

STABILITY OPERATIONS: THE  
"WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT"  
APPROACH USING A FRACTION  
OF THE TEAM CAN NO LONGER  
SUCCEED

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARILYN S. CHIAFULLO  
United States Army Reserve

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USAWC CLASS OF 2009

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved*  
*OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 01-04-2009			<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Civilian Research Project			<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b>		
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  Stability Operations: The "Whole of Government" Approach Using a Fraction of the Team Can No Longer Succeed						<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>		
						<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>		
						<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>  LTC Marilyn S. Chiafullo						<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>		
						<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>		
						<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>  U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Ave. Carlisle, PA 17013						<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Dr. William C. Martel Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University 160 Packard Ave. Medford, MA 02155						<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>		
						<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> DISTRIBUTION A: UNLIMITED								
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>								
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Diversification is not typically the first word to come to mind when thinking about U.S. military strategy of the past. This was a term often reserved for the business world when discussing the natural progression of a company's growth once the core business becomes stable and profitable. Excellence in both offensive and defensive combat operations has been the cornerstone of the Army's business. The events of September 11, 2001, introduced diversity into military lexicon. The U.S. and its allies no longer face an easily identifiable enemy. State actors in military uniforms have been supplanted by armed groups of terrorists, often aided by outlaw states, willing to take their fight to any location to pursue their radical ideology. In response to this new threat, the Army was forced to diversify. The fragile global security environment dictates the Army adopt an additional and equally important core function; stability operations. Successful stability operations contemplate a force that understands the culture and population in conflict areas with the ability to work in concert with other government and non-government agencies. Seven plus years of persistent conflict has placed an unprecedented strain on our military forces. The time for meaningful collaboration is now.								
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Stability Operations, Whole of Government, Operational and Strategic Reserve Component Management, ARFORGEN								
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>				<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>		
<b>a. REPORT</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>					
				UNLIMITED	26			

USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT

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A FRACTION OF THE TEAM CAN NO LONGER SUCCEED**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Marilyn S. Chiafullo  
United States Army Reserve

Dr. William C. Martel  
Professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy  
Tufts University  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

## **ABSTRACT**

**AUTHOR:** Lieutenant Colonel Marilyn S. Chiafullo

**TITLE:** Stability Operations: The “Whole of Government” Approach Using a Fraction of the Team Can No Longer Succeed

**FORMAT:** Civilian Research Project

**DATE:** 1 April 2009      **WORD COUNT:** 4,940      **PAGES:** 26

**KEY TERMS:** Stability Operations, Whole of Government, Operational and Strategic Reserve Component Management, ARFORGEN

**CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

Diversification is not typically the first word to come to mind when thinking about U.S. military strategy of the past. This was a term often reserved for the business world when discussing the natural progression of a company’s growth once the core business becomes stable and profitable. Excellence in both offensive and defensive combat operations has been the cornerstone of the Army’s business. The events of September 11, 2001, introduced diversity into military lexicon. The U.S. and its allies no longer face an easily identifiable enemy. State actors in military uniforms have been supplanted by armed groups of terrorists, often aided by outlaw states, willing to take their fight to any location to pursue their radical ideology. In response to this new threat, the Army was forced to diversify. The fragile global security environment dictates the Army adopt an additional and equally important core function; stability operations. Successful stability operations contemplate a force that understands the culture and population in conflict areas with the ability to work in concert with other government and non-government agencies. Seven plus years of persistent conflict has placed an unprecedented strain on our military forces. The time for meaningful collaboration is now.

## STABILITY OPERATIONS: THE “WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT” APPROACH USING ONLY A FRACTION OF THE TEAM CAN NO LONGER SUCCEED

The security problem created by failing states and vast ungoverned regions where terrorist groups and violent extremists assemble cannot be solved by military efforts alone. In recognition of this reality, United States Army doctrine now reflects stability operations as a third core function and has acknowledged that success is dependent on a comprehensive team approach. In his foreword to the Army's *Stability Operations* manual, Field Manual 3-07, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, emphasizes the importance of the whole-team approach. “At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.”<sup>1</sup> This research paper explores the *whole of government* approach to conducting comprehensive stability operations, with an emphasis at the macro level, on the role of the Department of Defense. In addition, this project investigates the strategic implications of Federal civilian participation in stability operations as well as the new operational management strategy of the Army's Reserve Components (Army Reserve and Army National Guard). The following strategic issues are addressed:

I. Define the *whole of government* approach to stability operations. What is the Department of Defense's role in this process, the best practices, and the way ahead to ensure effective and sustainable results?

