

VOICI:
Le paquet de cigarettes
PHILIP MORRIS
ROUGE-BLANC-O
dans sa nouvelle tenue
EN VENTE PARTOUT

Philip Morris
King Size

Agent Général:
ZINDEL
ALEXANDRIE: 15 Midan El
LE CAIRE: 6 Midan Soliman

شكوبك الاحتيا عند اللقاء
يُصيب الهوى فَيُؤمِّد الوفاء

ادعوا لنا الجنة السَّاجِرَةَ
ستلا. ذات النجوة النَّبَاهَةَ

هي ستلا. يكتفينا
رسولك حيت ولأبينا

تصنع بيورة ستلا من الشعير
الصرى الغدق الجسيم وغيره حيت
العاصم الملقاة بيورة ستلا الطازجة
هي الشروب الصحتة المثلثة

ستلا
البيورة
السيرة الملبسدة
أخرساعة 1٩٥٧
شكر خاص أحمد حجازي

CIGARETTES
COUTARELL
DE LUXE

ASPERO FRERES
EGYPTE
EGYPTIENNES

EN VENTE PARTOUT

CAIRO: — Shipboard's Hotel Buildings.
ALEXANDRIA: — 13, Rue Fouad Iv.
PORT SAID: — 4, Rue Prince Farouk.

CREDIT LYONNAIS
FONDE EN 1863
ETABLI EN EGYPTE EN 1874
1498 SIÈGES
RÉSERVES: Fcs: UN MILLIARD

AGENCES EN EGYPTE
LE CAIRE ET MOUSKY
(R.C. 3382)

TOUTES OPERATIONS DE BANQUE
OFFRES-PORTS EN LOCAT

PORT-SAID
(R.C. Canal 213)

الأمم المتحدة
جزيرة العرب

عالمنا صانع
الأمم المتحدة
الأمم المتحدة
الأمم المتحدة

وصف ممتاز
ليس تفرك تمتد

**شاي
روزو**

أنواع شاي ممتازة

المدن السياحية من اللذات

ضوابط الضمان

صحة ضوابط الضمانات بانظر الصدى

تاريخ الضمانات

رأس مال المدفوع ٧٢٠٠٠٠ جنة مصري
المدن السياحية من اللذات
المدن السياحية من اللذات
المدن السياحية من اللذات

إذا أردت ان تكوني ذات بشرة صبرية
ناعمة الملامح فقليلك باستعمال
كريم العرايس

انواع فاخرة روائح شاكر ميخائيل عبدالله

SOUSSA

1959
SOUSSA
Extra
Saladin

THE CHRONICLES

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY
RESEARCH CENTRE

JULY—SEPTEMBER 2006,
VOLUME 2 / ISSUE 1

The American University in Cairo

EXCLUSIVITÉ
BORGOGNES "MARCILLY Frères"
LES BORDEAUX "GINESTET"
LES CHAMPAGNES "KRUG"
GROPPI

منتجات

STELLA

LA BIÈRE DE LUXE "FRAICHE"

pour découvrir le rang
pour découvrir le rang
pour découvrir le rang

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EDITOR'S NOTE...

July 2006 is a month to be added to the chronology of events in the Arab world's historical conflict with Israel. Lebanon at war is a topic that cannot be avoided, if one attempts to write anything about this region at this point in time, even if the venue is a publication on economic and business history. Apart from the political manifestations of the conflict, it has left, throughout the 20th century, a trail of a socio-economic nature. One could even argue that even the minute details in the contemporary history of this region have been imprinted by the conflict.

In 1922, a group of industrialists, mostly of foreign origins, established what we now call, The Federation of Egyptian Industries. Since 1925, they published a monthly magazine, *Misr il-Sina'iyah/L'Egypte Industrielle*, which was an effective mouthpiece for an influential interest group in Egypt's modern history, its industrial bourgeoisie. Interestingly, Palestine was constantly present in the magazine. Prior to 1948, the magazine often praised the Palestinian industrial experience. They spoke very highly of the economic legislation and tariff system instigated in Palestine that were of great benefit to local industry. After the tripartite aggression of 1956, historical Palestine was addressed in government decrees and laws that ordered the boycott of Israeli products and all companies that were affiliated with Israel. It is worthwhile to attempt to study the Palestinian industrial experience and the role of the Zionist movement in its development. A comparative study between the Egyptian and Palestinian industrial experiences could make for an interesting research. The point to be made here, however, is the extent to which this region is haunted by Israel and is affected by the Arab Israeli conflict in all its facets.

Last June, we met Youssef Darwish, days before his death. He greeted us in his apartment in Youssef El Guindy in downtown Cairo, and having known that we work at The American University in Cairo [AUC], he asked us about the rumor that AUC was going to sell its premise to the Israeli embassy. He was outraged by the rumor and scolded the Israelis. He could not fathom the possibility that they might be his neighbors. If Darwish were still alive today, the old radical would have been fuming at the Israeli atrocities in Lebanon. Proud of his Jewishness till the very end, he would have probably reasserted his lifelong opposition to Zionism and all that it represents to an active and unapologetic Egyptian communist. We pay tribute to Darwish, Ahmed Abdallah and all those who lost their lives in Lebanon under Israel's brutal aggression.

An Ode to the Founding Crew!

As this fifth issue of *The Chronicles* is making its way to the print shop, two of the most important contributors to this and previous issues, **Dina Khalifa** and **Mostafa Hefny**, are taking their first steps as graduate students in Georgetown, D.C. Dina has been editor of *The Chronicles* since it began appearing over a year ago, and has seen this issue through until its final steps. Both she and Mostafa have contributed writings to all previous issues, as well as to the present one, and we have all reason to believe that this will continue while they are in Georgetown.

Dina and Mostafa are not the first of our officers to take this route. When the effort to establish the Economic and Business History Research Centre (EBHRC) began in February 04, one of the major factors that made the idea materialize was the enthusiasm, energy, and fresh vision of a cohort of fresh and outstanding graduates, mostly from AUC. Six of them soon became full time officers during the pilot project phase or after the actual establishment of the centre in June 04. Of these six officers, Omar Cheta soon left to join the MA program at Chicago (now on his way as a PHD candidate at NYU), Dina Waked followed suit a year later (Harvard Law School) and now on her way to a PHD track as well, and now Dina and Mostafa are taking the same steps. A fifth officer, Karim El-Sayyed, opted for the corporate world. Others who chose to contribute on part-time basis to the activities of EBHRC have

either started or are similarly preparing to join graduate programs in the USA or the UK (Sara el-Mezlawy, Mohammad Menza, Dalia Ghanem, Amr Adly), and a few are presently either in the media (Lina Atallah) or in the corporate financial world (Alaa Dajani).

In less than three years, thus, the centre witnessed a nearly complete turnover in its officers. This perhaps demonstrates its role as a meeting point—incubator?—for promising calibers with potential interest in research during their early exploratory phases.

The departure of Dina and Mostafa is an occasion to remember and recognize the contribution of an entire group in creating the centre from scratch, compiling 150 hours of oral history records with nearly 50% transcribed and ready for conversion into library holdings, organizing three annual forums and two Young Scholars annual seminars, contributing a panel to MESA 05, gathering and maintaining the nucleus of documentary archives, and in founding *The Chronicles* and publishing five issues of it. The centre is fortunate to have had the collective input of such talents. We are equally fortunate to continue to enjoy the contribution this year of the last of EBHRC's founding crew, Wael Ismail, and the input of his colleagues, Yasmeen Samir (now a veteran), Noha Roushdy (joined in April 06), as well as the many other outside contributors to the centre and *The Chronicles*.



THE EBHRC

Looking Back After Three Years.....

Prof. Ellis Goldberg, Political Science, University of Washington

Three years after the inauguration of the activities of the current Economic and Business History Research Centre, what have we learned? As a contribution to a prospective and collective stock-taking, a few observations are in order about this project: how has it affected and how might it affect existing narratives of 20th century Egyptian history; what does our new knowledge of business history tell us about Egyptian political dynamics of the second half of the 20th century; and (last) how possible will it be to integrate the study of business history into existing narratives of Egyptian social (as opposed to economic) history?

Twentieth century Egyptian history, whether written in Arabic or a European language, has been a narrative of the emancipation of national consciousness in which institutions have had very little substantive and independent impact. Writing these narratives has frequently been cast in terms of macro-historical concepts that presumably organize social life: national consciousnesses or identities; modern and traditional psychologies; experimentation with liberalism; and the emergence (or re-emergence) of Islam.

Despite asserting that the basic categories in which history is written are ideas, few of these studies investigate the internal states of any of the elite actors they describe. When, in the 1960s and 1970s, greater interest in Egyptian social and economic history appeared, it was also often cast in terms of big ideas: classes made their appearance as did macro-economic categories and even explicitly (and perhaps somewhat arcane) categories of sociology such as elites and the second stratum.

Memoirs and the publication of diaries and private papers have given us some insight into the how members of the political and cultural elites thought. The interest in recapturing the oral history of Egypt's workers and the poor has provided us with a clearer sense of the feel of history from below that complements the macro-economic categories.

The dominant narrative of twentieth century Egyptian economic history has not changed much in the decades since it was first developed by the late Charles Issawi around 1950. Egypt, in the account, became integrated into a global market in the late 19th and early 20th century but in a way

that subjected it to "lopsided development." Egypt's agricultural sector, geared toward the export of cotton, could not provide employment that an expanding population required. With an economy oriented to exporting a primary good, Egypt did not develop the industrial capacity to meet demand for manufactured goods at home and thereby increase employment and also begin to climb the ladder of development. Whether the failure of private enterprise in the first half of the 20th century to invest in industry was due to British political control of Egypt, the dominance of foreign investors in the urban and financial sectors, or was an inherent weakness of dependent capitalism has been one of the primary debates animating Egyptian historiography. Most historical narratives that employ economics either for explanation or context describe frustrated attempts by nationalist businessmen before 1952 to regain control of Egypt's political and economic institutions that, when acquired, would lead to higher levels of growth and equity. What private investors could not (or did not wish to) accomplish was finally, in these stories, achieved in the years after 1952 when the state nationalized private industry and undertook ambitious investment programs to stimulate industrial development.

“... Twentieth century Egyptian history, whether written in Arabic or a European language, has been a narrative of the emancipation of national consciousness in which institutions have had very little substantive and independent impact...”

It comes as no surprise then that Talaat Harb's campaign to create a nationalist financial institution, Bank Misr, and promote investment in industrial activities was held up as a crucial (but aborted) step toward development and national independence. Robert Vitalis has argued that Harb's actual investment strategies were not significantly different from those of other entrepreneurs such as Ahmad Abbud of the period. Robert Tignor has argued, based on some remarkable archival work, that Egyptians were more than able to dominate negotiations with British businesses by the late 1930s. Yet Harb's allure as a symbol of an embattled national development plan remains largely intact and a more complex picture of the period before 1952 has not entered much Egyptian historiography.

The oral history project of the centre can shed little light on the early 20th century. It has, however, yielded some crucial insights into events around mid-century and on the contentious issue of privatization. I have read through many of the Arabic transcripts of the oral history sessions as well as the English-language versions published by the centre and I have attended all three annual spring meetings of the centre.

The spring meetings have featured discussions with many of those who have given oral history projects and they therefore allow those who attend to supplement the words with a much immediate sense of how the subjects view their own and Egypt's past.

What kinds of things have we learned? Appropriately enough for a discussion of oral histories, I will limit myself to my recollections. We have learned three very important things: businessmen drawn into enterprise because of their technical expertise seem to have had some reservations about the breadth and speed of state-led industrialization from the beginning; there was continuous interest among the technical elite in private enterprise during the Nasser period; and last that Anwar al-Sadat's policy of privatization was conceived as a war of position rather than a frontal assault.

In May 2005 the Centre held a historical workshop on the automobile industry. Although most of the discussion focused specifically on automobiles, the discussion was wide-ranging. In the discussion of the origins of the automobile assembly plant in Egypt, Dr. Adel Gazarin recalled that the automobile industry had developed as an offshoot of the strategic decision by the state to invest in the production of trucks and buses. He also recalled that the decision to move to the production of passenger cars occurred in the context of the government policies aimed at complete economic self-sufficiency which was clearly not an efficient use of Egyptian resources. As a consequence an investment was undertaken despite the absence of demand which would have allowed an efficient scale of production.

Other participants at that meeting and in later meetings have voiced other concerns about the politicization of technical decisions that wasted or even destroyed investment in physical plant. Egypt clearly possessed a significant number of engineers who were full participants in the push for state-led industrialization. They appear to have been committed and even excited to use their technical skills in this effort. As always with oral interviews it is difficult to separate concerns at the time of the interview with concerns at the time about which the interview is being conducted. Nevertheless it is apparent that many highly skilled people were to one degree or another skeptical about the pace and degree of industrialization by state investment although not neces-

sarily about the role of the state in industrialization as such. There does not appear to have been a unified view about the role of the state. Some of the engineers appear to have been opposed to the public sector on principle; others to have had doubts about the how it was working; still others appear to have been affected by particular experiences of waste.

If critical stances toward the role of the state in the economy and the size and scope of the public sector varied so did support for the private sector. The histories make it clear that many members of the technical elite—whether in engineering, financial, or other sectors—gave serious and continuing consideration to re-creating a private sector. The sources of this support appear to have varied considerably. Our respondents have described many forms of dissatisfaction. They range from low salaries to positions incommensurate with training, aspirations or simple ambitions. They include concerns with the scope of state decision making, the lack of transparency and simple waste of resources. Few of the issues raised appear to be unique to state-owned enterprises and many are likely to occur in large firms, weak economies, or simply as part of anyone's life experience. Nevertheless in a setting in which state officials had a near monopoly over decision-making much dissatisfaction seems to have been targeted at the state itself. Clearly, too, in the absence of a decentralized economy the option of finding a new employer or even setting up a new business was not available to most of our respondents between roughly 1960-1980.

“... Memoirs and the publication of diaries and private papers have given us some insight into the how members of the political and cultural elites thought ...”

Many of the entrepreneurs interviewed began their careers as technical officials whether with engineering or financial degrees. Well-educated and thoughtful, these businessmen often have developed clear ideas about the public and private sectors and the relationship between them. For many of our respondents, however, these do not appear to have been a zero-sum relationship. Some clearly have a profound and deep-rooted disdain for the public sector but others see it as important in areas in which private investment cannot be mobilized.

Because several of the businessmen interviewed served as officials at the ministerial level, we have also learned something about how privatization policy was made. The most obvious and important lesson appears to have been that, despite coming in the wake of the *infitah* (economic opening) policies of the 1970s, privatization policy was complex, halting and frequently at cross purposes with other government policies toward the private sector. As Karim El-Sayed pointed out in a very able summary of the discussion involving two former ministers, Fouad Sultan and Mohammad Abdel Wahab, they appear to have had diametrically opposed visions and experiences of the economy while serving in the same cabinet for eight years. Sultan carried out what can only be described as a “war of position” rather than a frontal assault on the state sector. As Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation he had a clear strategy that involved significantly increasing the size and scope of the private sector from the margins of the existing economy. Actors within the state sector who favored an increased private role (and I am thinking especially of Dr. Gazarin’s comments) expressed some frustration at the absence of a clear strategy for dealing with it. Clearly there were important political conflicts whose full dimensions we do not understand at work but there was also the strategic reality that, having chosen to begin at the margins (however fitfully), the core of the public sector was going to be left untouched for a long time.

What can we learn from this? There at least two levels at which the work of the Centre must be integrated into Egyptian historiography (and even perhaps policy making): writing the narrative of state-led economy and privatization on the one hand and understanding the nature of political decision-making on the other.

