

U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)  
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**ORIGINAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 1 March 1953 through 29 March 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG-12 Action Report 1 March 1953 through 29 March 1953 - P 24

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period of 1 March 1953 through 29 March 1953 is hereby submitted.

PART I


COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) with Commander Carrier Division FIVE and Commander Air Group TWELVE embarked, sortied from Yokosuka Harbor at 0655I, 1 March 1953 and at 1215I, 4 March 1953 joined Task Force 77 in Area Sugar, the Japan Sea. Commander Task Force 77 and Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, was embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45).

Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. HICKEY, embarked in the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77 on 15 March 1953. On 29 March 1953 the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) returned to the force with Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked and assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77.

During the operating period other ships in company were the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37), the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked and various cruisers and screening destroyers.

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) was detached on 29 March 1953 from Task Force 77 and proceeded to Hong Kong, B.C.C. for upkeep and maintenance.



PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

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1 March 1953

Sortied from Yokosuka Harbor, Japan at 0655I enroute to the Korean operating area. RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, embarked.

2 March 1953

Enroute to Korean operating area. Conducted AA firing exercises. The U. S. S. OWEN (DD-536) joined and assumed screening station. Conducted refresher flight operations.

3 March 1953

Enroute to Korean operating area. Conducted refresher flight operations.

4 March 1953

Enroute to Korean operating area. Rendezvoused with the U. S. S. MOUNT BAKER (AE-4) for replenishment. Joined Task Force 77 in the Korean operating area. RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3, and Commander Task Force 77, embarked in the U. S. S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45). Conducted combat flight operations.

5 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

6 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. At 1543I, LT E. L. KUMMER, USNR, VF-124 F4U pilot landed aboard with one hung 250 lb. general purpose bomb. The bomb dislodged, and after several bounces, exploded on the number three elevator causing major damage. Two enlisted men died of injuries and thirteen others, including LT KUMMER, were injured. Wing tip tanks of two F9F aircraft parked in Hangar Bay Two were punctured and the bay had to be isolated due to the fire hazard of the leaking gasoline. All further flight operations for the day were cancelled due to inoperative flight deck.

7 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.5 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U. S. S. MANATEE (AO-58). Replenished ammunition from the U. S. S. FIREDRAKE (AE-14). Conducted AA firing exercises. All bomb damage repair was completed and the ship reported its status as "fully operational" at 1412I to Commander Task Force 77.

8 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

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9 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

10 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

11 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.1 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. NARASOTA (AO-106). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. FIREDRAKE (AE-14). Ammunition replenishment was discontinued due to rough seas and high winds.

12 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 95.1 to complete replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. FIREDRAKE (AE-14).

13 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. ENS D. B. PLACE, USNR, VA-125, ditched his AD in Wonsan Harbor after being hit by enemy AA fire. ENS PLACE was rescued uninjured by helicopter. The U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) joined Task Force 77.

14 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

15 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.5 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. NAVASOTA (AO-106). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. MOUNT BAKER (AE-4). Received provisions from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, embarked aboard the U.S.S. ORISKANY, relieved RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3, as Commander Task Force 77. The U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3 embarked, was detached and departed Task Force 77.

16 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

17 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

18 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

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19 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.1 for replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5). Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-27). Conducted AA firing exercises.

20 March 1953

Flight operations cancelled due inclement weather. The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), joined Task Force 77.

21 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

22 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. LTJG R. N. MEW, USN, VF-122, F9F-5 pilot, crashed into the sea immediately after being catapulted. The aircraft exploded upon contact and immediately sank. LTJG MEW was not recovered. Cause of the accident is not known.

23 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

24 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.1 for replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. VIRGO (AKA-20). Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. GUADALUPE (AO-32). Conducted AA firing exercises.

25 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. The U.S.S. SAINT PAUL (CA-73), RADM H. SANDERS, USN, COMCRUDIV 1 embarked, joined Task Force 77.

26 March 1953

Flight operations were cancelled due to rough seas and high winds.

27 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

28 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

29 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.5 for replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. FIRE Drake (AE-14). Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. GUADALUPE (AO-32). Received provisions from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). The U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3 embarked, joined Task Force 77. RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, relieved RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5 as Commander Task Force 77. The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) was detached from Task Force 77 and ordered to proceed to Hong Kong, B.C.C. for a period of upkeep and recreation. End of reporting period.

PART IIIORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Enclosure (1) lists all ammunition expended by aircraft during the reporting period.
2. Gunnery Department expenditures of training ammunition were as follows:

5"/38 caliber projectile, AAC	160
5"/38 caliber projectile, FCL (VT)	18
5"/38 caliber projectile, FC. (VT) (non-frag)	7
5"/38 caliber cartridge, SPDN	185
3"/50 caliber, FCL (VT)	321
3"/50 caliber, FCL (VT) (non-frag)	331

PART IVBATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship. No battle damage was sustained by enemy action by the ORISKANY during the current period.
2. Damage inflicted on the enemy. (See enclosure (1)).
3. Damage inflicted on ORISKANY aircraft. (See enclosure (1)).

