

Information
Counseling
and **R**eferral
Services

Preliminary analysis: Reporter Profiling from the Amnesty Commission of Uganda

ICRS Database
14 November 2008



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE





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The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Program or U.S. Agency for International Development.

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List of Abbreviations

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRT	Demobilization Resettlement Team
GoU	Government of Uganda
ICRS	Information Counseling and Referral Service
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	The International Organization for Migration
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
n	Number indicating size of statistical sample
NGO	Non-government Organization
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
SSR	Security Sector Reform
Ugs	Ugandan Shillings
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRF II	Uganda National Rescue Front II
UPDF	Ugandan Peoples Defense Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front

Foreword by Justice P.K.K Onega - Chairman of the Uganda Amnesty Commission



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The Amnesty Commission

This preliminary analysis is construed from the Amnesty Commission's database for reporters, profiled from 2003 to October 2008. It explores the analytical linkages between the multiple variables and values at the time of application for amnesty captured in the database. Noting that the situation of reporters now is different from the time of applying for amnesty, this point in time analysis provides the Amnesty Commission and other important stakeholders to the amnesty process in Uganda, with critical information, which paints a more detailed picture of the potential vulnerabilities experienced by reporters in Uganda.

The Amnesty Commission is the authorized Government statutory body to offer amnesty to all Ugandans, who have been involved in insurgency against the Government of Uganda through actual participation in combat, collaborating with insurgents, committing other crimes to support insurgency, or in any other way assisting others involved in insurgency. The Commission commenced its work in 2000, when the Amnesty Act 2000 came into effect.

The Commission would like to encourage development partners, their implementing agencies, and all duty bearers involved in addressing any form of reporters' vulnerability, to make the best use of this preliminary analysis, by devising and supporting interventions based on the evidence this analysis provides. The Amnesty Commission will be responsive to requests to provide specific information for this purpose.

The Amnesty Commission wishes to thank the International Organization for Migration (IOM), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) for the technical cooperation and preparation of this analysis report.

Sincerely Yours,


Justice P.K.K. Onega
CHAIRMAN AMNESTY COMMISSION

Introduction

This preliminary analysis was performed during 3-6 October 2008 as part of the Amnesty Commission and IOM's Information Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) using the entire Amnesty Commission reporter sample from 1 January 2003 until 22 August 2008 or 18,042 people. The purpose of this preliminary analysis is to develop a profile of reporters in order to provide the Amnesty Commission and other important stakeholders to the amnesty process in Uganda with a more detailed picture of the potential vulnerabilities experienced by reporters in Uganda.

Reporters have conflict-related vulnerabilities that can represent serious conflict pressures. As a result, the sustainable reintegration and recovery of reporters, both those with actual combat experience and their support networks, depends on the availability of realistic opportunities for social reintegration and economic recovery.

Vulnerabilities may take the form of lack of trust and confidence in the state, poor access to employment and basic services, social dislocation, and trauma as the result of injury, abduction, and participation in deadly conflict.

The Amnesty Commission's ICRS database has 22,930 reporters spanning the commencement of the Amnesty Act in 2000 until 22 August 2008, however due to changes made to the survey tools in 2002, the 2003-2008 sample was selected for analysis. In order to explore analytical linkages between the multiple variables and values recorded by the database, this preliminary analysis is disaggregated by age, gender, geographical location, and membership of a particular armed group (viz. Allied Democratic Forces, Lord's Resistance Army, and West Nile Bank Front).

Significant work was done in order to pinpoint the Amnesty Commission's ICRS database strengths and weaknesses before subjecting it to analysis, but this work is exactly what it says, *preliminary* and will be followed up with more rigorous analysis in 2009. Efforts are already underway in order to broadly socialize this preliminary analysis in close cooperation with the Amnesty Commission.

Besides from disaggregating data by age, gender, and geography, this preliminary analysis distinguishes the three main armed rebel groups in Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), and the Allied democratic Forces (ADF) from other groups. If tailored assistance is not provided to these rebel groups in order to address the needs of the different reporter groupings, reintegration efforts may do little to facilitate the successful transition of these people within society and, at worst, may be counter-productive for the ongoing amnesty process. This is especially true in Uganda where targeted socio-economic reintegration has not effectively taken place.

The spoiler potential represented by high densities of reporters can undermine humanitarian and peace-building efforts in Uganda and should be carefully considered. The Government of Uganda has experienced the twin pressures of conflict and massively displaced populations of refugees and IDPs drawing heavily on limited public resources. The success of the amnesty process will depend on complimentary and oftentimes stop-gap peace-building and reintegration approaches by external actors until local civil society and government can fully support reintegration and recovery processes without external assistance.

Oftentimes reinsertion and reintegration focuses too heavily on the ex-combatant or in the case of Uganda a reporter or formerly abducted person. It cannot be overstated that the most culturally-charged and difficult part of the DDR process is reintegration. Sadly, reintegration some eight years into Uganda's amnesty process is still being treated as a reinsertion exercise. Given the ever-present displacement

challenges in Uganda, any approach that focuses on quick fixes entirely miss the point of reintegration – enhancing stability in Uganda and the broader region.

Reinsertion and reintegration is a term almost exclusively used for reporters. In light of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, this must change because reporters and other vulnerable groups (eg. internally-displaced persons and returnees) must be reintegrated into a larger whole; firstly into their communities, and secondly, through their communities, into the Ugandan state. Damaged trust and confidence are distinct obstacles to reporter and community reintegration. If the resulting recovery obstacles are not addressed, grievances will be manipulated by political elites and possibly threaten the emergence of any fragile peace that forms at the community level.