II. What are the risks and benefits of managing the Reserve Components (Army Reserve and Army National Guard) as an operational force? What effect will an

operational Reserve have on the strategic depth of the U.S. military; and how does this new Reserve paradigm fit into the *whole of government* approach to stability operations?

**III.** Evaluate the Army's current strategic human resources (HR) initiatives. What effect will the HR proposals have on the Army's ability to identify the capabilities residing in its Reserve Component force? Finally, what impact will the proposed HR strategies have on the Army's ability to better manage and recruit for capability shortfalls?

**I. Strategic Issue:** Define the *whole of government* approach to stability operations. What is the Department of Defense's role in this process and what are the best practices to ensure an effective and sustainable outcome.

**Discussion:**

As it becomes more and more evident that crises in the current security environment cannot be solved by military means alone the combining of civilian and military elements is essential. *A whole of government approach* to stability operations "is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal."<sup>2</sup>

**Department of Defense (DoD) and the Interagency Process; Best Practices:**

Interagency cooperation is the new focus of the national security policy process. The global security environment demands the need for a new approach to the application of the elements of national power. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 2004 Tsunami off the coast of Sumatra, and the Disaster Response Operations of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, broadened the scope of DoD contacts, roles and missions in the

interagency arena.<sup>3</sup> DoD recognized the interagency void at the operational level. To address this void, Joint and Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) were established and placed as staff elements of the Combatant Commanders. “In response to the terrorist attacks and the need for greater coordination and integrated operations with mission partners, DoD approved the concept of JIACG to improve interagency cooperation and improve operational effectiveness...”<sup>4</sup> Effective interagency coordination has emerged as a best practice to defeat today's threats. The capabilities of multiple agencies must be harmonized creating integrated solutions and maximizing mission success in complex contingencies. DoD must continue to foster the JIACG mandate which, upon continued refinement, will serve to deter organizational isolation.

DoD has long understood the value of a collaborative effort to ensure success in the primary tasks of stability operations. One need look no further than the “definition” section of DoD Directive 3000.05 (DoDD 3000.05) issued in 2005, where “stability operations” is defined as follows: “Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”<sup>5</sup> DoDD 3000.05 also illustrates the “can do” attitude of the military and its willingness to step into the breach. “Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”<sup>6</sup> The 2008 Army Posture Statement indicates the future security environment will be an era of persistent conflict. “We have looked at the future and expect a future of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who will use violence to achieve political, religious, and other ideological ends...This era

of persistent conflict will result in high demand for Army forces and capabilities.”<sup>7</sup>

The commitment by DoD that U.S. military forces will perform those tasks left unfulfilled by our mission partners (U.S. Government agencies, international partners, humanitarian organizations and the private sector) is unsustainable over the long-term and must be addressed by meaningful actions. Doctrine dictates that the Army must remain ready to respond to the entire continuum of possible missions, from major combat operations, counter-insurgency operations, to peace-time engagements; simultaneously or near simultaneously. “The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies.”<sup>8</sup>

**The Way Ahead to Ensure Effective and Sustainable Results:** The Total Force Concept, the DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, and the Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America.

The Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006 (QDR 2006) expands on the need to integrate DoD Civilians as part of the Total Force concept: DoD’s Total Force... “its Active and Reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors – constitutes its war fighting capability and capacity. Members of the Total Force serve in thousands of locations around the world, performing a vast array of duties to accomplish critical missions.”<sup>9</sup> To sustain an effective level of effort in an environment of persistent conflict and crisis, the necessary skills must be spread across the four elements of the Total Force. This will allow DoD and the Military Services to optimize their contributions across the full spectrum of military operations, from peace to war. “In a reconfigured Total Force, a new balance of skills must be coupled with greater accessibility to people



so that the right forces are available at the right time. Both uniformed and civilian personnel must be readily available to joint commanders.”<sup>10</sup>

The Total Force concept set forth in the QDR 2006 gained momentum over the past two years culminating in the codification of the DoD Civilian Expeditionary Work Force. Department of Defense Directive 1404.10 (DoDD 1404.10) formerly known as “Emergency-Essential (E-E) DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees” was reissued on January 23, 2009 under a new title: *DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce*. DoDD 1404.10 establishes “the policy through which an appropriately sized subset of DoD civilian workforce is pre-identified to be organized, trained, and equipped in a manner that facilitates the use of their capabilities for operational requirements.”<sup>11</sup> This Directive specifically addresses the DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce’s collaborative role with their military counterparts across the full spectrum of operations. “Members...shall be organized, trained, cleared, equipped, and ready to deploy in support of combat operations by the military; contingencies; emergency operations; humanitarian missions; disaster relief; restoration of order; drug interdiction; and stability operations...”<sup>12</sup>

