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Operation Provide Comfort:  
A Model For Future NATO Operations

A Monograph  
by

Lieutenant Colonel John P. Cavanaugh  
Signal Corps



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School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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## ABSTRACT

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT: A MODEL FOR FUTURE NATO OPERATIONS  
by LTC John P. Cavanaugh, USA, 56 pages.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO member nations have begun reducing the size of their military forces. Therefore, NATO is faced with responding to crises situations with considerably smaller forces available. To answer the challenge of responding rapidly with smaller, multinational forces, Operation Provide Comfort provides a model of a successful coalition operation.

This monograph analyzes Operation Provide Comfort as a model for NATO operations and future coalitions with which the United States may become involved. This study begins with Operation Proven Force, the precursor of Operation Provide Comfort, and develops trends that were carried forward to Provide Comfort. The most significant trend was that of a cohesive, subordinate staff providing advice and assistance to a senior headquarters ad hoc staff.

This study develops the chronology of Operation Provide Comfort and compares this chronology to the four future missions of NATO, conducting combat operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. It determines that the four missions were performed during the operation and serve as a model for NATO. This study concludes with a recommendation that the term humanitarian conflict become a doctrinal term in FM 100-5, Operations.

## PART I. INTRODUCTION

Operation Provide Comfort began in early April 1991, in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm and was one of the largest ever humanitarian relief efforts. (1) Its purpose was to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurdish refugees clinging to the mountainsides along the Turkey-Iraq border. It was a fast-paced operation that involved a hastily formed coalition of military forces under the control of the United States European Command (USEUCOM). (2)

With current discussions and speculations concerning the future of NATO and its employments with smaller, multinational formations, Operation Provide Comfort provides a successful model of coalition operations directly applicable to NATO. According to COL K.C. Brown, special assistant in Washington, D.C. to GEN John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander, USEUCOM, the four missions that NATO may be called upon to execute in the future were performed by coalition forces during Provide Comfort. These four missions are to conduct combat operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. (3) Although this was not a NATO operation, most of the forces provided to USEUCOM were NATO forces.

During Operation Desert Storm the United States called for Iraqis to rise up and throw out Saddam

Hussein. It is believed that these messages emanated from Central Intelligence Agency clandestine transmitters located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Kurds in northern Iraq responded to these appeals and revolted.(4)

Kurdish leaders exploited the Iraqi Army situation at the end of the war and conducted limited operations with the Peshmerga, the military force of the Kurds.(5) They made gains initially, controlling the cities of Dihok and Kirkuk. However, the Kurds miscalculated Saddam Hussein's remaining strength and he responded to the revolt by brutally crushing it. After suppressing the Shiite rebellion in southern Iraq he unleashed his military on the Kurds in the north, using those Republican Guard units that had not been destroyed or disarmed in the Basra pocket during the Gulf War.(6)

Fierce battles raged between the Kurds and the Iraqi Army, which used armored vehicles and helicopters to crush the rebellion. This use of helicopters could have been termed a violation of the cease-fire that General H. Norman Schwarzkopf had concluded in the desert at Safwan. President Bush, however, initially did not view it as a violation and allowed the Iraqis to fight from the air.(7) It appears that U.S. policy at this time was not clear regarding the Kurds and Saddam's brutal repression. Saddam's forces moved in and destroyed entire city blocks in the Kurdish section of



Dihok with artillery fire. In the wake of this onslaught the Kurds fled. Almost the entire Kurdish population of Dihok and Zakho abandoned their homes. The city of Zakho was a virtual ghost town when coalition forces entered it.

The suffering and death among the Kurds clinging to the mountainsides were well publicized by the media. As world opinion grew, the United Nations (U.N.) passed Security Council Resolution 688 condemning Iraq's oppression of the Kurds and appealing for humanitarian aid for the Kurds.(8) As a result, USEUCOM was directed by the National Command Authority (NCA) to conduct Operation Provide Comfort which commenced in Turkey and later moved into Iraq to assist the Kurdish refugees.(9) Many nations responded with materiel and military forces to assist the Kurds.

It is in this context of international military cooperation during the conduct of these operations that this study is based. The research question focuses on the applicability of Operation Provide Comfort as a model for future NATO missions.

## PART II. METHODOLOGY

An explanation of the methodology and several definitions are required for the study. The methodology will trace the development of Operation Provide Comfort

from pre-Provide Comfort events to the withdrawal of coalition forces from northern Iraq at the end of Provide Comfort 1. Lessons from pre-Provide Comfort operations will be developed and carried forward as trends developed throughout the operation. Strategic guidance provided, along with the phasing of the operation and their effects at the Joint Task Force tactical levels, will also be studied.

The chronology of events will be applied against the four future missions of NATO (combat operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations) to determine if they were conducted during Provide Comfort. The analysis will compare actual Provide Comfort events with these four missions to determine their validity in the context of future NATO operations. Additionally, a United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) term, humanitarian conflict, will be analyzed as a more apt description of the missions performed during Operation Provide Comfort. (10)

The chronology will be developed primarily from the perspective of Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B). The author's personal experiences as the JTF-B, J-6 Signal Officer will be used as the basis for several observations.

The study will conclude with the reasons for the success of Operation Provide Comfort, the future applicability of this model, and a recommendation for

humanitarian conflict to become a doctrinal term.