The conflict-carrying capacities of reporters and their communities – feelings of inequity, distrust, disillusionment, or frustration at limited livelihood opportunities – can easily metastasize and cause a relapse into conflict. At this transitional stage in the amnesty process, external support needs to be much more targeted. The analyses and findings in this report are meant to provoke a more informed debate on the specific vulnerabilities and gaps in assistance to reporters, and how we can more effectively target recovery and transitional assistance.

Therefore, and until such time as the technical capacities of government and civil society actors are strengthened and able to support sustainable local reintegration and recovery processes, it is not fair to assume that standard government budgeting and planning processes will be able to do so on its own. This is the central argument for external actors continuing to play a role in addressing the gaps in recovery assistance in Uganda.

ICRS database particulars

The table below describes the strengths and weaknesses of the Amnesty Commission’s ICRS database:

Original Purpose	Monitoring and Evaluation tool for Amnesty Commission’s (AC) Information, Counseling & Referral Service program for reporters and amnestied former abducted persons.
Sample Size	Amnestied Reporters n = 22,520 (NB. sample for preliminary analysis is smaller – see notes below).
Methodology	Data on individuals was captured through face-to-face interviews at reception stage by Amnesty Commission. Recorded in a MS Access database.
Geographical Coverage	Uganda-wide.
Timeframe	Data was collected starting in 2000, however comprehensive surveying using an expanded questionnaire commenced in 2002 and only effectively became standard practice in 2003. Accordingly, the entire reporter sample from 1 January 2003 until 22 August 2008 (viz. 18,042 people) was used for analysis.
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Accuracy and completeness of data entry. Multiple parties have been involved in this process, and quality control of face-to-face interviews was not effectively performed until 2008. ▪ Recording of data in Boolean format makes it impossible to differentiate between a true ‘no’ and a missing value. Particularly concerning for this database as there is a large number of missing values. ▪ The above demonstrates that, because of its size, the Amnesty

	Commission's client-roster, although not randomly selected, is a highly representative quantitative sample in relation to the social and economic conditions confronting those who were active combatants and formerly abducted persons when the 2000 Amnesty Act came into force.
Areas for Database Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Random sampling of hardcopy survey forms and comparing data inputting accuracy to ICRS database. Subject to the findings of this exercise, repopulating the database with all survey data. ▪ Building a secondary analysis capability within the ICRS database that identifies processes and performance management issues. ▪ Further development of user interface for 'standard' and query-based reporting. This anticipates developing internal monitoring and evaluation practices, e.g. automatic reporting disaggregated by Amnesty Commission department, donor, and regional variations. ▪ Refining case management database components, e.g. identifying referral/extension services, tracking client referrals, caseworker notes. ▪ Unpacking database components (e.g. referral/extension services) for sharing with civil society and government agency partners for the purposes of populating the ICRS database with more up-to-date reintegration opportunities. ▪ Additional database components/modules to meet information demands from broader PRDP response actors.

Additional notes to preliminary analysis and ICRS database

Amnestied Reporters versus Non-Amnestied Reporters

The total number of client entries in the Amnesty ICRS database is 22,930 people, however only 22,520 are qualified for amnesty. This means that there are 410 reporters in the database that did not qualify for amnesty.

Timeframes, Instruments, and Sampling Techniques

Data was collected starting in 2000, however comprehensive surveying using the expanded questionnaire commenced in 2002 and only effectively became standard practice in 2003. Accordingly, one of the obstacles with the data used in this report relates to the fact that it is assumed that until 2003 data collection did not use the expanded survey form/questionnaire. Therefore for this preliminary analysis the entire reporter sample from 1 January 2003 until 22 August 2008 is used, viz. 18,042 people.

The 2003 expanded survey form/questionnaire uses qualitative and purposive rather than random methods, with data gathered in semi-structured face-to-face interviews with individuals and direct observations/case management notes.

Note concerning WNBF reporters

Unlike the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) or Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) is an inactive rebel group, and for this very reason it was chosen as a useful comparison to the ADF and LRA for analysis purposes. In the West Nile region of Uganda during the mid-90s the WNBF

emerged, articulating grievances based on allegedly inequitable centre-periphery relations. In 1996 many of the WNBF's rank and file broke away from WNBF and formed the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II).

Peace talks continued between 1998-2002, however only the breakaway UNRF II was successful at negotiating a peace agreement on or about 26 December 2002. Meanwhile, the general amnesty entitlements under the 2000 Amnesty Act offered amnesty and incentives for those rebels who renounced rebellion and surrendered to the Ugandan authorities. The terms of the UNRF II peace agreement included infrastructure, a weapons for development scheme, and cash assistance in the order of 4 billion Ugs paid through the UNRF II command structure.

There are 2,615 UNRF II reporters in the Amnesty Commission ICRS database, and 2,350 WNBF reporters. This analysis has assumed that WNBF reporters largely did not benefit from the UNRF II peace settlement, however its mere existence and the fact that the WNBF was split apart has effectively rendered the movement inactive. It is not clear exactly when, but a political settlement of sorts took place between WNBF and the Government of Uganda some time in 2003-2004. It is worth noting that the WNBF still has negotiations on foot with the Government of Uganda. This means that, whilst WNBF may still have grievances, they can be clearly distinguished from the ADF and LRA, which remain in open conflict with the Government of Uganda.

