

USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY

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ABSTRACT

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Intelligence gathering is a key element in fighting the chronic and difficult battles that make up an insurgency. Insurgency is defined as a political battle waged among a cooperative or acquiescent populace in order for a group of outsiders to take over (or at least undermine) the government of a nation. This is a contest of wills, uneven resources, chosen initiatives, covert political and paramilitary operations, and sometimes very public measures. Once the insurgency actively challenges the government for control of the general population, government forces are often involved in a protracted war -- before they are even cognizant of it. This war will be fought at the most inopportune times, the most difficult conditions, and the most inaccessible terrain, often taking place in the caverns and warrens of that nation's cities.

All along this difficult front, intelligence will make or break the government's efforts to thwart the insurgency. Intelligence gathering must be accomplished in the most difficult conditions and from inhabitants who do not want to get involved. As the vast majority of intelligence collection will fall on the military and police forces, this paper will explore a collection strategy which focuses on tapping the indigenous population and local authorities. The people will be the center of gravity for both sides of the insurgency fight.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY

"[We] attack an enemy who is invisible, fluid, uncatchable. In order to get to him, we have no alternative but to throw a net of fine mesh over the entire area in which the [guerrillas] move. Counter guerrilla operations therefore cannot succeed unless they are conducted on a large scale, unless they last the necessary length of time, and unless they are prepared and directed in the greatest detail." Col. Roger Trinquier, French Army, Father of Modern Counterinsurgency.

Fighting Insurgency

The Government of the United States is currently involved in counterinsurgency warfare on a number of fronts, what Col. Roger Trinquier called "Modern Warfare."² Counterinsurgency warfare is not new to the U.S. government and its military. In pre-Civil War Kansas and against John Brown's movement at Harper's Ferry, U.S. forces fought insurgency, as they did in the Civil War itself, in the post-Civil War Indian campaigns, in Cuba in the late 19th Century, in the Philippines in the early 20th Century, and in Vietnam in the mid-20th Century.³ The Vietnam conflict arguably created a collective malaise with respect to counterinsurgency warfare as a U.S. national security issue.⁴ Thereafter, the United States wished to avoid any such painful, protracted, asymmetric conflicts -- but the events of 11 September 2001 brought counterinsurgency warfare back into our warfighting lexicon.⁵

Whether it is called counter-guerrilla warfare, small wars, complex, irregular war, counter-revolutionary warfare, or counterinsurgency, the U.S. must face its greatest challenge – an amorphous, ruthless, self-sacrificing, and determined enemy in its midst. This enemy will fight the might of the United States in asymmetric combat, what some strategic analysts are now calling Fourth Generation Warfare.⁶ This type of combat is fought at the enemy's choosing and using ways of war which undermine U.S. national will to carry it through. Intelligence is the key to what the National Security Council expects to be "this long war."⁷

What Makes Insurgency So Difficult?

Often, the government in authority (what this paper calls the government in-being) does not realize that a violent counter-movement is taking root until it is too late for easy solutions. Once an insurgency takes root among an indigenous people in a region, the population becomes the key to resolving the conflict – one way or another. This conflict may endure for years or decades until resolved. Most insurgencies in history have lasted from half a dozen to a score of years.⁸ Trinquier defines insurgency as:

“An interlocking system of actions – political, economic, psychological, military – that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. . . . In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization . . . whose essential role is to impose its will upon the population. Victory [against this armed clandestine organization] will be obtained only through the complete destruction of that organization.”⁹

Intelligence gathering is at the center of both sides of insurgency warfare. This paper will develop the themes and seams of insurgency and how a government-in-being can employ various means of intelligence with strategic implications. The government’s aim is to overcome the advantages of insurgents’ exploitation of local people to achieve their objectives. The insurgents’ main objective is the overthrow (or at least the weakening) of the government by the most violent, intimidating, and undermining means available. They pursue their objective on asymmetric battlefields of their choosing and at their initiative.

Popular Support and Chaos

The center of gravity for each side of the insurgency is the indigenous population. For an outside power fighting an insurgency, like the U.S. in Iraq, the will and endurance of its own people -- as reflected in their political leadership -- will be a center of gravity. This is the most vital lesson to be learned from fighting insurgencies.¹⁰ The lamentable local populace becomes the rope in a tug of war, stretched, brutalized, and used by both sides in the course of the protracted conflict. Trinquier describes the dilemma as follows:

“The citizen lives continually under the threat of violent death. In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him, he has the depressing feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. The fact that public authority and the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He is more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists, who alone are able to protect him [in the most active stages of the insurgency].”¹¹

This is the pitiable paradox of insurgency – who can the average person trust? Who can he rely on for his security? How can he care for his family’s welfare? How can he continue to earn an honest and honorable living? All law and order are in jeopardy, because chaos serves the cause of the insurgents.¹² Through seemingly uncontrollable public violence, attacks against the government establishment, its buildings, infrastructure, officials, against the local, regional, and national economy, and against people supporting and engaging government authorities, insurgent cells break down the public’s faith in and reliance on the government in-being. Popular support (or at least public passivity) is the means by which the insurgents can

exist, but chaos is the way by which they sever government authority over the local populace. The insurgent achieves this favorable condition of chaos through mass terror, public murder, coercion, sabotage of the economy, and intimidation. Trinquier's compatriot in time and experience, David Galula, in his seminal work, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, wrote,

“If anarchy prevails, . . . the insurgent will find all the facilities he needs in order to meet, to travel, to contact people, to make known his program, to find and organize the early supporters, to receive and to distribute funds, to agitate and to subvert, or to launch a widespread campaign of terrorism.”¹³

The government in-being has to walk a fine tight rope. It aims to root out the insurgent political organization and its military cells. However, the more it presses the populace in its search for insurgents in their midst and the more violent the government's campaign against the insurgency, the more the populace will turn away from it and support the guerrillas – or at least remain uncommitted and uninvolved. It is the involvement of the local populace that is the turning point for either side. Many of the insurgents come from the locals' own neighborhoods and regions, from their own tribes and ethnic backgrounds. Nonetheless, it takes the personal involvement of citizens at the local level, cooperating closely with government authorities and security forces, to turn the tide against insurgency and the disruption and destruction it can cause local areas. Intelligence gathering will work these same trap-lines, for the best intelligence will come from the locals themselves.

Because the government, in the eyes of the population, has reneged on their social contract with it for the provision of their security, the populace will take umbrage at the government's indiscriminate use of firepower. After all, the government's security forces have the power to refrain from harming their citizens. So, the populace may become alienated by the excesses of their own government and side with the insurgents as alternative power and social service centers.

The people are caught in the middle. They feel brutalized, regardless of how lightly the government attempts to step, for the insurgents will shift the burden and blame for all of the mayhem they cause on the government itself. The insurgent leadership will take advantage of this. Its propaganda campaign is often much superior and more believable than that of the government.¹⁴ Even worse, government silence or ineptitude in response to insurgent propaganda may bolster the perceived believability of it. Galula states that when local people lack an attachment to what the government stands for, insurgents can develop a myth of grievances that the government will have difficulty counteracting.¹⁵

Look at what the criminal Zarqawi has gotten away with until recently in Iraq in the name of Islam and hatred of the West. It is one of the insurgent's primary weapons for de-stabilizing the existing regime. This is the government's dilemma, because it can rarely achieve the fine balancing act of force versus finesse. It is a complex and sensitive application of carrot and stick that is required, skills far beyond the usual government security forces. According to Bernard Fall, master observer of "The Two Vietnams," one of the chronic failings of the Government of South Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s was the uncontrolled looting of local villages by the very security forces that were supposed to protect them against the Viet Minh (later the Viet Cong).¹⁶

It's All About Security

The government must decide what its national objectives are – survival of the state, security for its people, maintaining a privileged class, keeping its military viable, keeping their personal wealth, obtaining international or major power relief, controlling the population, improving the plight of its people, understanding the root causes of the insurgency and addressing them, upholding its constitution and its cultural mores. These are not complementary choices. Are its national objectives immutable, or have they been altered by the insurgent forces within the country?

