

U. S. Marine Corps Special Operations in a Narco-Terrorism Environment

CSC 1997

Subject Area - Operations

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: U. S. Marine Corps Special Operations in a Narco-Terrorism Environment

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Thesis: The Marine Corps should establish a force or enhance the training of an existing unit in order to focus direct intervention on the narco-terrorist threat at its source.

Discussion: Today narco-terrorism is thriving in the Andean Ridge countries which provide the world with most of its cocaine and various other illicit drugs. A large proportion of those drugs enter the United States illegally and are poisoning our society in many alarming ways. This is a massive implication for the security of the United States. Our borders are seemingly porous and invite the highly adaptive narco-traffickers to invent new ways to invade. Thus far, U. S. government counter-narcotics efforts at home and abroad, have failed to stem the flow into this country. Additionally, most of the political anti-drug legislation on the part of the Andean countries, as well as our own, have gone unheeded.

As the world's great power, the United States needs to be proactive in its efforts to stop the "scourge" of narco-terrorism and keep illicit drugs from entering this country. The ideal method for accomplishing that mission is to assign it to a Marine Corps Special Operations Capable unit and allow them to directly interdict narco-terrorist activities in the source countries. The Marine Corps is the force of choice for this mission due to its rapid environmental adaptability and deployment status. However, the low intensity conflict nature of this type of

## Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved*  
*OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>1997</b>	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997</b>			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>U. S. Marine Corps Special Operations in a Narco-Terrorism Environment</b>		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 22134-5067</b>		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>	<b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	<b>62</b>	

operation will require a variety of additional specialized training for successful operations in this environment. What is required is a unit with Raider type training capable of operating for extended periods in a LIC. Raider training, with regard to the critical riverine aspects of the Andean Ridge, is not normally given to deploying units. Specifically, Raiders can be used as an augmentation/attachment to a MEU(SOC). An extant trained Raider force could also be used with the MEU(SOC) acting as an enabler for in-country access.

Conclusions: If we do not eliminate illicit drugs from our society, we face a serious threat to our survival as a nation. Direct in-country intervention by U. S. Marine Raider type forces is the most effective method of eradicating the narco-terrorist threat to U. S. national security. Ideally these efforts will be in concert with host nation support. However, we must take the initiative and be ready to strike.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### CHAPTER

1.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
	Background.....	1
	Problem.....	2
	National Strategy.....	5
2.	THE THREAT: NARCO-TERRORISM.....	7
	Defining Narco-Terrorism.....	7
	The Narco-Terrorist States.....	10
	Narco-Terrorist Groups.....	12
	Low Intensity Conflict.....	20
3.	STATUS QUO ANTE BELLUM: THE ANDEAN STRATEGY.....	21
	The Andean Strategy Objectives.....	21
	Andean Strategy Endstate.....	26
	U. S. Operations in Latin America.....	28
4.	JURISPRUDENCE BACKGROUND.....	31
	International Narcotics Control Strategy.....	31
	Direct Intervention.....	34
5.	LIC AND THE NEWEST CENTURIONS.....	36
	Special Operations Forces.....	36
	LIC and the MEU(SOC).....	39
6.	CONCLUSIONS.....	42
	APPENDIX A: Qualifications, Roles, and Organization for the Raider Force.....	45
	ENDNOTES.....	50
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	61
	REFERENCES.....	64

*"Diplomacy without military force is like music without instruments."*

Frederick the Great

*"Plata o Plomo"*

Narco-terrorist slogan <sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

Dateline, Lima, Peru December 15. In Lima today, an unknown number of rebels who reportedly belong to the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) attacked the U. S. Embassy in downtown Lima and are holding hostages. Several U. S. Marine Security Guards were injured in an exchange of gunfire but remain trapped in the Embassy. Specific demands are unknown at this time but it is believed that the release from prison of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman will be a key demand. The scene is reminiscent of the December 17, 1996, takeover of the Japanese Embassy in Lima by Tupac Amaru guerrillas. Peruvian officials are not forthcoming with details of the status of negotiations as communications with the Embassy have been cut. In Washington, State Department spokesmen seemed noticeably uncomfortable with the immediate U. S. response to the incident and were not able to address the issue of military options in any detail. The President was unavailable for comment ...<sup>2</sup>

The headline above is only a scenario that has potential. That potential may embarrass the United States if we do not prepare to decisively attack the causes of this type of narco-terrorist act.<sup>3</sup> Thus far, U. S. Administrations have only defined an American drug consumption problem, and illicit drug consumption is a threat to national security.<sup>4</sup> What Washington has not yet done is to identify the significance that the sources of these threats pose in order to combat them. What has been neither acknowledged nor identified are the origins of what we now force ourselves to live with, the war in the streets of America. Government policy deals with the problem as it exists from day to day, reacting to the current situation, but no solution will surface unless we identify the root causes.<sup>5</sup> We must be proactive in our efforts to fight this scourge infecting our society.<sup>6</sup> Legalization of illicit drugs, though touted by many as inevitable, is not the solution.<sup>7</sup>

The Marine Corps should establish a force or enhance the training of an existing unit in order to focus direct intervention on the narco-terrorist threat at its source.<sup>8</sup> Since the U. S. military is downsizing, and the Marine Corps has realized and internalized those cuts, the obvious ways to minimize those effects on combat power are to maximize specialized training.<sup>9</sup> The goal of this training should be twofold: to prepare the Marine Corps for additional special operations roles and missions in support of national policy, and to fight against the narco-terrorist threat.

The United States Marine Corps is standing poised on the brink of a momentous occasion when it can tell the American people that it is going into harms way again. The mission will be a series of ongoing campaigns to dramatically reduce from our streets an insidious monster ripping apart our society and infecting the lives of our citizens in even the remotest American community--illegal drugs and terrorist acts. No one is spared the horrific effects of these problems. Narco-terrorists ensure that the constant influx of drugs into the United States fans the flames of desire for the incessant demand, huge profit, and political gain relative to illicit drugs. The "war on drugs"--or lack thereof--needs a real injection of commitment from the U. S. Government.

The U. S. needs to strike at the drug problem in this country by invading the sources of that cancer in foreign countries. These sources are the illegal drug producing and narco-trafficking countries in Central and South Americas--specifically the Andean nations--with the operations they have established for the transportation and distribution of their lucrative but deadly products.<sup>10</sup>

We are continually bombarded with banner headlines, television magazines, and the rhetoric of political candidates who tell us that there is a drug crisis. Children and teenagers are at risk, unsafe streets, dizzying sums of money, helpless officials, political charges and counter-charges alert us that we are in the midst of an alarming phenomenon. The drug crisis in the U. S. is real. There is a plague of dangerous drugs, with all manner of accompanying social pathologies. To understand it, the drug crisis must be placed in its global context and be

understood as a threat to the most fundamental values in modern politics: freedom and democracy. The general public, however, remains mostly unaware of the complex dimensions of the threat.<sup>11</sup> The immediate consequences of the drug trade, most notably violent crime and addiction, are felt by many and grab headlines and lead spots on the television news. A recent *Wall Street Journal/NBC News* poll indicates that drugs, crime and education were the top concerns of voters in the 1996 presidential race.<sup>12</sup>

Every President since Richard Nixon has declared a "war on drugs" and none of them have won. Each outspent his predecessor, yet at the end of every administration the drug trade had only expanded. Now, it has become a global dilemma.<sup>13</sup>

Driven by consumer demand principally, but no longer exclusively in the developed world, the drug trade thrives where the rule of law is weak or nonexistent--conditions that hold in an overwhelming majority in the world's nations. Like any other successful transnational enterprise, it effectively exploits the global trade and financial system, and in so doing undermines the integrity of domestic economies and global markets. With vast economic resources and an almost unlimited capacity to corrupt, the drug trade erodes public institutions and threatens the legitimacy of governments, including many that are chosen democratically.<sup>14</sup>

After decades of apparent futility, U. S. politicians consider the drug issue as anything but a career springboard. But they all fear that it can damage them politically.

That means that we are now treated to quadrennial, practically *pro forma* exercises in which the out-party, Democrat or Republican, pronounces the incumbent president a failure on drugs, which in turn compels him to declare another war on drugs and appoint a new drug czar.<sup>15</sup>

Once the election has been decided, and no matter who wins the White House, more anti-drug money is spent with little discernible effect and the drug nightmare rolls on. According to an estimate by the U. N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the global trade in illegal drugs has become a nearly \$500 billion-a-year industry, a figure that dwarfs the gross domestic products (GDP) of all but the richest nations in the international system, such as the U. S. or Japan.<sup>16</sup> Interpol's estimate for the drug trade industry is about \$400 billion.<sup>17</sup> That would mean that the

drug trade accounts for between 10 percent and 13 percent of all international trade, greater than the international trade in oil.<sup>18</sup> U. S. law-enforcement officials estimate that between \$100 billion and \$300 billion in U. S. currency is laundered each year in the narco-trafficking business.<sup>19</sup>

In 1995, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on intelligence priorities. These Presidential priorities include: Transnational threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international narcotics trafficking, international terrorism, and international organized crime.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, the *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (NSS) signed by the President in February 1996, highlights the issues on counterterrorism and fighting drug trafficking. The NSS states,

"Our policy in countering international terrorists is to make no concessions to terrorists, continue to pressure state sponsors of terrorism, fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists and help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. The administration has undertaken a new approach to the global scourge of drug abuse and trafficking that will better integrate domestic and international activities to reduce the demand and the supply of drugs. We will engage more aggressively with international organizations, financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations in counternarcotics cooperation. Some of these [missions] can be accomplished by conventional forces fielded for primarily theater operations. Often, however, these missions call for specialized units and capabilities."<sup>21</sup>

Governmental efforts to this point have not made significant progress in reducing the horrifying effects of illegal drugs and terrorism on American society.<sup>22</sup> Since 1991, the President has slashed anti-drug aid to Latin America from a level of \$50 million to \$13 million in 1996, which has severely hamstrung law enforcement operations worldwide.<sup>23</sup> Drug use and abuse has grown tremendously since the beginning of the Clinton Presidency. From 1992 to 1995, drug use in youths from ages 12 to 17 has risen 106 percent. Cocaine use among teenagers leaped 166 percent from 1994 to 1995.<sup>23</sup> It is now time to reverse this trend to safeguard the future of our nation.



