


AD-A272 302



2

S DTIC
ELECTE
NOV 09 1993
A




This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.

93-27104



93 11 4 27 4

THE FUTURE OF THE AIR FORCE



Reinventing the Wheel
Structuring Air Forces for
Foreign Internal Defense

RICHARD D. NEWTON, Maj, USAF

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE REINVENTING THE WHEEL: STRUCTURING AIR FORCES FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE				5. FUNDING NUMBERS N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ RICHARD D NEWTON, USAF				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER AU-ARI-CPSS-91-1	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) CADRE/PT MAXWELL AFB AL 36112-5532					
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SAME as #7				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER N/A	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT PUBLIC RELEASE				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)					
14. SUBJECT TERMS				15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLAS		18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLAS		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLAS	
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT NONE					



Report No. AU-ARI-CPSS-91-1

Reinventing the Wheel

Structuring Air Forces for Foreign Internal Defense

by

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 6

RICHARD D. NEWTON, Maj, USAF
Special Operations/Combat Rescue

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Date	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

August 1991

Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment and in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
DISCLAIMER	<i>ii</i>
FOREWORD	<i>v</i>
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	<i>vii</i>
PREFACE	<i>ix</i>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	<i>xi</i>
INTRODUCTION	<i>1</i>
Guerrilla Warfare versus Conventional Warfare	<i>2</i>
More than Military Operations	<i>2</i>
Adaptability	<i>3</i>
BACKGROUND	<i>5</i>
Jungle Jim	<i>5</i>
Changing Missions	<i>6</i>
Shifting Political Attitudes	<i>6</i>
Refocusing Air Force Doctrine	<i>7</i>
THE INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT	<i>9</i>
Maoist Revolutionary Warfare	<i>9</i>
Commitment and Instability	<i>11</i>
ANALYSIS	<i>13</i>
Host-Country Aircraft	<i>14</i>
Structure and Functions of Training Teams	<i>15</i>
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	<i>17</i>
Proposed Wing Structure	<i>17</i>
Types of Aircraft	<i>20</i>
Providing Foreign Internal Defense	<i>21</i>
Notes	<i>22</i>
BIBLIOGRAPHY	<i>25</i>

Illustrations

Figure

1	Mao Tse-tung's Phases of Revolutionary Warfare	<i>9</i>
2	Proposed Wing Structure	<i>18</i>

Foreword

The stunning changes in the complexion of international politics that began late in the decade of the 1980s and continue today will profoundly affect the American military establishment as a whole, and the US Air Force in particular. Decisions about the future course of the military will be made in the early part of the 1990s which will essentially determine the course of the US Air Force well into the next century. Decisions of such importance require thoughtful consideration of all points of view.

This report is one in a special series of CADRE Papers which address many of the issues that decision makers must consider when undertaking such momentous decisions. The list of subjects addressed in this special series is by no means exhaustive, and the treatment of each subject is certainly not definitive. However, the Papers do treat topics of considerable importance to the future of the Air Force, treat them with care and originality, and provide valuable insights.

We believe this special series of CADRE Papers can be of considerable value to policymakers at all levels as they plan for the US Air Force and its role in the so-called postcontainment environment.



DENNIS M. DREW, Col, USAF
Director
Airpower Research Institute

About the Author



Maj Richard D. Newton

Maj Richard D. Newton graduated from the US Air Force Academy in 1977 with a bachelor of science degree in history. After graduation, he attended Undergraduate Helicopter Training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. His first operational assignment was as an HH-3 copilot at Osan AB, Korea. In January 1980, he reported to Tyndall AFB, Florida, and flew CH-3s in support of the Air Defense Weapons Center for three years. His next assignment was as the chief of standardization and evaluation for the air rescue detachment at Keflavik, Iceland. In 1984, upon leaving Iceland, Major Newton served as an air staff training officer in the Airlift Force Structure Division and in Air Force Project Checkmate at Headquarters US Air Force. His most recent flying assignment was as an HH-3 instructor pilot and wing tactics officer for the 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. He is a graduate of the US Army School for Advanced Military Studies, the Command and General Staff College, and Squadron Officer School. He, his wife Kathy, and their two sons are currently assigned to MacDill AFB, Florida, where Major Newton is an action officer in the Joint Mission Analysis Division of the Plans, Policy, Doctrine, and Studies Directorate at United States Special Operations Command.

Preface

One day while sitting in the squadron, one of the pilots, a former T-37 instructor in Air Training Command, told a story about Tweet pilots being sent to South America to train host-nation fighter pilots to fly and employ the A-37 in combat. That Latin American country had been fighting an insurgency for years and the United States had recently transferred some excess A-37s to them. What bothered me was the storyteller's contention that the US Air Force would send first assignment instructor pilots instead of experienced fighter pilots to teach combat veterans how to employ these airplanes. I can't say how true the story was, but it seemed crazy enough to just be possible. Out of curiosity, I went to the base library and researched the history of the Air Force and foreign internal defense. I never did find out if the guy's story was true, but it amazed me to discover that since 1973 the USAF has virtually ignored the low end of the conflict spectrum. Knowing that the Air Force's charter was to prepare forces for aerial combat at all levels of conflict, that didn't seem right. More importantly, I found it hard to believe that the United States or the Air Force would risk reputation and credibility by sending young Air Training Command instructors to teach combat veterans how to employ an airplane in combat. The absurdity of that notion caused me to put words on paper. This paper is the result of a "wild hair" after hangar flying one day in the squadron.

The ideas presented in this paper were little more than "bar talk" until recently. The composite wing structure being advocated by the current Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen Merrill McPeak, has given cause for hope to those who think the Air Force must structure itself for missions across the conflict spectrum—to include those low-intensity conflict situations when the best application of military power is indirect and subordinated to political considerations.

One of the finest officers I've ever known, Col James P. White, the director of operations at the 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing agreed that this was a paper that needed to be written. Colonel White moved on and I went to Command and General Staff College, but his encouragement never left me. This paper was written because of him. Also, Lt Col Ron Dietz, my running buddy and sounding board, helped me sort through my thoughts. He continually admonished me to "think critically" as I wrestled with these and other issues. In addition, Col Dennis Hill and Lt Col Tom Mitchell deserve the credit for the original version of this paper being accepted by the School of Advanced Military Studies. Finally, Emily Adams edited my errant thoughts and helped me convert this paper into a format suitable for Air University—no easy feat. One can't do something like this without acknowledging the ones who kept the home front under control while I was in school. Thank you Kathy, my wife, and my two sons, David and Robbie, for your love, patience, and support all those nights I was upstairs with my head stuck in a book or cursing at the keyboard. It was a long two years and like the twelve that preceded them, I couldn't have done it without you.

Executive Summary

This paper examines the theoretical role of air forces in counterinsurgency and the disconnect between what's needed and the US Air Force's capability. The equipment, organizations, doctrine, and tactics required to support third-world counterinsurgencies are different from that which the Air Force has focused on to counter the Soviet threat in Europe. The study's purpose is to suggest a possible wing structure for the US Air Force to address the perceived shortfall.

Effective US military support of counterinsurgency efforts in developing nations almost always takes the form of indirect support—training, advisory assistance, logistics, and transfer of excess military equipment. This has been United States policy since the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. The aggregate of actions taken by the United States to help another country resist an insurgency is called foreign internal defense (FID). The premise of this paper is that US Air Force doctrine, force structure, and training are inadequate for the lower half of the conflict spectrum—intrastate war in developing nations where US national interests are at stake. The focus on the conventional Soviet threat to Europe over the past 45 years has left the US Air Force virtually unable to advise or assist developing nations facing internal revolution. As Gen John R. Galvin, the supreme allied commander in Europe noted, these sorts of “uncomfortable wars” require developers and instructors, rather than fighters, to help them solve their problems.

