

**CREATING TURKISHNESS: AN EXAMINATION OF TURKISH
NATIONALISM THROUGH GÖK-BÖRÜ**

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CREATING TURKISHNESS: AN EXAMINATION OF TURKISH NATIONALISM
THROUGH GÖK-BÖRÜ

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NATIONALISM THROUGH GÖK-BÖRÜ**

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Abstract

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Güldeniz Kıbrıs

History, M.A. Thesis

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This M.A. thesis attempts to exhibit the cross-fertilization between the Pan-Turkist and Kemalist varieties of Turkish nationalism through their definitions of ‘Turkishness.’ In the same vein with contemporary nationalisms, the late Ottoman/Republican nationalist elite created ‘Turkishness’ by referring to a mythical past. In that creation process, the Pan-Turkist and Kemalist nationalist discourses historically developed in the same pool and used similar intellectual sources. Though their ultimate goals were different, the two varieties scrutinized very similar racist and nationalist references in their imaginations of Turkish identity as racially superior.

In the name of revealing the similarities and differences, a Pan-Turkist journal, Gök-Börü [Grey Wolf] has been examined. Published and edited by Reha Oğuz Türkkân, the journal appeared between 1942 and 1943 as a byproduct of the special aggressive international environment. A discourse analysis shows that like the Kemalist elite, writers of the journal emphasized the superiority of the Turkish race the difference being that in order to ‘prove superiority,’ the latter highlighted the uniqueness of the Turkish race whereas the former put fingers on the similarities with the ‘Western’ civilization. Thus, it has been argued that Gök-Börü’s Pan-Turkist discourse was not a deviance from the official ideology of the Kemalists; instead it was complementary to it. Combining theories of nationalism with practice and focusing mainly on similarities among different varieties, this thesis offers an examination of Turkish nationalism from a broader and continuous historical perspective.

Keywords: Turkish Nationalism, Racism, Gök-Börü, Turkish History Thesis, Second World War.

Özet
TÜRKLÜĞÜ YARATMAK: GÖK-BÖRÜ ÜZERİNDEN BİR TÜRK
MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİ İNCELEMESİ

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Bu çalışmada, Pan-Türkçü ve Kemalist ‘Türklük’ tanımlarından yola çıkılarak, Türk milliyetçiliğinin bu iki çeşidi arasındaki karşılıklı beslenmenin sergilenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Diğer milliyetçiliklerinde olduğu gibi, Türklük kavramı da geç Osmanlı/erken Türkiye Cumhuriyeti milliyetçi elitlerinin mitsel bir geçmişe atıfta bulunmasıyla yaratılmıştır. Bu yaratım sürecinde, Pan-Türkçü ve Kemalist milliyetçi söylemler tarihsel olarak aynı havuzda gelişmiş ve benzer entelektüel kaynaklar kullanmışlardır. Nihai amaçları farklı olmasına rağmen, Türk milliyetçiliğinin iki çeşidi de Türk kimliğini ırksal açıdan en üstün bir şekilde tahayyül ederek neredeyse aynı milliyetçi ve ırkçı referansları kullanmıştır.

Sözü edilen benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları açığa çıkarmak amacıyla, 1942-1943 yılları arasında İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın yaratmış olduğu agresif siyasi ortamın bir yan ürünü olarak ortaya çıkmış, Reha Oğuz Türkkkan tarafından basılan Gök-Börü isimli Pan-Türkçü dergi örneklem olarak kullanılmıştır. Derginin söylem analizi gösterir ki; Kemalist elit gibi Gök-Börü yazarları da Türk ırkının üstünlüğü vurgulamıştır. Vurgulamadaki fark şöyledir; Kemalistler Türklerin Batı kadar üstün olduğunu kanıtlamaya çalışırken, Gök-Börü Türklerin kendine has ve üstün olduğunu anlatmaya çalışır. Bu çalışmada farklılıklar da belirtilerek, Gök-Börü’nün resmi ideolojiden bir sapma değil; aksine onun bir tamamlayıcısı olduğu savunulmuştur. Milliyetçilik teorilerini pratikle birleştiren ve farklı varyasyonlar arasındaki benzerlikleri özellikle vurgulayan tez, Türk milliyetçiliğinin geniş ve devamlılık arz eden tarihsel bir incelemesini sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Milliyetçiliği, İrkçılık, Gök-Börü, Türk Tarih Tezi, İkinci Dünya Savaşı

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To my family.....

*“(iřret, oyun, iffetsizlik, tembellik, eğrilik, zulümkarlık)
bu fenalıklar havada, denizde ve karada yapmayacağıma, yapanları gücümün yettiđi, dilimin
döndüđü kadar yaptırmamaya çalışacağıma namusum, vicdanım, şerefim, hulasa, vatanım ve
Türklüğün adına and içiyorum.
Ömrüm oldukça bu sayılı fenalıklardan herhangi birini işlersem ve başkalarının fenalıklarını da
usanmadan, asla fütur getirmeden telkin ve tatlılıkla men'e çalışmazsam gökler başıma yıkılsın,
dağlar beni ezsın, yerler beni yutsun, ırmaklar ve denizler beni boğsun. Hasılı her türlü felaket beni
yok etsin.”*

Nuri Demirađ Gök Okulu Öğrencileri Andı -1943

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INTRODUCTION:

“Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister on the bank and of having nothing to do: once or twice she had peeped into the book her sister was reading, but it had no pictures or conversations in it, ‘and what is the use of a book,’ thought Alice, ‘without pictures or conversations?’ So she was considering, in her own mind (as well as she could, for the hot day made her feel very sleepy and stupid), whether the pleasure of making a daisy-chain would be worth the trouble of getting up and picking the daisies, when suddenly a White Rabbit with pink eyes ran close by her. There was nothing so very remarkable in that; nor did Alice think it so very much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to itself ‘Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!’ (when she thought it over afterwards it occurred to her that she ought to have wondered at this, but at the time it all seemed quite natural); but, when the Rabbit actually took a watch out of its waistcoat-pocket, and looked at it, and then hurried on, Alice started to her feet, for it flashed across her mind that she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket, or a watch to take out of it, and burning with curiosity, she ran across the field after it, and was just in time to see it pop down a large rabbit-hole under the hedge. In another moment down went Alice after it, never once considering how in the world she was to get out again.”

