

AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY AND ITS INSIGHTS INTO
FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

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ABSTRACT

AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY AND ITS INSIGHTS INTO FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE, by Lieutenant Commander Scott A. Davis, 98 pages.

This monograph determines the tenets of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) through a review of current literature. The case studies of Braddock's Campaign, the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution, and the Philippines Insurrection provide justification for the presence of the tenets of 4GW throughout American Military History and provide insights into the fighting 4GW. The insights garnered from a review of the case studies are then used to provide strategies for the successful engagement of 4GW.

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CHAPTER 1

GENERATIONS OF MODERN WARFARE

While much of Clausewitz' *On War* has been rendered obsolete by the enormous changes in the World, his admonition to national leaders remains more important than ever. Clausewitz wrote: "The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."¹

This thesis will show that the tenets of fourth generation warfare (4GW) are present throughout the history of American warfare, thus insights from the history of American warfare can be used to provide improved strategies for employment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In order to do this, one must not only have an understanding of the tenets of 4GW, but also the tenets of the first three generations of modern war and the tactics which characterize all generations of modern war. This chapter illustrates the tenets and tactics of the four generations of modern war. Subsequent chapters will review 4GW in the context of three case studies: Braddock's Campaign, the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution, and the Philippine Insurrection.² The final chapter bridges the past with present operations being conducted in OIF. The end state of this thesis will show the presence of 4GW tenets and tactics throughout the history of American warfare and provide insight into improved strategies for employment in OIF.

Prior to the first generation of modern warfare (1GW) three decades of religious wars, the Thirty Years War, plagued Europe. The Thirty Years War concluded with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which led to the formation of modern nation-states and gave those states a monopoly on organized violence leading to 1GW.³ The monopoly on

violence along with the ability of the nation-state to create large armies of conscripts provides the key tenets for 1GW. The orderly waging of war by nation-states and a culture of order amongst warriors also developed during 1GW.⁴ The technological improvements of the Industrial Age brought an end to this culture of order, symbolized by the classical nation-state wars of the Napoleonic Era, which reigned for nearly two centuries.⁵

The smoothbore musket and the formations of line and column formed the basis of tactics in 1GW. These tactics maximized firepower with available technology, traditions, and large conscript armies of the day.⁶ The tactics of Napoleon and his battles in Europe culminating with the Battle of Waterloo typify this type of warfare.⁷ These tactics were developed partially in response to the technological and social conditions prevalent during the period, but vestiges of 1GW survive into today with the desire for linearity on the battlefield.⁸ Advancements in technology during 1GW culminated with the revolution of military affairs that occurred with the development of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the United States.

The killing fields of the Crimean, Franco-Prussian, Russo-Japanese, and American Civil Wars spawned the second generation of modern warfare (2GW). Technological advancements provided the catalyst for the revolution in military affairs known as 2GW. The advancements in technology not only included heavy artillery, rapid fire weaponry, and bombing aircraft, but also the advancements in industrial technology and social migration into the cities in order to support the production and delivery of such items.⁹ Second generation warfare is similar to 1GW in its ideas; the

weapons used by warriors provided the most significant difference between 1GW and 2GW as stated by William S. Lind:

The second generation saw the formal recognition and adoption of the operational art. . . . Technology factors included von Moltke's realization that modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph.¹⁰

The advancement of technology and the operational art, to a lesser extent, required a change in tactics that spawned 2GW.

In 2GW, the tactics of massed firepower replaced those of massed manpower.¹¹

The French saying "The artillery conquers; the infantry occupies" describes the tactics of massed firepower over massed manpower. Tactics, with centralized decision making, dominated 2GW in a military culture that prized obedience over initiative.¹² Movement and fire illustrate the tactics of 2GW, while the battlefield remained linear with attacks being conducted in rushes with small groups across a laterally dispersed line. The reliance on indirect fire provides a significant change between the tactics of 1GW and 2GW.¹³ The technology and tactics of 2GW led the countries of Europe into a war of attrition, and near the close of the First World War, German advancements in doctrine spawned a new revolution in military affairs: third generation warfare (3GW).

A shift in doctrine to counter the increase in battlefield firepower characterized 3GW's revolution of ideas. The Germans developed a doctrine based on maneuver that was the first use of truly nonlinear tactics in modern warfare.¹⁴ The third generation, known as maneuver warfare, incorporated decentralized decision making in order to maintain momentum and exploit success. Training exercises conducted by the Prussian military emphasized the decentralization of decision making by intentionally giving junior officers orders that made mission accomplishment impossible. In order to

succeed, junior officers exercised initiative by diverging from issued orders.¹⁵ The shift in doctrine from place to time in 3GW is described as follows:

In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place . . . to time. This shift was explicitly recognized only recently in the work of retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd and his “OODA” (observation-orientation-decision-action) theory.¹⁶

This shift in doctrine led to a new set of tactics for 3GW.

The tactics of infiltration and speedy decision cycles provide the foundation of 3GW or maneuver warfare.¹⁷ Maneuver warfare culminated in maneuvers, such as blitzkrieg, which relied on bypassing the enemy’s main force and infiltrating to the rear.¹⁸ Infiltration into the enemy’s rear relied on bypassing and collapsing the enemy’s combat forces rather than destruction of enemy forces through frontal assault which was used in previous generations of warfare.¹⁹ Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the tactics of maneuver naturally progressed into 4GW which allows irregular forces to meet the remaining superpower on the field of battle.

For the purpose of analyzing the case studies, the tenets and tactics of 4GW are primarily explained by using the associated works of Lind and David Galula. Chapter 2 discusses alternative definitions of 4GW. The nation-state’s loss of its monopoly on war, a world of cultures in conflict, and multiculturalism provide the tenets for the idea-based, rather than technology-based revolution in military affairs that has evolved into 4GW.

Martin van Creveld describes this in *Transformation of War* when he writes:

We are standing today, not at an end of history but at a historic turning point. . . . As war between states exits through one side of history’s revolving door, low-intensity conflict among different organizations will enter through another door. . . . Extensive conflict of this nature will cause existing distinctions between government, armed forces, and people to break down. National sovereignties are already being undermined by organizations that refuse to recognize the state’s monopoly over armed violence. Armies will be replaced by

police-like security forces on the one hand and bands of ruffians on the other, not that the difference is always clear today . . . As new forms of armed conflict multiply and spread, they will cause the lines between public and private, government and people, military and civilian, to become blurred as they were before 1648.²⁰

Many students of 4GW believe that conflict outside the nation-state framework will continue to be the dominant form of war for several years. Other students contribute the shift in military affairs to the unbridled ambition of the leaders of various movements, but Galula stipulates that the roots of conflict were evident before the leader emerged when he writes:

The cause of . . . insurgencies can . . . be attributed to revolutionary situations that might have exploded into spontaneous revolutions but bred instead a group of leaders who then proceeded to organize and conduct the insurgencies.²¹

Basically, the tenets and tactics of 4GW present themselves throughout human history; the weapons employed and the ideas fought for provide the only changes throughout time. The impoverished, former colonists, the miserable, the alienated, and the downtrodden of this world using a set of tactics that are contrary to the traditional state versus state tactics constitute the warriors of 4GW.²²

The fourth generation pits non national organizations and networks against the forces and people of the nation-state. Guerrilla warfare, insurrection, and terrorism made more effective by modern technological advancement provide the evolutionary roots of 4GW tactics. The downtrodden of the world, who believe that suicide on behalf of the cause is a triumph, provide the raw material for conducting 4GW. The correction of social conditions causing class inequality will cause 4GW to fade into the past.²³

Conflict in which the enemy refuses to obey the rules constitutes 4GW and causes a

blurring of war and peace according to Dr. Chester Richards, a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel. By paraphrasing Clausewitz, Galula explains 4GW when he writes:

We might say that “Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.” It is not like an ordinary war – a “continuation of the policy by other means” – because an insurgency can start long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force.²⁴

Fourth generation warriors also use the tactics of psychological operations in the form of media and information intervention. Psychological operations use propaganda to alter domestic and world opinion, as well as degrade the enemy population’s support of its own government causing that government to implode. The fourth generation also uses terrorism, which is decentralized in command structure and dependant on mobility, to facilitate the implosion of an enemy government. Lind provides further information on terrorism and its effects on society and government:

They [terrorists] can move freely within our [American] society while actively working to subvert it. . . . If we treat them within our laws, they gain many protections; if we simply shoot them down, television news can make them appear to be victims. . . . If we are forced to set aside our own system of legal protections to deal with terrorists, the terrorists win another sort of victory.²⁵

Based on the tactics and players involved in 4GW, inequity among populations provides the cause and destruction of the enemy’s will to fight entails the strategy of 4GW.

This chapter provided a brief description of the generations of modern warfare and the style of warfare prior to the modern era to broaden understanding of the case studies and suggests insights into 4GW. The student of modern warfare understands that the massing of manpower and the development of the nation-state characterizes 1GW, the massing of firepower to overcome technological advances encompasses 2GW, and maneuver to combat the effectiveness of firepower describes 3GW. In 4GW, the picture becomes blurry. The nation-state’s loss of the monopoly on violence provides the key

assumption to defining 4GW. However, chapter 2 introduces two additional arguments on the definition of 4GW. Chapter 2 assures that the defining element of 4GW is the nation-state's loss of the monopoly on violence rather than technological advancements or terrorism. It is also evident that elements of preceding generations of warfare remain intact in later generations and that 4GW is a reversion to a type of warfare conducted prior to the modern era that began with the creation of nation-states. Case studies centered on Braddock's Campaign, the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution, and the Philippine Insurrection provide the context for 4GW review. Based on the defining elements of 4GW and the case studies, using the full spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power to improve the legitimacy of the nation-state and its ability to maintain order, the primary responsibility of the nation-state, provides a much more effective means to combat a 4GW threat than the weakening of the nation-state through direct warfare. The final chapter provides bridges from the past to the present operations being conducted in OIF. The end state of this thesis will show that the tenets of 4GW are present throughout the history of American warfare and this history provides insight into improved strategies for employment in OIF.

¹Thomas X. Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1994, 13.

²Braddock's Campaign led by English General Braddock in 1755 that started in Virginia and had present day Pittsburgh as its primary objective. The campaigns in the western counties of the southern colonies are also included in the American Revolution study. These counties include the modern states of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.

³Harold A. Gould and Frank C. Spinney, "Fourth Generation Warfare is Here," *University of Virginia Center for South Asian Students Newsletter*, fall 2001, 1 [database on-line]; available from <http://www.virginia.edu/soasia/newsletter/Fall01/warfare.html>; Internet.

⁴William S. Lind, "On War #71: The Cannon and the Four Generations," *Ivanhoe Unbound*, no date, 86 [database on-line]; available from http://ivanhoeunbound.com/cgi-bin/nph-fnord.cgi/010110A/http/d-n-i.net/lind/lind_archive; Internet.

⁵Gould and Spinney, 1.

⁶Scott Wheeler, "The Nation: War on Terror, Terrorist Tactics for the War with the West," *Free Congress Foundation*, 12 December 2002, 1 [databases on-line]; available from <http://www.freecongress.org/commentaries/2002/021217PW.asp>; Internet.

⁷Stan Crock, "War, the Fourth Generation," *Business Week Online*, 3 April 2003, 2 [database on-line]; available from http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2003/nf2003043_6499.htm; Internet.

⁸William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, 22.

⁹Ibid. 23.

¹⁰Ibid. 23.

¹¹Wheeler, 1.

¹²Lind, "On War #71," 86.

¹³Lind et.al, "The Changing Face of War," 23.

¹⁴Ibid. 23.

¹⁵Lind, "On War #71," 86.

¹⁶Lind et.al, "The Changing Face of War," 23.

¹⁷Gould and Spinney, 1.

¹⁸Crock, 2.

¹⁹Wheeler, 1.

²⁰William S. Lind, Major John F. Schmitt, and Colonel Gary I. Wilson, "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look," *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 1994, 35.

²¹David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 18.

²²Gould and Spinney, 2.

²³Ibid. 2.

²⁴Galula, 3.

²⁵Lind et.al, “The Changing Face of War,” 25.

CHAPTER 2

CHALLENGING PERSPECTIVE: A LITERARY REVIEW

Every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle.

Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address

The study of fourth generation warfare (4GW) brings numerous authors to the forefront. A review of the pertinent literature centers on the three major subcategories of study with reference to the prominent authors in those subcategories. The authors reviewed agree that warfare has crossed over into a new generation. These authors differ as to what constitutes this new generation and can be grouped into three separate subcategories of how, what, and why warriors fight in this new generation. Most authors span two or more of the categories. The focus of writers may touch on more than one area, but their primary focus generally is centered on one of the three and this center of focus is how the authors are grouped according to sub-category. As described in chapter one, the determination of "why" is used as the basis of the definition of 4GW in order to determine the best strategies available for employment in future military conflict for this reason an intensive review of doctrine is not compiled because of its strong foundation in the "what." However important the "why" factor is in determining the root cause of 4GW, one must not forget to reflect on the "how" and "what" in determining strategies for employment against 4GW.

One misconception in describing the nature of 4GW is to describe the tactics of 4GW as wholly new.¹ Another common misconception is to equate 4GW as being asymmetrical on the tactical level only without regard to the political, psychological, and economic portions of the spectrum of influence.² Two authors that successfully address

this subject without falling into the previously mentioned pitfalls are Colonel Thomas Hammes and David Galula. According to Lind, Hammes describes 4GW through how it is fought by saying that it is asymmetric and guerrilla in nature. Hammes does, however; provide insight into the means to acquire an end when he states, “The fourth generation has arrived. It uses all available networks--political, economic, social, and military--to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.”³ Hammes concurs with Galula on the review of tactics and the assumption that the 4GW warriors on their own cannot win ultimate victory.⁴ Galula also emphasizes the tactics employed in 4GW by stating that this type of warfare is both asymmetric and guerrilla in nature, but he does so twenty years before Lind coins the term 4GW. Galula believes that 4GW is but one of many phases of revolutionary warfare and that the end goal of 4GW is the overturning of the government and the gaining of power by the revolutionary element in defense of the cause.⁵ Thus, Galula indirectly states that 4GW occurs when the state loses its monopoly on violence, and he gives the end state of the insurgency as the acquiring of the powers of the state through the ultimate actions of a popular uprising spurred by the 4GW warrior. In the three decades between the writings of Hammes and Galula, little has changed in the tactics, but there has been a vast jump in technologies used in the employment of 4GW and the defense against it. Based on this perception, America has taken the view that superiority at the tactical level, manifested in high technology, will overcome any failures at the strategic and moral levels of warfare.⁶

Technological and doctrinal improvements dominate the "what" factor in describing 4GW, which attempts to define 4GW as a product of the technology and

doctrine used to fight the 4GW warrior. Most of the writings on this portion of the triad are by critics, such as Lind, based on presentations and press conferences provided by military, civilian, and business leaders. The largest contributor to this mode of thought is the buzzword of the current Pentagon administration, "Transformation." Most doctrinal connections to 4GW hinge on the transformation of the military through the reformation of the basic force building blocks (Division - Brigade) and to a large extent through the acquisition of high-technology weapons, such as the future combat system, Stryker vehicle, F-22, F-35, DD(x), and LCS.⁷ This leads to a sense of technological determinism, which predicts the outcome of conflict through superiority of equipment. This falls directly into the hands of the business leaders and technological hucksters, who use this determinism in order to lobby the premise that their new invention is an absolute requirement for victory against 4GW.⁸ If the argument of technology being the contributing factor of 4GW is confusing, then the forwarding of a new fifth generation of warfare by some technology-centric leaders should confuse the topic even further. In order to clear this confusion, one must dig into the issues and find the root cause of conflict.