The paper begins with a short history of past US Air Force programs to support foreign internal defense. The USAF Special Air Warfare Center of the 1960s is the proposed model for regaining the FID capability lost during the Vietnam War. Next, the study reviews the environment of revolutionary warfare, consistent with the discussion in JCS Publication 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. Third, the paper examines the sort of USAF organization needed to integrate air assets and conduct the types of missions required in FID. The concluding chapter proposes a USAF wing structure dedicated to foreign internal defense.

This study shows that the USAF has limited utility in those types of conflicts General Galvin dubbed the “new paradigm.” If counterinsurgency and revolutionary warfare are the model for the future, the US Air Force must anticipate and prepare itself for the changed nature of war. The possible consequence is that the Air Force will be excluded because it has nothing of value to contribute to the counterrevolutionary effort. There are tremendous changes looming on the horizon for the Air Force and all the services. This paper suggests one way the Air Force can prepare itself to meet those challenges.

Introduction

The military challenge to freedom includes the threat of war in various forms, and actual combat in many cases. We and our allies can meet the thermonuclear threat. It remains for us to add still another military dimension: the ability to combat the threat known as guerrilla warfare.

John F. Kennedy

THE 1988 *National Security Strategy of the United States* reports that in most instances of security assistance, "the most appropriate application of US military power is usually indirect . . . training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment."¹ Experience shows that in a counterinsurgency situation, it is a grave political error to exercise the full weight of US military power. Therefore, indirect support will be the "most common role in which US forces will conduct counterinsurgency."² This has been a tenet of national policy since first proposed by President Richard M. Nixon in his 1969 State of the Union Address.

In the past 20 years, most instances of US military involvement have been to train or assist host-nation forces and civilian agencies. Since the end of Vietnam, US leaders have been reluctant to place military forces into direct combat situations. In fact, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger proposed strict prerequisites for committing the US military to combat.³ These policies have caused the military to seek noncombat ways of assisting friendly foreign governments.

The Air Force, like the other services, must be able to "assist allied air forces to

organize, train, and equip their forces" to provide for their own security.⁴ While quite capable of conducting quality training with the air forces of developed nations, since 1974 the Air Force has had no organized capability to assist allied forces combating an insurgency. By and large, the methods, techniques, and procedures unique to counterinsurgency (COIN) aerial warfare have been forgotten in today's US Air Force.⁵

The ability to advise or train friendly foreign governments to effectively employ air power in counterinsurgency situations has been sorely missed in the Air Force of the past 15 years.⁶ Using the conceptual framework first proposed by Lt Col David J. Dean, this paper examines how the Air Force might restore that capability. In *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict*, Colonel Dean suggests that there are three levels of participation for the military in third-world-related counterinsurgency. These three levels are assistance (training and equipment sales), integration (advice, joint exercises, and noncombat participation), and intervention (unilateral direct action).⁷ Colonel Dean says that foreign internal defense (FID) "is the heart of the assistance level" of US military participation.⁸ More recently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

have affirmed that foreign internal defense is the most relevant tool for low-intensity conflict.⁹ To achieve an effective Air Force role in FID, this paper proposes an organization structured to help others conduct counterinsurgent aerial operations.

Guerrilla Warfare versus Conventional Warfare

THE challenge of counterinsurgent warfare in developing nations has the potential of becoming a significant threat to the vital interests of the United States. The problem is that the weapon systems, organizations, and philosophy required for COIN are different from those needed for conventional warfare. Although *Defense Guidance* requires the Air Force to prepare forces for combat across the entire spectrum of conflict, the Air Force has focused predominately on high technology and conventional war against the Soviet Union and has endangered its ability to address insurgent threats.¹⁰

Limited ability to respond to insurgent situations means that the USAF is less able to help its allies and friends defeat their insurgent guerrillas. The Air Force suffers a credibility problem when invited to assist developing nations—what we espouse is not what we practice. Because the USAF focuses its doctrine, tactics, and weapon systems on the Soviet Union, they have little utility in developing nations facing internal revolution. Granted, the US Air Force has an impressive capability to fight and win at the upper end of the conflict spectrum. What it lacks, though, is an organic capability to conduct, and thus influence through training, advice, and assistance, that

form of conflict most likely to be found in the developing regions of the world—guerrilla warfare with an ideological dimension.¹¹

More than Military Operations

JCS Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines foreign internal defense as those civil and military actions taken by agencies of the US government to assist a host government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.¹² US military forces conduct security assistance and development programs to help a nation develop and sustain the ability to protect itself. Military training programs are subordinate to and complement the economic, social, educational, and political elements of the counterinsurgency strategy.

According to Gen John R. Galvin, former commander in chief of the US Southern Command, "We are not sending soldiers to these countries, we are sending developers and instructors. . . . The essential problem here isn't military, and the answer to the problem isn't military."¹³ General Galvin's statement recognizes that the problem goes beyond combat operations. Military forces assisting a friendly foreign nation must also help develop the economic, administrative, and social systems in the supported country. Recently, the United States Special Operations Command (US-SOCOM) renewed its interests in those aspects of foreign internal defense other than combat skills.¹⁴

As the only unified command with the "specific, principle mission of FID," US-SOCOM recognizes that the military must enhance and complement the other elements of an overall government internal defense and development plan.¹⁵ A key

principle guiding US actions in COIN is that host governments bear the primary responsibility for their own development and security.¹⁶ Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney noted that US military forces must not usurp the role of host country forces and agencies. He also stated that efforts to solve the problems could be "successful only if the host countries aggressively address the problems in their own societies."¹⁷

Adaptability

EACH country and its insurgency are different from any other. Any proposed Air Force organization dedicated to FID must be able to adapt its methods and tactics to accommodate dynamic economic, political, and military conditions, as well as changing rules of engagement.¹⁸ The requirement for adaptability is a determining factor of the success of a proposed FID organization. In other words, the measure of success for this study is the proposed unit's ability to effectively meet the training needs of the many different nations likely to request US assistance.

JCS Pub 3-07, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," and FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict," reinforce this criterion by making adaptability one of the imperatives for low-intensity conflict. These manuals state that adaptability means much more than simply tailoring flexible organizations.¹⁹ Adaptability also includes developing and fielding new ones appropriate to each situation. Therefore, what the Air Force must have is an organization able to examine an insurgency, build an effective security assistance and internal development plan, and then institute an effective

training program for the supported nation's aviation resources.²⁰

This study examines the tactical aspects of foreign internal defense, namely the training requirements necessary for air forces in developing nations. The scope of the monograph precludes a discussion of the direct combat role of US forces in COIN. Also, the strategic implications of FID are left for further study. A basic assumption of the study is that the USAF must be able to address those situations requiring less technological sophistication than would a European, Southwest Asian, or other conventional scenario.

I use the following methodology to present and evaluate the research. First, this paper addresses the history of US Air Force efforts to support foreign internal defense. Second, it presents a brief overview of the counterinsurgency environment, including a discussion of USAF tactical missions in COIN. Third, based on the requirements set by national policy and military doctrine, it addresses the characteristics of the USAF organization needed to effectively integrate air assets and conduct foreign internal defense and development. The concluding section recommends an Air Force organizational structure to perform the security assistance aspects of foreign internal defense programs.