PART VPERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance.
  - a. Personnel.

During the period of this report morale and personnel performance has been excellent. During this period the average on board count of enlisted men was 2743, i.e., 1948 ship's company; 62 marines; 17 SWU team; 641 Air Group TWELVE and 75 staff COMCARDIV 5.

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Critical shortages exist in the following rates: MM, EM, AD, AL, AO, and AE.

During the period of this report there were fifty-four (54) transfers and four (4) receipts.

b. Training.

Training for the period as covered by this report consisted of the following:

New classes organized	5
Active classes at the end of period	9
Number of class hours held during period	121
Number of Navy Training Courses (texts) checked out	81
Number of Navy Training Courses (correspondence) ordered	86
Number of USAFI tests checked out	35
Number of Navy Training Courses (correspondence) completed	52
Number of USAFI Correspondence Courses ordered	24
Number of batteries of USAFI GED tests administered	20
Number of USAFI End-of-Course tests administered	5
Number of USAFI GED tests batteries ordered	20
Number of enrollments in College Extension Courses	0
Number of USAFI End-of-Course tests ordered	2
Number of letters sent to civilian schools on behalf of men for counseling and placement purposes	2
Number of requests for service schools forwarded	50

c. Legal.

As compared with prior periods during and immediately following a stay in port, the number of offenses ashore increased noticeably. Most of the cases were quickly disposed of by non-judicial punishment or courts-martial.

Aside from disciplinary matters, a total of four (4) incidents required processing by fact finding bodies--three boards of investigation and one court of inquiry. It became necessary to utilize, on a round-the-clock basis, clerical personnel in addition to those assigned to the legal office.

d. Welfare and Recreation.

Regularly scheduled Bingo games have been conducted at 1900 on Wednesdays and Saturdays of each week in the crew's messing compartments for all hands. Happy hours have been conducted on replenishment days, using talent from ship's company and the Air Group. The ship's band plays on Tuesday and Friday evenings in the officer's ward room.

The hobby shop is open daily for the use of all hands. It carried a wide variety of crafts, i.e., leathercraft, model planes, ships, sail boats, wagons, autos, etc..

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The ship's library is open daily from 0830 to 2130 for use by all hands.

The Charity Committee has conducted special raffles and bingo parties for the purpose of raising funds for the March of Dimes, Netherlands Flood Relief, Red Cross, and the two (2) amputees who lost arms as a result of a bomb explosion on 6 March 1953.

March of Dimes	\$3,000.00
Netherlands Flood	350.00
Amputee Fund	2,400.00
American Red Cross	3,000.00

Bingo parties and raffles have provided "on-the-line" recreation for all hands and are serving both morale and charity.

e. Religious Services.

Catholic services are held daily. Three (3) masses are said on Sundays followed by Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Special daily prayers are said for the safety of our pilots. The Rosary, Novena, and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament are held daily.

Protestant divine services are conducted at 0900 on Sunday mornings and Vesper services at 1900. The Bible Class meets at 1930 on Wednesdays. Memorial services were conducted for LTJG R.N. MEW, Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO, on 30 March 1953. LTJG MEW lost his life while on a combat mission against the enemy.

Jewish services are conducted on Friday evenings and on special days of religious significance on the Jewish calendar.

Mormon services are conducted at 1000 on Sundays.

Christian Science study periods are observed on Sundays at 1100.

f. Public Information Office.

The Public Information Office releases covered by this period are as follows:

- 16 Navy news dispatches (by radio)
- 6 News feature stories (by mail)
- 57 News photo releases (by mail)
- 1 Magazine article submitted
- 1570 Hometown news stories (FHTNC)
- 24 Hometown photographs (FHTNC)
- 5 Radio newscasts (internal)
- 59 Letters from Commanding Officer
- Motion picture footage (bomb explosion)

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g. The following is a list of news correspondents who visited the ship during the period:

Barry Bingham  
William Atwood  
Peter Robinson  
Walter Durrel  
Bob Schnecke

Robert Updick  
George MacArthur  
J.P. Higgins  
Patrick Catling

Louisville Courier  
Look Magazine  
Rueters  
United Press  
International News  
Service  
United Press  
Associated Press  
Buffalo Evening News  
Baltimore Sun

h. Distinguished visitors that visited the ship:

Adlai Stevenson (and party)  
LT. GEN. Maxwell D. Taylor (EIGHTH Army Commander)  
Harry Henshel (Chairman, Armed Forces Div., Jewish Welfare Board)

i. Air Group 12 (See enclosure (1)).

2. Casualties.

a. Ship's Company.