Researchers of the "why" factor use the determination of the root causes of 4GW as the focal point for providing the definition of 4GW. These authors view globalization and disruption of order as contributing factors of 4GW. Two writers, Robert Kaplan and John Barnett, provide significant description of the "why" factor. Both authors envision the degradation of order being the root cause of 4GW. Kaplan describes this use of the "Chaos Theory," in which a significant criminal element contributes to the state's loss of a monopoly on violence and a degradation of the state's ability to perform its prime duty

of providing order. Barnett, however, describes 4GW as a product of globalization and the Internet. He credits the degradation of order on the global economy and further explains that as the economies of the world become more interdependent, the influence of the state is degraded. This further leads to a loss in the state's ability to maintain order and its monopoly on violence. Both authors agree that globalization is the element which makes 4GW a new generation rather than a revival of warfare prior to the modern era. By combining the efforts of these authors, one can expand the definition of 4GW to the state's loss of its monopoly on violence due to the increased globalization and loss of influence created by the direct communications of the world's peoples through use of the internet. One other author has provided a significant influence in the creation of this thesis and his works whether critical, original, or complimentary provide the crucible for 4GW studies.

William S. Lind provides the crucible for studies on 4GW. His joint authorship of the 1989 article which introduces the term 4GW was but a start to his prolific writing on the subject. In 1989, it was not certain as to whether 4GW would be characterized by technology or ideas, but by 1994 a further explanation of 4GW was provided that stipulated 4GW was a generational shift based on ideas, rather than technology. Initially in his writing, Lind was open to differing ideas, but as time has passed his writing has become more critical of fellow authors, the current administration, and the United States Army. This shift in attitude is no better demonstrated than with a reading of Lind's writing following the introduction of hostilities in Iraq. However critical he has become, his writings are still a worthwhile read and provide a central point for beginning research into the scholarly study of 4GW. He also serves as an example of what happens when

ideas become inflexible. His failure to openly view differing opinions also serves as an example for why it is important to consider all perspectives before making a decision as to the true nature and possible strategies for fighting and determining the causes of 4GW.

Writing on 4GW is prolific in its nature. This chapter reviewed the literature by dividing 4GW writings into three major subcategories of study. The authors reviewed agree that warfare has crossed over into a new generation. However, these writers differ in their opinions as to what constitutes this new generation. The focus of these writers may touch on more than one area, but their primary focus generally is centered on one of the three and this center of focus was how the authors are categorized. As described in chapter 1, the state's loss of its monopoly on violence due to the increased globalization and loss of influence created by the direct communications of the world's peoples through use of the Internet is the defining nature of 4GW. It has also been shown, that no matter how important the "why" factor is to the definition of 4GW, one must always openly view differing opinions and other subcategories in order to develop a fully comprehensive strategy for combating future military conflicts.

¹William S. Lind, "On War #47: Understanding Fourth Generation War," Free Congress Foundation, 2004, 2 [database on-line]; available from <http://www.freecongress.org/centers/cc/031219.asp>, Internet.

²William S. Lind, "On War #130: Getting Swept", Ivanhoe Unbound, 18 August 2005, 1-2 [database on-line]; available from http://ivanhoeunbound.com/cgi-bin/nph-fnord.cgi/010110A/http/d-n-i.net/lind/lind_archive, Internet.

³William S. Lind, "On War #90: The Sling And The Stone", Ivanhoe Unbound, no-date, 63 [database on-line]; available from http://ivanhoeunbound.com/cgi-bin/nph-fnord.cgi/010110A/http/d-n-i.net/lind/lind_archive, Internet.

⁴Ibid. 64.

⁵David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 1-16.

⁶William S. Lind, "On War #7: Some German Lessons", *Ivanhoe Unbound*, 12 March 2003, 134 [database on-line]; available from http://ivanhoeunbound.com/cgi-bin/nph-fnord.cgi/010110A/http/d-n-i.net/lind/lind_archive, Internet.

⁷William S. Lind, "On War #51: The Army's 'Transformation'", *Ivanhoe Unbound*, no date, 107 [database on-line]; available from http://ivanhoeunbound.com/cgi-bin/nph-fnord.cgi/010110A/http/d-n-i.net/lind/lind_archive, Internet.

⁸William S. Lind, "On War #53: Fifth Generation Warfare?" *Ivanhoe Unbound*, 22 January 2004, 109 [database on-line]; available from http://ivanhoeunbound.com/cgi-bin/nph-fnord.cgi/010110A/http/d-n-i.net/lind/lind_archive, Internet.

CHAPTER 3

BRADDOCK'S CAMPAIGN

Forgive but never forget.

John F. Kennedy¹

A review of events surrounding and including the Battle of Monongahela, figure 1, demonstrates that the tenets of fourth generation warfare (4GW) are present throughout the French and Indian War. The tactics used in the war demonstrate a clear parallel to those used in 21st Century Warfare. A review of the backgrounds of the significant players demonstrates the presence of a sphere of interests that narrow the area of conflict to the Ohio River Valley. Conflicts between natives and settlers was present prior to and following the battle as was the continual presence of disenfranchised parties.




Figure 1. Campaign Map of Braddock's Expedition

Background

Critical events in the history of the colonies, England, France, and their relations with native populations provide the context to influences that led to military conflict in the Ohio River Valley in the mid-Eighteenth Century. The events provided the foundations for French, English, colonial, and native influences that directed interaction between the populations and pointed to the importance of the Ohio River Valley. Treaties, charters, and previous wars all provide insight into the events and beliefs that

contributed to the beginning of hostilities between England and France in 1754 for the vital Ohio River Valley.

French

The signing of the Treaty of Lancaster in 1744 signified a shift in the stance of the Ohio River Valley that was fully realized with George Washington's 1753 survey mission. New France required the Ohio River Valley in order to maintain line of communication between Upper and Lower New France. The Ohio River Valley also provided a trade route for the interior and between Louisburg and New Orleans. King William's, Queen Anne's, and King George's wars provided background as to what was required to maintain the Ohio River Valley as part of New France. The rivalry between England and France being constant virtually assured future conflict. The only question was where.

French political aims prior to and during the French and Indian War centered on administering a vast land mass and maintaining lines of communication with minimal French populations. King Louis XV, figure 2, ruled over France and her colonies in the years prior to and following the French and Indian War and thus his political aims provide a large context to the events in New France. Louis XV was crowned King of France in 1715 at the age of 5 following the death of his grandfather King Louis XIV, The Sun King. As King of France, Louis acted as protector of the Church, which was a historical reference to the Carolingian Kings descending from Charlemagne. As protector of the Church, Louis XV continued to follow the policy of his grandfather which disallowed the emigration of French Huguenots to New France. He also maintained the Feudal System in New France, which provided large tracts of land to the

nobility and ensured that commoners lived a life that equated to serfdom.² These policies provide the backdrop to low native French populations in New France; there was no incentive or hope of a new life for the common people of France in the New World. During Louis XV's reign, the main concern was protection of France's European Empire from the powers of England, Prussia, Austria, and Poland, which further impacted the governance and settling of New France since the population was needed to defend France and France provided the focus for governance. Just as the government of France centered on the King, the government of New France centered on one man, the Royal Governor. This provided New France with a unity of effort, but administration of such vast territories was difficult from the government center in Quebec. Figure 3 details the holdings of England, France, Spain, and Portugal in the New World of 1722. In order to administer and defend New France, the government entered into alliances with the native populations of the Saint Lawrence River Valley, Mississippi River Valley, Missouri River Valley, and the Lower Great Lakes. Each of these waterways also served as an important transportation link among the territories of New France. Only one major interior river valley was in contest and that was the Ohio River Valley and its tributaries. This river valley provided a vital transportation and communications link between Upper and Lower New France. The building of forts and outposts in the Ohio River Valley by New France led to direct conflict with the expanding colonies of England at Fort Duquesne in July of 1755. Fort Duquesne provided maximum administration benefit with a minimum population requirement with its location at the forks of the Ohio, Monongahela, and Allegheny Rivers. The river systems not only provided the means to

communicate and move throughout New France, but also provided the basis of trade and economic development throughout New France.



Figure 2. King Louis XV of France



Figure 3. North America prior to French and Indian War

Trade in New France centered on the exchanging of European goods to acquire furs from the native populations in the interior of New France, which were transported on the river systems to the port cities of New Orleans and Louisburg. Native populations

provided the furs and pelts of deer, beaver, bear, and buffalo in exchange for firearms, ammunition, metal products, cloth, and beads. These pelts and furs were then transported to France via port cities where they were sold. In 1744, English expansion began to encroach on these trade routes when the area previously thought to be a buffer zone, the Ohio River Valley, was officially granted to the colonies of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania with the signing of the Treaty of Lancaster by the Iroquois Nation.³ In order to protect this vital trade link, New France began the establishment of forts and outposts in the Ohio River Valley. Fort Duquesne provided the central point of contention in this effort due to its location at the meeting place of three rivers. The building of forts and outposts in the Ohio River Valley by New France provided the protection of trade routes between Louisburg in the north and New Orleans in the south, but led to direct conflict with England in the vicinity of Fort Duquesne in 1755 and the loss of all territories in Upper New France and east of the Mississippi with the exception of New Orleans by 1760.

New France provided for the existence of a standing army in order to maintain the forts and outposts throughout the river valleys of the colony. This standing army consisted of Canadian and French light infantry officers and soldiers who were able to maximize mobility by use of the river systems. The existence of a mobile standing army and a strong central government allowed for ease in mobilizing forces to troubled areas throughout the colony. The existence of native alliance provided the context that a small regular force coupled with forces of native and local militias. Louis-Joseph Montcalm gave credence to this view when he described the Canadians as:

born soldiers, from the age of 16 . . . on the rolls of militia. Boatmen and good shots, hunters . . . [T]hey excelled in forest war and ambushes.⁴

Another example of this is the force composition for the defense of Fort Duquesne. Of the 900 men present, only 100 were regulars, while Canadians accounted for 200 and natives the remainder.⁵ The small contingents of French forces were instilled by Louis XV's interest in defending France from its European enemies, while leaving New France to fend for itself. In this context, the psychology of New France was born.

The psychology of New France was fixed in the need for cohabitation with natives and a continuous rivalry with England. The rivalry with England in the New World led to three wars prior to the French and Indian War: King William's War (1689-97), Queen Anne's War (1702-13), and King George's War (1744-48). Raids on frontier settlements and assaults on Port Royal, Louisburg, and Quebec provided the basis of fighting during these wars as in the French and Indian War. The common link that the previous three wars had was that they all started in Europe and were carried over to the New World while the French and Indian War started in the New World and carried over to Europe. In Europe, these wars were known by the names of Grand Alliance, Spanish Succession, Austrian Succession, and Seven Years.⁶ The conflicts in Europe gained a major portion of French attention, while the raids and skirmishes in the New World were mere sideshows. The treaties concluding all conflicts with the exception of the Seven Years War allowed for the return of captured lands to the original owners. One additional exception to this was the ceding of Newfoundland and the recognizing of the Hudson Bay Company by France following the signing of the Peace of Utrecht ending the War of the Spanish Succession. This event led to the Acadian migration to New Orleans. With New France relegated to a sideshow, it was up to New France to provide for itself with minimal assistance from France. The people of New France accomplished

this through the creating of alliances with the native peoples and cohabitation among the natives. With the exception of a few settlements along the river ways, France had made no incursion into native territory other than to build forts and outposts to further the fur trade. This sense of cohabitation lasted until the signing of the Treaty of Lancaster in 1744. Following this event, conflict in the Ohio River Valley was certain; the timing was determined by the delivering of an ultimatum by George Washington in 1754 and his defeat at Fort Necessity.

The signing of the Treaty of Lancaster in 1744 by representatives of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Iroquois Nation signified a shift in the views and fate of the Ohio River Valley. Politically, New France was forced to protect the Ohio River Valley in order to maintain line of communication between Upper and Lower New France. Economically, the Ohio River Valley provided a vital trade route for the interior and between Louisburg and New Orleans. With King William's, Queen Anne's, and King George's wars as background, it was clear to New France that maintaining the Ohio River Valley as part of New France would have to be accomplished through military might and the use of regulars, militia, and natives. New France also knew this war would be a fight for survival since the Treaty of Lancaster directly correlates in time to the beginning of King George's War in which the treaty required New France to cede land claims to England. All events combined, it was certain that war would occur between England and France and all evidence point to the conflict beginning in the Ohio River Valley.

English

King James I's disbanding of the charter to the London and Plymouth Companies in 1624 signaled that the English Crown would have much more to say about affairs in the colonies. Politically, it is significant that James I separated the settled areas into two colonies. Economically, English industry would become dependant on the natural resources provided by the American Colonies. In order to protect its economic interests from France and maintain the balance of having separated colonies, England fulfilled its role as protector of the realm.

The political climate of England centered on the creation of alliances with traditional French allies such as Prussia, maintaining the separation of the colonies in America, and the dominant personality of King George II, figure 4. George II detested England and longed for sanctuary in Hanover; he was also a warrior who was the last reigning English Monarch to lead troops in battle at the age of 60 in 1753, while fighting in Germany.⁷ George II's connections to Germany provided the context for the creation of an alliance with Prussia's King Frederick II. Prussia was a traditional ally of France and this change of events infuriated the French Monarch and further increased the rivalry between England and France. George II focused on European affairs for most of his reign, but he was forced to focus attention on the colonies in the North America after events in July of 1754. The two events that gains George II's attention were George Washington's defeat at Fort Necessity and the attempts of the Albany Congress to unify the colonies for the purpose of a common defense. France's increased presence in the Ohio River Valley created the need for England to become militarily involved in the

Ohio River Valley in order to protect the security of its colonies and the vast economic benefits provided by the colonies.