The second part of the equation for employing the civilian workforce to ensure effective sustainability resides in the creation of the Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America (Civilian Response Corps). The Civilian Response Corps consists of a partnership among eight U.S. Federal agencies and departments: Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of the

Treasury. “The Civilian Response Corps provides the U.S. Government with a pool of qualified, trained, and ready to deploy civilian professionals to support overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations.”<sup>13</sup> The considerable task of coordinating the efforts of these civilian experts was assigned to the Department of State by then President of the United States, George W. Bush, in the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). “The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”<sup>14</sup>

The Civilian Response Corps force configuration is similar to that of the military and consists of three complementary components:<sup>15</sup>

- **Active Component (CRC-A)** officers are full time Government employees whose specific job is to train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict prevention efforts. They are able to deploy within 48 hours and focus on critical initial interagency functions such as assessment, planning, management, administrative, logistical, and resource mobilization.
- **Standby Component (CRC-S)** officers are full time employees of their departments who have specialized expertise useful in reconstruction and stabilization operations and are available to deploy within 30 days in the event of a reconstruction and/or stabilization operation.
- **Reserve Component (CRC-R)** officers are U.S. citizens who have committed to be available within 45 to 60 days of call up to serve as U.S. Government temporary employees in support of overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations. Reserve officers are critical to efforts to bring “normalcy” to countries by filling capabilities career U.S. Government employees simply cannot match in expertise or in number. (Note: the Reserve component has not yet been funded.)

**Conclusion:**

The Federal Government work force is large enough to provide a plethora of qualified experts necessary to sustain an effective interagency response for the long term. A positive side effect of this effort that should not be overlooked is the psychological benefits on the indigenous population where these Federal Government civilians are deployed. A larger civilian presence will serve to reduce the number of uniformed military in the region alleviating the perceptions of a foreign occupation force while providing some much needed relief to our over stressed military forces. The *whole of government* approach to stability operations: The Total Force concept, the DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, and the Civilian Response Corps are all worthy of continued political support and should be expanded and funded as part of our National Security Strategy in the foreseeable future.

**II. Strategic Issue:** What are the risks and benefits of managing the Reserve Components (Army Reserve and Army National Guard) as an operational force? What effect will an operational Reserve have on the strategic depth of the U.S. military; and how does this new Reserve paradigm fit into the *whole of government* approach to stability operations?

**Discussion:**

Any discussion of stability operations and the Total Force concept must include an examination of the current status of Army's Reserve Components. Following September 11, 2001 and the on-set of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) the Army's Reserve Components were challenged to evolve from a *strategic* force in reserve of the

Active Army, to an *operational* force that is constantly deployed. The Reserve components are now employed in a variety of different ways and in unprecedented numbers. “The Reserve Components have been relied on heavily to fill operational requirements comprising close to 40 percent of forces in theater at the height of the mobilization.”<sup>16</sup> “Since the September 11 attacks, the Army Reserve Components deployed approximately 540,000 soldiers in support of the war on terror.”<sup>17</sup>

In recognizing the need to formalize this concept in both policy and doctrine, DoD introduced it into the strategic dialogue in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. “To fight the long war and conduct other future contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the Reserve Component must be *operationalized*, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.”<sup>18</sup>

**Risk/Benefit of an Operational Reserve Component:** It can be argued that the shift toward managing the Reserve Component as an operational force began with the Bosnia mission. Between November 1995 and December 1997, 15,246 Reservists were mobilized in support of this operation.<sup>19</sup> The dialog concerning the shift from a strategic Reserve to an operational Reserve seemed to grow more pronounced only after it became clear that Reserve deployments would rise to unprecedented numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Risks:** Managing the Reserve component as an operational force versus a strategic force contemplates a much greater level of commitment from the Reserve component Soldier. “Today, the Department of Defense is asking much more of its Guard and Reserve members. Being in the Reserves is no longer about deploying

once in a career, or maybe not at all. Today's reservist might deploy three or four times over the course of a career. This is a different type of commitment, based on different expectations for members, their families, and employers."<sup>20</sup> The most significant risk associated with the increase in operational tempo, and which garners the most attention, is the threat to the sustainment of the all volunteer National Guard and Reserve. Simply put, the ability to recruit and retain Soldiers will be severely impacted by the competing interests of the Soldier's family and employer.