However, without determined guidance and aggressive action from the President, his political rhetoric is useless and the NSS mere eyewash. If in fact the President decides to take the threat seriously, then the "specialized forces" he describes in the NSS can expand their roles and missions and take the "war on drugs" to where it hurts the most. The Marine Corps is the logical force of choice to expand its roles and missions, to include directly countering the narco-terrorist threat, due primarily to its rapid environmental adaptability.<sup>25</sup> Before examining that "force" and how best to engage it, we must first understand the threat in the context of the political, cultural, and environmental factors involved.

## THE THREAT: NARCO-TERRORISM<sup>26</sup>

The real enemy in the war on drugs is not the American people; it is those states and organizations who combine drugs with terror in a still largely clandestine war against "Western" societies, above all, the American one.<sup>27</sup> Since the enemy has not been clearly defined he can not be eliminated, and therefore the measures that the U. S. has implemented to date have been incomplete, misdirected, and the problem not solved. The narco-terrorist who has evaluated the "West's" anti-drug efforts must find reason to believe that he is winning the war of attrition. The narco-terrorist wins if he survives, therefore, we must understand where he comes from philosophically, politically, economically, and culturally.<sup>28</sup>

The same sociopolitical factors that foster the development of illicit narcotics agriculture also provide the setting for emerging or existing insurgencies. The illicit narcotics trade benefits the insurgents in two ways. First, government counternarcotics efforts without effective crop substitution, intervention, or other development programs further alienate a neglected population and provide the guerrillas a base of potential recruits.<sup>29</sup> Second, insurgents gain weapons and financing from their associations with narcotrafficking--either from extortion or from direct participation in narcotics processing.<sup>30</sup>

The combination of terrorist tactics and drug money has permeated the fabric of Latin American society because of the keen interest the terrorists and drug producing organizations share in destabilizing governments and in breaking down the established social order.<sup>31</sup> Narcotics traffickers have adopted terrorist tactics to maintain the flow of drugs, acting with their own paramilitary forces and hired terrorists. The terrorists in turn have used drug money to fund insurgent activities aimed at the overthrow of Latin American governments and the restructuring of society along Marxist, Maoist, or Castroite (Communist) lines.<sup>32</sup> The signs of narcotics-induced disintegration are apparent everywhere in the hemisphere, in some nations at a very advanced state. Mexico, Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia head the list and receive the bulk of attention, but narco-terrorism has a habit of moving almost at will into other countries.<sup>33</sup>

The drug trade is an enigma. The potential rewards are so great that no matter the risks, there are always new contenders who are willing and able to step in when a drug lord goes down. Similarly, there are millions of poverty stricken peasants throughout Latin America whose traditional crops bring so little in the increasingly competitive global commodities markets that they are willing, too, to risk their lives for the far greater monetary rewards of growing coca.<sup>34</sup> As long as there is a market for the drugs, there will always be a drug lord determined to deliver and reap the profits.

Unconventional threats to national security are not based on the ability to seize territory and defeat military forces; rather, they affect U. S. interests through less direct means and often take advantage of, or are directed by, non-state actors or forces.<sup>35</sup> Terrorism, insurgency, and narcotics trafficking are all means that foreign adversaries may employ or manipulate to their advantage and at the expense of U. S. national interests. Such unconventional threats are distinct from the threat posed by the military forces of other nations and the routine political and economic competition that mark interstate relations.<sup>36</sup> The cumulative effect of unconventional threats is a slow but steady erosion of the U. S. security posture that must be stopped before it destroys American society.

Ironically, the unparalleled success of U. S. forces in the Gulf War has also contributed to the likelihood of unconventional threats. Having witnessed the proficiency of conventional U. S. military forces, foes of U. S. interests will probably be more inclined to challenge the United States through unconventional means.<sup>37</sup>

In assessing the types of narco-terrorist groups that are likely to be operating in today's transnational environment and the threats that they may pose to U. S. interests, it is important to engage in an examination and analysis of several groups from the Andean countries--the focus of this paper. In surveying the narco-terrorist landscape, it is necessary to focus on major patterns of narco-terrorist organizations and their operations. However, bringing artificial analytic order out of the enigma that is narco-terrorism is not the intent here. Instead, it is probably more prudent to suggest that there are a variety of highly complex narco-terrorist networks that are

constantly subject to change. Some of the most influential and historically notorious organizations will be examined.

Significantly, it is important to note that while there indeed may be major changes in objectives, operations, and manpower, the various narco-terrorist groups have nevertheless developed their own methods of operation; and many of them will be resistant to change. Therefore, they can more easily be attacked, neutralized, or reduced. What is particularly alarming for U. S. interests is that narco-terrorists will soon probably have--through their drug connections-- the capability to acquire a growing arsenal of sophisticated weapons that will allow them to inflict damage on the delicate infrastructure of the Andean governments.<sup>38</sup>

The Narco-terrorist states of the Andes are the greatest threat to U. S. national security today. However, note must be taken of the Central American narcotraffickers.<sup>39</sup> Despite various U. S. government interdiction efforts, Central America continues to be a primary transshipment point for cocaine to the United States. The supply of drugs entering the U. S. via Central America remains virtually uninterrupted. Drug traffickers have adjusted and adapted their mode of operations to evade U. S. interdiction efforts and are increasingly using ingeniously disguised drug cargoes in sea and land transportation vehicles to move drugs.<sup>40</sup> These modes are difficult to detect and interdict. The Central American nations have neither the resources nor the institutional capability to address the new drug trafficking modes and are heavily dependent on U. S. assistance.<sup>41</sup>

The large volume of vehicular traffic crossing into Mexico from Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica) also provides traffickers with ample smuggling opportunities.<sup>42</sup> Once in Mexico, whether by boat, air, or land, the drugs are usually destined for the United States. U. S. Customs estimates that two-thirds of all cocaine entering the United States crosses the U. S.--Mexican land border concealed in cargo.<sup>43</sup>

In Europe, the Andean drug barons are doing business with the Sicilian Mafia and

other criminal groups in Italy, France, Germany, and Britain. They are also penetrating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)--formerly the Soviet Union-- and opening new markets there in association with the thriving criminal underworld.<sup>44</sup> Despite these developments, there is no convincing evidence of a globally cohesive plan to utilize drug trafficking as an element of revolutionary war. It stretches credibility to believe that the international drug trade was a creation, rather than merely one more instrument, of communist (Soviet) policy. One indication of the truth of this observation has been the fact that communism's demise has not led to a significant decline in drug production and trafficking.<sup>45</sup> We must also not ignore the significant threat that the non-communist "Golden Triangle" of Southeast Asia poses. But as stated earlier, I will concentrate on the most seriously developed and sophisticated threat to U. S. security--the Andean nations.<sup>46</sup>

Colombia is the world's primary cocaine production center. As the home of the dominant drug syndicates, it is currently the world's leading producer, distributor, and a major cultivator of coca, marijuana, opium poppy, and of heroin.<sup>47</sup> Colombian narcotics labs have an estimated yearly production capacity of 600-720 metric tons (MT) of cocaine and 20 MT of heroin, the majority of which is bound for the U. S. Cocaine is the most serious drug problem facing the U. S. in the social costs it imposes and the lives it ruins through addiction and with the violent crime it fosters. Three-quarters of the cocaine available worldwide comes from Colombia.<sup>48</sup>

Weak unenforceable legislation, corruption, and inefficiency have hampered efforts to bring mid and high level narcotics traffickers to justice. Colombia is home to the world's primary cocaine trafficking syndicates.<sup>49</sup> Taking advantage of the fragmentation of the Medellin syndicate and the killing of kingpin Pablo Escobar in 1993, the Cali syndicate was for several years dominant in the cocaine trade in Colombia and exercised a powerful influence worldwide.<sup>50</sup> The Cali kingpins and their key lieutenants are well known to law enforcement both in Colombia and the United States. Criminal cases and warrants exist against many of them, sometimes in both countries, yet only a handful have been arrested. However, by 1995, six of the top seven Cali leaders had been arrested.<sup>51</sup> The fragmentation of the Medellin, and in

its turn, the Cali syndicate, has not reduced the drug flows from Colombia.<sup>52</sup> The failure of the Colombian political establishment to support bilateral anti-drug agreements and the efforts of counternarcotics and counterterrorism forces operating on the ground is the principal reason for Colombia's continued lackluster performance in the war on drugs.

U. S. counternarcotics experts believe that Colombia is the world's first narco-democracy--a narcotics superstate--a country whose economy, political system, and society have been profoundly compromised and distorted by the wealth, power, and global influence of the drug cartels.<sup>53</sup> The cartels are now more frequently turning to guerrilla groups for enforcement and protection of their narcotics operations. The cartels pay the groups to safeguard the drug manufacturing process and transportation networks and derive money and weapons to support their causes.<sup>54</sup> Colombia's two main guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).<sup>55</sup>

FARC is formerly the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the PCC. FARC and ELN are well organized, equipped, and experienced insurgents. Historically, they have been the strongest of the insurgent groups.<sup>56</sup> They are predominantly rural-based insurgent organizations that largely control the coca-growing areas of the country that may also cultivate and refine cocaine directly. Experts believe that they have also taken a share of the growing opium trade.<sup>57</sup>

For well over a decade, both the FARC and ELN have operated at will within most of the Colombian regions and follow the Che Guevara school of rural guerrilla warfare.<sup>58</sup> Colombia's tainted history of illegal enterprise has laid the foundation for the narcotics trade. However, the burgeoning narcotics industry could not flourish as it has without one critical factor, and that is the drug traffickers' alliance with the guerrillas of Colombia. That alliance is the basis for narco-terrorism.<sup>59</sup> Without an alliance, the problem could not exist in this hemisphere in the enormity that it now enjoys.