Any attempt to analyze, describe, or evaluate the Egyptian economy from about 1958 on must, from now on, utilize the materials—and especially the oral histories—of the Centre. Simply as a point of comparison (and admittedly to some degree unfairly so) it is instructive to recall that when Robert Springborg wrote *Mubarak’s Egypt* (Boulder: Westview Press 1989) and Robert Bianchi wrote *Uruly Corporatism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1989), Fouad Sultan appears as a minor character

“... What is clear, however, from the Centre interviews is that the Egyptian government, at least at the highest levels, was able to employ the services of able and energetic individuals whose debates, disagreements, and initiatives have largely escaped our knowledge until now ...”

engaged in a somewhat quixotic hotel privatization scheme (Springborg, 124) or as an antagonist of the Minister of Labor (Bianchi, 178). It is now possible to draw a much more finely-grained picture of antagonisms within the cabinet about privatizing the public sector and also about the strategies employed by various ministerial and interest groups.

Moreover, where Springborg placed political conflicts within the framework of a contest between President Mubarak and Defense Minister Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazala for influence this seems less important now.

Of course it is possible that additional research—especially should ministerial documents ever become available—would place these oral histories in a more complex context. For the time being however they add significantly to our understanding of that period and require a far more nuanced approach to Egyptian economic and political history.

Of equal importance is the degree to which the oral histories reveal the existence of complex and wide-ranging conflicts within Egyptian cabinets and ministerial politics. They therefore provide us with some insight into the process through which policies—about the economy and more—have been made. To my mind they shed some additional light on what is still a contentious issue of economic history in the early Nasser period: the labor legislation. The debates and conflicts revealed to us suggest that seeming incoherence or divergent policies may be the result of arguments among ministers and other ministry personnel. Thus the early labor legislation of the 1950s probably was, in fact, the result of many different hands at work with different agendas which today escape us. The idea that economic policies were either unambiguously pro-labor or unambiguously pro-capital does not, in light of the oral histories, appear plausible.

Lastly the oral histories shed some light on the process of policy formation and implementation in Egypt over the last 40 years. On balance they should lead us to discard formulations which see economic policy in Egypt as resulting from regulatory incapacity, state weakness, or technical insufficiency. Clearly the Egyptian state has, on more than one occasion, adopted unwise or unrealistic economic policies. What is clear, however, from the Centre interviews is that the Egyptian government, at least at the highest levels, was able to employ the services of able and energetic individuals whose debates, disagreements, and initiatives have largely escaped our knowledge until now. The Centre’s oral history projects have provided all students of Egyptian history with an invaluable resource.

Egypt's Nuclear Quest: Between Reality and Illusion

Mohamed I. Fahmy Menza, Dialogue Coordinator, AUC

Perhaps the phrase “Egypt’s nuclear quest” might sound like an oxymoron to some; however the fact is that Egypt’s nuclear program was initiated over five decades ago, pretty much coinciding with the eruption of the 1952 revolution. The issue of Egypt’s nuclear ambitions is indeed complicated and rather multifaceted and what we shall attempt here is to take abreast at the progress of this project since its foundation and the potentialities of its development in the upcoming phase.

Overview

The starting point of Egypt’s nuclear venture came along with President Nasser and, ever since then, Egypt’s nuclear program has been directly tied to regional politics. Inspired by Washington’s Atoms for Peace program in the early 1950s, Nasser established the Atomic Energy Agency, Egypt’s nuclear authority, to implement research into peaceful uses of nuclear energy and began to develop the country’s nuclear research program. In essence, “both superpowers assisted Egypt in establishing the Inshas Nuclear Research Center: the United States with the installation of a radioisotope laboratory in the late 1950s, and the Soviet Union by supplying a 2MW research reactor in 1961”⁽¹⁾.

With the rising hype over Israel’s activities at Dimona in the early 1960s, Egypt for the first time threatened to develop its indigenous nuclear weapons capability. Depending upon its close ties with the Eastern bloc at the time, Egypt first approached the Soviet Union and then China with demands for nuclear arms, primarily via requesting access to fissile materials, essential to undertake nuclear fission, the main pre-requisite for nuclear weaponry. “Both requests were denied, and after suffering defeat in the June 1967 War, Egypt signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in July 1968, with the hope that Israel would follow suit”⁽²⁾.

President Sadat’s agenda of maintaining a good relationship with Israel and the West, accompanied with the lack of any clear-cut progress in Egypt’s nuclear stratum, resulted in no major alterations in the quest for a potent nuclear energy program. This of course was mounted with the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, ultimately perishing the need to develop a nuclear weapons program, now that Israel was not viewed anymore as a potential adversary. Ultimately, Egypt ratified the NPT in 1981 and, by then, the country’s sole nuclear facility at Inshas was limited to producing radiological materials for medical and other industrial purposes. It seemed, by that time, that the nuclear potential that was earlier

“... With the rising hype over Israel’s activities at Dimona in the early 1960s, Egypt for the first time threatened to develop its indigenous nuclear weapons capability ...”

incepted during the Nasser era was waning, with the failure to even generate any sort of peaceful nuclear power plant that could utilize the skills of the hundreds of nuclear scientists that were bred and trained within the Inshas reactor.

Current Status

Under Mubarak, Egypt’s nuclear quest wasn’t subject to much change either. In an interview with Dr. Mahmoud Barakat, one of the country’s prime experts in the field of nuclear energy, he utters that ever since the commencement of its nuclear project, and for no particular rea

son that he could perceive, Egypt hasn't been capable of building a single power plant for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, even though it's allowed and further encouraged to do so under the auspices of the NPT⁽³⁾.

The truth of the matter is that President Mubarak has delayed purchasing such power plants, citing budgetary constraints and Egypt's natural gas reserves as justifications for neglecting the development of the country's nuclear capacity. On top of that, Egypt's sole reactor at Inshas was closed down from 1986 to 1990 for security improvements after the Chernobyl incident. Nevertheless a virtual kiss of life was endowed in the mid 1990's when "Argentina supplied Egypt with a 22-megawatt open pool light-water reactor, which went critical in 1997 and was used to produce radioisotopes and R&D on nuclear fuel. Mubarak has called for a Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East since 1974 and in 1990 proposed a WMD-free zone"⁽⁴⁾.

By and large, it seems that the worry of being suspected of developing a nuclear weapons program has halted Egypt's nuclear scheme even further. Once again, the testimony of Dr. Mahmoud Barakat only reaffirms this conviction as he utters that the Egyptian government hasn't been paying due care or attention to the issue of developing nuclear energy for peaceful use. This was displayed with the ongoing abandonment of the Dabaa power plant, an ambitious project that aimed at constructing a nuclear power plant along the North Coast near Alamein. The initiative, which was first conceived under Nasser, aimed at building a nuclear power plant at that area due to its preferable location and in fact two bids had been handed in to the government from the Americans and the French. But of course the deterioration of Egypt's relationship with the United States followed by the 1967 defeat put an end to the venture. But then both Sadat and Mubarak also neglected the scheme, despite of the apparent enthusiasm and abundance of sufficient manpower within the Egyptian community of nuclear scientists to undertake it ⁽⁵⁾.

Why Egypt Does Not Have Nuclear Weapons

It could be viewed that it is the lack of financial resources or the predominance of resource constraints that resulted in the incapability of a country like Egypt to develop an indigenous nuclear program until today. Nonetheless, and in concurrence with what was asserted by Dr. Mahmoud Barakat regarding his experi-

ence with the nuclear program of the country, one could argue that it is indeed the lack of political will. Subsequently, conceiving a nuclear weapons program was rather unrealistic. According to Kelly Campbell:

Despite Nasser's rhetoric about catching up with Israel, he never provided the scientists and military officials seeking a nuclear weapons capability the sustained political and financial commitment they needed from him to continue their work. He did not seem to think nuclear weapons were worth the cost, which also means he did not think they were necessary to guarantee Egypt's security. He saw that engaging Israel in a nuclear arms race would at best be counterproductive. Sadat, Nasser's successor, seemed to share his logic on this point, and Mubarak has never proposed nuclear weapons ⁽⁶⁾.

Hence, the question now is: What are the prospects of Egypt's nuclear scheme? Is there a way out?

Conclusion

In fact, in terms of scientific knowledge, "Egypt's nuclear research program has continued somewhat steadily since the 1950s, and Egypt has also aimed to develop the ability to indigenously produce the nuclear fuel cycle. While this has not happened yet, it does seem that scientists have mastered the front-end of the fuel cycle"⁽⁷⁾. However, the overall status of Egypt's nuclear posture appears to be stagnant and, with time, waning, due to the limitation of the nuclear activities to basic research and, mostly, to primitive usages of radiological materials. At the same time, the need to establish an indigenous nuclear program for peaceful purposes is indeed on the rise, with an increasing pressure on the conventional sources of energy, such as oil and natural gas reserves, which are non-renewable sources by nature. Most recently, since April 2005, "there have been conflicting reports of negotiations between Egypt and Russia for a nuclear power station"⁽⁸⁾. Yet these attempts are expected to end exactly where the Dabaa project did, and for the exact same reason: The lack of the political will from above.

Alas, the status quo of Egypt's nuclear program is most likely to prevail as long as Mubarak is in power. With no definite decision to pursue a viable nuclear program, primarily due to the absence of the political will on the one hand, cou-

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pled with the American preference not to have a new nuclear bugbear in the Middle East on the other, especially with the ambiguous destiny of the country's political system post-Mubarak, Egypt's nuclear posture shall remain the same. Only an alteration at the apex of the political system could suggest otherwise.

END NOTES:

1. NTI Chronology: Egypt: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/1697_482
2. Ibid.
3. Dr. Mahmoud Barakat is one of the most prominent scientists in the field of nuclear energy in Egypt. He contributed greatly to the study of applied radiological chemistry in the field of nuclear reactions and was granted the State's Award for chemistry in 1970 followed by the Medal of the State for Sciences and Arts in 1972. In the 1993 he held the post of the Director General of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency. He is currently Professor Emeritus of nuclear and radiological chemistry.
4. Kelly Lorraine Campbell. Avoiding The Tipping Point: The Case of Egypt. <http://lumen.georgetown.edu/projects/PosterTool/index.cfm?fuseaction=poster.display&posterID=2440>
5. NTI Chronology: Egypt: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/1697_482
6. Kelly Lorraine Campbell. Avoiding The Tipping Point: The Case of Egypt. <http://lumen.georgetown.edu/projects/PosterTool/index.cfm?fuseaction=poster.display&posterID=2440>
7. Ibid.
8. NTI Chronology: Egypt: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/1697_482

Places shaping people: An interview with Professor Mohamed Dwidar

Dina Khalifa Hussein, Project officer, EBHRC.

STIA is the El Nasr Wool and Selected Textiles Company. As I passed by STIA a couple of days ago, which is located in the Somouha district in Alexandria, I immediately remembered our interview with Dr. Mohamed Dwidar, Professor of Economics at Alexandria University. As a teenager, Dwidar would spend his summers working in STIA. Around 1947, Dwidar moved to Alexandria with his older brother. In one of the summer breaks of his high school years, he put on his new white nylon shirt and stood in line at the factory's gate. He was selected and joined STIA's workers. A couple of days later, he was introduced to the world of labor

"... The study of law is not a goal in itself," he said, "but a channel to study social life ..."

unions and met the famed and ill-fated pair Ba'ari and Khamis, who would later be hanged by the 1952 regime in Kafr il-Dawar.

The story is more than just an autobiographical anecdote. It opens up a door to the process of formulation and socialization of one of Egypt's more intriguing intellectuals. It becomes worthwhile to wind back and explore the origins of this acclaimed social scientist, not only to learn about him, but also to discover the origins of previous generations. Places are the best narrators of the history of people and their time.

“... it is only in the village that communal responsibility truly exists. It was through experiencing the intricate process of daily agricultural production that he understood that the rural is the base of societal development. ”

The Village

It was the village of Kum il-Nur, in the Daqahliya governorate that left lasting imprints on Dwidar. In 1940, it was composed of 20,000 people, but was enmeshed in a unique web of modernity. Agriculture was its main economic activity, yet it was famous for its domestic textiles crafts. It also had a rather special system of land ownership. There were no big landlords, but it was composed of rich peasants, who owned land, such as Dwidar's father, and their tenants. Medium and small land ownerships were the norm, which made the standards of living relatively high, compared to other villages. The village also had modern services and utilities. It had a majlis qarawi (village council) that looked after its welfare. Parks, a music group, sports and even mixed schools were all part of Dwidar's village, childhood and youth in the 1940's. "It was a special village," Dwidar re-iterated.

The encounter with the industrial world through STIA came second to Dwidar's initial interest in the agricultural sector. Dwidar's fascination with agriculture was a result of his encounter with peasants and their rural life. He asserted that it is only in the village that communal responsibility truly exists. It was through experiencing the intricate process of daily agricultural production that he understood that the rural is the base of societal development. He believes that since the rural platform is wider, and has

a more inter-related societal bond, then it is the bases of development that would spill over to the whole society. He added that his interest is not solely in agricultural economic activity, but in rural society. He believes that change is that of society itself, and is to be attained through its economic activity. "The shift to development has to be through rural industrialization," he said. Kum il-Nur did not only shape this economist's economic views and theories of development, but was a gateway to the discovery of the political scene.

The Politicized Village

Dwidar hosted us in his exquisitely ornamented apartment in Saad Zaghloul Street in Alexandria with a warm smile and handshake that is accompanied by a courteous bow to the ladies. He dresses in a manner that reminds you of old pashas, yet his modesty and generosity sometimes resembles the rural *a'yan* (notables). Concomitantly, he is driven by a calm but concrete enthusiasm of the left. He uses French phrases to describe the bombardment of World War II over Alexandria. In the midst of all this, you are left clueless as to the political affiliation of this Egyptian intellectual. Yet, the story of his village unravels the confusion.

"The Wafd party had a strong presence in the village," Dwidar said. The political scene in the 1940s, however, was not monopolized by the Wafd, the party of

“... On the 23rd of July 1952, Dwidar woke up to the news of the military coup and his immediate response to his friend who bore the news was, “niharak iswid” (This is a black day). ”

the middle-classes. The village included one of the biggest Muslim Brotherhood networks in Daqahliya, and Hassan il-Banna, the founder of the brotherhood, had visited Kum il-Nur and preached in its mosque after one Friday prayer. Dwidar was among the crowd. The list of political parties that were present in the village extends to include the Sa'di party, then affiliated to the palace, and the Misr il-Fatah party, with its quasi Fascist/Nazi influences, which came to the scene at a later stage. Kum il-Nur even witnessed the birth of the famous communist party Hadiitu (*il-harka il-dimokratiya lil-taharur il-watani*). The founders of Hadiitu, Kamal Abdel Halim, Ibrahim and Mounir Abdel Halim came from the village. It seems that most political parties were present in this exceptional place. Yet, we are left to wonder which of these political trends did Dwidar belong to?

Dwidar spoke about the left wing of the Wafd party that included figures like Aziz Fahmy, Mohamed Mandour and Mostafa Moussa. He told stories of how the sporting club in the village had a Wafdist influence and was in constant clash with the Muslim Brothers, who Dwidar described as violent. In 1949, he was interested in yasar il-wafd (the left wing of the Wafd party) and he developed an interest in foreign thought and began reading books like Mao Tse-Tung's *On New Democracy*.

Dwidar studied law at modern day Alexandria University, then Farouk I University. He realized that law is a channel to understand the various aspects of social life. A true social scientist, he is however, more well grounded in his ideologies than most scientists are. He lived among the peasants and the workers. He absorbed their daily lives and troubles to an extent that made it puzzling to identify his affiliation.

