

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
 To: Chief of Naval Operations
 Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
 (2) Commander Seventh Fleet
 (3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
 (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

8 JAN 1951

AR 119/CV

Subj: Narrative Report of Action for the period 1 December 1950 through 26 December 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr OP-345/aa ser 1197P34 of 3 Aug 1950
 (b) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 092A of 9 Nov 1950
 (c) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 0121 of 18 Dec 1950
 (d) U.S.S. LEYTE Action Reports #277 through 438 of Dec 1950

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1. The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) Narrative Report of Action is forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

PART I

COMPOSITION OF FORCES AND MISSIONS

U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) a unit of Task Force 77 was operating in the Sea of Japan, OTC was Rear Admiral E.C. EWEN, U. S. Navy, TF-77 (ComCarDivONE) in U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). (Com7thFleet) in U.S.S. MISSOURI, (ComCarDivTHREE) (CTG 77.3) in U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA-119), ComDesRon 11 in the U.S.S. WILTSIE (DD-716), U.S.S. ROWAN (DD-702), U.S.S. LOFBERG (DD-759), U.S.S. MOORE (DD-747), U.S.S. MADDOX (DD-731), U.S.S. CHANDLER (DD-717), U.S.S. GURKE (DD-783), U.S.S. KERPLER (DDE-765), ComDesRon 2 in the U.S.S. BERRY (DDE-858), U.S.S. CAFFERTY (DD-850), U.S.S. HENDERSON (DD-785), U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-869), U.S.S. STICKWELL (DD-438), and U.S.S. BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887).

The U.S.S. LEYTE conducted operations in accordance with ComCarDivONE's Op-Order 3-50 and daily dispatch air operations plans. The mission was to support United Nations Forces in Northern Korea and to furnish defensive combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol for TF-77. During the month of December, Air Group THREE was committed primarily to close air support missions in the Chosin Reservoir and Hungnam Area.

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PART II

(a) <u>Total sorties for December 1950:</u>	<u>1124</u>
Sorties over Korea	781
Sorties over TF-77	343
Total hours flown	3210.9 hrs.
Total days operations	25
Days on which air operations conducted	18

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

- (b) 12/1/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir Area. This was the second day of maximum effort close support missions in this area in support of ground troops encircled by Chinese Communist Troops. During instrument flight operations along route to and snow storms in the action area 22 sorties including night sorties were flown.
- 12/2/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir Area. Close Support provided for First Marine Division under mass attack by Chinese Communist Troops. Continued support flights until 2038I with night intruder aircraft. 61 sorties were flown.
- 12/3/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir Area. Close support provided directly to First Marine Division. 36 Napalm Bombs were expended on two parallel ridges 1½ miles long cremating Chinese Communist Troops holding these highly strategic high positions along the only usable route to Hamhung. 69 sorties were flown.
- 12/4/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir, (Koto-Ri) Area. F4U4, BUNO. 97231 crashed in Koto-Ri Area behind enemy lines. Crash was caused by enemy anti-aircraft hits. Pilot Ensign Jesse L. BROWN, 504477, U. S. Navy sustained severe injuries and was unable to extricate himself from aircraft. LTJG T.J. HUDNER, Jr., 485270, U.S. Navy, landed his F4U4, BUNO. 82050 wheels up nearby and endeavored to remove Jesse BROWN who was pinned in the wreckage. HUDNER and rescue helicopter pilot were unable to remove BROWN.