On 6 March 1953 a Corsair landed aboard with a hung 250 pound general purpose bomb. On landing the bomb fell from the plane and exploded on number three elevator platform, killing 2 men and wounding 13 others, including 4 men from the Air Group and 2 from the Marine detachment.

Ship's company men killed were:

Thomas Leo MC GRAW, PHAN  
Thomas Michael YEAGER, AEAN

Ship's company men injured were:

J. BLACKBURN, AN  
C. N. HAWKINS, AN  
L. N. HENSHAW, AE3  
S. S. KALFAS, QMSN  
J. D. MOORE, AN  
J. N. OLIVER, AN  
R. L. WILLIAMS, AN  
J. A. MULACH, PFC  
W. T. ALLRID, PFC



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The injuries sustained by MOORE and MULACH resulted in the amputation of each of their left arms.

b. Air Group 12 (See enclosure (1)).

PART VI

COMMENTS

1. Air Department.

a. General. During this period two AJ aircraft were recovered and launched without incident. On 17 March 1953 a member of the flight deck crew was blown overboard by jet blast and recovered within 1 minute by helicopter.

b. Aircraft handling.

(1) Special operations utilizing AJ type aircraft were conducted during the first day's operation. Prior to arrival of the two AJ's, six (6) AD aircraft were launched with strike loads and accompanied aircraft from other carriers on a routine mission, and were recovered by another carrier. This left a total of 68 aircraft and 2 helicopters on board at the time the two AJ's were recovered. A ready deck was maintained until dark with sufficient space available to recover 3 or 4 aircraft. No difficulty was encountered in respotting with the two AJ's on board; however, alignment of the AJ over the number 1 bomb elevator required considerable effort. Landing gear spot lines were painted on the deck which should reduce future spotting time to a minimum. The AJ's were catapulted the following morning, on a OST training mission, followed by routine prop and jet strikes.

(2) On 6 March a 250 pound general purpose bomb became dislodged from an F4U during an arrested landing and exploded on #3 elevator. In spite of the serious damage resulting, the elevator and flight deck were placed back in commission within 24 hours. Repair parties were effective in preventing further damage as a result of a bomb explosion on the flight deck. Repair Eight immediately extinguished the fire on the flight deck as the hot suit man rescued the injured pilot. Hangar bays were isolated by shutting fire doors on the hangar deck and the Repair Seven and Repair One crews effectively controlled the serious gasoline leakage which resulted when bomb fragments pierced two wing tip tanks on aircraft parked on the hangar deck.

(3) An increase in the size of jet flights launched and recovered during this period caused some concern for handling crews particularly in cases where a large prop recovery was scheduled to follow a twenty (20) to twenty-two (22) jet recovery. In order to assure sufficient room to recover all aircraft, most of the jets had to be struck below during the recovery. Due to the usual low fuel states of the jets, action had to be fast and both #1 and #2 elevators utilized to the maximum degree. During such recoveries, some pilots were over-eager to taxi out of the gear, and occasionally this haste resulted in pilots having to use excessive brakes to

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slow up in the barrier area. Several foul decks of 3 to 4 minutes duration were caused by the breaking of barrier and barricade shear pins due to braking action of wheels when taxiing over the barricade. Another critical situation experienced was the recovery of large jet flights with most props on board in the pack ahead of the barrier. Only #2 elevator was available during such conditions and usually 8 to 10 jets had to go below to the hangar deck. In order to prevent wave-offs the jets extended their interval slightly. A time saving method was incorporated by having the pilots report on the down wind leg if their plane is going to be "down". Knowing this, the plane can be struck below upon recovery, leaving only "up" aircraft on the flight deck for the next launch.

(4) During this period several jet strikes were scheduled carrying 500# bombs. Loading the 500# bomb requires spreading the wings of the F9F as it does on the AD aircraft. This problem is of no significance if the loading is accomplished during the night or periods during the day when the props are off on a strike. Wing spreads are difficult to accomplish when all aircraft are on board and ready deck condition set.

(5) One additional jet starting unit would be of great value on the hangar deck at #2 elevator. Many times standby aircraft are brought up to the flight deck for launch and delay is experienced in starting if a starting jeep is not available. The ship's allowance is four jet starting jeeps, and this number barely keeps up with the fast catapulting abilities of this ship.

c. Arresting Gear.

(1) There was a total of one thousand six hundred seventy-six (1,676) landings made during this period of which eight hundred ninety-two (892) were conventional type aircraft. There was an average run out of cross deck pendants for the jet aircraft of one hundred thirty-four point three (134.3) feet and one hundred thirty point four (130.4) feet for the conventional type.

(2) There were three (3) barrier and/or barricade crashes involving three (3) jet aircraft.

d. Catapults.