There are two fundamental characteristics of this alliance. First, the economic incentive: Colombia's guerrilla armies have learned through long experience that drug money can provide

them critically needed resources to carry out their revolutions, and thus prolong the violence. As a result of that understanding, it is now estimated that FARC's "fronts,"--its cadres collecting "taxes"--receive protection money for guarding the illegal plots growing coca. They also protect the secret cocaine processing laboratories and the landing strips that dot the Colombian countryside, and provide safe journey for air and water craft bearing drugs enroute to American consumers.<sup>60</sup>

Second, the ideological incentive: there are now direct working links between the terrorist-guerrilla groups and the narco-traffickers to carry out acts of terrorism. The motives may be different, but their common goal is to destabilize and undermine the government.<sup>61</sup> In exchange for guerrilla protection, the cartels would allocate a percentage of its drug profits to be spent on arms for the insurgents. While the drug lords had their gunmen enabling them to carry out their business, the guerrillas used the monies paid by the cartels to escalate their wars and spread their ideology.<sup>62</sup>

By any standard, Colombia is no longer a reliable ally in the U. S. war on drugs. The Colombian constitution prohibits extradition of Colombian nationals.<sup>63</sup> The time has come to begin treating the Colombian government as part of the American drug problem rather than part of the solution. The first step would be through International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) decertification from the U. S. President. This would allow UN and other sanctions to pressure the Colombian government into stepping up its commitment to cooperate with counternarcotics campaigns.

Peru is the world's largest producer of coca.<sup>64</sup> The DEA conservatively estimates that cocaine is worth \$600-700 million dollars a year to the Peruvian economy; the U. S. Embassy estimates that it may be twice as much.<sup>65</sup> The Upper Huallaga Valley is the world's richest and most dominant area for the cultivation of the coca plant and a center for the burgeoning narco-terrorist drug trafficking environment.<sup>66</sup> Coca production is the major, often sole, source of income for almost all of the approximately 300,000 farmers in the Upper Huallaga.<sup>67</sup>

Peru's most notorious terrorist organizations are the Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).<sup>68</sup> Some estimates number the SL with 5,000 members and an additional 50,000 supporters and sympathizers--this is an army involved in a war.<sup>69</sup> The Sendero began as a fanatical Maoist, extremely violent urban revolutionary organization in the Ayacucho region of southern Peru.<sup>70</sup> Under pressure of government counterinsurgency campaigns, it shifted operations in the early 1980s to the Upper Huallaga Valley in the north, a remote, virtually inaccessible area which is one of the world's major centers of coca growing, supplying some 40 percent of the world's crude cocaine (coca base).<sup>71</sup> In the Upper Huallaga, the Sendero was able to take advantage of popular dissatisfaction among the Indian coca growers with government anti-drug policy--pursued with U. S. cooperation--and with trafficker excesses.<sup>72</sup> This enabled them to gain peasant support and, posing as the protector of the peasantry, to achieve substantive political control over the area. It is also believed that Sendero has joined forces with traffickers to form and train anti-government militia forces.<sup>73</sup>

Sendero Luminoso also inserted itself as a middleman between growers and mostly Colombian traffickers, ensuring that the growers received a fair price for the product and representing their interests and thus cementing their loyalty, while imposing taxes on the traffickers to finance revolutionary activity and bringing an end to their dominance of the valley.<sup>74</sup> The Sendero have also protected drug shipments, warned of impending raids, and guaranteed grower discipline and the timely meeting of demands for raw materials.<sup>75</sup>

In return, apart from the political benefits, Sendero is alleged to have received approximately thirty million dollars or more per year from involvement in various aspects of the drug trade. It is also alleged that Sendero took one fifth of the growers' harvest as a revolutionary tithe, which they then processed into paste and sold or bartered to the traffickers.<sup>76</sup> Like the Colombian FARC, Sendero functions as an armed trade union representing the growers,



by fixing the prices for labor, agitating to maintain high paste prices and preventing abuses by cartel personnel.<sup>77</sup>

Five years after the capture of Sendero leader Abimael Guzman, the Maoist terrorist group is struggling, attempting to rebuild and resolve its leadership problems. The Sendero have become less active, its operations smaller and less sophisticated. However, it retains the capability to cause considerable harm, and its "anti-imperial" animus has not changed.<sup>78</sup>

MRTA is the smaller Marxist insurgent group currently holding the Japanese Embassy in Lima.<sup>79</sup> While it has suffered some military setbacks, the group has the financial resources to continue to be a threat. It continues to spread its base of operations from Lima to the northern part of the Upper Huallaga Valley. In an attempt to distinguish itself from the random violence of SL, the MRTA has limited its attacks to mainly Peruvian government and U. S. targets, and avoids innocent Peruvians. MRTA supports growers that cultivate coca and taxes traffickers for protection and permission to land smuggling aircraft.<sup>80</sup>

Of the two Peruvian insurgency groups, the Sendero Luminoso is the more dangerous. It conducts violent guerrilla campaigns in rural areas of the interior and to a growing extent in some cities and is particularly active in the Upper Huallaga Valley.<sup>81</sup>

The Sendero's primary objective is to overthrow the civilian government through overt and clandestine political struggle and terrorist activities, such as brutal killings of villagers, assassinations of government officials, and bombings.<sup>82</sup> The SL and the MRTA further complicate the drug problem by playing both a passive and active role in its production and distribution. By protecting the coca-growing peasants from joint Peruvian--U. S. government efforts to combat the drug trade, the SL believes it can gain additional support bases for its proposed "new democracy" in Peru.<sup>83</sup> The SL also control as many as 120 or more landing strips in the Upper Huallaga Valley, collecting taxes from air traffickers.<sup>84</sup>

Peru has not been successful in establishing a climate in which U. S. aid, in any form, can be employed. Its law enforcement efforts have not had a significant impact on disrupting drug

trafficking activities or reducing the amount of coca cultivation. Despite some recent setbacks, Peru's terrorists are still a significant threat to U. S. security.<sup>85</sup>

Bolivia remains the second largest producer of coca leaf, after Peru. Coca grown in Bolivia is the basis for about one-third of the world's cocaine.<sup>86</sup> Bolivia, historically, has received the most U. S. military support and financial aid of all the Andean nations.<sup>87</sup> This support combined with Bolivian government programs enjoyed some limited success in early years of this international cooperation.<sup>88</sup> Drug labs were destroyed, crops changed to licit products, and narcotics traffickers interdicted. Despite this unprecedented cooperation, however, the anti-drug effort has been a mixed success at best.<sup>89</sup> In the 1980s, the anti-American element in Bolivia charged that U. S. was turning Bolivia into a military base which had a dampening effect on the antinarcotics thrust of this effort.<sup>90</sup> After U. S. troops departed, many of the destroyed drug labs were rebuilt, coca leaf production increased, arrests of criminals decreased, and corruption continued unabated.<sup>91</sup>

Bolivian terrorist groups have not developed the notorious reputations that their Peruvian and Colombian brothers have earned. However, there are some notable groups such as the Zarate Willca Armed Forces of Liberation who have dynamite bombed the Bolivian Congress. Rachel Ehrenfeld in *Narco-terrorism* calls them Bolivia's "future Sendero Luminoso."<sup>92</sup> Their parallel futures are obviously worrisome to the Bolivian government as there is so much fertile soil to launch a similar campaign.<sup>93</sup> The Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN) which has ties to the Colombian ELN, shares the same "Castroite-Guevarist" ideological background.<sup>94</sup> However, the group is comparatively small and does not enjoy the support of the peasants who view them as "foreigners." Their influence is small but they still exist as a threat to Bolivian security and must not be discounted.

What does all this mean to the U. S.? The linchpin of a bold and successful counternarcotics strategy is political will. This means the willingness to push ahead with

effective anti-drug measures that may be politically unpopular in the short term, but can permanently improve conditions over time. When the government backs down it is almost always a sign of flagging political will.<sup>95</sup> The American public and military notice it and so do the narco-terrorists. The U. S. has individual statesmen, law enforcement, and military professionals who would like to see the drug trade crushed. However, the government has not shown the political determination to carry out the fight. The President and the Congress must take aggressive action and decide now to stop this threat to national security.

What the U. S. government has not done to this point is to identify the type of conflict that it faces in order to counteract that threat. Since we are not in a declared war in its strictest definition, we must select a definition that fits the NSS/NMS philosophy and strategic intent in preparing for and conducting countermeasures. The environmental description of a slice of the warfare spectrum which fits the general characteristics of a campaign to fight the narco-terrorism threat is that of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). The U. S. government needs to recognize and accept this reality to energize politically, economically, and militarily.

LIC is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among nations. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies and can range from subversion to the use of armed force.

LIC is analogous to war in that it requires the same philosophical, strategic, operational, and tactical approach as war. However, it is a special type of war that has some irregular considerations as compared to a higher form of conventional war. LIC can be waged in isolation or as part of a larger conflict. By nature, most LIC will occur in underdeveloped or emerging countries. The economies of these countries are usually limited and frequently fragile, subject to corruption and other forms of malfeasance. Unless the U. S. commits to warfare in a LIC environment, these factors make a decisive victory over narco-terrorism a somewhat elusive goal.

The narco-terrorist LIC that the U. S. faces today is an undeclared conflict relative to public knowledge and governmental commitment. As the dominant world power, we should cast off our myopic view towards the narco-terrorism threat, and declare our intent to win the "war on drugs" with direct intervention by the appropriately tasked military force.