On the 23rd of July 1952, Dwidar woke up to the news of the military coup and his immediate response to his friend who bore the news was, "*niharak iswid*" (This is a black day). He was close enough to the land and its people, to the workers and their factories to understand that that point marked the abortion of a brewing social revolution.

From Kum il-Nur to Cairo and then to Alexandria, Dwidar went through childhood and youth, absorbing all the trends in the socio-political life in Egypt. His village with its peasants and land shaped his existence, and made of him a social scientist, nourished in its womb.

Demystifying the

FOGG *oral history and structural analysis**

Wael M. Ismail, Project Officer, EBHRC

Structural analysis has been the tool by which many social scientists have opted to look at the human condition. A range of theories has been developed based upon such line of analysis, most important of which is the dependency theory. Its importance, at least to the author of this piece, is that it is directly concerned with the third world, or the less economically developing countries. Dependency theory is an attempt to look at the condition of those countries in an effort to analyze their backwardness in relation to the more developed countries - in North America, Western Europe and other parts of the world. The most significant contribution of the theory is that it has shed light on the inter-relatedness between the various countries of the world, at least based on their intertwined histories, most prominently through the colonization phase. This theory and other attempts, whether through anthropology or linguistics, have been in fashion for decades now. Their pitfall, however, is that they fall into traps of generalizations that do not do justice to their subjects. Structural analysis as a tool of analysis has its advantages, but it can not be relied upon especially now with the emergence of new lines of thought and

sources that sometimes fall in direct oppositions to some of the propositions put forward, which solely depend on structure and symbols.

My interest here remains in the third world and most importantly the third world peoples, whose history is yet to be written. Post-colonial studies have emerged as a discipline that invites us to take a second look at the history and lives of the third world peoples. Scholars as Edward Said, Spivak and others initiated an intellectual debate in academia and other circles, calling for a much more in depth analysis of the conditions and lives of the third world. Focus has been given to local factors and conditions, with an understanding that the third world, and other societies for that matter, cannot be crammed into coherent and well-defined categories anymore. To achieve such a level of analysis not only should we alter our perception and analysis of matters, but we have to also explore and approach a new repository of untapped resources.

Many communities and societies in Africa and Asia, and other parts of the third world, have a rich oral tradition; a tradition that was used to preserve heritage, history and cultures through memory and

narration. Life history, whether through oral account, diaries, biographies or autobiographies, has to be consulted as a source of information that can shed new light on old topics and issues. Exploring such a new source of narratives will not only help construct a better understanding of the past, but it will problematize old questions. This will lay the ground for different narratives, which will lead to different histories, different truths, and might as well lead to a clearer understanding of things. In other words, complexity is part of daily life, and it cannot be simply shunned away for the sake of clean-cut analysis.

The Economic and Business History Research Centre (EBHRC) has undertaken for almost three years a number of oral history projects aimed at documenting and collecting various narratives related to economic and business life in Egypt over the past fifty years. The wealth of information collected is monumental, not only because it gives life to the history we once read in books and assigns names and faces to what was formerly raw macro economic data, but because it opens up a wide range of topics and issues that would have gone unnoticed if it were not for some of the accounts.

“... dependency theory and the exploitative nature of the core-center hypothesis became the pretext to many nationalist movements to thwart any real change in their own country through the blaming of an imperialist West...”

Let us take for example the notion of entrepreneurship, which is always cited as one of the reasons behind the economic success of the developed world and, the lack of it, as one of the ingredients of the backwardness of the less economically developed countries. Through a set criteria or simply looking at raw numbers of figures we might come to hasty conclusions, but if we look at oral sources a different picture might be unveiled. Through a number of cases found at the EBHRC archives we can witness different cases of entrepreneurship found in Egypt even under the supposedly anti-liberal and anti-private sector regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Dr. Adel Gazarin (1), for example, who headed one of Egypt's largest industrial ventures at the time of the revolution, Al Nasr Co. for Automobiles, which was made responsible for the production of a wholly Egyptian car, provided a lot of anecdotal evidence on how the public sector used to operate in order to make revenues and gain investments. Gazarin, pointed out that the public sector from the outset was burdened by political decisions and aspirations that were bad for business. Nevertheless, he described how he and others manipulated the bureaucracy around them in order to make room here and there for business opportunities and, occasionally, profit. Gazarin was also very critical of the government's import substitution policy, which is fondly promoted by dependency theorists. To Gazarin these policies only helped increase Egypt's underdeveloped status because the public sec-

tor was overwhelmed by industrial production, instead of at least importing some of the goods.

Other cases include a number of businessmen who started working in the late 1960s. For many observers, these people were out of their mind to start a private sector business under Nasser's regime, but they resisted the government monopoly and now most of them have their own business empires in their respective fields of operation. Entrepreneurship is not only felt in large businesses - Maison Papazian (2) for example tells the tale of an Armenian watch shop which has survived for over a 100 years, weathering all possible storms to stand now amid peddlers in the once green al- 'Ataba Square. The current owner, the third generation owner talked about his family's business and how it shifted focus from one line of operation to the other, finally settling on repairs. Mr. Papazian also talked about how his father was able to shift his clientele from pre-revolution cosmopolitan customers to army officers afterwards. This family has shown extreme resilience in weathering difficulties; its survival to this day is probably one of the rare remnants of a once multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society.

All of these tales, collected through oral history, give voice to the peoples of the third world, not only to a special class or group but all sectors of the society. A closer study of such new resources will lead us to eventually question all of our formerly created formulations and

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propositions. History is a narrative, says Alum Munslow, a story told by a historian (3). Historians and other social theorists for that matter should navigate away from assumptions and structures that lead to an over simplified approach at times. The search should not only be for a new historical and analytical framework, it should also be for a new pool of sources away from the ones written by the victor. It is about time that social scientists take it to the streets and plough the field in search for new evidence and new formulations.

The main problem with dependency theory is that it merely replicated its arch nemesis, the modernization theory, in thinking that all of the third world had to go through the same development process. In its attempt to gain a better understanding of the world, it has marginalized its people. Moreover, dependency theory and the exploitative nature of the core-center hypothesis became a pretext to many nationalist movements to thwart any real change in their own country through the blaming of an imperialist West, to a degree that the notion has been hugely discredited as a ploy to hide the reason behind a country's underdevelopment. You can only cry wolf once or twice, but to make it your slogan for years, will not breed change, development, progress or similar pretexts.

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*This is article is partly based upon a graduate paper presented in partial fulfillment of a Masters Degree in Middle East Studies at the American University In Cairo, May 06.

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AMERICAN Real Estate Investment in LATIN AMERICA

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The international real estate market provides potentially lucrative investment opportunities to many people. Compared to real estate prices in some countries – such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom – prices in Latin America, specifically Mexico, Argentina, Panama and Costa Rica are a relative bargain. But it is not only the low prices that are attracting affluent Americans to Latin America – it is the natural beauty, the spirit of change, and most importantly the relative rise in purchasing power associated with foreign real estate investment. The countries that receive these American investors reap economic benefits from the influx of

new, affluent real estate investors. The economic relationship between Americans seeking a market for foreign real estate investment and the countries that supply these customers with their desired products is a classic relationship in which both parties earn economic rewards from the transaction.

International real estate development is a big business. According to Jones Lang LaSalle's data on international commercial real estate development, "Cross-border investment... [reached] \$164 billion" in 2005. Mexico alone had approximately \$2 billion in real estate acquisitions last year. But this growth is not only evident in

the dollar amounts on spreadsheets; one can constantly read about the latest construction projects in Latin and Central American countries as a testament to their real estate renaissance as new condominium complexes and hotels are built in places such as Mexico and Costa Rica. Unlike the U.S. market, many Latin American markets remain unsaturated – whether one is discussing condominium developments, new hotels or shopping centers. (One should also remember that with a less saturated market, there is less competition, which means that one or a few dominant players can control a

niche of the market with less resistance than in a highly competitive market.) American shopping center developers are moving to Latin American markets because as the CEO of General Growth said, "Our new Latin American projects offer locations for our current U.S. retailers as they expand globally and represent an opportunity to build relationships with international retailers and facilitate their U.S. expansion plans." General Growth, in partnership with a Costa Rican developer, is moving into the relatively mature real estate market of San Jose, Costa Rica to develop a 500,000 sq. ft. shopping center that will cost \$70 million dollars. This mall will positively impact the region's economy in terms of added capital because it will require the use of labor and supplies for its construction and also create service sector jobs once the mall is completed. One of the primary forces behind the growth in American real estate investment abroad is the rapid appreciation of the domestic real estate market. The American real estate market has been booming in the last four or five years. The median price for homes in some areas of the country – such as San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles – is easily over half a million dollars. For example, the average price of a Manhattan apartment is US\$880,000. While some investors who jumped into the market before the boom have profited from their initial investments, the appreciation has been so rapid that many Americans have been priced out of the domestic market. To compensate, they look elsewhere for real estate prospects – usually domestically but sometimes on the international market.

If a country wants to attract wealthy real estate investors and help its future economic prospects, the government of that country must take a proactive role in attracting these buyers. For example, Panama has a "20-year suspension of property taxes to those who build houses or renovate in a historic district, and an income tax hiatus for those starting some small businesses." However, when the moratorium reaches the end of its run, it may detrimentally impact the country's real estate investment opportunities because a primary economic incentive for investment would be lost. However, Panama is in the midst of "[c]anal improvements [and] increasing tourism" which could offset the impact of the tax moratorium. Perhaps more important than tax breaks and moratoriums, the government must provide a sense of law and order. A lack of government corruption is a significant incentive for investors to invest within the

country. Unfortunately, Latin American countries are not known for their transparent markets. An employee of Jones Lang LaSalle stated, "Investors who can cope with semitransparent markets, such as Mexico...can make a lot of money.

“... When these wealthy investors move to a country that is relatively poor, the country will reap many economic benefits. Most importantly, the country is going to have new sources of financial capital with the increase in affluent real estate investors. These real estate investors will be spending their money at local businesses and will be paying the local population for certain services. ...”

Mexico is the most advanced real-estate market in Latin America...although the markets are still dominated by local players.” However, sometimes the risks associated with a semitransparent market will not be worth the potential economic benefits. Investors are not going to invest

money in a real estate market that is not bound by the rule of law. It would require a cost-benefit analysis on the part of the real estate investor to determine if the financial risks associated with possible accounting fraud, tax schemes or corrupt officials are less than the possible economic rewards derived from the investment. If there are no mechanisms in place to ensure that one's real estate purchase is contractually and legally legitimate, then a reasonable investor will spend his money elsewhere.

When these wealthy investors move to a country that is relatively poor, the country will reap many economic benefits. Most importantly, the country is going to have new sources of financial capital with the increase in affluent real estate investors. These real estate investors will be spending their money at local businesses and will be paying the local population for certain services. The increase in wealthy investors will be associated with an increase in jobs and businesses in the region. These investors are accustomed to living a certain lifestyle, and they want to maintain their lifestyle into old age. This could include hiring maids or drivers, having specialty grocery stores, or frequenting upscale coffee shops. This will have spillover effects in the region because it will provide the population with more potential employment opportunities.

However, despite these benefits of international real estate investment, a country with investment from abroad may also experience some negative externalities. One of the most pronounced problems will be an increase in economic inequality between the local population and the new investors. It only makes sense that economic inequality will increase because there are wealthy investors moving into a relatively impoverished country, who invest more in new countries than in the United States. If this increase in purchasing power did not exist, there would be little incentive for initial real estate investment. This shift in socioeconomic factors as the divide between the poor and elites increases may potentially exacerbate an already dualistic society, which could cause regional instability in the long run. Real estate development impacts the local environment. While it is possible to create green buildings (structures that minimize their impacts on the surrounding environment), it is significantly more expensive to do so, and this would cut into the profit margin of the developer. The region may experience more water, air and noise pollution as a direct result of

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the new real estate development. Associated with an increase in wealthy investors is a regional appreciation of real estate prices. As the area becomes more developed, it becomes more lucrative for other potential homebuyers. More potential investors will want to buy into the region, which will create more development, which will require more business and services to support the new population. This trend will continue until the region loses its comparative advantage in real estate prices as all the real estate values significantly appreciate, and development spills over to a neighboring albeit cheaper region. This spillover effect will then create a new cycle of international real estate devel-

“... A lack of government corruption is a significant incentive for investors to invest within the country. Unfortunately, Latin American countries are not known for their transparent markets...”

opment in the country. The question remains whether this economic pattern of American real estate investment abroad will continue. There is evidence that the American real estate market is experiencing – in typically cautious real estate jargon – a “slow down” or a “soft landing.” Price appreciation is not maintaining its former rate of 20 percent increases, but instead housing rates are increasing at a much slower, perhaps at even more economically stable rates. This “slow down” is going to have more of an impact on the hottest real estate markets in the United States, namely Miami-Palm Beach, the Los Angeles metropolitan area, San Francisco, Washington, and New York City. It should be noted that there are still real estate markets in the U.S. that are experiencing high rates of appreciation. These are typically second-tier markets that are growing as a response to the high rates of appreciation experienced by first-tier markets as consumers look elsewhere for affordable housing. For example, in a one year period, housing prices increased by more than 27 percent in Virginia Beach, Virginia; 34 percent in Orlando, Florida; and more than 38 percent in the Phoenix metropolitan region. If the domestic real estate market slows down and real estate does not appreciate at the extraordinary rates of the past several years, then perhaps American real estate investors will return to domestic properties, as affordability becomes less of an economic issue. This may in turn cause the amount of American dollars flowing to Latin American countries to decrease markedly.

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VELVET GOLDMINE

L'Égypte Industrielle & The Representation of An Industrial Bourgeoisie

Mostafa Hefny, Project Officer, EBHRC

They couldn't have known back then just how pear shaped things would turn out for Senior Mussolini. In 1927 (1) it was still possible to contemplate the advantages and disadvantages of the man's fascism the without the specter of its eventual brutality. Corporatism [or *corporativismo* in its Italian rendering], the fascistic apparatus in which action is taken by civic assemblies that represent economic, industrial, agrarian, and professional groups in the shadow of strong, autocratic government was examined, without great alarm, as a viable model. Still, they were never entirely fooled by the apparent successes of the Italian experience, noting severe violations of the individual liberties inherent in the system. Thankfully, they noted, these tendencies would likely be mitigated by Senior Mussolini's background: he had been, at one point in his political career, a socialist.

"They" are the Egyptian Industrial bourgeoisie. In the thirty year span historically designated as the liberal era [1922 – 1952] they poured into the space created by the alliances and confrontations of the quasi-independent Egyptian regime, its British overlords, the landed elites who controlled local wealth and a centrist Nationalist movement [represented by Al-Wafd] and cohered themselves into a unified and significant organ of Egyptian politics. It is not just the cubbyhole they

managed to secure in this maelstrom that is significant; as a group, their identifications and allegiances were convoluted by the circumstances of the age to an almost preposterous degree. This was an Egyptian bourgeois class, the majority of which was made up of non-Egyptians. They were economic liberals whose incessant demand was for government intervention. Their demands for tariff protection of Egyptian industry were made in the name of independence and nationalism. Their nationalism was as inflexible as it was delicate; with one hand they stoked the nationalist fire with rhetoric about imperialist hypocrisy, with the other, they calmed what must have seemed to this cosmopolitan group, a dangerous ethnic parallel to the cause. For thirty years, one publication, *L'Égypte Industrielle* or *Misr El-Sina'iya* [Industrial Egypt] distilled the political will of this narrow but ambitious class into an agenda. One would expect the dense intricacy and sensitivities of this group would destroy any cohesiveness of such a publication – yet, and this is what is remarkable, *L'Égypte Industrielle* is perhaps the most consistently representative publication, of any Egyptian grouping in the 20th century.