**Benefits:** As a mechanism to manage the high operational tempo's demand for troops, the Army introduced a new strategic force generation model (ARFORGEN) which applies to all three Army Components (Active, Guard, and Reserve). Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command and Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, explains the rationale behind the model. "The Army Force Generation model, nicknamed "ARFORGEN," ensures there's always a pool of trained, equipped and deployment ready troops. ARFORGEN, when fully implemented, is intended to place the Army on a footing for an environment of persistent conflict. The plan, which generally means Army Reservists can expect to deploy for up to a year once every five years, also helps them live up to their dual obligations as warrior-citizens."<sup>21</sup>

Figure 1 illustrates the ARFORGEN model.<sup>22</sup> The human aspect of the "reset" phase is critical to the long-term health and readiness of our Army. The ability to retain well trained experienced Soldiers often hinges on the reintegration of Soldiers and Families during the reset period. The Reserve Component Soldier has the added stress of reintegrating into the civilian workforce. Ultimately, the increase in predictability for Soldiers, Families, and employers will enable the Army's Reserve Components to

become a truly operational force. ARFORGEN will become the premier management tool for ensuring commanders have immediate access to the Total Force while maintaining a strategic reserve for the Nation.




Figure 1 – ARFORGEN Model

Lieutenant General Stultz highlights the importance of ARFORGEN in relationship to the overall health of the Reserve Component calling the model... "critical to the future, particularly in light of the Army Reserve's shift from a strategic to an operational force..."<sup>23</sup> As an operational force, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve participate in a full range of missions at home and abroad providing operational capabilities according to the national defense strategy. Although the paramount intent of the ARFORGEN model was to ensure the Army's ability to support the demand for forces, Lieutenant General Stultz astutely recognizes the psychological benefits of predictability and its effect on individual readiness. The disruption of frequent deployments goes beyond the individual Soldier. "Families have to adapt too, whether it's changing doctors when they move between civilian and military health-care systems, or figuring out who's going to pick up the slack at home...how is the grass going to get cut...how is the oil in the car going to get changed?" Although it will take several years to refine and implement the management of the Reserve Components as an operational force, ARFORGEN and the predictability it brings to the Soldiers, Families, and employers, should ease the transition.

In an era of persistent conflict with heavy reliance on the Reserve Components, the Department of Defense is taking deliberate steps to manage the Guard and Reserve as an operational force. Toward that end, the principles [of ARFORGEN] described herein will serve to institutionalize the Reserve Components as an operational force and, in turn, further the sustainment of an all volunteer Guard and Reserve.<sup>24</sup>

### **Strategic Depth:**

Although the current military strategy emphasizes the phrase “operational Reserve,” the fact is the Reserve Components will continue to provide the nation’s military with strategic depth. “The Guard and Reserve still serve as an expansion force; that is, as a strategic reserve; but they also serve as an operational force.”<sup>25</sup> The Reserve Components must be well staffed, trained, and equipped for both missions. “As resources are not unlimited, the force must be flexible and agile so that it can transition between strategic and operational roles as needed. Because the Reserve Component is a part time force, its use in war and peacetime must be coordinated so that the force is not overused, in order to preserve its value to the nation. The importance of this factor, the part time nature of the force, must be fully considered along with the operational and strategic roles of the Reserve Component in devising Department [of Defense] policies underlying the organization and use of this force.”<sup>26</sup>

### **The Reserve Paradigm Shift and the *Whole of Government* Approach to Stability Operations:**

While the strategic and operational roles of the Reserve Components are not new, the the degree to which the military services have relied upon the National Guard and Reserve for the operational mission has increased significantly. The paradigm shift from the strategic management of the Reserve Components to operational management of the Reserve Components must consist of much more than a change in terminology. In the January 2008, Final Report to Congress by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (the Commission), led by Chairman, Arnold Punaro, the Commission makes it clear that the mechanisms for management must change. “The



fact that in some respects the Reserve Components are currently being used operationally does not make them a sustainable operational force. The Reserve Components were not established to be employed on a rotational basis, and key underlying laws, regulations, policies, funding mechanisms, pay categories, mobilization processes, and personnel rules that manage the Reserve Components will have to be modified to support their evolution into such an operational force.”<sup>27</sup>

To that end, a number of Department of Defense policies and directives have been issued to ensure the proper and prudent use of this force. Department of Defense Directive 1235.10 (DoDD 1235.10), Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, specifically speaks to a number of items for consideration before requesting forces from the Reserve Components.