Thus, with these celebrated lines, begins the novel *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* by Lewis Carroll. As befits that title, the tale is about the trip of Alice, who follows a White Rabbit to the wonderland and meets there many imaginary characters. Until the very end of the tale, the reader fails to realize that the wonderland and the characters are in Alice’s mind. In reality, Alice created this imaginary atmosphere thanks to her imagination power, and also by taking some elements from the actual life and magnifying them. In fact, it is this mindset of magnifying, selecting from the reality and also sometimes transforming the image into reality which formed the discourse of *Gök-Börü*, a racist journal, published in Istanbul between 1942 and 1943 by Reha Oğuz Türkkan, a leading Turkish nationalist-racist.

Aggressively contributing to attempts for defining ‘Turkishness’ through resonating them with the irredentist aim of ‘uniting all Turks,’ the cadre of *Gök-Börü* imagined the ideal ‘Turk’ as a member of the highest race amongst all ‘other’ human-beings and as the developer of the earlier civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt. While creating this image, what the authors basically scrutinized was the Turkish History Thesis and its linguistic counterpart, the Sun-Language Theory of the 1930s. They, however, incorporated these sources into an anti-westernist ideological structure which highlighted the uniqueness of the Turkish race. On the other hand, the Kemalist emphasis was on the similarities with the Western civilization. The point is that for reaching their ultimate goals, they made very similar references through a continuous

emphasis on the ‘superiority of the Turkish race.’ This was not surprising since the two versions were both fed up from the same sources; therefore although their ultimate goals were different, their political strategies and starting points were the same; racial superiority. Thus, in the history of Turkish nationalism, the picture drawn by *Gök-Börü* is not a deviance or an exception that can simply be explained as one of the political maneuvers of the Second World War or a result of an effective foreign propaganda in Turkey. Instead it was part of a larger picture, a certain ideological background of Turkish and European nationalisms which created ‘national pasts’ since the nineteenth century-the age of nationalisms.

The available literature on this period that *Gök-Börü* appeared is centered mainly on the foreign policy aspect in the rise of Pan-Turkism. First, there are extensive and detailed surveys of diplomatic relations during the war. Focusing on foreign policy, these major sources are S. Deringil’s *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, W. Hale’s *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, K. Karpat’s *Turkey’s Politics*, C. Koçak’s *Milli Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945*, B. Oran’s *Türk Dış Politikası*, and E. Weisband’s *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1943-1945*.¹ These sources have the aim of presenting present a diplomatic history; therefore as it can be expected, they do not very much include the history of mentalities. However their concentration on foreign policy while mentioning Pan-Turkism, leads reader to the trap of considering the outside influences as the only factors that made Pan-Turkism grow in the 1940s.

The point on foreign policy influences may result with another missing analysis; to emphasize only the changes between the Pan-Turkism of the late Ottoman Empire and the Kemalist nationalism. In the second group of literature are some works focusing on changes without much discussion on continuities. *Turkism and the Soviets* of C.W. Hostler and *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* by J.M. Landau are the two

¹ Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); William M. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000); Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989); Cemil H. Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi(1938-1945): Dönemin İç ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986); Baskın Oran(ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Kadar Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004); Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy(1943-1945): Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973).

remarkable works in this group.² Although implying the continuity between Pan-Turkism of the nineteenth century and Kemalist variety of Turkish nationalism in-between lines, Landau and Hostler do not really much dwell on the issue in these two books. Throughout his book, Landau constantly emphasizes the difference between the two types of Turkish nationalism, which, according to him, is irredentism. This also makes his book not enough for my quest since he does not give much clue on continuities.

The third set of works is exclusively on Turkish nationalism during this period. A very recent book; Mithat Atabay's *II.Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Akımları*³ has the claim of presenting a total vision of all nationalist movements of this period. However, the author fails to create an original contribution to already existing official literature. While explaining Pan-Turkism during the Second World War, he argues that these Pan-Turkists in Turkey were a few adventurers who were excluded from political power in the Republican People's Party (RPP). His analysis of political power is true to some extent, but not enough for understanding the ideological mindset of these years.

The three remarkable books that mainly guided this thesis are *İki Turan* by Nizam Önen, *Turan'dan Bozkurt'a* by Günay Göksu Özdoğan and *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism* by Jacob M. Landau.⁴ These are good references for understanding the historical and ideological continuity between Kemalist nationalism and Turkism of the nineteenth century. Among them, Önen's work occupies a special place because it is the only book in the literature that also brings light on Turanism in Hungary in a comparative perspective. Other two books with their detailed historical survey of the Pan-Turkist variety of Turkish nationalism in Turkey were the main methodological guides of this thesis. Özdoğan and Landau, through these works, do not detach the Pan-Turkism of the 1940s from the historical development of Turkish

² Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995); C.W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets: the Turks of the World and their Political Objectives* (London: G. Allen & Unwin; New York, F.A.Praeger, 1957); Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981).