An important factor is the language. *L'Égypte Industrielle* was the official mouthpiece of the Egyptian Industrial Society [*Gam'iat Al-Sina'yeen Bil Qutr El-Masry*] which from 1930 onwards

became the Federation of Egyptian Industries, an entity that still exists today. First published in 1925, it was, and remained for the four decades that followed, a bilingual publication, in French and Arabic. The most important figure behind the publication, and indeed the society for which it spoke, was I.G. Levi, an Istanbul born graduate of the University of Naples and according to one economic historian of the period "one of the most articulate and knowledgeable proponents of Egyptian capitalism" (2). Articulate he may have been and indeed Levi, as well as being former head of the Egyptian Bureau of Statistics also studied Oriental languages at the University of Naples, but his own background and the list of names of those responsible for the publication in those early years suggests that the language in which the articles originated was French rather than Arabic. If this was indeed the case – and in truth this is difficult to verify – this represents a level of translation of an unusually high caliber. In any case, going through the issues of the magazine's first thirty years of publication, whence it was published consistently eight times or sixteen times a year, one is immediately struck by the silky loveliness of the language. Its exquisiteness is only enhanced by the fact that clarity and economy never seem to have been sacrificed for effect.

On the language employed in political discourse, George Orwell famously wrote the following: "The inflated style itself is a kind of euphemism. A mass of Latin words falls upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outline and covering up all the details" (3) and "Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind"(4). Of course Orwell wrote this of the English language, and though he probably would not have changed his opinion had he been privy to, and able to understand, the language of employed by the Egyptian bourgeoisie in the 20s, 30s and 40s - in which case he would simply have been wrong. The language here is indeed political insofar as it has been carefully designed for the promotion of an agenda, a search for the most potent method of promoting a message, not the most accurate reflection of contemporary reality. Because of this, rather than in spite of it, it is never deceptive; it conveys exactly what the Federation, and the nascent class which it vigorously represented, advocated.

Reading the eloquent advocacy of the Egyptian industrialists then becomes

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
something richer than impotent post modern discourse analysis. The designation of the thirty years that preceded the 1952 revolution as a "liberal era" is a politically loaded observation – often used by those inclined to oppose some of the economically progressive measures undertaken by Gamal AbdelNasser's military regime to create an idealized picture of an era whose dynamism should never hide the fact that its deeply inequitable distribution of wealth was an important factor in its demise. Concurrently one cannot escape the fact that, at least for certain groupings such as the Egyptian industrial bourgeois, an avenue of interaction with other political forces - and the public - existed in a way that accurately reflected an agenda. As such, their publication, insofar as it accurately reflected their interests becomes a valuable prism through which to view the history of the period – inasmuch as it is a true representation of a group, and by inference, a marker of other political and economical developments they were reacting against. It is significant here to note that L'Egypte Industrielle continued to be published by the Federation of Egyptian Industries well into the 1970s. By the time it had arrived at that late date it had become a bureaucratic government document highlighting ministerial decisions and announcing presidential decrees. Since it represented nothing, the need for argument was gone. And so of course was the language. By the late 1980s, the publication had atrophied and died.

Back in the "liberal era", the eloquence of the writers, who for the most part did not sign articles individually – a choice that adds to the impression of a unified political stance – pursued a clear agenda of advocacy. Paradoxically, this is not a mere a pamphlet, but a serious arena where a case is made to a reader the writers diligently strove to convince. Apart from the familiar hagiography of the two monarchs of the period, there is consistent duality in the articles; a praising of the implementation of the federation's demands and urging of more action in favor of local industry. Articles on topics as varied as the economic development of Argentina, a tariff war between France and the United States as well as technical analyses of various sectors of the Egyptian economy are all used to direct the reader towards the position of the industrialists; namely that industrialization is the salvation of country no longer able to survive on agriculture alone. All the articles however are backed up by statistics and are of sufficient integrity as to admit conflict on

issues where purely propagandist inclinations would have favored obfuscation.

Consider the article on Fascism mentioned above. The ambivalence towards Mussolini may strike a reader now as naive, perhaps amusing, but consider also that the corporatist system that was seriously examined in the article was, to a degree, implemented by the Free Officers after 1952 in their designation of the public into professionals, laborers and peasants. Note also that for an article appearing in a journal dedicated to advocacy, no clear conclusions are reached. The very fact that it was a real avenue of political engagement meant that those responsible for the writing of the pieces published in L'Egypte Industrielle actually expected their work to have a resonance beyond the justification of actions already taken [as would later be the case with the regime dominated press that pervades and dictates Egyptian politics today]. In fact what we often find here are markers of political battles initiated as ideas and played out and concluded within weeks of an article's initial publication. Whence the opinions expressed are representative, they are heard, and when heard they are engaged. And if such a context exists, as it clearly did for this publication, even with the attendant and manifest ideological prejudices, a natural standard for the level of argument is enforced on all those who write.

"... what we often find here are markers of political battles initiated as ideas and played out and concluded within weeks of an article's initial publication. Whence the opinions expressed are representative, they are heard, and when heard they are engaged...."



Issue of *L'Egypte Industrielle* dated to November 1st, 1932

“... The designation of the thirty years that preceded the 1952 revolution as a “liberal era” is a politically loaded observation – often used by those inclined to oppose some of the economically progressive measures undertaken by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s military regime to create an idealized picture of an era whose dynamism should never hide the fact that its deeply inequitable distribution of wealth was an important factor in its demise...”

That L’Egypte Industrielle is an invaluable source for the writing of any history of the Egyptian industrial bourgeoisie and Egyptian industry is perhaps intuitive. It also offers another possibility that becomes clearer on following its progression over the decades of its publication. Just as a vividly clear segment of a painting may reveal enough of the content and style to allow an observer to visualize the entire canvas, so is the case

with this vivid representation of an important class in 20th century Egypt. Reaction, fully captured, is exactly congruent to an action completely obscured. This is fruitful when we follow L’Egypte Industrielle’s increasingly profound immersion in the issues of labor rights and Egyptianization laws in the 1940s as its authors grappled with what must have been progressively intense leftist and nationalist pressures that forced them to construct complex arguments in response. The same maybe said of the issue of nationalization, which by the late 1940s had taken on a rabid and unfamiliar urgency on the pages of the magazine. Warning against what was to finally take place over a decade later in the early 1960s, the authors here went about their usual method of presenting the experiences of other states, deliberately, but plausibly, presenting those experiences as ones fraught with pitfalls and failures.

The Economic and Business History Research Center has been granted access to the entire catalog of L’Egypte Industrielle by the Federation of Egyptian Industries. Sifting through the entire collection reveals a clear demarcating line when this publication stopped being a representative organ of a class within Egyptian society and became a press release on the state’s industrial policy by the new regime – that day was not long after 1952. Without looking closer at the thirty years that preceded that date, one would be naturally inclined to accept the widely held assumption that the story of the Egyptian industrial bourgeoisie is one of failure. As later editions of the government controlled version of L’Egypte Industrielle informed its readers – who at this stage were almost certainly state bureaucrats who filed and shelved it – there was no industry of note prior to the revolution. Empirical data would probably not go a long way towards disproving this claim; Egypt, on the eve of the revolution, was not an industrialized country. But look closer at those thirty years when the industrial bourgeois was the most accurately and dominantly represented class of Egyptians in public discourse; Reading old documents can be a peculiar experience; one is struck not so much by the alienness, but the sameness. It is the fact that familiar claims were made, the same positions advocated and that some of the key phrases have survived, that seems out of place. In those velvety arguments of the early L’Egypte Industrielle you will find progressive calls for a nationalist program led by a strong and independent

central government that would commence a program of land reform and import substitution led industrialization based on the tariff protection of Egyptian infant industries. As individuals, the men who wrote in favor of these measures were destroyed by the nationalizations of 1960, but as a group, whose program was adopted by a ideologically heterogeneous group of army officers, 1952 may just have been their greatest success.

END NOTES:

1. Misr El-Sina’iya/ L’Egypte Industrielle: “Al-Hal Al-Fashisti L-Masa’il Al-Amal” [The Facistic Solution to Labor Issues], January, 1927, P 29.
2. Tignor, Robert. State, private enterprise, and economic change in Egypt, 1918-1952. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1984. P 73
3. Orwell, George, “Politics and the English Language”: http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/politics/english/e_polit
4. Ibid

The Third AUC Forum on Economic and Business History of Egypt and the Middle East

May 4-8, 2006

The Economic and Business History Research Centre

held its third annual forum last May.


Inside are synopses of the sessions and topics
addressed in the forum.



Adel Gazareen

Institutional History of the Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI): Recalling the Past

The Federation was created in 1922 as a representative body of the big industrial bourgeoisie. It gained a particularly strong status during the liberal era. A major transformation, however, took place with the advent of the revolution's nationalization policies. The balance of power shifted against industrial capitalists and it is argued that the Federation lost its role as a representative, and lobbying apparatus, of this once powerful economic group. A major turning point was in 1993, with the election of the first president from the private sector since 1952. Since then it seems that the Federation has shifted, considerably, towards more independence from the state.



Bahaa Fayez

During the May Forum, the various heads of the FEI addressed both historical developments and current challenges facing the federation. Issues on the relationship between the state and the current private sector businessmen were addressed. In addition, the session witnessed debates on labour rights and privatization. Among the most critical issues highlighted was the privatization of 'strategic' industries such as the cement industry.




Ellis Goldberg

Research & Development in Egypt: A Receding Horizon?


A plethora of challenges face Research and Development in Egypt. There is a pattern of scattered activities based primarily upon personal initiatives or due to crisis situations, which require fast solutions, and the common element among these initiatives is that they were rarely documented or integrated in a bigger systemic approach towards R&D. These random acts might indicate a tendency towards production rather than a process geared towards the accumulation of knowledge, know how, and experience. Although R&D institutions were created initially to serve industrial projects, it is alleged that they were later altered into entities that produce irrelevant research. In the conference pioneers in the fields of R&D presented a historical evaluation of the status of R&D in Egypt whilst the current head of the National Research Center defended his institutions ongoing plans to integrate R&D and industry.



Ibrahim El-Nur




Galal el-Zorba



Mahmoud Saada



Mohamed Abdel Wahab



Samir Allam

Egyptian Pharmaceuticals & Intellectual Property Rights

As of the 1st of January of 2005, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) came into effect in Egypt. In the period immediately following, there were signs of substantive repercussions. In addition, the Egyptian government is now working towards “TRIPs Plus” provisions of bilateral free trade agreements. So what of the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry? It happens to be one of the older Egyptian industries and has a rather unique course of development inasmuch as multinationals were invited to Egypt by the Nasserist regime, in 1961, in an era when the emphasis was on developing domestic alternatives. Do Egyptian pharmaceutical companies suffer from a lack of vision? Representatives of the Egyptian pharmaceutical companies, human rights body, the government and scientists addressed questions on the future of Egyptian pharmaceuticals, for both producers and consumers.

The Scientist in Public Office

Dr. Mostafa Kamal Tolba shared his narrative of his long vibrant career as a scientist in public office. He was Founding Chairman of the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Research & Technology as well as Founding Director of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). He was also member of the Advisory Councils to the President of Egypt for Economic Development and for Education & Scientific Research. He has authored more than 700 articles, and 95 papers on scientific research and development.

The Industrialist between the Public & Private Domain.

Between the private and public sector, Dr. Adel Gazarin shared his account on Egypt’s rocky road to industrialization. He started working in El Nasr Automotive Company since 1961; first as a planning manager and then factories’ general manager and board member, until he was promoted to become chairman of the board from 1967 to 1984. He was the chairman of Federation of Egyptian Industries from 1983 to 1990. In addition, Dr. Gazarin negotiated several international cooperation agreements between several international automotive companies; such as G.M, Fiat, Iveco, and Renault.



Abdelaziz Ezzelrab



Abdel Moneim Scoudi



Mahmoud Amin El Alim



Bahaa Helmy



Panel of Federation of Industries



Hany Nazer




Mohamed Taymour




Hossam Bahgat



Mahmoud Barakat




Ibrahim Fawzy




Mostafa El-Hadary



Talaat Abdel Malek



Kareem El Sayed



Mohamed I. Fahmy



Naguib Megalli

Between Professionalism & Entrepreneurship: Striking a balance?

Dr. Mahamed Taymour spoke of his experience as one of Egypt's most successful entrepreneurs. He is the founder and board member of EFG-Hermes, Egypt's largest investment banking group, with activities ranging from brokerage and asset management to corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, and privatization. EFG-Hermes is listed on both the London and Cairo Exchanges. Prior to founding EFG, Dr. Taymour was head of Projects Division at the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in Kuwait, where he was responsible for evaluation of lending proposals to member Arab countries.

Perspectives on Contemporary Egyptian Economy: A Discussion of Samer Soliman, al-Nizam al-Qawi wal-Dawlah al-Da'ifah (2005)

Rule in post-revolutionary Egypt has been many things, but always authoritarian. In "Al-Nizam Al-Qawi Wa Al-Dawla Al-Da'eefa" [The Strong Regime and The Weak State], Samer Soliman has proposed the thesis that the method of rule in Egypt has been built on the state patronizing social groups in return for political apathy. In effect, successive political regimes, from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Hosni Mubarak have utilized the expanding state to purchase the political apathy of the masses. In doing this they reinforced the "rentier" character of the Egyptian state and suppressed the political expression of different groupings in society.

Coal Miners in Upper Egypt in 1850s Between State and Foreign Experts

Zeinab Abul-Magd, PhD Candidate, Georgetown University

This article presents an account for a joint Egyptian-European enterprise in Upper Egypt in the mid-nineteenth century. The state undertook a project for coal mining with French miners in Qina in 1850s, which was one of numerous other state enterprises that Khedive Sa'id embarked on during his reign. It was pursued in an age marked in Egyptian history as a period of early economic liberalization, after many decades of state protectionism under Muhammad 'Ali. In the Qina coal mining endeavor, the state was involved with foreign experts and Upper Egyptian workers to search for soft coal during a period when this mineral was a precious

new source of energy for an expanding industrial revolution.

This account shows that the state's desperate search for coal was basically funded from the pockets of Qina's taxpayers and was carried out by conscripted workers from the same province. The mine endured difficulties that made it eventually a failure story, as the official documents portray. Nevertheless, there is so much to learn here particularly about the forgotten history of workers in this period of Egyptian history. The story heavily relies on archival records, mainly the official correspondence of Mudiriyat Qina and other state documents. These archival records depict a vivid portrait of

the state, its workers, and how foreign experts interplayed with them both to shape this episode of Egypt's modern economic history.

Sa'id Pasha and market economy

The state of Sa'id Pasha (r. 1854-1863) is known in Egyptian history as the first to apply policies of liberal economy. He created an active, developmental state that embarked on many enterprises in different sectors, the most famous of which is the Suez Canal. As opposed to Muhammad 'Ali's protectionist and monopolistic political economy, Sa'id took serious steps to liberalize the Egyptian economy.

For the first half of the 19th century, Muhammad 'Ali applied state capitalism that employed agricultural monopolies to establish an advanced manufacturing sector; a policy that disturbed the capitalist industrial centers. Muhammad Ali eventually had to surrender to the hegemonic economic forces in the world economy, basically Britain, and agreed to abide by the Anglo-Turkish "free trade" agreement in 1838. This ended his agricultural monopolies and led to a decline in his industrialization policy. Later on, imperative integration into the world capitalist economy at this time pushed Sa'id Pasha to liberalize Egyptian economy.