DoDD 1235.10 states: It is Department of Defense policy that:<sup>28</sup>

- a. The decision to activate Reserve Component forces is made only after determining that it is both judicious and prudent to do so.
- b. To the extent possible given operational considerations, Reserve Component forces shall be activated with the consent of the individuals being called or ordered to active duty.
- c. Predictability of the Reserve Component forces is maximized through the use of defined operational cycles and utilizing force generation plans to provide advanced notification that allows the implementation of the train; mobilize; deploy model.
- d. Units and individuals of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty without their consent shall be kept on active duty no longer than absolutely necessary.

DoDD 1235.10, issued seven years after the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, reflects an understanding by DoD, that the demand for Reserve Component forces cannot be sustained at the same levels of the past seven years. Although an increase in end strength of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve is part of the

overall Army transformation plan, it will take several years to recruit and train the additional forces necessary to sustain the current effort. In the now famous words of former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, “as you know, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”<sup>29</sup>

**Conclusion:**

The Army “we have” today will continue to remain responsive to the entire continuum of possible missions. The efforts of the other Federal Government agencies in the *whole of government* strategy are the key to the sustainment of the military’s success. Congress must ensure that laws, policies, and funds are put in place so that the *whole of government* can climb down from the shoulders of their military teammates and walk side-by-side with them toward a shared goal.

**III. Strategic Issue:** Evaluate the Army’s current strategic human resources (HR) initiatives. What effect will the HR proposals have on the Army’s ability to identify the capabilities residing in its Reserve Component force? Finally, what impact will the proposed HR strategies have on the Army’s ability to better manage and recruit for capability shortfalls?

**Discussion:**

As all indications point to an era of persistent conflict for the foreseeable future, the security environment will consist of complex problems requiring specialized resources and skill sets not normally associated with conventional warfare preparation. The force implications for this unpredictable operational environment are identified in

the 2008 Army Posture Statement: “Because of the complexity of conflict and the hybrid challenges presented, land forces must be *full spectrum capable* – able to combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”<sup>30</sup> The Army must continue its excellence in both offensive and defensive combat operations while embracing its third core mission of stability operations. Transformation has begun to ensure the Army is responsive across the full spectrum of operations. While most of the skills for combat operations are trained for and reside within the Active Army and the National Guard, the Reserve Components are the natural place to search for the specialize skills required for successful stability operations.

“It is Department of Defense Policy that ... many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. **civilian professionals**.”<sup>31</sup> The Reserve Components are comprised almost entirely of civilian professionals with skills obtained in their civilian employment well suited for stability operations tasks. The citizen Soldier offers cutting edge technical skills such as those possessed by engineers, scientists, or information technology professionals, as well as specialized skills such as languages and cultural understanding.<sup>32</sup> The importance of the civilian-acquired skills of the Reserve Components cannot be overstated. Reserve Component Soldiers “have skills acquired through their civilian careers that are invaluable to DoD for both domestic and overseas missions. These skills are not easily attained or maintained by personnel in full time military careers... The value of these skills, and of the capability resident in the reserves to respond to unforeseen events, is not easily quantified, but it is significant.”<sup>33</sup>

## **The Challenge of Identifying the True Capabilities Residing in the Army's**

**Reserve Force:** The Reserve Components have always been talent rich with diverse skills obtained from service in civilian professions. These citizen-Soldiers are community and industry leaders, highly trained and educated professionals, and experts in their chosen field. The need for the military services to tap into those skills has never been greater than it is right now.

**Scenario:** Battlefield commanders are finding themselves in conflict environments requiring specialized combat skills as well as the non-lethal skills not normally associated with combat preparation. The ability to gain the security and support of the indigenous population of a volatile region often times depends on the ability to restore basic services to the people. Commanders poll their ranks on the battlefield for Soldiers with non-traditional skill-sets to operate abandoned civilian public utilities infrastructure such as power plants, water treatment facilities, and telecommunications equipment. This combat zone survey typically reveals information that should have been provided to that commander at the mobilization station. The Reserve Component Soldiers augmenting their Active Component counterparts include citizen Soldiers employed by Penn Power, Boston Water and Sewer Commission, and Verizon. Capturing this information in a usable format at the appropriate time is a significant challenge for the military. Commanders must be armed with the ability to readily retrieve such vital personnel information at any stage of the mission. The U.S. military is attempting to remedy this problem with its new Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System.

