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Operationalizing COIN

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Operationalizing COIN

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Foreword

The doctrine for strategy and campaign planning has been well established in the military literature, but the focus has been on conventional war fighting—decisive combat with large formations to seize terrain and destroy enemy units. Since the Soviets have faded from the scene and Desert Storm is now a distant memory, the area of operations has become the “human terrain” of insurgency, guerrilla war, and terrorism.

In this paper, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S. Army, Retired, provides his thoughts on how we might think about, plan and conduct operations in the new threat environment of “Terro-Insurgency.” In this environment insurgents are joined by various terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals to create what he calls the “Gray Stew” mix that confronts us today in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Based on his understanding of the new environment, Colonel Celeski posits a theory of counterinsurgency (COIN) and suggests techniques for developing the COIN plan and executing it employing special operations forces. He reinforces his concepts concerning COIN with a review of the war in Afghanistan.

This paper is important because it reflects the experiences and thoughts of a recent special operations commander who dealt with the exigencies of COIN combat every day on the battlefield. Through a former 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) commander and two-time commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), the reader, too, can gain a sense of urgency for improving our COIN strategy and doctrine and enhancing our abilities for “Operationalizing COIN.”

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, U.S. Air Force
Director, Strategic Studies Department
September 2005

Introduction

The prevailing form of irregular warfare confronting us today is unconventional in nature—insurgency often combined with terrorism. The effects of globalization, modernity, and economic interconnectedness create stresses on developing, undeveloped, and underdeveloped societies, often with costly repercussions to the world’s major powers. Across the globe, zones of instability exist where the aggregation of factors such as frustrated youth, religious zealots, and poverty provide a fertile ground for the recruitment of future insurgents who blame modernity for their social ills.

Insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla war are the manifestations of weak actors choosing asymmetric strategies against strong actors. Combining these three means to an end is the deadliest of options weak actors may choose. In ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are already cast in the role of counterinsurgents

Insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla war are the manifestations of weak actors choosing asymmetric strategies against strong actors.

against this congruence of actors. In prior decades, we confronted manifestations of communist ideology and often became embroiled in insurgencies either through direct intervention or through proxy wars with surrogates.

Continued Involvement

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the charter to promote liberty and freedom as part of our national policy will predictably mean confrontation with those who are opposed to our national strategy. We should expect to see our continued involvement in insurgencies, including those of a transnational nature. The problem is immutably asymmetric in nature. Correlation of forces will not work, massive firepower will not overwhelm the enemy, and conventional tactics will need to be tailored to adapt and fight within the exigencies of the environment. The enemy is characterized by insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists. One can even throw in the criminal or drug lord who

survives within this environment in a symbiotic relationship with the irregular warfare enemies.

Shifting our national security focus from the conventional mode of war into increasing involvement with the unconventional (small wars and irregular warfare) will require increased prominence given to the art of COIN. While a preponderance of theory and literature exists on insurgency, counterinsurgency theory and art has been a neglected subject and an underdeveloped area in the U.S. military arena. New joint doctrine in the form of JCS Draft Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, will introduce terminology such as the range of military operations (ROMO) to capture the notion that insurgency is a form of war, rather than a military operation other than war (MOOTW). This is important as we are now decisively engaged in combating insurgency in several areas of the globe.

Today we find clear examples of a partnership between insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Philippines. In the case of Iraq, it is difficult to ascertain the exact nature of the insurgency because no clearly defined head organization seems to be running it; there appear to be loosely netted pockets of insurgents and terrorists who join together when conditions are beneficial, then rapidly separate.

In some aspects, this blending of the threat becomes more insidious in nature when additional partners join, such as we have seen in Afghanistan. Added to the mix today there are tribal warlords, regional drug lords and transnational criminals. This is a vicious and dangerous brew, which I label as “Gray Stew” for the sake of discussion.

In prior times, the remedies were fairly clear for combating insurgents. Tried and proven principles of COIN worked and were validated over and over again, given patience on the part of the practitioner to apply them. However, this required a different form of warrior than the counterterrorist warrior in action today. Combat advisors, light infantry units, and practitioners of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) were the considered experts in this arena. Experts of COIN agreed that attrition and force-on-force strategies alone could not work.

Today we find clear examples of a partnership between insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Philippines.

Solving the political and social grievances and winning the “hearts and minds” of the populace were very important building blocks towards the strategy of defeating the insurgents and achieving overall victory for the oppressed country in question.

With the new congruence of “gray stew,” classic approaches to COIN may no longer guarantee success. This paper suggests some solutions for unconventional warriors to help them defeat this new style of insurgency. One of those areas will be to “Operationalize COIN”—translating the joint commander’s strategy into viable ways and means to reach a successful end state. Additionally, it attempts to consolidate the collected experiences of counterinsurgents into a useful form for military professionals who may fight in the new “gray” arena.

Understanding COIN

To date, the only path to becoming an expert in the field of COIN has been an eclectic approach to sampling of various courses in disparate schools, reading, self-development, and, possibly on rare occasion, having the opportunity to actually participate in a COIN contingency. This work is intended to promote an understanding on this form of warfare for special operations forces’ (SOF) professionals as well as other practitioners of COIN. Techniques for translating the operational art of COIN into a viable campaign are included, along with a representative case study of the insurgency in Afghanistan, to assist the practitioners of the art in understanding this form of warfare.

Operationalizing COIN is organized to provide insight about emerging terrorist-guerrilla threats, to suggest techniques for planning and operating, and further the understanding of COIN issues via a case study.

Chapter 1, Framing the Requirement

Explores the need for SOF to conduct unconventional operations in a COIN environment.

Chapter 2, The Nature of the Threat

Explores the changing nature of the new threat—the convergence of nonstate actors, insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists.

Chapter 3, A Modern Counterinsurgency Theory

Describes a theory for COIN warfare, examines previous U.S. approaches, and suggests a set of principles by which we might operate in the security environment of the 21st century.

Chapter 4, Developing the COIN Campaign

Establishes operating principles for campaign planning to facilitate translating the operational art of COIN into battle-field effects.

Chapter 5, The War in Afghanistan 2002-2004

Provides a case study of lessons about the unconventional warfare environment and the associated challenges for COIN professionals.

Chapter 6, Conclusion

Provides the author's concluding remarks.

Appendix A, Principles, Axioms, and Rules

Consolidates time-honored ideas about insurgency and COIN for use by counterinsurgents and COIN campaign planners.

Appendix B, Acronyms

Appendix C, Definitions

As with any research study, a body of established work forms the basis of the project. Much of professional military development is in the domain of self-learning, and I would recommend at least the following readings for those interested in the art of COIN:

1. Bard E. O'Neill's *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*
2. Anthony James Joes' *Resisting Rebellion: History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*
3. Robert Taber's *War of the Flea—The Classic Study of Guerilla Warfare*
4. John A. Nagl's *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*
5. David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare—Theory and Practice*
6. Ted Robert Gurr's *Why Men Rebel*

Of course, there are a myriad of other sources, but these should certainly serve as the first on the bookshelves of the modern counterinsurgent.

As always, it is the duty of counterinsurgents and unconventional warfare professionals to pass the lessons learned of their experiences to the next generation of warriors. As we continue to fight the insurgency wars of the 21st century, this work hopefully adds to the body of collected lessons.

Joseph D. Celeski
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Atlanta, Georgia
June 2005

1. Framing the Requirement

“This is another type of war new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him ... it requires in those situations where we must counter it ... a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.”

– President John F. Kennedy, 1962

In the fall of 1944, the British government attempted to restore order in the formerly German-occupied Greece. It was clear to the nationalist, royalist and communist resistance fighters that Great Britain favored restoration of the old monarchy, and thus the impetus for an uprising developed among those eager to ensure such a thing would not happen. The December 1944 uprising formed the launching point for the Greek insurgents and British forces found themselves embroiled in the Greek Civil War—one of the first tests of Allied democracies’ resolve against Soviet expansion.

Not recognizing the nature of the insurgency, General Scobie, commander of the British forces and the post-war stability government, represented what is often all too common in a counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. General Scobie’s disdain for insurgent and guerrilla fighters over regular conventional forces, his lack of COIN military training, and an overall misunderstanding of the theoretical nature of how to defeat an insurgency led to a protracted insurgency, the eventual decline of the British military effort, and their diplomatic withdrawal from the affairs of Greece. Surprisingly, the United States stepped in as a willing partner to the fledgling Greek government and chose to conduct a COIN campaign by proxy, buttressed with massive aid and military advice, which eventually succeeded with the surrender of the insurgent movement in 1949.¹

Effort and interest in counterinsurgency within the U.S. military peaked during the Vietnam War; but after that experience, the body

of military knowledge pertaining to COIN was virtually excised from doctrine and military education in favor of conventional war fighting subjects. A form of institutional bias against small and messy wars occurred with our ultimately favoring the Powell and Weinberger doctrines of massive force conventional operations if use of American military forces were considered. By default, many believed this unconventional “art” to be the purview of the U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets) and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Even today, an impressive bevy of academics and renowned strategists would contend we have no strategy or military theory for irregular warfare and one of its branches—COIN.

USSOCOM and LIC

The very inception of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) met the intent of Congress to focus attention on Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). This impetus originated in the Reagan military doctrine of the 1980s, designed to counteract the various “proxy wars” sponsored by the Soviet Union. One of Reagan’s major policy goals for irregular warfare was limiting the involvement of U.S. military forces by designing national special operations forces (SOF) with unique unconventional warfare capabilities.

This bolstering of U.S. SOF would presumably restore the “art” of LIC and prepare a select body of officers to become the future Lawrences (reference to Lawrence of Arabia and the Arab Revolt). General Lindsay outlined some of the thought behind the creation of USSOCOM during a January 1989 Low Intensity Conflict Curriculum Symposium held by ASD (SO/LIC) and the DIA/DIC at the Army and Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict on Langley AFB, Virginia. General Lindsay recommended USSOCOM should be the proponent for the development of low intensity conflict doctrine. He stated the two forces generating the congressional interest in increasing national SOF were primarily to enhance our capabilities in direct action (DA) and counterterrorism (CT), and secondly to enhance our capabilities in low intensity conflict.² Along with the development of a congressionally-directed formation of a new unified command, USSOCOM, Congress additionally created the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (ASD) position to oversee its running with a unique charter and responsibility for Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC).

In reality, ASD SO/LIC leads in low intensity conflict responsibilities, which include insurgencies, and USSOCOM was divested of COIN as a mission set (although the command retained the core task of the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission presumably to play a trainer and combat advisor role in internal wars characterized as insurgencies). This is changing, however, based on the adoption of US-SOCOM's newly established Ninth Core Task: Synchronization DoD efforts in the GWOT³. With insurgency and Islamic militancy on the rise and increasing as a favored form of warfare in the 21st century, many will look to the SOF community to provide lead and guidance in this form of irregular warfare.

If insurgency and guerrilla war are not “conventional,” then they easily fit into the category of being “unconventional.” Unconventional is the realm of

irregular warfare. Special operations professionals have long trained for and practiced unconventional warfare in the event this type of warfare becomes important to the national interest. The very purpose of SOF is to provide low-key and discrete responses to a set of unique circumstances not appropriate for larger conventional forces. Ross S. Kelly captured the essence of this role for SOF in his book *Special Operations and National Purpose*:

With insurgency and Islamic militancy on the rise and increasing as a favored form of warfare in the 21st Century, many will look to the SOF community to provide the lead and guidance in this form of irregular warfare challenge.

“Special operations in the generic sense address a spectrum of challenges not normally considered appropriate for regular armed military or national forces. Nations facing threats by terrorists and/or insurgents have felt the need to develop specialized capabilities targeted against these threats. Nations with more complex interests and commitments (such as the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union) have seen special operations in the guerrilla-counter-guerrilla, mobile training

team, and strategic reconnaissance roles as offering minimum-escalation options in a variety of politically sensitive situations. In all cases, special operations constitute specific missions or tasks, involving individual risks, to meet specific situations that threaten national interests but that do not warrant commitment of general purpose forces.”⁴

Developing the COIN Capability

As we have seen over the last three decades, and predictably will see in the next several decades, insurgency as a form of warfare has been more prevalent than main force, conventional conflicts. Special operators are being called upon more and more for their expertise in this arena and thus it becomes imperative to explore the theoretical underpinning of COIN and conversely insurgent strategies to enhance the application of its “art” amongst the USSOCOM community. Special Forces (SF) are considered to be the Army’s experts on guerrilla warfare in conflict and experts in advisory assistance and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) during peacetime engagement. Combined with Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) units and their doctrinal underpinning of the Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission set, they also will be considered as the most capable COIN, counter-guerrilla warfare, and counter-terrorist assets in a joint COIN campaign effort. Other elements of SOF will fight at the congruence of terrorists and insurgents and conduct counter-terrorist (CT) missions in a form of nodal warfare where this nexus occurs.

Why shoulder the responsibility? Dr. Steven Metz posed this question by exploring “strategic rationale” for COIN requirements in his 28 February 1995 paper on “Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability,” published by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dr. Metz’s theory explored the hypothesis for why the U.S. military has never been serious on the formulation of COIN theory and education. He concluded this deficiency in a form of military operational art exists because the “strategic rationale” for it has barely existed

since the days of the Vietnam War, excluding some small forays into COIN operations in El Salvador and in Columbia.⁵

However, the elevation of terrorism to a global, strategic war by the U.S. Government should be the impetus for developing a more robust COIN capability as a newly emerging strategic rationale—the global fight between the Islamic extremists with their global Jihad against modernity and the western world. The insidiousness and danger of this “global insurgency” has put American society and values at their highest risk than ever before. The survival and protection of the American people is the “strategic rationale” for resurrecting and developing a unique American COIN theory for the 21st century and its associated doctrinal application by the military. The GWOT character given to USSOCOM is forcing special operators to shoulder the responsibilities of becoming more and more the practitioners and strategists of this 21st century style of COIN.

The insidiousness and danger of this “global insurgency” has put American society and values at their highest risk ...

Who is responsible for the collection of the aggregate experiences and lessons learned in the American way of war with respect to COIN? The capturing of the philosophical and theoretical nature of fighting is one of the many functions of our assorted war colleges and military staff colleges. Combined with service doctrinal centers and joint centers for lessons learned, much could be explored and synthesized on the subject of COIN. And yet, one still finds it difficult to pin the rose on the one center or one service with overall primary responsibility as the dedicated agent for synthesizing all of the material on this subject. COIN is a land-centric endeavor and the U.S. Army is the executive agent for the development of doctrine for COIN operations. The United States Marine Corps (USMC), recognizing a long history of fighting in small wars of punitive raids or interventions which have often included counterinsurgency, developed its famous *Small Wars* manual (recently revised and updated). The USSOCOM community embodies a significant slice of the learned lessons of insurgency and counterinsurgency with organic capabilities and units with demonstrated skill in unconventional and asymmetric expertise required to fight insurgents and terrorists. USSOCOM is also the

lead agent for development of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for foreign internal defense operations. USSOCOM should take the lead to develop an overall U.S. military doctrine and theory on COIN under its wider umbrella as the lead for GWOT.

Several works exist on insurgency and counterinsurgency along with their associated case studies and allow the unconventional warrior to develop a theoretical framework for an operational art of this unique form of warfare. As we turned the century, however, a convergence of factors is changing our view of the nature of an insurgency. There is a new asymmetry in insurgency with the added dimension of ideological warfare and the nexus of terrorist organizations with insurgents which may increase the chances of success for insurgents never seen before. This new form of unconventional war may last for decades. Understanding this evolution will be imperative to strategists, theorists and practitioners to get the “counter” portions of their operational and tactical efforts correct. We cannot afford to incorrectly analyze modern insurgencies before developing appropriate COIN strategies and forming tailored COIN military formations or we may have similar experiences like the British effort in post-war Greece.

COIN fits in the context of unconventional warfare by the simple premise that it is not “conventional” warfare. In and of itself, it is a limited war and can fit within the USMC’s rubric of being a type of “small war.” It is also a low intensity conflict. What is important to get right, however, is it being *unconventional* (nonconventional) as we develop a theory of war for how we are going to fight in the 21st century. To correctly develop and espouse a 21st century COIN theory, we must stay focused on the nature of the environment, i.e., unconventional, in order to clearly set it apart from conventional war fighting. This clarification provides the roadmap for training unconventional warriors with the same fervor as we have trained conventional warriors to date.

An additional challenge will be to train future militaries for the mix of conventional and unconventional aspects proffered by this form of warfare. On the one hand we will always need generalists and conventional warriors who have a modicum of understanding of irregular and unconventional warfare, while on the other hand

needing many more specialists who can be the “go to” experts and future commanders in the application of this art. We may also need to develop additional COIN forces to fight asymmetric war.

SOF doctrinally provide a joint commander with an economy of force option, a force multiplier option, and a specialized mission (high risk) force within the context of larger military operations, but in and of themselves have not been used as the primary lead organization for COIN due to lack of robustness in their organizational strength and limited logistics (USSOCOM is not the executive agent for COIN).