Sa'id's liberal state mainly introduced large-scale laissez-passez policy, especially as it appears in the expansion of commercial agriculture oriented to cotton as a main cash crop. He changed land tenure law to allow secured private property in land and to allow foreigners to own landed property in Egypt.

Like Muhammad Ali, Sa'id Pasha employed foreign experts. However, Sa'id had so much faith in these foreign experts that he made them business partners with the state. Sa'id Pasha "sought to develop the country's resources by the promotion of joint Egyptian-European companies like the Nile Navigation Company...All this was expensive enough, but the cost was vastly increased by the growing number of European entrepreneurs and adventurers who were able to exploit Sa'id's friendship and the growing power of the European consuls..." (1). The following story of Qina's coal mine accounts for one of these joint companies doomed to fail.

Coal Mining in Qina

In the age of the industrial revolution, when coal assumed its essential place in the world economy, Muhammad Ali had to run his manufacturing enterprises by oxen imported from the Sudan for the lack of other sources of energy. Muhammad Ali was fond of new experiments suggested to him by French scientists to start new adventures, the most successful of which was the long-staple cotton experiment that opened the door of wealth for Egypt throughout the nineteenth century. In 1820, a French scientist advised Muhammad Ali to search for soft coal in Upper Egypt. The scientist had heard when he came with the French expedition to Egypt more than quarter a century ago that there was soft coal there. As Muhammad 'Ali always welcomed French scientists, he embarked on the venture. The French expert asked the viceroy to heir him as the chief commander for this project. Muhammad Ali granted him the position with all the facil-

"... The difficult search for soft coal failed to yield any fruits, no coal was found. As the hope was disappearing with the passage of time, Sa'id Pasha had to issue a royal decree to terminate the search ..."

ities to begin mining in Qina. The initiative was rather limited, as he was sent with only one assistant. In 1826, the viceroy received a sample from the site that he thought was worthless. However, his adventurous spirit made him carry on the project and send some mining workers and tools to help the French scientist. Muhammad 'Ali kept following the news of the search for what was officially called *ma'dan al-fahm*, until the state gave less attention to the experiment as it was busy with gold extraction in Aswan and soft coal extraction in the Levant under the Egyptian rule. The state kept hiring one French chief commander after the other for *ma'dan al-fahm*, with no satisfying results. The project continued to receive state funding, and payed for foreign mining experts and workers, to look for a high-quality sample even years after Muhammad Ali died (2).

During the 1850s, railways along with other steam engines were introduced in

"... The state kept hiring one French chief commander after the other for *ma'dan al-fahm* (coal), with no satisfying results..."

Egypt, and the state had to import coal to run it. This no doubt made it more important to expand the enterprise. Sa'id Pasha was more determined than his predecessors to find it in order to catch the new technological advancements into Europe. Unlike Muhammad Ali, Sa'id Pasha made business partnership with foreign experts rather than making them merely state employees. He promoted joint Egyptian-European companies, one of which was the renewed Coal Mining enterprise in Qina. Its purpose was to search for potential soft coal mines in the eastern desert between the province of Qina in Upper Egypt and Al-Qusayr port on the Red Sea (3).

1858 witnessed a new momentum that brought this project to life again. It was a relatively big enterprise in its place and time. It employed about 100 persons, including foreign miners, clerks, workers, water carriers, and camel riders. *Khawaja* Doufrice was the state's business partner, but he stayed in Cairo and his deputy miner, *khawaja* Barabrous, managed work at the mining site where he enjoyed executive authorities. The administrative hierarchy of the enterprise began from the governor of Qina on the top, then came the *khawaja* along with a government official, to be followed by the chief camel rider, *shaykh* Zayd Khamis, who was responsible for delivering the workers and guarding them. Workers were at the bottom of this hierarchy (4). Although the terms of the contract of this "company" are not clear in the records, it seems that the *khawaja* contributed to it only by his expertise rather than capital.

The finances of this costly enterprise were evidently burdened on Qina's taxpayers. All the provisions were demanded from and supplied by Qina warehouses, where peasants, artisans, merchants, and other social groups had to submit their dues to the state treasury in kind or cash. The mining administrators requested their daily provisions from the general governor of Qina, who ordered the local warehouses to send them from the reserves or to collect them from the people of the province according to strict deadlines. Such provisions included bread, butter, lentils, baskets, mining tools, wood, water-skins, transport fares, cash for wages, etc (5). Camel riders regularly carried shipments of provisions from the Qina warehouses to the mine. They were paid 12 piasters per kantar, including food supplies for each shipping trip. A group of Bedouin camel riders had to write a petition to the governor of Qina in order to have this food supplies provided to them. The governor granted them food for each trip, but cut it from transport fare that the state had to pay to them (6).

In addition to supporting the mining expenses, Qina's taxpayers had to provide the labour force. Mining workers in the project were all locals of Qina. Through conscripted wage labour, miners, builders, blacksmiths, carpenters, camel riders, and water carriers were recruited. It was still the age of *corvée* work, but wages were paid along with food and transportation supplies for the conscripted laborers. Each sub-province in Qina had to contribute with its share of workers. Conscripted basically took place through the guild chiefs, or the *shaykh al-ta'ifa*. When, for example, there was a need for a number of carpenters, the chief carpenter (*shaykh al-najjarin*) in each sub-province was addressed to send an assigned number of carpenters from the area under his chieftdom. Artisans of each guild were registered by name in the state official files in each area, so they were requested by name also when their turn came for conscription. According to the applied labour law, workers had to be replaced every given time, before they lost their energy and became too fatigued to work, so they could return to their families then. The period they had to work for was not clearly defined, but the workers who were digging canals, for example, had to be replaced, by law, every fortnight. Workers' replacement was carried out in regular terms, but they were not all replaced at the same time. Some workers preferred permanent wage labour at the mine. Workers who wanted to stay expressed their wish to the administrators and they mostly received the permit to do so (7).

After being recruited by the guild *shaykh*, a mining worker had to go through a long, hazardous journey. It was his journey to reach the excavation site in the middle of the eastern desert, undertake the assigned tasks, and return back home safely, if he could make it. First, he had to carry his own work tools, if required, and deliver himself to Hamad Muhammad, the camel rider of the mine, who was officially responsible for delivering him and was acquainted with all the difficult routes in the desert due to his tribal origins. The worker was provided with food for the road, namely one *kantar* of *buqsumat* (crackers). He had to sign a receipt for receiving this snack in order to have it deducted from his future wage. Upon arrival to the mining site, the camel rider had to hand him over to the chief miner, who then would send a letter to the governor of Qina confirming the delivery. The chief miner also had to assign the arriving

worker his tasks at once. After that, two scenarios were to take place: he either liked the job and applied to be hired full time, which he was granted, or he ran away. Running away was a fatal decision to take if it was not arranged with secretive help from an expert camel rider, for the very high chances to get lost and die in the vast desert. Even the most skilled camel riders got lost in the desert in very sad accidents on their way to the digging site. If the worker had enough luck, he would be replaced after a reasonable period before he completely becomes physically unable to dig wells. Eventually he would return home to his family with his wage in hand (8).

In one incident, workers had to protest about the irregularity of their wages. Wages were suspended on some days because of long pauses in digging. It was not possible then for the miners to find some other work in neighboring places to make their living for the lost time: there was nothing around them but desert. Thus, they complained and requested that they get paid all weekdays. The governor of Qina affirmed that it was the responsibility of the enterprise to pay them regular wages and to find them tasks to do on a daily basis. He wrote to the *khawaja* about the new rules of regular payment for the entire week, except for Fridays. Eventually, it was decided that they were to be paid monthly, maybe to persuade them to think twice before running away (9).



Kedive Sa'id

“... the only losers in this entire venture were Upper Egyptian people, who had to pay for the faults of the foreign experts and the wrong decisions of an alleged liberal state....”

As all mining sites in the world in the nineteenth century, work safety was a crucial problem with a high rate of death among mining workers. In Qina's case, the foreign miners chose a specific point to dig a well in hope of finding a rich mine. They taught the workers how to dig. One day, a disaster almost happened when the walls of the well collapsed on the mining workers, but, luckily, nobody was injured. This incident disturbed Sa'id Pasha and he had to convey strict orders to the *khawaja* to find a safe method in mining. Interestingly enough, the *khawaja* was asked to discuss the issue with the workers in order to reach the best technique for digging. He was ordered to agree with the workers on a safe method that should secure their own safety as well as expediting the work. The governor of Qina affirmed, "think with them [the workers] about the appropriate technique until you reach an easy one... [given] that [it] does not delay the course of work and causes no harm to the workers"⁽¹⁰⁾. The new technique reached was to build wooden walls for the well during the digging



Photograph courtesy of:
http://www.pngallery.com/legends/legends10/art/photos/regular/g2_9.jpg

“... After being recruited by the guild *shaykh*, a mining worker had to go through a long, hazardous journey. It was his journey to reach the excavation site in the middle of the eastern desert, undertake the assigned tasks, and return back home safely, if he could make it...”

process to prevent the collapse of sand walls. *Khawaja* Doufric affirmed to Sa'id Pasha that this was the best method that his deputy, Barabrous, had reached to improve the state of work and prevent harm. Wood was shipped from Cairo to Qina's warehouses specifically for this purpose, with firm instructions to the *khawaja* to use them for the safety of the workers⁽¹¹⁾.

A few weeks after the collapse of the well's walls, and without finishing the search in this one well, the *khawaja* began digging another. This raised the concerns of the governor of Qina, so he requested an explanation for the waste of resources. It did not seem that any progress was accomplished.

The difficult search for soft coal failed to yield any fruits, no coal was found. As the hope was disappearing with the passage of time, Sa'id Pasha had to issue a royal decree to terminate the search. The venture was eventually closed six months after the well accident. The decree stated that the state would not positively respond to *khawaja* Doufrice and his accompanying Egyptian miners in accepting their allegation that soft coal existed in Qina. They requested that they continue the search at the state's expense, but Sa'id decisively ended the project⁽¹²⁾. Obviously, the only losers in this entire venture were Upper Egyptian people, who had to pay for the faults of the foreign experts and the wrong decisions of an alleged liberal state.

END NOTES

1. Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914* (London; new York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), p.123.
2. Ma'iya Saniya Turkish, no. 3, 4 Dhu al-Qi'da 1234; Ma'iya Saniya Turkish, 18 Dhu al-Hijja 1241; Diwan Khidiwi Turkish, no. 729, 28 Dhu al-Qi'da 1241 ; Diwan Khidiwi Turkish, no. 779, 5 Rabi' Awwal 1248; Ma'iya Saniya Turkish, no. 67, 28 Rajab 1251; Ma'iya Saniya Arabic, no. 63, 28 Sha'ban 1267.
3. Qina in this article refers to the two provinces of Qina and Isna, as they were then jointly administered by one governor.
4. *Sijill Sadir Mudiriyat Qina and Isna*, 1275, part. 1, 3 Safar, p. 8 and p 26; 7 Safar, p. 14.
5. *Sijill Sadir Mudiriyat Qina and Isna*, 1275, part. 1, 27 Safar, p. 86.
6. *Sijill Sadir Mudiriyat Qina and Isna*, 1275, part. 1, 3 Safar, p. 26.
7. *Sijill Sadir Mudiriyat Qina and Isna*, 1275, part. 1, p. 1, p.10, , p.13, p.38, p.42.
8. *Sijill Sadir Mudiriyat Qina and Isna*, 1275, part. 1, 14 Safar, p. 10 and p. 14; 20 Safar, p. 21; 21 Safar, p. 42; part 4, 27 Rabi' al-Awwal, p.6.
9. *Sijill Sadir Mudiriyat Qina and Isna*, 1275, part. 4, 17 Rabi' al-Awwal, p. 6.
10. *Sijill Sadir Mudiriyat Qina and Isna*, 1275, part. 2, 7 Safar, p. 14.
11. *Sijill Sadir Mudiriyat Qina and Isna*, 1275, part. 2, 19 Safar, p. 21; 23 Safar, p. 42.
12. Awamir Karima, no. 1891, 28 Sha'ban 1275.

Towards a New Egyptian Constitution: Laying Foundations for Economic Growth*

Prof. Samer Soliman, Political Science, AUC.

Egypt's economic crisis is in essence a political crisis. The current constitution hinders economic development not because of the various "socialist" articles from an outdated past, but also because it has been imposed from the top to the bottom and is not the product of societal consensus. A societal consensus over a new constitution must originate through dialogue and consultation from the segments of society. This brings us to the most important socio-economic issues that require consensus for embarking on constitution building.

Tiger on the Nile:

During the early nineties there was some optimism amongst elite circles concerning the state's capability in transforming Egypt into a "tiger on the Nile" – as per the official address at the time. The point was transforming Egypt into an upcoming economic power along the paths of the "East Asian Tigers". It is more evident today than ever, that the optimism of the

90s was not founded upon a solid base. As Egypt enters into the 21st century, it is burdened with various economic predicaments, the most obvious of them being:

First, uncompromisingly high unemployment rates that reveal that investment rates and trends have been incapable of creating necessary employment opportunities.

Second, chronic deficit in the state public budget, treated with further borrowing, which depicts the state's inability to generate revenues that suffice expenditures.

The past years have proven the failure of "economic reform" to remedy these ills.

There is no agreed upon magic solution/definition for "economic reform". The use of the term has been widespread since the early 90s to describe a number of government policies executed in coordination with international financial insti-

tutions in exchange for writing off more than half of Egypt's external debt. Since that time people have come to identify with economic reform as basically the process of economic transition from a state controlled economy to a capitalist economy dominated by individual initiatives. If we choose to use such a definition for reform, then the process was initiated decades before the 90s, specifically in 1974, when President Sadat announced the "Open Door Policy". Although some researchers stress that signs/indications of the market economy date back to the end of the Nasser regime, after the failure of the first five year plan – 1961/66 – in generating sufficient surpluses to finance a consequent five year plan. Those who adhere to such beliefs are inclined to argue that the political economy since that date has been inclined more towards the right, especially since the late 1960s. Such developments as the partial liberalization of external trade (by which the government allowed export/import with external markets) are used as evidence to back this claim.

* Paper presented to Al-Ahram forum for global reform, The Third Conference, February 2006.

In other words, economic reform in Egypt has been in place for over three decades. But until this moment many researchers agree that the Egyptian economic system does not resemble other capitalist economies in the North and South. The government/state continues to interfere in the economic processes despite a partial withdrawal from direct production. Be that as it may, it would be delusional to imagine a capitalist economy dependent solely upon the "blind market forces", i.e. an entire economy's capacity exclusively based on the interaction of the forces of supply and demand with no government intervention. Countries differ based on the varying degrees of economic intervention on the part of political authorities, over and above lays the extent of intervention, its objectives and motives. Is the government intervening to curb harmful effects of the "blind market forces", which might result in environmental degradation? Or is the intervention in place to bequeath vision on the "blind" forces and therefore allow for a specific view of the ruling elites' interests (and those favored by them naturally) and consequentially favoring some over others? Opening loan faucets for some while shutting them down to others. There is consensus amongst Egyptian political economists that the economic sphere in Egypt is governed by the necessities of maintaining the stability of the regime, i.e. security concerns/necessities. And to a large extent this explains the reason why the transition to a market economy has lagged without resulting in sustained and timely capitalist development.

An Economic or Political Crisis?