These are vital issues to intelligence gathering in a counterinsurgency, for the government's national security objectives will frame how its limited resources will be used and committed to fighting the insurgency. These national priorities should also frame the fight in the minds of the populace. They are instrumental in focusing and promoting the cooperation of the populace in accepting and supporting the fight. They must be convinced that it is their own intimate interests that they are fighting for – their nation, their families, their way of life.

A debate must be held on national priorities by the power centers of the nation or by the government or the ruling elite. A national goal or set of strategic objectives must be developed to focus the counterinsurgency campaign.¹⁷ This debate will focus the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic resources of the nation to fight the destabilizing and dislocating effects of insurgency.¹⁸ A strategic focus and a plan to achieve it will facilitate the use of intelligence against shifting and amorphous insurgent groups. With limited resources, a government must be able to organize and concentrate its intelligence assets to make up for the loss of initiative and the absence of a clearly targetable enemy that are shortcomings in fighting an insurgency.

In the midst of insurgency, the people's chief concern in life becomes their security, which the government can no longer guarantee. Hence, the government must re-align its national

strategy to regain its citizens' security and the public's peace and order. This may become an all-consuming strategy, for the insurgents will strike at the heart of the Clausewitzian Trinity – against the government, the people, and the military.¹⁹

An entrenched insurgency enjoys the compliance of the population. Even before their assault on the peace and order of society, insurgent cells must rely on some segment of the disenfranchised, disaffected, or disadvantaged population in order to survive and grow.²⁰ This is actually a seam in the insurgency that is an opening and an opportunity for the government forces to use as a lever. The lever is the local people, who can provide the most timely, most actionable, and most trustworthy intelligence against the insurgents in their midst. The key for government forces is in obtaining it.

Providing security to the citizen is the way of obtaining that key. Some would recommend the carrot-and-stick approach, but most government forces will be unable to achieve the fine balance that method requires.²¹ The government-in-being must find other viable means by which to secure its citizenry.

Spies Everywhere

“Our rest and supply bases are located in the midst of a populace whose essential mission is to keep an eye on them. No troop movement can escape the inhabitant. Any threat to the guerrilla is communicated to him in plenty of time, and the guerrilla can take cover or trap us in profitable ambushes. Sometimes the inhabitant's home is the guerrilla's refuge, where he can disappear in case of danger.”²²

Trinquier sums up the fact that intelligence in a counterinsurgency works both ways, and usually, the insurgents' intelligence is far superior to that of the government forces. This is because the insurgent usually operates on the terrain that is most familiar to him and his supporters. He grew up in that terrain, understands its advantages and traps, knows where his supporters are located and where he can procure his men and materiel to support and sustain his base of operations.²³

If he did not belong to the local tribe or ethnic group, he will invest the time and resources to build his network among them. This is how Hizballah achieved victory among the people of south Lebanon.²⁴ This is how Hamas achieved popular electoral victory in Gaza and the West Bank.²⁵ The insurgent will lure local support with promises or coerce the local populace with violence until he gets the vested interest of the locals. This rooting of the insurgency in the local populace will be difficult to uproot by the government.

Trinquier further confesses that “I had always been convinced that I was preparing my operations in the utmost secrecy, but nothing could escape the numerous agents among the population surrounding us, who spied upon us unceasingly.”²⁶ The side that possesses the best intelligence will also command the initiative and master the element of surprise. Unfortunately for the government forces, the advantage of who owns the local spy network will usually rest with the insurgents.

Then, how can the government wrest the initiative from the insurgents, capture the element of surprise, and turn the tide of modern, unconventional warfare? The government’s police and military forces are usually ill-prepared and poorly trained in counterinsurgency warfare to regain the initiative from the insurgents. There is often a period of denial or neglect of the root causes for insurgency in the country. The people themselves are frequently unresponsive to alerting the government to what is happening in their localities, due to oppression from the government or neglect of their interests and needs. Nonetheless, the people are the balance of power that the government will need to tap in order to obtain the information necessary to counterinsurgency warfare. The people have the key, and the key is information.

Intelligence As The Key

Each step in the counterinsurgency plan will require intelligence. It is at the same time the most prevalent, but the most difficult, commodity that a government must resource to defeat an insurgency. It must be cultivated from the sources, collected, processed, analyzed, transformed into a product, and then disseminated into the hands of those who will best be able to use it. Trinquier defines the importance of intelligence in fighting an insurgency as follows:

“With a reliable intelligence service, we would be able to detect all infiltration attempts against our territory and discover who are those indispensable to the enemy’s preparation of his projected offensive action. The inhabitants will know them, since they suffer terribly from their activities, but will not denounce these agents unless they can do so without risk. Fear of reprisal will always prevent them from communicating to us information they possess.”²⁷

Unfortunately, the government forces will rarely have this “reliable intelligence service” at the ready when an insurgency breaks out. Its challenge will be to develop one as quickly and as thoroughly as possible to get at the nub of what gives the insurgency its advantage.

Before the government can gather intelligence from its people, it must set the conditions for regaining control of the local populace. This is a prerequisite to effective government counterinsurgency operations. For if the government does not control the population, the

insurgents will. This may sound manipulative and callous, but remember that the population is what each side is fighting to control.²⁸

Insurgents will use intimidation, as well as chaos, to control the population. It is a potent weapon, which government forces cannot effectively employ. The insurgents will readily use any attempt at government control of the population against the regime in their information and psychological campaign. This is a major point in Galula's treatise:

"The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does. Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon for him. . . . The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he says."²⁹

Trinquier captures this asymmetric advantage that the insurgent possesses: "We will be tempted to obtain by violence information that a well-organized service would have given us without difficulty. Selective terrorism, as we have seen, will, even before the opening of hostilities, put an end to our regular intelligence agents. Leaders and small functionaries are its first victims."³⁰ How can the government sustain an intelligence effort when its local agents are assassinated and the local people intimidated? Unfortunately, the best information will come from these sources. We have come full circle, for creating a secure environment will be incumbent upon the government in-being before it will be able to obtain a steady flow of intelligence from the local populace.

The Gridding System

"In any military operation, we must first locate the enemy before we can concentrate our blows against him. We know that in modern warfare we are not clashing with just a few armed bands, but rather with an organization installed within the population – an organization that constitutes the combat machine of the enemy, of which the [fighting cells] are but one element."³¹

Trinquier proposes a simple gridding system to gain control of both the population and the insurgents.³² The starting point for this gridding system will be in the urban areas of the nation, where insurgents can best hide and be protected and supported by the local populace.