Figure 4. King George II of England

The economic benefits of the Colonies in America provided an essential point in the Triangle Trade Routes and the raw materials that allowed the tobacco, mercantilist, and shipbuilding industries to flourish. The Triangle Trade Route, displayed in figure 5, provided the basic building blocks of economic activity throughout the coastline of the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. The triangle allowed slaves from Africa, cotton and sugar from the Caribbean Islands, and the various raw materials from North American Colonies to enter the market. At various points along the route products such as rum, furniture, textiles, snuff, and ships were manufactured as finished goods to be sold at other points along the route. The route received the name triangle for three reasons. First, the actual route resembled a triangle, but the commodities exchanged also covered the industrial triangle of labor, raw materials, and finished goods. The final reason for the naming convention of the triangle trade was that it encompassed Mercantilism, the rum trade, and the slave trade. The assurance that all colonies would trade their raw materials for the finished products of the mother country provided the basis of Mercantilism. This

premise also caused the colonies to maintain a dependence on the mother country due to a lack in manufacturing capacity. Mercantilism also provided grounds for the premise that being rich in natural resources does not necessarily translate to actual wealth.



Figure 5. Triangle Trade Route

Sea transport established the Triangle Trade Routes, therefore; it can be assumed the French incursions into the Ohio River Valley did not threaten English economic capacity in the colonies, but this was not true. The colonies provided an abundance of four raw materials to the English manufacturing industry (hard woods, tar, molasses, and tobacco). Tar and molasses production did not provide for French incursions to alarm the English, but hard woods and tobacco provided major concerns. Hard wood forests cannot be created overnight and required colonists to clear vast tracts of land in order to support the shipbuilding industry. Tobacco was another concern. Tobacco yields drop exponentially according to the number of years the crop has been planted in a particular field. Colonists required constant availability to new tracts of land in order to maintain

and increase the yields of the tobacco crops. The logical place for colonists to expand the colonies was the Ohio River Valley because of its hard wood forests, arable land, and key river systems for transportation of goods. This expansion of the English Colonies in North America for economic means created the backdrop for military conflict between England and France in the Ohio River Valley.

The English Royal Navy along with regulars of the English Army and colonial militias provided the basis of English military might in the New World. With the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, England appeared on the scene as a naval power. This preeminence was further fostered in 1607 when England established settlements in Kennebec and Jamestown. The settlement in Kennebec was abandoned by 1608, but it was home to the first naval vessel constructed in the colonies, the *Virginia*. Captain James Davis constructed the *Virginia* from the oak and tar that was in abundance in the frontier of modern Maine. The *Virginia* would later be made famous and prove the value of colonial raw materials as one of three ships that survived a hurricane that ravaged the third supply of Jamestown in 1609.⁸ From this point, the connection between England, the colonies, and shipbuilding was solidified. The power of the Royal Navy allowed England freedom of navigation, mobility of ground forces, efficient logistics, commerce interdiction capacity, and a vital communications link between the colonies and the king. Without the Royal Navy, English regulars had no means to remove themselves from their posts in England to the areas of need throughout the empire. English regulars provided the backbone of English forces in combat and little consideration was given to the capabilities of colonial militias and native allies. The continental style of linear warfare and the English regulars' dependence on this type of warfare provided the

predominant context for English contempt for colonial militias and native allies. The English belief that hiding behind trees and ambushing enemies was the work of rogues was another reason for contempt. A simpler explanation was the general arrogance of the English toward their subjects.

Psychologically, England's conflict in the Ohio River Valley stemmed from a long standing rivalry with France and the belief that subjects of the crown were as children to a mother. The rivalry between England and France began in 1066 with William the Conqueror's invasion of the England, but was not in full swing until King Edward III of England began hostilities in 1340 to initiate the 100 Years War. Edward entered into war upon being denied the Kingship of France due to being of a female descent to the royal line.⁹ England and France had fought three colonial wars in North America prior to 1753 in part because of this intense rivalry. King James I began England's settlement by allowing for the chartering of the London and Plymouth Companies. In 1607, the London Company would launch two expeditions to the New World and found settlements at Jamestown and Kennebec in what is now Virginia and Maine. By 1624, it was clear that the independent corporations were not capable of providing the security and life support services in order for settlements to survive, so King James disbanded the London and Plymouth Companies and gave Royal Charter to the colonies of Virginia and Massachusetts Bay. This event, more than any other, shaped the manner in which the crown viewed its relationship with the colonies. From this point on, the crown provided security for the colonies. This provision of security not only included providing troops and the implements of war, but also included the funding of war in England's North American Colonies. England's rule over the seas allowed troops

to be sent from England to the colonies in a matter of three months; therefore, colonial militias were required to hold the ground until regular forces from England arrived. It was clear that England believed that the colonies could not stand alone. In order to ensure this, England fostered the idea of individual colonies taking care of their own issues by sending individual Royal Governors to each colony. An example of English arrogance was displayed by General Edward Braddock when Shingas, an Ohio Delaware war chief, offered his braves to support Braddock and that all he wished in return was to kick the French out of the Ohio River Valley and that English settlers would share the land with natives. Braddock's only response to Shingas was that the assistance of native forces was not required. Braddock believed that English regulars were more than capable of handling the fighting on their own and then England would determine what was to be done with the Ohio River Valley without concern for native populations.¹⁰ The Albany Congress threatened to topple this balance, so England sent troops to the colonies in order to settle the unrest in the Ohio River Valley, settle old scores with France, and fulfill their position as protectors of the realm.

King James I's disbanding of the charter to the London and Plymouth Companies and the granting of a Royal Charter to the Virginia and Massachusetts Bay Colonies stood as the root of English involvement in the Ohio River Valley. Politically, the dividing of the two areas of settlement into two colonies maintained colonial dependence on England, while the policy also demanded that England stand on a pedestal as protector of the realm. Economically, England could ill afford to lose the valuable natural resources of land and timber that fueled the shipbuilding and tobacco trade. In order to protect its economic interests and maintain the balance of having separated

colonies, England fulfilled its role as protector of the realm and sent two regiments of regular soldiers to the American Colonies in order to secure the Ohio River Valley.

American Colonists

Efforts of the colonists to provide for a common defense drove English actions to provide forces for the pacification of the Ohio River Valley. Politically, the colonists' attempts to unify threatened England's traditional position as protector of the realm. Economically, the colonies required acquisition of the Ohio River Valley in order to profit from the natural resources and land that it would provide. In order to secure the Ohio River Valley, the colonists were required to join together for a unified defense or depend on England to provide regular forces for that defense.

The early 18th Century witnessed the first attempts of the separated colonies to unify for common purposes and these events would lead to conflict between English and French forces in the Ohio River Valley. As mentioned earlier, England maintained each colony with a separate Royal Governor in order to maintain control over the colonies as a whole. In 1744, the colonies of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania combined efforts in order to obtain rights to the fertile native lands of the Ohio River Valley. This combining of efforts would result in the Treaty of Lancaster, which witnessed the peoples of the Iroquois Confederation signing the land rights of the Ohio Delaware Indians over to the colonies of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. As the colonies began to expand into this newly gained territory, the natives of the Ohio River Valley began raiding settlements on the western frontier. By 1754, relations with the natives and French expansion into the Ohio River Valley caused the colonies to start thinking about unification. In July 1754, a group of influential colonial leaders came together for the

Albany Congress in Albany, New York. The goals of the congress were to improve relations with the Iroquois Confederacy and establish a unified approach for defending the colonies against France. Benjamin Franklin, figure 6, was among these men and it was his belief that unified colonies would provide a strong ally to England.¹¹ The context of the Albany Congress was strong, but when Virginia asked for the colonies to provide troops for the securing of its claims in the Ohio River Valley and New York asked for the other colonies to provide troops to defend their northern border against France, the answer was a resounding, no. The primary results of the conference were that England assigned William Johnson as they sole representative to negotiate with the native population and General Edward Braddock was sent with two regiments to secure the encroachment of French forces on England's claimed lands.



Figure 6. Benjamin Franklin

Because the policy of Mercantilism was not conducive to the development of manufacturing capacities, with the exception of shipbuilding, in the colonies, the primary economic concerns of the colonists revolved around natural resources, land, and the sea trade. The sea trade required ships and ships required the hardwood forests of the Ohio River Valley for maintenance and building. French resistance in this region would cause a reduction to the available resources of lumber, which would in turn cause

reductions to the capacity of the sea trade. Another valuable resource to the sea trade was tar, which enabled ships to remain water tight and this was another resource to be gained by settlement of the Ohio River Valley. Another commercial activity that was prevalent in colonial America was that of land speculation. Wealthy merchants and land owners from the east would purchase large tracts of land or receive land grants for service from colonial governments and would then in turn sell them for a profit to settlers entering the new territories. Tobacco was another industry that required continuing additions of land in order to maintain levels of production. With a large portion of the lands east of the Appalachian Mountains settled and cultivated, there was a pressure to expand the territories claimed and settled by the English Colonies in order to maintain and expand the industries available to colonial America.

The military capability of the colonies was based on local militias, who engaged in the forest style of irregular warfare. The government of each colony maintained the right to levy militia in each colony. Therefore, employment of militia generally centered on defending the interests of the colony from which the militia were located. These actions normally consisted of a company being mustered and sent into the forest to defend a settlement on the frontier against native raids, which lead militia members to provide little value to drill and linear warfare. The expedition to Cartagena in 1740 provides one example of the employment of colonial militias in actions that were not in direct support of the colonies interests. The English contempt for militia during this campaign fostered anxiety among colonists and is exemplified by Major General Wentworth's decision to fill a provincial field grade position by promoting a junior foreign officer over an American captain who had performed meritoriously. Wentworth

determined early on that Americans would only fill support roles and would not be the basis of combat forces, but even in a supporting role only 50% of those who departed on the expedition returned to their homes in the colonies upon completion.¹² The officers of these units were designated in two manners. First, the officers of each company were elected by the members of the company. Officers could also receive a militia commission from the Royal Governor and this was generally reserved for field grade positions. Officers in the colonial militias generally aspired to receive a Royal Commission as a symbol of status; George Washington was among these officers. These royal commissions rarely happened, so young men in the colonies had to look elsewhere to improve their status in the community.

The notions that land directly correlated to wealth and status that natives were savages and were not to be assimilated and a growing anxiety with English treatment of colonists contributed to the psychological make-up of the American Colonist. Owners of large plantations maintained elected posts on colonial assemblies and commissions in local militias outside of the merchant class in New England. George Washington was among these wealthy landowners, which gained him status in the community. His marriage to the wealthy widow, Mary Custis, and the early death of his brother Lawrence enhanced his position in society. Removal of native populations from ancestral lands via ambiguous treaties and military action vice assimilating native populations was a product of colonial beliefs that the natives were savages. Colonial interaction with native populations was tumultuous from the beginning. In the Massachusetts Bay Colony, relations started well, but as Puritans grew uncomfortable with the native religion, which was considered heresy, relations were strained. In

Virginia, the starving times were largely caused by the native siege of Jamestown during the winter of 1610. The relations were further strained by the Good Friday Uprising of 1623 in which native populations slaughtered over half of the colony's population in a matter of a few days. After the failed expedition to Cartagena in 1740, growing anxiety over English treatment of colonists became prevalent. This growing anxiety led Lieutenant Colonel George Washington to make the following statement with regard toward the behavior of English Soldiers at Braddock's Defeat:

In short the dastardly behaviour of the English Soldier's expos'd all those who were inclined to do their duty to almost certain Death; and at length, in despite of every effort to the contrary, broke and run as Sheep before the hounds, leav'g the Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, and, every individual thing we had with us a prey to the enemy.

In the same account, Washington praised the bravery of the colonial companies that were almost killed to a man.¹³ The obtaining of a secure Ohio River Valley by the English Government provided the only measure that could stymie the seeds of revolution present in the American Colonists.

The meeting of the Albany Congress in July 1754 provided a clear signal to England that the colonies were not prepared to unify for a common defense, but failure of England to act would influence the colonies to unify for defense. Politically, the Albany Congress threatened to dislodge England from its traditional position as protector of the realm. Economically, the colonies required acquisition of the Ohio River Valley in order to profit from the natural resources and land that it would provide. In order to secure the Ohio River Valley, the colonists were required to join together for a unified defense or depend on England to provide regular forces for that defense.

Native Americans

Native American interests centered on land and thus land was the basis of all political, economic, military, and psychological influences. The natives' central locality between the holding of England and France provide significant context to the events between 1754 and 1763. The bounty provided by the Ohio River Valley and its access to European powers made the position of natives important to England and France. The forested lands of the Ohio River Valley provided for a type of war not seen in Europe. Finally, previous interaction between natives and Europeans provided the psychological context for events during the mid-Eighteenth Century.

The Native American population of the Ohio River Valley, figure 7, hinged their position of being the balance of power between France and England as a means to avoid assimilation into the European settlements and to maintain native lands. The tribes (mainly Delaware and Shawnee) of the Ohio River Valley wanted neither the French nor the English to occupy the Ohio River Valley because of their experiences with European powers east of the Appalachian Mountains. The actions of a Seneca chief, Tanaghrisson, responsible for maintaining relations between the Iroquois Confederation and the tribes of the Ohio River Valley brought the conflict between England and France to a head with his assassination of a French diplomat, Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville, in 1754.¹⁴ Many of the tribes remained neutral until it could be determined which side was going to win. The natives who did not remain neutral belonged to the Ohio Delaware tribe of Chief Shingas, whose reason for breaking neutrality was made clear in an earlier section. Native allegiance centered on the European powers allowing natives to remain

on their lands free of settlers. Neither the French nor the English were prepared to make that promise during the summer of 1755.



Figure 7. Ohio River Valley

Trade and land provide the basis of economics in Ohio River Valley native society. The basis of life for the natives revolved around land. Land provided them the means to hunt and gather food. Land also provided the pelts and raw materials for tools and shelter. Finally, land allowed them the ability to grow crops in order to sustain villages. The native populations of the Ohio River Valley then used excess crops and furs to trade with the Europeans in order to obtain metal equipment, textiles, beads, lead, gunpowder, and the all important firearms. This land that spawned life for the native of the Ohio River Valley was the exact thing that the European powers were looking to take through treaty or military means.