³ Mithat Atabay, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Akımları* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2005).

⁴ Nizam Önen, *İki Turan: Macaristan ve Türkiye'de Turancılık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005); Günay Göksu Özdoğan, *'Turan'dan 'Bozkurt'a: Tek Parti Dönemi'nde Türkçülük(1931-1946)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002a).

nationalism. Instead, they drew a broader framework for understanding the ideological formations of the Turkish nationalism.

What is missing from the existing literature is not a total one, but a deep examination of the changes and continuities between ‘official nationalism’ of the ‘center’ and ‘Pan-Turkism’ of the ‘margins,’ through a product of this particular era in which the continuities became very much visible. A detailed discourse analysis is very convenient for tracing common myths and images that are valuable clues for grasping the way that ‘Turkishness’ was constructed. Here, Turkism and Kemalist nationalism are not taken as the two opposite ends of Turkish nationalism, instead it is argued that their duality creates a symbiotic and reciprocal relationship, which taken together, helps to formulate a complex nationalist ideology. Hence, the main purpose of the proposed thesis is to fill this void in the current scholarship with a critical approach to changes and continuities between two different varieties of Turkish nationalism through analyzing basic themes which formed the tenets of Turkish nationalism. *Gök-Börü*, being the most aggressive of the journals appeared during this time, is central to our understanding of this creating and imagining process of ‘Turkishness’ in the wonderland of nationalisms.

The ideological mindset that formed the discourse of *Gök-Börü* was the product of years of search for defining ‘Turkishness.’ This adventure from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic followed an exhausting path. It started as a central ideology in the nineteenth century with an attempt to ‘modernize and Westernize’ the empire, nurtured by the works of Russian-origin intellectuals and European orientalist. It became the pursuing ideology of the Turkish Republic as a state-led nationalism which aimed to establish Turkishness as the sole identity within the ‘national’ borders. Abandoning Islamic and Ottoman roots was the way chosen for claiming westernization. This was accompanied by the attempts to block other nations’ territorial demands on Anatolia. As a consequence, the search for roots through a re-writing of history began as the case in the European nationalist movements.

The guide of the elite was Western positivism and Enlightenment; however the aim was to prove the existence of Turkishness in order to create attachments in the community; so the outcome, naturally, was a racial and pseudo-scientific definition of

Turkishness. This was followed by building certain myths on the antiquity and the superiority of the Turks through a process of selecting, magnifying and imagining in the form of Turkish History Thesis and Sun-Language Theory. Besides, historians and politicians acted together in the building of a Turkish nation-state. It was this factor that equated nation and state in the Turkish case. State-led nationalism mainly carried the same meaning with official nationalism. Therefore 'national history' was written, which was at the same time the history of Turkish state. This constitutes an example of how history is politicized and used as a tool for legitimizing the existence of State and Nation.

Indeed what the Kemalist cadre did was to search for the same things with the Pan-Turkists of the previous century. Therefore, although their ultimate aim was different, the Kemalists and the Pan-Turkists used the same sources with for serving to the same political strategy of creating a superior Turkish race. Therefore, neither Enver Pasha nor Reha Oğuz Türkkkan was adventurists. Or they were as adventurist as Mustafa Kemal in creating a nation out of the ashes of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. These figures were part of a broader historical framework of the development of Turkish nationalism. They developed in the same pool; therefore they cannot be detached from one another. However, on the other hand, they were also different in their ultimate goals. The Pan-Turkists had aims that exceeded borders of the Turkish Republic, whereas the elite of the new nation-state aimed to prevent the existing borders. The crucial point is that they both hit the road with a creation and imagination of Turkish race in order to block any possible challenges.

The Kemalist regime purposed homogeneity within the borders, so that repressed alternatives through some dictatorial measures. Despite their common ideological references, the Pan-Turkists constituted a challenge to the central ideology with their irredentist aims that had the possibility of causing aggressive reactions in the international arena. Therefore, Pan-Turkists were excluded from political power. As a reaction to these measures, Pan-Turkists and other excluded ones came together in an anti-modernist and anti-RPP platform. For the Pan-Turkists of this time, who passed through a Kemalist education focused on the Kemalist history thesis, this platform was associations and journals. In this platform, they pursued Pan-Turkism strongly. During

the Second World War, they again found opportunity to voice their ideas more freely with a flow of Pan-Turkist journals.

It was a time of the Second World War when the destruction of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany seemed likely. Therefore the Kemalist elite tolerated to some extent the Pan-Turkist discourse in these journals. In fact some of the political and military elite, adopting irredentism, had already declared their support for Germany which had been pursuing war propaganda in Anatolia. Within that environment, the journals were the platforms for voicing Pan-Turkist ideals through an emphasis on the superiority of the Turkish race; therefore pursuing unification. In addition to the works of the late Ottoman Pan-Turkists, they mainly used the Kemalist History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory, so that they had many racist myths and symbols for defining 'Turkishness' in their supply. What makes *Gök-Börü* of Türkkkan special among these journals is first its aggressiveness. Including articles, poems, stories, caricatures and novel pieces, it was one of the most militant one of the journals of the time. In addition to the specific environment of the Second World War when the destruction of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany seemed likely, among possible reasons for *Gök-Börü*'s aggressiveness is that it was born out of an internal bitter feud on leadership between Nihal Atsız and Türkkkan. Therefore the journal became the stage for Türkkkan in proving himself. Another reason that makes this journal unique is a practical one. Since it appeared as thirteen issues continuously without any interruption, an analysis of it is easier than the other journals which appeared several times with many closings and re-openings.