First, the army enters an area occupied by insurgents and clears and holds the area, creating a security perimeter. If successful, insurgents will scatter, probably to occupy surrounding areas that have not yet been swept – with the intent of re-occupying their territory once the military departs the area. As in pest control, the objective is to gain control of one area first and then build on that sterilized sector. The objective is not to eradicate the insurgency in one set-piece battle, but to gain control of one sector after another and build an integrated

security environment. If this causes insurgents to flee to other areas, then those will be addressed in turn until an entire section of the country is secure.

This describes the Oil Spot Strategy that French General Gallieni (and later hero of the Battle of the Marne in World War I) used in Indochina as governor-general of Tonkin in the late 19th Century.³³ The government's security forces will target successive areas as part of their clear-and-hold campaign against insurgent-held territory. The aim is for the government's rings of control to spread and overlap, as spots of oil on a piece of paper will, until the entire territory is secure. However, this strategy requires as much as a 10:1 superiority in government forces, versus insurgents, in order to maintain territory once it has been taken and cleansed. The objective is not to let the insurgents back in.

Then, the constabulary follows as "inhabitants of the nearest villages or isolated individuals [farmers, for example] are progressively brought within the security perimeter." Inside the perimeter, the constabulary divides the area into grids, by which the government authorities may track all people and all supplies. (Trinquier discusses even tracking all of the animals in an area to deny insurgents an important resource. The objective is to starve them of resources and force them out of a secure area.³⁴) Government security forces then control the entry and exit points of urban areas and impose a curfew. Those out at night without special exception or orders will be considered as the enemy. Once the area is under control of government forces, then the people can be identified by census and provided identification cards. This sweeping mechanism is then repeated as each successive area comes under verified government control. Military quick reaction teams can be called upon to restore order in case of re-flash of insurgent activity in an area that overwhelms the capabilities of the constabulary.

For the government's intelligence effort, the gridding system can be employed to organize and control sources. As each citizen obtains his/her identification card, he can be tapped for certain basic information, which goes into his file and into a central data base. This initial subtle interrogation can lead to a developing relationship with each source and for following up on leads. It is in the nature of the fine web that Trinquier used in Algeria to excellent effect in the battle for Algiers.³⁵ "Every inhabitant is individually and privately interrogated, without any resort to violence."³⁶ If any insurgents are caught in this sweeping process, then "[m]ore stringent interrogation will enable us to discover quickly who all the members are . . . as well as the location of food deposits and arms caches. . . . [T]he most desirable objective is the destruction of the politico-military organization in the intermediate area."³⁷

The purpose of this net is not necessarily to root out insurgents from among the populace, although that may be a useful spin-off from the intelligence activities. Rather, the main usefulness is in the exclusionary mechanism that provides the security forces with a fresh start in a sterile working environment. They will then build on this secure environment to collect information on the trace elements of insurgent activity in that area and in adjacent areas. As in Iraq, insurgent cells are likely to be pushed out of one area as government security forces sweep it, occupy it, and then control it – only to occupy adjacent areas that have not yet been swept.³⁸ “The supplying of the [insurgents] will become more and more difficult in the intermediate area as we proceed to drain off their means of support.”³⁹

People have a way of talking about previous situations when they feel secure and comfortable in their surroundings again. It may take some time for locals to be comfortable again with the presence of government security forces. However, if their presence is beneficial to daily life and restores law and order, then local citizens will find cause to cooperate with intelligence efforts against the former insurgent cells in their areas.⁴⁰ Trinquier sums up this equation succinctly: “To succeed, we must never lose sight of the fact that we will receive information only from people who can give us information without risk to themselves. We must assure our agents of this indispensable security.”⁴¹ At the same time, government services must be restored and infrastructure re-built and improved to ensure that locals are more satisfied with their government administration than with insurgent attempts at community services.⁴²

A Good Census Is Worth The Effort

Since the insurgency is fought over control of the people, the government must be able to account for its citizens. If its citizens can be tracked, then the regime may be able to distinguish friend from foe, supporter from agent, and neutral from accomplice, using a variety of methods. Only the reverse was available to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, using Saddam’s Oil-for-Food ration cards. The CPA’s effectiveness may have been heightened had it taken measures to account for the Iraqi people, providing a common basis by which to differentiate one Iraqi from another. A data base of citizens is instrumental for pursuing insurgents and criminals. A decent census has not been taken in Iraq since the mid-1950s.⁴³

Before a good census can be taken of the population, however, the military and police must be able to guard the people against insurgent violence, threats, and intimidation. Otherwise, the people will not cooperate, and the census-takers will not be able to operate. This is what Trinquier’s gridding system aims to secure. As the U.S. learned the hard way in

Iraq, once territory is re-taken from insurgent cells, the government forces must hold the territory and manage it. Otherwise, the insurgents will simply move in again once the government forces have left. This is the lesson of Fallujah and Tall Afar, as well as in other insurgencies.⁴⁴

While military intelligence can be collected by security forces in the context of military engagements with the enemy, the more effective and lasting intelligence from the people will only be possible in a secure environment. Once basic security can be restored -- that is, when innocent people can walk the streets in daylight and conduct their daily business, and when government services have been restored, backed by its security forces -- then a thorough intelligence campaign can be waged among the people. In addition, once people begin to trust the government again, they will be able to form their own local militias and neighborhood watches.⁴⁵ This is also part of the gridding system and its follow-up campaign for local self-defense and neighborhood watches, all of which operate under governmental authority and supervision.⁴⁶ This is a very important turning point in the government's counterinsurgency campaign. Since the summer of 2004, U.S. forces have started to see this develop in Iraq as a viable, indigenous Iraqi security force has begun to stand up.⁴⁷ The local populace has responded positively to the development of their own security forces protecting them.

Since the insurgents will attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the government through asymmetric means, the people in their neighborhoods and town centers will be the bell weathers for warning. The insurgent is constantly searching for areas in which to expand his operating environment or to find alternative havens against penetration of security forces against their current safe zones.

Just as every citizen knows what goes on in his or her neighborhood, on the street in front of his house, in the area of her business, once the government re-gains their trust, citizens will be some of the best reporting sources on insurgent and criminal activity. (The two types are closely linked. Insurgents will readily employ criminal elements for intelligence against government forces, or for re-supply services and contract labor -- like those who frequently plant improvised explosive devices in Iraq. The insurgency in Iraq is buoyed by a sea of criminality. ⁴⁸) Once the local public sees some hope in sticking their necks out, they will act on their self-interest in government-protected neighborhoods and town centers.⁴⁹

If the government is not the actual cause of the insurgency, then the citizens will have a stake in keeping their way of life intact for their families, neighborhoods, and towns. Then again, if the insurgency is due to the government's routine patterns of abuse, then the regime has to reform itself before it can hope to receive the support of its populace. Needed government reforms not only undermine the attractiveness of insurgent opposition, but also

inspire the populace to help their government fulfill promises that will improve their lives. The current Nigerian government has not comprehended this accounting sheet yet. It has forgotten the lessons of Biafra from the civil war of 1967-70. Now, a renewal of those same inequities has arisen in an environment rich in oil revenue, which the people of the southeast delta region never see. A newly emergent militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, has kidnapped foreign oil workers and sabotaged oil installations amounting to 20 per cent of the current Nigerian capability to export its oil.⁵⁰ The classic rise of insurgent liberation groups, which Galula describes so well, has occurred.⁵¹