SOF can expect to be actively employed in COIN operations for doctrinal reasons alone. Some of the doctrinal U.S. responses to assisting a nation plagued with insurgency are the options to provide indirect support such as security assistance (SA) and military exercises, direct support such as advisory training and assistance, or combat operations involving U.S. forces. These actions are collectively known as U.S. FID efforts designed to support a host nation’s program of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). Joint Publication 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), promulgated by USSOCOM, defines FID as: “FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”⁶ FID activities include military assistance as one of the measures to provide security within the IDAD and COIN environments. Of relevance is this doctrine is currently the standing procedure for how we will conduct COIN; there is no other joint doctrine specifically for COIN.

Joint Publication 3-07.1 focuses almost exclusively on IDAD to the host nation to protect itself against internal threats, including insurgency. The elements of national power—the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic model (DIME)—provide the mediums for application. The doctrine for FID TTP highly prescribes the use of the military aspect of American power focused and directed at supporting the internal host nation executing the IDAD program (and cautions against becoming focused on the COIN campaign itself). However, the manual does not go far enough to address what our ac-

tions might be if we are the ones primarily fighting the COIN effort, as we have found ourselves in Afghanistan and Iraq. SOF is highly touted as the premier force of choice for FID and UW, with Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) integral in leading the efforts to assist countries in their IDAD programs. Conventional forces

Foreign Internal

Defense (FID). FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. SOF's primary contribution in this interagency activity is to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military



and paramilitary forces. The generic capabilities required for FID include: instructional skills; foreign language proficiency; area and cultural orientation; tactical skills; advanced medical skills; rudimentary construction and engineering skills; familiarity with a wide variety of demolitions, weapons, weapon systems, and communications equipment; and basic PSYOP and CA skills. (SOF Reference Manual—Photo courtesy of the United States Army Special Forces Command)

should be used as a last resort. The doctrine defines the primary role of a U.S. sponsored Joint Task Force (JTF) as force protection and defensive missions, rather than offensive COIN and counter-guerrilla operations. There is some attempt to provide a template for analyzing insurgencies and an appendix for COIN planning, but overall the doctrine is dated when held up to the light of today's enemy and still does not serve as COIN doctrine when the U.S. leads the effort.

Although the U.S. Army is currently the lead agent for the development of the COIN mission and doctrine, USSOCOM inherently will participate in future COIN operations, primarily in a FID role (when not in direct combat operations). In recognition of its overall importance, FID is one of the core missions of SOF.

FID strategies rely heavily on the capability of SOF to train host nation forces, provide CA assets to assist in humanitarian and civic assistance, and provide PSYOP forces to assist the host nation win the war of ideas against the insurgents. The historical involvement of SOF was focused on the COIN aspect of FID, and all indications are this will continue to remain the focus of FID operations into the early 21st century.

As we turn the corner into the 21st century, we find our enemies increasing in their choice of the employment of insurgency as a form of asymmetric warfare. If this trend by our enemies continues, a commensurate measure may necessarily follow to readjust our strategies, doctrine, and military formations to meet these threats. Case studies abound on how to successfully conduct counterinsurgency and counter-guerrilla operations but, for the most part, these are drawn from the unique environments they were fought in during the 19th and 20th centuries. Will these proven principles of the past work when brought forward and used in the 21st century? We are clearly seeing a new dynamic affecting these modern struggles. What worked over the last 200 years may not necessarily work in the messy world of today. A comprehensive reexamination of the old tactics synthesized with what we are experiencing today should be the most important task of serious military academics and scholars. Once someone writes it, the resulting new theoretical piece on COIN and its translation into an operational art form could clearly transform our way of fighting and serve as a bridging piece relevant to the 21st century.

Publishing a new theoretical work on an emerging way of war will have its challenges. The new theory must capture the dynamic changes occurring in the practical application of LIC; the fact that terrorists and insurgents have joined forces together to further their goals and aspirations in a form of ideological warfare.

The problem for practitioners of COIN and CT is to correctly analyze this emerging trend and develop new methodologies in combating them. This paper seeks to contribute toward emerging COIN theory and doctrine that will address the terrorism and insurgency threats. The following chapter reviews the nature of those threats so that we can consider a COIN theory.

2. The Nature of the Threat

“Across the world, in the tropical jungles of Burma, another group of people inhabits a parallel reality as palpable as that of the compas in El Salvador. For their vision of life, these guerrillas look not so much to a fresh, untested future as to an idealized past, comfortable and snug with nostalgia. Ethnically distinct from their enemies, in their war they exalt their own cultural identity in an attempt to stave off assimilation. Here, there are no ‘hearts and minds’ to be won.”⁷

*John Lee Anderson on the Karen’s Guerrilla war
(from his book, *Guerrillas: Journeys in the Insurgent World*)*

A new view of the GWOT is warranted given the convergence of terrorist groups with insurgent groups and criminality. What’s different about the threat? If we have elevated combating terrorism to a global effort, then certainly it is because the terrorists have transcended in our eyes to a much more significant threat with capabilities we have not seen before. The blending of terrorism with guerrillas and insurgents manifests itself in an exceedingly dangerous form of increasingly brutal acts of terror; in the past, guerrillas and insurgents at least understood some conventions of the rules of war when applying violence.

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Guerrilla warfare’s military objectives were previously focused on the state-sponsored forms of authority symbolized in the state’s security forces, i.e., police forces, militia, army, etc. and state centers of economic gravity and political power. Terrorists do not have the same focus. The purpose of terrorism is extreme violence to get the actors to change their political outcomes in favor of the terrorists. Actors include civilians with the capacity to participate in the political process. Today, with the convergence of terrorists and guerril-

las, the distinction between violence directed at combatants versus noncombatants is virtually erased, and civilians are now targeted by guerrillas in acts of terror elevating the tactical level of war to the strategic level of war (transnational and global affecting the political actions of major nation states).

Extremist Islamic Insurgents

The insurgents we predominantly face in the GWOT are militant and extremist Islamic warriors and present a unique irregular warfare challenge. They are persistent in their strategy to gain power and practice a form of protracted warfare by teaching and educating new generations of militants to continue the struggle. They do not follow or practice international rules of law or war. They exist both locally and globally and are characterized by their adaptiveness and malleability. They can migrate and regenerate if defeated in one area. Their capability to conduct franchise operations makes them even more insidious. They practice a form of *netwar*: flat and linear organizations, autonomous and highly decentralized oftentimes not needing traditional hierarchical command relationships. They cooperate between groups with similar interests and work together when mutual benefit can be achieved. Attrition theories will not work against this type of threat.

It may be characterized as a global insurgency. An ongoing revolution is occurring by this new form of enemy against traditionally formed governments and nation states with the object of replacing the power structures of those nations who promote modernity and globalization, secular institutions, and for those who aid, abet, and support Israel. Their ultimate goal is an alternate, Islamic state, and they are driven by the engine of power and control. They are not afraid to use religion as an element of power. They are willing to use terror and intimidation of the populace to gain allegiance (no 'hearts and minds' at work here) and may ultimately transform themselves into political parties to eventually take over and influence the outcomes of the state (similar to Hamas in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories).

Taliban insurgents are aligned with Al Qaeda and drug lords; communist insurgents of the Abu Sayf in the Philippines have be-

come aligned with Al Qaeda and the Sunni Muslim Army insurgents in Iraq are aligned with Jihadists under the control of Al Qaeda operatives and fed and supported with black market money from criminal actions. This convergence challenge was described by the former CIA Director George Tenet as the “Gray World” in Newt Gingrich’s book, *Winning the Future*:

“Even small terrorists organizations can have global reach through the global criminal system of the Gray World: illegal narcotics and drug-dealing, illegal transportation across borders, international arms dealers, traditional international crime, and people smuggling.”⁸

What is overwhelmingly obvious is that these nonassociated actors have converged, morphed and transformed to conduct nodal or nexus operations, often driven by similar motivations. This nexus forms a dangerous hybrid enemy—a “gray stew” brew - and provide COIN operators the significant challenge of defeating an “eclectic” insurgency.

This hybrid enemy consists of nonhierarchical actors who pick and choose their targets and conduct operations via networking with other terrorist and insurgent cells and bodies. Insurgencies are devolving down to tribal and clan levels with very loose organizational

The nexus and convergence of insurgents, guerillas, terrorists and criminality (financing from drugs, smuggling, etc.) forms a dangerous brew of “gray stew” opponents for counterinsurgents. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF -Afghanistan)



structures. Convergence of operations for these types of insurgents includes “accomplices” rather than traditional allies.

Terro-Guerrilla Insurgencies

Another significant trait of modern terro-guerrilla (terrorists-guerrilla cooperation) insurgencies is their *modus operandi*. Between World War II and the end of the last century, most insurgencies followed one of three models in terms of their strategies:

- the people’s revolutionary war model as espoused by Mao Tse Tung,
- the urban insurgency as espoused by Carlos Marighella, or
- the *foco*-military style insurgency as espoused and practiced by Che Geuvara and Castro.

Modern insurgencies in this century seem to have “cut to the chase” and are not concerned with the mass mobilization and political aspects of the classic people’s war. The *foco*-military style insurgency has been adopted by the militants in Iraq and clearly was the operating methodology of the Taliban (although the case can be made that all of these Islamic radical-sponsored insurgencies are Maoist in principle based on their phasing and protracted nature).

Terro-guerrilla warfare type insurgencies pose extreme dilemmas to counterinsurgents. A combination of factors may confront the counterinsurgent and represent an asymmetric form of war so problematic that it becomes nonwinnable. For instance, the congruence of terrorists like Al Qaeda operating with insurgents gives a form of legality to their actions—the terrorists can now become fighters in a “Jihadi” army and thus may demand protections as combatants under international law. Conversely, guerrillas are now becoming more terrorist-like. Where they previously used acts of terror and sabotage as tactical tools, aimed at the government’s security apparatus, today’s guerrillas are emboldened by their association with terrorists and conduct terrorism as an operational and strategic level action. In its most lethal form, the trend to include noncombatants as viable targets has become increasingly the insurgents’ preferred form of ensuring they have the will of the people, albeit through intimidation.

The purpose of insurgents choosing terror as a means-to-an-end was formerly considered a way of gaining recognition, seeking support from the populace, and gaining acceptance politically or diplomatically. Thus, it was not pure terror for terror's sake. In this challenging new form of insurgency, acts of pure terror can be fueled merely by a religious dogma which seeks an alternate and parallel world, punishes so-called idolaters, rewards martyrdom, and attempts to eliminate politics altogether (although establishing a theocracy has its own political connotations). The well-recognized insurgency and counterinsurgency author, Ian Beckett, calls these insurgents "ideological warriors" (a most appropriate *nom de guerre*) in his work *Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750* (Routledge, 2001). The challenge for counterinsurgents is recognizing the form of power or politics insurgents are attempting to achieve with various brands of terrorist acts found in this type of insurgency.

The metaphorical "sea" in which the guerrillas swim has also changed. For counterinsurgents, "hearts and minds" techniques to keep the sea may no longer apply. It is far easier to terrorize and intimidate the populace in order to change the politics than it is to gain their support. Insurgents and terrorists have moved to a networked and loosely connected support base of clan, tribal, and ethnic communities throughout the world which more closely resembles a set of interlocking lakes or an archipelago, than a "sea." Refugee movements and ethnic diasporas are the highest contributors, financially, materially, and manpower-wise, to these insurgent movements. The transparency of the populace to separate the fish becomes increasingly difficult when modern insurgents are conducting a very MacArthur-like campaign of "island-hopping." Sanctuary, previously based on territory, is also moving to the Internet, which will pose its own problems for counterinsurgents to counteract. Mark Baillie describes this phenomenon in a paper written for the Center for Defence and International Security Studies, titled "Islamist Terrorism: A Primer":

"It is already too late for us because the condition for successful guerrilla or terrorist warfare is not just volunteers or money, but a social environment of useful tools and fellow-travelers: volunteers are

easy enough to find, however, made your cause, and money can simply be stolen or extorted (...the Badger-Meinhof gang, the IRA) if you do not have a rich backer. What you need above all is an informal network of normal civilians, friends of friends or relatives, who will give you a bed, lend you a car, buy you a meal, give you a temporary job or let you use their telephone without asking too many questions. Western Europe is attractive in this respect for Al-Qaeda. This is similar to what Mao meant by ‘...the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it.’ Mao advocated integration with and full support from the population but even without that full cooperation a community can be used as camouflage.”⁹

A new support base for terro-guerrillas is emerging at the ultra-national level. Insurgents and terrorists can now swim in a variety of United Nations (UN) and international aid organizations. Refugee camps are becoming notorious for breeding and recruitment areas for modern insurgents. International humanitarian organizations, private humanitarian organizations, and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations (IOs, PVOs, and NGOs) may be unwittingly providing sanctuary and resources to the enemy.

The classic strategy for counterinsurgents confronted with Maoist-style insurgencies was to attack the strengths held by the insurgents of revolutionary war: time, space and will. This quintessential operational art may no longer work. In terror-guerrilla warfare fueled by Islamic-radical fundamentalism, insurgents are guided by the Koran and by the rhetoric of radicals, not by any known principles of insurgent warfare doctrine. Their will to succeed is strengthened by this religious dogma.

The New Radicalism

Clearly the number one motivator contributing to today’s rise in terrorists, insurgents and guerrilla factions is that of religious ideol-

ogy. Without a doubt, the number of radical Islamic militants has risen steadily since the 1970s, in part motivated by the successful revolution of the clerics in Iran. Originally recognized as a rise in a return to a more fundamentalist Islam, a shift has occurred from the early political objectives of this movement to one of more radical and increasingly dangerous actions, indicating a shift from the political to the purely ideological. This new brand of “Islamicism” has been labeled “Islamofacism” by the pundits. The impact raises the realm of activity from the tactical level to the strategic level of concern because it portends a spread of this virulent form of religion beyond the sovereignty of recognized borders. In fact, it

Previously, counterinsurgency and counter-terrorists strategists could depend on identifying the political causes and motivators of the enemy and develop proportional measures to ensure their defeat. Getting at the root causes of an ideological form of warfare becomes more challenging, but none-the-less, can be analyzed for potential counter-motivation techniques.

has its roots in earlier forms of communist revolutionary theory, specifically the precept of “mass mobilization” of the populace.

Radical and Jihadist Islamicism can transcend borders with the potential capability for impact on a global scale. Previous COIN and CT strategists could depend on identifying the political causes and motivators of the enemy and develop proportional measures to ensure their defeat. Getting at the root causes of an ideological form of warfare becomes more challenging, but, can be analyzed for potential counter-motivation techniques.

There are several root causes for the rise in this radicalism. The after-effects of World War II created the decay of the colonial system of the major powers. With the rise of newly independent nations created throughout the Middle East, came the concurrent rise in the struggle to create Arab nationalism. Westernization would be rejected since it symbolized the colonization of several of the Arab countries. Socialism and Marxism were more attractive alternatives to these nascent states because their tenets seemed to be more in line with Islamic thought. Once communism collapsed and many of these states lost their benefactors, socialism continued to be a panacea.

This gave rise to several socialist-nationalist movements such as the Baathist party in Syria and Iraq. Egypt also marched on the path of socialism. Of particular note, these were Sunni-dominated endeavors. Saudi Arabia, a Sunni-dominant country, saw the need to balance the rising power of the Egyptian movement and began a series of programs to counter any dominance they would gain. Financed by their oil boom, Saudi Arabia began the push to export their Wahabist version of Islam to many of their neighbors. As Arab socialism failed to alleviate the political and social grievances of their populace, a return to fundamentalist Islam, as espoused by Wahhabism, crept into the daily lives of the religious as the only answer to addressing modernity—thus, not only was westernization rejected, but also socialism and Marxism.

It did not take long to find the answer in the glorious past of Islam during the golden ages of the caliphs. The Islamic caliphate system represented the purest form of governance over the ulema (the body of Islamic populace). Power resided in one man who ruled benevolently over people in strict accordance with the Islamic faith—religion and government were inseparable. Islam thrived and bloomed under this system, and it is clear to see why it is becoming

The Taliban accomplished the takeover of Afghanistan using a foco-military type insurgency method; it was not imperative they gain support of the populace as a first measure. They attempted to first install a fundamentalist theocracy based on a traditionalist form of the Golden Caliphate, and anticipated the populace would later support their efforts. They joined with Al Qaeda to further their cause. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan.)



attractive as an alternative to today's corrupt governments. We can see the manifestations of this thought in the choosing of Omar in Afghanistan to be the Emir Il Manoofeen, ruler of all the Islamic people, as a throwback to the title of the Caliphs and in the manifestos written and spoken by Osama Bin Laden when he calls for a return to the Caliphate system to rule the world.

The concept of Jihad has become increasingly radicalized and its verbiage captured and twisted by today's enemies. It comes from the root Arabic trilateral stem of J-H-D, also pronounced as "Jahada," meaning to strive and endeavor. Its second meaning is to conduct war to defend one's lands, religion, or way of life.¹⁰ There is debate on the meanings of "greater" and "lesser" Jihad amongst secular and religious intellectuals. Some attribute these modifiers to Mohammed (the Prophet) speaking upon his return from conducting war. (His "sayings" have been captured in the Hadith, the other holy work used along with the Koran.) Mohammed alluded to his return to the "greater" Jihad, now that he completed the "lesser" Jihad. For many, the greater Jihad was the struggle to improve one's self. Fasco-Islamics claim this interpretation of the use of these identifiers for Jihad as false writings, and that the "greater" Jihad is to conduct war against one's enemies. Thus, we see the recent rise in the call to Jihad to symbolize a time to conduct war against the enemies of Islam and the growth in militancy. Fighting and terrorism are now sanctioned within the context of religion. This is a powerful motivator and illustrates the use of religion as an element of power.