(1) A total of nine hundred eighty-six (986) aircraft were catapulted, the majority of which were F9F-5 Panthers. One (1) arrestor was lost on the second shot due to a failure of the webbing loop. A second arrestor and pendant assembly was lost after twenty-two (22) shots due to a similar failure. Nylon webbing for use in the manufacture of loops is not available.

(2) Availability of both catapults has remained excellent despite the continued wear of crosshead sheave bearings. One Ansco Air Solenoid valve was changed on the starboard catapult on 17 March due to erratic action. This valve has been installed since September 1950.

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LAUNCHING STATISTICS:

Average wind - Jet launch - 37 knots

Average wind - Propeller launch - 32 knots

F9F - 823	Average weight - 19,500 lbs.
F2H - 67	Average weight - 18,000 lbs.
F4U - 42	Average weight - 17,000 lbs.
AD - 45	Average weight - 20,000 lbs.
TBM - 7	Average weight - 14,000 lbs.
AJ - 2	Average weight - 46,000 lbs.

(3) One F9F-5 crashed ahead and to port of the ship following a normal catapult shot from the starboard catapult. The aircraft exploded upon impact and the cause of the accident is unknown.

e. Aircraft Maintenance.

(1) Getting the "downed" aircraft spotted so it can be worked on is a major handling problem. This problem has been partially eliminated due to the efforts of CVG maintenance and aircraft handling personnel. Timely information is passed to Flight Deck Control concerning maintenance requirements and check requirements are closely watched in order to assure getting the plane below for checks during recoveries and respots. One of the major maintenance problems is the lack of space for jet turn-ups on the hangar deck. Prop turn-ups in hangar bay #3 require opening all curtains and at night obviously require cutting off all lights, thereby stopping all maintenance work in progress at that time. Every effort is being made to spot "down" aircraft on the hangar deck in such a manner that when the aircraft is ready for turn-up, it can easily be brought top side via one of the available elevators.

(2) In order to provide more hangar space it has been found that two tail sections from F9F "dud" aircraft can be suspended from the overhead on the port side of #3 elevator. By shortening the cables of the standard hoisting sling the tail section can be suspended high enough to allow personnel and equipment to move about freely underneath. These tail sections had previously been suspended from the overhead in the after part of bay #3, but this position was difficult to reach and prevented removing wings from the overhead stowage without first removing the tail sections.

f. Ordnance.

(1) Elevator stoppage and over-travel was encountered due to old and faulty General Electric controllers. The relays stuck causing the main highspeed contact points to arc and weld closed. This causes over-travel resulting in the stoppage of the elevator. These controllers will be overhauled and new equipment installed. At present, no spare contact points are available. It is recommended that an adequate supply of these contact points be carried by all ships using this type control box.

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(2) 20mm ammunition, previously belted and stored in ship's magazines, should be re-checked for calibration before using. It is a good idea to save a supply of bomb nose and tail plugs for replacement in the event fuzes are withdrawn due to non-flying or bad weather.

(3) Maximum effort strikes necessitating rapid reloading, refueling, and respotting of F9F-5 aircraft again highlighted the difficulty and excessive time required in re-loading the 20mm guns due to the design and placement of ammunition cans and feed chutes. It requires approximately three (3) times as long to re-arm the F9F-5 as to re-arm other type aircraft. With limited numbers of ordnancemen available, this seriously hampers overall operation.

## 2. Engineering Department.

### a. Casualties.

(1) The following major damage was sustained during routine operations from 0000 1 March to 2400 29 March 1953:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>
1-29 Mar	(a) Hole in #3 elevator main platform approximately 5 and one half feet athwartship by seven feet fore and aft. Frames 137-138, approximately 15 feet port of centerline.	Explosion of 250lb. G.P. bomb which fell from wing of plane during arrested landing. (See ORISKANY Conf ltr ser 0105 14 Mar 1953)
	(b) Specific damage as follows:	
	1. Two longitudinal deck girders size 12"x14" (22 lb. "I" beams) destroyed and two additional girders (same size) bent down about one half inch outward. Location frames 137-139.	
	2. Intermediate transverse girders 18"x7½" (55lb. "I" beams) at frame 139 between points 13'6" and 14'10" to port of centerline bent down on forward flanges and up on after flanges about one inch. Web of girder has a slight twist at the point of maximum flange bend.	
	3. Approximately 360 linear feet of wood deck planking destroyed and additional linear feet damaged.	
	4. Approximately 46 square feet of 4.2 lb. deck plate destroyed with three additional holes in plating at frame 140 between 11' and 12' to port of centerline	
	5. Elevator platform bent down in area of blast. Readings were taken by means of chalk line and show a maximum depression of 2" at frame 140 at a point 11'4" to port of centerline decreasing to zero depression at frames 133 and 144.	