An Intelligence Program

A major erosive force of insurgency is the expense it claims on the nation. It will shake the foundations of government at all levels of organization. The government's intelligence effort, like all aspects of counterinsurgency, will therefore be expensive and will demand a commitment of major resources from the existing government. This fight will consume large quantities of lives, time, personnel, resources, and moral force.⁵² The government has no choice; the root causes of insurgency will not go away by themselves. Says Galula in his typical understatement, "What makes one country more vulnerable than another to insurgency is the depth and the acuity of its existing problems."⁵³

Anthony Cordesman explains the intelligence challenges this way, after years of studying the situation in Iraq from the U.S. warfighter's perspective:

"Human-centric warfare does not mean 'supersoldiers' or 'super intelligence officers.'" This is a particular problem for warfighting intelligence, given the limits of today's technical systems and means. . . . But to create effective HUMINT abilities to deal with security issues, the U.S. will need an effective local partner in most serious cases of both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Having allied countries, allied forces, or allied elements develop effective HUMINT will be a critical answer to U.S. shortcomings."⁵⁴

This is what a superpower faces in dealing with intelligence gathering for counterinsurgency. Iraq is just one example. What is a lesser power supposed to do with fewer resources and limited access to expensive sources and methods? Short of a well-financed, Saddam-like police state, the answer is to have a sound, honest, and honorable plan for attacking the problem with the commitment of all of its governmental resources and the support of the local population. These are the essential elements for a strategic plan; the rest involves the details of executing the plan and making adjustments along the way.

Informers, Defenders, and Spies

When extensive plans cannot be executed, a regime can still use locals as bellweathers. Informers are important to keep in the pay of the local constabulary, both for criminal and insurgent contacts. They can provide indications and warnings of renewed insurgent activity in their area, as well as reporting on emerging trends of insurgent leadership, tactics, supply networks, insurgent groupings, and contacts.

While a neighborhood watch can be employed in advanced stages of the gridding system, as described above, once the government restores order to an area, a neighborhood watch can reap first-hand benefits long after the gridding system is necessary. It is like a re-flash watch in the aftermath of a forest fire and an early warning system if another forest fire (qua insurgent cells) endangers an area.

Local police and constabulary can increase the effectiveness of this first-hand intelligence by processing it for coordinated use. In the case of insurgency, local police can also deputize citizens into self-defense teams that extend the influence and effectiveness of the police. These activities may involve special measures, since the government remains responsible for protecting individual rights, as well as guaranteeing the survival of the state and its culture. Extreme circumstances require extreme measures, but the regime must be careful to retain the faith of its people and resist the temptation to undermine their own value system for the sake of security.

Nonetheless, self-defense leagues can turn into government militias of the type that can make counterinsurgency warfare especially devastating to the enemy.⁵⁵ Trinquier describes how good citizen cadres are essential to the proper functioning of citizen militias.⁵⁶ Care must be taken to prevent them from becoming private militias, which are outside the control of the government security apparatus, and hence, can turn into death squads. The new Iraqi Government has struggled with this phenomenon since its inception in mid-2004, a chronic situation which could inflame inter-sectarian violence and sow the seeds of civil war.⁵⁷ President Karzai of Afghanistan has worked diligently to bring private militias under the control of the central government by passing legislation against them and by co-opting their war lords.⁵⁸

Furthermore, in a state of emergency, the legal system that protects insurgents should be revised to deny them this cover – with the proviso that the restrictions will be lifted once the insurgency ends.⁵⁹ This will enable the military and police to override normal constraints on search and seizure, as well as arrest, in order to proceed against insurgent (and terrorist) cells. In the initial phases of regaining control over the cities and countryside, martial law and curfews will aid security forces to restore order and control. This is part of Trinquier's experience in

Algeria, where the French Government attempted to fight the insurgency by undermining its political organization. For the Battle of Algiers, French forces were successful, even though the government eventually lost the political war for Algeria.⁶⁰

Self-defense teams can tap into yet another network for intelligence. Local self-defense teams can collect information from sources who may not want to talk to the police, but who may discuss important information in passing with unsuspected agents of local security in their everyday capacities as workers, shoppers, and students.

The more that local groups get involved in repulsing insurgents in their midst, the greater opportunities arise for the government to engage intelligence sources for mutual gain. The government must be able to show the benefits of sharing intelligence on the insurgents, but their successes and sensitivities will produce positive effects against the insurgent tide.

Intelligence and Modern Technology

Modern technology can make a major difference in the local security environment. Americans are seeing the effects of these measures on the streets of their post-9/11 localities. Street lights, well-placed cameras, emergency phone boxes, and greater police presence can have the double benefit of combating crime and insurgent activities in the local neighborhoods. Government information campaigns and progressive propaganda to explain the importance of increased vigilance and reporting of insurgent activities must accompany these technical counterinsurgency measures. The government must keep pressing the local population to assist its efforts in fighting for their own security. Furthermore, the government, in cooperation with local authorities, must show how local citizens can get involved in their own security by making the national and regional efforts more effective against the forces of anarchy and destruction.

A cross-disciplinary approach to the nexus of crime and insurgency will also pay dividends to the national police. Depending on the mobility of the offenders, a national data base will enable other localities to pursue criminals branching out into lucrative insurgent support activities. This is where military intelligence can greatly assist a national constabulary and local police in keeping tabs on suspect and repeat offenders of the state.

The affordability of routers for creation of centralized data bases and the greater access of communications links provide an intelligence network with readily available linking technology. The central government must take the lead in pulling together the usual disparate threads of intelligence in the various ministries, intelligence organizations, and levels of government. This was a primary lesson for the intelligence community from the 9/11 attacks.⁶¹

Whoever takes the lead regionally and nationally must be able to network local efforts to monitor, track, report, and coordinate responses to insurgent activity. This is more important than any high-technology response to insurgency. It provides a network of networks to counteract a similar strength that insurgents may develop. (This has been a major challenge in identifying insurgent power centers in Iraq. There, the various insurgent groups have stood a network of networks on its head. That is, an insurgent network of networks has enabled insurgent groups to remain amorphous to security forces attempting to identify, track, and eradicate them.⁶²) Such a government-led network will also keep the populace engaged in meaningful and enduring support for their government. It puts the human dimension into the fight, what Anthony Cordesman talks about with human-centric counterinsurgency in Iraq.

Harnessing Technical Means

As the government drives its plan to restore basic security to its people, military sweeps against insurgent cells can utilize more technical means of intelligence to good purpose. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become very important and reasonably inexpensive ways of monitoring, tracking, targeting, and sometimes even striking insurgent elements. This capability can be developed over time indigenously, or it can be contracted. Nonetheless, the information must remain in the hands of the government authorities; otherwise, it can easily be slipped to infiltrators and spies within the government's own intelligence, military and policing organizations.

Frequent military and police patrols along the logistics routes of the country can turn into fruitful intelligence collection activities. A patrol whose participants are familiar with the locality can spot subtle changes that can cue follow-up examinations. This one-two punch of combining intelligence sensors can yield significant data. The challenge here is to provide patrolling police and military members with simple, clear collection criteria to focus their security patrols. For them, intelligence collection will usually come a distant third in priority to self-defense and order.

This first-hand collection effort also requires a link to an intelligence organization that can translate complex and interrelated data requirements into multiple levels of contacts. Follow-up action may be required for more technical means of collection to respond to this first-hand cueing.