"Today's global Jihadi movements, from the Taliban in Afghanistan to Osama Bin Laden's worldwide Al Qaeda to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), ignore the greater Jihad advocated by The Prophet and adopt the lesser jihad as a complete political and social philosophy. Yet nowhere in Muslim writings or tradition does jihad sanction the killing of innocent non-Muslim men, women, and children, or even fellow Muslims, on the basis of ethnicity, sect, or belief. It is this perversion of Jihad—as a justification to slaughter the innocent—which in part defines the radical new fundamentalism of today's most extremist Islamic movements."¹¹

The beacon for Jihadists in recent decades was the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Based on the success of the Mujahadeen to drive out the invaders, a romantic and mythic aura now surrounds the endeavor. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and

its never-ending dispute continues to be a large contributor to the radicalization of Muslim freedom fighters today.

Religious ideology is shaped primarily from the writings and thought of its adherents. A contributing factor to radical Islam and its rising militancy comes from three key Islamic theologians: Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, and Al Mauddudi. These works have become the cornerstone of religious indoctrination for new recruits. Osama Bin Laden espouses their thoughts and writings and ensures that Al Qaeda operatives teach these to new recruits. An understanding of these works is one of the most important intellectual studies for counterterrorist and counterinsurgency students—know your enemy and what motivates him! Walter Laquer has published one of the best compendiums of writings and manifestos by terrorists and Islamic radicals in his work *Voices of Terror* (Reed Press: New York, NY, 2004).

Counterinsurgents will now require more than political will to defeat these types of insurgents; counterinsurgents may require an ideological will that may have to last them decades. Certainly insurgents in their current form, the “gray stew” may prove that they can outlast the will of democracies.

Why do Islamo-Fascists choose to adopt a terro-guerrilla style insurgency as a means to an end? Insurgency is an asymmetric form of warfare, conducted in an unconventional warfare environment. Insurgencies do succeed as shown by examples in the last century—against the French in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the British in Palestine. (Success is defined as the eventual overthrow of the government and its replacement by the insurgent movement and cause. Success is also defined as insurgents gaining conciliation from the government more favorable to their cause than prior to the insurgency.) Modern insurgents can increase their chances of success in a newer form asymmetry when they cooperate and network with terrorists and transnational criminals, on a global scale, within the context of an ideology which no longer requires the will of the people.

Adapting COIN to the “Gray Stew”

There are no new and profound measures to be taken here for counterinsurgents, and no unique idea is presented to solve this dilemma posed by the enemy I described as “gray stew.” However, COIN operational art must adapt and change as the threat changes. Blending a form of transnational COIN techniques with international and internal law enforcement measures may be the best method for defeating “gray stew.” Clearly, a robust intelligence capability shared across friendly nations is desirable.

A new style of “hearts and minds” campaigns will have to be developed for application within ethnic communities. Support and funding to secure marriages, buy homes, and provide a system of job security and education are important ethnic, tribal, clan and family values and for a relatively small investment, would neutralize the message of the insurgents and disrupt their recruiting systems. Separating the guerrillas from the people might require “taking a back seat” to first separating the insurgents from terrorist organizations who may be helping to further their cause.

Military operations will shift to a form of nodal warfare to counteract the nexus of insurgents, terrorists and criminals who combine assets to conduct operations when they are favorable to all of them, then disperse. Intelligence preparation of the environment at the operational level and intelligence preparation of the battlefield at the tactical level will shift from the old model developed for force-on-force fights, to one more consistent with law en-

forcement and detective work against criminal organizations and gangs—link diagramming and ethnic/cultural demographic studies.

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At the tactical level, the terro-guerrilla insurgents still operate much as guerrillas have always operated—light infantry, small arms, surprise attacks of ambush, hit-and-run, etc. Suicide bombers are merely substitutes for insurgent mortars, artillery and aircraft which they do not own. Suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) provide the insurgents a commensurate form of precision weapons to use against the counterinsurgent. Effective force protection measures can go a long way to nullify their effects. Contemporary methods and procedures of counter-guerrilla tactics and counterterrorism techniques are still useful, once adapted to the new threat. An interesting new work on the subject is John H. Poole's *Tactics of the Crescent Moon—Militant Muslim Combat Methods* (Posterity Press, 2004). Additional works of value to the modern counterinsurgent practitioner are Gilles Kepel's *Jihad—The Trail of Political Islam* (Press 2002) (it is eventually all about political power as the final goal) and T. P. Schwartz-Barcott's work on the form of Islamic warfare style, *War, Terror and Peace in the Qur'an and in Islam: Insights for Military & Government Leaders* (Press 2004).

Police work, intelligence, and law enforcement measures focused on the new threat will assist in isolating the insurgents, their support systems, and deterring new recruits. Measures could be taken to hack, penetrate, and disrupt the computer sites and chat rooms utilized by the insurgents. Other measures which could be taken would range from deportation of suspected insurgents as a disruption tool to assimilation as a co-option tool to neutralize the insurgent sanctuary. Immigration controls and measures can be tightened to ensure the movement of insurgent supporters between "archipelagos" is halted. The international community, in consort with the UN, must pay closer attention to the internal dynamics going on within refugee movements and camps to prevent the recruitment of insurgent manpower. Finally, moderate and secular religious leaders can contribute in turning around the radical rhetoric espoused by the insurgents.

Understanding the nature of the threat is vital to the correct analysis of an insurgency. Counterinsurgents develop appropriate strategies and campaigns with respect to the situational and environmental factors they find before them. "Know your enemy" is a

time honored dictum relevant to the operational art of COIN and ensures a greater rate of success when the practitioners of the art formulate countermeasures.

The threat described here suggests the need to update our theories concerning COIN so that we can envision effective COIN campaigns. The nature of the threat described above suggests the need to update our theories concerning COIN so that we can envision effective campaigns. The next two chapters address COIN theory and campaigns.

3. A Modern Counterinsurgency Theory

Theory (n) – belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the basis of action. ¹²

Military theorists often bemoan the lack of distinct COIN theory in the American way of war. By its very nature, a COIN theory will be a national security level endeavor that formulates a long-range social, political, and military approach to the changing dynamics of the 21st century. In essence, it modernizes our foreign policy based on the DIME model. Our informational element of power will play heavily in reinforcing moderate religious beliefs in any information campaign to counteract the use of extreme and radical religious ideology used as one of the tools clearly used by modern insurgents (and most appropriate for religious ideological warfare). Though fraught with complexity, a GWOT DIME model for foreign relations policy and national military policy may well need to consider the added cultural factors of indigenous religious beliefs to lend special support in exercising economic power benevolently in the affected region to counteract the message of religious extremists.

The foundations of a modern COIN theory would incorporate the characteristics of insurgencies by the triad of Politics, People, and Patience (P³). *Politics* embodies the acts of a host nation and its allies to maintain legitimacy by enacting the reforms necessary to solve the root causes of the insurgency. *People* are a critical consideration for any successful COIN effort, and their support is essential to support the government and deny legitimacy for the cause of the insurgents. *Patience* is the national will and endurance required to counteract the protracted nature of the insurgency as well as to gain time for needed social and democratic reforms to take place.

Formulating a theory of COIN can take two paths—a political/social theory or a military theory of a way of modern war. The political/social theory is the most attractive paradigm as historically it has

proven itself as one with the best chance for success in the irregular warfare environment.

Pure military theories of COIN tend to migrate to attrition strategies through counter-guerrilla operations such as seen in German anti-partisan activities in the Balkans during World War II and in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Attrition can be successful as a key strategy, but most modern democratic armies are limited and constrained by their counter violence strategies within the context of just-and-morally-legal-actions.

A social and political theory of COIN has as its overarching premise the prevention of a takeover by the insurgents or guerrillas of a society. Thus, war is not a continuation of politics; war is grounded in politics. Successful COIN strategies have all kept political solutions combined with social civic actions as the number one operational objective of their campaigns. For example, a concept forwarded in a recent strategy discussion attended by the author is based on a different form of preemption than counter-violence offered by a pure military option: a Marshall Plan-style project in either the Middle East or in Africa. Improving the economic and social conditions of struggling or failed states would preempt the conditions that create insurgency and social unrest. In other words, a preemptive COIN campaign (preventative COIN) characterized by political and social actions which focus on IDAD and “hearts and minds” prior to any outbreak of insurgency.

Anthony James Joes gets at the essence of this political and social aspect of COIN in his new book, *Resisting Rebellion: History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*. He appeared on the C-Span television show in early January 2005 and was asked by the moderator to describe the method in which we would conduct an appropriate COIN strategy if we knew what we were getting ourselves in for, once committing to the endeavor. He replied that “a COIN end state is peace and the reintegration of the disaffected into society.” He offered COIN as a political and social theorem, with COIN becoming more of a law-and-order operation, vice a military victory. Further in the discussion, he added that the “...insurgent strategy is to not lose power.” His book outlines some general principles of success in COIN that remain valid for the 21st century. Of note, the political and social

domains of activity all maintain their primacy as key facets of the strategy and any commensurate campaign. The following is a paraphrasing from the program on his relevant section of the book: ¹³

- An attractive amnesty program for the insurgents and disaffected
- A government seen as legitimate by its populace
- Limited military actions
- Redress of social and political grievances
- Conservative military policies (limited in scope)

He also concluded that the nature of the enemy threat was different in the 21st century and also agreed it was a convergence of many different types of groups and criminals. One of the counter techniques he forwarded for combating this nexus was to create doubt and divisions between different factions of the insurgents through an adept and shrewd PSYOP and subversion effort.

Articulating COIN as a political/social theory, with a subordinate role for the military, allows us to put the theory into a context of social dynamics. It has oft been said amongst counterinsurgent experts that the success of COIN is due to operating on “human terrain” vice geographical terrain. Having a social and politically based theory also assists in analyzing and understanding the enemy from a social and political organizational standpoint. As most insurgencies go, one can extrapolate a life cycle: first, it requires a political ideology (this can be in religious terms) or a social community which supports its cause (or both); second, it must have some semblance of an organization made up of people and political agendas to produce the insurgency; and last, it must be made of individuals with motivations to belong to the insurgency and participate in the movement.

For all of the attempts at analyzing modern insurgency movement, most insurgencies resemble Maoist Revolutionary Warfare, and any COIN theory must take the human and political aspects of that theory of insurgency into account to develop the proper counter measures. If people are the “sea” that guerrillas and insurgents swim in, then the theoretical underpinnings of any COIN way of warfare must address the need to operate in this medium and alter it as re-

quired: drain the sea, catch the fish, make the people transparent so the enemy cannot “swim” amongst them, etc.

Figure 1 illustrates the Clausewitz “trinity” (people, government, military) adapted to revolutionary war. In essence, both the government and the insurgents compete for the people as the source of




Figure 1. Clausewitz’s “trinity” adapted for irregular warfare with the populace as the source of power which the host nation government and the insurgent replacement political system compete over for legitimacy.

power for their legitimacy. The insurgent vanguard must match the government in designing an alternate state with the appropriate institutions to provide essential services to the people and solve their perceived deprivations. It is essential to insurgent strategies to build the organizational architecture first in order to function as the replacement government upon victory. This organizational structure becomes a key vulnerability for attack by counterinsurgents (counter-organization techniques).

Currently, as shown in figure 1, U.S. participation in insurgency is not direct. Our FID doctrine steers our efforts toward indirect support through aid, financing, and military training and assistance, with direct combat actions only as a last resort. However, if we “break

it,” we “own it.” In other words, we may take the lead as the military political government with responsibility to solve social deprivations while simultaneously combating insurgents until the host nation can restore governance and enough indigenous forces are generated to take on the fight. We conducted this type of COIN effort in the Philippine War at the turn of the 20th century and find ourselves embroiled in this scenario in Afghanistan and Iraq. FID doctrine alone cannot suffice. A 21st century theory for American COIN is useful here. Figure 2 illustrates the practical reality of what has occurred to the “insurgency triad.”




Figure 2. Depiction of insurgency relationships when the U.S. takes the lead as military government and provides initial security and COIN forces. In this model, the U.S. participation serves to maintain a balance which corrects for providing essential services to the populace while helping build governmental institutions to legitimize the effort and restore peace and a civil society.

Helpful in designing an American military COIN theory is to develop the principles by which we would implement the theory and translate it into appropriate strategy. The Nixon Doctrine formulated in 1969 (or sometimes called the Guam Doctrine being named after the site where Nixon delivered his first speech outlining his new

policy, 25 July 1969) should certainly become one of the defining principles for a consolidated national theory on COIN based on its application in both realms of foreign and defense policies. The doctrine was based on pragmatism to recognize and accept the world as it exists and on guiding principles on which America stands (democracy, liberty, individual rights, freedom, etc.). President Nixon's doctrine was formulated as a National Security Strategy as a prevention and deterrence measure, using elements of national power (much like a national COIN doctrine could comprise a National Security Strategy). The doctrine was pragmatic in that it was based not so much on America doing everything to defend interests around the world, but rather the recognition of what we expected other nations to do in their own defense. As Melvin Laird said at a town hall meeting sponsored by the American Institute for Public Policy Research, America did not expect to be the "...cop on every beat."¹⁴ Nixon urged our partners in the world to play a larger role in their own defense and assume more responsibility in those matters. This premise is very similar to the overriding principle in COIN whereby greater success is achieved by the host nation solving its own political and social grievances through a political process while keeping their military effort to combat insurgency at as minimal a level as possible.

One of the premises for our involvement in any COIN operation should be the requirement to have a government in the affected country willing to work out the social and political grievances (with host nation dominance in this activities) while insisting on basic human rights and good governance within the international framework of sovereign nations.

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For our part, once we are committed to the COIN endeavor we must, in theory, be committed to combining all the elements of national power, along with additional tools, such as religion and culture, and then wield them through a methodology which coordinates the elements of power into a unified aim with the host nations we are assisting; strategic concepts similar to a national plan at the grand strategy level.

and culture, and then wield them through a methodology which coordinates the elements of power into a unified aim with the host nations we are assisting; strategic concepts similar to a national plan at the grand strategy level. The structure will require both interagency and military leaders with an overall, politically astute COIN czar in charge.

Our COIN theory should adopt the principle that any COIN conducted by the U.S. is under the clear political leadership of the State Department through the appropriate ambassadors and country teams, with the geographic military commander's role as subordinate. In this manner, we could preserve unity of command/effort and ensure all lines of operation are directed to the political end state. Military COIN forces would be minimal and focused only on the sources of the enemy's power—primarily targeting the insurgents will to fight.

Characteristically our theoretical framework for the conduct of COIN should have the principle of *indirectness* at its core. Unconventional warfare art within the SF community is built on the foundation of “through, with and by” indigenous forces. President Reagan's policy during the 1980s towards COIN and small wars emphasized the U.S. providing economic, political and military help commensurate with the endangered country's ability to perform “self help” before the introduction of American military forces. Within this indirect context, we are capable and could take the lead for using *direct* American power against external factors that are threatening the success of a host nation IDAD measures and the COIN campaign. Confronting the insurgent's out-of-country sanctuaries, external financing and equipping, and external political support should be the focus of a total national effort with all elements of power (DIME).

A great degree of patience is required to outlast the insurgents and thus neutralize one of their operational weapons—time. COIN is a long-term endeavor, and our leadership must prepare the American public for long, protracted operations. Part of this long-term effort will require the need to provide a shift to law enforcement and intelligence operations once military operations are concluded. Many insurgencies die out slowly with the diehards performing activities that are basically antisocial and criminal.

Finally, our COIN strategy should be an indirect form of warfare against another indirect form of warfare, thus maximizing on the asymmetric nature of our unconventional warfare capability.

Given the above discussion, the following derived principles would constitute a COIN theory, taking into account three key factors: *Politics, People, and Patience (P³)*.

P³ Principles for COIN Theory and Doctrine

- Indirect U.S. role, leverage and influence regional actors, burden-sharing
- The host nation helped must be willing to enact major institutional reform, if required
- Clearly in the U.S. national interest with backing of the will of the people
- Directed by order of the President, with concurrence from Congress
- Political solution as preeminent strategy
- Theory must be social-political, not purely military response
- U.S. response will be limited in nature with tailored COIN forces conducting predominantly FID
- Overall unity of effort embodied within lead from the State Department
- Has as its nature asymmetric or unconventional warfare
- Accounts for shift to law enforcement and intelligence operations after military options are concluded
- Includes a “preemptive” option of nation-building and assistance to forestall potential outbreak of insurgency (like the Marshall Plan)

The foundations for organizing a unique American response to insurgency will require an agreed-upon theory for the conduct of COIN. The *P³* theory of COIN (considering politics, people, and patience as its foundation) serves as a conceptual model for the development of COIN campaigns—the subject of the following chapter.

4. Developing the COIN Campaign

“The beginning of wisdom is to grasp and hold on tightly to the idea that insurgency is a profoundly political problem.”¹⁵

Anthony James Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency

The first step in conducting the operational art of COIN is a thorough analysis of the factors which comprise the insurgency. *Every insurgency has its own context.* There are a variety of sources existing to assist the planner in this process; most recently the revised U.S. Army doctrinal publication FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, published 1 October 2004. One of the best sources for analysis of insurgency still remains Bard E. O’Neill’s publication, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, published by Brassey’s, Inc., in 1990. This work includes in-depth sections on understanding the nature of insurgency, various strategies used by insurgents, how the environment in which the insurgency exists should be viewed (taking into account the populace, the insurgent military and political organizations, and the capabilities of the threatened government), and the wider issue of external support to insurgents.