Several definitions are required. The following terms will be used throughout this monograph as defined in Appendix A:

- Contingency Operations
- Demarche
- Humanitarian Conflict
- Humanitarian Operations
- Peacekeeping
- Peacemaking
- Tactical Control (TACON)

PART III. PROVIDE COMFORT PRECURSOR:  
OPERATION PROVEN FORCE

Operation Proven Force was the precursor to Operation Provide Comfort and was the USEUCOM planned second front on Iraq emanating from Turkey. Operation Proven Force was primarily a U.S. Air Force operation, commanded by Major General James L. Jamerson, USAF, with the mission of conducting air operations against Iraq. Subordinate to Proven Force was a U.S. Army Special Operations Task Force, commanded by Brigadier General Richard Potter, with the mission of performing personnel recovery in conjunction with the air operations. This operation contained significant lessons for both headquarters, as many of the same soldiers and airmen served together again in Operation Provide Comfort. (11)

One of the key lessons learned was that of staff interaction and cooperation. The Proven Force headquarters staff was a composite staff comprised

primarily of Air Force personnel, inexperienced in deployments. Conversely, the Special Operations staff was a cohesive one and was experienced in deployments. The subordinate Special Operations staff provided assistance and expertise to the inexperienced higher headquarters Proven Force staff. This was a trend that continued into Provide Comfort.(12)

Other significant factors that benefitted Provide Comfort were the building of an infrastructure at isolated locations, logistics resupply over long distances, knowledge of the terrain, and a knowledge of working through Turkish customs officials.(13) Although Operation Proven Force focused on conducting the air war over Iraq, the experiences gained paid immediate benefits when those forces redeployed to the area in early April for Provide Comfort.

#### PART IV. COMBINED TASK FORCE PROVIDE COMFORT

##### Early Days

In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, the Kurds revolted against Saddam Hussein. With the brutal suppression of the Kurds by the Iraqi Army, the Kurds fled before the advancing Iraqis. The Kurds retreated into the mountains to the north bordering Turkey. Here they huddled in open mountain valleys or clung to the steep sides of the mountains.(14) The Turkish government, although expressing sympathy for the plight

of the Kurdish refugees, did not allow them to enter Turkey. Turkish soldiers reportedly fired shots at the Kurds to keep them out of Turkey and interfered with the distribution of relief supplies.(15)

There was little organization to the Kurds clinging to the mountain slopes. Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, Commander, Combined Task Force Provide Comfort described the scene:

They hovered just below the snow line, without shelter, without adequate clothing, without food, without any kind of sanitation, and without any kind of medical attention...Before the world could realize the enormity of the tragedy unfolding hundreds of the very young and the very old were dying each day.(16)

As the nations of the world became aware of the suffering and dying, they clamored for something to be done. On 3 April, 1991 the United Nations Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 688 condemning Iraq and appealing to nations to render aid to the Kurdish refugees.(17) On this same date President Bush ordered U.S. military forces into eastern Turkey to participate in relief operations for the Kurds.(18) Also on 5 April, NATO issued a call for every possible international pressure to be applied against Iraq to force them to stop the "brutal repression" of the Kurds.(19)

NATO walked a fine line in responding to the growing crisis (without embroiling the Alliance in the crisis) because of the politically sensitive issue of

employing NATO forces outside of NATO territory. GEN Galvin used his SACEUR hat and requested allied participation in the operation. He called various allies and asked them to participate in the operation. (20) NATO's response was one of calling for aid, but not intervening directly in the crisis. Although many NATO nations provided military forces to the operation, they were provided to USEUCOM not NATO.

Joint Task Force (JTF) Provide Comfort was formed on 6 April and ordered to Incirlik, Turkey with MG James L. Jamerson as the Commander. His mission was to air deliver supplies to the Kurdish refugees in the mountains. BG Richard Potter also redeployed to Turkey subordinate to JTF Provide Comfort to resume his previous mission of personnel recovery in support of Air Force units operating out of Turkey. By 7 April air resupply had been initiated to the refugees. (21)

MG Jamerson's JTF Provide Comfort staff included many officers that did not participate in Proven Force. BG Potter's staff was essentially the same staff that had supported him on the previous operation. (22) The experience level of the two staffs was similar to their Proven Force experience. Once again, BG Potter's more experienced, cohesive staff provided assistance to the higher headquarters staff.

On 9 April BG Potter's mission was amended to include assisting the airdrops, organizing the refugee

camps, supervising the distribution of food and water, improving sanitation, and providing medical care. (23) As Operation Provide Comfort began to unfold the two staffs were again in the same situations as they were during Proven Force.

BG Potter's Special Operations Forces (SOF) quickly moved into the refugee camps, organized them for the air drops, and soon aircraft from the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain were delivering supplies. (24) Once supplies were reaching the refugees it was difficult to alter the flow of materiel.

As supplies poured into Turkey from all over the world the supplies were pushed forward as rapidly as possible. The supply system, like most other operating systems in this immature area of operations, did not have an adequate structure to handle the press of events. It was difficult to pass information out of these remote areas, consequently decisions were made at the JTF headquarters in Incirlik or in Washington, D.C. that were difficult to modify. An example was the blanket resupply. Since it was bitterly cold in the mountains the decision was made to send blankets, which were of great benefit. However, as the weather warmed the need for blankets was greatly reduced, yet the flow could not be turned off. A situation developed in which a daily "blanket count", reminiscent of the Vietnam era "body count", was reported to Washington. (25)

As the relief efforts grew so did concerns over a lingering presence. Concerns were expressed in Britain and in the United States about being dragged into any sort of occupation, even a humanitarian one.(26) In Britain the parallels to British troops being sent into northern Ireland for humanitarian purposes and still being there, were being drawn.(27) It was this lingering presence that added a sense of urgency to the operation to get the job done and move the troops out of the area.

The resupply efforts had stopped much of the misery and dying amongst the refugees but they could not camp on the mountainsides forever. The Kurds were afraid to return to their homes because of their fear of the Iraqi Army.(28) A plan to get them to return home had to be developed. By mid-April the coalition nations settled upon the concept of having their military forces establish a safe haven or security zone in northern Iraq. It was believed that this would convince the refugees to leave the mountains and begin returning to their homes.(29) Consequently, on 16 April President Bush ordered U.S. troops into northern Iraq to begin establishing refugee camps to help get the Kurds out of the mountains.(30)

To accommodate the rapidly growing coalition effort LTG Shalikashvili, Deputy Commander, United States Army Europe Commander, was named Commander of the



redesignated Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort, with MG Jamerson becoming the Deputy Commander, CTF. On 16 April LTG Shalikashvili received briefings from the USEUCOM staff and guidance from GEN Galvin. The guidance received was to assist the Kurds, be aware of the political sensitivities about any appearance of abandoning the Kurds, and to continue the spirit of coalition cooperation gained by Operation Desert Storm. The guidance also included accepting assistance from anyone who offered--i.e., not to turn anyone down. Finally, GEN Galvin told him to think big--if he thought he needed one of something to ask for two.(31) As the commander of an international coalition, it is important to understand LTG Shalikashvili's control of the forces.