Without including the political factor in our analysis, we cannot fully understand the reason why a transition to a market economy was not achieved in thirty years. Without including the same political factor, we cannot explain the behavior of the state throughout those years. A timeframe in which the drums were beating to the rhythms of the market economy (whether in the mid 70s or early 90s), the government was actually at the peak of its expansion whether in terms of public sector employment or rate of government expenditure as a percentage of the GDP. The truth of the matter is that the Egyptian system lacks adequate public support; hence political stability is ensured through the increasing power of the state bodies. Such an idea stems from the rationale that those employed by the state would be easier to control, and the higher echelons of society are

loyal to the ruling regime due to its dependence of their direct interests on the ruling regime.

Analysis of the crisis of capitalist development in Egypt is thus based on the nature of the political system in place. The same system of which Nasser had laid down its foundations and basic rules remains in place today. The nature of this system is characterized by a limited social base. During the peak of the July regime in the

"... The July regime never had any strong political parties, even its own party, be it the Socialist Union or the National Democratic Party were nothing but facades, which concealed those actually running the political system..."

early sixties, leaders of the regime only required passive public support. It was only required that the "masses" appear in millions supporting and blessing the decisions of the ruling authority. And they did just so. Which was basically mere passive support of the regime's policies without any actual participation. The July regime never had any strong political parties, even its own party, be it the Socialist Union or the National Democratic Party were nothing but facades, which concealed those actually running the political system.

A Document of the Past:

If Egypt's economic crisis has political roots, then the constitution is of central

importance. The constitution is the most important political document outlining the nature of political life in any country, or so it should be.

We would not be adding much to the debate if we mention that the 1971 constitution is outdated, as it was crafted for a specific time period with its own characteristics. Now after over thirty years since the promulgation of this document, after various changes on the local, regional and global levels, the constitution is rendered a witness to past times. There are many examples to support this argument. To mention but the simplest one, take for example the first article of the constitution "Egypt is a democratic socialist state", whereas Egypt is neither a socialist nor a democratic country. The predicament of the Egyptian constitution is not only a result of outdated articles that do not conscribe to the reality of the times, but also to contradictory and conflicting articles. Take for example Articles 24 ⁽¹⁾ and 25 ⁽²⁾ of the Egyptian constitution, one will notice a striking contradiction: how can there be ownership, whether utilized or unutilized, when at the same time the preceding article states that the people (of course represented by the state) control all modes of production? Let alone the fact that it is physically impossible for the state to control all means of production because these means of production are not limited to mega ones, but also include the shovel or hammer used by craftsmen or farmers.

Neither are the values, rights, objectives, nor liberties enshrined in the constitution, respected from the regime or the state. Look at Article 8 ⁽³⁾ and try to answer this question: Where are the equal opportunities? Observe Article 21 ⁽⁴⁾ and question whether the people's entire capacity or in partiality has been utilized to achieve this objective? What about Article 20 ⁽⁵⁾ referring to free education? Everyone knows that is completely untrue. Parents pay for schools fees and private tutoring, therefore education is not free.

If the constitution is a document from the past, one that induces laughter at times and tears at others; If reading the constitution reminds the reader of rights not respected, and promises and dreams gone unfulfilled, and limitations and restrictions on the executive branch that are breached on a daily basis, why is there so much insistence on not amending the constitution? Why have legislatures not omitted the articles that reduce the constitution to a farce? Why have there not been any attempts to salvage some of the legitimacy of the republic's constitution?

“... . Now after over thirty years since the promulgation of this document, after various changes on the local, regional and global levels, the constitution is rendered witness to past times...”

Some are inclined to explain this as the natural preservation/conservation of the Mubarak regime. Even though Gamal Abd El Nasser and Anwar El Sadat had amended the constitution more than once, Hosny Mubarak has not made any amendments, with the exception of last year's amendment of Article 76, after numerous requests. Nasser had changed the ruling political organization three times: from the Liberation Front to the Nationalist Union and then to the Socialist Union. Sadat managed to change it twice: from the Socialist Union to the Party of Egypt and then to National Democratic Party. Mubarak on the other hand has not ventured to change the system since inheriting it from his predecessor, and continues to govern with it.

Such a cautious preservation of the institutional setting and the rejection of change must be understood within the context of a strategic institutional perspective and not merely the self preferences of the head of state. Institutional changes imply that the relationships between individuals, groups, and organizations will change. Such change eventually generates a state of movement and mobilization, mobilization for resistance and rejection, or mobilization for support, or simply mobilization for the sake of participation. President Mubarak has justified the lack of willingness to change due to a need to maintain stability required for economic development. Stability which physically means that the system of governance will remain static unless for the utmost needs, because movement within the system would entail movement within society. In such a manner stagnation has dominated Egyptian politics and society for over a quarter century.

Socialist or Liberal...That is not the issue

Do the “socialist” articles in the Egyptian constitution hamper the growth of capitalism in Egypt? If we choose to agree with the previous statement then we assume that the Egyptian constitution is pervasive enough to govern the political system in the same manner as it governs the relationships between individuals and the political system. This is an assumption that contradicts the available proof. The system has formulated many laws and policies that have rendered the socialism of the republic mentioned in the constitution as merely ink on paper. When some attempted to use the constitution as means of challenging and opposing the laws and policies of “economic liberalization”, the supreme constitutional court was victorious towards the inclination of the executive powers. The supreme constitutional court interpreted the “socialist” clauses in the constitution in such a loose manner, and thus allowing for policies of privatization and liberalization that do not contradict the “socialist” nature/character of the Egyptian state. As one study ⁽⁶⁾ points out, the rulings of the constitutional court have always been inclined towards the sanctity of private ownership. As well as confirming that the establishment of this court was

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for the purpose of assuring private investors of the existence of an independent institution that protects ownership from the infringements of the executive branch. From here we can reject the exaggerations that make the “socialist” clauses of the constitution as the main impediment towards capitalist development. An impediment, that if passed through substitution with more liberal clauses would suffice to unleash the Egyptian capitalist potential. Just as the “socialist” clauses remained clauses on paper, the regime was capable of formulating liberal clauses that also remain merely ink on paper.

Transition Period

Therefore the problem of the Egyptian constitution cannot simply be solved through a substitution with a constitution that adheres to the reality of the matter at hand. That being: a constitution that acknowledges that the Egyptian economic system is not based on a socialist philosophy. The constitution's main dilemma stems from the fact that it was imposed from above (from a rigid top – bottom structure) like all the other constitutions of the July regime. In democratic systems a freely elected constitutional foundational committee is responsible for creating sub-committees and groups for constitutional formulation. After studying the constitution and amending it as deemed fit, a compromise is eventually achieved over a specific formulation. Constitution building is a highly difficult and time-consuming task. Crystallization of the main values of the state, the main structure of governance including distribution of powers, rights of individuals and groups is not a simple task. What makes constitutional building especially difficult is the need for unequivocal levels of support that exceed by far support levels for laws. Such levels can sometimes reach two thirds of the elected council or two thirds of the votes in the case of a plebiscite/referendum, while laws only require a majority that rarely exceeds 51%. This is not a surprising aspect, as the constitution determines the main characteristics

“... Just as the “socialist” clauses remained clauses on paper, the regime was capable of formulating liberal clauses that also remain merely ink on paper. ...”

of the rules of the game of politics, under which we all proceed, and therefore constitutions should enjoy higher degrees of support than laws.

However the July constitutions have not enjoyed such levels of consensus. The constitution formulation process has been monopolized by a few, who later imposed these constitutions on the public in referendums/plebiscites that would pass with 99% success rates. Therefore all rights and responsibilities enshrined in these constitutions were not the result of compromise from and within the different segments/echelons of society. Rights that come easily are easily forgone. The same applies to responsibilities imposed on citizens without their prior consent, which will rarely warrant any respect for these responsibilities. And so forth, any amendment to the current constitution or the formulation of a new constitution by a limited number of experts is a problem for the regime, and is not likely to fare any better than the 1971 constitution. In other words we will not attain a constitution based on the consent of the majority of society, with the consequential pervasiveness, unless it derives from the bottom gradually through compromise over every clause from popular associations, syndicates, political parties etc. Such a process in turn demands developed political forces that are capable of collecting and compromising between divergent interests, and also capable of sufficiently representing people and groups and communicating on their behalf. Without the existence of such forces, building consent over the constitution will be impossible because it will be comparable to striving to get the entire society to individually sign over

the constitution. This is the main challenge facing the formulation of a new Egyptian constitution. Based on this rationale, the country is in need of a new transition period with adequate essential liberties/rights that are sufficient to allow for the emergence of political forces in legitimate political parties.

The insistence that the constitution emerges from the bottom, as a result of societal approval, does not necessarily entail postponing the discussion of the different clauses of the constitution to an unknown future. Quite the contrary, progress in consensus building over the broad constitutional framework – especially in areas such as the relationship between religion and the state, the socioeconomic role of the state, etc. – is bound to encourage wide segments of society to accept the idea of change. Accepting the idea of change will not necessarily relegate society to the depths of the unknown, when that society has properly debated and discussed the broad outline of a new constitution. Therefore we find that there are certain socioeconomic issues that should be discussed at the moment due to their significance in facilitating the process of societal consent building over a new Egyptian constitution.

Among these socioeconomic issues are:

Basic Rights

The current constitution stipulates the right of private ownership despite some articles of concern. Such articles refer to exploitative capital and un-exploitive capital without defining exploitation. It will not be difficult to achieve consensus over the omission of these articles entirely. The more difficult task will be in achieving consent over the socioeconomic rights of the vulnerable groups (in terms of wealth or power) of the citizenry. Unleashing capitalist capabilities for growth in motion must be in coordination with an agreement over the minimum amount of goods and services that the society (represented in the state) is required to provide for the poor and the unable, in addition to a clear identification of the respective agencies to be charged with such a task. Such basic goods and services include the right to sustenance, healthcare, shelter, basic education. The more difficult matter to settle is the right to employment. The current constitution article 13 ⁽⁷⁾ stipulates the right to employment, however it would be

superfluous to mention that such a right is denied to millions of unemployed Egyptians. Even while the state has (with not much success) attempted to uphold such a right through employment in the public sector through the creation of impractical (illusive) jobs that have further burdened the state with devoid capabilities. The right to employment can be respected through other means while maintaining its value – for it is conscious employment/occupation that has differentiated man from other creatures. Therefore the humanity of the citizen remains lacking if he/she remains in a state of chronic unemployment. Perhaps the new constitution should stipulate that job creation is one of the objectives of economic policy and to further stipulate the need to compensate citizens deprived of their right to employment in manner that can preserve their human rights and dignities. It is unimaginable that the unemployed can be left to fall prey to hunger and destitution. Society today assists the unemployed – one way or the other – or at least provides the absolute minimum to keep them alive. Therefore further organization and planning of this aspect through more collective solidarity – through the state – will not necessarily add further burdens to society. In addition to that, compensating the unemployed has also its merits for economic policy. Such forms of compensation require investigating the citizen's unemployment status, and compiling an updated and accurate informative base about the unemployed. Such an informative base will be the foundation or the basis of unemployment eradication policies and the creation of new job opportunities.

“... The system has formulated many laws and policies that have rendered the socialism of the republic mentioned in the constitution as merely ink on paper. ...”

In all cases, the constitution should deal with employment in a manner so as to restore its value, sanctity and significance as the backbone of the desired economic development in this country. If the value of employment in Egypt has declined, then that can partially be attributed to the wage distribution that is not correlated to the actual services offered in exchange. Reducing the salary/wage gaps/inequalities can also be an objective of the state, at least pertaining to the employees of the public sector. The economic logic does not allow discrepancies in income of the servants of the same state to approach one to ten, let alone one to one hundred in some instances (press institutions to site but one example).

The Central Bank

It has become widely agreed upon in modern financial thinking that the autonomy and independence of the central bank is an important precondition for sound and competent monetary policy. Compliance of the central bank to the government results in intervention in bank policies which could result in expansionary monetary policy with high rates of inflation as repercussions, thus shifting money from the populace to the state. Central bank autonomy has become such a significant matter that many modern constitutions stipulate it in their articles before laws are drafted and thus activating the principle.

Public Budget

The general treasury is the treasury of the people. If the state is responsible for it in terms of supervising and monitoring it should not take for granted that it is only an agent for the people, and thus controlling on their behalf. It is therefore required to provide to the citizens account details with all expenditures and revenues of the public treasury. The practices of the Egyptian government have turned the public budget calculations and the final accounts classified military secrets. Only the general and main budgetary items are published without detail while other items are completely hidden from the public eye. Although the constitution grants the People's Assembly (the Egyptian Legislature – Lower House of Parliament) the right to monitor the budget as stated in Article 115 (8), in practice the People's Assembly has only been allowed to monitor parts of the budget. This has been either the result of "secret" items

and/or the prevalence of expenditures not included in the general budget. Lately, such expenditures have increased greatly to an extent that has rendered the universality of the budget a dubious principle as it is in practice. In addition to remedying the previously mentioned ills, the right to monitor and supervise the public accounts should be extended to include the media and all those who take an interest in the matter. The state until now does not acknowledge the right of society to review the details of the final/concluding budget accounts. In reality it is of great importance to ensure and build confidence in the capabilities and integrity of government officials overseeing the public treasury if the government is to expect compliance of the citizenry to state tax requirements. The primary excuse for tax evasion in Egypt is the belief that the government funds are pillaged by a corrupt few. The return of confidence to the public treasury is an essential prerequisite for the development of the voluntary commitment of the citizens in their participation in funding public goods.

In Conclusion

For the advancement of the Egyptian economy a new constitution must be formulated. A constitution that originates from the bottom and is formulated as the fruit of studies, dialogue, debate, conflict and compromise from and amongst professionals, politicians, and all those with vested interests in public welfare in society and the state. Any constitution imposed from above without the prior consent of the people will not be of much value even if formulated and crafted by the highest caliber of Egyptian constitutional experts. In other words even reaching a constitution lacking in some aspects but is a result of national societal approval is better than a solid and masterful constitution lacking societal consensus. Therefore it is imperative to decide on mechanisms for discussing a new constitution while simultaneously considering the detailed articles/items within that constitution.

Consent over a constitution requires well developed and solid political forces, that can collect and reconcile diverge interests, which represent and act on behalf of the peoples and different groups. Such forces are so crucial for the success of a task such as constitution building, that without them there stands no chance for achieving societal consensus over a constitution. Therefore Egypt requires a transition period during which basic rights and liberties are

made available for the development of political forces that can carry the weight of consent building for a new constitution. The direct commencement of discussions over the broad framework is necessary at the time and has actually begun. In addition to issues such as the relationship between religion and the state and the powers/authorities of the executive branch of government that receive the lion's share of constitutional debates, it is essential that other issues are discussed as well such as socio-economic rights. Even if wide segments of society have agreed upon the notion of the market economy, society has not yet reached a consensus over social and economic rights that the government is required to provide in light of this market economy.

END NOTES:

1. Article 24: *The people shall control all means of production and direct their surplus in accordance with development plan laid down by the State.*

2. Article 25: *Every citizen shall have a share in the national revenue to be defined by law in accordance with his work or his un-exploiting ownership.*

3. Article 8: *The State shall guarantee equality of opportunity to all Egyptians*

4. Article 21: *Combating illiteracy shall be a national duty for which all the people's capacity shall be mobilized.*

5. Article 20: *Education in the State: Educational institutions shall be free of charge in their various stages.*

6. Tamer Mostafa. *Law versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt.* The American bar foundation. 2003.

7. Article 13: *Work is a right, a duty and an honour ensured by the State. Distinguished workers shall be worthy of the appreciation of the State and the society. No work shall be imposed on citizens, except by virtue of the law, for the performance of a public service and in return for a fair remuneration.*

8. Article 115: *The draft general budget shall be submitted to the people's Assembly at least two months before the beginning of the fiscal year. It shall be considered in effect after approval. The draft budget shall be voted upon title by title and shall be promulgated by a law. The people's Assembly may not effect any modification in the draft budget except with the approval of the government. In case the ratification of the new budget does not take place before the beginning of the fiscal year, the old budget shall be acted on pending such ratification. The manner of the preparation of the budget as well as the determination of the fiscal year shall be determined by law.*

Yearning for a Cultural Plateau

Yara Goubran, actress and Program Associate, Contemporary Image Collective.