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- Ensign Jesse L. BROWN died of his injuries. His body was not recovered. LTJG HUDNER was returned to this ship. 77 sorties were flown.
- 12/5/50: In company with U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) and U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA-119) spent entire day in logistics area replenishing. Received 344,652 gallons of fuel oil; 125,000 gallons of aviation gasoline; 205 tons of ammunition.
- 12/6/50: Rejoined TF-77. Recommended close support missions over Chosin Reservoir Area at 0430I with Night Intruder Missions using Mark 6 flares to illuminate enemy troop concentrations. 67 sorties were flown.
- 12/7/50: Commenced flight operations with Jet TARCAP over Chosin Reservoir and continued maximum effort close air support missions throughout the day. 72 sorties were flown.
- 12/8/50: In company with U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) replenished in logistics area. Received 25,296 gallons of fuel oil; 63,156 gallons of aviation gasoline and 75 tons of ammunition.
- 12/9/50: Continued with maximum effort close support missions covering withdrawal of First Marine Division from Chosin Reservoir to Hamhung. 82 sorties were flown.
- 12/10/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions covering final stages of First Marine Division's withdrawal to Hamhung. 61 sorties were flown.
- 12/11/50: In logistics support area. Replenished 117,411 gallons of fuel oil, 68,194 gallons aviation gasoline, 120 tons of ammunition and 99 tons of Fresh, frozen and dry provisions.
- 12/12/50: Strike flights were directed against Huichon, Kanggye and Wonsan, with close support missions in the Omyonbo, Songjin and Pujun-Ni areas. AD4, BUNO. 123883 hit a high tension wire and crashed in Korea behind enemy lines. Pilot LCDR R.M. BAGWELL, 85753, U. S. Navy, Squadron Commander of VA-35 of CVG-3 was captured by enemy troops and is missing in action. 81 sorties were flown.
- 12/13/50: Strike flights were flown in Kilchu and Tokchon areas. Highly effective close support missions were flown in support of troops holding the perimeter at Hamhung. 87 sorties were flown.

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- 12/14/50: Continued close support of troops holding perimeter at Hamhung. Strikes were directed into Fusen Reservoir area against Chinese Red Troops and troop replacements moving into Hamhung area. 56 sorties were flown.
- 12/15/50: Replenished in the logistics area. Received 322,036 gallons of fuel oil, 151,008 gallons of aviation gasoline, 38 tons of ammunition, 37 tons of provisions.
- 12/16/50: Conducted strikes and night intruder missions in the Fusen Reservoir Area. Encountered adverse weather conditions over target. 18 sorties were flown.
- 12/17/50: Commenced close support missions in Hungnam sea port area in support of troops covering evacuation operations. 53 sorties were flown.
- 12/18/50: Delivered 99,832 gallons of fuel oil to U.S.S. HIGBEE (DDR-806).
- 12/19/50: Replenished all day. Received 224,154 gallons of fuel oil, 44,987 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 84 tons of ammunition.
- 12/20/50: Close support missions and TARCAP covered the Hungnam area. Strikes were directed against the Toejo area. 74 sorties were flown.
- 12/21/50: Close support missions covered Hungnam perimeter and gun fire spotters flew missions in coordination with surface naval units in the same area. 77 sorties were flown.
- 12/22/50: Replenished at sea. Received 126,789 gallons of fuel oil, 70,770 gallons of aviation gasoline and 75 tons of ammunition.
- 12/23/50: Close Support missions covered Hungnam perimeter and gun fire spotters flew missions in coordination with surface units in the same area. 74 sorties were flown.
- 12/24/50: Close support missions covered Hungnam perimeter and gun fire spotters flew missions in coordination with surface naval units in the same area. Deep support missions were directed at targets in the Punghori, Chosin Reservoir and Hagaruri areas. 71 sorties were flown.
- 12/26/50: Enroute from Strike area to Sasebo, Japan. 1053I moored to bouy #19 Sasebo-Ko, Japan.

(c) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR DECEMBER 1950

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
12/1	33	6	Kunu-Ri	Troop concentrations
12/1	34	8	Kunu-Ri	Troop concentrations
12/2	35	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/2	36	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/2	37	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/2	38	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/2	39	7	Chosen Reservoir	Bivouac area
12/2	40	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/3	41	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troop emplacements
12/3	42	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, ridges
12/3	43	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	44	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	45	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	46	7	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	47	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	48	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/4	49	4	North of Chosen Res.	Troops, emplacements
12/4	50	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/4	51	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/4	52	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	53	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	54	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/4	55	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	56	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	57	3	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements, buildings
12/4	58	10	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/4	59	7	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	60	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	61	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	62	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	63	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	64	2	Chosen Reservoir	Truck
12/6	65	3	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	66	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	67	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	68	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	69	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, gun emplacement
12/6	70	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/7	71	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/7	72	11	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/7	73	11	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
12/7	74	10	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/7	75	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/7	76	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements, buildings
12/7	77	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements, buildings
12/9	78	12	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements, buildings
12/9	79	8	Chosen Reservoir	Railroad trestle, troops
12/9	80	3	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/9	81	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/9	82	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/10	83	7	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/11	84	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	85	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	86	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	87	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	88	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	89	3	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	90	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/12	91	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/12	92	12	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/12	93	17	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/12	94	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/12	95	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/13	96	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/13	97	10	Hungnam	Troops, emplacements
12/13	98	9	Hungnam	Troops, emplacements
12/13	99	4	Hungnam	Troops, emplacements
12/13	100	4	Hagaru-Ri	Troops, emplacements
12/13	101	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/13	102	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/13	103	10	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/14	104	16	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/14	105	14	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/17	106	2	Chuhari	Troops, emplacements
12/17	107	4	Chuhari	Troops, emplacements
12/17	108	8	Koto-Ri	Troops, emplacements