This preliminary analysis has taken the view that it is not for IOM to view the WNBF and UNRF II as one group for analysis purposes, and has therefore used the 2,359 WNBF reporters as a comparison with ADF and LRA reporters mindful of the ongoing nature of the WNBF's grievances.

Analysis and preparation of this report

The statistical analyses of this report were performed by Stella Oyo, James Bean, and Maxie Muwonge.

It is also worthy and appropriate to point out to the reader that this report benefited in no small way from similar work already performed by IOM's Post-Conflict and Reintegration Programme in Aceh, Indonesia; namely the soon-to-be-published findings, analyses, and recommendations found in IOM's *Meta Analysis: Vulnerability, Stability, Displacement And Reintegration: Issues Facing The Peace Process In Aceh, Indonesia* (Authors: James Bean and Neven Knezevic PhD.).


RHM. Zafarullah assisted in setting the layout of this report.

The author of this report is James Bean (LL.B).


As can be seen from the graph below 82% of reporters are over 18 years old as of 6 October 2008. There were some difficulties with ascertaining age because of missing values in the ICRS database specific to date of birth. Accordingly, age was calculated in the following manner:

1. Date of birth was preferred if the data was available; or
2. The stated age at the date of registration was used in order to calculate age.

This means that the precise age of many reporters could not be calculated, but an approximation made. Emerging from this analysis is a surprising finding that the majority of reporters have entered their most productive period in their lives, ie. 18-45 years old. This finding in the sample also reinforces the view that the phases of rebel group recruitment from 1986-2005 targeted children *and* adults. It also calls into the question the targeting of resources towards so-called child combatants or formally abducted children, particularly by external actors. The fact is that these reporters have since aged and may have different demands and needs as young adults than the special needs they had as children (ie. assessment of their family situation, life skills, and health issues).




It is highly likely that given the vast majority of reporters (ie. 70%) are between 19-45 years old, with 8,713 or 48% of reporters between the ages of 19 and 30 alone, much more attention needs to be given to their economic reintegration needs as they enter the workforce.




Economic reintegration support should be market-focused but not too prescriptive, and may include access to credit, small-business development services, referral of jobs, and access to vocational skills training and apprenticeships. The graphs below describe the age densities in different rebel groups, as follows:

Age group by rebel group
(n=17926)




**Lord's Resistance Movement:
Children Vs Adults**



As between the rebel groups themselves, LRA reporters are significantly younger than WNBFB and ADF reporters; *there are only 61 WNBFB and ADF reporters that are under 18*, whereas there are 2,950 LRA reporters under 18 (with 116 under 12 and 2,834 between the ages of 12 and 18).

This speaks to the recruitment practices of the rebel groups themselves, with LRA far more likely to have recruited children at a very early age. This in and of itself underscores the need for ongoing special attention for LRA reporter youth, particularly in the areas of life skills and education.

**West Nile Bank Front:
Children Vs Adults**




**Allied Democratic Forces:
Children Vs Adults**



The density of reporters by district is an important indicator of conflict-carrying capacity; the capacities amongst reporters and their communities to become engaged in new patterns of violent conflict due to personalized forms of violence which they have experienced as a result of trauma and their participation in violent conflict. It may be further argued that conflict-carrying capacity is related to previous levels of conflict-intensity and weak social cohesion within and between communities. All districts in Uganda, to a varying degree, are conflict-affected; there are no districts with zero levels of reporter return. While many districts experienced high-intensity conflict, discrete ‘hot spots’ with high densities of reporters will remain the most vulnerable.

Density Category|High




Districts with the highest proportions of ‘hot-spots’ (i.e. villages or sub-districts that have over 500 reporters) were Gulu, Yumbe, Pader, Kitgum, Arua, Kasese, and Lira. The remaining districts had lower or significantly lower proportions of ‘hot-spots’ (e.g. Katakwi, Moyo, Kabarole). Those medium density hotspots were classified as having between 50-500 reporters.

There is clear geographic coherence to the concentration of ‘hot-spots’ or reporter density on a district-by-district basis: Northern Uganda is one big hotspot. The only exception is Kasese, an area of ADF reporter return. It is worth underscoring that many ‘hotspot’ areas of high reporter density have benefited from international assistance because they have experienced massive internal displacement and cross-border influxes of refugees.

By dividing reporter densities by district, and disaggregating by DRT, what also emerges is that Arua has been coping with a very large caseload at least as big as Kitgum and Gulu (NB. also see ‘Caseload by DRT’ below). This should encourage more actors to level their interventions accordingly.

Density Category|Medium

Reporter Densities by District, Gender, and DRT (Medium)
(n=1899)




In the medium-density areas there are also no surprises with the predominant reporter densities being Northern and Eastern Uganda.

Low density areas are those with less than 50 reporters by district, as follows:

Density Category|Low


Reporter Densities by District and DRT (Low)
(n=536)



It is critical that government agencies and authorities, with the cooperation of external actors, adjust their resources focus in line with reporter densities because it is these areas if left unattended where resentments and perceptions of inequity can quickly deteriorate into backsliding pressures that fuel new conflict.

In an environment of scarce resources, hotspot areas need not be the sole focus, but these are the areas that should receive specialized assistance that targets vulnerabilities and communities with higher conflict-carrying capacities:

1. Hotspot areas of WNBF return: Arua, Yumbe, Nebbi, and Moyo;
2. Hotspot areas of LRA return: Gulu, Pader, Kitgum, Apac, and Lira.
3. Hotspot areas of ADF return: Kasese, Kabarole, and Mbale.




