

Marine Artillery and Civil Military Operations: The Division's Pinch-Hitter

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Marine Artillery and Civil Military Operations:
The Division's Pinch-Hitter

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Submitted by Captain B. J. Sams
CG #11, FACAD: Major S. D. Griffin
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Introduction

Marine artillery is proud of its uncanny adaptability regardless of the situation. The performance of 11th Marine Regiment accomplished in Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIF) is testimony to this fact. Eleventh Marines provided close, continuous fires to support maneuver throughout all phases of the OIF. Then, upon conclusion of the kinetic fight, they formed the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) for the division. While 11th Marines was successful in this capacity, the CMO role is one for which artillery is positioned, but largely unprepared. Therefore, to accomplish this secondary mission, training needs to embody all of the potential aspects of CMO, civil affairs and information operations.

Background

Colonel Pace framed artillery's role in CMO when he stipulated what the mission would resemble,

On order, assume primary CMO mission for the division with focus on coordinating and achieving unity of effort among all forces and nonmilitary organizations participating in stability operations in the division's battlespace by establishing the division's CMOC.¹

This role was championed by Deputy Commandant, LtGen Huly at Plans, Policies and Operations in August and ultimately approved by General Hagee in December 2005. Additional

guidance can be found in Joint Publication 1-02, Civil Military Operations, which states that CMO responsibilities "include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government."² The importance of civil affairs is again emphasized in Joint Publication 3-57:

Properly executed CMO can reduce friction between the civilian population and the military force. The objective is to minimize interference with military operations by the civilian population. When possible, a second objective is to reduce military interference with the civilian populace.³

Finally as stated in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.1, "CMO have a powerful information operations component. Not only do MAGTF actions matter, but so do the perceptions they create."⁴ However, without an effective training program the multiple demands of CMO as a supplemental or collateral duty will create a significant degradation of its effectiveness. MCWP 3-33.1 stated that CMO,

activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.⁵

CMO, Civil Affairs and Information Operations

Artillery units will be the MAGTF's de facto active duty resident experts in IO, CA and CMO in lieu of other forces not available to the MAGTF commander. Given the complex nature of CMO, these capabilities should not be neglected or marginalized simply because CMO is a supplemental mission. By analyzing the supporting and related capabilities of information operations in Figure 1 (which CMO falls), artillery units should realize that their newly acquired mission will require training beyond what is typically seen within their MOS.




Figure 1

As stated by Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33.1A, "To be effective, all members of the CMO staff section must be trained in functional area 39C [a U.S. Army Enlisted Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)], Civil

Affairs.”⁶ This doctrinal assumption is reinforced by MCWP 3-40.4, “CA describes designated personnel and distinct units. It is neither a mission nor an objective, but the name of a particular force that helps the MAGTF commander to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO. CA forces bring expertise that is not normally available to the MAGTF.”⁷

Since Civil Affairs use CMO to accomplish missions relevant to the overall IO campaign, it is pertinent for artillery units to understand their impact in CA and IO operations. The structure of CMOC (Civil Military Operations Center) reveals the necessity for artillerymen who understand their role in the larger CA realm.




Figure 2⁸

Figure 2 demonstrates the CA TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) required of those tasked with the execution of a CMOC. In addition, Figure 2 visually displays the impact

the division's CMOC may have on the broader MAGTF CA mission.

Colonel Pace suggested that the emphasis on CMO training will be accomplished through annual exercises conducted by the artillery regiments augmented by reserve civil affairs groups. He noted the following:

As an example, a division, along with its organic artillery regiment augmented by a habitually associated civil affairs detachment could plan and execute an annual civil-military affairs command post exercise with the artillery regiment as the division's CMOC.⁹

Essential training at schools and appropriate courses for those involved in the planning of CA/CMO is necessary for all battalion staff officers. Educational opportunities that were mentioned by the December Transition Task Force included joint courses offered at Hurlburt Field in the Florida's Elgin Air Force Base, for example, the Joint CMO Course and Joint CMO Campaign Planning Workshop. Other courses of interest included the Marine Ordering Officer course for those supply officers who would be tasked with contracting beyond the battalion level. A certification course for this staff officer would also permit him to conduct payment operations above what is currently required in an artillery battalion. Additional opportunities

included courses in environmental health and sanitation for other special staff officers in the battalion.