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
12/17	109	6	Koto-Ri	Troops, emplacements
12/17	110	10	Koto-Ri	Troops, emplacements
12/20	111	12	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/20	112	5	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/20	113	4	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/20	114	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/20	115	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/21	116	9	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	117	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	118	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	119	3	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	120	5	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	121	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	122	4	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	123	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	124	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/23	125	6	Yonpo Airfield	Troops, emplacements, supplies
12/23	126	3	Yonpo Airfield	Troops, emplacements, supplies
12/23	127	6	Yonpo Airfield	Troops, emplacements, supplies
12/23	128	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/23	129	4	Yonpo Airfield	Fuel storage piles
12/23	130	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/24	131	16	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/24	132	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/24	133	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/24	134	4	Hanhung	Airfield

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PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

(a) Ordnance expended during the period 1 December to 26 December 1950:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Bombs: 100# FRAG	1,496
220# FRAG	360
350 ADB	2
500# GP	63
2000# GP	6
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	TOTAL 1,927 bombs
Rockets: 3.5" AR	20
5" HVAR	2,183
11.75" "Tiny Tims"	4
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	TOTAL 2,207
Machine Gun Ammunition:	
.50 cal.	317,230 rounds
20 MM	24,875 rounds
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	TOTAL 368,940 rounds
Napalm: Mk-5 and MK-12 (6% mixture)	721
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	TOTAL 46,144# Napalm
Flares: Mk-6	40

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

(a) Ship - - None

(b) Aircraft:

	<u>COMBAT</u>				<u>OPERATIONAL</u>			
	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Lost:	0	2	3	5	1	0	1	2
Damaged:	0	4	9	13	0	1	0	1

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(c) Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
Buildings	84	338
Railroad Trestle	2	0
Highway bridge	1	0
Towns occupied by enemy forces (50 to 100 percent destroyed)	0	7
Ammunition Dump	0	2
Fuel Dumps	0	9
Supply Dumps	0	4
Tanks	1	0
Armored Cars	1	0
Trucks	17	21
Locomotives	4	2
Railroad Cars	5	1
Oxcarts	4	42
Jeep Type vehicles	3	2
Horses	0	130
Oxen	0	3
Field Pieces	0	3
Mortar positions (silenced)	----- 4 -----	-----
Command Posts	1	0
Artillery Observation Post	1	0
Machine Gun Nests (silenced)	----- 4 -----	-----

Attacked over 152 troop emplacements. It is estimated that 8000 to 10,000 casualties were inflicted. 1824 bodies were counted from the air. In the one check with ground forces in the accuracy of these estimates a count of 250 from the air was checked by a ground count to have actually been 2000 killed. This occurred in a ravine near Hagaru-Ri during a Chosin Reservoir fight.

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CONDITION

1. Medical:

(a) Casualties:

- (1) One killed in action.
- (2) Two missing in action.

(b) Injuries:

- (1) Aircraft 4
- (2) Major 3
- (3) Minor 29

1. Medical: (Continued)

(c) Surgery:

(1) Ship's Company	18
(2) From Other Ships	0
(3) Major Surgery	3
(4) Minor Surgery	15

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(d) Average number of patients treated daily - 75- Out patients.

Average number of patients on sick list daily - 14

(e) First Aid Lectures to various divisions - 4

(f) General Health of the crew. Training Films and Lectures.