This proposal is not made in a vacuum. At one time the Air Force had the capability to help developing nations apply air power effectively to combat insurgency. By looking at its own history from as recently as the early 1970s, perhaps the Air Force can gain some valuable insights that will enable it once again to perform foreign internal defense in the less developed nations that request US assistance.

Background

IN JANUARY 1961 President John F. Kennedy asked the Department of Defense to examine ways of developing a capability to respond to Communist-sponsored subversion in underdeveloped countries. The president was concerned about Premier Nikita Khrushchev's announcement of Soviet support for "wars of national liberation" and the realization that the United States had no forces capable of responding to military challenges below the level necessary to trigger nuclear war.²¹ Nuclear equality had limited the superpowers to "small wars" rather than direct confrontation.

At that time, none of the US military services had units specifically designed to combat insurgency or revolutionary warfare. The services had designed their force structure with the belief that current conventional forces were adequate to handle any nonnuclear eventuality.²² The Army had trained its three special forces (SF) groups to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) in support of theater commanders' war plans. The Air Force had given selected tactical airlift units the secondary mission of supporting the Army UW forces. However, none of the services had dedicated any of these units to assist foreign governments in combating an insurgency.

Jungle Jim

To address the president's concern, the Air Force created the 4400th Combat

Crew Training Squadron (CCTS), nicknamed "Jungle Jim." This squadron had the double mission of training and combat. Activated in April 1961, the squadron developed the capability to conduct counterinsurgency aerial warfare. Its orientation toward strike operations, airlift, and reconnaissance reflected the lessons learned from past unconventional excursions. The Jungle Jim instructors trained selected USAF personnel to

- operate and maintain vintage aircraft and equipment,
- prepare those aircraft for transfer to friendly foreign governments,
- provide advanced training to host-nation personnel, and
- develop improved weapons, munitions, tactics, and employment techniques.²³

In addition, by providing small training cadres to host nations, the 4400th CCTS was tasked to help allies create conditions conducive to controlling and eliminating their insurgencies.

The 4400th CCTS's aircraft were not the most sophisticated nor the most capable in the USAF inventory. Quite the opposite, the squadron used older, simpler aircraft possessing the special characteristics needed by the developing nations they would serve—an important distinction then with significant implications for future security assistance efforts. Initially, the DC-3, also called the C-47 "Gooney Bird," performed airlift and transport. After modifications it assumed innovative roles in fire support and intelligence collection. T-28s and

modified B-26s handled fire support and aerial reconnaissance. The squadron chose each type of aircraft because it

- could be maintained in an austere environment;
- was rugged enough to operate from unimproved, short airstrips;
- was within the technological reach of developing air forces; and
- was currently in the inventories of most countries likely to experience an insurgency.²⁴

Four months after activation, the 4400th CCTS sponsored its first overseas training deployment—parachute training from C-47s in Mali. In November the second training detachment deployed. This unit, code-named "Farm Gate," went to Vietnam to train South Vietnamese aircrews to fight Vietcong insurgents. Jungle Jim and Farm Gate "would shape the role of the Air Force in small wars for years to come."²⁵ Future training detachments from the 4400th CCTS and its successor continued to operate throughout Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia until the mid-1970s.

Changing Missions

IN 1962, the Air Force chief of staff Gen Curtis E. LeMay created the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC). The SAWC was the Air Force's response to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's call to do more in counterinsurgency.²⁶ The SAWC absorbed the men and equipment of the 4400th CCTS. Most importantly, the center changed 4400th CCTS's mission from developing a unilateral capability to assisting others in developing an indigenous capability to conduct COIN aerial operations. Responsibility for this COIN training fell to the center's 1st Air Commando Group.²⁷ The 1st Air Com-

mando Group devoted the bulk of its effort to assisting the South Vietnamese, because the United States considered the conflict critical to its interests in Southeast Asia and because the Air Force leadership saw the war as an operational testing ground for counterinsurgency tactics and equipment.

As the war in Vietnam continued, the air commandos' mission slowly shifted away from providing advisory and combat-ready forces which trained indigenous forces to training US aircrews for service in Southeast Asia. The requirement for air strikes and airlift to support the growing number of US ground units serving in Vietnam forced the air commandos' to do less training of indigenous forces and fly more combat missions.²⁸ This continued until the war began to wind down. As the US began to reduce its commitments in Vietnam, the number of people and aircraft assigned to the wing declined. By 1974, with the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia completed, the Air Force deactivated the Special Air Warfare Center (since renamed the US Air Force Special Operations Force).²⁹

Shifting Political Attitudes

THE last few years of the Vietnam War had shaped American attitudes toward military intervention in foreign conflict. The mood of the American public was to avoid "unwinnable wars" in developing nations.³⁰ Reflecting that attitude in his 1969 State of the Union Address, President Nixon stated his criteria for applying US military power abroad. Over the next few years, Nixon and his national security adviser, Dr Henry Kissinger, promoted the idea that the US would not fight on foreign soil unless our strategic interests were directly threatened. President Nixon continued that this country would maintain its nuclear umbrella and that

the United States would provide equipment, training, and monetary assistance to its security partners.³¹

President Nixon and Dr Kissinger recognized that the world was changing from the familiar US-USSR bipolarity of the previous 25 years. They sought a new leadership role for the United States. According to the Nixon Doctrine, the US must maintain a major role in the conduct of world affairs, but the US could not be solely responsible for the maintenance of world harmony. Every US president since has continued Nixon's emphasis on security assistance and indirect military support.

Refocusing Air Force Doctrine

AFTER the Vietnam War, the Air Force retreated from the limited/unconventional/insurgent war it had fought in Southeast Asia. Instead, the Air Force concentrated on developing the high-technology weapon systems necessary for those scenarios most critical to national survival—nuclear deterrence and conventional war in Europe, Korea, or Southwest Asia. Like the other services, the Air Force focused on the conventional war and avoided insurgent warfare. One senior Air Force general officer summed up the prevailing attitude when he said that we "should not be distracted by 'those kind of wars' since we can always just 'muddle through'."³² This reliance on "somehow muddling through" leads to poor preparation for the realities of future conflicts. The history of modern warfare shows the fallacy of this approach.³³ Since Vietnam, the highest priority for the Air Force has been to close the gap with the Soviet Union in strategic and high-technology conventional systems.³⁴ The USAF has accomplished this at the ex-

pense of those doctrines, tactics, and systems applicable to aerial operations in counterinsurgency.

Although special operations forces have traditionally been responsible for FID, Air Force special operations forces (SOF) have focused exclusively on direct action and the support of unconventional warfare and special reconnaissance.³⁵ In 1984 Col Kenneth J. Alnwick pointed out that there had been a "major shift in emphasis . . . moving the Air Force SOF community away from traditional SOF missions in counterinsurgency, nation-building, and psychological warfare toward special operations behind enemy lines—more reminiscent of the World War II experience than the experiences of the last two decades."³⁶

By optimizing its doctrine, training, and equipment for operations at the upper end of the conflict spectrum, the Air Force of the 1990s has all but excluded itself from assisting allies who face insurgents employing guerrilla tactics. Its structure cannot adapt to the demands of conflict in and between developing nations. It appears as if the Air Force has taken a giant step backward to the early 1960s. Its present capability lacks tactical flexibility—the same dilemma which frustrated President Kennedy. By focusing closely on the Soviet Union, conventional forces of today's USAF are analogous to those of the 1960s.