As a collection method, patrol presence serves a purpose similar to increasing foot patrols in New York City's Times Square: The police presence deters criminals, keeps the public aware of their civic responsibility, impresses them with the concern of the government for their welfare, and provides increased reporting capability. This method has also worked in

Baghdad, as Iraqi military and police units take back responsibility for city neighborhoods. Their presence, resolve, credible force, and tenacity have pushed insurgents out of previously untouchable areas of the Iraqi capital and border towns like Tall Afar.⁶³ Residents have responded favorably with increased tips on insurgent activity to more active and higher-profiled local Iraqi security forces.⁶⁴

More technical means can be used to cue border patrols. Aircraft cover, use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other non-technical means can be employed for targeting foreign support to insurgent re-supply. They can also be used for countering cross-border infiltration of supporting personnel as the most efficient way to spot border violations and develop patterns of movement and favored geography. Rapid relay of information to border patrols is then necessary to make best use of this perishable data. In Iraq, the long, complex, and difficult terrain of its porous borders has long been a problem for even Saddam's police regime. Smuggling is a way of life for many border tribes, encouraging criminality and insurgent exploitation.⁶⁵

Security forces can use a variety of sensors to aid in their cueing and intelligence efforts. Drop-and-leave sensors can detect variations in heat, movement, and concentration of humans and various materiel in uninhabitable areas. These are the regions that insurgent groups use to build and train their forces. Visual, audio, and signals intercepts are among some of the packages that can be used. Israelis have used simple trip-wires to signal intrusion across sensitive border areas.⁶⁶ Combination of sensors, like trip-wires that trigger video or positional data can be fruitful detection of illegal entry or movement across suspect areas for security forces to follow-up on.

Other technical means may not be as effective against an insurgency which operates at the lowest levels of communications and organization. In Iraq, signals intelligence (SIGINT) has had limited value. Insurgents and their operatives often use face-to-face communications and have quickly learned that cell phones are heavily monitored by U.S. forces. They also use messengers and employ independent cells to avoid tell-tale signals, which may lead to interruption of their operations or even their capture.

Similarly, satellite imagery (IMINT) has limited use in a commuter insurgency, like Iraq, which operates like a pick-up game every day. Where do you monitor in a complex urban area, which provides insurgents excellent cover and concealment? The requirement for a long dwell time to monitor tactical movements of insurgent groups is better served by tactical UAVs.

Perhaps some measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) can be useful for tracking body heat and vehicle heat across line of communication and border areas. Or,

perhaps, MASINT would be useful in obtaining indications and warnings of chemical agents or the tell-tale motions of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) being planted along roadsides. UAVs can be employed with thermal sites to detect heat signatures of IEDs and those warm humans planting them. However, this expensive high technology is of limited usefulness against the low-tech and patchwork criminal cells that support the Sunni extremist insurgency in Iraq.

Likewise, some foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT) data can be used for quick tracking of incoming rockets and missiles frequently used in hit-and-run attacks by insurgents in Iraq. However, it is very difficult to respond in a matter of seconds against a highly mobile insurgent team. They may be carrying a rocket launcher or a bazooka or even a MANPAD (shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile) and operating from a stolen car or truck. Counter-battery fire has been limited in its effectiveness against these attacks, because even when an insurgent attack team is successfully engaged, there are many others available with almost unlimited access to weapons. Insurgents may also set up in politically sensitive areas, like school yards or mosques, for both cover and propaganda effect.

This technology assumes a rich capitalization base by which the government can afford most of these expensive intelligence sources. For most regimes infected with insurgency, this will not be the case. However, there are many alternatives that offer more personnel- and time-intensive measures for gathering intelligence against insurgent forces, rather than those technologically intensive means described above. Most governments that wrestle with insurgents will have plenty of less expensive personnel resources to use in their counterinsurgency campaigns.

Alternatives for Intelligence Gathering

The gridding system is the first order for collecting intelligence, especially in a low-tech environment. As developed above, while working to eject insurgents from a progressively larger area, by working and re-working one grid after another, the military and constabulary can collect bits and pieces of information that can be put together for a greater intelligence picture. Intelligence can be gathered from "the net thrown over each area in the grid."⁶⁷ This is the detective work of counterinsurgency. It is a process of layering all of the pieces of the puzzle out and methodically putting them together for counterinsurgency action.

The objective of the gridding system is to eject insurgents from a designated area and then to hold that area after it has been swept. The government wants the insurgents to depart

the urban areas, either through combat or through exfiltration. This is what happened in Fallujah in November 2004.⁶⁸

At the same time, however, some insurgents will be captured or killed and intelligence can be collected through what is left from the battle – pocket litter, forged identification materials, personal possessions, written or even computer materials. Or, those captured alive can be interrogated for actionable intelligence. The intelligence gathered in this manner will be highly perishable and often must be acted upon in a matter of hours to be effective.

Interrogation is a sensitive area in the fight against insurgents. It must not undermine the values of the nation. In a closed environment, like that of a prison in an inaccessible location, direct supervision and continuing training are required to ensure that interrogation of undesirables does not go astray.⁶⁹ Apparently, Trinquier, himself, dealt with the delicate issue of interrogation, versus torture, in both Indochina and Algeria. He appears less bothered about the use of torture than modern Western standards, although these standards have not prevented unsupervised U.S. and British soldiers from crossing the line into criminal conduct of their own in Iraq. According to Trinquier's experience,

“Interrogations in modern warfare should be conducted by specialists . . . versed in the techniques to be employed. . . . For this, it is first of all essential to place him precisely within the diagram of the organization to which he belongs. A profound knowledge of the organization is required. . . . Every clandestine organization is strictly compartmented”⁷⁰

Once a gridded area can be secured and the populace begins to trust in governmental authority again, there are a number of augmenting sources of intelligence that a regime may employ to gather counterinsurgency intelligence. Sometimes, reporters can be tapped to divulge their sources or can be tracked more easily than the insurgents themselves to their sources. Local companies and shopkeepers are another excellent source of alternate intelligence. They are usually open to financial arrangements in return for their watchful eyes and ears. Truckers range widely across the countryside and have access to urban areas that many government forces may not. A small retainer fee can go a long way to an economical network of informers.

Unions or guilds have wide-ranging networks that a regime could tap for information and reporting on suspect insurgent or criminal activity. Workers who service people's homes see many things that others are not privy to. Mail carriers, telephone repairmen, news boys, teachers, garbage collectors, road workers, are all out and about into local neighborhoods. These are untapped sources for valuable impressions of what goes on in suspect areas of urban and more inaccessible areas in the countryside for reporting on insurgent activity.

Once the police are a respected and trusted force in localities again, they would be best suited for organizing networks of concerned citizens. The police will also have the infrastructure to support this type of outreach effort. To supplement the law enforcement effort, a professional undercover structure may be required, using paid informers and a national reporting network. This is a costly apparatus to construct and maintain.