Battalion staffs need additional training in the execution of CMOC duties such as listed in MCWP 3-33.1:

- provide OGAs(Other Governmental Agencies), IOs(International Agencies), and NGOs (Non-Governmental Agencies) with a single, accessible point of contact for civil-military activities and matters
- act as a clearinghouse for all civilian requests for support from the MAGTF and the US military. The CMO section attempts to meet civilian requirements with civilian capabilities via coordination at the CMOC before passing validated support request to MAGTF
- organize outside agency support to reduce or eliminate redundancy and prioritize relief efforts
- request FNS from civilian organizations
- maintain maps and charts for collaboration that depict current and future CA activities and CMO; current enemy and friendly situations; current and planned dislocated civilian operations; the status of arts, monuments, and archives; and other details. Displays should also be developed that depict important ongoing requirements such as work requests, logistic requirements, DC statistics or situation report information¹⁰

These responsibilities can be conducted during the training exercises mentioned by Col Pace. A competent group of evaluators (familiar with the conduct of CMO) needs to be present in order to assess the measures of effectiveness when artillery units are conducting CMO in training.

Artillery units should study how the Tactical Training and Evaluation Control Group (TTECG) conducts their evaluations for guidance, that is, to ensure that artillery's efforts

are unbiased and provide commanders the objective data they need to adjust future training.

However, this solution does not the address the expertise required of the artillerymen involved in the CMO/CA mission. Col Pace agreed that "the types of civil affairs expertise found in the civil affairs detachments within the civil affairs groups (CAGs) would be required by the artillery regiment in order to fully [sic] realize its potential to execute the CMOC mission."¹¹ Therefore those responsible for planning and executing CMO missions need to be specially trained in these tasks prior to becoming "fully mission capable" in CMO.

Some still argue whether or not artillery units are the appropriate units to which CMO should be assigned. LtGen Huly stated that "Assigning civil military operations to the artillery regiment ensures the division maintains the resident structure and means to conduct CMO as a collateral or secondary mission."¹² Admittedly, without adequate guidance from commanders and subsequent additional training, artillery's competing missions will force Marines to choose between these two equally important tasks. In order to make this a valid mission, funding for training must be allocated, school seats need to be apportioned, and time for evaluated training must be provided (by priority)

to those units expected to execute this important task. As Colonel Cariker noted, "it is more expedient to train for a secondary mission than to eliminate, and then have to reconstitute, specialized or uniquely trained forces..."¹³ (Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005) Given the current focus of effort on CMO, this mission cannot afford to be relegated to the collateral duty category and only practiced in time of crisis. Artillery units need to be given the same amount of resources of a unit permanently assigned this mission.

Conclusion

The inherent vacuum of CA/CMO expertise resident in active duty forces was witnessed by the 14 October 2005 Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned report that stated, "Marine Corps CA units are neither trained, structured nor equipped for employment in lengthy post-hostilities or 'nation-building' scenarios. If this is a trend in future employment, the T/O, T/E and training must be modified to accomplish this mission."¹⁴ The assignment of CMO to artillery units has not adequately answered the requirement for modification of trained CA or CMO units. By assigning this mission to a unit without the training and educational resources necessary to accomplish the mission effectively means that the Marines will learn their newly acquired

mission via OJT (on-the-job-training). Therefore artillery units should be given this additional training normally given to CA or IO units in support of artillery initial or annual training requirements.

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Notes

¹ Colonel J.A. Pace, "Civil-Military Operations Center," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 89, no. 6 (2005): 13.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication for Civil-Military Operations 3-57*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001, p. 185.

³ *Ibid.*, p.9.

⁴ United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.1: Marine Air Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2003, p.9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.70.

⁶ United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.1A: Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003, p.85.

⁷ United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40.4: Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2003, p.44.

⁸ MCWP 3-33.1, p.25.

⁹ Pace, *Marine Corps Gazette*, p. 13.

¹⁰ MCWP 3-33.1, p.26.

¹¹ Pace, *Marine Corps Gazette*, p. 12.

¹² Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations. Memorandum, subject: "Marine Corps Combat Development Command Point Paper on Civil Military operations (CMO)," 12 August 2005.

¹³ Colonel T.L. Cariker, "No More 'One-Trick Ponies,'" *Marine Corps Gazette*, 89, no. 6 (2005): 34.

¹⁴ Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, report, *Civil Military Operations, OIF II*, published in electronic format, 14 October 2005.