The tribal social system provided the base for military operations among the native populations. Women were responsible for gathering, farming and basic village functions under the tribal system. This left males to the tasks of hunting and the making of war. War was waged on the tribal level with a tribal war chief at the head of the establishment. All males of age were warriors with the exception of the shamans. This type of warfare was generally limited in scope and short in duration. War was waged in order to advance the interests of the tribe or to defend the honor of the tribe. With the introduction of the European settlers, war became a different endeavor. War was waged on a higher level and lasted for several years, which seriously disrupted the native social system because males were not available to conduct their hunting responsibilities. The type of warfare conducted by natives was significantly different from that waged in Europe. Natives waged war from concealed positions through a series of raids and ambushes and had a higher rate of fire (bow and arrow) until dependence on firearms became prevalent. The native type of warfare is best described as irregular and became the balancing factor between the might and discipline of the English regular and the minimal presence of French light infantry.

European land grabs, diseases, and religious differences provide the context for the psychology of Native Americans residing in the Ohio River Valley. European settlers grabbed native lands by treaty or by force. An event that forever changed European settler and native relations was the brutal massacre of a Pequot village along the Mystic River in modern Connecticut. The Mystic Massacre was conducted by John Mason on behalf of Governor Winthrop of Massachusetts in 1636. Europeans and their native allies

encircled the village and then set it ablaze. The best description of the horror was written by William Bradford at the time in his book, *History of the Plymouth Plantation*.

Those that scaped the fire were slain with the sword; some hewed to peeces, other rune throw with their rapiers, so as they were quickly dispatche, and very few escaped. It was conceived they thus destroyed about 400 at this time. It was a fearful sight to see them thus frying on the fyer, and the streams of blood quenching the same, and horrible was the stincke and sente there of, but the victory seemed a sweet sacrifice, and they gave the prayers thereof to God, who had wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to inclose their enemise in their hands, and give them so speedy a victory over so proud and insulting an enimie.¹⁵

It is of eminent importance that one knows the Pequot village was placed on fertile farm land that was a focus for European settlement. European settlers not only took native lands by force, but they also took these lands via treaty. One treaty that is of extreme importance to the native psyche during the mid-Eighteenth Century was the Treaty of Lancaster in 1744. Colonists from Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania lavished the Iroquois Confederacy with gifts in order to secure lands within the colonial charters for each colony. The Iroquois believed that the treaty only covered a small strip of land in the Shenandoah River Valley, but colonists neglected to inform the confederacy that original colony charters were drafted to encompass lands from one ocean to the other. The treaty created a rift between the Iroquois Confederacy and the tribes of the Ohio River Valley, which provided a dramatic impact to the fighting of the French and Indian War.¹⁶ Colonists also brought diseases such as the measles and small pox from which native populations had no immunity. The colonists also demonstrated religious intolerance. The Puritans in Massachusetts believed that the native worshipping of nature was heretical. These events created the sense that native and European populations could never assimilate and that native populations would be forced to fight

for their lands against the land grabbing European colonists.

Native American interests centered on land and thus land was the basis of all political, economic, military, and psychological influences. The natives maintained the middle ground between French and English interests and also provided the balance of power between these two European countries. Trade with the Europeans and basic subsistence of tribal villages was centered on the bounty provided by the lands of the Ohio River Valley. The forests of the Ohio River Valley provided the concealment necessary for native populations to fight their particular type of irregular warfare. Finally, native experiences with Europeans portrayed the belief that there would be a fight to maintain native dominance in the Ohio River Valley. The only question to be resolved was which nation native tribes would choose to ally.

Conclusion

The events of the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, the Hundred Years War, and King James' replacing the charters of the London and Plymouth Companies with Royal Charters in 1624 provide the foundation for the influences that led to military conflict in the Ohio River Valley in the mid-Eighteenth Century. These events provided emphasis to the French imperative to maintain lines of communication between Upper and Lower New France and the underlying rivalry with England. The Treaty of Lancaster provided the colonies with legal claims to the Ohio River Valley and its rich land resources which would greatly enhance the economic and social mobility of the colonials. The treaty also persuaded native populations to become aggressive in order to protect their lands, which were the basis of all tribal actions. The actions of native populations along the western frontier coupled with a rivalry with France caused England to become involved in order

to keep the colonies from unifying and thus deteriorating the influence of England in colonial actions. This influence revolved around the Crown's role as "Protector of the Realm" since the rescinding of the London and Plymouth Company charters in 1624. All events pointed toward armed conflict and the assassination of Jumonville by Seneca chief, Tanaghrisson, in 1754 brought the conflict to a head in the Ohio River Valley.

Battle of Monongahela (Braddock's Defeat)

The Battle of Monongahela brought a brilliant, yet simple plan to capture Fort Duquesne up against the aggressive defensive plan of the French. Both plans would falter on first contact, but decisive French leadership won the day. The day ended in a complete English rout and unorganized withdrawal to Great Meadows. French victory in such a staggering manner changed the way England waged war.

A line march to Fort Duquesne with hopes of a peaceful occupation or siege was the basis of General Edward Braddock's plan of battle, figure 8. With a force of close to 1500, Braddock marched through the woodlands of the Ohio River Valley. His progress was slowed due to the need to ensure adequate roads for the large baggage and artillery train that trailed the vanguard of his force. The belief was that this force would march to within three miles of Fort Duquesne and then make camp prior to commencing the siege or occupation of the fort. By 3 pm on July 9, 1755, the vanguard was approaching to within three miles of Fort Duquesne, but progress was slowed by preparing the banks of the Monongahela River for the crossing of the baggage and artillery trains. This vanguard party was composed of the advance party under Thomas Gage and the working party under Sir John St. Clair. In preparation for this crossing by the main body, the working party would be exposed to enemy fire so Braddock instructed Gage to form

firing lines for protection. By nightfall, Braddock's entire force would be unified, encamped, and prepared to begin the siege of Fort Duquesne. This siege would not occur because the French had a plan of its own.¹⁷




Figure 8. Battle of Monongahela

The French plan of battle centered on the defense and holding of Fort Duquesne. The fort was capable of supporting 200 inhabitants within its walls. If the English were allowed to proceed to within three miles of the fort, chances of the French holding the fort would be seriously diminished. The French concept concluded that the best defense of the fort was to commit to offensive action in order to stall British advances. The French forces at Fort Duquesne were close to 900 with two-thirds of those being comprised of native allies. The fort's commander, Captain Claude Pierre Pecaudy, Sieur de Contrecoeur, determined to send a force of over 600 under the command of Captain Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie Lienard de Beaujeu and Captain Jean-Daniel Dumas out to meet the English. Of this 600, it is estimated that fewer than fifty were French regulars. This force was determined to ambush the English column as it crossed the

Monongahela River. As is exemplified in almost every battle plan, the plan works well until the first shots are fired.¹⁸

The Battle of Monongahela started with a collision of forces as illustrated in figure 9. The English had advanced 1 mile inland from the river and thus foiled the French plan to ambush them at the river, and the French had come out from the fort foiling the English plan to besiege Fort Duquesne. Both forces were caught by surprise, but English forces were able to fire the first volley. Beaujue was killed by the first volley, thus leaving Dumas, his second in command, to wage the battle. French forces held the high ground, but English forces were advancing on the confused French forces. Dumas made the decision to attack the English flanks, which stymied the English advance and caused English forces to fire in all directions and greatly contributed to the large instances of fratricide by English forces. Dumas' decisiveness in ordering a flank attack during the first ten minutes of the battle ensured French Victory. The disarray among English forces turned into a complete rout as they disintegrated and fled for the safety of the Great Meadows. George Washington testified to the dastardly performance of English regulars and in a letter to Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia blamed the defeat on English regulars panicking under fire.¹⁹ The defeat of the English at the Battle of Monongahela was complete as can be evidenced by a statement made by Colonel Jehu Eyre after a ride in the area of the battle in September 1760:

Monday . . . we set off through the woods to go to Braddock's field . . . when we came to the place where they (the English) crossed of the river Monongahela, we saw a great many men's bones along the shore. We kept along the road about 1 1/2 miles, where the first engagement begun, where there are men's bones lying about as thick as the leaves do on the ground; for they are so thick that one lies on top of another for about a half mile in length, and about one hundred yards in breadth.²⁰

George Washington came back to this spot following the taking of Fort Duquesne by Forbes Expedition and provided the fallen with a proper English burial.



Figure 9. Braddock's Fall

An English plan of battle that called for forces to march unopposed to within three miles of Fort Duquesne in order to begin a siege that produced a French surrender met its match when the French plan called for an aggressive defense of the Fort. Both forces met in confusion with the English being first to get a volley off, but French leadership under Dumas proved to be the match of English numbers and firepower. A French flanking attack enveloped English ranks and caused English soldiers to panic, which in turn caused numerous cases of fratricide. The battle ended with a complete rout of English Forces and their piecemeal withdrawal to Great Meadows. If victory in the war was to be achieved, England was required to complete a top down review and change their way of waging war.

Aftermath of the Battle

The Battle of Monongahela provided the symbology of national identity to America. The battle demonstrated the inability of regular English forces to provide security along the western frontier. Irregular tactics of the woodlands and native allies were used to a large extent following the defeat. Failure to defeat the native enemy in the Ohio River Valley allowed the conflict to expand into a full insurgency in the west. Finally, the means to end this insurgency provided the foundation for England's waging of another insurgent war in the following decade.

The English defeat at the Battle of Monongahela caused English leadership to reevaluate the value of native allies and their type of irregular warfare. It also provided France with a force multiplier when the natives of the Ohio River Valley sided with the French after the battle. Braddock sealed his fate when he dispatched Chief Shingas and his warriors, causing Shingas to side with the French in the days prior to the battle. Following the battle, England reevaluated this policy and began an aggressive campaign to enlist the allegiance of various assimilated eastern tribes and the Iroquois Confederacy. England's Agent of Indian Affairs, William Johnson, worked tirelessly to bring the Iroquois Confederation into the war on the English side and in the later years of the war he succeeded, but only after the Canadian branch of the Mohawks concluded that they would not enter into the hostilities.

The English not only sought native alliances, but also employed native tactics. In 1756, Lord Loudoun was instrumental in the development of these new tactics which combined those employed by regular and irregular forces. Loudoun went so far as to direct members of the Royal American Regiment, "in order to qualify them for service

of the Woods, . . . are to be taught to load and fire, lying on the Ground and kneeling." Loudoun also instituted new commands, one being "Tree all", which caused men to disperse behind the cover of trees in the event of an ambush. Even with this innovation occurring shortly after the defeat, it was thought that Americans should be taught the European style of war and leave the "Indian Style" to the natives, so Loudoun had very little use for rangers. Later in the war, General Forbes would gain an appreciation for rangers and employed them extensively in his successful campaign against Fort Duquesne.²¹ Tactics and allies were only part of the movement toward victory; England also unified the colonies for a common defense against France.

Following Braddock's defeat, England reviewed its policy against the unification of the American Colonies for a common defense against the French. The lack of unity among English colonies provided a significant contribution to their dependence on England and their continued loyalty to the Crown. The Albany Congress attempted to unify the colonies for this purpose in July 1754. In response to this attempt at unification by the colonies, England sent Braddock to the colonies with two regiments to provide for their defense. Upon landing in the colonies, Braddock had issues with the willingness of the colonies to provide supplies and additional forces for the campaign. Most of the issues gravitated to the fact that most of the colonies were not under the gun of native raids and French expansion. Loudoun reviewed this policy and determined that victory could not be secured in the Americas without the unification of the colonies for a common defense. The defeat of Braddock also created a sense that the English Army was no longer invincible. Loudoun policies of unification coupled with those of the new Prime Minister, William Pitt, allowed for increases in the militia musters and centralized

supply depots that ensured soldiers proper uniforms and food. The policy of unification paid mass dividends, but stimulated the creation of national heroes in the colonies.

The aftermath of Braddock's defeat created an American icon in George Washington. Washington wrote several letters following the battle to family and friends, but the letter he wrote to Governor Dinwiddie provided the context to the making of an American Hero. Washington mentioned his being alongside Braddock during the general's final moments. Washington also listed his deeds as Braddock's aid-de-camp and the gallant efforts of his fellow Virginians as well as the dastardly performance of the English regulars in the face of battle. The letter may have not reached such acclaim on its own. Governor Dinwiddie provided the motivation for the creation of an American Hero when he publicized the letter in a successful effort to highlight the courage of Virginians and bolster militia enlistment. Later actions in the war created heroes such as William Rogers of Rogers' Rangers, Daniel Morgan, Nathanael Greene, and the statesman, Benjamin Franklin. The names of these men transcended colony boundaries in the creation of a national identity for America.

Following the conclusion of the war, England's failure to recognize that two enemies were being battled resulted in Pontiac's Rebellion. Most of the natives living west of the Appalachian Mountains sided with the French during the war. Following England's defeat of France, the natives were left to their own devices as the French withdrew from North America. The English closed the gates to forts and refused to trade with the natives west of the Appalachian Mountains. This action prefaced the response of Chief Pontiac. Chief Pontiac and the natives west of the Appalachian Mountains had not surrendered to the English and thus continued a guerrilla war against the English.

Several forts were burned to the ground by Pontiac's warriors and Jeffery Amherst directed his commanders to provide native negotiators with smallpox contaminated blankets. Hostilities finally ended with the agreement of English negotiators to the Proclamation of 1763, figure 10, thus ending the French and Indian War.²²




Figure 10. Proclamation of 1763

The Proclamation of 1763 represented a disconnect between England and her colonies. England entered the French and Indian War to fulfill its role as "Protector of the Realm" and to head-off inclinations in the colonies to unify in the pursuit of a common defense. Colonials entered the fight to provide security to western settlements and to expand settlement into the rich lands of the Ohio River Valley. The Proclamation of 1763 disallowed settlers to encroach on native lands west of the Appalachian Mountains, but it also invalidated the original Royal Charter for Virginia. This effort to

curtail a native insurgency provided the context for England's problems with its colonies in the following decade.

Braddock's defeat provided America a national identity with national heroes and the efforts to end the war that began with this battle provided America with the context to rebel. The battle proved that English forces were not invincible and that the colonies would have to unite to an extent in order to provide a common defense against the French. The battle also presented the notion that irregular tactics and native allies needed to be employed in order to achieve victory. Pontiac's Rebellion at the conclusion of the war reminded the colonies that the defeat of one enemy does not mean that both are defeated. Finally, the Proclamation of 1763 broadcasted the rift between England's and their colonies' goals, which would provide context to struggles in the next decade.

Correlation to Tenets of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

The events that precipitated and followed Braddock's Defeat on the Monongahela River meet the tenets of 4GW described in chapter one. The nation-state's loss of the monopoly on war was prevalent. Cultural conflict was ever present between English settlers and native populations. Finally, the ranks of the disenfranchised were filled both by colonists and natives during each phase of the war.