Tactical Control (TACON) is a standard control measure used in NATO and was the manner in which LTG Shalikashvili controlled his forces. All forces were TACON except the Germans. According to LTG Shalikashvili it was not important whether the Germans were TACON or not because they clearly understood that they took orders and direction from him. The national forces maintained their national orientation but acknowledged that they worked for and received orders from LTG Shalikashvili.(32)

The USEUCOM staff explained to LTG Shalikashvili that the operation would be conducted in three phases.

-Phase One: Provide aid and stop the dying and suffering of the Kurds

- Phase Two: Relocate the Kurds from the mountains to relocation camps in the valley
- Phase Three: Return the Kurds to their homes(33)

This three phased concept caused operational difficulties later, specifically phase two, and prolonged the operation.

On 17 April, LTG Shalikashvili deployed to Turkey, accompanied by Major General Jay M. Garner, Deputy Commander V Corps. On 18 April, with the operation developing at breakneck speed, JTF-B was formed with MG Garner designated as the Commander. CTF Provide Comfort now had two subordinate JTF's, JTF-A commanded by BG Potter and JTF-B commanded by MG Garner.(34)

CTF Provide Comfort's mission (per USCINCEUR OPCRD on 16 April) was:

1. Identify locations for temporary shelter
2. Erect temporary living facilities
3. Relocate Iraqi (Kurd) displaced civilians to locations supportable by them
4. Be prepared to receive United Kingdom, French and Turkish forces
5. Be prepared to reinforce multinational security forces in Iraq
6. Be prepared to unilaterally operate, maintain and secure facilities
7. Provide airborne Combat Airborne Patrol (CAP) as necessary
8. Identify additional forces as required
9. Transfer administrative and support functions to civilian organizations (35)

The CTF concept was as follows:

- JTF-A: -Provide immediate relief
- Establish infrastructure in the camps
- Transfer refugees to transit camps in JTF-B's area of operations in northern Iraq
- JTF-B: -Build transit camps
- Receive and care for refugees
- Secure the area
- Return refugees to their homes

- Turn relief operations over to civilian organizations
- Withdraw from Iraq (36)

Up to this point operations had focused almost exclusively upon humanitarian efforts. As the nature of the operation changed and expanded with the planned entry into northern Iraq, the security situation facing the coalition forces became critical.

The security situation was a complex one common to any peacemaking force--that is, threats from all directions. There was the threat of Iraqi military action from Iraqi Army divisions in the area, terrorists' threats, and the threats from the Kurdish Peshmerga. Finally, there was a constant threat from mines and booby traps. (37)

Concern for the safety of the refugees and coalition forces resulted in the U.S. and Britain warning the Iraqi government not to interfere with the Kurdish relief efforts and not to attack any coalition forces or U.N. representatives. (38) With these warnings given, coalition forces were prepared to enter northern Iraq.

#### Demarche To Enter Iraq

On 19 April, LTG Shalikashvili met Iraqi Major General Savan (Deputy DCSOPS of the Iraqi Army) at the Customs House inside Iraq at the Turkish/Iraqi border, to issue a demarche informing the Iraqi government of

the coalition's intention to enter Iraq. LTG Shalikashvili's message was that coalition forces were going to enter Iraq for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid to the refugees. He further informed MG Savan that the coalition expected no interference from the Iraqis and that coalition forces would not harm them, but would be prepared to defend themselves. The demarche further demanded that Iraqi forces withdraw 30 kilometers from Zakho, Iraq--which was to be the location for Headquarters JTF-B. MG Savan acknowledged receiving the demarche but that is all--leaving the coalition to speculate on what the Iraqi response would be. (39)

The message was clear, the coalition was entering Iraq with or without Iraqi concurrence. In fact, the meeting was not one to secure Iraqi concurrence but rather one of informing them of coalition intentions. (40) LTG Shalikashvili was unsure what the Iraqi reaction would be. He said:

When I went into that first discussion with the Iraqi government, I had no idea what their reaction would be to our insistence that we move coalition forces into Zakho and into the valley...And when we asked them to withdraw to an arc of some 30 kilometers around Zakho, I was very encouraged when they did. (41)

The Iraqi position was made clear by Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz. He denounced the allied deployment into Iraq saying that it "has nothing to do with humanitarian assistance...we reject (this

intervention) in our internal affairs and we condemn it...The United States and their allies do not have the right to intervene or send troops."(42) With coalition concerns about potential Iraqi reactions, JTF-B entered Iraq to perform its mission.

#### JTF-B Mission And Organization

JTF-B's mission was to proceed into Iraq to establish security zones to expedite the safe transfer of refugees from their mountain camps to their homes. Additionally, JTF-B was to neutralize the Iraqi Army in northern Iraq and relocate 500,000 Kurdish refugees back to their homes.(43) Although, the mission was mainly to be a humanitarian one, MG Garner viewed his primary mission in Iraq to be one of security.(44) To accomplish these complex tasks MG Garner had an ad hoc staff to assist him.

The V Corps Tactical Command Post normally provided command and control for MG Garner but was unavailable due to Desert Storm constraints. Consequently, after his arrival in Turkey on 16 April, MG Garner requested several V Corps staff officers by name.(45) Four staff officers in the areas of operations, communications and logistics arrived from V Corps on 19 April, and became the nucleus of the JTF-B staff. It was obvious that the staff initially was not large enough.