Some of the impacts of conflict in Uganda include: abduction of children, the crippling of business and local economies; the wholesale deterioration of security, law, and order; the abandonment of agricultural land; and most depressing of all, the breakdown, and in some cases total collapse, of communities. These legacies undermine the ability of communities to support the sustainable return of conflict-affected groups such as reporters, IDPs and refugees.


The binary interpretation of Uganda that divides communities into 'displacement-affected' or 'conflict affected' will lead to extremely volatile local dynamics and community perceptions of fairness within and between districts.

Aggregate district-level statistics are helpful, but they can be misleading given the particular recovery challenges facing discrete conflict-affected communities, particularly those villages in 'hot-spot' areas. That said, in an administrative sense for both government and external actors, district level statistics are useful because this is often how programs are set up (ie. on a district, or at best, county basis). Moreover, in order to offset perceptions of unfairness at the local level, government will always find itself having to assist an administrative region and not just the 'hot-spots' in that region.


**Lord's Resistance Army:
Active Combat vs. Support Functions
(n=8488)**




**Allied Democratic Forces:
Active Combat vs. Support Functions
(n=886)**



**West Nile Bank Front:
Active Combat vs. Support Functions
(n=2080)**



The diagram directly below describes rebel group populations divided into demographics A, B and C.



Demographic A refers to politico-military leadership and senior command structure, whilst demographic B refers to gun-carrying combatants and those who have experienced actual combat.

Demographic C refers to support networks that actively provided assistance and protection to combatants, and also refers to those responsible for political indoctrination of communities or new members; those organizing food, munitions, and other supplies or logistical support arrangements, those gathering or relaying intelligence or communications and other related activities – clearly the largest category within all groups. Definitions are not agreed upon, nor are strict criteria applied when discussing ex-combatants in Uganda, therefore it is not clear the extent to which membership of a rebel group reflects the broader definitions ‘combatant’ in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325/2000 on Women, Peace, and Security and 2000 European Parliament resolution on Participation of Women in Peaceful Conflict Resolution. It is quite clear that with WNBFB and LRA there is a roughly 60/40 split in terms of reporters performing active combat roles versus those who may be construed as performing more support-type functions as outlined above.

The standout rebel group is the ADF, whose reporters to date are over four times more likely to be support-type personnel. There are three possibilities for this, as follows:

1. ADF as a rebel group is far more embedded within their community, and is a more community-oriented guerilla-led insurgency. This is supported by contextual evidence that suggests that ADF personnel and their families are very mobile, often operating as a cohesive military-family unit. 14

2. Conversely, reporters from ADF's support-network (esp. those in Uganda) may for practical reasons (e.g. economic incentives and/or geographical proximity) have decided to seek amnesty.
3. The ADF and to a lesser extent the LRA (mindful of peace talks underway in Juba, Sudan) have not entered into a peace deal, suggesting strong levels of reticence, fear, unwillingness, or practical inability (eg. for reasons of geographical remoteness) for active combatants to not have sought amnesty.


If and when a peace agreement is entered into, the two clear implications that distinguish the ADF are as follows:

1. There will be a significant caseload of reporters who performed more support-type functions in the caseload: there may be 4.2 or more people claiming amnesty who performed support-type functions for every so-called active combatant. This means that a potential caseload of 800 ADF 'hardcore' combatants seeking amnesty and reintegration assistance would translate into a total in excess of 4,000 persons claiming amnesty. This ratio of active combatant/support networks is consistent with IOM-Amnesty Commission discussions with key individuals within the ADF command structure; and/or
2. If in fact ADF is similar in its membership profiles to the LRA and WNBFB, then there will be significantly more 'hardcore' ADF with active combat experience that seek amnesty.

Preliminary Analysis

Reporters disaggregated by rebel group and gender


Reporters Disaggregated by Rebel Group and Gender
(n = 18042)



In addition to the points raised above in relation to reporter densities by age, key findings from this data in relation to gender are as follows:

1. There is a huge number of LRA women reporters who may have special needs relating to health, pregnancy, having to look after children, or being ostracized by their community.
2. The ADF clearly has a more gender-balanced caseload *at this stage*. One explanation for why ADF female reporters are overrepresented in the caseload compared to other rebel groups is that they were more likely to have performed support-type functions (see above).
3. Those 'hardcore' ADF male combatants are yet to seek amnesty possibly because there is not enough incentive to do so in the absence of a peace agreement or political settlement.

Number of Reporters by Gender and Rebel Group (n=18042)



Given the 2000 Amnesty Act specifically provides as follows:

Article 3 (1) An Amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda by –


- a) actual participation in combat;
- b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion;
- c) committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed rebellion; or
- d) assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed rebellion.

Article 4 (4) Persons to whom section 3 applies and who are living outside Uganda shall be deemed to have been granted the amnesty if –

- a) they renounce all activities described in section 3; and
- b) report to any Ugandan diplomatic mission, consulate or any international organization which has agreed with the Government of Uganda to receive such persons.

it is surprising to find is that 180 non-Ugandan people qualified for amnesty.


Nationality of Reporters (n = 18042)



Therefore, a possible explanation for this may be as follows:

1. Recording of data in Boolean format makes it impossible to differentiate between a true 'no' and a missing value. Accordingly, of these 180 non-Ugandans 179 amnestied reporters have missing values for the field 'nationality'. One reporter specified his/her nationality under the field 'other'.
2. Further analysis and outreach would determine whether the 180 amnestied reporters are in fact non-Ugandan.
3. Given the total number of amnestied reporters is 22,520 the number of non-Ugandan reporters could be significantly higher than 180 persons.