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(2) The following minor damage was sustained during routine operations from 0000 1 March to 2400 29 March 1953:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>
1 March to 29 March	(a) Damage to flight deck planking involving approximately 1000 linear feet.	Aircraft landings
4 March	(a) Rupture of superheater tube in #7 boiler (see ORISKANY ltr ser 767 14 March 1953). Location: Two MK 368 in the inlet header, 22 tubes down from the top of the header. (See BUSHIPS Plan CV9-S5101-114).	Believed to be internal corrosive condition of tubes as previously reported in ORISKANY ltr ser 2833 21 Dec 1952.
6 March	(a) Secondary damage to #3 elevator main platform as follows:  1. Channel securing track about 14' bent or destroyed.  2. Arresting gear chafing plate about 12 feet at frame 136 bent and pierced by small fragments.  3. Welds in blast area, in particular the joining points between intermediate transverse girder (frame 139) and main longitudinal girder, show external strain.  (b) Damage to auxiliary elevator platform as follows: Same as above  1. One hole 10"x14" in 15 lb. plating at frame 140 about 13 feet to port of centerline.  2. Longitudinal deck girder 10"x6" (18 lb. "I" beam) at frame 140 had lower flange bent down two inches for distance of about 6".  3. One hole in 15 lb. deck plating size 1"x3" frame 140 at 13'10" to port of centerline.  4. Safety net frame on port edge, frame 140, cut through.  (c) Additional minor damage was incurred by flying debris or shrapnel extending from hangar deck to 09 level of the island and as far forward as frame 98.	Bomb explosion. See a (1) (a) above.

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DATE

DESCRIPTION

CAUSE

11 March (a) Plates cracked at the following locations: Heavy weather.

1. Upper forward cover of coaming and knife edge of 16,000 lb. bomb elevator door, hangar deck level, frame 63, starboard side, approximately 11" long.

2. Cracked plates, diagonally from covers of opening of vent system (supply) 2-66-4, frames 64-67, main deck walkway port side, approximately (1) 5" long, (2) 3" long, (3) 1/2" long, (4) 10" long.

3. Frame 60, starboard side, main deck, 6 feet above main deck over winch, approximately 6" long.

4. Frame 71, starboard side, main deck 47" above main deck, approximately 3 1/2" long.

5. Frame 67, starboard side, main deck, 12' above main deck, approximately 12" long.

6. Frames 78 to 79, starboard side, main deck, 1" above the deck, approximately 5" long.

7. Main deck level, frame 112, where expansion joint meets main deck, is cracked.

b. Recommendations.

(1) None.

c. Steaming Data:

Engine miles steamed - 11,846.8	1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)
Fuel oil received - 2,047,623	1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)
Fuel oil delivered DD's - 43,667	1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)
Fuel oil consumed (underway) - 2,122,153	1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)
Fuel consumed (anchored) - none	1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)
Average speed - 17.1	1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)
Hours underway - 689.1	1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)

d. Fueling:

(1) During the period 1 March through 29 March, the U.S.S. ORISKANY fueled one destroyer on one occasion at an average rate of 67,180 gallons per hour. The U.S.S. ORISKANY refueled from tankers on six occasions during this period at an average fueling rate of 180,137.5 gallons per hour.

14

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3. Medical Department.

The Medical Department supplies and equipment continue to be adequate. No supply shortage or equipment breakdown occurred during the reporting period.

a. Medical Evaluation of Air Group and Ship's Company.

(1) The health of ship's company and the Air Group has continued to be excellent. If anything the incidence of disease, anxiety, and psychic tension has been less than on previous tours. There has been no loss in performance. Morale has improved, and is on a higher level than previously described. Two factors undoubtedly contributed to this. First of all, the ship is about to return to the United States. Secondly and probably more important, the disaster (vide infra) of the sixth of March has served to weld the ship more firmly together making every man realize that he is part of an organization that has been tried and found to have what it takes. Ship's pride, squadron pride is at an all time high. We know we have the best ship.

(2) On an inspection of ship's company on the 31st of March, only five cases of a very mild acne, one case of blepharitis, and one sebaceous cyst were noted in approximately 3,000 men. Many times this number were noted when the ship was inspected on the West Coast. No evidence of any other illness was noted.

(3) In conclusion it is felt that the personnel of this vessel are in excellent physical condition after six and one half months overseas.

(4) On the sixth of March 1953, a two hundred and fifty pound bomb exploded on the flight deck blasting a hole through the number three elevator platform. Two men were killed and thirteen injured. The important fact was that no one gave way to panic. Every man did his job coolly and efficiently. Men walked through gasoline on the hangar deck, men rushed to rescue the pilot even though the plane had begun to burn. Men did this with the memory of the BOXER fresh in their minds. It is felt that only a well disciplined crew with good morale and spirit could have performed in so creditable fashion. No cases of anxiety have resulted from this incident, an amazing record. Medically the first aid training of ship's company and the medical department paid off. Stretchers appeared, first aid was given, and patients evacuated to sick bay within a matter of minutes. Supplies and equipment were readily available. More casualties could have been handled without break-down of the organization.

b. Care of the Dead.