To compensate for a shortage of staff officers, MG

Garner borrowed from Operation Proven Force, the lesson of a subordinate staff assisting the higher headquarters staff. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was subordinate to MG Garner and he used the MEU staff extensively as his own until his staff grew.(46) MG Garner's staff was eventually augmented by staff officers from V Corps. This ad hoc staff supported MG Garner in his command of a coalition force comprised eventually of forces from eight nations representing the combat equivalent of a division.(47)

JTF-B coalition forces included paratroopers from the U.S., France, and Spain; infantry from the U.S. and Luxembourg; Marines from the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands; and special forces soldiers from the U.S. and Italy.(48) With coalition forces assigned to JTF-B the question arises why it was not a Combined Task Force. Although there were allied liaison officers from each nation at JTF-B headquarters, the JTF-B staff was strictly American.(49) The pace of the operation did not allow for the training necessary to integrate coalition officers into U.S. staff operations at the tactical level. Ingenuity and initiative were required at all command and staff levels to solve differences between coalition forces.

With forces from eight different nations under his command MG Garner developed innovative solutions to overcome the political agenda of some of the national

forces involved. The French brigade provides an example of these differences as well as the solution.

The French answered the U.N. call to render aid to the Kurds and as a sovereign nation sent a brigade into northern Iraq operating independently. The French brigade eventually agreed to operate TACON under MG Garner, with the conditions they not be placed subordinate to the British and that other allied forces be assigned under French control. MG Garner agreed and the French became TACON to JTF-B, with U.S., Italian, Spanish and British platoons being rotated subordinate to the French brigade. (50) Another troublesome area requiring skill in gaining coalition forces acceptance was the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

Although all forces were TACON to CTF Provide Comfort and JTF-B, this did not guarantee automatic acceptance of U.S. ROE. These coalition forces were still under their national direction responsive to their own political agendas. The British and French were initially unwilling to accept the ROE. (51)

The primary difference between U.S. and British ROE was that the British were initially prohibited by their government from bringing their artillery forward into Iraq. The British government viewed the mission as a humanitarian one and considered artillery inappropriate for this mission. However, as the threat from the Iraqi military became clearer, the British

government changed this policy and allowed the artillery to come forward. (52)

Additionally, the French ROE allowed French forces to aid individual coalition soldiers if in trouble, but they were prohibited from aiding any coalition formation of troops (squad or platoon). Operational accommodations were agreed upon with all accepting the essence of the U.S. ROE (See Appendix B). (53)

The Military Coordination Council (MCC), although not part of JTF-B, was subordinate directly to CTF Provide Comfort and collocated with JTF-B in Zakho, Iraq and was critical to the success of the operation. The MCC was composed of U.S. officers, Iraqi officers and Kurdish leaders. Its primary purpose was to provide a forum for face-to-face communications between coalition and Iraqi forces to prevent inadvertent conflict between the forces. (54) The most effective use of the MCC was when an Iraqi Army unit refused to withdraw away from coalition forces. The MCC would take the Iraqi senior representative, BG Danoun Nashwan, by helicopter to the unit and he would order them to withdraw. (55)

#### JTF-B Entry Into Iraq And Establishment Of Initial Security Zone

The initial combat element to be assigned to JTF-B was the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) which had been on an exercise in the Mediterranean as the crisis developed. The MEU was alerted and deployed hurriedly



to Silopi, Turkey--a remote site in eastern Turkey located about ten miles from the border with Iraq which served as the base of operations for the assault into Iraq. At 0800 hours on 20 April, six Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams were inserted into Iraq to watch chokepoints entering Zakho, Iraq.(56) Then at 1305 hours on 20 April, with USAF A-10, F-15 and F-16 aircraft flying air cover, the 24th MEU conducted an unopposed combat air assault into northern Iraq.(57)

The 24th MEU secured a landing zone in an empty field outside of Zakho, Iraq and rapidly secured the abandoned Iraqi 44th Infantry Division headquarters compound. This compound became the initial headquarters location for JTF-B in Iraq.(58) The 24th MEU secured areas to the north, east and west of Zakho. The Iraqi Army controlled the high ground overlooking Zakho as well as the city itself.(59) With the Iraqi Army occupying positions on the high ground and overlooking JTF-B headquarters, and with their intentions unclear, an uneasy Mexican standoff between two armed, former enemies ensued.

The situation confronting the first U.S. forces in Iraq during the first several days was a confusing one. Although the demarche had been issued, Iraqi Army forces were still present in and around Zakho. There were several confrontations between Iraqis and U.S. Marines, but patience, firmness and discipline of U.S.

forces prevented fighting from erupting. Instructions and demands were sent to the Iraqis telling them to adhere to the terms of the demarche and to withdraw. (60) MG Garner's guidance to soldiers confronted with these situations was to relay the message: "What are you still doing here? You are supposed to be south of the 36th parallel. Do you need help to pack your property?" In these early confusing days of the operation in Iraq, JTF-B officers were never sure when Iraqi soldiers refused to withdraw, whether their command and control had been so badly damaged during the war that they had no guidance on how to react or if they were actually playing hardball with coalition forces.

After several days of aggressive coalition patrolling up to and sometimes through Iraqi army positions the Iraqis agreed and began withdrawing to the south toward the city of Dihok (See Map, Appendix C). The Iraqi Army completed its looting and destruction of Zakho as it withdrew. However, the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army did not end Saddam Hussein's attempts to interfere with the mission of the coalition forces, instead it represented an escalation.

When the Iraqi Army withdrew they were replaced by about 300 secret policemen. An already tense situation now became even more so. The secret policemen were augmented by soldiers in civilian clothes from the Iraqi 66th Special Forces brigade. (61) They were well armed

and interfered with coalition forces by stopping coalition vehicles, and succeeded in intimidating the Kurdish population. As long as these policemen were in Zakho, the Kurds would not return from the mountains to their homes.