Development of COIN Strategy

A strategy for COIN is developed based on an analysis of the insurgency—what motivates it, what the insurgent strategy comprises, the government’s capacity to engage in COIN, etc. Strategy in this context consists of *ends* to be achieved, the strategic concepts required to achieve them, and the necessary resources—all to guide and sustain the operational level activities that will achieve the strategic objectives. The *ends* are the objective of the campaign. In other words, what to accomplish. *Ends* in COIN campaigns may be to achieve a *status quo ante*, create a democratic government friendly to the U.S. or western interests, or merely removal of conditions which create a haven for insurgents and terrorists. The *ways* refer to the strategic concepts used and how to get the job done—such as the employment

of all elements of power to conduct a COIN campaign under the aegis of an IDAD program utilizing FID as our mechanism. The means are the resources required to get the job done. These may include tailored military COIN forces to be deployed, logistics required to sustain the campaign, financing, etc.

COIN is a type of asymmetric war and, therefore, requires us to look at asymmetric concepts to accomplish our objectives. On the whole, insurgencies have been successful when the will of the insurgents is greater than the will of the conventional forces and their state's response. Insurgents gain even higher chances of success when the COIN strategy is mismatched vis-à-vis the insurgent strategy. The challenge for the counterinsurgent professional is to get the right strategy to mitigate, neutralize or destroy the insurgent strategy, and thus dramatically improve the chances for victory.

Key to the analysis must include a cultural "assessment," even prior to entering the area of operations, to understand the forces at play concerning ethnicity, language (to include dialects), religion, and nationalism (or ideology). This assessment must take into account the social influence networks which buttress the society—political, academic, criminal, business, technology, etc. The data provides a start point for the links and nodes sought for in the target analysis of human terrain systems (human nodes, influence links, nexus areas, etc.)

The war in Vietnam illustrates the case in point; for the entire first phase of the war, the strategy was to develop conventional South Vietnam (SVN) forces to take on a perceived future threat of the North Vietnam (NVN) forces. Meanwhile, U.S. forces chose to operate conventionally to attack and destroy the Viet Cong and NVA in "search-and-sweep" missions, with battalion-sized or larger operations. This strategy did not work.

Ivan Arreguin-Toft explored this phenomenon in his work on asymmetric conflict, "How the Weak Win Wars." His "Strategic Interaction" hypothesis separated all strategy into two venues: direct and indirect. He then went on to illustrate how weaker actors in asymmetric war win because of the very nature of the asymmetry—thus, a strong actor applying a direct force strategy against a weak actor

utilizing an indirect strategy, will lose.¹⁶ Toft viewed the works of Mao as illustrative of this concept:

“Building on Mao’s insight, I argue that the universe of potential strategies and counterstrategies can be reduced to two distinct ideal-type strategic approaches: direct and indirect. Direct approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight: Toward this end, a GWS [Guerrilla Warfare Strategy] targets enemy soldiers, and barbarism targets enemy noncombatants. Same approach interactions (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) imply defeat for weak actors because there is nothing to mediate or deflect a strong actor’s power advantages. These interactions will therefore be resolved quickly. By contrast, opposite-approach interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) imply victory for the weak actors because the strong actor’s power advantage is deflected or dodged. These therefore tend to be protracted, with time favoring the weak.”¹⁷

The point of the theoretical review is for the COIN practitioner to choose a strategy with the highest chance of success in defeating the insurgency. An indirect strategy approach serves best. Indirect strategies must counter the asymmetric strengths of the insurgent—his *time*, *space* and *will*. The strategy must make provisions for a sufficient amount of *time* in the campaign to counteract the effect achieved by the enemy conducting protracted war. It is possible to bring the insurgents to a level of war weariness, if one is patient and can maintain popular will for the effort. A clear and concise understanding of centers of gravity in COIN is imperative. Among the key considerations for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent is will. Other important factors could include the populace, the government, the military forces, U.S. support and assistance, key ground such as the insurgents’ sanctuary, or external support mechanisms for the insurgents. An indirect strategy would also focus on the de-

struction of the enemy's *will*, the denial of the support of the populace (focusing your strength against the enemy's center of gravity and his inherent weakness), and the denial of *space* in his sanctuaries and strategic bases (again, indirectly applying your strength to his weakness).

The COIN strategy considers the *ends*, *ways* and *means* to accomplish the campaign. The *ends* should consist of political objectives considered legitimate in the eyes of the populace and may include legitimacy in the view of the international community. The *way* of a COIN strategy embodies indirectness against insurgent indirectness (i.e. a "hearts and minds" campaign, denial of sanctuary and the use of limited, discrete military actions against the insurgents), and the *means* to accomplish it. The *means* are centered on the forces required for the protection of vital assets (our centers of gravity), consolidation and expansion forces, the fielding of a mobile and tailored COIN force (with a prominence of indigenous and host nation forces), and a focus on the assets required to foster the social reforms and political development in order to delegitimize the insurgents. Most of these measures are already embodied in FID methodologies and IDAD strategies.

Any strategy chosen must be relevant and valid in the context of the insurgency at hand. Historically, successful COIN strategies have been those which are highly flexible and adaptable and combine law enforcement (police take the lead when the insurgents challenge the law with the military supporting law enforcement efforts), protection of key assets and institutions,

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and the holding, consolidating, and expanding of security and stability by the government in contested areas. These principles are

currently embodied within our joint doctrine for FID. Certainly, any strategy chosen must be backed by a *ways* and *means* to implement, as the French learned in Indochina when General Leclerc attempted to implement his COIN campaign strategy:

“The method chosen was the so-called “oil-slick technique.” It involved the establishment of strong points in a region, from which ‘pacification’ forces would spread out to cut the country-side into small squares and then to comb each square on the grid, working from the outside, until the rebel forces within the net were finally brought to close quarters and exterminated. It is, in effect, a police method. The trouble was that Leclerc did not have a sufficient number of policemen for the rattisage, the combing without which the whole plan fell to pieces.”¹⁸

Taking a lesson from our own U.S. Army history during the Vietnam War experience, we were slow to understand that the “direct vs. indirect” strategy of attrition, typified by the “search and destroy” tactic of large, conventional unit sweeps, was not working. After study and analysis of why the strategy chosen by General Westmoreland was not working, Henry Kissinger commented introspectively in his article published in January 1969 in the magazine *Foreign Affairs*:

“We fought a military war; our opponent fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win.”¹⁹

General Abrams shifted the strategy in the remaining time of his command in Vietnam to emphasizing security and stability for the populace (known euphemistically as “hold and sweep”), and de-emphasized the strategy of attrition and body count. He inherently understood the COIN would be won in the realm of “hearts and minds” of the populace.

Operational Art of COIN

To conduct any operational art of war, you must translate your strategy so that it can be applied on the battlefield. The art of COIN at the operational level has a set of attributes described as conceptual (knowledge and intuition), static, and active components.

The Conceptual Component

The conceptual component is achieved by the gleaning of all intelligence and information sources to ascertain trends and deviations which analyzed by themselves are not obvious. The intent is to reach an intuitive level of decision-making with respect to the insurgency and afford the counterinsurgent the capability to remain one or two steps ahead of the game. A myriad of sources are utilized to achieve this level of knowledge. Knowledge is far more powerful a tool to the counterinsurgent than just having information. Knowledge must start with a historical and cultural understanding of the environment. The daily situation reports (SITREPS), periodic on the ground assessments, conversations of CA and PSYOP personnel with indigenous populace, local news media, results of interrogations, intelligence summaries, and even the daily reports of the various humanitarian and relief organizations must be digested and reviewed daily, put into context, and then absorbed to determine its overall meaning. This will require time each day to conduct reflective thinking (some call it “staring at the map”). There are just times when sitting at the map or internalizing all of the information results in an intuitive or informed decision as to what action to take next. Where do we go next to stay one or two steps ahead of the enemy and thwart his objectives? This elevates military skill levels to the “art” found in the operational level of war. Identify and employ those military leaders and strategists who have vast knowledge and cumulative background experience in the “art” of small wars and the intuitiveness to operate in this fashion.

A variation of this conceptualizing is used to detect and disrupt the insurgent organization and infrastructure (counter-organization). This is very similar to law enforcement and detective work through link-diagram analysis. A combined unit of law enforcement,

paramilitary and military operators, integrated into a judicial system with special powers to confront the insurgency, can be one of the best methods for disrupting and destroying insurgent membership and infrastructure.

The counterinsurgent's PSYOP and IO activities are another form of the conceptual component of COIN. The goal of these efforts is to destroy the belief system and message of the insurgents and ruin the myth and glamour of their cause. This is the war of ideas, and yours has to be better than the insurgents' message. Although PSYOP and IO are used predominantly to influence the population and win the "hearts and minds" campaign, a separate program dedicated to counter the motivations of the insurgent, ruin his morale, or co-opt him will have much greater effect for the success of the COIN campaign.

The Static Component

The static component comprises the measures taken to implement the operational maneuver of *Hold and Consolidate* or *Hold and Expand*. In *Hold and Consolidate*, the counterinsurgent and the host nation determine those key areas of physical vulnerability which are critical to the success of the COIN campaign, and assign forces to garrison and protect them. These may include exposed lines of communication. A good mission for the introduction of newly trained forces is in the role of static guard and area security as one of their first confidence-building measures. This type of operational maneuver is defensive in nature. *Hold and Consolidate* activities can also be used in conjunction with weather cycles in order to bottle up insurgents in mountainous terrain during winter. Occupying the lower mountain passes and key routes in and out of mountainous strongholds can block guerrilla movement and bottle them up until winter snows restrict their movements. However, this can only be construed as a temporary measure in order to buy time for other lines of effort to work until the weather and trafficability improve in the spring.

In *Hold and Expand*, forces are assigned to contested areas to regain government presence and control, and then conduct military and civic action programs to expand the control and edge out the insurgents. (This is very similar to the spreading ink blot used by the French in Indochina.) The COIN force is kept to a bare minimum

and is supported with CA and PSYOP troops. A company of infantry is normally provided for area patrolling and security for any immediate threat to the unit. Quick reaction forces in the form of close air support assets or reinforcing units back up these outposts whenever insurgent forces threaten to overrun them, but the tailoring of forces and the design of the force protection measures should allow friendly forces to defend themselves until the arrival of additional assistance. This option affords the counterinsurgent the ability to conduct minimal military operations with the capability to increase in scope as the situation dictates.

Hold and Expand forces conduct operations in ever increasing zones around their base. The first measure for force protection is to target and eliminate the insurgents living within the inner zone, defined by mission, enemy, troops, terrain and time (METT-T), around their base. This requires living amongst the local populace for long durations to gain their trust and support and to separate the locals from the insurgents. The secondary zone is the transit and support zone for the insurgents. *Hold and Expand* forces cast a wide net of operations outside their force protection zone to disrupt and interdict insurgent operations. Again, this requires patience and discrete intelligence work to ascertain the locations of weapons caches, safe houses, and transit support systems afforded the insurgents. The outer zone can be described as very remote locations or areas where the populace is neither friendly nor hostile to the COIN unit efforts. Occasional operations are conducted in these areas to show the flag and to at least keep the populace “neutral” to the idea of supporting the insurgents. Battalion-sized sweeps and clearing operations by conventional forces generally reap far less than their effort due to the extreme difficulty of finding and fixing elusive insurgents, but if used are more advantageous in the *Hold and Expand* option.

For example, one of the means to successfully translate the operational art of COIN and Counter-GW (Guerrilla Warfare) into a *Hold and Expand* effect in Afghanistan was to implement a form of the “strategic hamlet” program. A hybrid coalition military unit (SOF and conventional forces), in consort with host nation and indigenous forces, moves into and occupies one of the key and decisive areas designated from the risk analysis. The premise is to provide a long-

term presence and stability operation to the region. In essence, these operations became very similar to the “cop on the block” approach to law enforcement in major cities. Once you live somewhere and get to know the factors affecting that region, the populace will see the benefits of your presence and begin to participate in the process to move their region in a positive manner. Key to these operations in Afghanistan was to solve basic grievances of the Afghan people: provide some sense of law and order from warlordism and criminality (the very reason Afghan people whole-heartedly supported the Taliban in the beginning). Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon captured this sentiment in chapter 4, “Raiders on the Path of God,” from the book *The Age of Sacred Terror*:

“Within Afghanistan, The Taliban enjoyed a growing popularity. It provided something that ordinary Afghans longed for: a modicum of order. Chaos had reigned for so many years that people had become accustomed to being treated like the chattel of the warlords, or worse. The Taliban vanquished many marauding bands and disarmed trouble makers.”²⁰

Civil affairs actions followed closely once stability was gained, followed by the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to provide a conduit for host nation and international humanitarian organizations to move in and operate.

A very successful tool for continuity was the ability to conduct long-term operations of over six to nine months with the same forces, further enhanced by redeploying these forces back to Afghanistan into the same locations on follow-up tours. The background knowledge and efficacy of those military personnel and advisors became immense as the local Afghans in their region came to know them over time. The personal relationships of trust built up by these small unit commanders with their village elder counterparts was immense.

The Active Component

The active components of COIN operational maneuver consist of an armed reconnaissance capability and a specialized raiding force. Armed reconnaissance is defined as the patrolling of suspected in-

urgent areas in order to glean information on their activities, initiate contact and conduct battle, or to confirm the area is clear. Armed reconnaissance is a form of combat patrolling utilized in counter-guerrilla operations. Armed reconnaissance patrols are equipped for long durations and have the commensurate level of organic firepower to engage the insurgents. Armed reconnaissance is accomplished with a variety of platforms and measures. These all are tailored for “hunter-killer” type missions—search for, hunt down, gain contact with, and keep contact with insurgents. AC-130 gunships, Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (TUAVs), and ground reconnaissance patrols (mounted) all serve to accomplish this mission and to keep insurgents off-balance and disrupt their timing. A gridded-overlay method of operation can be employed to cover large sectors of suspected insurgent territory. This is similar to playing checkers: high-risk and medium-risk areas are subdivided in sort of a checkerboard fashion. Commanders choose the time and place to move into black squares or red squares to “check” the enemy (disruption and denial), or remove him altogether (destruction).

Each square or grid is covered by one method of surveillance and either confirmed as empty or containing suspicious activity. Once suspicious activity is noted, the counterinsurgent continues to develop the situation and may introduce additional forces into the area to destroy the threat. Timing is everything for the counterinsurgent. Long hours and numerous assets are utilized in counter-guerrilla operations to find insurgent forces—whether they be three insurgents or thirty. Hunter-killer platforms should engage insurgent forces immediately upon their discovery, and then continue efforts to maintain contact while reinforcements are being sent to the area. Over time, vast areas of the checkerboard could be identified as friendly or neutral, thus allowing friendly forces to focus on the most threatened portions of the board.

A specialized raiding force is required to conduct time-sensitive targeting beyond the scope of conventional forces in nodal operations. Nodal refers to key points identified from link-analysis or systems analysis and are the nerve points for the insurgent organization. These may include the interrelated systems of infrastructure, financing, social demographics (tribal affiliations), or behavioral sys-

tems. Insurgent nodes are links to identifying decisive points and allow the counterinsurgent the ability to achieve a desirable effect or gain a marked advantage over the insurgents. Raiding forces are also utilized against insurgent nexus areas. Nexus operations are areas where a variety of insurgent support systems, such as smuggling routes, infiltration routes, etc., come together and are utilized by a variety of insurgent guerrillas, auxiliaries, and underground support structures simultaneously.

Specialized raiding forces may be in the form of a counter-terrorist unit, an indigenous strike force, pseudo-guerrilla forces (those

Specially-equipped, long-range assets in the form of “hunter-killer” teams with dedicated mobility platforms are utilized to conduct armed reconnaissance patrols to seek out insurgents or deny them a base of operations. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)



made up to resemble enemy forces and operate in their areas), or a specially formed and trained unit from organic forces (a combination of general purpose forces and SOF). To ensure the highest chances for success, this unit will require dedicated mobility platforms and an extremely high level of access to intelligence assets. The sensor-to-shooter links should be uncluttered by removing noncontributing layers of decision makers. The number one role for this unit is to target insurgent organizational structure and leadership. A secondary role for this unit would be to conduct raids in sanctuaries where political sensitivities may preclude larger operations.

The COIN practitioner may find the need to combine conceptual, static and active components of his plan to conduct effects-based operations such as border interdiction and denial. Effects-based operations are conducted to change your opponent’s overall behavior favorable to your goals. Living on the border in firebases, combined with search and destroy missions, armed reconnaissance, and hunt-

er-killer operations all backed up with an effective PSYOP and IO campaign can change the behavior and actions of insurgents using the border as a transit and sanctuary. Technological measures, such as fences, minefields, and remote sensor fields can enhance the effect achieved to deny a border sanctuary to insurgents.