Spy vs. Spy

The U.S. experience in Iraq shows the dangers of accumulating useful information against terrorist and insurgent cells, only to have the data leaked by double agents in security force headquarters and ministries to the insurgent leadership.⁷¹ This has also happened repeatedly to Pakistani Army efforts to root out Muslim extremists in their lawless, autonomous northwest regions. These semi-autonomous tribal areas, which border Afghanistan, harbor some of the most terrible operatives of al Qaeda.⁷²

The issue of insurgent infiltration of the government's security apparatus shows the need for a counter-espionage campaign to complement the counterinsurgency plan. Infiltration of police and military, as well as government ministries, can be very difficult to detect and counter. The new Iraqi government has suffered through repeated infiltrations of local police and military units. Many insurgent attacks on government facilities can be linked to inside connections.⁷³

A counterintelligence program against insurgent groups will be made even more difficult if a foreign power aids and abets the insurgents. This was the challenge with insurgencies in south and central Africa and Central America in the 1960s and 1970s, as the Soviet Union sponsored uprisings as proxy wars of expansion.⁷⁴

Counterintelligence is made difficult by infiltration of indigenous ethnic groups that are part of the composition of the native population. This is the dilemma of the current nascent government in Iraq, dealing with the predominantly Sunni-based insurgency. Infiltration of insurgent spies in government organizations has plagued the current Iraqi Government and its new security forces since their stand-up in mid-2004.⁷⁵ The infiltration has been an inevitable result of efforts to integrate all major Iraqi ethnic groups into the new government apparatus.

To ensure democratic government, Sunnis must be represented on the regional and national levels. At the same time, many of those Sunnis in elected government, ministries, military, and police have double agendas. They serve the insurgency by working their associations in government. The Iraqi dilemma of infiltration is complicated by other ethnic groups conspiring against the central government, such as Iranian-backed Shi'a groups, like the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Kurdish independence groups.⁷⁶

Their presence -- since they are part of the make-up of the indigenous population and deserve representation in the regional and national governments -- cannot be summarily dismissed simply because of their ethnic association. Still, some of those who enter government do so with hidden agendas to work their governmental associations for the good of the enemies of the state.

The government will have to develop its own counter-intelligence organization, separate from the intelligence and planning functions. The counter-intelligence chain of command will need to coordinate its relations with the other governmental functions, but will need to keep its operations quarantined from their access.

Using International Means of Intelligence

The regime must also appeal to its neighboring countries for assistance. While this may be unlikely against those countries actually supporting the insurgency, this important diplomatic maneuver will get the point across as to who is involved on each side. This is an important designation for continual development of intelligence sources. As used by the new Iraqi government against Syrian tolerance of insurgent re-supply activities in their country, the world spotlight can put a regime on notice and build international pressure against their support for the insurgent cause.⁷⁷ With a major power's help, like the U.S. with Iraq, powerful international pressures can be brought to bear against uncooperative neighbors. International pressure has yielded positive developments in border policing and sharing of information between Iraq and its neighbors.⁷⁸

Intelligence organizations of neighboring states can be powerful allies in understanding the nature of the insurgency, how it is re-supplied and financed, what are its broad-based appeals to the populace, and how it can be countered. Often, roots of insurgency cross borders and are better understood by a neighboring government, which itself may have encountered the ethnic, tribal, or criminal segments of insurgency. When combined with coordinated police action, this can provide a potent advantage against the spread of insurgent groups across borders and within the nation fighting the insurgency.

International threats to political stability can be powerful motivating factors for regional alliances. This is how ECOWAS (the Economic Organization of West African States) became more than simply an economic conglomeration of West African nations and turned itself into an international peace-keeping force in the 1990s.⁷⁹ There was just too much instability in the region with no major power to turn to for resolution. The West African states, led by the regional

power, Nigeria, banded together to stem civil war and insurrection from spilling over into their own borders.

Conclusion

Counterinsurgency is a test of time and commitment. It will take a proper understanding of the national strategic causes and the costs of the war to carry it out with success. Intelligence is at the center of any effective fight. It can be sized and ranged appropriate to the resources of a nation, but it must be addressed quickly and extensively to be effective. The full, imaginative, resourceful, and committed use of the nation's resources – primarily the support of its own peoples – is required for counterinsurgency warfare to work. Only then can a government in-being outlast its enemy by sapping all sources of its strengths. Understanding the enemy is the key to outlasting and defeating it. Intelligence gathering is the way by which this understanding can be achieved.

For an effective intelligence program in pursuit of a successful counterinsurgency campaign, a government in-being must provide its security forces the following assets:

- A strategic plan for fighting insurgency, including an understanding of its roots and a commitment to resolving social inequities that inflame popular resentment.
- A program for national intelligence coordination, reaching into all levels of government capabilities.
- A sound counterintelligence program to back up the integrity of an effective counterinsurgency campaign.
- A gridding system of taking and holding insurgent territory, with the concomitant intelligence that can be gathered in military and police sweeps.
- An interrogation program of insurgents caught in the gridding system that is thorough, but does not compromise the values of the people.
- A complete census of the populace, which can yield important intelligence from the interview process and from the winnowing of the population to yield insurgents hiding in their midst.
- An information program that is persuasive to the local citizen, explaining the nature of what the security forces are fighting and how the local citizen can get involved.
- A network of networks that builds on multiple levels of sources of information, from the military data collected on the battlefield, to the police data collected in the localities, to the instrumental bits and pieces collected by the locals and reported into an integrated collections system.

- Employment of all sources of intelligence available within the resources of the government and from its allies and neighbors.
- An analytical framework for using the collected data to its best effect against the enemy, with a reporting network that delivers time-critical information into the hands of those who can best use it.
- An interagency approach to the issues of reestablishing public security, rebuilding infrastructure, balancing individual rights, and creating a public environment for truth and reconciliation among those disenfranchised who may have provided insurgents with succor and resources.
- A training program for police and the military in counterinsurgency warfare and the ethics involved in not crossing the line of atrocity and unethical, de-humanizing behavior.
- An international approach to fighting the insurgency, drawing on neighbors, friends, allies, and big powers to assist with the intelligence fight to understand the various insurgent groups and get inside their decision/resource loops.

For the government in-being, balancing the severe costs involved in prosecuting a counterinsurgency with the aggressiveness required for pursuing violent insurgents will be the most difficult part of the struggle. The bits and pieces of intelligence data may be plentiful, but not satisfying at first. Since most insurgencies are protracted, the government must take the time necessary to put the puzzle of the insurgency together for long-term, actionable operations. This necessity for “the long war” is what the American people and their government representatives are struggling with now in terms of the prolonged war in Iraq and the expected long war against al Qaeda.⁸⁰ The patience and understanding of the people will be paramount to facilitating this process. To this end, the government’s information operations campaign will have to go hand-in-hand with its intelligence and operations efforts. The will of the people must be won.

Endnotes

¹ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, Translated from the French by Daniel Lee, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1961), 92.

² Ibid.

³ See Robert B. Asprey's sweeping two-volume history of insurgency, *War In The Shadows: The Guerrilla In History*, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1975), in which he discusses the pathologies of counterinsurgency from Darius and the Scythian guerrillas to the post-Soviet tribal conflicts in Afghanistan. In his preface for the 1994 one-volume edition, also published by William Morrow and Company, Asprey makes damning accusations against the Johnson-MacNamara administration of the Vietnam War, to which he devotes the a large part of his work. Mao and Ho Chi Minh figure largely in development of modern guerrilla strategies.