## STATUS QUO ANTE BELLUM: THE ANDEAN STRATEGY

The U. S. continues to face serious problems of drug abuse and drug-related violence for which there are no quick or easy solutions. However, the "Andean Strategy," that targets the cocaine supply coming from source countries is not working and evidence exists that it cannot succeed.<sup>96</sup> Furthermore, in pursuing this strategy, its military component is likely to have more serious negative consequences on human rights, democratization, and internal stability in the Andean region.<sup>97</sup>

The "Andean Strategy" was approved by President Bush in August of 1989 to reduce the flow of illicit drugs from the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, and is the centerpiece of the U. S. national drug control strategy.<sup>98</sup> This strategy is part of the overall effort to reduce the cocaine supply in the U. S. by 60% before the end of 1999, and includes eradication, low-level interdiction at the processing and trafficking stages, and efforts targeting high level cartel leaders.<sup>99</sup> Although this strategy proposes significant amounts of economic assistance as part of the five-year, \$2.2 billion "Andean Initiative," it marks a sharp shift towards militarization for the countries involved.<sup>100</sup>

The strategy has four principal objectives:

- Strengthening the political and institutional capabilities of the Andean governments to enable them to take the needed steps to disrupt and dismantle the drug trafficking organizations;
- Increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement and military activities in the countries against the drug trafficking organizations;
- Inflicting significant damage on the drug trafficking organizations by working with these countries to disrupt and dismantle the organizations;
- Strengthening and diversifying the legitimate economies of the Andean countries so they can overcome the destabilizing effects of removing cocaine as a major source of income.<sup>101</sup>

Interestingly, several tendencies marked the first years of the "Andean Strategy." First, and as planned in the first year-and-a-half of the "Andean Strategy," the U. S. military's role in

the drug war had expanded dramatically.<sup>102</sup> In 1990, US Southern Command's (USSouthCom) then-commander, General Maxwell Thurman, ordered his subordinate commanders and staff to make the anti-drug mission their "number one priority," and drugs remain the command's top priority today.<sup>103</sup> While the direct presence of U. S. troops in the Andes region is relatively small, (the specifics are classified) this presence has risen steadily since 1991.<sup>104</sup> SouthCom's anti-drug budget is now in excess of \$400 million.<sup>105</sup>

Since late 1989, all of the Andean governments have formally agreed to an expanded U. S. military role in the drug war. In Peru, after extensive negotiations, the Fujimori government signed a bilateral anti-drug accord with the United States in May 1991. In the accord, the two governments agreed to sign three annexes governing military, police, and economic assistance. The U. S. proposal for the military annex includes the training of six strike battalions and the refurbishing of twenty A-37 airplanes.<sup>106</sup>

Under intense U. S. pressure, the Bolivian government signed an accord in May 1990 agreeing to expand U. S. military participation in the drug war. However, the then-Paz Zamora government delayed inclusion of his army in counter-narcotics operations for almost a year. In April 1991, the first of over 100 U. S. Special Forces troops arrived to begin training the Bolivian army.<sup>107</sup>

In 1989, the Colombian government agreed to a greater role for its armed forces in counter-narcotics missions, and since then the U. S. has provided counter-narcotics advice and training to the armed forces and police.<sup>108</sup>

Following the bilateral accords, U. S. military assistance to the Andean nations has risen dramatically. Economic assistance, which has also increased, consists overwhelmingly of balance of payments support, not assistance for development projects. Military assistance, including drawdown equipment, to Colombia and Bolivia jumped from less than \$5 million in FY1988 to over \$140 million by FY1990. Military aid to these two countries exceeded that to all of Central America in FY1990. Over \$141 million was requested in military assistance for

Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru for FY1992.<sup>109</sup> Over \$313 million was requested in economic aid for the three Andean countries in FY1992.<sup>110</sup>

These figures merely account for the U. S. "Andean Strategy" of the late 1980s and early 90s; since 1990, the U. S. has spent over \$70 billion on drug control programs of all kinds.<sup>111</sup> Yet more drugs are available at lower prices and higher quality than ever before, and drug abuse remains widespread.<sup>112</sup> As the "Andean Strategy" is a centerpiece of the overall U. S. approach, one must ask has it worked? Is the U. S. winning the "war on drugs" with the Andean narcocracies?

Thus far, the "Andean Strategy" has failed to achieve its goals. While cocaine use declined immediately after the strategy implementation, there are now indications of a rapid rise of abuse in the U. S. with a commensurate rise in associated crime.<sup>113</sup> The Bush administration's main supply-side goals were to reduce cocaine supply by 60% within 10 years, and by 15% within 2 years.<sup>114</sup> Since those goals were set in 1989, Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) agents report that production in the Andean region--where U. S. efforts have been focused-- has actually increased over 28%.<sup>115</sup> Eradication efforts in 1990 have destroyed only an estimated 4% of total production in the Andes.<sup>116</sup>

Indications are now that the "Andean Strategy" cannot succeed because it ignores two fundamental realities in the region. First, Andean governments do not have the political will to pursue the "war on drugs." They have shown disinterest or outright opposition to the military thrust of the "Andean Strategy." Corruption is rampant within Andean governments, and counterinsurgency is a top priority with their military forces.<sup>117</sup> In negotiating the bilateral accords, Peruvian officials resisted U. S. proposals for a military solution to the drug problems, favoring more socio-economic assistance for alternative crop development. However, U. S. law requires the U. S. to vote against any multilateral loans to Peru in international financial institutions if the government is not cooperating with the U. S. anti-drug efforts.<sup>118</sup> The "stick" of legal sanctions and the "carrot" of desperately needed foreign aid led President Fujimori to accept the military component in May 1991.

As in Peru, the Bolivian administration resisted having their army involvement in counternarcotics operations. When U. S. training of the army began in April 1991 after a year-long delay, protests erupted from labor groups, opposition parties, and the Catholic Church.<sup>119</sup> Current events are likely to strain Colombia's cooperation with U.S. anti-drug efforts. Colombia has never actively sought military aid, and has offered to forego all foreign assistance in exchange for trade benefits.<sup>120</sup>

Second, the "Andean Strategy" ignores the market logic of the cocaine trade. Even if Andean governments could carry out effective counternarcotics programs, cocaine use would not be significantly affected because of the flawed logic of U. S. anti-drug policy.<sup>121</sup> The "Andean Strategy" assumes the following links between supply-side efforts and U. S. demand: (A) that supply-side efforts will reduce the availability of cocaine to U. S. consumers, and (B) that disruption of production and trafficking will drive up the price to the consumer, reducing demand. This logic ignores two fundamental economic realities of cocaine trafficking.<sup>122</sup> In what's known as the "balloon effect," squeezing production and trafficking in one location simply forces operations to shift elsewhere. Hence, even successful repression of supply would have little effect on the ultimate price, and thus demand, of cocaine on the U. S. streets. Without the suppression of production throughout the hemisphere, counternarcotics efforts are useless.<sup>123</sup>

Additionally, corruption is rampant within Andean military and security forces. Andean officials retain working alliances with drug traffickers in all three countries, largely because of the unrivaled rewards offered by traffickers.<sup>124</sup> Cooperation with narco-traffickers is also a proven survival mechanism for many officials.

Both the armed forces and the police of the Andean region have long been reluctant to have an expanded role for the U. S. military in counternarcotics operations.<sup>125</sup> Although the militaries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru welcome U. S. security assistance, any counternarcotics aid will undoubtedly be used for other missions of higher priority for the Andean armed forces.<sup>126</sup> Counterinsurgency, viewed by Andean militaries as independent of the drug war, is chief among these other missions.<sup>127</sup>



The "Andean Strategy" is not only unworkable but directly harmful to U. S. interests in the region. U. S. narcotics-related aid is directly contributing to counterinsurgency campaigns characterized by widespread and systematic abuses of resources (foreign aid) and human rights.<sup>128</sup> As the militarization of the drug war sluggishly continues, U. S. policy is likely to exacerbate those abuses. The "Andean Strategy" is also undermining civilian control of locally powerful militaries. It also cements their impunity from prosecution for corruption and human rights violations. Ironically, the strategy appears to have already contributed to the Shining Path's recruitment in the upper Huallaga valley of Peru, and poses the serious danger of sparking armed unrest in Bolivia's volatile Chapare coca-growing region.<sup>129</sup>

Ultimately, the "Andean Strategy" has not worked and the "drug war" issue has now become a question of foreign policy priorities. As international drug control efforts have failed to achieve desired results, the focus of U. S. policy has shifted from source country efforts to transit countries and, with the Clinton administration, back to the source countries.<sup>130</sup> In the past, U. S. anti-drug policy was subordinated to the exigencies of the Cold War. Today, it is being subordinated to the primacy of international trade and commerce.<sup>131</sup> Throughout the transition from one epoch to the other, the drug trade has continued to expand, to the point where the rule of law in established democracies is imperiled and the integrity of global markets is in question.<sup>132</sup> This is a direct threat to the national security of the United States that must be dealt with immediately and decisively.

A principal objective of the U. S. national drug control policy is to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.<sup>133</sup> To accomplish this objective, the U. S. has several law enforcement agencies overtly involved in counternarcotics operations. International anti-narcotics training is carried out by the DEA, the U. S. Customs Service, and the U. S. Coast Guard.<sup>134</sup> The missions of these agencies are to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States, collect intelligence regarding the organizations involved in drug trafficking, and support worldwide narcotics investigations. All of these agencies have had numerous but limited successes in combating the flow of narcotics into the U.S.<sup>135</sup>

Increasingly, U. S. law enforcement agencies stationed at home and abroad are seeing their prime responsibility as promoting the creation of host government systems that are compatible with and serve the same broad goals as ours.<sup>136</sup> However, these programs have not achieved the intended results as part of the "Andean Strategy" despite a continued Herculean effort from those involved.<sup>137</sup> Without some serious new thinking and the application of new approaches, the borderless world threatens to become an increasingly lawless one.