Thus, in this thesis, a discourse analysis of *Gök-Börü* is central to our understanding of the essence of Turkish nationalism. In the first part a theoretical examination of nationalism is made for highlighting the position of the thesis. In the second, Turkish nationalism and the efforts to define 'Turkishness' is traced historically. The common sources for Kemalist version and Pan-Turkist versions of Turkish nationalism are emphasized for their contributions to the creation of common images and myths focusing on the Turkish History Thesis. The third part begins with a brief examination of the authoritarian nature of the Kemalist regime in relation to its European counterparts, then relevant reactions to the authoritarianism at the ideological level are emphasized. The influence of the Second World War and the symbiotic

relationship between the Pan-Turkists and the Kemalist elite are emphasized. The last part analyzes *Gök-Börü* as a product of these transformations for implying the continuities and penetrations among late Ottoman Turkism, Kemalist nationalism and the Pan-Turkists of the 1940s.

To make a conceptual clarification, this thesis uses the term ‘Turkist’ in an inclusive fashion; for naming all of the political and intellectual elite who emphasized Turkish origins since the late Ottoman Empire to the 1940s. ‘Pan-Turkist’ is used for the ones who adopted irredentism after the borders of the Turkish nation-state had clearly been defined. In fact, the Ottoman Empire had more permeable borders than the Turkish Republic. The thesis does not deal with Pan-Turanism, which was a Magyar rooted national movement. However uses the term *Turan* for the promised land of the Turks. This should not be mixed with the Magyar *Turan*. The same applies to ideologies as well.

CHAPTER I:

THEORIES OF CREATING NATIONS

"I wonder if I've been changed in the night?
Let me think; was I the same when I got up this morning?
I almost think I can remember feeling a little different.
But if I'm not the same, the next question is 'Who in the world am I?'
Ah, that's the great puzzle!"

Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland

1.1. Imagining and myth-making:

Benedict Anderson, in his book on nationalism states that “the nation is an imagined political community.” It is imagined, because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” According to Anderson, it is the sense of fraternity which keeps people together by imagining a certain kind of bond among them.⁵ Another interpretation comes from the French historian Ernest Renan (1823-1892). In his famous lecture of 1882, entitled *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, Renan declared:

“A nation is a large solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is...a daily plebiscite.”⁶

From a historical perspective, what Anderson and Renan shed light on is totally related with modernity. Before the rise of nationalism, in the Ottoman Empire, Jews, Albanians, Turks, and Bulgarians could have lived together. However at the end of the nineteenth century, as the result of various social, economic and political transformations; nationalist movements began to challenge the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-linguistic character of empires. This was synchronized by reducing

⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, Verso, 1991), pp. 6-7.

⁶ Ernest Renan, “What is A Nation?” in Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 19.

loyalty to imperial religion and imperial dynasty. Indeed the nineteenth century was the century of building and constructing nations.

Thus nation is a historically constructed phenomenon, it did not exist before. As Ernest Gellner states in his *Nations and Nationalism*, “nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent... political destiny are a myth.”⁷ Another influential remark comes from Hobsbawm in *The Invention of Tradition*. Making a historical examination, very similar to Gellner’s, Hobsbawm comments that nations are the products of a ‘social engineering’ during the period between 1879 and 1914. Nationalism is the producer of that engineering process.⁸

A path breaking historical approach to nation and nationalism is presented by Miroslav Hroch, a Czech historian, who made a comparative quantitative study on small European national movements. Arguing that national movements have three subsequent phases, Hroch states that in the nineteenth century firstly, national consciousness grew among intellectuals at cultural, literary and folkloric levels. According to his theory this constitutes Phase A. Following this, with pioneers and militants, national consciousness gains a political character and then turns to be a national movement in Phase B, whereas in Phase C, the movement acquires mass support and demands equal rights and self-determination.⁹ Hroch’s approach is particularly useful for seeing each different stage in a nation-building process historically.

Anderson contributes to the discussion by arguing that nations are built by nationalism which was born towards the end of the eighteenth century as a result of ‘spontaneous distillation of a complex crossing of discrete historical forces.’¹⁰ He continues that nationalism has to be considered within the context of larger political structure of empires, because it came into being out of and also as a reaction to the religious community and the dynastic realm. The gradual decline in the legitimacy of these two provided the geographical and historical space for the rise of nationalisms and

⁷ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 48-49.

⁸ Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Roger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.1.

⁹ Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 23-25.

¹⁰ Anderson (1991): p. 4.

then nations. In his analysis, Anderson particularly emphasizes the waning power of religious communities. According to him, this decline happened firstly as a result of explorations of the non-European world so Europeans' realizing that their 'civilization' is one among many, and secondly as a result of the gradual decay in the sacred language, Latin, with publishing of many books in vernaculars.¹¹ He points out that "what then was required was a secular transformation of fatality (of the era, created by various wars) into continuity, contingency into meaning." Only nationalism, idealizing an immemorial past and a limitless future as opposed to the medieval conception of time as circular,¹² could fill this place. For people living in the nineteenth century, "it is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny."¹³ It is clear that for Anderson nationalism fulfills the role of religion for the sense that also creates loyalties, but it is a secularized religion.