⁴ See Richard Lock-Pullan's excellent doctrinal history of the U.S. Army in the aftermath of the amnesia of Vietnam in "An Inward Looking Time: The United States Army, 1973-1976," *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, No. 2, 483-511. "The complex and sophisticated demands of low-intensity warfare would have to wait until the basic aspects of a military force had been re-established. Because the Army was so utterly run down by 1973, it had to focus first on its principal mission, the potential battlefield of Europe. . . . Most significant about these changes [wrought by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and U.S. Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams] are the routes not taken. As noted, the Nixon Doctrine [of 1974] weakened the Army's concern with low-intensity conflicts (LICs). Further, the lack of emphasis on LIC reflected the absence of consensus within the Army as to what the "lessons" of Vietnam were in this regard. The Army's blockage in its learning meant that neither its doctrine nor its practice of LIC changed in the 1970s."

⁵ Neill Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and American in Vietnam*, (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1988), 4.

⁶ Tony Corn, "World War IV As Fourth-Generation Warfare," *Policy Review*, The Hoover Institute, January 2006.

⁷ Josh White and Ann Scott Tyson, "Rumsfeld Offers Strategies for Current War," *The Washington Post*, 03 February 2006, A8. Also see, Bradley Graham and Josh White, "Abizaid Credited With Popularizing the Term 'Long War,'" *The Washington Post*, 03 February 2006, A8.

⁸ O'Neill, 13-28.

⁹ Trinquier, 6, 8-9.

¹⁰ Bernard Fall, in his introduction to Trinquier's *Modern Warfare*, ix.

¹¹ Trinquier, 16-17.

¹² See Anthony Cordesman's tough love article on "Shaping the Future of Counterinsurgency Warfare: A Strategic Approach," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 29 November 2005, accessed via the Internet at www.CSIS.org/public_affairs, downloaded on 02 December 2005. On pages 13-14, he asserts, "Iraq has already shown time after time that it is difficult to sustain any victory without a lasting presence by local police and government offices." Without local police and government, there is chaos, which insurgents thrive on.

¹³ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), 29.

¹⁴ Trinquier, 48-50.

¹⁵ Galula, 18-25.

¹⁶ Bernard Fall, *Viet-Nam Witness, 1953-66*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966) as discussed by Leonard P. Liggio in *Left and Right*, March 1968, 60-67.

¹⁷ Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, Stephen J. Cimbala, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 3-22, Chapter 1, "National Interests and National Security."

¹⁸ See J. J. Bartholomees, editor, *National Security Strategy Reader*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003), 279-285. The DIME Model of national security powers and authority is an effective tool for understanding how a nation's full resources can be brought to bear on a problem of fundamental and existential import. This is a matter for both the people and their government to understand and to employ in its best interagency agenda.

¹⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

²⁰ Galula, 17-42, Chapter 2, "The Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency."

²¹ Lieutenant Colonel (P) Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare*, September 2005, Vol. 18, No. 2.

²² Trinquier, 63.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Gal Luft, "Hizballahland," *Commentary Magazine*, July-August 2003: "The growth of Hizballa. Viewing Lebanon's current political system as an aberration, the organization plans to turn that country into a satellite of Iran. The project may take many years, but Hizballah's leaders are optimistic. After all, they already control not only the entire south but also the crowded Shiite suburbs of Beirut--not to mention eleven out of the 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament. In Lebanon, Hizballah runs schools, community centers, and hospitals and operates an independent media outlet. As such, it enjoys the power to pursue its own foreign policy--which is to say, its vision of a Middle East free of Western influence."

²⁵ Martin Asser, " Hamas Election Victory," BBC News, 26 January 2006, accessed via the Internet, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4650300.stm on 11 February 2006: "How much of a shock is a Hamas victory? A big shock. Almost no one was predicting that Hamas would win a clear majority in the Palestinian parliament."

²⁶ Trinquier, 60.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 35.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 16, 45-46, 64.

²⁹ Galula, 14.

³⁰ Trinquier, 36.

³¹ Ibid., 67.

³² Ibid., 89-91.

³³ The French version of this term, *tache d'huile*, was used in Indochina prior to 1895 by Joseph-Simon Gallieni, according to Frederick Quinn, *The French Overseas Empire* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 2000).

³⁴ Ibid., 75.

³⁵ See the valuable movie adaptation for "The Battle of Algiers," by Gillo Pontecorvo, made in 1966, produced on location in Algeria, and starring many of the surviving insurgent leaders and their French rivals, including Col. Roger Trinquier appearing in the accompanying documentary on "The Making of 'The Battle of Algiers'!" As David Stubbs reviews the significance of the film:

"Director Gillo Pontecorvo's 1966 movie *The Battle of Algiers* concerns the violent struggle in the late 1950s for Algerian independence from France, where the film was banned on its release for fear of creating civil disturbances. Certainly, the heady, insurrectionary mood of the film, enhanced by a relentlessly pulsating Ennio Morricone soundtrack, makes for an emotionally high temperature throughout. Decades later, the advent of the "war against terror" has only intensified the film's relevance.

"Shot in a gripping, quasi-documentary style, *The Battle of Algiers* uses a cast of untrained actors coupled with a stern voiceover. Initially, the film focuses on the conversion of young hoodlum Ali La Pointe (Brahim Haggiag) to F.L.N. (the Algerian Liberation Front). However, as a sequence of outrages and violent counter-terrorist measures ensue, it becomes clear that, as in Eisenstein's *October*, it is the Revolution itself that is the true star of the film.

"Pontecorvo balances cinematic tension with grimly acute political insight. He also manages an evenhandedness in depicting the adversaries. He doesn't flinch from demonstrating the civilian consequences of the F.L.N.'s bombings, while Colonel Mathieu, the French officer brought in to quell the nationalists, is played by Jean Martin as a determined, shrewd, and, in his own way, honorable man. However, the closing scenes of the movie--a welter of smoke, teeming street demonstrations, and the pealing white noise of ululations--leaves the viewer both intellectually and emotionally convinced of the rightfulness of the liberation struggle. This is surely among a handful of the finest movies ever made."

³⁶ Trinquier, 77.

³⁷ Ibid., 77-78, 71.

³⁸ Jonathan Finer, "Neighborhood Peace A Casualty of War," *The Washington Post*, 11 February 2006, A01. The aftermath of the battle for Fallujah or Tall Afar is another case study for this phenomenon of insurgents being swept from one area only to gather in another, less protected area.

³⁹ Trinquier, 79.

⁴⁰ Thomas E. Ricks, "The Lessons of Counterinsurgency," *The Washington Post*, 16 February 2006, A14.

⁴¹ Trinquier, 78.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 81.

⁴³ See Joel Brinkley, "U.S. Rejects Iraqi Plan to Hold Census by Summer," *The New York Times*, 04 December 2003, 1. Also see Jamie Tarabay, "Sunnis Allege Major Fraud in Iraqi Elections," *National Public Radio*, 20 December 2005.

⁴⁴ Professor Juan Cole, of the University of Michigan, has been closely following U.S. strategic policy in Iraq since OIF began. His web site, "Informed Comment," has garnered many awards and many followers for its analysis of strategic issues in Iraq. He discusses the importance of preventing insurgents from practicing take-and-hold tactics, and instead, training and equipping Iraqi security forces to take hold as part of a sensible U.S. departure plan in <http://www.juancole.com/2005/08/ten-things-congress-could-demand-from.html>, accessed on 21 January 2006. Also see Professor T. O'Connor's extensive class notes on "Insurgencies and Peacekeeping," from North Carolina Wesleyan College, accessed via <http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/429/429lect17.htm> on 21 January 2006.

⁴⁵ Trinquier, 75.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁴⁷ *Wall Street Journal*, "Tal Afar Turning Point? A Breakthrough for Iraqi Forces," 18 September 2005, accessed via www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007274 on 18 January 2005.