(1) It is hoped that some more expeditious plan may be worked out for the disposing of the dead. Under present operating conditions, it is felt that embalming of bodies is not technically feasible. The procedure ties up sick bay facilities for several hours, aboard a man of war that may be called on at any time to handle more casualties. Four hours time elapsed recently when this was done. Half of sick bay was made untenable by formaldehyde fumes for an even longer period.

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(2) Even then embalmed bodies must be placed in storage at 34 to 40 degrees. This might be satisfactory for a few days, but is not for periods at sea of 25 to 30 days. Freezing of embalmed bodies at 16 degrees, or less, is technically satisfactory, but against present directives. The present procedure aboard this vessel has been to freeze unembalmed bodies holding them until the ship arrives at Yokosuka. Embalming these bodies at such a late date is technically difficult. To solve this problem it is recommended that special COD flights be made to transport bodies, which have been previously frozen, to Atsugi for further transfer to the U.S.N.H.. Five or ten flights per month would be more than adequate. If this is not logistically sound, it is recommended that bodies be buried at sea. The present method of holding bodies for further transfer, though meeting the wishes of a few bereaved relatives, imposes a greater psychic trauma on ship's company, and uses up valuable reefer space.

c. Medical Department Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company

	Periods			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Admitted to sick list	190	226	369	156
Admitted to binnacle list	15	14	14	2
Percent sick days out of possible 67,232 work days	.73			
Percent sick days out of possible 67,232 work days	.77			
Percent sick days out of possible 104,475 work days	.78			
Percent sick days out of possible 67,091 work days	.69			
Officers admitted to sick list	10	9	10	4
Total visits to sick call	1,161	1,258	3,879	1,901
Patients received from other ships	1	1	1	0
Patients transferred to hospital	0	0	1	3
Minor injuries treated	200	216	103	173
Major injuries treated	1	1	1	7
Number shipboard injuries resulting death	1	0	0	2
Number of personnel died of disease	1	0	0	0
Minor surgical procedures	25	12	33	42
Major surgical procedures	3	3	7	16
Venereal diseases and non-specific urethritis	58	117	179	96
Gonorrhea	7	11	23	10
Chancroid	14	18	20	6
Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure	38	88	136	80

d. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed, not recovered	1	1	1	0
Planes lost, pilot not recovered	1	0	0	1
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries	1	0	0	0
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, uninjured	2	0	3	1
Planes lost, operational, crewmen recovered uninjured	0	0	0	0
Planes damaged, enemy action, crewmen injured	0	0	0	0



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	periods			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured	0	0	0	0
Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons	15	24	25	16
Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation	0	0	0	1
Crewmen grounded for medical reasons	0	0	1	0
Average number days pilot grounded	2.4	4.2	7.2	4.4

e. Remarks.

On 6 March 1953, LT E. L. KUMMER, USNR, sustained numerous missile wounds about both lower extremities, left upper arm, left shoulder and face when a 250# general purpose bomb fell from the port wing rack of his F4U-4 fighter and exploded, as he landed aboard the carrier. Wreckage burst into flames immediately thereafter, but because of the expeditious manner in which he was removed from the cockpit and by virtue of the protection afforded by his helmet, goggles and exposure suit, he sustained only second degree burns of both cheeks and his chin. He remains on the sick list, having been transferred to the United States Naval Hospital at Yokosuka, Japan for further treatment on 15 March 1953.

There were twelve others wounded and two fatalities, as a result of this accident. It is considered miraculous that the pilot escaped more serious injury.

LTJG R. W. MEW, USNR, was killed on 22 March 1953 when his F9F-5 fighter crashed into the sea shortly after being catapulted from the carrier.

4. Navigation Department.

The Navigation Department has continued its OOD training plan with thoroughly qualifying as many personnel as possible as the goal. Although it is an accelerated plan, each watch stander receives excellent training, both on the job and by written examination. Officers from departments not normally assigned bridge watches are included in this program in an effort to benefit as many as possible. This can be seen in the fact that of the six qualifications granted this tour, one officer was from the Air Department, one from Air Intelligence, one from CIC, and one from the Executive Department and the remaining two from Gunnery. As personnel become qualified, they are rotated from OOD watches to other duties to allow billets for new officers to qualify. So far on this Korean tour 16 officers have been qualified, bringing the total of qualified Officers-of-the-Deck to 28.

To increase the experience of those officers already qualified, OOD's have been given practice in actually making approaches on replenishment ships and keeping station alongside. This has greatly increased the OOD's practical knowledge of relative motion in addition to relieving the workload on the Navigator and Executive Officer during replenishment days.