Like their conventional counterparts, Air Force special operations forces have developed into a potent, capable force. They also have focused their efforts on direct action in high-threat environments. The time has come, however, to adjust that orientation. USAF special operations forces should develop and manage the capability to assist, train, and advise friendly foreign air forces. Then, like the Army special forces, they, too, might influence those "dirty little conflicts" . . . critical to Western security."³⁷

The Insurgency Environment

There clearly is a war going on . . . a highly politicized form of warfare. It is political, psychological, economic and it's military, and frankly, we the United States institutionally do not understand it and are not organized to very effectively cope with it.

Gen Wallace Nutting

AN INSURGENCY is rooted in popular dissatisfaction with the existing social, political, and economic conditions. It is "an armed revolution against the established political order."³⁸ The insurgent leadership may attempt to blame these conditions on the existing government and perhaps offer alternative programs to improve the situation.³⁹ All societies have their problems; thus, insurgent movements usually can find reason to oppose their governments. Creation of an effective, armed insurgent organization changes benign, constructive opposition into a revolutionary insurgency.⁴⁰

Maoist Revolutionary Warfare

THE mass-oriented insurgency, as designed by Mao Tse-tung, is difficult to organize. Once begun, though, it enjoys a high probability of success, and most likely a government will require external assistance to defeat such an insurgency. Therefore, that is the type of conflict US forces probably will face.⁴¹

Maoist revolutionary warfare encompasses three phases ranging from initial political organization in phase one to mobile, conventional warfare in phase three.⁴² Not all revolutions experience each phase to the same degree or in the

same manner, but this is an accepted model and a good starting point for a discussion of revolutionary warfare.

Mao's goal was to turn conventional military thought and attitudes against his opponents, denying them quick victory and exhausting them militarily and politically. His three phases overlap, and the revolution proceeds to the next phase or reverts to a previous one as circumstances dictate. As the model (fig. 1) illustrates, each phase forms the foundation for the next; thus, activities of previous phases are always present when the insurgency advances to another step.




Figure 1. Mao Tse-tung's Phases of Revolutionary Warfare

Phase One. During phase one, "latent and incipient insurgency," the rebellion is still germinating.⁴³ This phase involves no major outbreaks of violence because the guerrillas are too weak to conduct

offensive combat operations. Gen John R. Galvin noted that it usually takes about 15 years to develop an infrastructure before insurgents can move into phase two, guerrilla warfare.⁴⁴ The government must regain and/or hold the support of the people in contested or guerrilla-controlled areas. The military's role is to assist the government's development programs and to provide security for the people and government agencies operating in the contested areas.

The government's ultimate goal is to defuse or defeat the insurgency during phase one. To keep an insurgency at this level, aggressive government social, economic, educational, and political programs must address the causes of the dissatisfaction. While development programs cannot guarantee that the government will remain in power, they help build a support base among the population from which to resist the insurgents' appeal. The need for non-military reforms nearly always outweighs any possible benefits to be gained by military action alone. To help initiate reforms, military and police forces first must guarantee the security of the people. In addition, they must complement and support the government's programs to develop the economy, improve the standard of living, and provide necessary health and welfare services to the populace. Security forces create the stable environment necessary for government-sponsored reforms to take root and have an effect.⁴⁵

The role of US military forces is to enable and enhance the government's efforts to win back the people. A common mistake made by FID forces is that sometimes they only gain popular support for themselves.⁴⁶ The US Air Force must understand and embrace its supporting role in the internal defense and development

(IDAD) plan and imbue that spirit into the host-nation's air force. The methods employed by USAF forces include security assistance training programs to bolster military and police forces as well as humanitarian and civic-action programs such as medical and veterinary services, construction projects, or logistics management. Flying training programs should emphasize support of development programs and provide mobility to military and police forces responding to acts of terrorism. The emphasis is on support instead of tactical combat operations.

During this phase, when cultivating and maintaining the support of the people, it is especially important to counsel against strike operations. USAF training teams should promote alternatives to strike operations and bolster reconnaissance and airlift capabilities in the supported nation.

Phase Two. The insurgents reach phase two, "guerrilla warfare," when they begin organized guerrilla warfare and related violence.⁴⁷ This can happen only after the insurgents believe they have gained enough local and external support to conduct sustained combat operations. By denying the government access to certain areas of the country, forcing government agents and troops into static, defensive positions, or causing the government to institute harsh and repressive policies, the insurgents alienate the government from its people. In effect, the insurgents negate the legitimacy of the government to govern.

Successful tactical operations by government forces reduce the guerrilla threat, show government strength and resolve, and allow the agencies involved in the counterinsurgency to continue their development programs free from harassment. As in phase one, if internal development programs are given the chance to work, the root causes of the dissatisfaction which spawned the insur-

gency are more likely to be resolved. This in turn deprives the insurgents of the popular support Mao Tse-tung says they must have to survive and contributes to defeating the insurgents with minimal combat action.⁴⁸

If the insurgents escalate to organized guerrilla warfare, the need for government-sponsored development programs remains and the need for security is compounded. The nature of guerrilla warfare allows the insurgents to hold the initiative and thus dictate the course and tempo of the struggle. The government's goal, therefore, is to wrest that advantage from the insurgents and regain control of the conflict. The need for timely and accurate intelligence increases tremendously at this point. Such intelligence enables the government to reverse the insurgents' advantage. A primary task of USAF foreign internal defense teams would be to train host-nation air forces to collect, analyze, and exploit aerial intelligence.

As numerous historical examples show, an equally important mission for air and aviation forces during counterinsurgency operations is to provide mobility to ground forces. Because infantrymen are usually better suited than aircraft to find and destroy the insurgent guerrillas, the government can increase the capability of its ground forces through effective use of air mobility. Since security forces cannot be everywhere at once, superior mobility enables them to counter the insurgents' initiative. US Air Force training tasks during phase two will be similar to those found in phase one, namely air mobility, intelligence, support of government development programs, and limited fire support.

As the insurgents mount organized guerrilla actions, they are vulnerable to alert government forces attempting to neutralize them. Unlike the single terrorist, a guerrilla organization can be defeated by means familiar to most military professionals. Even more so

than in phase one, the major contributions of aerial forces would be intelligence and mobility. As the British and the French learned in Malaya, Indochina, and Algeria, counterinsurgency warfare is a matter of "identification, isolation, and annihilation of the enemy."⁴⁹

Phase Three. During phase three, the "war of movement," the insurgents directly engage the government in open, conventional conflict. An example of phase three is the 1968 Tet offensive, in which Vietnamese forces transitioned from guerrilla operations to conventional warfare. During this phase, conventionally organized military units fight a conventional war. If all other efforts have failed at this point the host nation may ask US combat forces to intervene. The object of US FID operations is to help the host nation defeat its insurgency while it is in phase one, but certainly before it matures into phase two. All US military development and defense efforts should focus on effective assistance in accordance with the imperatives of low-intensity conflict. This way, we should be able to avoid phase three and the introduction of US combat units.

Commitment and Instability

THE experience of the United States in these sorts of conflicts has been less than gratifying. Since 1945 the United States has been involved on the periphery of such wars and has experienced limited success. When these conflicts were not central to US vital interests, we entered them with vague objectives and partial commitment. As the US experience in Vietnam has shown, committed opponents could persevere until the American people tired of the effort. The paradox remains, however, that if the US is to be effective in protecting its interests, it must be capable of fighting or support-

ing limited wars against adversaries fighting unlimited wars.⁵⁰

Furthermore, in a world of increasing interdependence and changing superpower relationships, regional powers have emerged that dilute the relative strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. This relative decline in the national power of the two superpowers tends to encourage lesser powers to pursue regional interests and further con-

tributes to worldwide instability. Their independent actions often sponsor or sustain dissent by minorities in other countries who are seeking to change the status quo. As the interests of regional powers, the Soviet Union, and the United States collide within the third world, the US can "expect to be involved in LIC and operations to prevent LIC for the foreseeable future."⁵¹

Analysis

In the colonial wars after World War II . . . air power functioned almost entirely in a supporting mode. The few analysts . . . generally concluded that air power's most effective use was in its non-firepower role—reconnaissance, transport, liaison, and in general providing increased mobility for other arms.