Anderson, like Hobsbawm, Gellner or Renan, does not mention ethnic consciousness as a tie that makes people unite. What he particularly states along with the above historical happenings is print capitalism indicating the expansion of the book market. The eighteenth century was also a time of revival in vernaculars with publication of dictionaries and grammar books. The speakers of a variety of native languages became aware of one another as the market developed. A parallel increase in literacy rates, together with developments in communications enhanced the feeling of linguistic unification. Finally, print-capitalism fixed the language to some extent, and only a few languages became persistent through history.¹⁴ Here the tie that politically connects different people together under 'an imagined identity' is taken to be a macro element; fixed and stable language, not vernaculars themselves.

Whereas Anderson stresses language as the encompassing force, Anthony D. Smith puts his finger on ethnic ties. According to him, that the roots of today's modern nations are formed in accordance with the ethnic cores-these 'cohesive and self-consciously distinctive *ethnies*- of pre-modernity.¹⁵ In those times, people were already united around a common heritage, traditions and a common language and an organized

¹¹ Ibid.: pp. 12-19.

¹² Ibid.: pp. 24-26.

¹³ Ibid.: pp. 11-12.

¹⁴ Ibid.: pp. 42-44.

¹⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 13-39.

religion.¹⁶ At the first sight, Smith's explanation on the existence of different *ethnies* in pre-modern times resembles Anderson's theory on the existence of people speaking a variety of vernaculars before the age of nationalism. However what Smith particularly emphasizes is some kind of a consciousness of 'us' among those *ethnies*, which are connected to one another through a common culture. This kind of a feeling might have existed in pre-modern times, but there happened many radical changes throughout history such as 'wars, conquests, immigrations, exiles, and religious conversions'¹⁷ as Smith admits. What these great changes created should be much diversity, or maybe mixing; not a great, historical and cultural continuity as Smith assumes from a *longue dureé* perception.

While explaining the reasons of continuity in terms of ethnic identities, Smith stresses the role of state-making, military mobilization, and organized religion as the external forces that helped to crystallize ethnic identities and provide their continuity.¹⁸ State-making is a modern phenomenon, therefore here Smith actually projects present to past as nationalists of all nationalist movements do. Besides, in the case of language, Hobsbawm provides some figures which are helpful for checking Smith's theory. According to these figures, in 1789, 50% of French people did not speak French at all, and only 12-13% of the rest speak the language correctly. Besides, French was spoken in a central area, so in the northern and southern parts almost nobody talked French. The situation is the same for people living in the Italian peninsula. At the moment of unification in 1860, only the educated elite, meaning 2.5% of the total population were talking Italian.¹⁹

The figures indicate that even at the time of the formation of nations, there were not continuously united ethnic cores. This kind of unification can only be possible with some kind of consent or transformation in the modern era; which is nationalism. Furthermore, non-existence of same linguistic culture does not necessarily lead to non-existence of a certain nation in future. Therefore, culture cannot be the only determinant of a nation. On the other hand, it may also be argued that culture or ethnicity or nation

¹⁶ Ibid.: pp. 59-64.

¹⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), p. 26.

¹⁸ Ibid.: pp. 35-36.

¹⁹ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 60

does not imply the same things. Same ethnic groups can live as parts of different nations, with similar cultures whereas the same ethnic groups living in the same nation can still have different cultures. This implies that ethnic consciousness or ethnic continuity cannot be the only reason for formation of nation; there are many cases of nations formed without immediate antecedents. Therefore it is also true that mentioning an ethnic continuity from pre-modern to modern times is almost impossible. In this context, Smith's claim is problematic and is not sufficient to justify pre-modern roots of modern nations.

Thus, the position of this thesis on the issue is that nation is a modern entity; it does not have a previous example of any kind like ethnic consciousness. There might have been communities with a shared culture and consciousness of 'we' and 'other;' but the notion of nation is a later phenomenon. Besides, continuities do not necessarily exist between pre-modern entities and modern ones. Even for contemporary nations no one can assume an exact continuity with the nations of fifty years before. Identities penetrate each other in today's world; even feeling of attachment to a particular nation may become ineffective. There may lay the feeling of belonging in our minds or genes, but this is just 'belonging,' therefore it may include a family, city, school, association OR nation. The difference of nation is in its size. It is such a big social, political, economic and cultural project which was born as the result of the death of empires. Therefore nation is a historically constructed 'imagined community' which was born out of certain social, political and economic processes. Therefore it is not constructed in a magical vacuum. Besides, it is not necessarily the ethnic continuity from an immemorial time that keeps people together, but it is the feeling of belonging and relating to one another. This feeling is so strong that even in the twenty-first century people are willingly giving their lives for their 'imagined community.' In order for a person to do this, s/he must feel so strong and deep attachments to 'the nation.' This also shows that nations are not just built from nothingness. Creating a nation should be a great project of imagining. However the real challenge lies in continuing this project by creating those attachments in people.

Walker Connor argues that people of a certain nation feel themselves related with one another because they believe that they are the descendants of a common

ancestor.²⁰ This attachment through an assumed common bond makes people connected not only to living members, but also the ones who lived in the past, and who will live in the future.²¹ According to Smith, in the nineteenth century, this feeling was created through a rediscovery of already existing ethnic cores. In order for awakening the sleeping beauty as independent from any other loyalty, the ‘secular’ intellectuals engaged in the task of providing ‘new communal self-definitions and goals,’ and constructing ‘maps and moralities out of a living ethnic past.’²² Similarly, Hobsbawm advances that the glue for group cohesion and a strong attachment to a certain community and land, is created by a discovery of an ‘immemorial past’ and a ‘limitless future.’²³ This discovery that aims to become free from an imperial and religious past requires an invention of tradition, “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition which automatically implies continuity with the past.”²⁴ Since the search was actually an invention, creation and imagination process, no one can argue that it had scientific basis; instead it depended on ‘ideology’ which strove for legitimizing of the assumed bonds with the past and future. In other words, it was a search in wonderland from which nationalists selected roots and at the same time created and imagined.