**Lord's Resistance Army:
Weapons possession by reporters
(n=10813)**



**West Nile Bank Front
Weapons possession by reporters
(n=2350)**



**Allied Democratic Forces:
Weapons possession by reporters
(n=1442)**




Across the entire sample 41% of reporters confirmed they possessed a weapon during involvement with the rebel group in question. There are significant levels of recorded weapons possession by LRA, WNBF, and ADF reporters.

In the case of the LRA, 27% reporters indicated they had possession of weapons, whilst in the case of ADF only 6% indicated they had weapons. WNBF on the other hand appears to have a much higher level of weapon possession. Possible explanations are put forward as follows:

1. This accurately describes weapons possession within these rebel groups. This might possibly point at regional or political reasons why WNBF had greater access to weapons during conflict.
2. LRA and ADF have not had a formal peace agreement in force acting as an incentive to hand over weapons, whereas WNBF has had a political settlement in place. This may explain ADF's very low level of weapons possession (and potential dishonesty) and LRA's somewhat less dishonest or lukewarm response to this question.
3. Weapons possession for LRA and ADF indicates a positive relationship with the active combatant-support network splits of the rebel groups (see discussion of *Active Combat vs. Support Functions* above).
4. Another reason for the low level of ADF weapons possession is the lower levels of personnel with active combat experience seeking amnesty (see discussion of *Active Combat vs. Support Functions* above).
5. WNBF has concluded their demobilization and reinsertion and therefore had no strategic or military reason to be dishonest about weapons possession not fearing disarmament, but viewing it as part of 'the deal'.

It is worth noting that very similar patterns are identifiable in the 16% of reporters who handed in their weapons (see discussion and analysis overleaf).

Reporters with weapons that handed them in (n=18042)




Figures for disarmament of those who possessed a gun are highly varied depending on the rebel group. Fort-one percent of reporters who possessed a gun disarmed. If disarmament is a form of compliance to amnesty, what this data suggests is that ADF have been least compliant to date.

Not surprisingly, the highest levels of compliance were amongst WNBFB reporters at 89% further reinforcing similar findings that the political settlement in place has been effective. The ADF's amnesty compliance, in this case their disarmament, was less compelling at 57%.

The standout group is the LRA with nearly 60% not returning their weapon.


Lord's Resistance Army: Reporters that handed in weapons (n=2669)




However, the political settlement with the WNBFB offers hope, and if similar peace deals are struck with these two rebel groups, disarmament levels should rise. The differences in compliance between the LRA and the ADF are instructive for future disarmament incentives either as part of a peace deal or a separate standalone intervention(s).

One caveat should be made in relation to this data: Amnesty Commission staff in the field appeared to ignore the injunction in the survey instrument to discontinue asking questions after the reporter indicated s/he did not possess a weapon. Also, because data was inputted in Boolean format it is impossible to differentiate between a true 'no' in terms of weapons


West Nile Bank Front: Reporters that handed in weapons (n=1638)



Allied Democratic Forces: Reporters that handed in weapons (n=90)




Number of Reporters with Injuries (n=18042)



It is quite possible that many injured reporters sought amnesty precisely because their injuries prevented them from full participation in the rebel group in question.

Once again, it must be noted that because data was inputted in Boolean format it is impossible to differentiate between a true 'no' and a missing value. Accordingly, those reporters who did not answer are 'unknown' and in this case are more likely to not be injured. From the graph below, the incidence of body and head trauma appears very high, which needs further analyses.

Reporters with injuries by injury-type (n =18042)



One problem with the data is that trauma to the body and head are mixed up (ie. 'body/head injury'), which could distort findings and analysis. One possible way of looking at this is that other body-type injuries are cited and this field may have been responded to with greater focus on head trauma. However, a glaring oversight is bullet/shrapnel wounds, broken limbs, not to mention the myriad of other injuries people sustain during combat or exposure to deadly conflict. It is also worth noting that many of these other body-type injuries are specified qualitatively under a field marked 'other', therefore supporting the notion that this field is weighted more towards head trauma.

At any rate, even if only 50% of those with body and head trauma have experienced head injury, the incidence across all reporters within the entire Amnesty Commission ICRS database could be as high as 1,171 persons. Three possible explanations may be hypothesized in relation to this issue of head trauma, namely as follows:


1. If the head trauma in question diminishes over time, as is the case with post-traumatic stress disorder, then the innate resilience of these people may mean that these mental health vulnerabilities may no longer be acute.
2. Conversely, timing is critical for addressing many mental health issues, and the longer these vulnerabilities are left unaddressed, the higher the likelihood that these vulnerabilities may become stressors on families and communities struggling to reintegrate.

Further analysis and follow-up research is necessary, and quite possibly, immediate intervention should be considered. Head trauma caused by brain injury as a result of beatings, asphyxiation, and other forms of torture or violence during conflict can lead to long term emotional, cognitive, and behavioral effects. These effects may include reduced ability to concentrate and work (ie. an organic inability to reintegrate), impaired judgment, dysfunctional behaviors evidenced by strange, anti-social, possibly even criminal acts, and of course, the personal anguish and that of the sufferer's family.¹

A possible way of looking more closely at the issues of injuries experienced by reporters, in particular the mental health issues therein, may be for the Amnesty Commission and IOM to partner with a prominent international university with strong credentials in mental health and the relationship with conflict.