What is being done by the U. S. in the Andes today? The U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) has been designated the lead agency for detecting and monitoring the movement of narcotics into the United States.<sup>138</sup> Anti-drug efforts in the Andean countries today have involved U. S. support for: (1) Crop substitution, which rewards peasant growers for substituting legal cash crops for coca; (2) Crop eradication, where agencies locate and destroy coca fields; (3) Interdiction, when law enforcement and military forces seek to disrupt the shipment of coca products; and (4) Counter-insurgency, in which the military attempts to defeat narco-traffickers to eliminate their base of popular and financial support.<sup>139</sup>

Concurrently, U. S. military forces have been actively engaged in providing assistance to the Andean nation's "drug war" through the proactive efforts of the U. S. Commander in Chief South (USCINCSOUTH) located in Panama.<sup>140</sup> These efforts have been in an attempt to stop the importation of drugs into the U. S. by stopping the exportation from sources in Latin America. Typical support missions have included: listening and observation posts, small construction engineer projects, diver hull inspections, vehicle cargo inspections, linguist support, intelligence analysis support, ground based radar, and aviation support.<sup>141</sup>

Also provided as in-country support [unclassified] are, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Extended Training Service Specialists (ETSSs), and Deployments for Training units (DFTs), that assist in training host nation military organizations and law enforcement agencies that have counterdrug missions.<sup>142</sup> The Coalition and Special Warfare (CSW) Counterdrug (CD) Section of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) has been providing periodic Riverine Training Teams (RTTs) to the Colombian Marines and police forces since 1989, with

some positive results.<sup>143</sup> Additional Andean nation expanded role RTTs are planned for the future and may include U. S. Coast Guard operations.<sup>144</sup>

Additionally, the Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH) currently located in Panama, has tasked the Commander of Marine Forces South (COMMARFORSouth) to assume the component lead for USSOUTHCOM riverine operations in support of counter-drug trafficking efforts within the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR).<sup>145</sup> The focus of effort will be on the initial establishment of a combined Joint Regional Riverine Training Center (JRRTC), Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS), and Jungle Training School (JTS) Panama, into a Multinational Counterdrug Coordination and Training Center (MCCTC).

MCCTC's mission will be to plan, prepare, and focus coordination of U. S. and the Latin nation air, land, maritime, and riverine forces in support of regional, joint and combined counterdrug operations.<sup>146</sup> MCCTC will also synchronize operations, intelligence, and training efforts.<sup>147</sup> Although SOUTHCOM will be moving to Miami, Florida, sometime in 1997, the MCCTC will stay in Panama.

The U. S. drug interdiction players also include: the U. S. Air Force who provide intercept and tracking aircraft; the Treasury Department who provide Customs Service surveillance and intercept support and the Secret Service who handle money laundering; the Department of Transportation's U. S. Coast Guard and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) who intercept aerial and waterborne smuggling; the Department of Justice provides the FBI, DEA, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).<sup>148</sup>

The dedication, bravery, and resourcefulness of these organizations has been superb, but they are effectively just a drop in the bucket in combating the narco-terrorism campaign in a war that is not being won. The flaw is in the lack of political will to conduct sustained military intervention. Because sanctions, UN accords, embargoes, exclusion zones, and in-country programs will be used more often in the post-Cold War world, the U. S. military will be tasked to enforce these measures. More aggressive interdiction can make these measures more successful.

These efforts will work most effectively when they are accompanied by forceful military operations.<sup>149</sup> As a form of diplomatic leverage, the threat (or promise) to use U. S. forces becomes more credible if there is substantial U. S. political and public support for counterdrug operations.<sup>150</sup> That support depends upon the perception that U. S. interests are at stake.

## JURISPRUDENCE BACKGROUND

The U. S. State Department has published an annual "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (INCSR) since the mid-1980s.<sup>151</sup> Produced by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the INCSR is a detailed assessment of the worldwide drug and money-laundering trade.<sup>152</sup> Looked at over the years, the State Department reports provide a detailed chronicle of a global infestation by narco-terrorist forces that have either overrun, outrun or outflanked every U. S. and international attempt to control it.<sup>153</sup>

Within the INCSR, the White House must certify whether the countries involved in the drug trade have cooperated fully with U. S. anti-drug efforts and, if not, whether they should be sanctioned.<sup>154</sup> The State Department reports have been expanded to include country-by-country assessments to provide an analytical basis for the certification process. However, the annual certification process produces political fireworks and considerable "truth-bending" in Congressional hearings.<sup>155</sup> The benefits for certification are that foreign assistance continues to flow into the particular country in the form of multilateral bank lending and trade benefits as well as law enforcement and military training support.<sup>156</sup> Two other areas that are considered by the State Department reports are the countries that are major sources of precursor chemicals and major money-laundering countries and territories.<sup>157</sup>

In March of 1995, the administration denied full certification to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; instead they were made eligible for continued U. S. assistance through "national security waivers."<sup>158</sup> These "waivers" allow aid into these countries despite their individual lack of cooperation in the "war on drugs." The certification process and the Clinton administration's heightened criticisms and threats of sanctions if more progress is not made against narco-terrorism have strained relations between the countries.<sup>159</sup> This certification process has been largely ineffective during the last two administrations and illicit drugs continue to poison our society. For example, the State Department and U. S. Customs are aware that narco-traffickers

have taken full advantage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to move drugs and money into and out of the U. S.<sup>160</sup>

The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS) and its derivative National Military Strategy (NMS) both outline the U. S. position with regard to counterterrorism and drug trafficking.<sup>161</sup> The NSS is quoted above but the NMS expands the military role and states: "The Armed Forces, working in close cooperation with law enforcement agencies, will use all means authorized by the President and the Congress to halt the flow of illegal drugs into this country. We will also act both unilaterally and in concert with security partners to fight international terrorism."<sup>162</sup>

There are three basic categories of national interests that can merit the use of our armed forces. The first category involves America's vital interests including interests that are of a broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity--the defense of U. S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being. The second category includes cases in which important, but not vital, U. S. interests are threatened. That is, the interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live.<sup>163</sup>

The third category involves primarily humanitarian interests using the unique capabilities of our military rather than on the combat power of military force.<sup>164</sup> The decision to use force is dictated first and foremost by our national interests. We are more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement. The United States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of the public.<sup>165</sup> The American people must get the message to the President that the drug problem must be stopped by his immediate attention and action now that the 1996 elections are over. The longer the problem percolates in society, the harder it will be to eradicate.

U. S. military personnel are prohibited from participating in counterdrug operations, according to Sections 371-379 under Section 10 of the 1982 *Defense Authorization Act*. The DoD may provide information, training, equipment, and other support to law enforcement

agencies, but is prohibited from directly participating in interdictions of a vessel or aircraft, searches, seizures, and arrests.<sup>166</sup>

The time is ripe for a change in the legal status of U. S. military forces to allow them to take the "war on drugs" to the source if we are truly serious about the health of our society. Partisan political rhetoric is not enough to solve the narco-terrorism problems. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) into the Andean hinterlands can only be partially successful and their effects transitory. Direct military intervention is the key to solving this dilemma. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would probably not admit it, but the only way to stop this threat is direct in-country proactive operations.

But why direct in-country intervention? For several key reasons, direct intervention is the next logical step in the evolution of the U. S. "war on drugs." The first reason is technology. U. S. forces can bring a technological edge to the fight. We can bring night vision capability, precision munitions, global positioning systems, advanced communications, stealth equipment, modes of transportation, and a host of other equipment that the Andean nations just do not possess or have the skills to operate. Far too many Latin American military and law enforcement organizations are manned by undereducated "peasants" who can not operate sensitive, complex systems. Training areas and ammunition are also in short supply.<sup>167</sup>

Additionally, terrorist organizations are quick to adapt to changing technology by obtaining the ability to counter technology through corrupt officials or capturing equipment from government agencies. It is far easier to discard, sell, or barter a piece of technology when you are threatened or bribed than to operate it successfully in a narco-terrorist environment. While terrorists embrace technological change through necessity, Andean nation law enforcement has failed to exploit technology through ignorance or lack of funding.<sup>168</sup>

The second reason is political. The failure of the "Andean Strategy" and the repetitive failure of the Andean nations to comply with signed treaties, interoperability agreements, counternarcotics laws, sanctions, and numerous international drug summit agreements, has led to continued problems in the U. S. and worldwide.<sup>169</sup> Diplomatic efforts have obviously not

worked. The U. S. must have a clear strategy and be willing to use it operationally and tactically.



## LIC AND THE NEWEST CENTURIONS

What then must the Marine Corps do to defeat the narco-terrorist threat in a LIC environment? Who will fight these campaigns? Special Operations Forces (SOF) are exceptionally flexible instruments for responding to LIC and unconventional threats such as narco-terrorism. Their small size, unique capabilities, and the relatively self-sufficient nature of SOF units often means that their employment will not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with larger, more visible conventional forces.<sup>170</sup> SOF may be used to maximize the effectiveness of conventional forces by augmenting U. S. Navy, Coast Guard, U. S. law enforcement agencies, and host nation enforcement of sanctions. SOF are best employed when they utilize stealth, speed, precision, and audacity to undertake penetration and strike operations against selected targets.(see Appendix A)

Dramatic improvements in recent years of conventional standoff precision-strike and long range reconnaissance capabilities have significantly reduced the risks to the operators on the ground. These capabilities have been enhanced by advanced technologies in such areas as thermal imagery, electronic-signals collection, intelligence collection, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), secure real time communications, and placed, unattended sensor systems that increase coverage of larger areas. These advances have not gone unnoticed by the narco-traffickers who have continually adapted to threats and diversified their efforts to move drugs.<sup>171</sup>

SOF--as a generic term--organized to combat the narco-terrorist must be trained in a wide variety of weapons, explosives, operational scenarios, threat characteristics, and close combat techniques. In both peacetime and wartime, special operations units are comparatively inexpensive and represent great force multiplier capabilities. A truly adequate training and preparation period is lengthy, intense, and must be followed up with extensive simulation and field exercises so that the critical skills will not atrophy. Identifying personnel and buying "high-tech" equipment does not translate into functional capability.