In Hroch’s analysis, national movements pass Phase A to Phase B by discovering their roots and so gaining a political and militant character. Referring to this point, for the sake of this research, a distinction should be made between nationalism of a national movement and nationalism of state. Hroch examines national movements which were born under the dominance of another political unit such as the Serbs under the Ottoman Empire, or the Turks under the dominance of the Russian Empire. The intellectual elite of these movements actually made the excavation in history and created myths to reawaken the ‘nation.’ Hroch’s perspective is somewhat a bottom to top one. These nationalisms are ‘state-seeking’²⁵ ones in Tilly’s words.

²⁰ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 202.

²¹ *Ibid.*: p. 89.

²² Smith (1991): p. 64.

²³ Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.12.

²⁴ *Ibid.*: p. 1.

²⁵ Charles Tilly, *The Formation of Nation-States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1975).

However there is also the other side. Nationalism comes to the scene also as ‘state-led’²⁶ one, as a political strategy adopted by the modern state, actually by the political elite of the modern state, to obviate dismantling of the state against newly rising nationalist movements that Hroch takes as the unit of analysis. In other words, a top-down nationalism, which is called as ‘official nationalism’ by Seton-Watson,²⁷ arose as a political response to ‘unofficial’ popular nationalisms that were mainly directed against imperial center. The aim is to ‘super-nationalize’ the small national movements. Anderson presents the most famous examples for this; “Russia applied a fatal policy of Russification, London tried to Anglicize Ireland, Imperial Germany tried to Germanify its share of Poland, Imperial France imposed French on Italian-speaking Corsica.”²⁸ As the examples imply, official nationalism imposes a certain ‘high culture’²⁹ in Gellner’s words, and a supreme, homogeneous and central identity, which is justified through various invented traditions.

While publicizing the imagined identity; ethnic bonds, an ancient land, a common language, common traditions and blood tie are fetishized³⁰ against alternatives. This leads to naturalization of certain cultural attributions as if they existed for all times. The ‘naturalization’ actually provides the transition from history to myth. Then, as Barthes states, around the myths, a world without contradictions is built. On the way of coming up with some attributions to culture, myths essentialize and also naturalize what is visible without looking at the invisible.³¹ The results become very simple then and words speak for themselves; good is only good, superior is only superior.

There are a number of recurrent myths in every nationalist narrative. Anthony Smith identifies the most common ones. These are; the antiquity of the particular nation, the genesis of it, the golden age when this nation reached to the highest level of civilization and heroism, the period of decay resulted from degeneration in the essence, and finally the awakening by a national hero.³² These myths are centered on ‘race’ as

²⁶ Tilly, Ibid.

²⁷ Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

²⁸ Anderson, “Western Nationalism-Eastern Nationalism: Is there a difference that matters?” *New Left Review*, no. 9 (May-June 2001), p. 35.

²⁹ Gellner (1983), pp. 54-55.

³⁰ Smith (1986), p. 148.

³¹ Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1972), p. 143.

³² Smith (1986), p. 245.

their ‘given’ reference point. Being itself a myth, race is used to distinguish community from other communities and to legitimize community’s existence. This race-understanding is common in almost every nationalist ideology. An analysis of it provides the major clue for grasping the real essence of nationalist movements.

1.2. “Nihil Humanum a me alienum puto:”³³

Creating an ethnic identity firstly requires establishing cultural and institutional distinction between ‘we’ and ‘they.’ Connor declares that construction of ‘we,’ as sharing common bonds and a common identity, starts from defining the ‘Other.’³⁴ Historically, this method has been used by every nation-building ideology.³⁵ Balibar adds that for building a nation, racism, which very strongly puts forward the difference, is a needed tendency, in either a covert or open manner, in all nationalisms.³⁶ It is this process of nationalization that creates ethnic foundations to nations.³⁷ Therefore, racism comes out as a kind of strategy; not different from nationalism, but a complementary to it.³⁸ Therefore ethnic and civic nationalisms should not be taken as mutually exclusive.³⁹ What changes is the degree of emphasis which depends on whether this nationalism has a territory or not.

If ‘nation’ does not have a certain territory with its limits, the attachments will rise towards race very smoothly. In the case of Central and Eastern European nationalisms, particularly that of people who were part of multi-national empires, or were politically disunited and scattered like Germans or Italians, rather than having state within its territorial limits, race was mainly emphasized as the basis of nationhood.⁴⁰ Not surprisingly, Pan Movements, which were very intensely aiming at promoting the solidarity or union of the group physically present in different states, were born in this

³³ An ancient maxim meaning: “Nothing human is alien to me.”

³⁴ Connor, *Ibid.*: p. 42.

³⁵ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: An Anthropological Perspective* (London: Pluto Press, 1993), p. 118.

³⁶ Etienne Balibar, “İrkçılık ve Milliyetçilik,” in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds), *İrk Ulus Sınıf: Belirsiz Kimlikler* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000), p. 65.

³⁷ *Ibid.*: p. 66.

³⁸ *Ibid.*: p. 73.

³⁹ Connor, *Ibid.*: p. xi.