In trying to promote independent artists, specifically women, the ministry of culture organized a theatre festival for female directors. The aim was to provide the different directors with a chance to show their work to the public. The chosen venue for the festival was initially the national theatre, then for some unknown reason it moved to El Salam theatre on Kasr El Aini st, and yet for another obscure reason, it finally moved to the floating theatre in Manyal. Finally settling on the latter, the festival preparation started taking place. I was part of the performance that was chosen to be performed as the opening show of the festival. We, the cast and crew of the play, went to the theatre three days before the opening to realize that the theatre that has been recently renovated is not at all prepared for a performance, let alone a festival. I must say that the marble entrance was very enchanting. Disappointing, though, was the fact that none of the money used was spent on the stage itself. We quit before the festival started because the theatre was far from being ready to hold a festival.



“... During the 1990s we were at a state of loss as a result of the rise of commercial cinema. We were stuck in between this rising business of the 90s and the void of the 80s”

A lot of Egyptian artists from various disciplines stumble a lot when producing or showing their work. Primarily, young artists face difficulties financing their projects. Some are also faced with the lack of experience and training in bringing things together. Lately, some institutions have been offering young independent artists financial and technical support. The Egyptian independent cultural scene has been subject to many changes as these artists find space to work away from crippling surroundings.

For example, Al-Mawred al-Thaqafy, a non-profit organization, supports artistic creativity in the Arab World and encourages cultural exchanges within the region and the developing world. They provide assistance on many levels, from simply offering funds to creating workshops and organizing different artistic events. They also succeeded in establishing their own performance space, El Geneina Theatre, which unfortunately has been shutdown for security reasons. El-Geneina Theatre was an active and equipped venue that presented music, poetry and storytelling amongst other performances in a unique location.

Equally active is The Young Arab Theatre Fund (YATF), a production fund founded in 1999 to serve independent young artists and directors living and working in the Arab world. YATF aims at encouraging and developing independent theatre and performing arts in the region. They also offer funds, workshops, assist artists in touring in addition to organising different events featuring various Arab

artists. In an attempt to promote arts outside Cairo, they were involved in creating performing spaces in Alexandria and Minia.

The extent by which the independent arts scene in Egypt is growing is quite noticeable. When artists couldn't find assistance from the state or mainstream circles to produce their work according to their standards, they created their own infrastructure.

“We wanted to make films that we liked, not the ones that the producers wanted” said Hala Galal, director and producer. Galal is also a founder of SEMAT, the first Egyptian organization for independent films. SEMAT was established by a group of young filmmakers to make documentaries and short narratives. Its main goal is to create a free artistic trend, parallel to but independent from the existing cinema institution, which uses different forms and patterns of art and production techniques. The aim is to open new channels for free artistic expression, encourage youths to join this field, and stress the role of cinema as a form of cultural expression.

SEMAT was established at a time when independent filmmakers were suffering from the lack of creative freedom caused by the interference from producers in the mainstream cinema industry, which resulted in superficial productions depending on what SEMAT describes as the “Hollywood example in its worst form.” “We were a group of filmmakers and friends who studied and worked together. During the 1990s we were at a state of loss as a result of the rise of commercial cinema. We were stuck in between this rising business of the 90s and the void of the 80s,” Galal said. Galal labels cinema then as one that triggered instincts of apathy and indifference. People would just go in, eat popcorn and chitchat. Why not, Galal said, when viewers can do all of this and still follow the movie. According to her, these circumstances pushed a number of people to discuss the prospects of the industry. They couldn't accept being part of what was going on and they were insistent about creating a space in which to move freely.

To create this space, they needed cameras, editing equipment, crew- basically, an institution. Thus, SEMAT was created, with the aim of producing distinctive films that are not controlled by the mainstream organizations. According to SEMAT, “The films produced should be far

“... Participation in Art & Culture is one of several areas Cilantro is trying to work on in partnership with the youth NGO Nahdet El Mahrousa. Rifky explains, that the program being developed is hoping to reach more people through the Cilantro branches, and involve them in cultural activities and happenings across Cairo.”

from typical in their themes or characters, provide an opportunity for creative innovation of artistic forms, and give expression to neglected community groups” to increase the cinema's role as a tool of raising awareness, and not only for entertainment. Besides producing films, other activities had to take place such as producing bulletins and organizing seminars and screenings.

In the last two years, the mainstream cinema situation has not improved, yet many changes occurred in the independent cinema scene, which was reassuring for SEMAT. According to SEMAT, their objectives are “to increase support for the production of films made by independent filmmakers and create diversity in films. To continue to attract the movie cadres who work independently by executing or contributing to achieving their projects. Also to continue to shed light on the concept of independent cinema and the important role that it can play in enriching the art of cinema, globally.”



Sanaya Park play at the Puppet Theatre in Cairo [al-mawred al-thaqafi (Cultural Resource)]

Currently, more than one channel is available for artists to train, produce and show their work. However, the number of people involved is still quite limited. "Generally, the audience that is interested in culture is not a big one," Galal says. However, she thinks the circle is getting bigger. When SEMAT first started, they were ignored. But now it is different; having some sort of structure creates legitimacy and creates an introduction to a kind of work which cannot be ignored or neglected.

The most recent initiative is a quite promising one in terms of enlarging the circle of audience. That is the cooperation between Cilantro cafe and Nahdet El Mahrousa. According to Sarah Rifky, The Community Program Manager, the reason's behind Cilantro's interest in the cultural scene in Cairo is that Delicious Inc. (now owned by ElSewedy Foods) has developed a very strong interest in social responsibility and has an increasing realization towards the importance of civic

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engagement. Participation in Art & Culture is one of several areas Cilantro is trying to work on in partnership with the youth NGO Nahdet El Mahrousa. Rifky explains, that the program being developed is hoping to reach more people through the Cilantro branches, and involve them in cultural activities and happenings across Cairo.

"Nahdet El Mahrousa has its own art development programs; however the initiative came from Cilantro in December 2005 when they approached El Mahrousa to structure an ongoing Community Outreach program together," says Rifky. The program has both a content component and an activity/event based component. Rifky says that it is the beginning of a slow change which she is hoping to work on and develop in liaison with different cultural entities and institutes. "Through announcing art exhibits and events on 104.2 Nile FM for example, listeners who normally would not be informed about such happenings maybe lured into appearing at more alternative cultural functions," she explains. Also, now that Cilantro, as a well known commercial franchise of cafes is involved, other companies and organizations (for example Cilantro's product supplier) or other affiliates, are starting to be drawn to the activities and the entities which comprise the cultural scene. According to Rifky, it may be a great tool to draw the



Remix: Musicians from six Arab countries meet in Cairo [al-mawred al-thaqafi (Cultural Resource)]

attention of the individuals and companies to the cultural plateau.

There are 6,000 Cilantro visitors on a daily basis, with more than 1,000 people placing take-out orders. This is a huge number of people covering a diverse age and cultural range; from school kids, to businessmen, from undergraduates to young mothers. "By producing a publication such as Cilantro Central and talking about young artists, exhibitions, events, festivals and NGOs which may not be known to them, we are making these events very accessible and very inviting," Rifky says. Finally, as part of the outreach initiative, she explains that the program would like to begin working on highlighting and promoting new, young, and under-represented talents, through the Cilantro Central publication and through providing them with space and support to show case or display their work.

The urge to create an independent space was triggered by artists and concerned institutions to develop the state of the arts in Egypt and the Middle East.

Amidst a heated discussion about whether we were going to perform or not at The Festival for Egyptian Women Directors, one of the festival organizers, who is also an independent female director, gave us a piece of advice. It went like this: "Remember, you are in Egypt 2006."

If it weren't for her tone of voice, I would have thought she wanted us to fight for a better performance space, better equipment, better quality...etc. But she wasn't. She was advising us to settle for the mediocre. Egypt 2006: accept the mediocre, it's better than having nothing at all.



The COLLECTOR:

Metaphysical Angst in a Small Enterprise

Noha Roushdy, Project Officer, EBHRC

Anyone who has ever cared to make a hobby of stamp collecting would tell you how it started off in their childhood when they first started washing stamps off letters, how it was then a leisure interest among schoolmates to trade stamps, and how, eventually, as elders, “there was ‘this man’ who came by my office and got me all the new collections”, one stamp collector recounts. For a good majority of stamp collectors, the hobby ends there. For others, their collections may win them medals in national or international exhibitions. For a person like Alfy Zaglama, the only Egyptian professional philatelist, stamps are more than collections. This man’s relationship to stamps can be described, in his own words, “as a relationship of an addict to opium”.

But Zaglama did not inherit a family shop, or start a profit-making business. Five years prior to his retirement from the Ministry of Justice in the early 1980s, Zaglama bought his office in Emadeldin

street from its previous owner, a Levantine resident in Egypt. “He told me the price he wanted for the entire office including any equipment and its collection of stamps so I got him the amount he asked for a couple of hours later”. Zaglama bought the office, where he would spend his days from 8 am to 1 pm for the next 30 years, for around 15 thousand LE. It’s a small room with his desk, a smaller desk for his assistant, and three cupboards with all the albums. The Egyptian albums are situated right to his back, and all the others, labeled by country, in the other two cupboards facing his desk. It’s an extremely simple and intimate place that creates an almost typical atmosphere for “old stamps”.

“Old and new”, however, is not the criterion that sets the value of a stamp but the all too familiar rule of supply and demand. It is the scarcity of a particular stamp and not its age that increases the demand for it, and hence its price. Tiny variations between stamps, unde-

tectable to the untrained eye, make up vital differences for the philatelist, or the person whose primary concern is with the study of rare stamps, and not necessarily their collection or acquisition. Variations appear in the shades of color, paper, and level of damage compared to the original copy. Others are detected on the pictures and forms drawn on the stamp. Some variations are even made intentionally by postal authorities to increase the value of certain stamps.

“... This man’s relationship to stamps can be described, in his own words, “as a relationship of an addict to opium””

“... There are people everywhere, who fill their time, or what they believe to be their spare time, by collecting stamps, coins, medals, etc... and they probably do so out of something that we might call metaphysical angst, perhaps because they cannot bear the idea of chaos being the one ruler of the universe....”

For instance, in 1953, a member of the revolutionary corps of 1952 gave orders to make so-called overprints of three horizontal lines on old stamps that were issued under the monarchy to smear the picture of the late King Farouk of Egypt on the stamp. Subsequently, overprints of six, nine and vertical lines were issued and collectors hurried to acquire the different prints. Another example of rare Egyptian stamps is King Farouk's special collection of stamps, which comprised sheets of the same stamp in different colors that were not given out to the public but remained among his personal collection. It was his habit to make orders for printing one stamp in several colors; admitting only those sheets he favored to the public, while keeping the rest to himself.

For a philatelist, like Zaglama, one is adjudged a serious hobbyist rather than mediocre, by the depth of his study of the history of the stamps he is looking at. “But these are a few”, Zaglama reveals, “The hobby of stamp collecting is an

expensive one that fewer and fewer Egyptians can afford every day”. The society of stamp collectors has been abandoned to unregistered traders whose primary concern is to make profit out of stamps. While Zaglama affirms that honest unregistered traders do exist, it is nonetheless easier for an amateur stamp collector to be deceived by forgeries that only philatelists can detect, ones that only honest traders can expose.

During my visits to his office, I came across some of the clients he deals with. It was an interesting experience to observe how much people from all walks have come to share in this niche world. One of Zaglama's visitors was an owner of a simple car agency who sought out Zaglama's stamp collections of foreign countries. Judging from Mr. Zaglama's friendly but unconcerned attitude towards this customer's choice of stamps and their pricing, I could tell that he didn't think very highly of this customer's dedication to stamp collecting. “No, he is not a trader. But he only cares to collect foreign stamps”, Mr Zaglama informed me. Another visitor to the office was a public official in the ministry of interior who seems to have a special interest in currency and has come to see Mr. Zaglama for some special bills. I was given my first one Egyptian pound coin during that visit. Some of the visitors come all the way from the governorates and hang out at the office for the day, while another, a middle-aged Sheikh, who makes his own business out of stamps came to buy a few from Mr. Zaglama. While he was in the office, Mr. Zaglama asked him for a special stamp, the one issued on the occasion of the opening of the Suez Canal, that a foreigner has asked him for, and which he couldn't find anywhere. The Sheikh made a call for him, apparently a shared acquaintance, who seemed to have one of these stamps. The incident showed me how very informal the business works and how small its circle seems to be.

There remain only two officially registered stamp traders in Cairo, who pay taxes on their business of stamp selling. That was Zaglama's primary ground for buying his office. He did not wish to “work in the dark” and preferred to make a serious and established occupation after his retirement. Perhaps his willingness not “to be put on the shelf after retirement”, to use his own words, was the main objective behind Zaglama's endeavor. The office hardly makes any

profit. It does, however, cover its expenses and that seems to be all what Zaglama is concerned with.



Egyptian postage stamps, with the King's face overprinted.

“... The history of stamps offers an extremely interesting and unusual perspective to the study of history, especially for those concerned with its politicization....”

Mr. Zaglama doesn't foresee any future for his business. None of his family members took up the hobby, so he doesn't even wish to spend huge sums on a collection knowing that it will end up in the hands of greedy traders, or in the back of a dusty storage room. It's interesting to see how some people make use of their simple hobbies at the right time for the right purposes. Alfy Zaglama's livelihood seems to be something of a laborer's utopia, where, in reference to Karl Marx's theory of estranged labor, the realization of a person's labor is far from an objectification. He is not alienated by his labor, but creates it with a personal and spiritual attachment. The man, his labor, and the product of his labor become one friendly unit serving, primarily, the man but also the product, whose labor is only for the personal fulfillment of the work-

“... ‘Old and new’, however, is not the criterion that sets the value of a stamp but the all too familiar rule of supply and demand....”

er. Of course, Marx's theory on alienated labor may not technically fit into the context of Mr. Zaglama's leisure business. Needless to say, that it does have a personal effect on its observer, who not enjoying the privileges of retirement, finds himself closer and closer to the right context. Yet, the significance of stamp collecting and stamp trading does not stop with reference to informal business or a job for leisure. The history of stamps offers an extremely interesting and unusual perspective to the study of history, especially for those concerned with its politicization as some of the examples previously mentioned in this article indicate. It, furthermore, sheds light on the anthropological development within the culture of leisure and interests among Egyptians throughout the past century and its relationship to an overall changing social, economic and political structure. How people spend their free time today is naturally different from how they have spent it twenty years ago, or forty years ago. However, if we consider what interests are shared within a community at a certain period given its economic, social and political circumstances and how these interests change over time and space and what are the factors that bring about these differences, one would see that the laptop on Mr. Zaglama's desk shouldn't limit us into assuming that modern technology, for instance, the only natural hindrance to such a "royal" hobby, is, on the contrary, spreading it. It is interesting to note that most of the "once collectors" that I talked to seem to believe that stamp collecting is obsolete and look back at their days of stamp collecting with nostalgic reference to the golden past where stamp collecting was a common hobby among people. Is it perhaps the individual practice of a hobby like stamp collecting, or reading, for instance, that seem to be losing ground within our culture or is it really only the material cost of this hobby, as Mr. Zaglama believes, that the society of stamp collectors is shrinking.