¹ For further discussion on the link between conflict-induced head trauma and its long terms effect, refer to *Psychosocial Needs Assessment of Communities in 14 Conflict-affected Districts in Aceh* (Banda Aceh, 2007); and *Psychosocial Needs Assessment of Communities Affected by the Conflict in the Districts of Pidie, Bireuen, and Aceh Utara* (Banda Aceh, 2006), Good, B., M.-J. D. Good, J. Grayman, and M. Lakoma, International Organization for Migration and Harvard Medical School.

Reporters with identification documents (n = 18042)




The fact that 97% of reporters did not have ID points to a significant achievement by the Amnesty Commission; empowering them with some form of ID, namely an amnesty certificate.


However, the absence of more formal ID represents a huge challenge assuming that reporters come back to damaged homes, abandoned land, dilapidated infrastructure, poor public services, disputes over land ownership, not to mention social dislocation.

Lack of ID disempowers reporters facing these challenges upon their return.

Asset Ownership by Reporters (n=18042)



Of those that own assets: House/Land ownership vs. ownership of other assets (n = 7830)




Access to land through family or traditional forms of land usage may mean that access to land has not created obstacles for some 40% of reporters. Some 57% of reporters do not own any assets, and of those that do 89% own a house or land with only 11% citing ownership of livestock, poultry, a bicycle or a motorbike. It is worth noting that it is highly likely due to the positioning of the 'none' field in the survey form as the penultimate multiple choice question (before 'other assets') that unknown means no assets.

Because access to or ownership of livestock, poultry, a bicycle or a motorbike is very low, this demonstrates that there are major obstacles to livelihood recovery; lack of asset ownership inhibits reintegration through an occupation or livelihood and any traditional saving through non-land asset-ownership. It also suggests that the means of generating agriculture-based income remains a significant gap for reporters without land.

Those that own a house or land may also find themselves drawn into land disputes, which are very common in Uganda; it is not clear the extent to which land disputes become first presentation of conflict for reporters upon their return. The graphs above also suggest that the absence of formal ID documentation will disempower reporters seeking to prove ownership rights or seek assistance from formal and traditional authorities.

This data should be put in perspective: 99% of reporters returned to their place of origin. That said, resettlement preferences are interesting because it hints at a number of issues, although without follow-up information it is an incomplete picture in order to ascertain medium-long term patterns of resettlement.


**Lord's Resistance Movement:
Resettlement Preference Urban Vs Rural (n=3401)**




The key findings and analysis are as follows:

1. LRA is far less urban-oriented than ADF and WNBFB, and therefore may be expected to focus more on barriers to their reintegration in the form of obstacles to agricultural livelihoods recovery and disputes over land ownership.
2. Reporters who were former members of WNBFB appeared more open to urban resettlement. A possible reason for this was the fact that the WNBFB has negotiated and implemented a political settlement since 2003. The closure and incentives to reintegrate that this has offered are illustrated by their openness to resettlement in urban areas.
3. In the case of ADF, given ADF areas of return are south-eastern, south-central, and south-western, it is not clear whether this is urban-urban resettlement or rural-urban resettlement.


**Allied Democratic Forces:
Resettlement Preference Urban Vs Rural (n=618)**




**West Nile Bank Front:
Resettlement Preference Urban Vs Rural (n=718)**




Education Type Received
(n=18042)



Formal Education by Level
(n=12554)



Have you received professional/ on-the-job/apprenticeship training?
(n=18042)



Levels of formal education for reporters is higher than anticipated (i.e. when compared to anecdotal experiences) at 69% of all reporters in the sample having some form of formal education ranging from primary school to higher education. This data does not capture the quality of the education in question or the exact level of education attained.

What this data may be telling us is that a lot of children in school were abducted and filled the ranks of the rebel groups in question.

Making comparisons with the broader Uganda population is potentially counter-productive as it deflects attention from tailoring effective reintegration and/or recovery strategies. It is commonly accepted that education and training opportunities for ex-combatants is often a determining factor for making a successful transition into the world of work and, by extension, successfully making a transition from an environment of conflict to a context of peace as constructive and productive citizens.


As shown in the graphs to the right, some 84% of all reporters with formal education have only attended primary school, whereas 16% have attended secondary school.

What is not clear is whether the higher than anticipated exposure to any formal education manifests in improved access to economic opportunity, or does it in fact work against reintegration? In light of anecdotal information supplied by IOM and Amnesty Commission field staff, the higher proportions of ex-combatant youth *without any level* of secondary school education translates into economic marginalization. This vulnerability can incubate frustrations and resentment; these conflict-carrying capacities can fuel further conflict.

Lastly the 2003 expanded survey/questionnaire form also provides clues as to professional/on-the-job/apprenticeship skills with some 7,076 reporters citing some type of vocational/on-the-job skills ranging from carpentry to art. This is to some extent corroborated by employment/unemployment patterns of reporters (see below).

However, due to the way in which the question is asked in the survey tool, reporters may have interpreted it as asking them whether they *wanted* training. In this case, the data clearly points to strong preferences for professional/vocational skills training and apprenticeships.


Several sections of the 2002 expanded survey/questionnaire ask questions that give important clues as to reporters' attitudes towards the state at the time of registration. Levels of security for reporters (and society more broadly) hinges upon the ability of ex-combatants to reintegrate successfully into society. Security also depends upon the ability of state security institutions (i.e. police and UPDF) to maintain security in a way that accords with and strengthens the rule of law. The Amnesty Commission asked participants a series of questions. These are used here as perception and attitudinal indicators of reporters awareness, trust, and confidence towards the Amnesty Act, the Amnesty Commission, and state security institutions.