It was clear to the Kurds that although coalition forces were present in Zakho the area was not secure. Nightly, shots were fired, explosions occurred in the city of Zakho and booby traps were placed in the vicinity of coalition forces. As the situation became more tense, Washington and London gave Iraq a "Schwarzkopfian message". The implication of the message was clear, force would be used if the secret police were not withdrawn. (62)

MG Garner developed a plan for an aggressive show of force coupled with a MCC initiative to remove the secret police. The MCC delivered a demarche order to EG Nashwan. Its key points were:

- Iraqi Army forces continue to withdraw 30 kilometers in all directions from Zakho (out of artillery range)
- Iraqi police immediately withdraw from Zakho
- Iraq allowed no more than 50 uniformed policemen in Zakho at any one time (must be indigenous to the region, carry only one pistol and display a coalition force identification badge)
- Coalition forces enter Zakho on 26 April to verify compliance with the order and commence regular patrolling
- Coalition forces establish a 30 kilometer radius around Zakho with checkpoints and permit no weapons in this area except for coalition weapons (this also applied to the Kurds as well as the Iraqis)
- Iraqi military members, either in or out of

uniform, not permitted in the security zone without MCC approval (63)

With the demarche delivered and no Iraqi compliance, MG Garner initiated the show of force plan. To beef up his combat forces, MG Garner requested and received the addition of the British 40 Commando Regiment of Royal Marines, straight from a tour of duty in Northern Ireland. (64) The plan capitalized on 40 Commando's expertise at city patrolling by having them aggressively patrol the streets of Zakho on foot.

Concurrent with the foot patrols, U.S. Marines patrolled the city in light armored vehicles (LAV's) and towed artillery through the city. U.S. aircraft flew combat air patrols at tree top levels over the city of Zakho to support the plan. The operation resulted in 40 Commando herding the secret police and corralling them in five compounds within Zakho. BG Nashwan intervened and the secret police were removed to the south of Zakho. (65)

Humanitarian efforts occurred simultaneously with the security operations. Marines constructed a tent camp to the east of Zakho to begin USEUCOM's second phase of the Provide Comfort operation, the relocation of the Kurds to camps inside Iraq. As the secret police vacated the area it was widely assumed that the Kurds would begin flowing from the mountains to the security and comfort of the refugee camps that were being built

around Zakho. However, after the police withdrawal few refugees came to the camps. They remained in the mountains waiting to see what the coalition forces would do next.

Coalition forces still prepared for a flood of refugees. Therefore, to meet the anticipated demand, tents were feverishly erected. Similar to the JTF-A "blanket count", JTF-B had to report daily on the number of tents erected--the "tent count". This camp focus of phase two by the higher headquarters slowed down the overall operation.

MG Garner's view was that everyone above the CTF-- that is USEUCOM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the NCA--were focused on the refugee camps. The CTF, JTF-B and lower headquarters were focused on returning the Kurds to their homes. MG Garner said:

My theory is that the relocation facilities was a flawed concept and the better one was to go to the villages. The problem was with the politicians. When we wanted to go to Dihok, getting them to understand this concept was difficult. (66)

He further stated that the coalition wanted the refugees to return to their homes as quickly as possible, so that the refugees could spend the winter in their homes rather than tents. He was also concerned with getting the coalition forces out of Iraq as soon as possible. Consequently, MG Garner saw his primary focus as being the security mission, effectively eliminating phase two by returning the refugees directly from the mountains to

their homes.(67)

Shortly after the eviction of the secret police additional combat forces from the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands arrived subordinate to JTF-B.(68) With the arrival of these forces JTF-B began planning operations to expand the security zone.

With few refugees entering the camp around Zakho it became evident that the security zone required expansion. JTF-B wanted to expand the security zone to the east and south, to include the city of Dihok. The prevailing opinion was that many of the refugees in the mountains came from Dihok, so if that area could be secured, the need to build and administer refugee camps would greatly diminish. This would permit the refugees to bypass the camps and return directly to their homes.(69) Political considerations prevented the expansion southward so the expansion commenced to the east.

#### Security Zone Expansion

With the area around Zakho secured under the 24th MEU control, the British 3 Commando Brigade was directed to expand the security zone to the east. 3 Commando Brigade rapidly seized the airfield at Sirsenk (which had been damaged by the U.S. during the Desert Storm bombings), and continued their advance to secure the city of Al Amidiyah even further to the east. By 3 May,

the British had secured their objectives. (70) Further expansion to the east was accomplished by the French.

With the eastern limit of the British advance at Al Amidiyah, there were insufficient coalition forces to further expand the security zone. The French were not yet TACON to MG Garner and it required skillful personal diplomacy by the JTF-B Commander and staff to fold them into the plan. It was recommended that the French brigade move to the east of the British because there was less of a threat there and the ROE was not yet clarified. The French agreed and quickly expanded the security zone to Suri. (71) With concern and sensitivity over proximity to the Iranian border, the easternmost limit of the security zone was 45 kilometers from the Iranian border. (72)

#### Methods Of Securing Iraqi Acceptance Of The Coalition Advance

The method of securing Iraqi acceptance of the coalition forces advance involved issuing a demarche followed by an advance of forces. The demarche would be issued to BG Nashwan by the MCC. A 1:50,000 scale map would be provided to the Iraqis with a 30 kilometer arc drawn on it indicating the area to be vacated by Iraqi forces. The Iraqis would have 24 hours to vacate the area before the allies would enter. (73) After 24 hours the ground advance would commence.

Iraqi military units were usually unwilling to

withdraw. Consequently, coalition forces would deploy into battle formation and approach the Iraqi positions. Often the Iraqis would withdraw, leaving mines scattered in their wake. When the Iraqis failed to withdraw, coalition leaders would approach, demand their immediate withdrawal and to emphasize the seriousness of the coalition demands, U.S. aircraft would make threatening passes overhead. (74) MG Garner's guidance concerning combat aircraft was for them to fly low, slow and loud. This intimidation usually hastened the Iraqis on their way. (75) U.S. air was critical to the advance and protection of the force.