Dr David MacIsaac

ANY ACTIONS taken by the United States in an insurgent situation must meet the imperatives of low-intensity conflict: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance. "Success in the [COIN] environment requires planning and conducting operations based on [the above] imperatives."⁵² These principles help channel military efforts toward success and ensure that the military assumes the proper, usually subordinate, role in a foreign internal defense operation.

The methods employed by USAF forces assisting in a counterinsurgency normally would be geared to developing the host-nation's aviation capability. Meeting this criterion requires flexible and tailorable forces. Adaptable forces must be capable of integrating their efforts into the programs of other US agencies operating in the target nation or region. The USAF team assisting a nation should be capable of responding to the peculiar needs and priorities of the host country.

The challenge for USAF teams assisting friendly developing nations is the technology and resource gap. Typically, the host nation has a shortage of aviation assets—sometimes their entire air force consists of a few dozen aircraft of varying types and vintages. Frequently, the aircraft are older and logistically difficult

to support. Too often, newer aircraft, though inherently more capable, are beyond the ability of the recipients to operate, maintain, and employ. Last, in many nations likely to need US security assistance, scarce resources and US monetary assistance would serve best if applied to nonmilitary solutions. There is an obligation to ensure that development, as well as defense, receives adequate attention.

An important consideration when tailoring Air Force detachments to conduct foreign internal defense is that they can provide the most effective aviation equipment and services to meet both defense and development needs. Therefore, the emphasis of the detachment's efforts should be on minimizing costs and preventing host-nation reliance or dependence on US support. Joint doctrine emphasizes this point by stating that "military doctrine and force structure advice must be adapted to the host country's circumstances and not based solely on a US model."⁵³ USAF assistance should include advice as to the best way to employ indigenous weapon systems to support government programs.⁵⁴ Furthermore, USAF advisers and trainers should facilitate the creation of mechanisms to link host-government

civic-action, internal development, and humanitarian assistance programs with the security missions and defense capabilities of the indigenous weapon systems.

To meet the security assistance requirements of friendly foreign governments, the USAF training detachments should be capable of providing mutual aircraft qualification to host-nation aircrews, teaching them the proper employment of aircraft in a counterinsurgency environment, and teaching COIN tactics to host-nation pilots. Basic flying skills properly remain the responsibility of Air Training Command and the US Army Aviation Center. While there are many more combat, support, and technical skills that USAF personnel could offer to the host government, these are the most common applications of air forces to COIN warfare.

As the successful employment of air power in Malaya and Algeria demonstrated, the two roles of air power in counterinsurgency were "gathering intelligence and providing mobility."⁵⁵ Fire support was also considered a primary function. As Roger Trinquier cautioned in *Modern Warfare*, though, "aerial attacks accord our enemies complete freedom to present the facts in a manner most favorable to them."⁵⁶ Although the principles of counterinsurgency aerial warfare are intended for the use of host-nation forces, they apply equally to USAF forces engaged in foreign internal defense. It is the task of USAF training teams to advise, train, and encourage host governments to apply their limited resources to best meet host-country needs.

Host-Country Aircraft

BECAUSE FID emphasizes the supporting role of the military and the need to restore social and economic welfare,

preferred aircraft should be multifunctional, simple, rugged, and inexpensive. These aircraft must be inexpensive enough that the country purchasing a reasonable number will not bankrupt what may probably be a troubled economy; should be simple to operate and maintain, given the typically limited educational and technical base in most developing nations; and must be rugged enough to operate from small, austere airstrips in countries usually lacking a developed infrastructure.

Missions for these aircraft will likely be tactical airlift, reconnaissance, and fire support instead of special operations against conventional opponents. An important caution should be reemphasized at this point. While fire support is an important and viable mission for aerial forces conducting counterinsurgency operations, it is prudent to apply aerial firepower sparingly and judiciously. The double-edged nature of indiscriminate fires allows the insurgents to transform aerial attacks into government terrorism. Generally, important political, economic, and sociological considerations restrict the use of firepower.⁵⁷ A key policy of counterinsurgency is the minimal use of firepower to limit collateral damage. Collateral damage feeds the insurgent's propaganda machinery, possibly negating the gains made with government-sponsored development programs. Although fire support can disrupt and destroy insurgent forces, small mistakes in targeting can potentially cause more problems for the government than any advantage firepower accrues.

The limited funds and resources usually available to nations experiencing an insurgency ought to be channeled to correct the internal problems that spawned the conflict. For example, it is a mistake to divert precious resources toward multimillion-dollar F-16s when the money might be better spent on schools, health care, or roads. More importantly, the

country may not have the technical and educational base to support such high-technology aircraft. USAF trainers and advisers have a responsibility to offer effective help once a nation asks for our assistance. That obligation includes advocating the proper aircraft, if any, for the unique situation facing the host government. Developing nations tell us they require simple, inexpensive, and easily operated and maintained systems.⁵⁸ Security assistance teams must encourage supported countries to forego the prestige factor of a modern frontline fighter and instead resolve internal problems and restore the stability of their nation.

Structure and Functions of Training Teams

DURING the 1960s, the US Air Force had the capability to adapt its training and assistance programs to address the specific needs of the country it was helping. These training detachments were organized, trained, and equipped to "help a third world air force grow effectively."⁵⁹ Since then, the focus on security assistance seems to have been on forming other air forces in the USAF's image. The forces traditionally charged with conducting foreign internal defense, the Air Force Special Operations Forces, are for the most part limited to single, short duration, direct-action missions. The ability to assist third-world air forces with COIN on a long-term basis is not within the means of any current USAF forces, special or conventional.⁶⁰

An Air Force FID organization for the 1990s must have a worldwide focus and capability. The unit should be able to support internal defense and development programs in Africa, South America, and Asia simultaneously. To best meet the needs of different host countries, the FID organization will have to tailor teams

for each situation. According to the Army and Air Force manual for foreign internal defense, this translates into regional expertise and an organizational structure flexible enough to adapt to the various conditions found in the many possible supported nations.⁶¹

To meet the myriad commitments, the FID unit should build small teams or detachments of instructors, culturally attuned and reasonably fluent in the appropriate languages. In addition, the USAF must support the unit sufficiently, both in aircraft and personnel, so that it can sustain a reasonable number of deployed training detachments worldwide and maintain the detachment's long-term commitment to those assisted countries. This requirement to support a number of detachments simultaneously for extended periods of time probably will require a fairly large and complex organization. The FID unit would have to determine the specific details and structure of the detachments through a thorough mission area analysis. Anything more than conjecture is outside the purview of this paper.

As Colonel Dean stated, the Air Force must consider its role in counterinsurgency in terms of assistance, integration of forces, and possible intervention. Only after careful analysis can one determine the proper response to requests for USAF assistance. The structure and functions of training teams sent to advise and train host nations would then become apparent. Although many similarities would exist between detachments, each response to third-world assistance would be different. The nature of the insurgency, the economic and social conditions of the country, and the number and types of aircraft available to the host nation's air forces are a few of the factors to consider when tailoring a training package. The priority of the detachment's effort should go to building

CADRE PAPER

an effective, responsive air capability, yet ensuring that the host nation does not

become dependent on the United States for materiel and services.