⁴⁰ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876-1908* (London: Totowa; NJ: Cass, 1977), p.7.

geography.⁴¹ These ‘state-seeking’ nationalisms at first had to prove that there existed certain ‘nation’ and they were aiming its unity. However they did not have the territory, so they had to use another strong and deep attachment; this was race. The particularity of these nationalisms, thus nurtured race-theories and ideology. In the nineteenth century it was mainly the German Romantics, who contributed to the development of race-theories with their longing for a unity for their ‘stateless’ ‘race’ living under the domination of different states.

Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) was one of the most influential Romantics. Opposing to the universalistic and rationalistic fetish of the Enlightenment, Herder puts emphasis on ‘soul’ of a nation instead of a territorial unity. According to him, some authentic features of a community like language and culture make it organically connected. Then *volk*, meaning people living within natural boundaries with a common soul, common identity and common language come to realize.⁴² Barnard argues that Herder’s ideas were a call for ethnic communities which did not have separate states. This is valid, because Herder stresses the uniqueness of communities, and in a way, gives them hope for unification. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1764-1814) and Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), later politicized and militarized Herder’s conception of *volk*. The emphasis on race was pushed within that ideological mindset and then ‘the fatal equation of language, state and nation’⁴³ came to the scene as political implications.

Thus the links between racism and nationalism become more obvious. Race and language had been interpreted as the indicators of the same things. As an example to this, *Turan* was invented for naming a language family which included Finnish and Magyar. It was thought that this was a sign that these people, who are now living indifferent areas, were united at some point in time. When they migrated to other places from their homelands, this unity was disrupted.⁴⁴ Besides, as Hobsbawm underlines, the attempts of purifying languages also reinforced that racial character.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Landau, *Ibid.*: pp. 180-181.

⁴² F.M. Barnard, *Herder’s Social and Political Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 55-67; J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), pp. 56-64.

⁴³ Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 33.

⁴⁴ Alaeddin Şenel, *İrk ve İrkçılık* (Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Yayınları, 1984), pp. 80-83.

⁴⁵ Hobsbawm (1992), p. 108.

In the case of state-led nationalisms, race comes out as one of the elements of the state-led imposition process. When the ‘state’ stretches the tight body of its nation to the whole with either factual or fictitious roots, it enters into an uneasy and unsmooth process. Alternative nationalisms or the ‘traditional groups’⁴⁶ or the ‘low culture’ may show resistance to the supreme and homogeneous identity. The creator of the nation, the State, then adopts racism for repressing heterogeneous elements by exalting the supreme identity in a hierarchy of races.⁴⁷ Actually, the sources of both state-seeking and state-led nationalisms are the same. The state-led imposition process may include pseudo-scientific works for ‘proving’ antiquity and superiority of the ‘nation.’ State-seeking ones also can benefit from these studies for creating certain motivation for unity and establishing a state.

The pseudo-scientific works at first came from Europe. In fact, racism’s basic idea of classifying people was developed through the Enlightenment era. This depended on the impact of Reconnaissance, during which European men, literally, saw other people, and tried to come up with some explanations for difference between ‘we’ and ‘they.’⁴⁸ The ‘universalistic’ values of Christianity⁴⁹ along with the idea of ‘progress,’ gave birth to ‘white men’s burden’ of ‘civilizing’ the whole world. The ‘discovered’ ones did not have the capability of contributing to this process of ‘creating a civilization,’ therefore they had to be sacrificed. In other words; the weak and incapable had to be eliminated for ‘progress’⁵⁰ as Darwin argued in his *The Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection or the Survival of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life* in 1859.

Accordingly, the nineteenth century witnessed the development of many new sciences, such as philology, anthropology, criminology, and psychology, through which the classical division of people into color-groups was nurtured by shape-division. The

⁴⁶ Ibid.: p.109.

⁴⁷ Smith (1991), p. 76.

⁴⁸ Robert Bernasconi, *İrk Kavramını Kim İcat Etti?: Felsefi Düşüncede İrk ve İrkçilik* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000), pp. 34-36.

⁴⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, “Kapitalizmin İdeolojik Gerilimleri: İrkçilik ve Cinsiyetçilik Karşısında Evrenselcilik,” in Balibar and Wallerstein (eds.) (2000): p. 45.

⁵⁰ For a detailed examination: Marvin Harris, *Our Kind: Who are We, Where We Come from, Where We Going* (New York: Harper&Row, 1990); *Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Cultures* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991). Wallerstein adds that besides this change in ideology, labor has also been ethnicized since then.(Wallerstein, 2000).

occupation was to classify mankind from the highest 'race' to the lowest and attribute differences in physical appearances to behavioral characteristics. Behaviors were assumed to be resulted from blood and genetic heritage; therefore the 'inferior races' were thought to be that kind because of their blood so as the superior ones.⁵¹ Measuring became an increasingly common method to find out differences. One of the remarkable 'scientific' studies was that of W.F. Edwards, *Des Caractères Physiologies des Races Humaines Considérées dans Leur Rapport avec l'Histoire* (1829). Looking at different 'races' in France, Edwards asserted that the form and proportions of the skull constitute the principal test of race.⁵² By essentializing physical characteristics what race theorists did was to create models of humanity and naturalize differences among people. Thus they actually constructed myths to either to justify inequalities, or to understand them.

The French Revolution had emphasized equality of Man without any distinction in rank, creed or race. Race theorists, on the other hand, argued for inequality as a reaction to the universalistic values of the Revolution. The interesting thing is that the foremost runners of race theories also appeared in France. This might be a clue that the values of French Revolution were not accepted by French people as a whole, the oppositions were still powerful, or maybe not much time had passed yet. There is also the fact that the French monarchy was restored after 1815. Then the race revived in French politics with works of history and political theory for crushing those of the Revolution.⁵³ Therefore the revival of race theories synchronized with the rise of nationalisms. What these theories did was to response *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité* motto of nationalist movements and to make those 'ethnic groups' remember their places in the model of humanity.