Phasing of the COIN Campaign

Campaign plans are phased to arrange operations and help to systematically achieve objectives. When shaping operations cannot contain an insurgency and deterrence fails, COIN forces and assets are mobilized and prepared for deployment. Phasing of a COIN campaign can be broken down within the construct of the remaining five phases recommended in the newly drafted Joint Publication 3-0 *Joint Operations* (Deter, Seize the Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, and enable Civil Authority): the initial phase - *Prepare-Hold-Defensively Consolidate* - is conducted to establish the COIN effort. It consists of the analysis and planning with the host nation and the preparation and deployment of the COIN forces along with the commensurate FID programs and IDAD resources to deter the insurgents. Key in this preparation phase will be the force-generation of indigenous units. Our efforts may take on more of a combat advisory role, initially, than combat operations. This phase is typified by holding and consolidation activities in order to deter the insurgents or at least reach a stalemate period with the insurgents and allow time for the COIN strategy to begin working. Friendly centers of gravity and host nation decisive points must be protected in this phase.

The second phase is designed to seize the initiative and dominate the battlespace. The *Offensive-Pol Mil-Internal Defense and Development* phase is the application of the indirect strategy with the aim of destruction of the enemy's will to fight and winning the "hearts and minds" of the populace by resolving social and political grievances as its centerpiece. It also includes FID to strengthen the nation's capability to secure and safeguard its populace. This phase is typified by the government's reoccupation and expansion of contested areas in order to delegitimize the message of the insurgents and deny them the support of the populace and space for their operations. The military focuses primarily on the neutralization or destruction of the

insurgents by denial of their support and denial of their sanctuary measures. Subphases within this could be focused on achieving key political objectives as they occur, such as buying time for elections, or could be climatic dependent such as operations in winter or summer due to the unique characteristics and impacts on operations. (Interestingly enough, the sowing, tending, cutting and selling of the poppy crops in Afghanistan dictated subphases of military operations.)

The third phase of the COIN campaign is typified by stabilizing the situation and the beginning of the enablement of the civil authorities in the host nation. It includes winning the war of ideas, destroying the enemy's will, and accomplishing the political end state (*Transition - Conciliation and Reintegration Phase*). The government is no longer threatened, and they exhibit good governance and rule of law; social grievances are resolved; and the insurgents have surrendered or reached a stage of conciliation with the government and are reintegrated back into society. A transition occurs from the security lines of operation against the insurgents to the rule of law, utilizing the existing legal system to identify, monitor, arrest and prosecute insurgents for their continual criminal activities. This phase is more characteristic of stability and support operations, as doctrinally known by U.S. forces and is still heavily dependent on intelligence.

The fourth and final phase is the long-term nation building and development required to complete the enablement of civil authorities and move the affected nation into modernization (*Nation-building*). It is by this measure alone that any resurgence of the insurgency can be eliminated.

Lines of Operation

Lines of operation may be physical—the arrangement of military forces on the ground with respect to geography or the enemy force—or logical. Logical lines of operation are used to achieve desired results which may bear no relation to the insurgent's physical activities. Logical lines of operation have inherent logic of purpose: they link decisive points with the desired effect to be achieved. Logical lines of operation help commanders visualize how they can assist and support nonmilitary means of national power with military assets. For

example, to achieve the “good governance” in a COIN campaign plan, a logical line of operation may link decisive points such as establishment of governmental institutions, elimination of corruption, providing basic social services, rule of law, etc., to achieve the desired objective of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.

The security lines of operation are normally reserved for the military means of power. These may include: counter-guerrilla operations to destroy or disarm the existing insurgents, security for critical vulnerabilities, and development of host nation military forces into a professional army.

A key principle discussed earlier was the requirement for unity of effort. Development of lines of operation provides a system for the coordination and synchronization of all COIN, FID and IDAD efforts, and must include the efforts of both the military and civil institutions. Each insurgency will have its own complexities, but some examples for logical lines of operations may include:

1. *Governmental Institution-Building Measures.* These include measures to build-up, assist, and even reform the government, law enforcement, national organizations such as the judicial branch, customs and border patrol, paramilitary and regular military forces. It may also include civil organizations such as the transportation industry, the health system, the judicial system, and work to repair and restore the economy. All good governance measures need to be backed up with an aggressive IO campaign to destroy the insurgent’s legitimacy.
2. *Employment and Reconstruction.* One of the key tasks to prevent additional populace grievances and to help restore the legitimacy of the government is to redress grievances at the local level and to restore basic services. Employment of disaffected youth will help prevent their recruitment by insurgents. Reconstruction projects, on a small and large scale can be effectively used in a “carrot or stick” fashion to reward compliant behavior and separate the insurgents from the populace. The key here is to understand the cultural norms by working with village elders and through cultural paternal systems when administering money or supplies for these efforts. Small unit commanders should have

some type of emergency funds to begin programs of this nature locally.

3. *Diplomatic and Political.* These include all measures to gain legitimacy for the government and the COIN effort, as well as to deny the insurgents venues for external support. They include international efforts to maintain support for the host nation and to thwart any external support sought by the insurgents.
4. *Military and Security Operations.* This line of operation is used to synchronize all conventional military, special operations and irregular and paramilitary COIN operations across the area of operations. Military operations should be focused on measures to enhance the achievement of political objectives and are limited and discrete in nature.
5. *Development of Civil Defense Forces.* Part of the consolidation measures required to ensure security and stability for the populace is the creation of self-defense forces. Conventional COIN forces will never be sufficient in numbers to adequately conduct all the tasks required to secure the population. This measure is a necessity in order to relieve COIN forces for higher priority tasks.
6. *Border Patrol and Interdiction.* Based on the uniqueness of the insurgency, part of the COIN effort will be diverted to this action in order to deny the insurgents freedom of maneuver and their lines of communication.
7. *IO and PSYOP.* Key to winning the war of ideas and destroying the will of the insurgents is to have a professional and well-thought-out IO campaign. The PSYOP aspect of the campaign focuses on the “hearts and minds” of the populace and conversely on measures which destroy the morale and capabilities of the enemy.
8. *Civil-Military Operations.* A vast amount of effort may be required to develop rural and urban infrastructure and to provide for the enhancement of social services such as health systems. This line of operation should also focus on international efforts to provide resettlement of refugees and rebuilding assistance with the support and input of NGOs and PVOs.

9. *Humanitarian Aid.* This line of operation is utilized to relieve suffering of the populace in affected areas not serviced by government or organized institutions. Military assets may be used to provide food and relief supplies to mitigate the suffering and serve as a temporary bridging device until social services are restored. This was one of the lines of operation chosen by General Franks early in the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM campaign.

Effects-based Campaigning in COIN

Although difficult, effects-based operations designed for major conventional war campaigns can be applied to COIN environments. Effects-based operations were primarily designed for conventional military operations to quicken results, focus on centers of gravity, and synchronize operational level resources. These were characterized more as a kinetic targeting process.

Effects-based operations can also be aimed at influencing and changing the behavior of insurgents in a way conducive to the counterinsurgent's plan. Effects-based operations do not focus on any distinct target but are, in fact, a systems perspective of the operational environment. Effects-based operations can be used to dissuade the insurgents, assure allies of the effort, and shape perceptions. The result of effects-based operations overwhelms the enemy—it gets inside his decision cycle and forces him to react to so many complex situations presented him until his command and control becomes chaotic and his forces are neutralized or destroyed. The prime factors are speed of operations, time, and a cost-benefit analysis which identifies high-value, high-payoff results. How can this be applied to COIN, if the essence of successful COIN is patience? If we delink the speed and time factors, and focus on high-value, high-payoff operations, effects-based operations can be applied to a COIN model.

In Afghanistan, operational planners were very apt at identifying the areas of the battlefield that would give the highest rate of success, once desired objectives, known as lines of operation, were applied. A risk analysis identified clearly where the thrust of efforts should be conducted by the host nation and the coalition forces. More importantly, we began to tie combat operations to political ob-

jectives, resulting in a much more efficient use of military power. The application of military power was based on gradualism. Only the most necessary military force was used in any one location but could rapidly be built upon and reinforced by a variety of methods. Clearly the first desire on the part of all was to use indigenous forces whenever possible, bolstered by combat advisors.

There are several operational level effects which can be achieved by COIN-tailored forces. The most over-arching is the immediate benefit provided by their presence in high and medium-risk areas. Presence and stability operations bring an immediate form of legitimacy and law and order, facilitate the rebuilding of governmental and provincial institutions, and provide a platform for the reintroduction of humanitarian and reconstruction aid.

COIN forces provide a platform for strategic information operations. Combined with the visible presence of legitimate government agencies, such as the Afghan National Army, great effects can be achieved to counteract the propaganda of the enemy. PSYOPs and CA units are critical to these efforts. The most critical task, and the hardest to achieve, is to break the motivators that create recruitment in the insurgent camp.

COIN forces with unique specialties can be employed operationally to conduct disruption and interdiction operations, all preceded by surveillance and reconnaissance using operational-level resources. Larger conventional COIN forces are then allowed to concentrate on the knowledge gleaned from these actions.

Small specialized forces can also fill the gaps in the campaign to conduct economy of force operations in medium- and low-risk areas as a preventative measure against the enemy moving to establish sanctuaries or conduct operations. Combat advisors become force multipliers in these arenas by generating combat power with indigenous forces. At a peak of operations in Afghanistan, combat advisors were able to field up to twelve to fifteen battalions of local militia and irregular forces allowing conventional and main-stream forces to concentrate on more important operations.

Task Organization for SOF COIN

This paper does not address the organization and composition of larger conventional forces in COIN. Suffice it to say they are needed, if for no other reason than to stand as a deterrent to any attempts by insurgents to conduct a quick campaign utilizing the *foco*-military strategy (primarily by conducting battalion-sized counter-guerrilla operations). The best use of conventional forces is in the protection of key assets, consolidation of formerly contested areas, and the expansion of government control to newer areas. Conventional forces are also used as Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) when lighter, less capable unconventional and SOF become engaged by insurgents. Last, conventional forces will play the lead role in any direct confrontation with insurgent main forces if the insurgents make the decision to transition to a conventional force-on-force phase. Light infantry units make the best COIN conventional forces, but armor and artillery can also play an important role.

SOF COIN forces will normally be organized in the model of a theater Joint and Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commanded by a senior special operations officer. For a counterinsurgency, the Special Forces Group is highly adept at forming the nucleus of the theater JSOTF, given the expertise in guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense and COIN which reside in this organization. COIN is land-centric by nature and Army Special Forces, along with Army CA and PSYOP personnel, will form the bulk of the SOF COIN force.

Naval SOF could also be part of the JSOTF providing DA strike assets and riverine patrol platforms. Additional joint SOF might include assets in the form of a Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) providing the Army SOF and the Air Force SOF aviation assets. Coalition SOF assets could also be provided to the task force. Attachments may further consist of conventional forces (e.g., U.S. or host nation infantry) and unconventional, irregular forces such as local militia, paramilitary and pseudo-guerrilla forces.

The operational art aspect is to ensure the forces match the strategic and operational needs of the joint force commander. Theoretically, SOF is the unconventional force and should not be used in

conventional operations. SOF provides the joint force commander a specialized, high-risk mission force, economy of force tool, and a force multiplier capability (with the ability to generate indigenous forces). SOF also provides a joint force commander some enabling and facilitating functions (operating at the seams): CA, PSYOP, monitors and observers, advisors, liaisons, etc.

The development of a SOF COIN task organization begins with the analysis of the insurgency, an analysis of the mission, and a troop to task analysis. An understanding of the principles of insurgency and COIN provides a foundation for key tasks best served by unconventional forces. The physical and logical lines of operation in the campaign plan will also serve as a source for tasks best served by SOF and unconventional forces. Generically, once this process is complete, SOF COIN organizations can be organized around these key functions:

1. *COIN Military Operations and Combat (UW/GW)*, consisting of operations in consolidated and contested areas—counter-guerrilla. These forces primarily consist of SF, paramilitary (rural self-defense forces), militia, indigenous and pseudo-guerrilla forces. CA and PSYOP units are attached and are an essential part of these operations.
2. *A Specialized Raid Force, for discrete, surgical military operations and for counterterrorism operations, if required.* This force consists of SOF direct action (DA) forces and may also combine conventional, joint and coalition assets.
3. *Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) capable of adding combat power, in general support - reinforcing, to unconventional forces as required.* These forces will have secondary functions such as personnel recovery, asset security, and personal security detail.
4. *Foreign Internal Defense Trainers and Advisors.* FID forces will focus on the IDAD portion of COIN strategy to help build professional military and paramilitary forces. They provide combat advisory assistance.
5. *PSYOP and IO.* Information and perception shaping forces are comprised of PSYOP and to some extent CA units. Information operations experts and planning cells are incorporated into the staff.

6. *Combat Support.* Combat support forces which consist of mobility assets and operational firepower assets (aviation, maritime, etc.) should be incorporated into the task organization.
7. *Coordinating and Liaison assets.* Organizations such as the Special Operations Command and Coordination Element (SOCCE), the Special Forces Liaison Element (SFLE), the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) into the air operations center, various SOF Liaison Officers, etc., and requisite coalition coordination and integration centers are required to perform transactions with higher, lateral, and subordinate units. One of their key functions is the prevention of fratricide.
8. *Administration and Support.* These functions are required to run bases, force protection, and logistical systems and will utilize both joint doctrine and service regulations to perform their job.

The size of the units, amount of bases required, and type of command and control mechanisms required are based on METT-T. Figure 3 illustrates a generic SOF COIN force within a coalition and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) command structure. This Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) organization is within joint SOF doctrinal norms.

The leadership style best suited for this type of campaign should be characterized by the willingness to decentralize authority down to small unit level. Due to the array of forces assigned to a CJSOTF commander, a collegial style of leadership works best to recognize that commanders will be varied in rank, but certainly representing their respective nations. The CJSOTF commander will have to display the competencies required at the operational level in order to provide well-thought-out guidance: he must be reflective, analytical, and intuitive in order to overcome the ambiguity and complexity of an irregular warfare environment. Command and control must be flattened out from hierarchical to more horizontal, including more flexible and adaptive command and control mechanisms with other maneuver commanders on the battlefield. "Supporting and Supported" command and control measures between other major maneuver elements and SOF are the preferred C² arrangement given the




Figure 3. Notional Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force for COIN operations.

nature of the fluid operations being conducted and responsiveness required for emerging operations. The CJSOTF commander must at all times attempt to maintain the flexibility and speed afforded by SOF to achieve operational level effects by maintaining tight control (OPCON) over his assigned forces.

Measures of Effectiveness

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are difficult to design and judge in a COIN campaign. By their nature, insurgencies are political wars and asymmetric. Everyone understands what victory should look like: the insurgents are defeated, the host nation is restored in its legitimacy, and the factors creating the grievances are fixed.

Key tactical MOE include the number of insurgent incidents, the number of successful COIN force initiated fights, the number of IEDs and bombings, how many caches and what amounts of weap-

ons are hauled off the street, distribution of media in PSYOP form, etc. Counting the number of dead insurgents, the infamous “body count,” although useful, may not be an accurate assessment of their strength. The number of insurgent defectors or enemy personnel turned is more useful down at the tactical (and sometimes operational level), as it is a measure of the will of the insurgents and how effectively your PSYOP, IO or subversion programs may be going.

However, the asymmetric tools of the insurgent are *time*, *space*, and *will*, all used within a political context of legitimacy. At the strategic and operational level, the MOE must take these elements into account. T. E. Lawrence in his work *Science of Guerrilla Warfare* remarked, “Guerrilla War is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.” Figure 4 outlines one method to ascertain who is winning during the insurgency.

Much of the metrics proposed are subjective and abstract. The chart is used during key and critical times during the campaign or during transition of phases or after major operations. It is designed as an “operational art” tool and is not reflective of tactical metrics such as the number of incidents, insurgents killed, caches recovered, etc.

	Govt	Insurgents
TIME		
SPACE		
WILL		
LEGITIMACY		

Figure 4. Operational Art Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) diagram.

The three major strengths of the insurgents which comprise their asymmetric weapons are *time*, *space* and *will*. Denying the insurgents these modes of operation must go into any device which attempts to measure effectiveness. All insurgencies have politics as the crux of the operational environment, and all insurgencies are ultimately about power and politics. Therefore, legitimacy, and who has it in the eyes of the populace, becomes an important metric.

Time reflects the patience required to go the long-haul and also the timing and operations tempo of military battles to keep the insurgents off balance. Space is required by insurgents to have sanctuary or base camps. Will requires endurance and support of the effort by the populace (this includes the war of ideas). A subordinate measure of will should be the willingness and amount of the populace to participate in the government's security projects and assist by providing information and intelligence which leads to the capture or destruction of the insurgents and their supplies. (In some cultural contexts, this measure of effectiveness may be the percentage of village elders and local leaders currently supporting the government's efforts.) Legitimacy requires providing good governance, security, and stability. Reconstruction projects provide a metric of legitimacy and should be included in this tally along with any positive economic indicators. At key phases within the campaign, this proposed mechanism for MOE is used to evaluate these four areas (legitimacy, time, space, will) and ascertain who is rightfully gaining ground. To be on the path to success, the government must have more overall checks in the blocks than the insurgents.