Events prior to and following Braddock's Defeat symbolized the nation state's loss of a monopoly on war. Native raids on frontier settlements precipitated the arrival of General Edward Braddock with two regiments of foot to pacify the western settlements. Following the conclusion of hostilities with France, native unrest west of the Appalachian Mountains once again erupted in Pontiac's Rebellion. The Proclamation of

1763 brought the hostile action of Pontiac's Rebellion to a close, but left the door open to a whole new insurgency that was realized in the following decade.

Expansion of European settlements into the Ohio River Valley intensified the rift among the varied cultures and created cultural conflict in its wake. Conflict between English Colonists and native populations started in conjunction with the founding of Jamestown in 1607. As colonists expanded land holdings toward the Appalachian Mountains, native populations migrated westward toward the Ohio River Valley. The Treaty of Lancaster in 1744 provided colonists with legal reasoning to claim the Ohio River Valley for settlement and once again these two cultures were in direct contact. The beginning of hostilities in the form of raids on western settlements began almost immediately. Previous dealings between colonists and native populations provided the psychological backing that required native populations to fight the expansion of European settlement into the Ohio River Valley.

The events covering the timeframe between 1744 and 1763 provided four separate examples of disenfranchised groups. The Iroquois Confederacy gave the colonies of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia claims to the Ohio River Valley with the signing of the Treaty of Lancaster in 1744. This agreement did not provide voice to the Delaware and Shawnee natives who resided in the valley which provided a catalyst to the conflict that erupted in 1754. During the early 1750's, settlers began the migration into the eastern portion of the Ohio River Valley and were greeted by native raids that decimated entire settlements. The negotiations and requests for forces from England to provide security remained unheard. In July 1754, colonists held the Albany Congress in an attempt to provide a unified effort to secure the western settlements, which

precipitated the arrival of English regulars to provide that defense. Following the negotiation of peace with France, Both France and England neglected to incorporate the requirements of native populations into the agreement. As the French withdrew settlements located east of the Mississippi River, native unrest began to boil to a point that made Pontiac's Rebellion possible. The Proclamation of 1763 provided the means to quell this insurgency, but neglected to take colonial land claims into concern, which set the stage for England to become involved in another insurgency during the following decade.

The events that precipitated and followed Braddock's Defeat on the Monongahela River meet and symbolized the tenets of 4GW as demonstrated by William Lind and David Galula. The nation-states of France and England clearly lost the monopoly on war as hostilities flared-up between colonists and natives in the western settlements of the Virginia and Pennsylvania colonies. The colonists and natives provided the clay used in the formation of cultural conflict. Both sides had a history of failure to assimilate that intensified the need of natives to check the western expansion of English settlements. Finally, the events were full of examples of disenfranchised persons beginning with Delawares and Shawnees after the Treaty of Lancaster and culminating with English colonists following the Proclamation of 1763, which contributed to the American Insurgency in the following decade.

Conclusion

The review of events surrounding and including the Battle of Monongahela demonstrated that the tenets of fourth generation Warfare (4GW) were present throughout the French and Indian War. The tactics used in the war demonstrated a clear

leaning toward the guerrilla style of war that embellished ambushes and raids. A review of the backgrounds of the significant players demonstrated the presence of political, economic, military, and psychological (PEMP) interests that narrowed the area of conflict to the Ohio River Valley. Conflicts between natives and settlers were present prior to and following the battle and each solution to an issue replaced one disenfranchised party with another. Finally, England's solution to Pontiac's Rebellion, which concluded the war in 1763, provided the foundation for disenfranchised colonists to rebel in the following decade.

¹saying, attributed in Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy* [1965].

²"New France" U-S-History, no date, 3 [database on-line]; available from <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1172.html>, Internet.

³Laurie Collier Hillstrom and Kevin Hillstrom, *French and Indian War* (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, Inc.), 11.

⁴Daniel Marston, *The French-Indian War: 1754-1760* (New York: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2002), 24.

⁵Ibid. 28.

⁶"French and Indian War" Answers.com, no date, 1-3 [database on-line]; available from <http://www.answers.com/topic/french-and-indian-war>, Internet.

⁷Brenda Ralph Lewis, *Kings & Queens of England: Murder, Mayhem, and Scandal 1066 to the Present Day* (London: Amber Books Ltd., 2003), 188.

⁸Virginius Dabney, *Virginia : The New Dominion, A History from 1607 to the present* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1971), 16-20.

⁹Lewis, 59-61.

¹⁰Hillstrom, 40-41.

¹¹Ibid. 32-33.

¹²Douglas Edward Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 51-57.

¹³Paul E. Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 230-233.

¹⁴Hillstrom, 25-27.

¹⁵Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492 - Present* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1980), 14-15.

¹⁶Hillstrom, 11.

¹⁷Kopperman, 31-49.

¹⁸Ibid. 19-30.

¹⁹Ibid. 247.

²⁰Ibid. 92.

²¹Ibid. 126-127.

²²Zinn, 87.

CHAPTER 4

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION'S SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN

The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.

Thomas Jefferson¹

The review of events surrounding and including the Southern Campaign, figure 11, of the American Revolution demonstrates the presence of the tenets of 4GW. The tactics used in the war demonstrates a clear leaning to those employed in the pursuit of 4GW. A review of the backgrounds of the significant players will demonstrate the presence of political, economic, military, and psychological (PEMP) interests that, with the exception of the Americans, changed very little from those present during the French and Indian War. There was considerable cultural conflict as well. Finally, England's attempts to quell rebellion through legislation only provided fuel for the flames of revolution.




Figure 11. Revolutionary War Campaign Map

Background

On 4 July 1776, the Second Continental Congress declared independence from England. However, the road to independence began in the days following the end of hostilities during the French and Indian War. Acts passed by Parliament provided the justification for independence, while influential writers provided the Second Continental Congress with the popular appeal for independence. England's actions to improve the status of the treasury following the French and Indian War set the stage. French involvement centered on revenge and reemergence, while native populations realized this fight would be for survival. The French and natives both faced outcomes from the conflict that significantly changed their ways of life. The actions of the Patriots on 19 April 1775 evolved from the interaction between English, native, French, and American concerns in North America.

Elected assemblies and the move toward unification drove politics in Colonial America. Elected governments in the colonies began as an effort to revive the Virginia Company of London's failing colony in Virginia. Governor Yeardley issued writs in 1619 that each town, hundred, or plantation elect two representatives by plurality of voices to meet with him and the Council of State in Jamestown on 30 July 1619.² This representative form of government became so popular and provided such benefit that it was instituted as law in 1621.

The other Counsell, more generall, to be called by the Governor, and yeerly, of course, & no oftener but for very extraordinary & important occasions, shall consist for the present of the said Counsell of State and of tow burgesses out of every towne, hunder [hundred] and other particular plantation to bee respetially chosen by the inhabitants. Which Counsell shall bee called the General Assemblie.³

The institution of an elected assembly allowed colonists to have a say in the day-to-day

operation of the Virginia Government. Colonies founded after 1619 provided grounds for an assembly at the time of formation. Each colony had its own assembly and governor with direct links to the king, which established an environment of disorganization among the various colonies. The Albany Congress in 1754 attempted to unify the colonies for a common defense but to no avail. In 1774, the First Continental Congress met in another attempt to unify the colonies, handle the Boston situation, and address redresses to the king with regard to perceived injustices. This body provided minor success, but in 1776 the Second Continental Congress convened and declared political independence from England on 4 July 1776 for the "Thirteen United States of America."⁴ Thus, an elected assembly made possible the unification of the colonies in the common pursuit of independence from England.

Taxes levied by the English Parliament and a policy of mercantilism dominated the economic structure of the colonies from the close of the French and Indian War to the hostilities of the American Revolution. The French and Indian War made the colonies important enough that English taxes were levied to pay for the war. And in turn, Americans believed their importance deemed them worthy of determining how they were to be taxed. The Stamp Act of 1765 required that a tax be paid on fifty-five specific items in the form of a stamp being placed on the item to signify the tax was paid. Items ranged from dice to legal documents from the governor and amounts ranged from ten shillings to six pounds. In testimony before Parliament, Benjamin Franklin stated that there was not enough gold or silver in the colonies to provide for the tax and that each colony levied internal taxes within its boundaries. For instance, a question about Pennsylvania taxes invoked Franklin to respond,

There are taxes on all estates real and personal, a poll-tax, a tax on all offices, professions, trades and businesses, according to their profits; an excise upon all wine, rum and other spirits; and a duty of ten pounds per head on all negroes imported, with some other duties.

During this timeframe, Parliament also passed the Sugar Act of 1764, the Quartering Act of 1765, the Townshend Act of 1767, and the Tea Act of 1773, which all had impacts on the colonial economy and provided for the taxation of specified goods. Mercantilism, which permitted trade with England only, also had a negative impact on the colonial economy in what can only be called America's largest trade deficit. Franklin also testified to this before Parliament by stating that colonial exports to England amounted to 40,000 pounds, while colonial imports from England amounted to 500,000 pounds.⁵ The trade deficit resulting from the mercantilist system coupled with excessive taxes and duties levied by both England and the colonies provided a crippling effect on the Colonial Economy.

The American military formed its base as the Continental Army with militia and continental dragoons in support. On 26 September 1776, the Continental Congress called for the formation of a Continental Army, which was informally created on 14 June 1775 that was not to exceed end strength of 75,000 men. At its high point in October 1778, the force numbered at 18,000 men. This Continental Army was separated into a Northern, Main, and Southern Force under its Commander-in-Chief, General George Washington. The Continental Army used European tactics and close order drill for the most part and was supported by French forces and state militia throughout the war. The Northern Campaign demonstrated these European tactics, but following the surrender of the American Army in Charlestown, South Carolina, the Southern Campaign followed the tactics of irregular warfare to provide time and shape the environment in order for a

conventional force to defeat the forces of Lord Cornwallis. Another difference in the Southern Campaign was the use of continental dragoons as a highly mobile force for striking the rear area of the English. The Continental Army may have been a smaller force than the English forces, but its employment of conventional and irregular tactics coupled with the effective use of French forces and mounted troops allowed the force to survive long enough for England to grow tired of war in the colonies.⁶

The writings of John Locke and Thomas Paine provided one psychological context which drove American colonists to declare independence from England. John Locke's, figure 12, *The Second Treatise of Government* instilled the ideals of elected representative government into the minds of colonial leaders. Locke's ideas revolved around the premise that the only way to rein-in an uncontrollable prince was for society to elect representatives to develop legislation. In doing this, the representative body then gains absolute control of legislative matters from the individual. Thomas Jefferson mentioned little revolutions being the necessity of democracy and Locke seems to justify this when he writes,

the power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again as long as the society lasts . . . so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts . . . But if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative . . . it reverts to the society, and the people have the right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or elect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands as they think good.⁷

This conclusion to Locke's work provided the framework for what would become the Government of the United States of America. Locke set the framework for government, but Thomas Paine, figure 13, lighted the spark of independence in the populous of the

colonies. In *Common Sense*, Paine provided answers to the questions that vexed American colonists. Paine believed with the men and materials available to the colonists that they could make a stand against England. Paine also believed that as long as Europe ate, it would require the products of America. Paine struck at the heart of the south and west by stating that England would employ slaves and natives to subjugate the colonists. Paine's success was not in the creation of new ideas though; his success was in the combining of these ideas and writing them in such a manner that was understandable by the common man. Pauline Maier signifies the central argument of *Common Sense* when she writes,

Paine promised, however, that by eliminating monarchy and hereditary rule and founding a government entirely on popular choice, the Americans could "form the noblest, purest constitution on the face of the earth," one free of errors that had dogged mankind for centuries. "We have it in our power to begin the world over again," he wrote; and what the Americans did would affect the future of "all mankind."

Paine published *Common Sense* in January 1776 and by July 1776 an estimated 150,000 copies had sold in America alone. The copies spread throughout the colonies and gave representatives at the Second Continental Congress something that the First Continental Congress did not have, the support of the people to declare independence from England.⁸ The writings of Locke and Paine created the spark of revolution, but the Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec and Coercive Acts of 1774 provided the foundation of revolutionary ideas.



Figure 12. John Locke



Figure 13. Thomas Paine

The Proclamation of 1763 followed by the Quebec and Coercive Acts of 1774 tested the loyalty of Americans with regard to English Rule. As noted in the previous chapter, Pontiac's Rebellion forced England to take action in the form of the Proclamation of 1763. This proclamation in effect negated all gains made by Americans during the war and disallowed settlement into the lands west of the Appalachian Mountains. In short order, England passed several acts of legislation that levied taxes and required Americans to quarter and provision troops of the crown. Then in 1774, following the Boston Massacre and the Boston Tea Party, the English enacted the Quebec Act, figure 14, and the Coercive Acts which became known as the Intolerable Acts. The acts revised the Quartering Act to allow for the quartering of troops anywhere

within the colonies, closed ports, reduced the impact of elective governments, allowed English citizens to be tried in England for the killing of a colonist while attempting to quell a riot, took weapons and powder from militia units, and allowed the catholic population of Quebec to exercise control over the lands west of the Appalachian Mountains.⁹ In effect, Parliament backed Americans into a corner and on 19 April 1775 the "beast at bay" turned to fight on the Old North Bridge in Concord, Massachusetts. Within nine months, those patriots received a voice in the form of Thomas Paine and six months later the Second Colonial Congress declared independence from England on 4 July 1776.




Figure 14. The Quebec Act of 1774

English concerns changed very little from those prior to the French and Indian War. The political insurgency of the American Colonies was stifled by the presence of English troops and American sentiment toward the Crown was at an all time high following the war. England paid a cost to gain this influence and its treasury was nearly

bankrupt by the waging of war in North America. England also banned settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains to quell native uprisings. To correct the negative flow of funds into the treasury, Parliament levied taxes on the Americans. The taxes and denial of lands west of the Appalachian Mountains infuriated Americans and as exchanges of violence became frequent, England enacted legislation that virtually ensured hostilities. Parliament extended the administrative territory of Quebec to encompass lands west of the Appalachian Mountains, possibly to ensure the neutrality of France in the pending conflict. Parliament then enacted legislation to silence the political, military, and economic arm of the American insurgency through the Coercive Acts of 1774. However, Parliament neglected to account for common Americans and in January 1776 Thomas Paine capitalized on their mistake by publishing *Common Sense*. The revolution now had a voice that was too large for England to quiet.

France lost recognition as a world power following their defeat at the hands of England during the French and Indian War. France wished to reemerge as a world power and revolution in America seemed like the perfect place to gain revenge for their defeat. During the previous war France ceded Canada, islands in the Caribbean Sea, and parts of India to the English. Some may say that the ideals of the revolution stirred France into action on the American side, but their limited commitment in the south during the early years of the war points to another idea. France spent most of the war fighting for the Islands of the Caribbean and then waged war in the American South while not campaigning in the Caribbean. England's defeat at Yorktown coincided with a timeframe that France was not fighting in the Caribbean. France bankrupted its treasury during this war and before the turn of the century would be facing a revolution of its own.