**Recommend the Continued Fielding and Training for Implementation of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS):** DIMHRS was introduced to the U.S. military in 2008. It is based on a commercial, off-the-shelf PeopleSoft product and, when fully implemented, is expected to bring all three components (Active, Reserve, and National Guard) into a single database for personnel systems. DoD envisions DIMHRS as the cure for everything that is wrong with the current personnel systems of the military services. DIMHRS...“will revolutionize how the Uniformed Services handle personnel and pay...a congressionally mandated program, will provide the Army, Navy, and Air Force an integrated personnel and pay system to support service members and their families, using commercial, off-the-shelf technology and the Web.”<sup>34</sup> DIMHRS will replace approximately ninety redundant and inefficient legacy personnel management systems and consolidate them into a single, authoritative source. The Army transformation to DIMHRS will take place in March 2009 with the Air Force and Navy following shortly thereafter.

In an era of “jointness” where interoperability of systems among services is paramount, not another dollar of taxpayer money should be directed toward the existing ninety disparate personnel management systems. Instead, Congress should continue to fully support this long overdue transformation of the military’s personnel system with appropriate legislation and funding to ensure commanders have a single, definitive source for personnel management and analysis creating more time for focus on the mission.

**Better Management for Recruitment and Retention:** In addition to DIMHRS, other personnel management initiatives are being considered to improve recruitment and retention in the Reserve Components.

**Continuum of Service:** “The continuum of service is utilized to enhance the effectiveness of and sustain the all volunteer force with flexible service options that are attractive to a broad population.”<sup>35</sup> This management principal is intended to facilitate the seamless transition between active duty and reserve duty based on mission requirements and availability of the Soldier. This strategy is fundamental to recruiting and retaining highly trained and skilled personnel in an era of increasing competition for a shrinking pool of qualified individuals. As expectations about career paths and mobility change, flexible service options are essential to attract the talent necessary for maintaining a technologically advanced force.

**Volunteerism:** “Voluntary duty is duty performed by reservists who request or indicate willingness to accept orders for active duty beyond any active duty obligation.”<sup>36</sup> Operationalizing the Reserve Components and the introduction of ARFORGEN injected predictability into the planning for involuntary active duty service. However, sustaining the expanded operational tempo of today’s security environment will require Reserve Component Soldiers to volunteer for duties beyond the minimum statutory requirement of participation. The flexibility offered by the continuum of service structure “...fosters volunteerism by providing greater opportunities for Guard and Reserve members to tailor service commitments to their availability, consistent with military requirements.”<sup>37</sup> Incentives, both financial and professional, will be necessary to increase volunteerism.

The flexible affiliation options provided by the continuum of service strategy and an incentives based volunteerism plan will allow the military services to "...better position themselves to meet some of the sudden requirements that emerge during times of national emergency and to meet requirements with individuals who may be willing to volunteer for some form of military service for short periods of time or in response to specific emergencies, but for whom traditional affiliation programs are not of interest."<sup>38</sup>

**Conclusion:**

Removing barriers to Reserve Component participation is essential in this era of persistent conflict. Congress must recognize the new strategic and demographic realities by developing a personnel management strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century and by reforming laws, policies, and systems to bring about the changes necessary for success in the current security environment.

**Final Conclusion:**

It is well established the substantial challenge of conducting successful stability operations requires much more than a military solution and so it is reflected in our nation's plans, policies, and strategies. The *whole of government* approach must become more than a slogan. The civilian component to the Total Force Concept (DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce and the Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America), must develop into viable tools that can be readily called upon to assist the military in meeting the nation's strategic objectives.

At the same time, the military must continue to transform into a flexible and effective force able to conduct its three core tasks; offensive and defensive combat operations and stability operations; with equal precision. The management of the

Reserve Components as an operational and strategic force must reflect a commitment to real reforms of personnel management systems, laws, policies, and funding for flexible affiliation and retention and recruitment incentives. Soldiers, Families, and employers have earned the right to a reasonable expectation of predictability promised by the troop rotation plan proposed in the Army's Force Generation model (ARFORGEN).

No matter how difficult the challenge, America will continue to pursue a plan towards comprehensive stability operations integrating our tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector. Each member of the team must be accountable to its partners and the mission. A goal of anything less will jeopardize success.

### Endnotes

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