JTF-B had a serious shortage of artillery, having about half of what is required for a division--the approximate size of the JTF-B combat forces. Due to this lack of artillery, as well as a lack of adequate armored forces, air became a substitute. Attack aircraft was provided to JTF-B by the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Army. (76)

With the French expansion to the east the length of the security zone physically occupied by coalition forces was 160 kilometers from west to east. The physical occupation was critical to the Kurds before returning home. By 10 May, it was clear that Dihok, home to a majority of the refugees, would have to be cleared of Iraqis before the Kurds would return to their homes. (77)



### Movement To Dihok

As the expansion eastward progressed it became apparent that the key to the operation would be to include the city of Dihok in the security zone. The road network made Dihok the key to the area. Eventually, the Iraqis figured out that the coalition would advance on Dihok and they began looting the city. SEAL teams observing Dihok saw the Iraqis looting and destroying the city in preparation to evacuate. However, JTF-B was not given permission to secure Dihok by the NCA. (78)

The U.S. State Department and USEUCOM were concerned because Dihok was a provincial capital, therefore a political solution was pursued. When the Iraqis sensed coalition hesitation to enter Dihok, they reoccupied the city--resulting in a three week pause by JTF-B before moving on Dihok. (79) On 5 May, U.S. commanders requested permission to include Dihok in the security zone and on 13 May, coalition commanders were informed that Dihok would not be included in the security zone. (80)

The U.S. State Department requested that the U.N. provide a U.N. force to police the area of northern Iraq occupied by coalition forces, with the aim of protecting the Kurds. The intent was for the U.N. to take control, to enable coalition forces to leave Iraq. Iraq refused the U.N. request and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker

asked the U.N. to set up the police force despite the Iraqi refusal. (81)

While the negotiations over the future of Dihok were ongoing, concern was increasing over the length of time that coalition forces would have to remain. GEN Galvin said that the purpose of the force was to provide humanitarian aid, not to take and hold terrain. He said that the force did not need to try to take over control of cities and towns. (82) His comments are indicative of the political sensitivities involved in these types of non-traditional military roles. They indicate the long-term nature of an intervention that military forces could become involved in, such as providing police protection or repairing electrical generation equipment. JTF-B was involved in doing these things in the city of Zakho.

In Zakho coalition forces patrolled the streets, repaired key facilities, and kept Iraqi civil servants on the job to administer the town. However, it was their armed presence that enforced an uneasy peace between the Iraqis and the Kurds. Since Dihok was a provincial capital, coalition forces did not want to be responsible to administer the town. Such an arrangement would have led to a long term presence.

As the negotiations continued, coalition forces advanced toward Dihok to the southern limits of the security zone. U.S. forces subordinate to the 24th MEU

conducted this advance down the western and eastern approaches to Dihok. Once the high ground just to the north of Dihok was secured, coalition forces halted and advanced no further. (83) It was during this advance that the Iraqi forces proved to be very reluctant to withdraw. Several tense standoffs ensued but coalition resolve, patience and show of forces measures forced the Iraqi withdrawal.

Shortly after this advance was completed in mid-May an agreement was reached among the coalition, Iraq, the Kurds and the U.N. concerning the future of Dihok. The agreement allowed for each side to have a light armed presence in Dihok. The goal of the agreement was to allow Iraq to maintain the provincial capitol of Dihok, but under conditions that would enable the Kurds to return from the camps in the mountains and Zakho. The Iraqi military pulled out but the civilian infrastructure remained to establish city services with coalition assistance. (84)

In accordance with the agreement, coalition forces and civilian organizations entered Dihok on 25 May. Coalition forces were to remain for only three weeks to clean up the city, restore food and water distribution points and to police up unexpended ordnance that was widely scattered in large quantities. (85)

Coalition forces professionally went about their tasks and accomplished all missions on time then

withdrew from Dihok. This opened the flood gates and the Kurds returned to their homes. (86) Operation Provide Comfort rapidly drew to a close and coalition forces executed a withdrawal from Iraq. With U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft making passes overhead, on 15 July the last coalition forces withdrew with a pledge to the Kurds that the coalition still intended to protect them and would return if necessary. (87)

With the withdrawal from Iraq Provide Comfort 1 ended. Provide Comfort 2 and Provide Comfort 3 continued, demonstrating coalition resolve of not abandoning the Kurds. The original aims of stopping the dying and suffering of the refugees and returning them to their homes had been professionally and quickly accomplished. The operation began as a contingency operation, was of short duration and exemplified a successful multinational coalition. The success of the operation makes it a model not only for future NATO operations but for all future coalitions in which the United States may become involved.

#### PART V. ASSESSMENT: PROVIDE COMFORT MODEL FOR FUTURE NATO MISSIONS

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the western nations have begun to reduce their military forces. In the future NATO will be charged with responding to crises rather than countering an

existing potential threat. NATO must respond rapidly for early containment of these crises. The challenge for NATO will be to respond militarily with significantly smaller, flexible multinational forces. (88) Provide Comfort modeled this challenge for NATO as well as performing the four future missions of NATO, conducting combat operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief operations. (89)

The combat operations role of Provide Comfort was primarily performed by JTF-B in northern Iraq. With its task of establishing and later enlarging the security zone, JTF-B was put squarely in confrontation with the Iraqi Army, which did not want the coalition forces in their country, and the Iraqi government which condemned the entry into Iraq. When confronted with armed Iraqi Army forces surrounding them, JTF-B planned and executed combat operations against the Iraqis to force their withdrawal.

Operations conducted against a force reluctant to fall back consisted of a mixture of combat operations and negotiations through the MCC. The combat operations were executed by positioning combat assets to fight if required, maneuvering in combat formations up to Iraqi positions, and flying combat air patrols and close air support missions close over the heads of the Iraqis. (90) Although there were instances of firing between the coalition and Iraqi forces the fact that the situation

did not escalate into full scale conflict was due to coalition discipline and Iraqi fear of retaliation.(91) The peacemaking role of the coalition forces placed them at the greatest risk. Although a demarche had been issued, the Iraqi government did not agree to it. When dealing with the Kurds many tribes and factions had to be dealt with. Consequently, no one leader spoke for all Kurds, so an agreement with one was not binding on all Kurds.(92)

The only way to gain security in northern Iraq was either through the presence of a military force or a political agreement between the Kurds and the Iraqis.(93) Provide Comfort used both of these methods to accomplish its mission. JTF-B went into Iraq and, performing a peacemaking mission, carved a security zone between two warring factions. The Iraqi Army had to be forced back to expand the zone, often with serious confrontations and standoffs in the process. The Iraqis frequently left mines in their wake, which caused coalition casualties. Kurdish soldiers, the Peshmerga, were not allowed to enter the security zone armed. Coalition checkpoints in the zone searched and disarmed anyone attempting to enter with weapons. Additionally, on more than one occasion coalition forces were fired on by Kurds.(94)

The distinction between peacemaking and combat tends to blur as the potential for combat increases,

especially at the tactical level. This distinction between these types of operations then must lie at the strategic and political levels. This distinction at these levels then determines the approach to the crisis in terms of resources and economics.