Conducting a successful COIN campaign will require the knowledge of operational art to ensure the strategy fits the situation and the campaign plan is synchronized with all aspects of the FID and IDAD programs ongoing by the host nation government. Unity of effort can be achieved by developing physical and logical lines of operation intended to overwhelm the efforts of the insurgents and deny them freedom of movement. Applying the military art of COIN using conceptual, static and active components as the *means* and *ways* of a strategy will contribute to the end state sought by the counterinsurgent. In the following chapter an example of COIN strategy and operations is provided in a case study about the recent war in Afghanistan.

5. The War in Afghanistan, 2002–2004

“I don’t know how everyone else sees it, but to me it’s starting to look like an insurgency with a political front, area commands, and guerrillas as the action arm.”

CJSOTF-Afghanistan commander, summer of 2002

The emergence of a Taliban-inspired insurgency in Afghanistan during the spring of 2002 provides the counterinsurgent a unique study of an example of insurgency in the 21st century. This case study is offered to provide reinforcement of the salient points made in this paper.



The Hindu Kush mountain range. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)

Afghanistan Case Study Analysis²¹

In the spring of 2002, coalition and Northern Alliance forces had routed the Taliban, controlled the major cities, and smashed the existing Al Qaeda (AQ) remaining in Afghanistan. Operation ANACONDA pushed hardcore Taliban and AQ into cross-border sanctuaries. The focus of the conflict then turned to establishing the new interim Afghan government through the Loya Jirga process. The Loya Jirga was a time-honored method of gaining consensus from tribal leaders throughout Afghanistan. Key Afghan leaders came to Kabul to meet under a large tent, and after days, of debate cast their vote and promised their loyalty to support Hamid Karzai as the interim ruler of Afghanistan until more formal elections could be held. The Interim Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a NATO contingent of several European countries (numbering around 5,000+ personnel), was established in Kabul to protect the fledgling new government, and by May 2002 the training of the new Afghan National Army began. All the while, friendly forces occupied key territory throughout Afghanistan to keep a wary eye on any resurgence of AQ. Although a tenuous peace existed for Afghanistan, pockets of lawlessness, warlordism, and instability remained outside Kabul.

By summer 2002, increased attacks by predominantly Taliban forces captured the attention of the coalition. Astute military leaders and strategists came to recognize the re-emergence of a new threat—an insurgency fomented by the Taliban and in concert with terrorists (Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Hezb Il Islami [HIG] - political party). Cojoined in the effort and often in league with Taliban forces were criminals, opportunist, anti-coalition militants, and drug lords.

The *reasons* for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan were primarily due to a lack of a cohesive government caused by the fragmentation and diffusion of political power to the warlords who were

The war in Afghanistan provides the clearest example of how insurgencies blended with terrorism could affect military operations in the 21st century. Understanding its dynamics could lead to a reformulation of theories and doctrine for how to fight this new form of war.

left in place upon the withdrawal of the Soviet army. This condition was further exacerbated by existing divisions within Afghan society, ethnically and politically (but surprisingly, not religious). Afghanistan had long-suffered economic underdevelopment in conjunction with lack of social services for the populace. Shattered from several years of war, no formal tax system or economic revenue was available to mitigate the misery. In fact, the major industry providing work and dollars into the economy during the 1990s was the humanitarian NGOs. As is typical in a failed state, crime and banditry became rampant and unchecked by any legal authority. The Taliban were initially welcomed by the people as they reduced crime, defeated the warlords and removed them from power, and attempted to limit the effects of the drug trade.

The *strategy* of the Taliban insurgents resembled a mix between the protracted war strategy defined by Mao and the *foco*-military strategy, or *guerrilla foco*, articulated by Che Guevara. The objective was establishing a totalitarian theocracy, an alternate world based on the Islamic Caliphates of the past and led by a vanguard of religious mullahs. The golden age of the Caliphates was considered the highlight of Islamic rule and jurisprudence; an enlightened Muslim leader reigned over the Islamic people and territories and ruled in accordance with the law of God. This would obviate the need for nation-states ruled by a myriad of kings and despots throughout the Middle East.

The nature of the insurgency created by the Taliban was typified by a foco-military style campaign with the objective of establishing a totalitarian theocracy, an alternate world based on the Islamic Caliphates of the past and led by a vanguard of religious mullahs.

The Taliban insurgent movement was highly dependent on external support, considering they initially were surrogates of Pakistan. The Taliban were not concerned about the will of the people and were not resorting to a political solution. Their organization was selective, and the leadership was comprised of small, elite groups who did not view mass mobilization as one of the requirements to sustain

the movement. Their insurgency can be characterized by two of the seven types of insurgency outlined in Bard E. O'Neill's work:²²

1. Anarchist. The Taliban viewed the standing political arrangements in Afghanistan as unnecessary and illegitimate.
2. Reactionary-Traditionalist. The Taliban carried out violence based on the radical Salafist movement (militant traditionalists) with a desire to revert the Afghan society back to the golden age of the Caliphate.

Initially, the Taliban demonstrated the capability to conduct conventional warfare (albeit Third world in nature and sophistication) against the Northern Alliance, but after the Taliban defeat and rout in 2001 and 2002, adopted guerrilla warfare as the prominent form of conflict against the coalition forces and the Afghan government. This type of warfare was typified by mobile hit-and-run operations, harassment operations, and ambushes designed to discredit the government and wear down the will of the coalition. The insurgents (the Taliban, anticoalition militants, and the various terrorist organizations in the region) operated from bases in both rural and urban areas. Although the insurgents have demonstrated the capability to conduct terrorist acts, these are very discriminate in nature and have an intended political purpose. Some of the minor acts of terror were clearly intended to seek revenge or punish some of the population who did not support the insurgents.

Upon their major defeat and rout by Northern Alliance and coalition forces in spring 2002, the Taliban insurgent movement entered a strategic defense stage. At first, this was not recognized by coalition forces. The Taliban did not go away, they merely melted into the population (the Taliban are indigenous Afghans) to bide their time for a resurgence. In this strategic defense stage, they built up their bases, recruited and trained new members, and continued attempts to implement a shadow government. Once they were prepared to resume operations, they remained fixated on the *foco*-military strategy because they perceived popular support as insufficient or nonexistent. Therefore, they did not see the need to involve political development of the populace. The insurgents were, and still are to this day, dominated and led by key, charismatic leaders (such as Mullah

Omar and Mullah Berader) who form the vanguard and elite of the insurgency.

The Taliban insurgents increased their level of guerrilla warfare operations throughout the remainder of 2002 and into 2003, but as of 2004, the insurgency was characterized as reaching a strategic stalemate. An even tempo of operations has been reached; the capabilities and effects achieved by the insurgents do not rise in any dramatic sense.

An analysis of the *environment* for the insurgency reveals advantages and disadvantages for the Taliban-led insurgency. The insurgents overwhelmingly took advantage of the mountainous terrain in the central region of the country and along their eastern border with Pakistan. These large unimproved areas, with proximity to Pakistan, provide key sanctuary and strategic basing for the Taliban. Unimproved roads, the few which exist, canalize mobility and limit the reaction times of counterinsurgent forces. The poppy crops in these areas of Afghanistan are vast, and the illegal trade in this drug, along with revenues from traditional smuggling, provides much of the financing for the insurgency.

What limits the counterinsurgent also limits the insurgent. Due to the vast and separated nature of the border and central region sanctuaries, the insurgents have difficulty conducting large-scale, coordinated guerrilla operations. The various area commands are also hampered by this physical dislocation from one another. The insurgents are forced to conduct roving guerrilla operations, making them vulnerable to counterinsurgent forces.

The climatic conditions in Afghanistan also cut both ways. The extreme heat of the summer and the cold, deep snowfall in the mountains during the winter limits military operations, particularly air operations. Normally, the Afghans pass the winter by remaining at home, maximizing family time, and visit with relatives during winter holidays.

The cultural and political environment for the insurgency is based on ethnic, tribal, and elder system of society. The tribal autonomy contributes to the lack of political engagement by the populace on national matters; there is a distrust of the central government. The insurgents are predominantly from the Pushtun tribal background

and are motivated by their code of *Pushtunwali*: a code which orders their conduct. Ideologically, they are against foreigners or any intervention in their affairs. They have an abiding respect for hospitality and protection of their guests and a system of “face” which dictates revenge (*badal*) if affronted. The Pushtuns are Sunni Muslims and their religious values foster their will to maintain the insurgency and replace the current Afghan government with their idealized form of Islamic utopia.

The Afghan government is based on the precepts of a Federal Republic. It is an Islamic, constitutional government, recently legitimized in a nationwide election conducted in 2005. Even so, some Afghans remarkably remain bitter about the makeup of the government as being too dominated by the former Northern Alliance factions. This provides some of the enmity the Taliban insurgents tap into for their propaganda campaign. Warlords still rule and govern, although they are appointed as “governors” from the central government but, in some areas, are not seen as fully legitimate representatives of the people.

The Taliban do not enjoy *popular support* of the people. There may be active support in very limited regions, and any other support is passive in nature. The social and political grievances of the people still remain crime, social services, warlordism, and lack of international reconstruction support, but the Afghan government and the coalition provide a better message for hope and opportunity than the insurgent alternatives. Military actions, for the most part, have been kept small in scale and limited in scope and duration. The implementation of the PRTs in over nine sectors of Afghanistan has begun to improve social services and infrastructure, something the insurgents cannot accomplish. The government and the coalition are also helped in this endeavor by superior resources and assets in the information media, allowing them to get their message relayed to the population and to win the war of ideas. Although the insurgency has charismatic leadership, and it uses theological appeals to the masses for a better Islamic government and society, it has never delivered on this promise in any significant way. Ironically, the insurgent’s use of terrorism remains discrete and limited in order to not lose what support of the populace they may enjoy.

The *organization* of the insurgents is not cohesive and is still plagued by factionalism. It is difficult to ascertain what constitutes the head of the insurgency; not apparent is any existence of a main headquarters or political party running overall policy. The major political faction is the Hezb Al-Islami Group (HIG) led by Hekmatyr. The military arm is the Taliban, still led and orchestrated by Mullah Omar. The Al Qaeda is a pure terrorist organization and still aligns with and enjoys support from the Taliban dominated insurgency. All these elements have exhibited the ability to form various area and district commands and are highly conspiratorial and secret. The leadership is small, executive style. They are very adept at using the network of mosques and madrassas existing in contested areas for meetings, planning, and recruitment. Within urban areas, the insurgents form classic cellular structures with distinct specialties: bomb-making, propaganda, and support.

The analysis of *external support* is the key to understanding the lifeblood of this insurgency. Sanctuary provided by crossing into the eastern border into the Pakistani tribal areas, or into eastern Iran in the Baluchistan area, has contributed more to the survival of the insurgents than any other factor. Fighting under the ideological banner of a global Jihad ensures sympathetic support for the Taliban, in the form of funding, from various Islamic nations and Islamic charities. External material support in the form of logistics and weaponry is also provided from the drug trade, smuggling, and black marketing. The Taliban receive moral support from Al Qaeda and from propaganda generated in Pakistani cities and on the television airwaves with the *Al Jazeera* news media.

Finally, this analysis examines what the *government and coalition response* has been. When the Taliban insurgency re-emerged in the late summer 2002, the coalition predominantly handled the COIN effort in order to buy time for the political development of the Afghan interim government. The strategy focused on consolidating and holding ground and areas clearly pro-Afghan and pro-coalition; protecting the government and other key resources (lines of communications, major cities, the capital city of Kabul, etc.); and simultaneously deploying coalition COIN forces to conduct counter-guerrilla operations in insurgent-contested areas of Afghanistan. Deploying

forces into insurgent areas was designed to deny sanctuary, interdict the border, and expand governmental and coalition presence. Each time a new area was occupied then cleared of guerrillas, civil affairs activities and reconstruction activities followed.

The interim government kept on the path towards legitimacy. A *Loya Jirga* was held in summer 2002 to elect the first interim government. This political activity was followed months later by an assembly to write the national constitution. Parallel efforts were underway to develop the Afghan National Army, the Ministry of Defense, and other governmental institutions needed to run the Afghan nation. The interim president, Mr. Karzai, revived the tax system and began to replace warlords and recalcitrant governors to indicate he understood the grievances of the populace. Although the drug trade contributed immensely to the breakdown of law and order in Afghanistan, its elimination did not become the highest priority measure in order to first focus on defeating the insurgency. While Karzai focused his efforts on rebuilding the national government, the international community provided the earliest response to social improvements in the form of new schools, roads and bridges, medical centers, telecommunications system, and housing for the return of millions of refugees. These efforts could not be matched by the Taliban insurgents. Karzai's most recent response to the insurgency is to offer conciliation and reintegration of the Taliban insurgents back into Afghan society.

The Conduct of the War

A focused analysis helped to develop a clear picture of the emerging insurgency—the formation of area commands, urban cells, a political front, guerrilla bands, a drug-financed support system, and even a psychological operations support cell. With this coherent view of the threat as insight, countermeasures were developed in fall 2002 and applied on the battlefield continuing on into the onset of winter.

The COIN effort dramatically improved in 2003 with the deployment of Afghan National Army units (in consort with coalition military advisors) and the use of local militia, Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), and indigenous forces to focus on the remaining pockets of insurgent areas. To deny the Taliban their previous border sanctuary

with Pakistan, coalition forces conducted combined operations with Pakistani forces to limit access of the Taliban to previous safe areas. Combined with an effective “hearts and minds” campaign using PSYOP and humanitarian reconstruction assets, the coalition was quite effective in delegitimizing the message of the insurgents. Even if some segments of the populace were not in support of the government, at least these efforts kept them neutral toward supporting the insurgency. Because the popular support for the insurgents was very low, population and resource control measures were not needed, or instituted as one of the COIN measures.

The arrival of spring 2003 brought on the first, theater-wide coordinated strategy to conduct COIN, as the coalition came to understand an accurate picture of the battlefield. Pakistan began a series of military maneuvers to put an end to the sanctuary afforded the insurgents in their northwest tribal areas. With the addition of the ready and capable battalions of the Afghan National Army and the local AMF, an aggressive campaign was instituted focused on those

The arrival of spring 2003 brought on the first, theater-wide coordinated strategy to conduct COIN, as the coalition came to understand an accurate picture of the battlefield.

areas under predominant insurgent influence. Operationalizing the military effort of COIN resulted in the disruption, dispersion, and the destruction of enemy forces and the removal of hundreds of Taliban and Al Qaeda combatants from the equation. Attacking their sanctuaries and associated support and command and control networks was equally successful. One of the key, contributing factors to the success of this campaign was a constant update and revision of the original analysis of the nature of the insurgency (“gray stew”) combined with accepting risk to concentrate efforts on high payoff effects. A different approach to the enemy’s winter hiatus put coalition and Afghan forces on the offensive to continue to take the fight to the enemy and thus disrupt his emergence in spring 2004. The results allowed the necessary political and social solutions to work—legitimizing more and more the Afghan Interim Government.

The operational concept devised to conduct the campaign, all based on joint interoperability, became a blend of COIN, CT, and

counter-guerrilla operations, or the “C³” technique. There are intersecting points of agreement in each of these three applications which can be used by commanders when faced with a war such as that found in Afghanistan. A lesson learned from experience, the practitioners of unconventional warfare and COIN were fused with the practitioners of combating terrorism by a very simplistic formula: COIN + Knowledge + Patience = Successful Combating Terrorism. (This in no way hampered or diminished CT operations when there was actionable intelligence.)

Given the application of successful COIN principles combined with the patience to gain knowledge and “finger-tip feeling” of the regions (operational prescience), friendly forces were able to asymmetrically approach a level of capability that would lead to successful operations against terrorists. This helped to solve one of the dilemmas posed by the “gray stew” (the cooperation of the Taliban, anticoalition militants, criminals, and terrorists) in separating the terrorists from the insurgents.

The momentum for winning the COIN campaign is on the side of the government and coalition forces. There still remains the requirement for the expansion of government and social services, combined with the establishment of some form of national economy (and a commensurate elimination of the drug trade). However, the Taliban insurgency, even though protracted in nature, may be losing its will to continue as they see Afghanistan improve socially and politically. President Karzai and the government and people of Afghanistan still enjoy vast international support for their cause; the Taliban, Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin faction (HIG), and Al Qaeda do not.

In 2004, the Afghans conducted their first democratic election. Success will be achieved as more government institutions mature, borders are secured, the drug trade is suppressed and ongoing reconstruction continues. The Afghan government and coalition forces are well-positioned to win the COIN campaign in Afghanistan.

COIN Principles Validated

From these experiences, some conclusions were drawn about principles of COIN that work in this ongoing irregular war. The observa-

tions can hopefully serve to further help future commanders combating insurgents and terrorists in this century:

1. *A correct analysis of the threat and what type of “small war” you are in is an absolute imperative.*

Thorough study is required in understanding the motivations and the factors which created the insurgency, its environment, and the social dynamics of the populace. Equally important is the understanding of the interrelated and networked nature of criminals, terrorists and insurgents and how they are supported and financed. Traditional Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IOE) and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) methodologies must be modified to perform guerrilla and insurgent IPEs. Law enforcement tools such as link-diagramming of criminal nets are appropriate for use in this arena. Additionally, the overall analysis should scrutinize friendly factors such as the capability of the host nation government to deliver social programs, provide for stability, and a look at its military and paramilitary forces capabilities. Removing and preventing the factors which created the Taliban were an important task in all of the lines of operation used in this COIN campaign: provide stability where there was lawlessness; begin education of the children in government-sponsored schools; remove offending warlords; and, most importantly, remove the political patronage the Taliban and HIG previously held with Pakistan.