Natives faced a completely different environment from the one faced prior to the French and Indian War. Natives no longer provided the balance of power in this new war. The Proclamation of 1763 allowed them a few years without the incursion of settlements into their territory, but this new war was a war of survival for the natives. British and American forces alike did not allow natives to remain neutral. It was a time for choosing sides and those who did not choose a side were viewed as enemies by both English and American soldiers. One example of a tribe that attempted to remain neutral was that of the Moravian Delaware. The Moravians were removed by the British and Wyandot, and then massacred by American militia. Possibly the greatest example of what the American Revolution meant to native populations is seen in the naming of streets in Leavenworth, Kansas. Street names such as Miami, Delaware, Shawnee, Kickapoo, and many others symbolize the movement of those tribes from the Ohio River Valley into modern Kansas and Missouri in the decades following the American Revolution. The fight waged by natives in the Ohio River Valley remained constant until American Victory during the War of 1812 and the killing of the unification leader, Tecumseh.¹⁰

On 4 July 1776, the Second Continental Congress declared independence from England upon the convergence of several concerns and after being backed into a corner that left few alternatives other than independence. The road to independence began with colonists holding a high opinion of England in 1763 and ended with ultimate disdain for the same by 1775. Tax acts such as the Sugar, Tea, Townsend, and Stamp paved this road, while the Quartering Acts of 1765 and 1774, the Quebec Act of 1774, and the writings of John Locke provided the passengers. England made an attempt to curtail

travel through the Coercive Acts in 1774, but this only infuriated the populous and made them ripe for the ideas forwarded by Thomas Paine in January 1776. England set this stage by the levying of taxes to pay for the French and Indian War and subsequent troop stationing to ensure peace on America's frontier. The French realized the revolution as a time to regain world power status, while natives saw the outcome as a matter of survival. Ultimately, France's involvement led to revolution within its borders, and native survival amounted to moving toward the west. The actions of the English Parliament forced American Colonists into a corner and the "beast at bay" struck back through the dogged resistance forwarded on 19 April 1775.

The Southern Campaign

The Southern Campaign displayed the importance of irregular operations in the conduct of conventional war that saw America through her bleakest hours to the final realization of liberty. America's combination of irregular and conventional tactics provided the decisive factor in their ultimate victory. American irregular attacks and harassment of English forces coupled with key victories forced the British into a defenseless position to close the war. This war witnessed the employment of the entire southern populace and atrocities were committed by both sides.

Irregular warfare dominated the landscape of the Southern Campaign following the surrender of the American forces in Charleston. The routine of the Southern Campaign centered on several skirmishes followed by large battles. These skirmishes symbolized the hit and run tactics of irregular warfare. The skirmishes at Tappan, Vincennes, Gnadenhutten, Williamson's Plantation, Charlottesville, and Hammond's

Store explain the brutal nature of warfare in the Southern Campaign and are the primary centers of discussion for this thesis.

The skirmish at Old Tappan, New Jersey, which is known as the Tappan Massacre, occurred during the Northern Campaign, but provides significant impact to the Southern Campaign because an influential officer to the Southern Campaign was present. Captain William Washington and Ensign James Monroe were among the 100 Americans of the 3rd Virginia Continental Line Regiment sleeping in three barns in Old Tappan on the night of 28 September 1778. British forces under the command of General Charles Grey approached the barns under cover of darkness and bayoneted thirty unsuspecting Americans, while capturing fifty. Americans were quick to report the massacre to the press and the implications of Grey's actions were realized during the Southern Campaign as Captain Washington was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and maintained command of the 3rd Continental Light Dragoons.¹¹

On 25 February 1779, General George Rogers Clark accomplished the unthinkable. Clark attacked the fort at Vincennes during the harsh winter of the Illinois Country. Clark's force of 200 men completely surprised Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hamilton's force within the fort. Clark's men began sniping at the English fort immediately upon arrival on 23 February. This tactic assisted Clark in the hiding of his actual numbers from the English, who actually outnumbered the Americans. Hamilton sent Captain Helm out of the fort to propose surrender terms, but Clark insisted on unconditional surrender of English and native forces in the fort. To provide emphasis to this point, Clark had five captured natives tomahawked. The point was made and official

surrender, figure 15, of the fort occurred on 25 February. Natives were not the sole recipients of atrocities as was shown when the war moved south in 1780.¹²



Figure 15. Surrender of Vincennes

The war entered the Southern states in earnest during 1780 and demonstrated the rift between loyalists and rebels in the Southern states as the war not only encompassed combatants, but was also inflicted on the populous in general. On 12 July 1780, patriots under Colonels William Bratton and Edward Lacey met Tories under the command of Christian Huck at Williamson's Plantation, South Carolina. The skirmish occurred in large part due to the kidnapping of Captain John McClure's son and son-in-law by Tories. The Tories intended to hang their captives on the morning of 13 July, but patriots advanced to within seventy-five yards of the plantation and began firing at pointblank range. The casualty figures of one Patriot killed; while thirty-five Tories were killed and seventy-five were captured testify to the one sided victory won by Bratton and Lacey. South Carolina also testified to the reemergence of Colonel William Washington in 1780.¹³

On 28 December 1780, the atrocities by Washington at Hammond's Store, South Carolina, forced General Sir Charles, Lord Cornwallis to order Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton to track down General Daniel Morgan for ordering the attack. Thus began the grotesque partisan warfare demonstrated so graphically in Mel Gibson's film *The Patriot*. During the skirmish 280 members of the 3rd Continental Light Dragoons engaged 250 tory raiders at Hammond's Station. The actions of the dragoons were ruthless as was illustrated by their forces facing no losses, while tory forces suffered 150 killed and forty captured. Tarleton answered this action during his raid on Charlottesville during Cornwallis' withdrawal into Virginia.¹⁴

Tarleton's raid on Charlottesville, Virginia, on 4 June 1781 demonstrated the totality of this war and its involvement of both military and civilian populations. Tarleton found that the Virginia Legislature was meeting in Charlottesville and rushed to the city with 250 men to capture the author of the Declaration of Independence, Governor Thomas Jefferson. Captain John Jouett thwarted this plan by spreading the alarm and warning Jefferson at his home, Monticello. No casualties were reported during the raid, but Tarleton was able to destroy vital military supplies and capture some of the Virginia congressmen.¹⁵

The Ohio Country witnessed the greatest atrocity of the war in 1782. On 4 March, members of the state militia commenced actions at Gnadenhutten (in the future state of Ohio) in retaliation for years of native raids and the brutal native attacks on Boone's borough (in the future state of Kentucky). One hundred and forty peaceful native of the Moravian Delaware tribe migrated from Northern Ohio to collect corn. State militia surrounded the natives and killed all men, women, and children present. The

following day more natives arrived and they were also killed. This action resembled that of the one faced by natives during the Mystic raid of 1637 and provided a taste of the type of warfare that lasted into the late 19th Century. Skirmishes and massacres dominated the Southern Campaign, but there were also a few major battles of note.¹⁶

The Southern Campaign witnessed a conventional European style at the battles of Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, and the wars culmination at Yorktown. The skirmishes mentioned earlier coupled with the harassment tactics employed by General Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, provided the shaping operations for the large-scale land combat employed during these battles. Without the combination of irregular combat and conventional battles that culminated at Yorktown, Americans could not realize victory in their fight for independence.

Morgan defeated Tarleton at the Battle of Cowpens, South Carolina, on 17 January 1781. Morgan formed his forces into three lines with Washington's dragoons in reserve. The first line was composed of sharpshooters. South Carolina militia under orders to fire three volleys and withdraw made up the second line, while Continentals and Virginia militia filled the rear. The trick worked and as the South Carolina militia withdrew, Tarleton ordered a general attack, which met the full force of the third line and was flanked by Washington's dragoons. Washington's attack on Hammond's Station set the stage and Morgan's battle plan ensured complete victory for American forces. American casualties amounted to twelve killed and sixty wounded, while English casualties tallied-in at 100 killed, 229 wounded, and 600 captured. With this battle, Morgan ended "Bloody" Tarleton's reputation of invincibility and rescued South Carolina from the throes of English domination.¹⁷

On 15 March 1781 the forces of General Nathanael Greene were prepared to meet Cornwallis on the field of battle at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina. Greene employed a plan that roughly resembled the one used by Morgan at the Battle of Cowpens, but victory eluded the Americans. As English soldiers broke the continental's left flank, dragoons under Washington outflanked English forces and began to attack their rear. Cornwallis envisioned a rebel victory and thus ordered his artillery to fire into the melee killing both English and continental forces. American forces withdrew from the battlefield without the pursuit of the victorious Cornwallis. England won a victory at a heavy cost. American casualties amounted to seventy-nine killed and 185 wounded, while English losses were over 500. Following this victory and the cutting of his line of communication by irregular forces, Cornwallis withdrew into Virginia for his rendezvous with Yorktown.¹⁸

American and French troops under General George Washington commenced the siege of Cornwallis' troops in Yorktown, figure 16, on 6 October 1781. Yorktown witnessed the convergence of American Northern and Southern Armies with French forces on land and at sea that cut all lines of communication for English Forces under Cornwallis. Three days following the beginning of the siege, the bombardment of Yorktown began. On 14 October, French forces under General Count William Deu-Ponts and American forces under Colonel Alexander Hamilton captured redoubts #9 and #10 bringing the American line to within 250 yards of the English. Realizing the situation was helpless; Cornwallis requested a cease-fire on 17 October and surrendered his force to Washington on 19 October. As the English soldiers marched out the band played "The World Turned Upside Down." War still ravaged the countryside until late

1782, with minor skirmishes until the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 3 September 1783 signified the end of hostilities and the recognition of the United States of America as an independent nation.¹⁹



Figure 16. Battlefield Map of Yorktown

The Southern Campaign displayed the importance of irregular operations to the conduct of conventional war that saw America through her bleakest hours to the final realization of liberty. Doctor Thomas Huber of the Army Command and General Staff College refers to this combination of irregular and conventional warfare as Compound Warfare or Fortified Compound Warfare if safe havens are available to the conventional forces. Huber's research of the Napoleonic Wars points to the notion that English attempts to pacify the American countryside met with an extremely capable enemy at the onset of the combining of irregular and conventional tactics by American forces. Cornwallis evened the odds by allowing Tarleton to conduct independent operations to ravage the countryside, but his defeat at Cowpens signified the beginning of the end for the forces of Cornwallis. The examples provided also show that American forces were

not free of atrocities as they employed them at the skirmishes at Hammond's Station and Gnadenhutten.

Aftermath of the Campaign

The culmination of the American Revolution with the signing of the Treaty of Paris brought many changes for the countries of England, France, and the United States. It also dramatically effected native populations west of the Appalachian Mountains. England shifted the central emphasis of its empire. France faced revolution and decades of war. The United States suffered through the growing pains of a fledgling democracy and was viewed as inferior by England. Finally, native populations suffered continuing settler expansion into their lands. The American Revolution and all the resultant changes definitely lived-up to the sentiments of Cornwallis as his men departed Yorktown in defeat.

At the culmination of the Southern Campaign, these United States of America became a nation. The nation used the Articles of Confederation as its foundation of government from 1783 to 1789. The colonies unified to win victory, but under the Articles of Confederation they each operated as a separate entity once again. It took six years for Americans to realize the value of a strong central government and in 1789 The Constitution of the United States of America was ratified providing for a strong central and representative government, while still maintaining states rights. With the ending of hostilities east of the Appalachian Mountains, the United States still faced opposition from both English and natives west of the Appalachian Mountains that did not subside until America's Second War of Independence, the War of 1812, ended in December 1814.

The war signified the face of things to come to native populations east of the Mississippi River. Atrocities and reprisals were routine in the interaction between frontier settlers and the natives, which would culminate in the reservation system of the late 19th Century. This did not occur until the native nations had endured over a century of total warfare. The station days in Kentucky, the Battle of Fallen Timbers, the Battle of Tippecanoe, The Battle of Talladega, and the Battle of the Thames brought about the capitulation of native living east of the Mississippi and America's "Manifest Destiny" ensured that the migration would continue from coast-to-coast until the native presence was all but eradicated.

England lost what was believed to be its most valuable colony and was forced to look in other directions for the wealth of the British Empire. This search directed England toward India and the founding of the East India Company, which increased the value of Egypt and its canal at Suez. England's involvement with Egypt caused great concern for the Confederacy during the American Civil War mainly due to the South's inability to supplement the English need for cotton. English fears of losing the colonies and the negative impact to the English economy proved to be a temporary condition that was remedied by the increased influence of other English colonies throughout the world.

France suffered the greatest change in the aftermath of the American Revolution. Their support of American forces in the pursuit of revenge against England brought the French treasury to its knees. The taxes levied on the population of France to pay for the war and the hyper-inflation that followed brought the population of France to the boiling point. Before the close of the 18th Century, the people of France dedicated themselves to the cause of liberty and rebelled against the monarchy. This allowed the rise of Napoleon

and many years of war and it also allowed Thomas Jefferson to purchase the Louisiana Territory in 1803 in order for Napoleon to pay for an invasion of England that never happened.

The culmination of the American Revolution with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783 brought many changes for the countries of England, France, and the United States. It also brought an end to the curtailment of American expansion into native lands west of the Appalachians. England shifted the central emphasis of its empire from the North American colonies to its colony in India. France faced revolution and decades of war that culminated with Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815. The United States suffered through the growing pains of a fledgling democracy until ratification of the Constitution in 1789 and was viewed as inferior by England until its victory in the War of 1812. Finally, native populations suffered continued settler expansion into their lands, which culminated in the reservation system of the late 19th Century. The American Revolution and all the changes it generated definitely lived-up to the sentiments of Cornwallis as "The World Turned Upside Down."

Tenets of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

America prior to entering into the hostilities of the American Revolution provides an outstanding case study for the validation of the tenets of 4GW. There was evidence of England's loss of a monopoly on war. Cultural conflict was present throughout the colonies. Finally, the colonists definitely believed they had been disenfranchised. The colonies were backed into a corner that ultimately resulted in armed conflict with England.