JCS Pub 3-07 states that peacekeeping is performed with the consent of the belligerent parties, which is what JTF-B did.(95) As the operation matured, utilizing the efforts of the MCC the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders looked to the coalition to settle differences. During the course of the operation, coalition forces protected Kurds and Iraqis alike. Both sides recognized and accepted the legitimacy of these coalition police actions.

Eventually, a political arrangement was reached with the Iraqi government permitting a U.N. security force of 500 lightly armed guards to provide security in northern Iraq.(96) This arrangement paved the way for the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq.

The roles of combat operations, peacemaking and peacekeeping were conducted by coalition forces in order to perform the primary purpose of the operation, to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds. Relief supplies, amounting to 17,092 short tons, were delivered to stop the dying and suffering of the refugees. Within one month of the commencement of the operation, refugees began returning to their homes. In less than

three months 500,000 refugees had been relocated from the mountains to their homes. (97)

Although the four future missions of NATO were performed during the operation, the USPACOM term of Humanitarian Conflict more adequately describes what actually occurred. As the term indicates some form of humanitarian effort was the primary focus of the operation. However, the term also describes the actual or potential for conflict that may occur in the forms of combat or peacemaking. This is precisely what occurred during Operation Provide Comfort. It was primarily a humanitarian effort that involved conflict.

With the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq on 15 July, 1991, phase one of one of the largest relief efforts in history ended. (98) Provide Comfort 2 and 3 continued, with troops still employed in overseeing Iraqi compliance with their pledge not to attack the Kurds.

#### PART VI. CONCLUSIONS

Operation Provide Comfort is the model that should be used for future NATO missions as well as future coalition efforts in which the United States may be involved. The environment in which CTF Provide Comfort had to perform its mission was a complex one, ranging from forging political



agreements to conducting multinational operations at the tactical level. Success in this operation was due to many factors.

There was clear understanding of the goals of the operation at the national levels. Consequently, when the national forces joined the coalition they came with a clear vision of what was expected. Additionally, many of the forces came with similar experiences due to their NATO background.

NATO was the unifier in this operation. Although the operation was conducted under the control of USEUCOM, many of the forces provided by the various nations also were forces they provided to NATO. Therefore, the leaders and forces had a common frame of reference from NATO. NATO procedures were successfully used during the Gulf War for maritime command and control as models for working arrangements with non-NATO coalition forces.(99) Essentially, the forces provided had common NATO standards in training, tactics, readiness and interoperability.(100) Armed with these experiences, the astuteness of leaders at all levels to operate in a multinational environment was critical.

Leaders had to be aware of the capabilities and limitations of all forces as well as their

political agendas in the operation and fold them into the plan to increase the opportunities for success. Leaders were adept at identifying each nation's political objectives and using its national forces accordingly. Additionally, coalition leaders balanced national forces' capabilities with their doctrine then integrated them into the plan. (101)

There was close personal contact among all command levels, particularly with GEN Galvin, LTG Shalikashvili, and MG Garner. (102) Although there were strategic flaws in the phasing of the operation that caused initial operational difficulties, a commonality of understanding developed which resulted in focused efforts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Because of this understanding of the political realities, there were no signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU's) during the operation. LTG Shalikashvili told GEN Powell he did not want them because he did not want to limit coalition forces, but rather to enhance their participation. (103) Professionalism was a key aspect of the overall success of Provide Comfort.

The units and soldiers involved were professional and highly motivated. The high quality of the troops and leaders sent by the

various nations was indicative of the cohesion at the national levels. This cohesion was transferred to the various military forces that entered the theater of operations which resulted in a rapid, successful accomplishment of the mission. There were no prima donna's in the operation. It was the professionalism of the commanding officers and the troops from all nations, as well as the common frame of reference from their NATO experiences that ensured success. (104)

According to GEN Colin Powell, Chairman of the JCS, Operation Provide Comfort involved all four U.S. services, as well as forces from eleven nations; missions were found for all that showed up. He said that he did not give many instructions but on his visit to the operations area found a mix of many nations accomplishing the missions. GEN Powell said "That's the kind of joint spirit that exists in the armed forces..." (105) His statement is a testimony to the effectiveness of the operation from the strategic to the tactical levels. This very spirit of cooperation makes Provide Comfort the model for future NATO operations.

Operation Provide Comfort demonstrated that NATO forces can come together quickly from the strategic to tactical levels, deploy out of area

and conduct operations in an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust. This operation demonstrates that there are numerous roles a military force can accomplish.

Provide Comfort demonstrated that military forces do much more than place steel on target. As Operation Desert Storm proved the U.S. military does that very well, but Provide Comfort proved that in addition to conducting combat operations military forces can also be peacemakers, peacekeepers, and simultaneously provide assistance to those in desperate need.

Rep. Les Aspin said Provide Comfort demonstrated that the U.S. can conduct large-scale relief operations with little or no reliance on local facilities. He further termed any U.S. effort to assist the former Soviet Union to avoid starvation as "defense by different means". (106)

Marine Lt Gen Martin Brandtner, Director of Operations on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expanded on this concept. He said that the military has great capabilities to operate in hostile environments to assist in disasters or participate in combat. He also said that the military has always performed these "other" roles but because the military is not structured or trained for them, commanders do not seek out these roles and

missions. (107)

GEN Powell refers to these missions as ones that are welcome and may well come more frequently in the months and years ahead. (108) The trend is not only toward these types of missions typified by Provide Comfort, but also toward multinational coalitions and operations. (109) For these coalitions to be successful, several elements must be agreed upon.