Conclusion and Recommendation

TO RESTORE the capability to train others to conduct counterinsurgent aerial warfare, I propose dedicating an Air Force wing to foreign internal defense. To best provide indirect support to friendly foreign governments, the wing's structure should facilitate assistance and training of foreign air forces. Specifically, the wing must be capable of building specialized training detachments tailored to meet the peculiar training, organization, and equipment needs of the country they are supporting. The four primary missions for such a wing would be (1) providing initial aircraft qualification to host-nation aircrews, (2) teaching proper counterinsurgency tactics to host-nation pilots and USAF cadre members, (3) developing and testing new COIN aerial warfare tactics, and (4) integrating weapon systems and mission areas for innovative, multifunctional employment.

Special operations forces in both the Army and the Air Force have traditionally conducted foreign internal defense. In fact, they are the only US military forces assigned the FID mission.⁶² Therefore, this proposal presumes that Air Force Special Operations Command with its focus on the COIN environment would also assume advocacy for a FID wing. The special operations wings are currently organized, trained, and equipped to support the theater commanders' war plans in a mid- to high-intensity scenario. While the MC-130 Combat Talon, AC-130 Spectre, and the MH-53 Pave Low are amazingly capable aircraft, there is little need for these high technology, special operations weapon systems in nearly all instances when the USAF is asked to

provide advice or training. The same is true of MH-47 and MH-60 helicopters assigned to the Army's 160 Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Proposed Wing Structure

THE proposed FID wing would be analogous to the Special Air Warfare Center of the 1960s. Like the SAWC, the wing's primary mission would be to train others in counterinsurgent aerial warfare.

To support the mission and to sustain itself, the wing will have to train its cadre members to execute the tactics and methods unique to this form of combat and combat support. Also, the wing should be capable of developing, testing, and validating new tactics and innovative concepts for integrating weapon systems. Last, as the basis of knowledge grows after experiencing various training deployments, the wing might serve as a clearinghouse for innovative concepts of COIN aerial support.

The proposed FID wing (fig. 2) has two flying squadrons, one technical training squadron, and the normal assortment of combat-support squadrons associated with a combat aircrew training wing; that is, maintenance, transportation, communications, supply, services, and security police. Like the operations squadrons, the combat-support squadrons could and should play a valuable role in the training of friendly foreign nationals. This is especially true in the areas of air base ground defense and air traffic control. The scope of this paper




Figure 2. Proposed Wing Structure

limits discussion to just the operations squadrons. To support its advisory and training commitments around the world, the wing would command and control a number of mobile training detachments and would ensure that these organizations are task organized to meet the specific needs of their host government.

Flying Training Squadron. The flying training squadron (FTS) ought to be responsible for all basic and advanced hands-on flying training, whether deployed with the training detachments or at home station. All cadre members should be rated instructors and mission (combat) ready in their previous weapon systems before they report to the FID wing. The FTS would consist of three flights, each based on one of the three assigned weapon systems: short takeoff and landing (STOL) airlifter, light-attack aircraft, and utility helicopter. Each

flight would train USAF instructor cadre in COIN aerial warfare, conduct initial and advanced tactical training for foreign crew members being trained at the wing's home station, and provide qualified crew members to constitute the deployed training detachments.

Combat Development Squadron. A key obligation of the FID wing would be to develop innovative and imaginative uses for common aircraft. The combat development squadron (CDS), the second flying squadron, serves that function. In that role, it would be the integrating center for the wing. More importantly, the CDS should evaluate current tactics and develop new or refine the old tactics and procedures as required. The CDS would also be the proponent for developing and fielding organizations keyed to the specifics of a given counterinsurgency.

One key element of this process is designing innovative ways to integrate the different types of aircraft. Pilots and crew members assigned to the CDS would not normally perform training and assistance functions. Their task would focus primarily on the development of new procedures and equipment, as well as innovative modifications to old weapon systems.

Rather than being organized around a specific weapon system, the combat development squadron is a composite organization, internally grouped according to mission area. Specifically, there should be a mobility flight, a reconnaissance/psychological operations (recce/psyops) flight, and a fire-support flight. To emphasize mission area orientation over specific aircraft capability, each flight should contain crew members from each of the various applicable weapon systems.

The mobility flight would consist of US Air Force and US Army cadre members qualified in tactical airlift and helicopter assault. They would be responsible for innovative approaches for delivering or retrieving cargo and personnel in combat situations. Made up of a complete array of crew members, the flight would concentrate on air assault and airdrop operations. The missions would be similar to those of a tactical airlift squadron or an assault helicopter company. In addition, they would develop and refine helicopter insertion and extraction equipment and methods, and innovative landing zone location and marking aids. Last, the flight should look at ways of using attack aircraft to deliver cargo as well as fires.

Possibly, the reconnaissance/psychological operations flight could be the most important of the three. One of the government's primary needs during

the early phases of an insurgency is timely and accurate information. In addition, experience has shown that providing information to the public helps the government build and cement its case with the people. All three types of aircraft can perform valuable functions in both mission areas. The helicopters and the attack aircraft can scout and locate targets visually. The airlifter and perhaps the helicopter would be ideal platforms for radio direction finding and infrared detection equipment. A pod or strap-on system could enable the airlifter to serve dual cargo and reconnaissance roles. For loudspeaker operations, leaflet drops, and airborne radio broadcasts, each category of aircraft has a possible role. The flight would determine the best ways of accomplishing these missions and ways to improve methods and equipment.

The fire-support flight would integrate the light-attack aircraft, the STOL airlifter, and helicopters as fire platforms. Aerial fire support is the tactical mission entailing the most risk for the government. The fire-support flight's mission would include looking at ways of increasing accuracy to limit collateral damage, providing accurate fire support at night and in austere conditions, and developing alternative munitions that might better serve the needs of a host-nation's circumstances. Forward air control tactics and equipment should be another function of the flight.

Technical Training Squadron. The technical training squadron (TTS) serves many of the functions similar squadrons currently do in tactical and combat crew training wings. It should offer an array of classroom instruction geared to specific weapon systems and to the operating conditions peculiar to counterinsurgency, such as air navigation in austere or hostile environments. One of the most

important missions of this squadron would be to provide initial and sustaining language training to US cadre assigned to the wing.

All classroom instruction required prior to flying training and for support training offered by the wing also would be the responsibility of the TTS. In addition, this squadron would offer academics, such as area studies, COIN familiarization, and internal defense and development planning to members of the wing, appropriate outside commanders and staff planners, and others needing a background in COIN. Last, it would also be appropriate to include self-defense, area-oriented survival (e.g., jungle, desert), and cultural awareness training under the TTS umbrella.

Choosing an instructor cadre could be a formidable task. The function of the FID wing is outside the mainstream of the Air Force. Recruiting a sufficient number of experienced instructors will be a challenge, especially at the start. The intent is to develop a cadre of instructors with credibility in the airlift, air assault, and fire-support mission areas, rather than experience in all of the possible aircraft the host nations might possess. This also means that the cadre likely will include US Army as well as US Air Force instructors. My proposition is that it is easier for an experienced, tactically proficient US pilot to transition to aircraft similar to the ones flown by the FID wing than to learn to employ an aircraft tactically. The US pilot's credibility stems from tactical expertise in the mission area rather than total number of hours in type. As an example, an Air Force A-10 pilot who flies an OV-10 in the FID wing could possibly fly the Hawk (British), the Tucano (Brazilian), or the Pilatus (Swiss) with deployed FID teams. The goal is to develop an aviation instructor who can apply previous experience to the specific COIN environment of the supported country.