Key findings are as follows:

1. Contrary to state policy, reporters almost unanimously do not want to join the UPDF. Whilst further research would be useful in order to determine reporters' current attitudes and whether these attitudes change depending of the civilian versus military state security agencies, it is possible to view reporters' disinclination to join UPDF as a desire to lead peaceful lives and not be directly involved in conflict. This indicates latent peace-generating capacities that could form a strong basis for reintegration activities.
2. Conversely, reporters almost unanimously refrain from denouncing rebellion, which provides clues as to the incentives and levels of trust placed in the state's commitment to peace. Alternatively, it points to reporters harbouring deeply ingrained grievances towards the state.
3. LRA reporters represent the majority of the caseload, which to some extent explains their positive responses to the Amnesty Act questions. However, there is no denying their openness and ambit confidence in the Amnesty Act and the Amnesty Commission; this significantly confirms the efficacy of the amnesty process to date. The same can be said for the ADF and WNBF.
4. A striking difference in the pattern of responses is the response of ADF reporters to whether they want the Amnesty Act explained. This suggests a lack of information and awareness of the Amnesty Act, and possibly the work of the Amnesty Commission, and a useful entry point for further programming, ie. information.

Employment Status of Reporters Prior to Joining Rebellion (n=15147)




It was surprising to see such a high levels (ie. 43%) of reporter employment prior to joining rebel groups. That said the figures are wildly different between rebel groups.

Initial analysis for this data did not interpret 'student/pupil', as unemployed which resulted in very high levels of employment, however, once this was controlled for, the data made more sense.

It is important to note that it is highly likely due to the question ("What was your occupation before joining the rebel group?") that the field 'no data' means the reporter was not employed prior to joining the rebel group, either due to actual unemployment or the fact that s/he was a child not attending school at the time.


Lord's Resistance Army: Employment Status Prior to Joining Rebel Group (n=8502)




At approximately 60% prior employment for both ADF and WNBF reporters, there is a stark contrast with LRA whose reporters were nearly 60% unemployed (not counting 'no data' values). Several reasons may be put forward to explain this stark contrast, as follows:

1. LRA recruited and in many cases abducted young children who were not employed at the time or were attending school.
2. ADF recruited and in many cases abducted people who were employed, which in some cases may have included older children already working. This augurs with anecdotal experience that suggests ADF recruited/abducted adults.
3. When contrasted with voluntary/involuntary patterns of recruitment (see below), the contrast noted above closely supports the employment/unemployment patterns, particularly in the case of WNBF, who publicly claim high levels of voluntary recruitment.

West Nile Bank Front : Employment Status Prior to Joining Rebel Group (n=2247)



Allied Democratic Forces: Employment Status Prior to Joining Rebel Group (n=1243)




The relatively high levels of education, employment, and livelihood activity amongst reporters suggests that it was not a lack of education or employment opportunities that originally promoted armed conflict amongst rebel groups and the state. Rather, it was violent conflict that clearly brought a halt to education, productive livelihoods, and employment opportunities – particularly in heavily conflict-affected areas of Northern Uganda. Therefore, sustainable economic *and social* reintegration may be preferable to purely economic-oriented reintegration and recovery. Government agencies and authorities need to consider local social safety nets so that reporters have more to gain from peace than they do from violent conflict (e.g. by becoming involved in another insurgency). In turn, the creation of an environment of ‘peace’ will promote sustainable local economic development.


Preliminary Analysis **Patterns of voluntary / involuntary involvement in rebel groups**

Voluntary/involuntary patterns of recruitment closely relates to the widely reported incidence of abduction amongst rebel groups in Uganda.


**Lord's Resistance Movement:
Voluntary Involvement vs. Involuntary Involvement
(n=8858)**



**West Nile Bank Front:
Voluntary Involvement vs. Involuntary Involvement
(n=2188)**



**Allied Democratic Forces:
Voluntary Involvement vs. Involuntary Involvement
(n=1259)**




Voluntary/involuntary patterns of recruitment or involvement in rebel groups closely matches patterns of employment/unemployment, as the graphs above describe.

Clearly WNBFB stands out for its voluntary pattern of recruitment amongst reporters. The pressing issue is how to explain the strong patterns of involuntary recruitment amongst ADF reporters when viewed against the corresponding high levels of employment. As argued above the most logical explanation for this is that ADF recruitment/abduction was much more focused on employed older children and adults than young children attending school as the case was with the LRA. Another possible explanation is that ADF reporters were cajoled into joining the movement. This data is worth comparing with the stated motivations of reporters to join the rebel groups in question (see analysis below).


Ideological or political beliefs clearly underpinned the reasons for voluntary involvement in rebel groups, particularly with WNBF who is overrepresented within the caseload of reporters who voluntarily joined their ranks. The importance of poverty underpinning reasons for WNBF to join provides clues as to poverty-based cleavages and centre-periphery tensions that formed the basis of its members' grievances against the state.

Motivation to join armed groups by Reporters who volunteered to join (n=1850)



There are two breaks in the pattern of responses. The first of these is in the field 'misinformed/ misled/deceived by friends/relatives' where ADF reporters feature more prominently. The second break in the pattern is the very low response amongst ADF reporters in relation to "family members killed and I had no support", which suggests that, unlike LRA or WNBF, poverty, desperation, and killed family members are not the motivations of the ADF movement. Both responses tally with ADF reporters' attitudes towards the state in particular their desire for the Amnesty Act to be better explained. This strongly supports a finding that ADF reporters lack information and awareness of not only the Amnesty Act, but possibly misinformation, or disinformation for that matter, is a key grievance that has led the ADF into conflict with the state.