Successful coalitions require common political, economic and social objectives, agreed upon strategic plans to achieve objectives and agreement on a unity of command. (110) Operation Provide Comfort had all of this and much more going in its favor. Meeting these objectives, coupled with the professionalism of the leaders and troops involved and the common frame of reference from NATO ensured the high degree of success experienced by Combined Task Force Provide Comfort.

As has been demonstrated, Operation Provide Comfort performed the four missions that COL Brown indicates as future missions for NATO. It was designed primarily as a humanitarian mission but rapidly changed complexion and complexity. Confronted with a stubborn, uncooperative former enemy, coalition forces conducted combat, peacemaking and peacekeeping operations to ensure

the success of their primary humanitarian mission.

The USPACOM term of humanitarian conflict more accurately describes this operation and it should be incorporated into U.S. Army operations doctrine in FM 100-5. This doctrinal term will better prepare leaders for what they will encounter when the potential for conflict exists in humanitarian efforts. This doctrinal term will permit leaders to adequately develop a force structure to accomplish their humanitarian mission while simultaneously conducting operations to eliminate any potential threat. It will prevent confusion from occurring by clearly differentiating between humanitarian relief and humanitarian conflict operations.

Operation Provide Comfort is a model for future NATO operations. It involved a rapid deployment of multinational forces to meet a crisis situation. These forces learned to operate together and quickly brought an end to the dying and suffering of the Kurdish refugees. These forces performed the missions of combat operations, peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to accomplish their primary mission of humanitarian relief. This dynamic will be essential to NATO operations in the future. The tremendous success of Operation Provide Comfort makes it the model of allied

cooperation in future NATO operations.

## APPENDIX A

### DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are necessary for this study:

Contingency Operations  
Demarche  
Humanitarian Conflict  
Humanitarian Operations  
Peacekeeping  
Peacemaking  
Tactical Control (TACON)

Contingency operations are military actions requiring rapid deployment to perform military tasks in support of national policy. They are always joint and may take the forms of a show of force or direct military action. (111)

Demarche is a diplomatic move, countermove, or maneuver. It is any formal or informal representation or statement of views to a public official. (112) In the context of Provide Comfort it was a statement of intent for coalition forces to move into an area occupied by Iraqi forces. Iraqi forces would be instructed to vacate the area, that no harm was meant them, but that coalition forces would eliminate them if necessary.

Humanitarian conflict is a term developed by USPACOM to describe humanitarian efforts in which conflict is involved or the potential for conflict is great. (113) This term recognizes that the operation



involves much more than a humanitarian relief operation. The potential for conflict is great and the operation must be planned accordingly.

Humanitarian operations are conducted as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. The purposes are to provide relief and assistance to reduce suffering and death. The assistance is usually limited in scope and duration, and supplements the efforts of civilian authorities that have primary responsibility for providing disaster assistance. (114)

Peacekeeping operations are conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict. Its purposes are to maintain a negotiated truce and facilitate a diplomatic resolution. Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore or maintain the peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. (115)

Peacemaking operations are conducted by military forces to stop a violent conflict and return to political and diplomatic means. Peacemaking is usually conducted at the request of one of the belligerent parties; therefore, the peacemaking force does not represent a wholly disinterested power. (116)

Tactical control (TACON) is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions assigned. This is a standard mode of operating within NATO. (117)

## APPENDIX B

### RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The Rules of Engagement below were extracted from the Rules of Engagement Card carried by all coalition soldiers.

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT  
As Authorized by JCS (EUCOM Dir. 55-47)

1. All military operations will be conducted in accordance with the Law of War.
2. The use of armed force will be utilized as a measure of last resort only.
3. Nothing in these rules negates or otherwise overrides a commander's obligation to take all necessary and appropriate actions for his unit's self-defense.
4. U.S. forces will not fire unless fired upon, unless there is clear evidence of hostile intent.

HOSTILE INTENT- The threat of imminent use of force by an Iraqi force, or other foreign force, terrorist group, or individuals against the United States, U.S. forces, U.S. citizens, or Kurdish or other refugees located above the 36th parallel or otherwise located within a U.S. or allied safe haven refugee area. When the on scene commander determines, based on convincing evidence, that HOSTILE INTENT is present, the right exists to use proportional force to deter or neutralize the threat.

HOSTILE ACT- Includes armed force directly to preclude or impede the missions and or duties of U.S. or allied forces.

5. Response to hostile fire directly threatening U.S. or allied care shall be rapid and directed at the source of hostile fire using only the force necessary to eliminate the threat. Other foreign forces (such as reconnaissance aircraft) that have shown an active integration with the attacking force may be engaged. Use minimum amount of force necessary to control the situation.

6. You may fire into Iraqi territory in response to

hostile fire.

7. You may fire into another nation's territory in response to hostile fire only if the cognizant government is unable or unwilling to stop that force's hostile acts effectively or promptly.

8. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel.

9. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft south of the 36th parallel only when they demonstrate hostile intent or commit hostile acts. Except in cases of self-defense, authorization for such engagements rests with the designated air defense commander. Warning bursts may be fired ahead of foreign aircraft to deter hostile acts.

10. In the event U.S. forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, or rioters the responsibility for the protection of U.S. force rests with the U.S. commanding officer. On scene commander will employ the following measures to overcome the threat:

- a. Warning to demonstrators.
- b. Show of force, including the use of riot control formations.
- c. Warning shots fired over the heads of hostile elements.
- d. Other reasonable use of force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.


11. Use the following guidelines when applying these rules:

- a. Use of force only to protect lives.
- b. Use of minimum force necessary.
- c. Pursuit will not be taken to retaliate, however, immediate pursuit may begin and continue for as long as there is an immediate threat to U.S. forces. In the absence of JCS approval, U.S. forces should not pursue any hostile force into another nation's territory.
- d. If necessary and proportional, use all available weapons to deter, neutralize, or destroy the threat as required.

SOURCE: Operation Provide Comfort Rules of Engagement Card.

APPENDIX C

MAP



Source: Joint Task Force-Bravo briefing slides, briefing to GEN Colin Powell in Sirsenk, Iraq.

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