Types of Aircraft

AIRCRAFT assigned to the FID wing should be supportable by the Air Force logistics and personnel systems. Also, the aircraft should represent those technologies most often found in the developing nations the wing's training detachments likely would support. While the optimum solution would be to use aircraft currently in the inventory and crews already qualified to fly them, this may not be possible. The modern US Air Force does not use many of the smaller, less-capable aircraft found in most developing nations. When forming the wing, the goal should be to minimize new aircraft procurement and avoid creating a logistics tail to support a new weapon system.

The air commandos of the 1960s were able to use vintage aircraft from the "boneyard" because many developing nations still used them. Those aircraft met the standards of the simplicity, the ruggedness, and the cost demanded by economies ill prepared to support new or complex systems. Even though there are a few of these older aircraft available for export, this older technology is not suited to today's version of COIN. The good news is that the commercial marketplace contains an array of aircraft often better suited to developing nations' needs.

Because many developing nations look to the United States for guidance, the FID wing should fly the types of aircraft it encourages others to buy. This restores a measure of credibility because we fly what we advocate and also avoids the "prestige" factor in aircraft sales. While it may not be feasible to fly all the possible choices of aircraft, the wing could use aircraft in the same category and class as it recommends to developing nations. As the failure of the Northrop F-20 low-cost

export fighter project during the Carter administration demonstrates, third-world nations are reluctant to invest in an aircraft not "good enough" for the United States. Although the F-20 was a significant upgrade of the F-5 fighters then being flown by many third-world air forces, none were sold because those countries did not want what they perceived to be a second-rate jet.⁶³

The FID wing's aircraft should consist of modern STOL airlifters, light utility helicopters, and light attack/trainer aircraft. By concentrating on three categories of aircraft, the supportability of the wing remains manageable. As previously stated, the ideal aircraft flown by detachments from the FID wing should be the same as those flown by the host country, but on the surface this seems too hard to do. Because the choices are endless and it is not reasonable to expect the wing to fly and maintain more than a few different aircraft, the assigned aircraft should be as similar in performance and capability as possible to those found in the supported nations.

Unlike the host nation, the FID wing probably would be restricted to American-made products, although if the proposal were adopted, it would be worthwhile to seek an exemption to the "buy American" statutes imposed by Congress. While the host nation likely would look for inexpensive, simple, rugged, and easily maintainable aircraft, the wing's criteria would be slightly different. Like the countries its training detachments would support, the FID wing should emphasize simplicity, reliability, and ruggedness. In addition, its aircraft must be self-deployable to some degree. The deployed training teams will be small, austere detachments with long, tenuous lines of support. To avoid diverting attention from their primary training mission, the teams' equipment should be reliable enough to avoid significant maintenance

requirements while deployed and simple enough to be fixed by organic maintenance in austere conditions.

Providing Foreign Internal Defense

THIS notional wing structure takes advantage of equipment and skills currently available in the Air Force of the 1990s. The US military and the US Air Force "must be prepared to help selected nations help themselves through such programs as security assistance."⁶⁴ Just as the structure of the 1960s' Special Air Warfare Center was adaptable enough to accommodate the conditions found in each country requesting USAF support, so too should the proposed FID wing be able to modify its structure. The requirement to concurrently support a number of tailored training detachments, culturally attuned and able to speak the appropriate languages, seems to indicate a larger than normal wing structure with specialized skills not typically found in the generic Air Force wing. The exact size and composition, though, would have to be determined by a detailed mission analysis prior to creating the organization.

Because public opinion and national policy restrict the use of US military forces in foreign conflicts, especially in revolutionary counterinsurgencies, the military forces' most likely role will be to train or advise friendly foreign governments. Since the deactivation of the Special Air Warfare Center in 1974, the ability to indirectly support counterinsurgencies has been sorely lacking in the USAF. There is an important, valid need for the Air Force to restore the training and advisory capability it lost in 1974. The proposed foreign internal defense wing offers a way of regaining that

capability. This proposal offers a way of restoring the Air Force unit structure dedicated and organized to perform the

training missions of foreign internal defense in developing nations.

Notes

1. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1988), 35.

2. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-8, *Counter guerrilla Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1986), 3-1.

3. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984, 5-6. These preconditions include introducing forces to combat only as a last resort, with the sustained support of the American people, with clearly defined political and military goals, and with the clear commitment to win.

4. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force," draft, vol. 1, August 1990, 4-3.

5. Col Ray E. Stratton et al., ed., "US Air Force Special Operations Doctrine and Technology: Time for a Reappraisal," in *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*, ed. Lt Col David J. Dean (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), 358.

6. Thomas J. Doherty, "Counterinsurgency Support on Target," *Airpower Journal* 4, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 3. This recently retired squadron commander of the 1st Special Operations Squadron and former special operations force developer at Headquarters USAF agrees with the author that "today's Air Force lacks the ability to train and educate our allies to employ [counterinsurgency weapons]."

7. Lt Col David J. Dean, USAF, *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), 78.

8. *Ibid.*, 108.

9. JCS Publication 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (test pub), 1990, 1-18.

10. Quoted in Jerome W. Klingaman, "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars," in *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*, 138.

11. Paul F. Gorman, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not Kola" (Paper presented to Air Power Symposium, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 11-13 March 1985), 9; see also Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Myth of US Capability in Unconventional Conflicts," *Military Review*, September 1988, 12; and Gen John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New Paradigm," *Parameters* 16, no. 4 (December 1986): 5.

12. JCS Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1988), 150.

13. Deborah Gallagher Meyer, "An Exclusive AFJI Interview with General John R. Galvin," *Armed Forces Journal International* 123, no. 5 (December 1985): 36.

14. Fact Sheet, USSOCOM FID Working Group (MacDill AFB, Fla.: Headquarters US Special Operations Command, November 1990). These include nation-building tasks such as economic reforms and renewing social infrastructure (medical, dental, veterinary, education, sanitation, etc.).

15. *Ibid.*

16. *National Security Strategy*, 35.

17. Dick Cheney, "DOD and Its Role in the War against Drugs," *Defense* 89, November-December 1989, 6.

18. AFM 2-X, "Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Foreign Internal Defense Operations," working draft, 1990, 28. The manual goes on to say that "the ability to change tactics, techniques, and procedures, equipment, and even doctrine is critical."

19. JCS Pub 3-07, 1-23 and FM 100-20/AFM 3-20, "Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict," approved final draft (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1989), 1-9.

20. Stratton, 359.

21. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1981), 63.

22. Charles H. Hildreth, *USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities, 1961-1962* (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1974), 5.

23. *Ibid.*, 19.

24. Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, "Perspectives on Air Power at the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum," *Air University Review* 35, no. 3 (March-April 1984): 26.

25. Dean, 89.

26. Lt Col David J. Dean, "The USAF in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Special Air Warfare Center," *Air University Review* 36, no. 2 (January-February 1985): 50.

27. History, USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), 1 April-31 December 1962, 2. The 1st Air Commando Group proudly trace their heritage back to the air commandos who supported the Chindits and Merrill's Marauders in Burma during the Second World War.

28. Dean, *The Air Force Role in LIC*, 96. Although the training mission still existed on paper, it was all but ignored by TAC. In 1966 the mission of the SAWC was changed to place training third in

priority, behind development of COIN doctrine and tactics, and the training of US forces for combat operations.