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During this tour more use has been made of the automatic steering and it has been found generally quite satisfactory and especially so during the rough weather encountered on 26 and 27 March. During this period excessive rudder was used by the helmsman in "hand" steering because of the yaw caused by the seas, combined with our slow speed (10 knots). It was found that where the helmsman needed 25 to 30 degrees of rudder to maintain a satisfactory course, that, by proper adjustment, automatic steering could maintain the same course using approximately one half the rudder or 10 to 15 degrees. This not only was a rest for the helmsman, but it also reduced the wear on the steering engines.

5. Operations Department.

a. Air Intelligence

The Air Intelligence Office force consisting of three officers and three enlisted men plus the Air Group AIO and two enlisted men from the Air Group staff is considered adequate to meet the Air Intelligence requirements. The ship's AIO spent this period on the bridge training for the qualification of OOD underway.

A card index system has been initiated to facilitate ready reference to maps and charts. This method will also indicate high and low usage maps and those which have reached a critical supply level. It is believed this card index system will provide a means whereby a more workable stock level of maps and charts can be maintained aboard.

The Photo Interpretation unit has been separated physically from the Air Intelligence Office and reassigned working space in the wardroom air conditioning machinery room, compartment A-211-EL. The space is adequate and this solution has relieved the critical working space problem for both Air Intelligence and Photo Interpretation.

b. Air Operations.

Air Operations officer personnel during the ship's fourth line tour consisted of two officers, one lieutenant commander and one lieutenant. The third officer normally assigned to Air Operations, a lieutenant junior grade, was returned without relief to CONUS for release to inactive duty at the completion of the third line tour. This officer was the assigned CCA officer and had additional duties as air plot officer and OA division officer. Since aircraft recovery by CCA is not presently in effect in the Task Force, this loss was absorbed. Other officers assumed the duties of air plot officer and one of the ship's air intelligence officers became the OA division officer.

The assigned CCA enlisted personnel have been utilized to man Air Operations. Five rated air controllmen and five strikers were assigned to CCA. This permits manning the one and two JG circuits by two status board keepers, one air controllman on the land/launch frequency, and allowed the watch officer to act as a general supervisor. The two JG talker also mans the ready

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room teletype. As long as there are a minimum of ten enlisted men assigned to CCA, it is believed that Air Operations could continue to be efficiently manned even with the occasional use of CCA during poor weather conditions.

The above mentioned personnel on a watch basis were always on duty at all other times when underway. A twenty-four hour watch was thus maintained, personnel being organized on a three watch or section basis.

Air Operations has acted as the general information and coordination center for all phases of air operations. A direct line sound powered telephone connection was installed between the open bridge and Air Operations prior to reporting for the first line tour with Task Force 77. This direct line telephone has proven a very valuable and efficient means of rapidly transmitting the Captain's decisions to the pilots, particularly in emergency situations.

A gradual improvement in aircraft availability and percentage of assigned missions actually launched and completed has been noted with each successive line period. The fourth line period was the ship's most successful and efficient to date. With the exception of two days at the beginning of the period, the Air Group maintained a daily aircraft availability of well over ninety percent. This was reflected in the ship's averaging very nearly one hundred percent in meeting the assigned flight schedule over the twenty-nine day period.

c. Communications.

Communications during the period covered by this report were highly satisfactory from the view point of equipment performance. Traffic in general was processed expeditiously under all circumstances with the exception of short periods of atmospheric disturbance and circuit over-load.

Encrypted traffic, especially with a Staff embarked, has a tendency to "bog-down" with the ultimate result of lengthy delays in delivery to addressees concerned. It is felt that one cause of increased encrypted traffic loads is due to the abuse of overclassification. The results of such misuse are set forth in the United States Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter.

Attention is invited to the communication section of the Action Report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) for the period 28 October - 22 November 1952. Note was made of the indiscriminate use of precedences of "OP" and "O" in this particular theater. This misuse, which also tends to tie-up circuits being used, has on more than one occasion caused delay in attempting to clear traffic of an immediate operational nature.

Subject to the above comments, the following recommendations are submitted:

(1) Recommend commands review current instructions defining the proper use of precedence.

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(2) Recommend commands insure that all personnel having authority to assign security classification, are familiar with the contents of Chapter 4 of the United States Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter.

The following statistics are indicative of the communication aspects of the operation:

MESSAGES HANDLED IN MAIN RADIO

<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>NO. OF MSGS. RELAYED</u>
Task Group Common	562
Task Force Commanders Net	284
Task Group Commanders Net	259
COM7THFLT Circuit	31
JOCK Circuit	59
Total	<u>1,195</u>

MESSAGES HANDLED IN MAIN COMMUNICATIONS AND CRYPTO-CENTER

Incoming (Classified)	2,457 (502,338 groups)
Outgoing (Classified)	361 (45,624 groups)
Incoming (Plain)	4,642
Outgoing (Plain)	1,106
Total	<u>8,566</u>

MESSAGES HANDLED BY THE SIGNAL BRIDGE

Flashing Light (Incoming)	439
Flashing Light (Outgoing)	219
Nancy (Incoming)	80
Nancy (Outgoing)	46
Total	<u>784</u>

Groups: Incoming: 11,334; Outgoing: 5,003.