Motivation to join armed groups by Reporters who volunteered to join (n=1850)



Recommendations


It is important to reiterate that this preliminary analysis relies on data that is essentially a snapshot in time, ie. the perceptions, responses, and information supplied by reporters at the time of their registration with the Amnesty Commission. This means that the profiling presented in this report should be followed up by a more rigorous contextual analysis as a subsequent companion piece to this preliminary analysis. Given that very little in the way of socio-economic reintegration assistance has been provided to reporters, these profiles may represent a starting point, and provide clues as to what are the vulnerabilities and conflict-carrying capacities of both reporters and their communities of return (i.e. the backdrop for their reintegration).

The following are some thematic and practical recommendations for the Amnesty Commission:

1. The majority of reporters have entered their most productive period in their lives, ie. 18-45 years old. This calls into the question the targeting of resources towards so-called child combatants, children associated with armed groups, or formally abducted children, particularly by external actors. Economic reintegration support should be targeted towards the vast majority of reporters between 19-45 years old as they enter the workforce.²
2. The district-by-district densities of reporters closely resembles displacement patterns in Uganda. This means that communities are coming under the combined reintegration pressures of ex-combatants, formerly abducted persons, IDPs and refugees. The two-dimensional view of vulnerability, particularly in Northern Uganda, that divides communities into 'displacement-affected' or 'conflict affected' will lead to extremely volatile local dynamics and community perceptions of inequity within and between villages.
3. Government agencies and authorities should adjust their resources focus in line with reporter densities. If left unattended or concentration of programming is not achieved, 'hotspot' areas become the locus of resentments and perceptions of inequity. These feelings and perceptions can quickly deteriorate into backsliding pressures that fuel new conflict. Those areas that should receive special attention are as follows:
 - Hotspot areas of WNBFF return: Arua, Yumbe, Nebbi, and Moyo;
 - Hotspot areas of LRA return: Gulu, Pader, Kitgum, Apac, and Lira.
 - Hotspot areas of ADF return: Kasese, Kabarole, and Mbale.
4. Any settlement between the Government of Uganda and the ADF needs to anticipate a significant caseload of reporters who performed more support-type functions in the ADF caseload. Based on the ratio of active combatant/support networks in the current ADF caseload, there may be as many as 4.2 or more people claiming amnesty who performed support-type functions for every so-called active combatant.
5. A very large number of LRA women reporters appears to be embedded within the Amnesty Commission ICRS database; irrespective of age, these women will have special needs relating to socio-economic obstacles to their reintegration, reproductive health, parental responsibilities, and/or being ostracized by their community.

² This recommendation should not be construed as diminishing the importance of addressing the special needs of former child combatants, children associated with armed groups, and formerly abducted persons in Uganda. This recommendation speaks to resources allocation, not the special importance of reintegration assistance to children associated with an armed force/group or who were otherwise the victims of conflict in Uganda.

6. Further analysis and direct outreach by DRTs would determine whether the 180 amnestied reporters are in fact non-Ugandan. Moreover, given the total number of amnestied reporters is 22,520 the number of non-Ugandan reporters could be significantly higher than 180 persons.
7. If a political settlement or peace deal is struck, disarmament levels will rise and ADF and LRA reporters will be more compliant towards the amnesty process. However, the differences in compliance between the LRA and the ADF are instructive for future disarmament incentives either as part of a peace deal or a separate standalone intervention(s).
8. The Amnesty Commission and IOM should consider entering into a research partnership with an international university that has established strong research and policy credentials in the field of mental health and the relationship with conflict.
9. The Amnesty Commission has been successful at empowering reporters with some form of ID, namely an amnesty certificate, which to some extent addresses the disempowerment reporters face upon their return. Many reporters that do own a house or land find themselves drawn into land disputes, which may very well be the first presentation of conflict upon their return. A national ID card with a parallel land dispute commission would be an important next step towards empowering reporters and other vulnerable conflict-affected groups such as IDPs and returnees.
10. The Amnesty Commission should encourage external actors to focus more of their efforts on generating agriculture-based income especially for reporters who do not own a house or land. In particular, access to or ownership of livestock, poultry, a bicycle or a motorbike is very low, which is illustrative of the significant obstacles to livelihood recovery; lack of asset ownership inhibits reintegration through an occupation or livelihood and any traditional saving through non-land asset-ownership.
11. A striking contrast amongst rebel groups is that ADF reporters feel misinformed and deceived, most likely by the ADF. This suggests that the ADF controls information flows, and effectively disabuses potential reporters from seeking amnesty. This lack of information and awareness of the Amnesty Act, and possibly the work of the Amnesty Commission, makes a useful entry point for further programming, especially if peace talks commence with the ADF.
12. Sustainable economic *and social* reintegration is preferable to purely economic-oriented reintegration and recovery. Government agencies and authorities need to consider working with donors, civil society actors, and other stakeholders to cultivate and reinforce local self-supporting mechanisms or 'social safety nets' so that reporters see that they have more to gain from peace than they do from violent conflict.



“it is the expressed desire of the people of Uganda to end armed hostilities, reconcile with those who have caused suffering and rebuild their communities in order to establish peace, security and tranquility throughout the whole country”³

³ Preamble, 2000 Amnesty Act. Photo by Wayne Conradie © 2008