In effect people everywhere continue to collect the strangest objects. In his novel, *All the Names*, Jose Saramago had his special analysis for this humane habit, he wrote,:

“There are people like Senhor Jose [the main character who collects newspaper clippings on famous people] everywhere, who fill their time, or what they believe to be their spare time, by collecting stamps, coins, medals, etc... and they probably do so out of something that we might call metaphysical angst, perhaps because they cannot bear the

idea of chaos being the one ruler of the universe, which is why, using their limited powers and with no divine help, they attempt to impose some order on the world, and for a short while they manage it, but only as long as they are there to defend their collection, because when the day comes when it must be dispersed, and that day always comes, either with their death or when the collector grows weary, everything goes back to its beginnings, everything returns to chaos”

If we were to follow Saramago's logic, could we presume that, given the economic, social and political context affecting contemporary Egyptians, fewer and fewer people (specifically residents of Cairo!) believe that they may have any "limited powers" over the infringement upon order by the shrieking hegemony of chaos in simple comfort of collecting objects?

Lives of Struggle and Commitment to Social Justice



Youssef Darwish
(October 2, 1910-June 7, 2006)

**Ahmed
Abdalla Rozza**
(January 15, 1950-June 6, 2006)



When I last saw Youssef Darwish ten days before he passed away he was full of life, fully alert, and as engaged in politics as he was the day I met him in 1986.

Darwish was born to a Karaite Jewish family of modest means in 'Abbasiyya. His father was illiterate but made sure that his children received a first-rate education. In 1929 Youssef graduated from the Ecole des Frères. In 1930 he went to France to study commerce and then law.

There he met the Communist Party of France in the heyday of Stalinism and embraced orthodox communism. Returning to Egypt in 1934, Darwish joined the anti-fascist, anti-war Federation of Peace Partisans (Ittihad Ansar al-Salam). Several of its members became leaders in the renewal of Egyptian Marxism, which had been harshly suppressed by the first Wafd government in response to a militant strike movement in Alexandria in 1924 led by the first Communist Party of Egypt.

Paul Jacot des Combes, a Swiss citizen with links to European communists, encouraged Darwish and two other young Egyptian Jews, Ahmad Sadiq Sa'd and Raymond Douek, to move beyond the mainly foreign milieu of the Peace Partisans and organize Egyptians. Their first independent activi-

ty was a literacy project in the village of Mit 'Uqba. Sadiq Sa'd and Douek worked mainly among intellectuals. They, along with Ahmad Rushdi Salih, were the animators of the Marxist periodical, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (New Dawn), which appeared from May 1945 to July 1946.

Through his work as a labor lawyer, Darwish became the group's main link to the working class. He encouraged Muhammad Yusuf al-Mudarrik and other trade union activists who sought independence from the tutelage of the Wafd and other political forces in the late 1930s. Since the nationalist uprising of 1919 various *effendiya* as well as "the prince of the workers," 'Abbas Halim, sought to harness the labor movement to their political agendas. Through Mudarrik, Darwish met and forged close relations with Taha Sa'd 'Uthman and Mahmud al-'Askari, the leaders of the General Union of Mechanized Textile Workers of Shubra al-Khayma. These textile workers, along with the urban transit workers, became the center of gravity of the post-World War II radical current in the Egyptian trade union movement.

Textile workers formed the social base of the Workers' Committee for National Liberation and its weekly newspaper, *al-Damir* (The Conscience) established in 1945. The WCNL proposed that the working class should now lead the national struggle because of the failures of all other forces since the 1919 Revolution. Although he was instrumental in its establishment, Darwish did not sign the program of the WCNL because he was not a worker – a small detail that reflected his commitment to building the leadership of actual workers rather than those who claimed to represent them. This program expressed the common understanding, of Egyptian Marxists of the time that their Marxism was an expression of nationalism. Darwish became a fervent nationalist during the 1919 Revolution. "Sa'd Zaghlul was my hero...When he died in 1927, I wore a black suit for one month and continued wearing a black tie for a year (1)."

The fusion of the nationalist and labor movements was expressed by the militant strikes in Shubra al-Khayma in late 1945 and early 1946, while a student movement demanded abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the evacuation of all British forces from Egypt. These strikes injected the theme of social justice into the nationalist movement, a development symbolized

“... His willingness to get his hands dirty with the unglamorous tasks of political organizing made Darwish exceptionally successful among the Egyptian Marxist intellectuals who sought to form ties with the emergent industrial working class in the 1940s and 1950s”

by the formation of the National Committee of Workers and Students. The NCWS organized a general strike and demonstration on February 21, 1946 demanding full evacuation of British forces from Egypt.

His willingness to get his hands dirty with the unglamorous tasks of political organizing made Darwish exceptionally successful among the Egyptian Marxist intellectuals who sought to form ties with the emergent industrial working class in the 1940s and 1950s. He devoted himself to the practical daily work of serving as legal counsel for dozens of trade unions representing tens of thousands of workers. During the two decades of our personal friendship, I met several former trade union leaders in his home, long after he ceased to be active in this arena. They clearly retained deep feelings of respect and affection for him.

From the 1940s to the 1970s Darwish was arrested repeatedly. Nonetheless, he found the time to marry his wife, Iqbal, in 1947. He had two children, Mugahid and Nawla. The political highlights of this turbulent period include the formation of the Workers' Vanguard for Liberation in 1946, the first formal Marxist organization in which Darwish participated

“... Abdalla is a political being of a different time and temperament. He was shaped by the global new left of the 1960s and early 1970s, which rejected both anti-communism and pro-Soviet orthodoxy.”

as a leader. His work with trade unions was largely responsible for the high proportion of workers among the membership. Darwish, Sadiq Sa'd, and Douek, unlike the great majority of Egyptian communists, opposed the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. They were prominent leaders of the Workers and Peasants Communist Party established in 1957. When the three main currents of the Egyptian communist movement united in 1958, the WPCP probably brought the largest number of workers into the united Communist Party of Egypt. Nonetheless, the intellectual leaders of al-Raya, the organization favored by the French and Italian Communist Parties despite having far weaker links to the working class than either of the two other groups, demanded that Jews be excluded from the leadership of the new party (the fact that the three had formally converted to Islam was considered irrelevant).

Over the objections of many workers, and though they opposed this demand in principle, Darwish and the other Jewish members of the new party acceded in the name of unity. Darwish and most of the other communists were jailed from 1959 to 1964. Although he was one of the oldest in jail, Darwish was respected for his physical strength and perseverance in the face of tortures and privation. The nationalist achievements of the Nasser regime and its alliance with the Soviet Union resulted in a decision to dissolve the two Egyptian communist parties (there had been yet another split) in 1965. While Darwish supported the anti-imperialist positions of the regime, he believed that the working class needed its own political party. Hence, he opposed the dissolution decision and became active in efforts to re-establish the Communist Party of Egypt.

For this he was arrested yet again in 1973. After the 1973 war he and Iqbal left Egypt for Algeria. The Communist Party was officially re-established in 1975. From 1980 to 1986 Darwish served as its representative to the Cominform in Prague.

Among his most important contributions after returning to Egypt was supporting and advising the Center for Trade Union and Workers' Services in Helwan. The center was formed by Kamal 'Abbas and others after 'Abbas was fired for leading wildcat strikes at the Iron and Steel Company in the mid-1980s.

Darwish was dismayed that the Communist Party conciliated with the regime of Hosni Mubarak by supporting it

against political Islamists. Consequently, he split and helped establish the People's Socialist Party. However one judges the efficacy of this action, it expresses his lifelong understanding that democracy and social justice cannot be granted by elites but must be won through popular struggles. To the day of his death Darwish maintained, "Marxism cannot be dismissed because the Soviet Union has become history...Marxism will survive as long as there are the exploiters and the exploited" (2).

“... The generations of Youssef Darwish and Ahmed Abdalla made historic contributions to the struggles for national independence, democracy, and social justice in Egypt. Today's challenge is to find a new language, new organizational forms, and new alliances appropriate to the current situation.”

Youssef Darwish and Ahmed Abdalla passed away within a day of each other. Abdalla is a political being of a different time and temperament. He was shaped by the global new left of the 1960s and early 1970s, which rejected both anti-communism and pro-Soviet orthodoxy. The main arena of his early struggles, like much of the new left, was the university campus. He was an energetic and creative leader who ultimately forced President Anwar al-Sadat to acknowledge him, even if only to proclaim that he would not negotiate with Rozza. Like Darwish, Abdalla spent much of the

1970s and 1980s in political exile, earning a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge. The chief product of this period is the first of his many books: *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, 1923-1973*. The title indicates the new left's openness to the radical potential of strata other than the working class.

Some years after Abdalla returned to Egypt, he established Markaz al-Jeel, a center for working class children in 'Ayn al-Sira, where he was born. Abdalla believed that educating the children he worked with to be curious, critical, and broad-minded was the most important socially transformative activity one could do in Egypt. I remember a conversation at the center with a twelve year old girl about the difference between Zionism and Judaism. She had more sophistication on the subject than some journalists three times her age – a testament to Abdalla's success as an educator.

The passing of Youssef Darwish, along with that of Mohamed Sid-Ahmed a few months earlier and Nabil al-Hilali a week later, marks the end of an era. From the 1940s to the 1960s the Egyptian left tried to link anti-imperialism and the struggle for social justice in a cosmopolitan and internationalist framework. That project was overwhelmed by pan-Arab nationalism.

The limits of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism were highlighted by the defeat of 1967 and the subsequent student-worker struggles of the early 1970s in which Ahmed Abdalla became prominent. His passing too marks the end of an era.

The generations of Youssef Darwish and Ahmed Abdalla made historic contributions to the struggles for national independence, democracy, and social justice in Egypt. Today's challenge is to find a new language, new organizational forms, and new alliances appropriate to the current situation. The lives of Youssef Darwish and Ahmed Abdalla exemplify the combination of continuity and innovation this challenge demands. Unlike many of Egypt's left intellectuals, neither came from a wealthy background. Their political visions were forged in grass roots work on the basis of equality with the people whose causes they served.

END NOTES:

1. Rady, "Youssef Darwish: The courage to go on," Al-Ahram Weekly, 2 - 8 December 2004.
2. Ibid.

OUR ARCHIVES...

The following are samples of the documents contributed to EBHRC to be part of its archival depository. Donors of documents vary from individuals to institutions. In addition documents received vary from original to copy forms and some old documents were purchased from a collector of old papers and artifacts in downtown Cairo. Donor name followed by a description of the documents will be found below:

Aziz Sidqi:

Ministry of Industry Publications:

1. "al-Thawra al-Sina'iya fi 'ahad 'ashar 'aman 1952-1963." (Eleven Years of Industrial Revolution).
2. "Dailil al- Sina'a fi Misr fi thalathin sana 1952-1982" (Guide to Industry in Egypt in 30 years).

Banque Misr Publications

1. Sixtieth Anniversary 1920-1980.
2. Diamond Jubilee 1920-1995.
3. Golden Jubilee 1920-1970.
4. Part 3 of Talaat Harb's collection of speeches 1939.

Café Riche Documents,

Official Documents:

1. Maslahit il-Dara'ib il-'Aqariyya records 1905
2. Official copy of Maslahit il-Dara'ib il-'Aqariyya records 1907.
3. Récépissé de déclaration pour un établissement public: 16 October 1914.
4. Formal Declaration to the Office of the Assistant to the Chief of Police: 9 May 1916.
5. Déclaration pour l'ouverture d'un établissement public: 9 May 1916.
6. Inspection Report: 16 May 1916: Chief of Abdin Police Precinct.
7. Internal Note: Cairo City Police: For/Commandant C.C.P.: 8 July 1919.
8. Internal Note: Confidential: Commandant C.C.P.: For/Acting Commandant C.C.P.: 20 July 1919.
9. Contract: 14 July 1921, Déclaration pour l'ouverture d'un établissement public: 4 November 1942.
10. Petition submitted by Mr. Abdel Malak Mikhail Salib: 22 May 1962, which cites the transaction contract with Avayianos, registered in 1962.
11. Letter from Russell Bey to Camp Commandant of the British Officers, Head Quarters: 26 February 1918.

Mohammad AbdelAziz Zayed

Papers/Reports:

1. Muzakira bi-Sha'n 'usus al-Tijarah al-Dakhiliyya wa al-Khariyya fi al-Mujtama' al 'Ishiraki al-Dimokrati al-Ta'awuni (Memo Re: Foundations of Internal and External

Trade in the Socialist Democratic Cooperative Society 1959).

2. Bahth 'an Wasa'il Tanmiyyat al-Tijara al-Dakhiliyya wa Mada al-Nuhud Biha (Paper on the means for Developing Internal Trade and The Extent of Promoting It) 1961.

3. Taqrir 'an Rihlat Mohammad AbdelAziz Zayed Ra'is Majlis al-'idara lil-kharij 'an al'Mudda min al-'usbu' al-akhir min 'uktubar hatta al-'usbu' al-Thalith min December Sanat 1965 (Report on Mohammad AbdelAziz Zayed's [Chairman of The Alexandria Commercial Company] Trip Abroad [Duration: Last Week of October 1965 – Third Week of September 1965]).

4. Taqrir 'an Rihlat Mohammad AbdelAziz Zayed Ra'is Majlis al-'idara ila al-Yaban wa al-Wilayat al-Mutahida wa al-Miksik (Report on Mohammad AbdelAziz Zayed's [Chairman of The Alexandria Commercial Company] Trip to Japan, The United States and Mexico [Duration: October/November 1966]).

5. Taqrir 'an Rihlat Mohammad AbdelAziz Zayed Ra'is Majlis al-'idara lil-'aswaq al-Qutniyya fi 'urupa al-Gharbiyya (REPORT Mohammad AbdelAziz Zayed's [Chairman of The Alexandria Commercial Company] Trip to The Cotton Markets in Western Europe [Duration: June 1968]).

6. Taqrir 'an Ma'rad Suq Bari b-Italya (REPORT The Bari Exhibition, Italy [September 1970]).

7. MINESTERIAL ORDER: The order is the permission granted to Zayed to attend the Bari Exhibition as Deputy Governor of the Central Bank. *Dailil al-Wukala' al-Tijariyyin bil-Iqlim al-Misri*, 1960 (Directory: Trade Agents in the Egyptian Province, 1960.) The directory is published by "The General Union of Chambers of Commerce"

Purchased Documents:

1. Land Contracts: Three land contract registered in the court of Alexandria in 1889, 1890 and 1893 under the Khedives' government.
2. Stock Certificates: Credit Foncier Egyptien 1951, Societe de Biere "Les Pyramides" 1956, Egyptian Federation for Agricultural Products 1943. Receipts: Three receipts from the Piastre Project for the Revival of Egyptian Industries (*mashru' il qirsh*).
3. Letter from Michel Politis to Assistant to the Chief of Police: 9 May 1916.

ORAL HISTORY RECORDS:

Below is a list of EBHRC's oral history interviewees. The list excludes the interviewees of the Young Scholars projects.

INDUSTRY, OIL, AND PUBLIC POLICY

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Dr. Mahmoud Helal
Eng. Abdel Moneim Khalifa
Dr. Rouchdy Said
Eng. Ibrahim Salem Mohamedein
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Mr. Fouad Sultan
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