(1) General health of the crew has been good.

(2) Training films were shown and lectures were given on the problems of survival to the entire ship's company and air group during the period covered by this report.

(3) During the month 17 venereal disease training films and lectures were given to remainder of ship's company and air group personnel who were unable to attend lectures during November, as well as all new personnel upon reporting aboard during this month.

2. Dental:

During the month of December, the Dental Department staffed by two Dental Officers and four dental technicians completed 725 restorations, surgically extracted 15 teeth, performed 66 uncomplicated extractions and rendered 150 treatments at 594 individual sittings. 3,072 restorations were completed since 5 September 1950.

PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS

(a) Aircraft Composition of Air Group:

(1) During the period 10 October to 25 December 1950, the U.S.S. LEYTE was in the Korean Theater for a total of 76 days. During this period, air operations were conducted on 49 days and a total of

(a) Aircraft composition of Air Group (Continued):

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- (1) Continued):
3369 sorties were flown by CVG-3 aircraft.
- (2) The aircraft complement by type assigned to the ship was as follows:

16 F9F - 34 F4U - 4 F4U5P - 4 F4U5N - 18 AD3 - 4 AD3W - 4 AD3Q

- (3) The following figures represent the average availability of Air Group Three's aircraft by type over the period of 49 days of air operations.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
11.7 F9F's	77.7%
33.7 F4U's	85.1%
20.4 AD's	82.1%

Average availability for all Air Group Three aircraft was 81.6%. This is considered to be a very high continuing standard of aircraft maintenance at sea. The major difficulty was the non-receipt of spare parts. If AOG aircraft were discounted availability would have been about 87%.

- (4) The number of total sorties, and sorties flown over Korea are indicated by type, in the following figures:

<u>SORTIES</u>		<u>SORTIES OVER KOREA</u>	
821	F9F	207	F9F
1,586	F4U	1,291	F4U
962	AD	750	AD
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>3,369</u>	<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>2,248</u>

- (5) Ordnance expenditures by offensive sorties over Korea were as follows:

	<u>TOTAL ROUNDS AMMO. EXPENDED</u>	<u>AVERAGE RDS. AMMO. EXPENDED BY SORTIE</u>	<u>AV. ROUNDS EXPENDED PER OPERATING DAY</u>
F9F	31,698	153	646
F4U	610,600	473	12,461
AD	91,575	122	1,869
<u>TOTALS:</u>	<u>733,873</u>	<u>748</u>	<u>14,976</u>

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	<u>TOTAL ROCKETS</u>	<u>TOTAL TINY TMS</u>	<u>TOTAL BOMBS (TONS)</u>	<u>TOTAL NAPALM (TANKS)</u>
F9F	000	000	000	000
F4U	5,394	000	116.58	496
AD	2,518	20	519.26	402
TOTALS:	<u>7,912</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>635.84</u>	<u>898</u>

(6) Although comparative statistics are not available on the ordnance loads carried by the PHILIPPINE SEA or the VALLEY FORGE, it is considered that plane complement of the LEYTE Air Group provided greater inherent bomb and rocket load carrying capacity for the effective destruction of enemy troops, equipment, shelters, and supply lines.

(a) Jet planes assigned to the ship, although two less than a normal 18 plane squadron, were sufficient to meet scheduled demands of CAP, TARCAP, Sweeps and condition 10 aircraft. It is recommended that the complement of jet aircraft for all CV-9 class carriers be limited to one squadron of 18 jet fighters. This is considered the most effective complement of aircraft for any operations foreseeable in the near future because it allows for the maximum number of attack type aircraft and yet provides an adequate jet defense for the Task Force and strike groups.

(b) The statistics given herein and above seem to confirm the above principle and recommendation. The comparative attack capacity of various possible Air Group compositions follow:

	<u>LEYTE *</u>	<u>PHIL SEA*</u>	<u>CARRIER "X"</u>
F9F	16	24	18
F4U	40	34	
AD	26	24	52
	<u>82</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>70</u>

Bomb Load:

(a) No Rockets	584 Rockets	512 Rockets	576 Rockets
on Jets	168,000# Bombs	148,000# Bombs	192,000# Bombs
(b) Rockets	680 Rockets	656 Rockets	684 Rockets
on Jets	168,000# Bombs	148,000# Bombs	192,000# Bombs

* Approximate present operations complement.
 "X" Hypothetical Air Group considering no F4U's available.

