about improving its ability to provide value to both the fighting force and the interagency or face extinction of its specialized assets, which also provide the primary argument for maintaining a significant CA force in the reserves.

DoD must recognize the gap between combat operations and post-conflict operations and understand that specialized CA assets are poised to fill this gap. The call for IO and greater civilian expertise is valid, but viewing the “civilian surge” as a comprehensive solution could prove dangerous particularly in the early stages of an operation. As Army War College student Matthew Stafford points out, “Their [federal agencies] participation provides little more than a team of consultants; teams that have to be transported, billeted, supplied, and sometimes secured by military forces.”³⁶ Narrowing DoD’s definition of stabilization operations and CMO presents a good starting point to refocus and streamline efforts. As it stands, doctrinal publications provide laundry lists of extensive stabilization requirements and while they point to the importance of coordinating with nongovernmental organizations and interagency entities, the underlying message is be prepared to do everything. Focusing on and mastering the immediate post-liberation tasks will pay far more dividends than attempting to enact post-war economic recovery plans that typically won’t gain traction until the later stages of the operation and certainly require advanced civilian expertise. In this regard, specialized operators may prove more valuable than consultants or interagency experts. DoD must recognize the value of CA reservists as specialized operators and enact better programs and policies to ensure they are trained and utilized to the fullest extent in supporting BCTs and follow-on agencies as they conduct IO.

Finally, this paper has presented a proposal for creating D/SCR teams comprised of reserve CA specialists assembled via a DoD database that catalogs civilian skills. The intent here is not to claim a perfect solution, for none exists, but to stimulate additional thinking. From a simplistic viewpoint, synchronizing and complimenting existing entities makes sense. PRTs and S/CRS teams provide existing concepts and structures that DoD needs to link into before commencing operations. Sending D/CRS teams to train with and in some cases deploy with S/CRS teams meets the intent of IO and unified action. This also heeds the warning of exchanging business cards for the first time during a crisis or on the battlefield. Irrespective of the approach, DoD must recognize that it does have a large pool of specialized civilian professionals that are poised to execute the initial R/S OPS that require crisis management and direct civil-sector actions in a combat environment. The specialized warrior-citizens that make up the reserve CA community were initially designed for this purpose. The time has come for DoD to get serious about training and utilizing these Soldiers in an operational environment that constantly changes and demands anything but conventional approaches.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC, February 27, 2008), 2-1.

² The Civil Affairs Association, *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, November 2007, <http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/CAA%20Issue%20Papers%20Nov%202007.pdf> (accessed November 14, 2008).

³ In general, CA and the joint force execute CMO (a subcomponent of stability operations) to interact with the civilian populace in a manner that facilitates and legitimizes a commander's objectives. Joint Publication 1-02 defines stability operations as more of an overarching term used to describe the broader efforts of United States Government Agencies to maintain or reestablish a secure environment, provide

essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

⁴ The Civil Affairs Association, 1-1.

⁵ IO is used throughout this paper as an abbreviation for Interagency Operations and should be not confused with Information Operations, which are not discussed.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 6, 2008), vi.

⁷ Christopher Holshek, "Civil-Military Power and the Future of Civil Affairs," *The Officer*, May 2007, 45.

⁸ Daniel P. Kennedy, "It's Time to Go Fully Joint with Civil Affairs" (Joint Forces Staff College, 2007)

⁹ The Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) is a DoS program headed by S/CRS that aims to create three pools of trained and equipped civilians. The Active Response Corps (ARC), the Standby Response Corps (SRC), and the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) are all aimed to improve the U.S. government's support to reconstruction and stabilization operations. Visit <http://www.crs.state.gov> for additional information.

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¹² Edward Marks, "Why USAFRICOM?" *Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ*, no. 52 (First Quarter 2009): 148.

¹³ Mary C. Yates, "U.S. AFRICA COMMAND: Value Added," *Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ*, no. 52 (First Quarter 2009): 152.

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¹⁵ Marks, "Why USAFRICOM?", 148.

¹⁶ Michael G. Mullen, "Brave Enough Not to Lead: The Proper Role of the Military in Foreign Policy," *Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ*, no. 53 (Second Quarter, 2009), 2.

¹⁷ Department of State, "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS): Civilian Response Corps," <http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QRB> (accessed November 19, 2008).

¹⁸ Karen De Young, "Reservists Might Be Used in Afghanistan to Fill Civilian Jobs," *Washington Post*, April 23, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/22/AR2009042203821.html> (accessed April 27, 2009).

¹⁹ David W. Shin, "NARROWING THE GAP: DOD and Stability Operations," *Military Review* 89, no. 2 (March 2009): 23.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

²¹ DSB, *Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DOD* (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board (DSB), September 2005), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-09-Stability_Final.pdf (accessed November 19, 2008).

²² The Civil Affairs Association, *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*

²³ Chris Holshek, "Civil Affairs Gets a Global View," *Scroll and Sword*, 61, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 1, http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/caa_winter_2008color.pdf (accessed November 19, 2008).

²⁴ Mark L. Kimmey, "Transforming Civil Affairs," *Army Magazine - Association of the United States Army*, March 1, 2005, <http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/KGRG-6CUQGK?OpenDocument&Print=1> (accessed November 19, 2008).

²⁵ William R. Florig, "Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers: A Force at Risk," *Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ*, no. 43 (Fourth Quarter 2006): 60.

²⁶ Robert M. Perito, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, March 2007), <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr185.pdf>, 10 (accessed January 12, 2009)

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²⁸ Perito, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*, 4.

²⁹ Jeffrey A. Jacobs, "Transforming Army Reserve Senior Leadership: A Matter of Cultural Change," *Army Magazine - Association of the United States Army*, <http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/KGRG-6CUQGJ?OpenDocument&Print=1> (accessed February 19, 2009).

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³² *Ibid.*, 6.

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