The American Revolution demonstrates the nation-state's loss of a monopoly on war. England did attempt to curtail the colonial ability to wage war through the enforcement of the Coercive Acts, but the end result was armed conflict against English troops at the Old North Bridge. England lost control over violence prior to this event with the Boston Massacre in on 5 March 1770 and the Boston Tea Party during December 1773. The citizens of New York City followed suit in the destruction of tea on 22 April 1774. Atrocities against native populations were made evident when colonial frontiersmen massacred natives residing at Logan's Camp in West Virginia on 30 April 1774. The result of this action was known as Lord Dunmore's War, which ended with colonial victory over native population at the Battle of Point Pleasant, West Virginia on 10 October 1774. In efforts to disarm colonial troops, English troops under General Thomas Gage attempted to raid colonial powder bunkers throughout the Northeast. One such raid led them to Concord, Massachusetts on 19 April 1775 where the first shots of the American Revolution were fired.

Cultural Conflict represents the second tenet of 4GW and makes its presence known prior to and during the American Revolution. Lord Dunmore's War and the Battle of Point Pleasant display the effects of the cultural struggle among native populations and the colonists. England added religious conflict by allowing the Catholic citizens of Quebec to have administrative rights over the territory west of the Appalachian Mountains by the passing of the Quebec Act of 1774. England also displayed a cultural conflict in its wish to subjugate the colonists without allowing them a voice in government.

The American cause represented in the Declaration of Independence provided the classic example of a disenfranchised people. The Proclamation of 1763 denied colonists the right to settle in the lands of the Ohio River Valley and the subsequent Quebec Act of 1774 once again placed French Catholics to the west of the colonies. In order to pay war expenses, England levied taxes upon the colonists without the consent of their elected assemblies. England even went so far as to invade the privacy of the individual home through the Quartering Acts of 1765 and 1774. By the close of 1774, war was nearly imminent and all that was required for the colonies to declare independence was a voice. Thomas Paine provided that voice and in July 1776 sentiment reached a point in which independence was declared.

America prior to entering into the hostilities of the revolution provides an outstanding case study for the validation of the tenets of 4GW. The wide-spread cases of violence throughout the colonies pointed to England's loss of the monopoly on war. Dunmore's War, English contempt for American representative governments, and the placement of a Catholic people to the colonies' west fostered an environment of cultures in conflict. The various taxes levied without representation, the restrictions placed on westward expansion, and the quartering of troops within the homes of colonists led to a population of disenfranchised persons. The colonies were backed into a corner that ultimately resulted in the firing of shots at the Old North Bridge and the declaring of independence.

Conclusion

The review of events surrounding and including the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution demonstrated that the tenets of 4GW were present throughout the

American Revolution. The tactics used in the war demonstrated a clear leaning toward a guerrilla style of war that embellished ambushes and raids coupled with conventional tactics that embodied the principles of compound warfare. A review of the backgrounds of the significant players demonstrated the presence of political, economic, military, and psychological (PEMP) interests that, with the exception of the Americans, changed very little from those present during the French and Indian War. Conflicts between the English, Americans, and natives were present prior to and following the war with the Americans being the primary disenfranchised party. Finally, England's attempts to quell rebellion through the Coercive Acts of 1774 only enflamed the conflict which began with the shot fired in protest against the enforcement of the act at the Old North Bridge near Concord.

¹letter to Col. William S. Smith, Nov. 13, 1787

²Warren M. Billings, *A Little Parliament: The Virginia General Assembly in the Seventeenth Century* (Richmond, VA: Library of Virginia, 2004), 7.

³Ibid. 3.

⁴Daniel Marston, *The American Revolution: 1774-1783* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 13-37.

⁵David Colbert, *Eyewitness to America: 500 Years of America in the Words of Those who saw it Happen* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997), 52-55.

⁶Marston, 17-25.

⁷*The Spark of Independence* (New York: History Book Club, 1997), 67-68.

⁸Pauline Maier, *American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1997), 31-34.

⁹Ibid. 118.

¹⁰Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 158-181.

¹¹Harry J. Karapalides, *Dates of the American Revolution: Who, What, and Where in the War for Independence* (Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1998), 122.

¹²Ibid. 127-128.

¹³Ibid. 145.

¹⁴Ibid. 159.

¹⁵Ibid. 173.

¹⁶Ibid. 187.

¹⁷Ibid. 160-162.

¹⁸Ibid. 166-167.

¹⁹Ibid. 181-193.

CHAPTER 5

THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION

I should welcome any war. The country needs one.

Theodore Roosevelt, 1897

A review of events surrounding and including the Philippine Insurrection demonstrates that the tenets of 4GW were present throughout the Philippine Insurrection. The tactics used in the war demonstrate a clear leaning toward the guerrilla style of war. A review of the backgrounds of the significant players demonstrates the presence of political, economic, military, and psychological (PEMP) interests. A review of American actions shows that assimilation was the initial strategy while one of punishment followed. Also, the review demonstrates that American actions during the war continue to have an impact on the world to this day.

Background

American concerns leading to the Philippine Insurrection circled around the Expansionist Movement. This expansionist sentiment came into direct conflict with the sentiments of the peoples of the Philippines Islands, figure 17, and their customs and culture. The ultimate failure of Americans to take these cultural concerns into consideration provided the fuel for insurgency. The end-state shows that the belief in Anglo-Saxon supremacy is the root cause of the conflict that allowed the Philippine Insurgency to occur.



Figure 17. Philippine Islands

Political sentiment in the United States following 1890 revolved around the issue of expansion. Prominent leaders and thinkers, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert Beveridge, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, championed the idea of American Expansionism. The ideas forwarded by this think-tank covered the full spectrum of influence and provided America's context for entry into a war with Spain. Senator Albert

Beveridge of Indiana summarized the expansionist argument on the floor of the Senate in January 1900 by stating:

The Philippines are ours forever. . . . And just beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. . . . Where shall we turn for consumers of our surplus? Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer. . . . The Philippines give us a base at the door of all the East. . . . At Cebu the best informed man on the island told me that 40 miles of Cebu's mountain chain are practically mountains of coal. . . . My own belief is that there are not 100 men among them [Filipino] who comprehend what Anglo-Saxon self-government even means, and there are over 5,000,000 people to be governed. It has been charged that our conduct of the war [Philippine Insurrection] has been cruel. Senators, it has been the reverse. . . . Senators must remember that we are not dealing with Americans or Europeans. We are dealing with Orientals.¹

In this short paragraph, Beveridge covered the central ideas which fueled American politicians to back a policy of expansion. The politics of expansion were founded in the need for economic gain.

In 1890, the Bureau of Census announced that the interior frontier was closed. This event, coupled with the natural tendency of the profit system toward continuous expansion, required the opening of new foreign markets. China provided an example of one such foreign market. The severe depression of 1893 further intensified the need to expand the American market base to handle surpluses in manufacturing and agriculture. This interest in commerce prompted Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts to write:

In the interests of commerce . . . we should build the Nicaragua canal, and for the protection of that canal and for the sake of our commercial supremacy in the Pacific we should control the Hawaiian islands and maintain our influence in Samoa. . . . and when the Nicaragua canal is built, the island of Cuba . . . will become a necessity. . . . It is a movement which makes for civilization and the advancement of the race. As one of the great nations of the world the United States must not fall out of the line of march.²

With this argument, Lodge made certain that American Expansionism was determinant

on commerce and not on the gaining of colonies.

American military concerns centered on the quick expansion of military forces that followed the commencing of war with Spain and the need for overseas facilities in order to support a growing naval presence throughout the Pacific. The drastic expanding of military forces posed a challenge to commanders in the Philippines. The waging of counterinsurgency operations requires the dispersal of forces throughout a nation and places a tremendous burden of command on the individual soldier. Experience in the force rested with its senior leadership, who participated in the Civil War and the pacification of the American plains. Propulsion systems for naval vessels also played an important part in the need to base in the Philippines. Naval vessels operated under the propulsion of steam and the fuel used to create this steam was coal. In order to maintain naval operations in the Far East, the United States contracted for coaling services in Japanese and English ports. The gaining of American ports in the Far East ensured unfettered access to coaling services, which enabled continuous naval operations. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan provided another aspect of naval thinking that enabled expansionist politicians to gain hold.³

The psychology of the American Expansionist Movement centered on the writing of Mahan and the closing of the interior frontier along with an underlying sense of racism. Mahan's book, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, provides for the premise that being a world power required a large navy in order to maintain freedom of navigation throughout the world's sea lanes. In the absence of the Expansionist Movement, Mahan's theories were nothing more than basic naval doctrine. Mahan's membership in an expansionist think tank made his theories on sea power propaganda

for the Expansionist Movement. This is further evidenced by the efforts of Roosevelt, Lodge, and Beveridge to have Mahan removed from operational status and placed in an administrative billet in order to complete work on his theories. The Age of Steel and Steam made certain that Mahan's theories provided evidence that the accession of overseas basing was required in order to sustain fleet operations in the support of American economic efforts. The expansion of economic markets overseas was a requirement based centrally on the fact that for the first time in American history there was no interior frontier to support the expansion of the sale of goods. The economic frontier now had to go beyond America's borders in order to sustain and grow profits. This brought America into contact with various cultures and people who clearly were not of Anglo-Saxon origin. The speeches of Beveridge and Lodge point to an evident outcropping from this contact-racism. The expansionist leaders of the time believed in the overwhelming superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. This forced a belief that oriental peoples were not capable of governing themselves and required education and training on the superior means of governance and morals of the Anglo-Saxon race. This belief was transmitted to the American populace in the form of blatant racism as is evidenced in the dehumanization of the Philippine warrior by applying names, such as "Filipino Monkey," "Goo Goo," and "Oriental Nigger," in main-line newspapers.⁴

The Anglo-Saxon racism against peoples of the Orient came into direct conflict with the concern of independence forwarded by the Tagalog peoples of the Philippines. On 1 May 1898, Admiral Dewey and the Far East Squadron won complete victory over Spain in Manila Harbor. Dewey then sent for the revolutionary leader of the Philippines, Emilio Aguinaldo, who was exiled to Hong Kong by the Spanish Colonial Government

for leading insurgencies against the creole dominated colonial system. By 19 May, Aguinaldo was on the island of Luzon and had proclaimed himself as dictator of the provisional government of the independent Philippine Republic. By the time of the American Army's arrival in late June, Aguinaldo had defeated Spanish forces and believed America would recognize his government. Aguinaldo had reason to believe this because Congress had determined that annexation of Cuba was not an option, but such was not the case for the Philippines. With United States failure to recognize Aguinaldo's government, Aguinaldo determined it proper to enter into conventional war with the United States around the city of Manila. Aguinaldo's army was defeated and fled to the mountains of Luzon to begin the full-scale insurrection against American occupation.⁵

The Moro peoples of the southern Philippine Islands practiced Islam and had concerns based on their practice of faith. These concerns provoked a long conflict with the Catholic, non-believer, Tagalog peoples and Spain. This conflict also provided the primary reason for the inability of Spain to subjugate the Moro people during their three centuries of occupation in the Philippine Islands. The Moro beliefs on government and the separation of church and state came into direct conflict with the Anglo-Saxon understanding of government and the rights of man. The Moro practiced the Law of Islam and failure to practice that law was a breach of faith that was unacceptable to the Moro people. These beliefs provide the primary cause of conflict with the United States and the Tagalog peoples of the north.⁶

American concerns leading to the Philippine Insurrection arose from the expansionist movement and its premise of advancing the superior practices of the Anglo-Saxon race while expanding markets to consume the surpluses produced by American

farmers and manufacturers. These concerns came into direct conflict with the sentiments of independence forwarded by the Tagalog peoples and their leader, Emilio Aguinaldo. Further conflict arose with the Moro tribe of the Southern Philippines when Christian and Muslim cultures clashed around the Anglo-Saxon form of government and morals. In the end, all conflict between America and the peoples of the Philippines Islands revolved around the central premise that Anglo-Saxon culture and beliefs were superior to all others.

The Campaign

The campaign began with the defeat of conventional forces and ended with the destruction of insurgent forces. Initially the policy was to win the hearts and minds of the people, but the failure of this strategy to stop the insurgency led to a policy that was punitive in nature. The punitive campaign successfully destroyed the insurgent's will to resist, but left the land devastated and open to criminal elements. Through the establishment of a Philippine police force, the civilian administrator was able to ensure that the United States could declare an end to hostilities.

Following the defeat of Aguinaldo's conventional forces, The American campaign began to fight the insurgency in November 1899 with a policy of Benevolent Assimilation. This strategy provided for the founding of a government and education system modeled after Anglo-Saxon institutions of the United States. This policy also required the dispersion of American Forces throughout the Philippines Islands and placed a tremendous burden on the young officers and soldiers who, for the most part, were fresh from the farm. These young officers and soldiers, who were just becoming accustomed to Army life, were now placed in positions of great responsibility. They

were required to develop educational and government systems while acting as the village mayor and defending the population against the sentiments of genuine nationalism, paternalism, superstition, and terror espoused by Aguinaldo's insurgent warriors. By the spring of 1900, it became clear that the policy of Benevolent Assimilation fostered by Major Generals Elwell S. Otis and Arthur MacArthur was not solving the insurgency. However, MacArthur's hands were tied until the election of 1900 was decided.

Comments made by Brigadier General Theodore Schwan in the fall of 1899 demonstrated a growing sentiment toward a stronger position than that of Benevolent Assimilation:

The Filipinos are in identically the same position as the Indians of our country have been for many years, and in my opinion must be subdued in much the same way, by such convincing conquest as shall make them realize fully the futility of armed resistance, and then win them by fair and just treatment.

During the fall of 1900, the issues facing young officers and soldiers were further compounded as President William McKinley wrested administrative control of the islands from MacArthur and placed it in the hands of a civilian administrator, William Howard Taft. They also had to face the growing descent of the American populous toward the war, which came to a boiling point in the fall of 1900 with McKinley's presidential campaign against the noted isolationist William Jennings Bryan. McKinley's victory in that campaign allowed MacArthur to implement a policy that was much more in-line with the sentiments articulated by Schwan.⁷

McKinley's victory in the election of 1900 provided MacArthur the ability to institute a stringent policy of Chastisement. This policy was not centered on the winning of hearts and minds, but on the breaking of the insurgents will to fight. Interestingly, the Americans used members of the Moro tribe to assist in the operations in Luzon. Under

Chastisement, soldiers separated the population from the insurgents by allowing voluntary removal to concentration camps. Those who chose to stay behind received no benefits of the American occupation and were treated in the same manner as insurgents. It may have been voluntary for the first village, but as word spread the voluntary nature of this operation was under question. This phase also called for full-scale offensive operations which allowed for the burning of vast amounts of supplies, crops, and dwellings. This policy showed signs of breaking the back of the insurgency. By the summer of 1901, Aguinaldo was captured and General Juan Cailles surrendered 100 officers, 500 men, 140 civilian officials, and 400 rifles to American forces signaling the beginning of the end for insurgent forces. Then, in September 1901, violence reemerged when insurgents massacred and mutilated an entire company of the U.S. Ninth Infantry near the town of Balagiga. This action caused Brigadier General Jacob Smith to carry out a punitive campaign throughout southern Luzon and to institute a pass system for civilians that culminated during the summer of 1902 with the American declaration that hostilities were over.⁸

The insurgent war began after the defeat of Emelio Aguinaldo's conventional forces in Luzon and hostilities were declared ended following Aguinaldo's capture in 1901 and the conclusion of a punitive campaign in the summer of 1902. The campaign began as one of Benevolent Assimilation to win the hearts and minds of the people, but ultimately ended with a policy of Chastisement to destroy the insurgency. With the countryside pacified, it was now safe for Governor William Howard Taft to reinstitute the policies of Benevolent Assimilation and establish a constabulary throughout the Philippine Islands.