Resources for these capabilities demand special consideration when forming a new unit. It has often been argued that any good infantryman will make a good SOF operator. This is quite simply not evident in the historical research.<sup>172</sup> Recognizing the special physical and mental skill factors on both sides, the most important difference between a good infantryman and a good SOF operator is one of psychological make-up. Not everyone is suited to the sustained and intense SOF environment. Maturity and experience are key ingredients for any SOF operator in this environment.

In doctrine development, SOF are often defined in contradistinction with conventional forces, with the aim that SOF conduct operations that conventional forces can not accomplish or undertake without unacceptable risks and commitment of resources. Therefore, in foresight of potentially sensitive emerging doctrine, I propose that the Marine Corps adopt an unorthodox approach to counter-narcotics warfare doctrine development, not unlike that of some U. S. Army and Navy SOF operations, and apply it to the as yet conceptual Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).<sup>173</sup>

Special operations require tactics, techniques, and procedures that can not be employed efficiently or effectively by conventional forces. However, SOF operations do not dismiss the traditional principles of war, instead they place a different emphasis on their relative importance. For example, relative to conventional operations, mass is less important in special operations, while surprise is achieved by SOF with speed, stealth, audacity, and deception. Tactics and techniques are far more critical for SOF operations. Because special operations are often conducted at great distances from support facilities, beyond the limits of large conventional military forces, using a wide range of specialized skills, they require special training and equipment compared to their conventional or host nation counterparts.<sup>174</sup>

Of primary concern, is the special operations requirement for special intelligence. This means a concerted effort to ensure SOF gets the best intelligence product available in a timely manner. This intelligence picture should also include political, social, and cultural issues. Situationally speaking, the intelligence picture will implicitly help design the special operation

and determine its feasibility.<sup>175</sup> The preceding paragraphs have focused on the direction that the Marine Corps should look towards when deciding on the development of a doctrinal solution for countering the narco-terrorist threat.

The solution for the U. S. is in new doctrine, organization for combat, training, and readiness of a new generation of SOF warrior--the Marine Raider.<sup>176</sup> My new doctrine proposal is to establish Raider units (one in each Marine Division) that would have the mission of directly attacking and eliminating the narco-terrorist threat at its source, in other words, direct in-country intervention. This mission would include operations in an urban littoral environment as well as deep jungle riverine operations--both overt and covert.<sup>177</sup> If the future battlefield is truly a Naval expeditionary battlefield, especially in the littorals, then the Marine Corps must be prepared to take this Raider unit into the narco-terrorism fight from the sea into the littorals or anywhere that it surfaces.<sup>178</sup> Preferably, these operations would be conducted with host nation support and cooperation, but we must be ready to function without it.

The ideal vehicle for the deployment of the Raider force in a LIC environment is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) or MEU(SOC).<sup>179</sup> The MEU(SOC) could either be a forcible entry enabler for a Raider follow-on force or have the Raiders assigned as a subordinate element of the MEU(SOC) depending upon the mission, location, and political situation. Since MEU(SOC)s are deployed worldwide and are ready 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, they can be used as Raider force enabler to any location on earth that the narco-terrorist threat emerges. The Andean nations serve as only part of the Raider force deployment equation as the illicit narcotics strongholds in Southwest and Southeast Asia would readily adapt and pick up the slack for the Latin American countries. Narco-terrorists are nothing if not extremely adaptable to adversity.<sup>180</sup>

LIC has been previously identified as a special type of war that has some irregular considerations as compared to conventional war. If this is so, can any type of military force be successful in LIC operations? If the response to a LIC is rapid with the projection of overwhelming combat power, regular conventional forces may be sufficient to defeat the threat.

However, the requirement for SOF will normally be the case, as LIC tends to be protracted conflict. LIC requires small unit operations with an emphasis on tactical leadership at the small unit level. Low visibility direct intervention forces are the key to successful operations in a narco-terrorism LIC environment.<sup>181</sup>

Today, U. S. forces often fall into a defensive or reactive mode when faced with terrorist activity. We must develop forces that can incorporate an array of operational and tactical responses to keep terrorist attacks from forcing the U. S. to escalate militarily but enable us to take action against terrorist activities. The employment of Raider type forces with good intelligence sources, using mobility, stealth, deception, and surprise can achieve the objective of countering the narco-terrorist threat.<sup>182</sup> SOF can also be used to specifically target the key centers of gravity in an insurgency or LIC. These targets may be a particular person, group infrastructure, or physical structure, based on the situation.<sup>183</sup>

Preparation for LIC takes on a new meaning for U. S. forces. The orientation centers around new operational, cultural, and political perspectives. The critical factor is the political nature of LIC, as opposed to simply warfighting skills. U. S. forces must have a complete understanding of the host nation, its governmental and political functions, and be ready to work within joint international interoperability.<sup>184</sup>

The Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory (CWL) estimates that by the year 2010: 70% of the world's population will live in the littorals, the littorals will be home to 300 of the world's largest cities, 80% of national capitols, 70% of the world's weapons of mass destruction, and most of the world's nuclear reactors.<sup>185</sup> As the international power base moves toward the littorals, so do the narco-terrorists. Most of these capitols have rivers that wind their way throughout the urban sprawl.<sup>186</sup> These can be exploited as routes of rapid ingress and egress in a wide variety of scenarios. The opportunities for narcotics inspired LIC and political violence will grow along with the threat to U. S. interests abroad. The U. S. must be prepared to meet this threat.

## CONCLUSIONS

While the Cold War is over, international narco-terrorism remains a threat across the globe, especially to the United States and its allies. Additionally, the drug industry in Latin America is a cancer that corrupts the Andean nation's political and military institutions, diminishes public faith in the credibility of democratically elected governments, replaces legitimate agriculture and economic endeavors, and finances violent insurgencies.

The problem for a "Western" democratic nation is to maintain and employ the appropriate strategy, force, and tactics for the conduct of a narco-terrorist LIC while meeting the other requirements of national strategy without denigrating the ability of the state to conduct a higher level of war. The U. S. must define its objective and understand the nature of conflict and how LIC is integrated into the conflict spectrum.

There is no easy solution for the U. S. in its "war on drugs." Monetary investment alone will not solve the problem or conclude the fight. We also can not live in isolationism with our heads in the sand and ignore this deadly threat.

To somewhat mitigate the possible observation that I am suggesting an immediate invasion of the Andean Ridge, I will temper this view with the following thoughts. First, direct U. S. military intervention is part of the solution to winning this LIC. After all, this is a war against all the American people--north, central, and south. However, this is not to suggest that we fight the culture, tradition, and social structures of these nations.<sup>187</sup> We must make it abundantly clear that we will cooperate with any nation on any level to stop the narco-terrorist threat. Our specious, business-as-usual politicians have not made this clear. The President, with support from Congress and the American people, needs to issue an ultimatum to the reluctant Andean governments--cooperate or face debilitating economic and counternarcotics measures.

Second, crop eradication, substitution, intervention of traffickers, and counterinsurgency by host nation forces can readily complement our direct intervention operations as force multipliers. Our noble, yet misguided, efforts to this point have demonstrated this already. We must supply the moral courage. We can export a command and

control structure through SOUTHCOM and MCCTC programs to support a unity of command to achieve unity of effort.<sup>188</sup> We must also be willing to sustain these operations until we have achieved a satisfactory endstate. This may sound a bit draconian, but this is an issue of vital interest to national security.<sup>189</sup>

In the not too distant future, the transnational threat of modern narco-terrorism will come to the forefront of U. S. military strategic and operational planning and should not be underestimated or simply dismissed as a supply/demand issue. To the extent that we delegate our responsibilities to lesser foreign governmental powers and organizations, we reduce greatly the chance of decisive action, and we raise dangerous questions about our will and capabilities. We are the dominant world power and should exercise the lead in eradicating illicit drugs from our society. This is not the "Ugly American" run amok but a concerted effort to diplomatically, economically, and militarily find a solution to illicit drugs entering the U. S.

Finally, the U. S. Marine Corps needs to take a proactive approach to this problem as the lead agency, ready the appropriate forces, and develop doctrinal procedures that I have suggested to counter this threat to our national security. We are a forward deployed force-in-readiness, on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The United States will be under attack by highly dedicated, well-trained, and technologically equipped narco-terrorist groups who will strike at the numerous vulnerabilities available within our diplomatic arena and socio-economic areas of interest.

The key point of understanding for any nation attempting to combat terrorism in all its forms is that terrorist operations will take place and that casualties will occur. The terrorist's requirement for notoriety and media coverage will certainly influence the media and the public's demand for information. Therefore, in the future, our borderless global society can expect more rather than less narco-terrorist acts. Economics, technology, and the ideological whims of both criminals and psychotics will ensure a continuing stream of spectacular headline grabbing incidences.

Narco-terrorism has already reached U. S. interests both domestically and internationally. Thus, we should focus our political and military efforts to counter narco-terrorism at its source. Unfortunately, if we do not, narco-terrorism in the developing countries of the Andean nations and elsewhere will continue to expand unabated and the great American society will be in deep trouble. With regard to Narco-terrorism, retaliation and pre-emption are not a non-sequitor. We must take the initiative and be ready to strike.

## APPENDIX A

### QUALIFICATIONS, ROLES AND ORGANIZATION FOR THE RAIDER FORCE

1. Qualifications. The qualifications for acceptance into the Raiders would not require the development of any process which is out of the ordinary for the Marine Corps. The Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of Marines selected for Raider training must first reflect the special characteristics required to perform in the missions and roles of a counterinsurgency or direct action type unit. Emphasis must be placed on amphibious reconnaissance, demolition, communications, language, intelligence, small watercraft and weapons handling skills. My recommendation would be to screen serving and former reconnaissance Marines or Marines who have served in the small boat raid company of a MEU(SOC). The final step would be to screen other volunteers to include Navy corpsmen and supporting establishment Marines.