2. *The political solution is the final answer to winning.*

Even with enemy opposition in the form of “gray stew,” military operations must complement the political objectives. International forces, in consort with international bodies, must help the threatened country have a concrete “country plan” such as an IDAD strategy (and a large percentage of that plan should be developed by the host nation). A country plan helps to keep everyone on the same sheet of music and will prevent stove-piping of efforts. Of equal importance is to have an understanding and appreciation of the geo-politics of the region. For a land-locked country like Afghanistan sitting astride trade routes to and from Central Asia, the countries of Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and the former Soviet countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and

Kyrgyzstan have tremendous influences which shape the politics and nature of society internal to Afghanistan.

3. *You cannot ultimately win a war of attrition in a COIN environment.*

Military operations must be finely-tuned to gain a favorable payoff. A counterstrategy to foco-military adopted by the insurgents is to attack the insurgents militarily in order to attrit and defeat their momentum. However, as the nature of the insurgency becomes more protracted (such as happened in Afghanistan), the strategy must shift. It is vastly more important to change the ideological motivators of the enemy and reduce his supporting capabilities. All attempts should be made to counter the “romanticism” of being a guerrilla fighter. This involves a deeper, more precise use of PSYOP and IO to destroy any image of an alternate or parallel existence.

4. *Intelligence is Job #1.*

The classic role of intelligence is changing in this new form of war. Much of what used to be considered intelligence has now become real-time information. All venues of information must be read and analyzed to glean “actionable” data. A system of monthly or quarterly assessments prepared by military forces stationed in each region was quite helpful in identifying trends and progress. Nontraditional forms of information lend a perspective quite helpful to commanders—UN reports, NGO/IO/PVO reports, local press, interviews by CA personnel, etc. Daily SITREPs and INTSUMS provide a baseline, but combined with other forms of information, a commander can gain the most precious resource at his mind’s disposal—*knowledge*. Key areas of nexus can be identified and attacked as critical vulnerabilities of the enemy. A good example may be a supply route where drug smugglers, gun smugglers, terrorists, and insurgents all traffic the same route. Hitting this nexus achieves success against all.

5. *Use the indigenous forces.*

The Army and militia, the police forces, trusted interpreters, local government and religious leaders, and area social workers put on a local face when dealing with the populace. The nuances of language, customs and cultures can only

Use of indigenous forces, to include the Afghan National Army, the local security forces, and the militia forces of the various governors was key to



successful COIN operations throughout Afghanistan. This form of force multiplier often added four to six light infantry style maneuver battalions to the battlefield. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)

be navigated by native-born people. We are not operating against a terrain-oriented enemy; we are operating on “human terrain.” The best counter-guerrilla force is one made up of “hunter-killer” teams formed from men indigenous to the region.

6. *You must identify who are the external supporters and how they are supporting the insurgents.*

A variety of pressure can then be brought to bear diplomatically to shut down these mechanisms and deny sanctuary. The solution may not only be military but have to include political repercussions. For instance, the opium trade has enormous bearing on the fight in Afghanistan. The poppy crops are planted in spring, and then harvested early summer. During this time, a certain percentage of enemy fighters are absent from the battlefield as they tend to the crop. By mid-summer, the drug trade starts up with fresh opium products and a corresponding flow of money fills the coffers of the enemy. With fresh money, more weapons and guerrilla fighters can be bought. Thus, in a dangerous cycle, fighting in Afghanistan surges in late summer and on into the fall, until the onset of winter. Knowing these cycles and how they affect the fight is a tremendous tool for where and how to position COIN efforts. Eventually, a more ro-

bust campaign to eradicate the poppy fields will have to be accomplished as a necessary line of operation to shrink terrorist and insurgent financing. The local leaders will need to divest themselves of this lucrative trade in order to finally gain legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.

7. *Engage the power of religion to help solve problems.*

The stark reality for most of these conflicts is that there exists a religious ideology as part of the mix. Positively engaging prominent national religious leaders along with local religious leaders to help further the cause of the country can be a powerful dynamic. The forces of religion can also be utilized to delegitimize the insurgents. This is a reversing of the “liberation theology” we saw sustaining South American insurgents.

8. *Create innovative and hybrid fighting units with mobility better than the insurgents.*

This is going to require a flattening of command and control structures while decentralizing the efforts on the battlefield. A mixture of capability utilizing indigenous forces, light infantry, some mechanized and armored units, CA and PSYOP units, SF, and appropriate intelligence and information-gathering assets is required. This hybrid unit should also have air and land mobility required to sustain the effort.

Specially modified vehicles allow for long-range operations and several weeks of duration on the battlefield. Shown are the Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMVs) used by Army SF teams. (Photo courtesy of the 3rd Special forces Group)



Any hybrid unit must also have enough lethality, both from organic weapons and from theater operational resources close air support (CAS), to handle any fight brought on by the insurgents. The hybrid unit must be directly connected to intelligence sources without the requirement for inter-

vening layers of staff. The need for backup, Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) was validated as still required on this type of battlefield. QRFs allowed commanders flexibility to shape the battlefield. QRFs can be local militia or multinational force units.

9. *The old “hamlet” idea still works.*

The USMC was highly effective in Vietnam with the Combined Action Program, administered by Combined Action Platoons. The strategic hamlet idea worked successfully in Afghanistan. These notions are based on the “spreading ink blot” strategies of the French during their Indochina war. Small units of SF or conventional military forces adopt a region, then move in and provide presence and stability over long periods of time. Living with the indigenous popu-



A typical SF firebase located in central Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)

lace brings its own benefits in co-opting or neutralizing a disaffected populace. A greater synergy is gained by developing local economies and security structures run by the populace. In Afghanistan, this is extremely important as the cultural norms of individualism, autonomy from central government, and the elder system of tribal and village government are prevalent.

Success is co-opting the village and region, and success is also keeping the populace at least neutral toward supporting the insurgents. Combined with an aggressive humanitarian effort from CA units and NGOs/IOs/PVOs to bring benefits to the region, commanders were able to glean vast amounts of information in each village or region, allowing them to disrupt insurgents. Surprisingly, this did not require major financial efforts. The repair or building of a school, drilling a well, building a dirt road, and repairing a bridge were all minor construction projects with large pay-off. Commanders had authority to spend up to \$1,000 in their region to improve relations and raise the importance of the tribal elders who suggested the projects. An additional benefit can be gleaned by using local labor and materials—thus improving the local economy. Although this is characterized as “winning the hearts and minds” of the populace, it really was more important for providing the stability and presence needed by tribal and village elders to move their communities in a positive direction.

10. *Assimilation and repatriation of the enemy is still a viable program.*

Reaching out to disaffected elements of the enemy to incorporate and reintegrate them into society has to be one of the tools of COIN. President Karzai and the regional governors have moved in this direction and for Afghanistan, it is a positive direction. An additional tool at the commander’s disposal is to trade the guerrilla’s job and weapon for a paid job with the government. Allowing insurgents to “come back into the fold” is a powerful tool that military commanders should support. Being a moderate Taliban, in support of the Afghan government, is not a crime in Afghanistan. Being a Taliban is an ideological way of thinking. Allowing the moderates to eventually form legitimate political parties will dissuade them from becoming militarily active. This type of program worked with great success in bringing the insurgents in El Salvador back into the folds of society.

11. *Patience, Patience, Patience is a virtue.*

Military commanders and governmental agencies need to be often reminded that COIN is a long-term investment if you want to achieve success. We gained success in the El Salvador COIN effort after 13 years’ perseverance.

12. *Information Operations is old wine in a new bottle but the speed provided by information technology is staggering.*

Failure to get and keep highly qualified people who understand this “art” will hamstring COIN efforts. Friendly information operations have to win the race with the enemy to be effective—the message you want to get out must get out first. We cannot afford to get sidelined by sensational news and then go into a defensive IO campaign.

13. *Once you gain contact with insurgents or terrorists keep contact and press the fight.*

Whether it is 3 personnel or 30, your COIN units and organizations must have the flexibility and adaptability needed to keep in contact and keep the fight going. On a cost-benefit analysis alone, it probably takes 90 percent of your resources to get the 10 percent effect of destroying or disrupting the enemy. You do not want to let the opportunity slip out of your hands. When the populace sees the ugliness of dead insurgents, it helps to demystify the cause.

14. *Population and resource control is effective, if done correctly.*

There have been some egregious historical examples of misuse of this technique, such as relocating whole villages or clans. However, surrounding a town or village and controlling the traffic in and out often led to the capture of anticolonial militants and cleansed the village of the insurgents.

15. *Dearming and demilitarization programs are necessary evils that really do not have high payoff.*

This includes the never-ending search for caches of weapons and ammunition. You have to do this to prevent the use of these weapons and supplies by the insurgents against your forces, but just like attrition strategies, these often are meaningless statistics, and commanders should be wary of giving them too much credibility. Most of the populace is astute enough to hide their best weaponry, if for no other reason than for their self-defense.

16. *You have to plug the leaks and holes on the battlefield.*

Isolating and destroying insurgents in sanctuaries is a must, along with interdiction of guerrilla bases and infiltration and exfiltration routes of insurgents. Conduct an aggressive surveillance campaign along lines of communications

for the enemy and design effective interdiction campaigns to damage and hinder enemy operations. The new enemy has migrated to urban areas, so a tremendous amount of effort must be spent on the location of enemy safe houses and identifying agents who support the enemy. Developing governmental institutions like the border security forces and customs agencies, while developing and growing local police and intelligence personnel, will strengthen this effort.

The war in Afghanistan provides the clearest example of how insurgencies blended with terrorism could affect military operations in the 21st century. Understanding its dynamics could lead to a reformulation of theories and doctrine for how to fight this new form of war. There are valid lessons learned from the experiences of the Afghan conflict which could be potentially helpful to future commanders. The conduct of COIN, CT and counter-guerrilla operations in Afghanistan is succeeding. Patience, combined with taking a long-term view to visualize the end state, will result in one of the most successful COIN campaigns. The experiences of fighting insurgents in Afghanistan provide a study for one of the first outbreaks of insurgency in the 21st century, and its eventual resolution will provide a variety of lessons learned for counterinsurgents.

6. Conclusion

Special Operations Forces are uniquely organized and equipped to fight in the changing unconventional warfare environment of the 21st century. This paper was an effort to contribute to formulating the theoretical aspects concerning insurgencies and counterinsurgency. It provides a source of information for professionals of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. If the trend in warfare for the 21st century is increasing outbreaks of insurgency, then we must prioritize and focus a new generation of warriors by shifting the organizational culture of our armed forces from conventional-direct war-making to the unconventional-indirect style of warfare. This includes a robust effort within the SOF community to serve as the lead and repository of theory and experience in this “art” of warfare. We will need to recognize and foster those in our ranks who have the appreciation and experience of counterinsurgency theory and application.

SOF will continue to have a unique role in this form of unconventional warfare and a vast amount of expertise concerning counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare already resides in the community. SOF have proven in El Salvador, the Philippines, and in Afghanistan that they can successfully execute COIN. If insurgency, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, continue to be the prevailing form of warfare we will experience as a result of the GWOT, then SOF will be looked upon as the expert source for translating the theory and art of this form of unconventional warfare into practical application on the ground.

As the U.S. military power grows unchallengeable in the conventional realm, our enemies have sought to engage us militarily in the unconventional arena of asymmetric operations—terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. These forms of irregular warfare are operating in a congruence of effort and transcending into a new form of asymmetric war known as the “gray” area.

Historically, these forms of conflict prove quite attractive to a weaker foe, but the body of evidence indicates the stronger actor, applying successful principles of counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla

and counterterrorism techniques, can still prevail in a large percentage of cases. Insurgents can win, however, and have proven so in roughly a third of the instances where asymmetric warfare is chosen as the means to challenge the stronger actor.

The new challenge of “gray stew”, the nexus of terrorism, insurgency, criminality, and negative transnational factors, poses new dilemmas for war fighters. Can there be a political concession or solution for this new type of enemy, once they combine? Formerly, we separated the populace from the guerrillas, but how do we now separate the terrorists from the guerrillas is a more important step? While we apply strategies to win similar to playing chess and checkers, the forces of “gray stew” surprise us by playing poker and raising the ante. How do we win the “hearts and minds” of the populace when they live in parallel and alternate worlds created by this new form of threat? (Or even worse, they are “heartless” and “mindless!”) How can we compete with tribal, religious and ethnic factors that neutralize our countermeasures?

New strategies are required. Along with existing countermeasures, we should explore other asymmetric options to employ against this enemy such as co-option, neutralization, subversion, sabotage, coercion and what Dr. Boaz Ganor, famed Israeli counterterrorist theorist of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel, describes as “counter-motivation”.²³

“Know your enemy” must include a more comprehensive study of what makes him tick than just a study of his tactical methods. Philosophical, theoretical, ideological, religious and historic motivators should be taken into account to understand the world of today’s insurgents. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are Afghans, and to some extent still enjoy support of the populace for some of their more moderate agendas. Getting at the root causes for this support involves a scholarly approach beyond traditional military studies.

A “hearts and minds” campaign may not work when alternate and parallel worlds exist between the insurgents, the disaffected and the government. The war of the minds has been elevated to an ideological battle. This will be the most challenging problem to solve for contemporary theorists of counterinsurgency. At best, neutralization

and suppression of this effect may be the only solution rather than winning.

Command and control mechanisms must be tailored to support hybrid units and ensure flexibility and responsiveness to levels never before imagined. This will necessitate the “flattening” of traditional staff systems and the retraining of key staff as COIN experts. Sensor-to-shooter links need to be shortened as well as information-to-shooter links. Quicker and more responsive arrangements for command and control (supporting and supported vs. traditional OP-CON/TACON arrangements) provide the flexibility for forces on the battlefield. Major headquarters will assume more and more of the responsibility of becoming force and resource providers vice commanding and maneuvering combat forces directly.

As the enemy becomes “gray”, hybrid units should become “gray.” We should see specialty stovepipes being erased. New hybrid units must be self-contained to have the skills and capabilities of unconventional, specialized, conventional, and humanitarian organizations with their own robust organic firepower and intelligence and information fusion cells.

The SOF warrior of tomorrow will need a variety of skills and tools to act much more capably than the infantrymen or special operations warrior we know today. This new warrior will need law enforcement tools, intelligence agent skills, and humanitarian and peacekeeping skills in addition to his previous warfighting skills. Most importantly, he will need the education, the insight, and the appreciation of the “human terrain” to develop his COIN campaigns. For this, a modern theory and doctrine for operationalizing COIN is essential.

Endnotes

1. Gerolymatos, Andre. *Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet- American Rivalry, 1943-1949*. Basic Books, Perseus Book Group: Cambridge, MA, 2004, pp. 147-147. The US intervention in the Greek Civil War was the first post-war example of foreign internal defense and foreign assistance provided by the US to defeat a revolutionary insurgency. Many of the lessons learned by the US in this conflict would make up the techniques used later during the Vietnam War and the development of our own FID doctrine.
2. General Lindsay’s remarks were recorded in the outgoing publication “A CLIC Conference Report” published in January of 1989 by the

- Army and Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, pp. 24-25.
3. "Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. USSOCOM synchronizes operations against terrorist networks by arranging military actions in time and space and leading a global planning process against extremists in coordination with other Combatant Commanders, the Interagency and partner nations. The purpose of synchronizing DoD's plans and operations is to leverage fully the capabilities of the Department of Defense in support of the USG's Global War on Terrorism." USSOCOM intends to combine the earlier core tasks of PSYOP and IO into the 8th task. Courtesy of the Joint Special Operations University SOED-F.
 4. Kelly, Ross S. *Special Operations and National Purpose*. Lexington Books, D.C Heath and Company: Lexington, MA, 1989, pp. xvi-xvii. Kelly provides one of the few works on the strategic and operational purpose for having a national SOF.
 5. Dr. Steve Metz was an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, PA. He earned his doctorate degree in political science from John Hopkins University. He was extraordinarily prescient in the writing of his paper in the mid-90s, basically advocating to the U.S. Army that a revival of counterinsurgency expertise was required.
 6. Joint Publication 3-07.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Govt Printing Office, Wash, D.C., 30 Apr 2004, p. I-1. Surprisingly, this JP serves as the only joint doctrine source for an American way of war to conduct counterinsurgency. Joint Doctrine officers have confirmed no work is currently in progress specifically to address joint doctrine for counterinsurgency, even though the United States is currently embroiled in two counterinsurgencies, Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall, this joint publication suggests the American military take efforts to not become engaged in counterinsurgency and is defensive in nature.
 7. Anderson, John Lee. *Guerrillas – Journeys in the Insurgent World*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 64. Anderson traveled extensively to visit a variety of existing guerrilla and insurgent activities and recognized a constant theme of their attempts to create an alternate government to legitimize their efforts to the affected populace. In some cases, he explained this phenomenon as creating an 'alternate reality'.
 8. Gingrich, Newt. *Winning the Future – A 21st Century Contract with America*. Regnery Publishing, Inc.,: Washington D.C., 2005, pp. 8-9. Gingrich, along with other contemporary writers, recognizes the growing trend on the convergence of irregular warfare enemies.
 9. Baillie, Mark. "Islamist Terrorism: A Primer" CDISS Paper #1: The Center for Defence and International Security Studies: Henley-on-Thames, UK, 2004, p. 8. Note the trend to cast a wider net in describ-

- ing the battlespace of the new terrorists. A shift is occurring from transnational to ultra-national.
10. Islamic Glossary Term: Jihad. www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/glossary/term.JIHAD. 17 Nov 2004.
 11. Rashid, Ahmed. *Jihad – The rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. pg. 2.
 12. Webster's Collegiate Thesaurus. Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield, MA: 1976. p. 826.
 13. Joes, Anthony James. *Resisting Rebellion: History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004.
 14. Laird, Melvin R. & McGee, Griffin, Schelling. *The Nixon Doctrine. Notes and essays from a town hall meeting held by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Washington, D.C. 1972*, p. 4.
 15. Joes, Anthony James. *Modern Guerrilla Insurgency*. Praeger: Westport, CT, 1992. p. 209.
 16. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars – A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict." *International Security* 26.1 (2001), pp. 93-128. Copyright 2001 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
 17. *Ibid*, pg 105.
 18. Taber, Robert. *War of the Flea – The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare*. Brassey's Inc.: Dulles, VA, 2002, p. 81.
 19. Nagl, John A. *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam – Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife*. Praeger, Westport, CT: 1966, pp. 170-171. LTC Nagl provides an illuminating review on the development of doctrine and leadership for irregular warfare challenges by comparing British and US models for counterinsurgency. Much of what he has identified contributed to the aversion of the US military from pursuing doctrinal and practical work in the art of counterinsurgency.
 20. Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. *The Age of Sacred Terror*. (NY: Random House, 2003), 135-136.
 21. A systematic methodology for analysis of insurgency was developed by Bard E. O'Neill in his work *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (published by Brassey's, Inc., Dulles, VA, 1990). His work examines the reasons for insurgency, the nature of the insurgency, insurgent strategies, the environment of the insurgency, the measure of popular support, insurgent organizations, external support, and the government response.
 22. O'Neill, Bard. *Insurgency & Terrorism – Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*. Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990, pp. 17-19. O'Neill's work defines the standard for any analysis of insurgency or terrorism.
 23. (Dr. Boaz Ganor from a lecture at the JSOU annual Counter Terrorism conference, 25 Sep – 1 Oct 2004, Orlando, FL. Dr. Ganor is the Staff Executive Director and contributing writer for the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. Website www.ict.org.il.)