The following statistics represent postal activities:

Money orders issued	1,241 (\$59,043.75)
Money orders cashed	99
Registered mail received	456 pieces
Registered mail dispatched	488 pieces
Air mail received	15 sacks, 50 pouches (approx 115,000 letters)
Air mail dispatched	8 sacks, 38 pouches (approx 95,000 letters)
Parcel post received	330 sacks
Parcel post dispatched	106 sacks
Insured mail received	233 pieces
Insured mail dispatched	110 pieces
First class mail received	6 pouches
First class mail dispatched	10 pouches

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**d. Photography.**

The number of photographic personnel assigned for the period was 14. This figure includes one warrant, one AFC and eight rated men.

Laboratory production was less than for the previous operating period. Print totals for the period were 23,332 9x18 inch, 1,926 8x10 inch target photos for briefing. 378 8x10 inch copy negatives were made of target mosaics selected by staff and ship photo interpretation units.

It is recommended that ships returning to the west coast be outfitted with new AIOA film dryers, print dryers and print washers before their next deployment. Due to constant use, approximately 15 to 20 hours each operating day, these dryers and printers become unreliable, especially the AIOA film dryer. Print washers tend to rust and corrode from use of salt water for washing prints.

**6. Supply Department.**

**a. Aviation Stores.**

During the 30 days covered by this report no on-the-line replenishment from ARS/ARV vessels was accomplished. Miscellaneous freight items were shipped via replenishment tankers and by COD aircraft. It was noted that priority screening is desirable for COD delivery since items of low priority were occasionally received when status information indicated that high priority materials were probably available for lift.

The following items continue in short supply and procurement has been on emergency basis only:

R82-C-625120	Cord 5/8"
R85-PW-198061	Liner, Weldment
R85-HO-A7002G:	Control Fuel
R90-NAF-600455-89-5	Pendants
R94-BUA-50A7OR103	Launcher, Aero 14A

**b. General Stores.**

Procurement problems as indicated in previous reports remain substantially unchanged, providing experience which will be of great assistance prior to next scheduled deployment.

**c. Ship's Store and C&SS**

Stationery is a high usage item with sales of one package per month for every two men on board.

89,000 packages of cigarettes were sold during the month of March.

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Fifty-three percent of the C&SS requisitions were filled. This leaves shortages in undershirts, dungaree jumpers, and dungaree trousers.

d. Commissary.

On 15 March 1953 the U.S.S. ORISKANY received provisions from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). Eighty-one percent of the requisitions were filled. On 29 March 1953 ninety percent of the material requisitioned was received from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55) leaving shortages in the following:

Potatoes, sweet, fresh	Potatoes, dehy.
Lettuce, fresh	Pickles, sweet
Tomatoes, fresh	Salad oil
Pears, fresh	Hot sauce
Spaghetti	

e. Disbursing.

Due to an anticipated 60 days without the availability of funds it was necessary to request permission from COMNAVFE to carry funds in excess of the authorized amount. Permission was granted to carry funds for a 90 day period.

PART VII

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Page 10 paragraph 1 b (5)

One additional jet starting unit be allotted for use on hangar deck at #2 elevator.

2. Page 11 paragraph 1 f (1)

An adequate supply of contact points for General Electric controllers be carried by all ships using this type control box.

3. Page 16 paragraph 3 b (2)

Special COD flights transport bodies of deceased personnel to Atsugi.

4. Page 16 paragraph 3 b (2)

That bodies be buried at sea.

5. Page 19 paragraph 5 c (1)

That commands review instructions defining proper use of precedence.

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6. Page 20 paragraph 5 c (2)

That commands insure that all personnel having authority to assign security classifications are familiar with contents of chapter 4 of United States Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter.

7. Page 21 paragraph 5 d (3)

That ships returning to west coast be outfitted with AIOA film dryers, print dryers and print washers before next deployment.

*Courtney Shands*  
COURTNEY SHANDS

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CNO (2) advance  
CINCPACFLT (5) Advance  
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP  
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CTF-77 (1) Advance  
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COMCARDIV 3  
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COMSERVPAC  
COMFAIRJAPAN  
COMFAIRALAMEDA  
COMFAIRQUONSET  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NLO JOC KOREA  
USS BOXER (CVA-21)  
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)  
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)  
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)  
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)  
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)  
USS WASP (CVA-18)  
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)  
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)  
CVG 2  
CVG 5  
CVG 7  
CVG 9  
CVG 11  
CVG 15  
CVG 19  
CVG 101  
CVG 12  
ATG 2 (5)