I would also recommend the establishment of a secondary MOS for the Raiders. For example, the suggested Raider MOS of 0322, in keeping with the basic 03 (Infantry) designator, and expanding sequentially on the approved basic reconnaissance MOS of 0321. Since these are perishable skills, this measure would allow Headquarters Marine Corps to track trained Raiders for future considerations as it does for other MOSs. The Navy has its own system for tracking special skills for assignment to Marine units.



2. Roles. The newly re-established Reconnaissance Battalion in the 2nd Marine Division is organized with three operational subordinate units. These are the Division Reconnaissance Company, the Direct Action Company, and the Deep Reconnaissance Company. My recommendation would be to stand down the direct action company and replace it with a Raider company. The direct action mission is too seldom employed by the Marine Corps and its training and time expenditures are not proportionally cost effective. The Raider company would be able to absorb the direct action mission in addition to its other skills.

MEU(SOC)s will now be deploying with a platoon from each of the Reconnaissance Battalion's specialized units. Adding a Raider unit to the MEU(SOC) in place of the direct action platoon would not diminish or interfere with the commander's reconnaissance capabilities, but would significantly enhance them by adding critical capabilities. There are too few trained reconnaissance Marines serving actively in units right now, and the direct action Marines could return to the other infantry and reconnaissance units (or a Raider unit) to reinforce them and reduce their long term deployment rates.

What will be the mission(s) of the Raider unit? Like the Direct Action Company in the new Reconnaissance Battalion, the Raiders will utilize close quarters battle (CQB), complex demolition skills, and precision shooting in their "tool bag." CQB is especially valuable in urban and hostage recovery scenarios. Additionally, and more importantly, they will also need to be masters of the riverine environment. There are more than 65,000

miles of navigable waterways in the Andean countries. Much of the narco-trafficking transportation infrastructure uses the numerous waterways (rivers and lesser water routes) in the

Andean region to move drugs. We must use these waterways as ingress and egress routes to the source and exploit these avenues when other methods become operationally nonviable. Many traffickers in the Upper Huallaga Valley are moving away from the risks involved in utilizing aircraft for internal transport as well as cross-border transport, and are instead employing rivers to transport arms and drug loads to clandestine sites along the Colombian and Brazilian borders.

3. Organization. Another recommendation would be to establish a Raider Battalion of a Headquarters Company, three Raider Companies, and a Support Company within each Marine Division. This would allow a larger organization that could fully support the wide range of administrative, intelligence, logistical, maintenance, and training requirements unique to this unit (see figures). This battalion would also be available for deployment as an entire unit in support of military operations across the spectrum of warfare. If the Raiders were not incorporated into the Reconnaissance Battalion structure in some form, then the Raider Battalion would be the logical source for the MEU(SOC) or other contingency deployments. The Raider units from the three Marine Divisions could also composite together to form a larger regimental sized unit on a contingency basis.

Despite protestations to the contrary, a regular Marine infantry battalion designated to fulfill Raider type missions would not have the requisite skill levels to

accomplish the mission in this unique role. The rigorous swimming requirement alone would eliminate many Marines from serving in the riverine environment. The Marine Corps small unit



riverine craft (SURC) program should also be accelerated in the budgeting process to enable training and planning to commence.

Where will the Marine Corps get the manpower to fill out this unit in the era of downsizing, political correctness, and extreme scrutiny of budgetary expenditures? My recommendation is that manpower for the new structure be derived from two units who would be disbanded as unnecessary in today's world of LIC and Military Operations other than War (MOOTW). One example of this type of Marine unit would be the active duty tank battalion(s). Tanks do not need to deploy with every MEU(SOC) that departs for overseas duties. Their utility and mobility in the currently predominating MOOTW scenarios can be debated but is dubious at best. Additionally, the cost savings in maintenance and storage space aboard the already overcrowded amphibious shipping would be significant.

My recommendation would be to enhance the armor capability of the Reserves in the 4th Marine Division by adding the active duty tanks to their inventory. Another option would be to add the tanks to the Maritime Pre-positioned Force (MPF) equipment list so that the trained Reservists could man them in a situation that dictates offload and employment. This is especially important if we are to validate the Marine Corps total force concept of seamless Reserve integration and employment in a major regional contingency (MRC) scenario. The U. S. Army can continue to train Marine tank crewmen at their facilities and PME schools.

Another unit that could be disbanded would be the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Groups (SRIGs). With the re-establishment of the highly capable Reconnaissance Battalions in the Marine Divisions, the SRIGs would be an unnecessary redundancy. The benefits here would be the re-distribution of critical command, control, intelligence, and communications assets to the new unit. The re-apportionment of these manpower numbers would be more than sufficient to establish and support the new Raider units.

# RAIDER BATTALION T/O



# T/O

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## ■ HEADQUARTERS CO.


- ▶ Administration
- ▶ Intelligence
- ▶ Operations
- ▶ Logistics



# T/O

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- 3 RAIDER COMPANIES
  - ▶ 3 Raid Platoons each
  - ▶ 1 Special Weapons Platoon



# T/O

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## ■ SUPPORT COMPANY

- ▶ Armory
- ▶ Smallcraft maintenance and repair
- ▶ Communications
- ▶ Motor Transport
- ▶ Paraloft and SCUBA locker





## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>"Plata o Plomo" is translated to mean "silver or lead." The inference is pay me or get shot, in the vernacular of the narco-terrorist.

<sup>2</sup>This spurious newspaper article is an amalgam of articles that appeared in the *Washington Post* on 18 December, 1996. I have used it to demonstrate the thesis.

<sup>3</sup>Rachel Ehrenfeld, *Narco-terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), xiii.

<sup>4</sup>U. S. President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, 12. Hereafter NSS.

<sup>5</sup>Ehrenfeld, 184.

<sup>6</sup>Ehrenfeld, 74.

<sup>7</sup>Douglas W. Payne, "Drugs Into Money Into Power," in *Freedom Review*, ed. Roger Kaplan, vol 27, no. 4 (July-August 1996), 16. President Bush appointed William Bennett to head the Office of National Drug Control Policy and elevated the position to cabinet level, earning its holder the informal title, "drug czar." During Bennett's tenure, domestic law-enforcement budgets soared and President Bush attempted to convince South American leaders to accept U. S. military intervention. Of note is Bennett's vehement stand against any legalization of illicit drugs.

<sup>8</sup>*Marine Corps Gazette*, Editor's note, September 1996, 10.

<sup>9</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 1995, 17. Hereafter NMS.

<sup>10</sup>Payne, 21.

<sup>11</sup>Payne, 4.

<sup>12</sup>Payne, 4.

<sup>13</sup>Payne, 9.

<sup>14</sup>Payne, 9.

<sup>15</sup>Payne, 9.

<sup>16</sup>David A. Andelman, "The Economics of Drugs" in *U. S./Latin Trade*, (September 1995), 10.

<sup>17</sup>Andelman, 10.

<sup>18</sup>Payne, 10.

<sup>19</sup>United States General Accounting Office, *Interdiction Efforts in Central America*, August, 1994: GAO Report B-257824 (Washington DC: General Accounting Office, 1994). Hereafter GAO B-257824.

<sup>20</sup>NSS, 24.

<sup>21</sup>NSS, 15.

<sup>22</sup>GAO B-257824, 1.

<sup>23</sup>Robert D. Novak, "Colombia's Drug War," *Washington Post*, 25 July 1996.

<sup>24</sup>U. S. Department of Health, "Preliminary Estimates from the 1995 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse," USDH Report, August 1996 (Washington DC: U. S. Department of Health, 1996). Hereafter USDH.

<sup>25</sup>Department of the Navy, "Forward...From The Sea," Strategic Concept Paper, (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1995). Forward...From The Sea describes the purpose of U. S. Naval forces as the projection of power and influence of the nation across the seas to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war.

<sup>26</sup>Ehrenfeld, xii-xiii.

<sup>27</sup>Ehrenfeld, 185.

<sup>28</sup>Christopher C. Harmon, "The Purposes of Terrorism within Insurgency: Shining Path in Peru," in *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol 3, no. 2 (London: Frank Cass, Autumn 1992), 185.

<sup>29</sup>Ehrenfeld, 126-7.

<sup>30</sup>Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990), 335.

<sup>31</sup>Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano and John B. Reuter, *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 100.

<sup>32</sup>Tarazona-Sevillano, 100.

<sup>33</sup>Ehrenfeld, 74.

<sup>34</sup>Payne, 27.

<sup>35</sup>National Defense University, "Strategic Assessment 1996: Elements of U. S. Power," Chapter 12 (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1996), 1. Hereafter SA96.

<sup>36</sup>SA96 Chapter 12, 1.

<sup>37</sup>SA96 Chapter 12, 2.

<sup>38</sup>Stephen Sloan, *Countering Terrorism in the Late 1980s and the 1990s*, Cadre Paper, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, 1987), 7.

<sup>39</sup>GAO B-257824, 1-3.

<sup>40</sup>LT Christopher Tomney, USN, "Countering High-Tech Drug Smugglers," in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, (July 1996), 59-61.

<sup>41</sup>GAO B-257824, 1.

<sup>42</sup>GAO B-257824, 14.

<sup>43</sup>GAO B-257824, 3.

<sup>44</sup>John P. Sweeney, "Colombia's Narco-Democracy Threatens Hemispheric Security," in *The Heritage Foundation*, Backgrounder #1028 (1995), 3.

<sup>45</sup>Grant Wardlaw, "Linkages Between the Illegal Drug Traffic and Terrorism," in *Conflict Quarterly*, vol 8, no. 3 (Fall 1992), 13.

<sup>46</sup>Joshua S. Krasna, "Narcotics and the National Security of Producer States," in *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, vol XVI, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 112.

<sup>47</sup>U. S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," (Washington DC: Dept. of State Publication 10246, 1995), 81. Hereafter INCSR.

<sup>48</sup>INCSR, 81.

<sup>49</sup>INCSR, 81.

<sup>50</sup>INCSR, 81.

<sup>51</sup>SA96 Chapter 12, 5.

<sup>52</sup>INCSR, 81.