(b) Aviation Ordnance:

- (1) In operations on board this vessel involving the use of shipboard ordnance handling equipment the following difficulties have been encountered: (See USS LEYTE serial 1513 of 1 December 1950 to ComAirPac):

(A) MK 4 Bomb and Torpedo Truck:

- (1) The MK 4 MOD 0 Bomb and Torpedo Truck is used to move aircraft ammunition from bomb elevators to the respective ready service ammunition lockers. In these operations it has been found that the brake mechanism of the MK4 MOD 0 Bomb and Torpedo Truck is highly unsatisfactory. The "life" of the brake cable is very short, and when the brake cable is broken, passage of the loaded truck over barrier cables sets the brake. To release the brake it is then necessary to unload the truck, turn the brake actuating drum by hand until the wheels are unlocked, reload the truck, and continue passage to ready service locker. The current use of Davis type jet barriers present additional problems in movement of this truck over the flight deck. These difficulties could be eliminated by the use of larger wheels on the truck to raise the carriage of the truck higher from the deck. A stronger manner of securing the brake actuating cable to the brake actuating drum, plus the use of larger cable would eliminate the problem of breakdown in the brake mechanism.

(B) Bomb Skids:

- (1) All bomb skids should be equipped with the chain type securing strap rather than the web straps now generally in use. The web straps have proven to be unsatisfactory due to the deterioration of the straps because of exposure to elements and wear from normal usage.

(C) Bomb Skid Adapter:

- (1) The MK 3 Bomb Skid Adapter currently used to transport HVAR's is not satisfactory due to reasons indicated below:
- (a) Racks for stowage of HVAR's on adapters are constructed of metal which bends.
 - (b) HVAR's are not sufficiently well secured in adapter, and at times during transport over flight deck the HVAR's are tumbled on to the flight deck.

- (c) To remedy condition in regards to adapter racks, bending, the use of stronger metal is recommended.
- (d) To remedy condition in regards to insecurity of HVAR's in adapter it is recommended that a metal securing strap, shaped to contour of HVAR motor be manufactured, and hinged to inboard of adapter. A flange should be added to the HVAR rack and this flange should be slotted, to accommodate a securing pin. The securing pin can be manufactured out of unthreaded metal stock and have a wing type nut, backed by spring pressure to effect locking of metal strap to flange of HVAR adapter stowage rack.

(D) Bomb Skid Stowage:

- (1) At present no allocated stowage space on flight deck exists for the stowage of bomb skids. As a result of this condition bomb skids are stowed where space permits. The need for empty bomb skids on the flight deck is justified by virtue of the need for jettisoning of bombs and rockets being ever present when engaged in combat operations. If stowage racks were constructed, a greater number of bomb skids could be stored on the flight deck without necessity of utilizing actual deck space. Having bomb skids stowed in a definite location will greatly expedite skid procurement by all ordnance personnel when need for jettisoning a deck load of aircraft ammunition becomes necessary.
- (2) The present parachute flare suspension band has proven to be unsatisfactory for use on MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Racks and it is necessary to manufacture metal suspension bands, as well as "cut down" to proper size, excess suspension bands from the 100# Water Filled Bombs. It is recommended that a new type suspension band for all parachute flares be manufactured, using the type used on 100# Water Filled Bombs as a model.
- (3) The T-2 type of gun heater employed on the 20 MM aircraft gun has a service "life" of from 4 to 6 hours. The short "life" is accredited to the fact that the heating element of the T-2 gun heater is too fragile. "Rough" arrested landings by aircraft causes a breakdown of the heating element.
- (4) The firing pin in the T-31 20 MM aircraft gun is subject to what is considered excessive breakage. Due to this high breakage it is often necessary to change firing pins after approximately 50 rounds of ammunition have been fired.