⁴⁸ Hamza Hendawi, "Ransom Kidnappings Fund Iraq Insurgents," *The Washington Post*, 07 February 2006, A1.

⁴⁹ See <http://www.usaonwatch.org/> for the National Sheriff's Association and its National Neighborhood Watch program, which has been very effective across the country for "taking a bite out of crime" in people's neighborhoods.

⁵⁰ Craig Timberg, "Nigerians Make Demands, With Hostage's Support: Militants, U.S. Captive Address Press from the Water," *The Washington Post*, 25 February 2006, A11.

⁵¹ See Galula, 17-42, "The Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency."

⁵² *Ibid.*, 10-11.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 21; also see pp. 18-21 on the costs of counterinsurgency.

⁵⁴ Anthony Cordesman, "The Iraq War and Its Strategic Lessons for Counterinsurgency," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, accessed via the Internet web site www.CSIS.org/public_affairs on 29 December 2005, 16-17.

⁵⁵ Dale Andrade, "Three Lessons From Vietnam," *The Washington Post*, 29 December 2005, A23. Andrade is an historian who specializes in American involvement in Vietnam and is the author of the recently released and acclaimed, *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War*.

⁵⁶ Trinquier, 91, 107.

⁵⁷ A Zarqawi-inspired attack on the sacred golden-domed Shiite shrine of Askariya in Samarra (north of Baghdad) inflamed a week of sectarian tit-for-tat violence throughout Iraq. It succeeded in its design to undermine the Shia majority government by inciting private Shiite militias to attack Sunni clerics, mosques, and local leaders. See Nelson Hernandez's report, "On Day of Curfew, Iraq Violence Eases," *The Washington Post*, 25 February 2006, A1.

⁵⁸ See BBC News, "Karzai Vows End to Warlords Era," 04 November 2004, accessed via http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3981523.stm on 25 February 2006.

⁵⁹ See the 1973 political movie classic, "State of Siege," by Costa-Gavras, for a graphic demonstration of how a national emergency can be extended and manipulated into the hands of a dictator. Italian film critic, Estaban Hernandez, writes incisively about this award-winning film: "This is not a fiction film. In fact, it reveals the way the guerrilla movement Tupamaros acted in Uruguay during the 70s. For those young people, it is necessary to remind that this left-wing movement was not a guerrilla in the mountains but an urban one, operating mainly in Montevideo. They used to kill esbirros (nasty policemen and agents) and to make justice against the existing dictatorship whenever it was required. The movement operated in a secret and compartmented way, i.e. many of the members did not know each other, thus avoiding to be eliminated by denunciation. Costa-Gavras was able to draw the way Tupamaros acted in Uruguay, and also an important happening of those days, the way the CIA agent Mr. Dan Mitrione (Yves Montand) was killed. In fact this movement was disarticulated once new police agents infiltrated in the movement, and the main leaders were discovered. Mitrione was killed, but this did not prevent another CIA "pinch-hitter" for Mitrione, who came later to replace the dead man. The film may seem sympathetic to the Tupamaros, and partially it might be, but this is rather a subtle critique to their methods than congratulatory for what they finally did to Uruguay."

⁶⁰ Col. Gilles Martin, French Army, "War in Algeria: The French Experience," *Military Review*, July-August 2005, 51-57; also see Richard Sale, "Battle of Algiers," *World Peace Herald*, 11 February 2005.

⁶¹ CNN.com, "9/11 Commission Faults U.S. Intelligence," *CNN*, 19 May 2004, accessed via <http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/04/14/911.commission/> on 21 February, 2006.

⁶² Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Networks," *Current History*, April 1998.

⁶³ Jim Garamone, "Iraqis Assuming More Security Responsibility," *American Forces Press Service*, 07 March 2005, accessed via www.defenselink.mil/news/March2005/20050307_104.html on 18 January 2006; also see John F. Burns, "There Are Signs the Tide May Be Turning on Iraq's Street of Fear," *The New York Times*, 21 March 2005, accessed via <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/21/international/middleeast/21haifa.html> on 18 January 2006.

⁶⁴ Capt. Steve Alvarez, "Citizens Providing More Help to Iraqi, Coalition Forces," *American Forces Press Service*, 18 June 2005, accessed via <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1425773/posts> on 21 February 2006.

⁶⁵ Stephen J. Glain, "Iraqi Tribes Are Key Source of Loyalty, Rebellion," *Wall Street Journal*, 23 May 2000, accessed via the Internet, www.iraqcomm.org/cmm/WSJ-20000523.html, on 30 December 2005.

⁶⁶ Ze'ev Schiff, "Something's Afoot Along the Fence," *Ha'aretz*, 30 December 2003, accessed via <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=37738> on 21 February 2006.

⁶⁷ Trinquier, 92.

⁶⁸ Jonathan F. Keiler, "Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?," *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, January 2005, accessed via www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_0105_Fallujah-P1,00.html on 18 January 2006.

⁶⁹ *NBC News*, "U.S. Army Report on Prisoner Abuse: Executive summary of Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba," 04 May 2004, accessed via <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4894001> on 21 February 2006. This is the lesson of Abu Gharyb Prison that we must live with in our experience in Iraq and that will trail us in our history of that conflict.

⁷⁰ Trinquier, 23.

⁷¹ Shron Otterman, "Infiltration of Iraqi Forces," Council On Foreign Relations, accessed via the Internet on www.cfr.org/publication/7828/iraq.html, on 30 December 2005.

⁷² Rahul Bedi, "Infiltration Worries," *Frontline*, accessed via the Internet on www.flonnet.com/fl1913/19130250.htm on 30 December 2005.

⁷³ Charlotte Sector, "Rats in the Ranks?," *ABC News*, 05 August 2005, accessed via www.abcnews.go.com/International/IraqCoverage on 17 January 2006; also see Sharon Otterman, "Iraq: Infiltration of Iraqi Forces," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, article dated 28 February 2005, accessed via www.cfr.org/publication/7828/iraq.html on 17 February 2006.

⁷⁴ Stephen Van Evera, "American Intervention in the Third World: Less Would Be Better," *Boston Review*, October 1991.

⁷⁵ Scott Johnson and Milinda Liu, "The Enemy Spies," *Newsweek*, 27 June 2005, accessed via <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8272786/site/newsweek> on 21 February 2006.

⁷⁶ Nelson Hernandez, "U.S. Envoy in Iraq Accuses Iran of Assisting Militias, Insurgents," *The Washington Post*, 21 February 2006, A10.

⁷⁷ *Arab News*, "Kingdom Welcomes Outcome of Cairo Conference on Iraq," 27 July 2004, accessed via

www.arabnews.com/services/print/print.asp?artid=48956&d=27&m=7&y=2004&hl=Kingdom+Welcomes+Outcome+of+Cairo+Conference+on+Iraq on 18 January 2006.

⁷⁸ *Daily Star*, "Iraq's Neighbors to Increase Border Control," 20 July 2005, accessed via www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=16906 on 18 January 2006 .

⁷⁹ Bureau of African Affairs, "Fact Sheet: Economic Organization of West African States," U.S Department of State, Washington, D.C., 22 November 2002, access via www.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/15437.htm on 18 January 2006.

⁸⁰ See the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, 01 February 2006, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed via <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/docs/2005-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf> on 25 February 2006 .