<sup>53</sup>Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1028, 2.

<sup>54</sup>Ehrenfeld, 85.

<sup>55</sup>U. S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "*1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism*," USIS Latin America Overview Report (Washington DC: U. S. Department of State, 1996), 2. Hereafter USIS LAO.

<sup>56</sup>Ehrenfeld, 78.

<sup>57</sup>Krasna, 114.

<sup>58</sup>Radu, 150-158.

<sup>59</sup>Ehrenfeld, 98.

<sup>60</sup>Ehrenfeld, 98-99.

<sup>61</sup>Ehrenfeld, 98.

<sup>62</sup>Ehrenfeld, 99.

<sup>63</sup>INCSR, 83.

<sup>64</sup>INCSR, 99.

<sup>65</sup>United States General Accounting Office, *The Drug War: US Programs in Peru*, October 1991, GAO Report B-245527 (Washington DC: General Accounting Office, 1991), 14. Hereafter GAO B-245527.

<sup>66</sup>Ehrenfeld, 123.

<sup>67</sup>INCSR, 100-104.

<sup>68</sup>Radu, 323-345.

<sup>69</sup>Harmon, 170. Other references vary between 30,000 and 50,000 supporters.

<sup>70</sup>Harmon, 171.

<sup>71</sup>Krasna, 113.

<sup>72</sup>Krasna, 113-114.

<sup>73</sup>Krasna, 114.

<sup>74</sup>Simon Strong, "Shining Path: A Case Study In Ideological Terrorism," in *Conflict Studies*, no. 260 (1992), 23.

<sup>75</sup>Krasna, 113.

<sup>76</sup>Krasna, 113.

<sup>77</sup>Krasna, 114.

<sup>78</sup>USIS LAO, 4.

<sup>79</sup>Radu, 339-345.

<sup>80</sup>GAO B-245527, 12.

<sup>81</sup>Harmon, 180.

<sup>82</sup>Harmon, 172-181.

<sup>83</sup>GAO B-245527, 12.

<sup>84</sup>Tarazona-Sevillano, 119.

<sup>85</sup>Tarazona-Sevillano, 139.

<sup>86</sup>INCSR, 67.

<sup>87</sup>Ehrenfeld, 131.

<sup>88</sup>GAO B245527, 5.

<sup>89</sup>Ehrenfeld, 132.

<sup>90</sup>Ehrenfeld, 134.

<sup>91</sup>Ehrenfeld, 132.

<sup>92</sup>Ehrenfeld, 135.

<sup>93</sup>Ehrenfeld, 135.

<sup>94</sup>Radu, 112.

<sup>95</sup>INCSR, 4.

<sup>96</sup>GAO B-245527, 5.

<sup>97</sup>Washington Office on Latin America, "Results and Prospects for the War on Drugs in the Andes," Policy Brief, June 1991 (Washington DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1991), 2. Hereafter WOLA.

<sup>98</sup>GAO B-245527, 5.

<sup>99</sup>WOLA, 5.

<sup>100</sup>WOLA, 2.

<sup>101</sup>GAO B-245527, 5.

<sup>102</sup>SA96 Chapter 12, 2.

<sup>103</sup>WOLA, 2.

<sup>104</sup>GAO B-245527, 6.

<sup>105</sup>GAO B-245527, 6.

<sup>106</sup>WOLA, 3.

<sup>107</sup>WOLA, 3.

<sup>108</sup>WOLA, 3.

<sup>109</sup>WOLA, 4.

<sup>110</sup>WOLA, 4.

<sup>111</sup>Washington Office on Latin America, "Fueling Failure: US Drug Control Efforts in the Andes," Policy Brief, April 1995 (Washington DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1995), 1. Hereafter WOLA2.

<sup>112</sup>WOLA2, 1.

<sup>113</sup>USDH, 24.

<sup>114</sup>WOLA, 3.

<sup>115</sup>GAO B-257824, 1-6.

<sup>116</sup>WOLA, 3.

<sup>117</sup>WOLA, 4.

<sup>118</sup>WOLA, 4.

<sup>119</sup>WOLA, 5.

<sup>120</sup>WOLA, 4.

<sup>121</sup>WOLA, 5.

<sup>122</sup>WOLA, 6.

<sup>123</sup>WOLA, 6.

<sup>124</sup>INCSR, 70.

<sup>125</sup>WOLA, 5.

<sup>126</sup>GAO B-245527, 12.

<sup>127</sup>GAO B-245527, 12.

<sup>128</sup>WOLA, 6.

<sup>129</sup>WOLA, 6.

<sup>130</sup>WOLA2, 3.

<sup>131</sup>Payne, 17.

<sup>132</sup>Payne, 17.

<sup>133</sup>INCSR, 1-7.

<sup>134</sup>INCSR, 42.

<sup>135</sup>GAO B-245527, 7.

<sup>136</sup>INCSR, 42.

<sup>137</sup>WOLA2, 5.

<sup>138</sup>Erik L. Kjonnerod, ed., *Evolving US Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1992), 52.

<sup>139</sup>T. David Mason and Christopher Company, "Guerrillas, Drugs and Peasants: the Rational Peasant and the War on Drugs in Peru," in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol 7, no.4 (Winter 1995), 148.

<sup>140</sup>Department of Defense, Center for Naval Analyses, "Future Naval Cooperation with Latin America: Final Report," CRM 94-63.10 (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, August 1994), 62. Hereafter CNA.

<sup>141</sup>MAJ P. B. Dunahoe of the Counterdrug (CD) Section of the Coalition and Special Warfare (CSW) Branch at MCCDC, Quantico, VA, interviews by author. The interviews took place over a period of months in 1996-97 when MAJ Dunahoe was back in the U. S. from trips to Latin America. He is the foremost expert in the Marine Corps concerning ongoing operations in the Andean nations. The author wishes to express his appreciation to MAJ Dunahoe for his cooperation. Hereafter Dunahoe.

<sup>142</sup>CNA, 53.

<sup>143</sup>Dunahoe, 30 January 1997.

<sup>144</sup>Dunahoe, 30 January 1997.

<sup>145</sup>Officer in Charge, Marine Forces South Liaison Element, Memorandum to MarForSouth G-3 and G-5 Officers, dated 13 June 1996, subject: FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE MARFORSOUTH LN ELEMENT UPON SOUTHCOM'S MOVE TO MIAMI; SUMMER 97.

<sup>146</sup>Officer in Charge, Marine Forces South Liaison Element, Memorandum, subject: MULTINATIONAL COUNTERDRUG COORDINATION AND TRAINING CENTER (MCCTC), 23 September 1996. Hereafter MCCTC.

<sup>147</sup>MCCTC.

<sup>148</sup>LTCOL John M. Howell, USAF, *Drug Interdiction*, Research Paper, (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1991), 15-25.



<sup>149</sup>SA96 Chapter13, 15.

<sup>150</sup>SA96 Chapter 13, 15.

<sup>151</sup>Payne, 17.

<sup>152</sup>INCSR, 37-39.

<sup>153</sup>Payne, 18.

<sup>154</sup>INCSR, 37.

<sup>155</sup>Payne, 18.

<sup>156</sup>INCSR, 37.

<sup>157</sup>Payne, 18.

<sup>158</sup>WOLA2, 4.

<sup>159</sup>WOLA2, 5.

<sup>160</sup>Payne, 86.

<sup>161</sup>NSS, 18-19.

<sup>162</sup>NMS, 9.

<sup>163</sup>NSS, 18.

<sup>164</sup>NSS, 18.

<sup>165</sup>NSS, 19.

<sup>166</sup>CNA, 19.

<sup>167</sup>Dunahoe, 30 January 1997. Training areas in the Andean nations are in reality live training areas that include illicit crops, narcotics, and guerrillas. In essence, each training mission is a real mission.

<sup>168</sup>Dunahoe, 30 January 1997.

<sup>169</sup>INCSR, 1-25.

<sup>170</sup>SA96 Chapter 12, 7.

<sup>171</sup>SA96 Chapter 12, 8.

<sup>172</sup>MGEN Oscar F. Peatross, USMC, *Bless 'em All*, (Irvine CA: Review Publications, 1995). A superb description of Raider history, training, and organization. Hereafter Peatross.

<sup>173</sup>U. S. Marine Corps, "Operational Maneuver From The Sea" (OMFTS), Marine Corps Concept Paper, (Washington DC: Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps June 1996). OMFTS is a marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare. It will couple doctrine with technological advances in speed, mobility, fire support, communications, and navigation to identify and exploit enemy weaknesses across the entire spectrum of conflict.

<sup>174</sup>United States Navy, "Naval Special Warfare/U. S. Marine Corps Riverine Operations Handbook", (NSW Strategy and Tactics Group: San Diego CA, January 1993). Hereafter ROH.

<sup>175</sup>ROH, Chapter 3.

<sup>176</sup>Peatross, 1-17.

<sup>177</sup>CNA, 52.

<sup>178</sup>OMFTS, 1.

<sup>179</sup>COL Richard A. Hobbs, USMC, *The Role of MEU(SOC) in Low Intensity Conflict*, Thesis Paper, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army C&GSC, 1988), 91. Hereafter Hobbs.

<sup>180</sup>Harmon, 175.

<sup>181</sup>Hobbs, 74.

<sup>182</sup>Hobbs, 95

<sup>183</sup>Hobbs, 73.

<sup>184</sup>.Hobbs, 75-76.

<sup>185</sup>The Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory (CWL) uses these statistics in their capabilities brief entitled "SeaDragon...Forward From The Sea." Students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College received the brief during the 1996-97 Academic Year.

<sup>186</sup> *"Oxford Atlas of the World,"* 2d ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), World Map Section.

<sup>187</sup>LTCOL W. R. Kellner, *The War on Drugs; Get Control or Get Out!*, Research Paper, (Quantico VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1993), 18. Hereafter Kellner.

<sup>188</sup>Kellner, 18.

<sup>189</sup>NSS, 18.

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