29. Ibid., 98.
30. Stratton, 349.
31. Richard M. Nixon, "The Real Road to Peace," *US News & World Report* 72, no. 26 (26 June 1972): 32-41.
32. Col Dennis M. Drew, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 3.
33. Dr Robert M. Epstein, classroom discussion, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 27 November 1990. Also, Bernard Fall, in his conclusion to *Street without Joy* says, "Revolutionary warfare cannot be left to happy improvisation" (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 383.
34. Conclusion from panel discussion, "Employment: Joint Tactics and Techniques," in *The Role of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Power Symposium Record of Proceedings, March 1984), 163.
35. JCS Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," initial draft (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989), II-1. The JCS publication states that SOF perform five principal, interrelated missions: unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, direct action, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense.
36. Alnwick, 18.
37. Dr Neil C. Livingstone, "Fighting Terrorism and 'Dirty Little Wars'," *Air University Review* 35, no. 3 (March-April 1984): 11.
38. Drew, 6; see also FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 2-2, 2-3; and JCS Pub 3-07, II-2, II-3.
39. JCS Pub 3-07, II-2.
40. Ibid., II-3.
41. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, D-1.

42. Samuel B. Griffith, ed. and trans., *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 20-22; see also JCS Pub 3-07, II-5.
43. FM 90-8, *Counter guerrilla Operations* (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Dept of the Army, 1986), 1-3, 1-4.
44. Meyer, 36.
45. AFM 2-X, 28.
46. FM 90-8, 3-20.
47. Ibid., 1-4.
48. Ibid., 3-2.
49. Robert L. Hardie, "Airpower in Counterinsurgency Warfare," professional study no. 3373 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1967), 44.
50. Lt Col Dennis M. Drew, "Marlborough's Ghost: Eighteenth-Century Warfare in the Nuclear Age," *Air University Review* 35, no. 5 (July-August 1984): 37.
51. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 1-4.
52. JCS Pub 3-07, I-22; and FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 1-8. The JCS publication categorizes them as principles, the multiservice regulation calls the same terms imperatives.
53. JCS Pub 3-07, I-20.
54. AFM 2-X, 43.
55. Alnwick, 25.
56. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 102.
57. FM 90-8, 5-1.
58. Maj Eric M. Pettersen, "Providing Tools for Victory in the Third World," *Armed Forces Journal International* 126, no. 2 (September 1988): 108.
59. Dean, *The Air Force Role in LIC*, 106.
60. Ibid.
61. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 1-9.
62. Fact Sheet, USSOCOM FID Working Group.
63. Dean, *The Air Force Role in LIC*, 118.
64. JCS Pub 3-07, I-13.

Bibliography

Books

Air Power and Warfare: Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium, 1978. Edited by Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979.

Special Operations in US Strategy. Edited by Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984.

Proceedings of the Air Power Symposium on the Role of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1985.

Dean, Lt Col David J. *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict*. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986.

Drew, Col Dennis M. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals*. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988.

Futrell, Robert F. *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1981.

Klingaman, Jerome W. *Policy and Strategy Foundations for Low-Intensity Warfare*. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986.

_____. "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars." in *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*. Edited by Lt Col David J. Dean. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986.

MacIsaac, David. "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists." in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Edited by Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Edited and translated by Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961.

Mrozek, Donald J. *Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam: Ideas and Actions*. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988.

Schlight, John. *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The War in South Vietnam, The Years of the Offensive, 1965-1968*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988.

Schultz, Dr Richard H., Jr. "Low-Intensity Conflict and US Policy: Regional Threats, Soviet Involvement, and the American Response," in *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*. Edited by Lt Col David J. Dean. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986.

Stratton, Col Ray E., et al. "US Air Force Special Operations Doctrine and Technology: Time for a Reappraisal," in *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*. Edited by Lt Col David J. Dean. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986.

Government Documents

National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1990.

_____. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1988.

JCS Pub 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1988.

JCS Pub 3-05. "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," initial draft. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989.

JCS Pub 3-07. "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict," test pub. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990.

AFM 1-1. *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*. 1984.

_____. "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force," draft. 1990. 2 volumes.

AFM 2-10. "Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Special Operations," draft. 1990.

AFM 2-X. "Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Foreign Internal Defense Operations," working draft. 1990.

Army Field Manual (FM) 90-8. *Counter guerrilla Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1986.

FM 90-25/MACP 55-35. *Airlift for Combat Operations*. Scott AFB, Ill.: Headquarters US Army Training and Doctrine Command and Headquarters Military Airlift Command, 1990.

FM 100-20/AFP 3-20. "Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict," approved final draft. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1989.

FM 100-20-2. "The Threat in Low Intensity Conflict," coordinating draft. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Combined Arms Center Threats Directorate, 1990.

History, USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC). 1 April-31 December 1962.

Periodicals and Articles

Alnwick, Kenneth J. "Perspectives on Air Power at the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum." *Air University Review* 35, no. 3 (March-April 1984).

Cheney, Richard. "DOD and Its Role in the War against Drugs." *Defense* 89, November-December 1989.

Dean, David J. "The USAF in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Special Air Warfare Center." *Air University Review* 36, no. 2 (January-February 1985).

Galvin, John R. "Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New Paradigm." *Parameters* 16, no. 4 (December 1986).

Lindsay, James J. "Low-Intensity Conflict: Risks Increase." *Defense* 90, May-June 1990.

Livingstone, Dr Neil C. "Fighting Terrorism and 'Dirty Little Wars'." *Air University Review* 35, no. 3 (March-April 1984).

Meyer, Deborah Gallagher. "An Exclusive AFJI Interview with General John R. Galvin." *Armed Forces Journal International* 123, no. 5 (December 1985).

Newton, Richard D. "A US Air Force Role in Counterinsurgency Support." *Airpower Journal* 3, no. 3 (Fall 1989).

Nixon, Richard M. "The Real Road to Peace." *US News & World Report* 72, no. 26 (26 June 1972).

Nutting, Wallace H. "Nutting: Stand Fast." *Newsweek*, 6 June 1983.

Olson, William J. "Low-Intensity Conflict: The Institutional Challenge." *Military Review* 69, no. 2 (February 1989).

Petterson, Eric M. "Providing the Tools for Victory in the Third World." *Armed Forces Journal International* 126, no. 2 (September 1988).

Schlachter, David C. "Another Perspective on Air Power at the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum." *Air University Review* 35, no. 5 (July-August 1984).

Zais, Mitchell M. "LIC: Matching Missions and Forces." *Military Review* 66, no. 8 (August 1986).

Unpublished Material

"Can the USAF's Security Assistance System Provide Third World Client's Needs?" Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1987.

"Considerations for Nation Building in Counterinsurgency Warfighting." Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, 1989.

"Yesterday's Doctrine for Today's Contingencies: The Small Wars Manual and the Security Assistance Force in Low Intensity Conflict." Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988.

Cartwright, Thomas F. "USAF Response to Insurgency in Developing Countries during the 1973-1983 Time Period." Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1972.

Diddle, James A. "Counterinsurgency—A New Look?" Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1971.

Hardie, Robert L. "Airpower in Counterinsurgency Warfare." Professional Study no. 3373. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1967.

Hildreth, Charles H. "USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities, 1961-1964." Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1964.

_____. "USAF Special Air Warfare Doctrines, 1963." Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1964.

Patterson, Robert E., Jr. "The USAF Special Operations Force: Participation to Partnership." Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1973.