Appendix A.

Principles, Axioms & Rules

“Insurgency, of course, is hardly a new phenomenon, as Roman armies could have reported from Gaul, Judea, or elsewhere. Indeed, insurgency has probably been the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the creation of organized political communities. It would be difficult and perhaps impossible to find many volumes on political history that do not mention rebellions, revolutions, uprisings, and the like.”¹

– Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*

Principles for Successful Insurgencies

Know your enemy is a time-honored maxim from Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*. Practitioners in the operational art of COIN, in order to achieve success, must be familiar with enduring lessons and generally applicable principles for insurgency deduced from these lessons. A key caveat for the commander and planner is to not fall into the trap of drawing lessons from the analysis of any one insurgency as being valid for all others. Each case of insurgency must be analyzed within its own context. However, some generalized lessons can be drawn from insurgent theory, insurgent strategies, and historical case studies in order to understand why insurgencies can be successful:

1. *The political has primacy over the military effort.*

The insurgents who can make the case for a better message to solve political and social grievances, who can develop parallel state or political systems which outperform the government, and who can make the status quo political situation intolerant for the populace have a better chance for success.

2. *Legitimacy.*

Insurgents who have more legitimacy than the government in the eyes of the populace and the wider diplomatic world, while at the same time, delegitimizing the current government can be successful.

3. *Popular Support.*

If the insurgents have wide appeal by the populace for the cause, combined with mass mobilization, it is pretty much a “done deal”—they tend to be highly successful (Mao and the Chinese Revolution).

4. *Outstanding Leadership and Organization.*

Highly charismatic leadership, who are themselves intellectual enough to provide strategy, focus, and drive to the insurgency, backed up by an outstanding political and military organization, can contribute highly to the success of the effort. They also contribute in motivating and rallying the populace to win over their support, as well as keep up the morale of the insurgents.

5. *Use of Indigenous Forces.*

Insurgencies are most successful when the military forces of the insurgency are comprised from within the indigenous populace. Guerrillas and insurgents from outside the area do not receive the welcome of the populace and tend to not establish the rapport needed to “swim in the sea.” We have seen in some of the current insurgencies, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgents enjoy enough external support and financing they seem to not require the support of the populace.

6. *Adoption of Correct Strategy.*

Mao’s strategy of revolutionary warfare and Che’s treatise on the strategy of guerrilla warfare tend to be widely adopted and used successfully by insurgents, even after modifications by the insurgents due to local conditions and context. Insurgents who can successfully translate the essence of the strategic and operational art factors of *time*, *space*, and *will* into the elements of their campaign tend to be successful. However, picking the wrong strategy is often fatal - terrorism and barbarism can achieve political effects as well as intimidate a populace to get their support, but traditionally fails in the long run as a strategy. Choosing to conduct an urban-based insurgency is not highly regarded as a good strategy either (note the effects of the destruction of the insurgents and terrorists in Fallujah, Iraq, during COIN operations in the fall 2004). Whichever strategy chosen, the

one with best success incorporates flexibility, innovation and has a dynamic nature to them.

7. *Conduct Protracted Warfare.*

The extension of time to wear down and attrit the enemy and to allow time for the achievement of political objectives is a successful tactic in insurgency. Protracted warfare also contributes to allow for the husbanding of strength of guerrilla forces and allowing their buildup and development into a larger force, allows for the building and development of strategic bases and sanctuaries, and facilitates the time needed to build the political mobilization of the populace. As the axiom goes: insurgents win if they are never defeated. Prolonging the war also contributes to wearing down the will of the conventional forces and invoking “war weariness” on the populace and the government.



Guerrillas typically will be armed with a variety of small arms rather than major combat systems in order to preserve their mobility. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)

8. *Superb Intelligence System.*

The successful insurgencies develop an intelligence and espionage system superior to their opposition. This includes detailed knowledge of terrain, the enemy forces, and the operating locales.

9. *Mobility.*

Successful insurgents must not be outmatched in mobility. Higher mobility than conventional forces prevents defeat during combat operations and allows insurgents to pick the time and place of their operations.

10. *Strategic Basing and Sanctuary.*

Insurgents require and need a base of operations which allow them survivability and refuge while negating the strength and technology of COIN forces. The correct choice of a strategic basing area also allows the insurgent forces to fight on grounds favorable to them and contributes to the prolonging of the war. Strategic bases and sanctuary provide the *space* required for insurgent maneuver, support areas, and protection. Insurgents who are adept at creating *space* which works for them also help create conditions for success.

Of course, not any single one of these actions in isolation will translate into victory for insurgents. Rather, an astute insurgent leader combines many of these principles to increase chances for success, all within the context of his local conditions.

Principles for Successful COIN Operations

Conducting a successful COIN campaign is achievable but very difficult for nations and armies trained for conventional war. No two successful COIN campaigns have ever provided all the answers to develop the next successful COIN campaign. The most important consideration taken to operationalize your COIN efforts is the correct analysis of what you really have before you. In fact, the success of your COIN campaign will hinge on that factor. Get the analysis right, pick the correct COIN strategy, apply the oft-recognized COIN principles for success, and you will build the conditions for success of the COIN operation. The second most important consideration is

to be flexible in the adoption of the following countermeasures and ensure you tailor your efforts to fix problems within the context of your campaign:

1. *The Political Objective outweighs the Military Objective.*

The penultimate choice for success in any COIN is to solve the political and social grievances which foster the discontent. This can only be done by good governance, not by a war of attrition with insurgents. Both the ability and capabilities of the government and the support of the populace become important factors in your campaign plan.

2. *Legitimacy.*

Your demonstration of good governance and provisions for security and economic success must be better than the alternate state proposed by the insurgents, and it must be recognized as legitimate in the eyes of the people and the wider diplomatic community. You must win the war of ideas. Governmental institutions must respect the rule of law and human rights. This may require COIN forces to assist in the development of civil and administrative functions (state building) and be prepared to conduct SASO. There must be an adequate state government which can work to provide the solutions for political and social grievances. To be successful, the counterinsurgency efforts of all must destroy whatever message the insurgency is promising and conversely delegitimize and isolate them militarily and politically. This may include the co-option of the insurgents.

3. *Selection of Appropriate and Adaptable Strategy.*

We have clearly learned from experience that you cannot fight an unconventional war in a conventional manner. Force-on-force strategies cannot be adopted in asymmetric situations. Selection of an indirect strategy is more appropriate to counter an unconventional, asymmetric force. A synthesized strategy formulated from multiple counterinsurgency techniques, which allows for flexibility and adaptation to changing local conditions, has the best chance for success.

4. *Unity of Effort and Unity of Command.*

There must be unity of effort and command between the civil and military authorities to have a successful coun-

terinsurgency. Coordination along objectives derived from the strategic concept must exist at federal and state levels of government in intelligence matters, civil administrative matters, law enforcement, and in military operations (counter guerrilla and counter terrorist).

5. *Coordinated and Multi-layered Intelligence and Information System.*

Historically, 90 percent of the effort in finding and defeating insurgents is the result of good old police and detective work combined with military intelligence. A well-integrated and well-resourced intelligence and information gathering system, coordinated and fused at all levels, has proven to be one of the most highly successful COIN techniques. It must also be capable of shortening the sensor-to-shooter execution cycle.

6. *Win the 'Hearts and Minds' of the Populace.*

As Mao elucidated, the populace is the sea in which the guerrillas (the fish) swim in; draining the sea and removing the support of the populace for the insurgents is another highly successful technique in counterinsurgency. The in-



Conducting a “Hearts and Minds” campaign, utilizing government forces, is a classic principle for success in any COIN campaign. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF- Afghanistan)

surgency is fought on human terrain through the war of ideas. Without the populace, the insurgents are denied operating space, support systems, recruitment, etc. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ may involve population and resource control measures if the insurgents are adept at terrorizing and intimidating the populace for their support. If the populace is the number one center of gravity in your COIN campaign (and not the institutions of government), then the security and stability of populated areas will become paramount as an objective.

8) *Utilization of Professional Counterinsurgency Forces & the Conduct of Minimal Military Operations.*

Conventionally trained forces will find it challenging to convert to tactics and procedures required for COIN if they are not developed and trained in those skills prior to their insertion in combat. A core cadre of specialized light infantry,



COIN forces will require a mobility capability greater than or equal to the insurgents. (Modified Toyota gun truck in Afghanistan—photo courtesy of CJSOTF – Afghanistan)

special operations forces, and intelligence personnel should be developed with extra training and consideration given to their capabilities in counterinsurgency warfare, language, regional expertise, and interpersonal skills. They are re-

ally diplo-warriors. They will require mobility as great as or better than the insurgents and staying power to remain in the field for long periods of time. However, there is a substantial role for conventional forces to operate alongside of tailored COIN forces to buttress and consolidate areas under governmental control, provide reaction forces, and to take on insurgent main forces if they choose to fight. Historical evidence indicates that required force ratios of counterinsurgents to insurgents on the ground is about 10:1 through 15:1, but these ratios can be mitigated with technology.

Military actions should be kept to the barest minimum, subordinate to wider civil-political objectives and be of a very discerning and discriminating nature. Combat must be tailored to isolate the insurgent without affecting the populace or one runs the risk of alienating the populace. Counterinsurgency forces are typified by their decentralized, small-unit actions giving them the best chance for success against insurgents.

9. *Use of Indigenous Forces - Counterorganization.*

Nobody knows the area and the populace best than police and military personnel formed from the indigenous population. Using host nation populace in conscripted units and volunteer units assists efforts to mobilize the populace to defend themselves and help fight the war. One of the first efforts in preparing to conduct COIN will be the need to generate enough indigenous force structure to provide this security. Counterorganization forces are those forces who adopt the style and tactics of the insurgents—to match them. They are best utilized in counterinsurgency formations as scouts, hunter-killer teams, pseudo-guerrillas, and commandos. They are extremely useful in local and regional paramilitary outfits as an economy of force. Gendarme type units of local law enforcement personnel help foster governmental legitimacy and rule of law at local and district outposts. At the higher organizational level, national forces put a legitimate face on larger conventional operations when conducted. Foreign military forces and outside advisors can often be seen as occupiers of the country or manipulators of the government's armed forces.

10. *Denial of Sanctuary and External Support.*

Insurgent *space* must constantly be threatened in order to throw off their timing and their will to continue. This may require the shutting down of a border, or a raid into an adjoining country supporting the insurgency. External support in the form of finance, equipment and diplomatic will need to be eliminated, interdicted, or neutralized using all elements of power. This saps the *will* and the lifeline of the insurgent organization and is a key measure to be accomplished to have a successful counterinsurgency program.

11. *Patience.*

If you do not have the patience to outlast the *will* of the insurgents and their strategy for protracted war and wars of attrition, you will ultimately fail. Tailor your national will, your forces, and your sustainment base for operations over the long haul, and you will be more successful.

Adoption of these time-honored principles, tailored to the exigencies of the insurgency you are dealing with, tends to foster success. Again, not any one in isolation will work; in fact, utilizing all of these in conjunction with each other increases the level of success.

Caveat: no two insurgencies are alike; do not make the mistake of blindly, or without analysis, applying measures which may have worked in other insurgencies! Use them as a guide for application to your situation. Success is never guaranteed, due to all the variety of factors which could occur throughout a counterinsurgency.

Notes

1. O'Neill, Bard. *Insurgency & Terrorism—Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*. Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990, pg. 1.

Appendix B. Acronyms

ACM.	anti-coalition militants
AFSOF.	air force special operations forces
AMF.	Afghan Militia Forces
AOR.	area of responsibility
ARSOF.	army special operations forces
ARVN.	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASD(SO/LIC).	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict)
AQ.	Al Qaeda
C2.	command and control
C4.	command, control, communications, and computers
CA.	civil affairs
CAS.	close air support
CBT.	combating terrorism
CDRUSSOCOM.	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CI.	counterintelligence
CIA.	Central Intelligence Agency
CJSOTF.	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CMO.	civil-military operations
COA.	course of action
COIN.	counterinsurgency
CONPLAN.	operation plan in concept format
CT.	counterterrorism
DA.	direct action
DATT.	defense attaché
DIA.	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIME.	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic
DOD.	Department of Defense
DOS.	Department of State
FID.	foreign internal defense

FM	field manual
GMV	ground mobility vehicle
GW	guerrilla warfare
GWOT	global war on terrorism
HIG	Hezb Il-Islamiya terrorist Group
HN	host nation
HUMINT	human intelligence
IDAD	internal defense and development
IED	improvised explosive device
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INTSUM	intelligence summary
IO	information operations
IO	international organizations
IPE	intelligence preparation of the environment
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISAF	Interim Security Assistance Force
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOAC	joint special operations air component
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LOC	line of communications
METT-T	mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MTT	mobile training team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSOF	naval special operations forces
NCA	national command authority
NGO	non-governmental organization
NMS	national military strategy
NVN	North Vietnam
NVA	North Vietnamese Army

OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
PAO	public affairs officer
POLAD	political advisor
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private organization
QRF	quick reaction force
ROE	rules of engagement
ROMO	range of military operations
SA	security assistance
SAO	security assistance organization
SASO	stability and support operations
SF	special forces
SFLE	special forces liaison element
SITREP	situation report
SOCCE	special operations control and coordina- tion element
SOCOORD	special operations coordinating element
SOF	special operations forces
SOLE	special operations liaison element
SVN	South Vietnam
TACON	tactical control
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
TUAV	tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
USDAO	United States defense attaché office
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Com- mand
UW	Unconventional Warfare

Appendix C. Definitions

campaign. A campaign is joint by nature and generally described as a series of related major operations aimed at achieving a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign. Campaigns synchronize and integrate necessary joint force operations as well as multinational operations and, when appropriate, the activities of the HN, OGAs, IGOs, and select NGOs. (Draft JP 3-0)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA administration. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in

a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorists activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization

to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

irregular challenges. Employment of “unconventional” forms of competition and resistance such as terrorism, insurgency, insurrection, and criminality to counter traditional U.S. advantages. (OSD)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

lines of operation. A line of operation defines the orientation of the force in time and space, or purpose in relation to an adversary or objective. Commanders may describe the operation along lines of operations that are physical, logical, or both. A physical line of operation connects a series of decisive points over time that lead to control of a geographic objective or defeat of an enemy force. A logical line of operation links multiple decisive points with the logic of purpose to defeat an enemy or achieve an objective. (Draft JP 3-0)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at

times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

operational art. Operational art is the employment of military forces to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. It translates the combatant commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately into tactical action, by integrating ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. Operational art is the creative model and thought process commanders use to determine how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by helping JFCs and planners understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the desired end state. (Draft JP 3-0)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO. (JP 1-02)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

stability operations. As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces must focus their priority on stability operations, which likely will involve both combat and noncombat. Of particular importance will be CMO; initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablishing civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. The long-term goal of stability operations is to develop an indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, and rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. US military forces should be prepared to support the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil authorities are unable to follow through. PSYOP will play an important role in providing public information to foreign populations during this period. (Draft JP 3-0)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce

or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

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