Aftermath

The effects of the Philippine Insurrection can be felt to this day. The insurrection and efforts following the insurrection were plagued with cultural ineptness and the belief in Anglo-Saxon supremacy over other cultures. This notion of cultural supremacy created the atmosphere that enables the Muslim extremism of today. Involvement in the Philippines also has provided the United States with a valuable ally against terrorism and more than likely hastened American involvement in World War II.

Following the declaration of an end to hostilities in 1902, the question of assimilating the Moro tribe of the southern Philippines remained unanswered. Governor William Howard Taft had instituted a constabulary force to administer the peace in order to ease isolationist sentiment in the United States and quell Army arguments that they should be placed in charge of the administration of the Philippines. Taft's plan worked in the Tagalog regions, but the Army maintained control in the as of yet not pacified Moro regions of the southern Philippines. U.S. experience in the Moro regions was one of cultural ignorance and blatant belief in the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race. Major General Leonard Wood arrived in an area that should have been easy to pacify with a little cultural savvy; after all, the Moro people had assisted in operations against the insurgents of Aguinaldo. Wood's disdain for Moro practices of slavery, polygamy, and tribal warfare and administrative measures to curtail their use enflamed the populous and provided the context of the Moro War. During this war, Americans faced suicide bombers and men more prepared to die than surrender as under their customs dying at the while fighting the infidel guaranteed entrance to heaven. The American effort succeeded and the relationship between the former enemies remained good. The reason

for this good relationship was that Americans served as a buffer between the Moro people and the hated Christians of the Tagalog tribe, but friction with the Moro people provides problems to the government of the Philippines to this day.⁹

Failure of the United States to unite the various peoples of the Philippines left the Philippines with an insurgency of their own to defeat. In 1971, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebelled against the Philippines in an effort to form a separate Muslim nation-state in the southern Philippines. The MNLF's fight continued through the 1990's and U.S. Forces were in place to provide training to Philippine forces. This failure also created a place for Muslim extremism to fester. Following the attacks of September 2001, the United States become more involved in the fight against Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim terrorist group operating from the Moro region of the Philippines.

United States involvement in the Philippine Insurrection ensured the creation of an independent Philippine state with ties to the United States and placed the United States at the backdoor of the Japanese Juggernaut of World War II. This state formed as a protectorate of the United States in the years prior to World War II and gained full independence in the years following the Japanese occupation. This independent state maintained relations with the United States through basing rights until the 1990's and is now a valuable ally in the Global War on Terrorism.

Tenets of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

The Philippine Insurrection provides an outstanding case study for the validation of the tenets of 4GW. The wide-spread cases of violence point to the nation-state's loss of the monopoly on war. Cultural conflict was evident in the religious and racial tensions evident in the conflict. The people of the Philippines were disenfranchised by failures of

the United States to recognize governments and cultures. The implications can be felt in the various extremist movements of today.

The Philippine Insurrection provides evidence of the nation-state's loss of a monopoly on war. The United States filled the void left as Spain departed and attempted to instill a government modeled in the form of the American Government, but forces under Aguinaldo remained in control of the countryside and deterred those efforts. Once pacification was complete, the United States once again attempted the formation of a Philippine Government, but Moro rebellion broke out in the southern province. The ability of these groups to wage war against the United States demonstrates that the United States had lost its monopoly on war.

The Philippine Islands were rife with cultural conflict prior to, during, and after the United States occupation. This cultural conflict stemmed from the belief systems of the various tribes. The Tagalogs of the north followed Spanish influence and became devout Catholics; while the Moro tribe of the south followed the beliefs of the Muslim Expansion and that the Christians of the north were infidels. The United States added to this cultural conflict the notion that Anglo-Saxon beliefs and instructions were supreme to all others. When the United States made Major General Leonard Wood military governor of the Moro province, armed conflict was made certain.

Both Tagalog and Moro peoples were placed among the disenfranchised during the hostilities. Tagalog disenfranchisement began when the United States government failed to recognize the authority of the Aguinaldo government to rule the Philippines. This resulted in a conventional war at first and then spawned into the Philippine Insurrection. During the insurrection, the Tagalog people were further disenfranchised as

the policy of Chastisement had them relocated to concentration camps in order to separate the populous from the insurgents. The Moro people's disenfranchisement began with the placement of Major General Wood as military governor of the Moro Province. Wood's policy demonstrated complete disregard for the cultural practices of the Moro people and ultimately led to a brutal rebellion against United States forces. This insurgency continues to this day in Abu Sayyaf activities.

The Philippine Insurrection provides an outstanding case study for the validation of the tenets of 4GW. The wide-spread cases of violence throughout the Philippines at the onset and during the conflict demonstrate the United States' loss of the monopoly on war. The belief that Anglo-Saxon beliefs and institutions were supreme to all others coupled with the Moro belief that the Tagalog were infidels testifies to the existence of cultural conflict in the islands. Tagalog disenfranchisement was demonstrated in the failure of the United States to recognize Aguinaldo's government as the legitimate power in the Philippines. Finally, the policies of Major General Leonard Wood toward the Moro people display a blatant disregard for the cultural concerns of the Moro people that has remnants in the Abu Sayyaf movement.

Conclusion

The review of events surrounding and including the Philippine Insurrection demonstrated that the tenets of 4GW were present throughout the Philippine Insurrection. The tactics used in the war demonstrated a clear leaning toward the guerrilla style of war that emphasized ambushes, raids, and the separation of the populous from insurgents. A review of the backgrounds of the significant players demonstrated the presence of American political, economic, military, and psychological

(PEMP) interests and Philippine interests of religion and independence. American expansionism coupled with the belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority combined to make a potition ripe for insurgency in the Philippines. American actions first started as a policy of Benevolent Assimilation and then moved to Chastisement in order to destroy insurgent factions. Following the end of hostilities in Luzon, Major General Wood demonstrated cultural ineptness in the handling of the Moro peoples, which led to an uprising that displayed the need for cultural awareness training. This need for cultural awareness training is a lesson that is still being learned to this day.

¹Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492 - Present* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 313-314.

²Ibid. 299.

³Anthony James Joes, *America and Guerrilla Warfare* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 103-130.

⁴Zinn, 298-320.

⁵Joes, 103-110.

⁶Ibid. 124-129.

⁷Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine: 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2004), 104-112

⁸Joes, 116-119.

⁹Ibid. 123-127.

CHAPTER 6

SO WHAT?

There is no limit to what a man can do or where he can go, if he doesn't mind who gets the credit.

ANONYMOUS, business aphorism

Through analysis of the political, economic, military, and psychological (PEMP) influences of involved parties in Braddock's Campaign, the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution, and the Philippine Insurrection, this thesis determines that the tenets of fourth generation warfare (4GW) are present throughout the military history of the United States. These tenets encompass the loss of the monopoly on war by nation-states, cultures in conflict, and disenfranchised persons. With this proven, it is now time to provide insights that increase our understanding of the current and future environment. These insights will assist in creating possible strategies to aid in the resolving of future conflicts.

The case studies provide numerous insights into the nature of 4GW, but four of these insights are considered key to implementing strategies in the resolution of future conflict. The first of these insights is to know your enemy. In all three case studies, the nation-state force either underestimated the resolve of their enemy or failed to recognize non-state actors in the conflict. The English failed to realize that their numerically superior force could be attacked by the French and their native allies during Braddock's Campaign and further compounded this error by neglecting to include France's native allies in the peace negotiations that followed the war, leading to a native uprising following hostilities with France. The English also failed to realize the resolve of the

American population and forces during the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution. English commanders believed that defeat of the Continental Army in the south would cause revolutionary sentiment to subside. The Americans believed the same thing in the Philippines as the policy of Benevolent Assimilation began as Philippine conventional forces were being defeated, but revolutionaries continued to fight a guerrilla war for the next three years. PEMP analysis of the involved parties provides the means to both realize and subvert these enemies.

Falling in-line with underestimating and failure to realize enemies, blatant arrogance of the nation-state holds true to each case study. The English displayed this arrogance during Braddock's Campaign through the failure to realize the value of native allies and the irregular tactics of forest warfare. Following the battle, the gaining of native allies and the implementation of irregular tactics began in earnest, but at the conclusion of the war this arrogance reemerged in the form of not including France's native allies in the peace negotiations. The English once again displayed arrogance during the Southern Campaign in their belief that American resistance could not survive the Southern Continental Army. They also believed European style tactics could win the day and failed to implement irregular tactics until the withdrawal into Virginia. Americans compounded their tactical arrogance with racial arrogance during the Philippine Insurrection. Americans, just as the English, believed that Philippine resistance could not withstand the defeat of their army. Americans compounded this error with an overwhelming reliance on firepower and an undaunted belief that Anglo-Saxon institutions and beliefs were superior to all others. Arrogance among nation-states

provides the makings of greatness, but if uncontrolled it can also provide the mechanisms of downfall and conflict.

The theory of compound warfare and fortified compound warfare and its use provides another insight from each of the case studies. In each case study with the exception of the Philippine Insurrection, elements of these theories were present among the winning sides. In the case of Braddock's Campaign, French regular forces initiated the attack and irregular forces then swept the English flanks, which led to victory for the French and their native allies. The English successfully combined irregular and regular tactics through the remainder of the war to win victory over France. American tactics during the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution provide the best example of compound warfare outside of the Napoleonic case studies analyzed by Dr. Thomas Huber. The Americans successfully implemented the use of irregular forces as a primary in order to buy time and shape the campaign in such a manner that allowed the Continental Army to reconstitute and meet the English on the field of battle. The case of the Philippine Insurrection provides an example of what happens when the irregular force is unable to gain the support of a conventional force.

In each case study, nation-state actors changed in policy in ways that adversely affected peaceful solutions. The English entered the French and Indian War to fulfill the needs of their colonists in North American, one of those being the settlement of the Ohio River Valley. In order to resolve the native rebellion that followed the war, the English issued the Proclamation of 1763, which nullified their original reason for entering the war by not allowing European settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains. Taxation of the colonies provided the context to entry into the American Revolution. English

policy originally allowed the colonies a high level of self-determination through their elected assemblies, but actions by Parliament following the French and Indian War reversed self-determination to a point that rebellion was the only answer. During the Philippine Insurrection, America's failure to recognize the revolutionary government of the Philippines symbolized one shift in policy. After all, Admiral Dewey sailed Emilio Aguinaldo from exile in Hong Kong to lead this effort. The other shift in policy occurred after the election of William McKinley in 1900. America shifted from a policy of Benevolent Assimilation to one of Chastisement. A hidden insight in these cases is that it is much easier to start operations strong and then level off than it is to start easy and then crack the whip.

The insights listed above provide invaluable guidance as to the creation of possible strategies to resolve future conflicts, which do not constitute the transformation of the force in such a manner as to make it ill-prepared to face possible state on state combat. They point to one strategy on the tactical level and one that gravitates to the strategic level. In the case of the tactical level, the theory of compound warfare and its implementation by American forces constitutes the strategy. Under this concept, little force enlargement or transformation needs to occur in order to wage 4GW conflict. The theory leans toward the use of irregular forces as the primary with conventional forces in support. Use of the compound warfare theory, requires the United States military to place special operators in the lead while conducting 4GW operations. The conventional force then is needed only as a rapid reaction force to handle emergency situations that are beyond the capacity of special operations firepower. This strategy also provides a

minimum footprint and enables the United States to place persons among the population to surgically handle enemy 4GW warriors.

The second strategy entails the complete restructuring of the Executive Department of the United States Government. The current command structure follows a horizontal model with appointed leadership in each level. This model is used successfully in the corporate world, but provides for little continuity in the world of a democratically elected government. The horizontal model currently used causes a massive shift in policy and personnel after each election, and provides the concept of plausible deniability in the events things do not occur as planned. A pyramid structure brings not only accountability to the organizations, but also stability. This pyramid structure removes several departments and then downgrades the importance of several others. If the purpose of government is to provide security and maintain the population's way of life, then upper rungs of government must directly impact the facets of security and maintenance of a way of life.

Limiting the number of departments with a direct link to the President provides the first step in the process of restructuring. These posts are also the only ones required to be by appointment, all other are to follow the civil service model. The Departments of National Security, Treasury, and Interior are proposed to encompass the entire list of departments in the executive. These departments are then divided into agencies in order to manage the concerns of the American population.

The Department of National Security requires the more change than all others in order to function in the 4GW World. The department's agencies are required to be based on functional area without concern for determination of civilian and military. Basically,


the make-up of each agency involves both civilian and military members and the agency head is also open to both civilian and military. Examples of the agencies encompass disaster relief, intelligence, stability operations, etc. The key to these agencies is the requirements that they be trainers, force managers, and day-to-day operators. Special cases such as a war or natural disaster fall under the command/administration of a joint force commander/administrator, who is appointed by the Secretary of National Security with Presidential approval. This structure does not incorporate the need for Agencies of Defense or Central Intelligence. These are force based institutions that have no place in a function based structure. The Departments of Treasury and Interior will handle functions based on financial concerns and the concerns of states respectfully. Initial structural diagrams for the Executive and National Security Departments are provided in appendix A and B. This structure provides accountability by providing agencies with a specific function of governance and deleting the current multi-agency approach to functions. It also provides stability in that only the highest level managers are political appointees.

Analysis of PEMP in the case of involved parties in Braddock's Campaign, the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution, and the Philippine Insurrection determine that the tenets of the nation-state's loss of a monopoly on war, cultural conflict, and disenfranchised persons are present throughout the military history of the United States. With the presence of the tenets of 4GW determined, insights from each case study were stated in order to develop effective strategies in the resolution of future conflict. The insights center-on knowing one's enemy, arrogance of the nation-state, use of compound warfare, and the stability of policy. These insights assisted in the determination that using the compound warfare strategy as a tactic made victory certain

on the battlefield. The insights also highlighted the need for a function-based executive department that increases accountability and stability.


APPENDIX A

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE



APPENDIX B

NATIONAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE



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