(D) Bomb Skid Stowage: (Continued):

- (5) The electrical (cannon) connection "pins" of the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Rack are extremely brittle and therefore are subject to excessive breakage in normal service. The electrical connection "pins" on the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Rack which suffer the greatest mortality are in the bomb release circuit of the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Rack. Due to operational requirements it is frequently necessary to install and remove the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Rack from the aircraft, and it is during the installation and removal operations that the "pins" prevent the completion of the electrical bombing circuit and result in "hung" bombs being returned to the carrier.
- (6) The MK 5 MOD 5 Rocket Launcher presently in use on the F4U4 Model aircraft is not constructed well enough to sustain the weight of the HVAR. Numerous cases of MK 5 MOD 4 rocket launchers breaking, when planes are taxiing forward, or are towed into the "spot" have occurred, and the rockets have dropped on deck as a result. It is recommended that a bracing method be devised for the rocket launcher post (front and rear). Due to method of securing MK 5 MOD 4 rocket launcher mounting plate to wing, and employment of the rocket launcher to carry HVAR's the "rivets" of the "skin" on the wing of the aircraft "work" loose and separate from the ribs of the wing.
- (7) Cold weather and high winds across flight deck especially during pre-dawn hours, constitutes a great problem in loading of aircraft wing stations with ordnance material.
- (8) Loading of the wing stations of the AD type aircraft with ordnance material weighing more than the HVAR, is a major problem of ordnance loading. Development of a means to load the wing stations, safely and rapidly, to maximum capacity on the AD type aircraft, is urgently needed.

(c) Communications:

Two tactical circuits are not considered sufficient for even the tactical needs of the Task Force. (See LEYTE serial 098 of 21 November 1950.) Current usage of either or both for administrative traffic adds an excessive burden to an already overloaded system. It is recommended that administrative traffic be removed from the tactical circuits.

(d) Logistics:

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(1) <u>DATE</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
5 December	Fuel Oil	344,652 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	125,000 gallons
	Ammunition	205 tons
8 December	Fuel Oil	35,296 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	63,156 gallons
	Ammunition	75 tons
11 December	Fuel Oil	117,411 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	68,194 gallons
	Ammunition	120 tons
	Fresh, frozen, dry provisions	99 tons
15 December	Fuel Oil	322,036 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	151,008 gallons
	Ammunition	38 tons
	Fresh, frozen, dry provisions	37 tons
19 December	Fuel Oil	224,154 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	44,987 gallons
	Ammunition	84 tons
22 December	Fuel Oil	126,789 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	70,770 gallons
	Ammunition	75 Tons

(2) The U.S.S. LEYTE's rearming operations 8 December 1950 from the U.S.S. MT KATMAI (AE-16) was conducted during darkness with the aid of cargo lights. Despite the night operations the rearming rate achieved was 80 short tons per hour. This excellent rate of transfer reflected a high degree of organization and coordination on both the supplying and the receiving ships.

(3) On 15 December 1950 the U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) rearmed from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE-18) under difficult conditions caused by heavy seas. However, a transfer rate of 55.9 short tons per hour was maintained as a result of excellent performance of personnel on both the receiving and supplying ships.


(e) Hull Damage from Jettisoned HVAR:

(1) On 17 December 1950 at 1344I a HVAR rocket that had fallen off a landing airplane was jettisoned from the flight deck level, frame number 126, starboard side. The rocket was seen to travel aft and towards the ship and then finally exploded deep in the water.

(e) Hull Damage from Jettisoned HVAR (Continued):


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- (2) Further investigation proved beyond a doubt that the rocket hit the rolling chock between frames 130 and 131 causing damage to the "G" and "H" straps in fuel oil tank B-79-F. The riveted lap seam joining "G" and "H" straps was badly distorted causing all rivets to leak in this area. Rivets attaching the rolling chock to the turn of the bilge also leaked. The next transverse bulkhead (T.B. #1) was split vertically a distance of 3' 6". Evidence of concussion was evident by bent gussets, slightly warped frame (frame no. 130) and distorted vertical separator bulkheads in fuel oil tank #79. The damaged area of the "G" and "H" straps consisted of a large dished in area. Vertical height 5 feet and horizontal 4 feet in the turn of the bilge.
- (3) This damage was repaired temporarily by welding rivets in the lap seam of "G" and "H" straps and building a small steel cofferdam in the bottom of B-79-F in the damaged area. The split in the bulkhead of T. B. #1 was cut out and a plate patch welded in its place.



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