Race-thinking actually became a convention in scholarship, literature and journalism of the nineteenth century, then.⁵⁴ Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) was one of those theorists who played the prominent role in the development of race as an ideology. He highlighted psychological, mental, and moral characteristics of a 'nation' as determining factors of whole civilization. In his *Les lois Psychologies de l'évolution*

⁵¹ Alan J. Barnard, *History and Theory in Anthropology* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

⁵² Jacques Barzun, *Race: A Study in Superstition* (New York, Evanston, London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967), pp. 34-37.

⁵³ *Ibid.*: pp. 20-21.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*: p. 27.

de Peuples (1894), he argued that each race has its own characteristics which are inherited from the ancestors. Equality and mixing with communities lead to the degeneration of this spirit.⁵⁵ Similarly to Herder, he considers race as ‘soul of a nation.’ Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) approaches to the issue with the classical color-character pair. In his *L’Essai Sur L’inégalité* (1853), the starting point is the division of the mankind into three. The first one is white, which is noble, superior, intelligent, and energetic, the second is stable and fertile and lastly the black is sensual and artistic.⁵⁶ According to Gobineau, it is only when two of these races mix, civilization comes into being. However as the time passes the ruling caste becomes more contaminated and the civilization falls. The *Essai* was read by many intellectuals during Gobineau’s lifetime. Among those names, Barzun states Renan, Taine, Nietzsche, Wagner and Albert Sorel.⁵⁷ The names indicate that Gobineau was popular at least among intellectuals. Gobineau connects decadence to the decrease in the number of white caste, which is assumed to be best presented by German and Scandinavians.⁵⁸ It was this idea of Gobineau that guided the policies of Second and Third Reich. Indeed, Gobineau signifies a feudal reaction to the universal citizenship of France; which according to him led to the fall of ‘Western civilization.’

Thus, during the nineteenth century, German Romantics’ idea of the soul of a nation and ‘scientific’ studies were the available sources for every kind of nationalisms. Therefore it is not possible to think of any nationalism away from these, so that it is not possible to think any nationalism without including some racist aspect. To make it clear, racism assumes homogeneity and uniformity. Nationalisms exploit this idea for distinguishing themselves from others, claiming continuity, so that proving the nation’s existence. Ideal types of Kohn as ethnic and civic, fail here.

The imposition of a constructed national identity was realized through a developed communications network and also new innovations, such as mandatory primary education, public ceremonies; and the mass production of public monuments for reproduction of official nationalism everyday and everywhere.⁵⁹ A recent work, *The*

⁵⁵ Gustave Le Bon, *Tarih Felsefesinin İlmî Esasları* (İstanbul: Şirketi Mürettibiye Matbaası, 1932).

⁵⁶ François De Fontette, *İrk ve İrkçilik* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), p. 2.

⁵⁷ Barzun (1967), pp. 61-62.

⁵⁸ Ibid.: pp. 54-55.

⁵⁹ Hobsbawm (1997), pp. 51-57.

Myth of the Military Nation by Altınay, shows that universal conscription should also be considered within that framework.⁶⁰ Through these mechanisms, “what they did was ‘stretch the short, tight skin of the nation over the vast body of empire’”⁶¹-in fact that of the defined nation. Billig’s study of Banal Nationalism is deserved to be mentioned here. According to him, the imposition process is a never-ending one.⁶² The absolute identity continuously reproduces itself through above-mentioned mechanisms. As Balibar states the main problem lies in reproduction, because the aim is to create a ‘unity’ by repressing partialities since they can constitute challenges.⁶³ In newspapers, journals, music, sports, cinema, advertisements, literature, educational institutions, almost everywhere, the traces of that imposition could be found. The official nationalism continuously re-proves itself with various national symbols, images and myths. When a conflict emerges, an automatic fast fabrication of myths begins. The members are made remembered their origins, their identities. Then nation, the constructed identity, is re-naturalized with references to glorious past and limitless future.

In order to provide absolute control, state elites repress any other alternative opinion tools; like associations and newspapers whether they are pursuing a different nationalism or not. However if the essence of official nationalism is very similar to one of these unofficial ones, then this alternative one can also gain significance whenever it finds an opportunity. The peculiarity is that it conciliates with the ideology of the center in many aspects since they mainly scrutinize the same ‘historical’ and ‘scientific’ sources. They may adopt similar discourses; one being milder than other, and also employ same symbols and myths. Thanks to these similarities in their essence, it turns out to be an interesting juxtaposition if state-led and state-seeking ones, or previously repressed one and the central one meet.

Turkish nationalism, historically, did not follow a different development. It was on the scene as a state-led movement during the late Ottoman/early Republican era. There was also an independently developed variety of Turkish nationalism, the state-

⁶⁰ Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey* (New York, Houndmills, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 25-27.

⁶¹ Anderson (2001), p. 35.

⁶² Michael Billig, *Banal Milliyetçilik* (İstanbul: Gelenek Yayıncılık), Cem Şişkolar (trnsl.), pp. 12-22.

⁶³ Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in *New Left Review*, XII (3), pp. 334.

seeking nationalism of the Turks under the Russian dominance. These two fertilized one another in the establishment of new nation-state in Anatolia without any Islamic and Ottoman heritages. In order to create attachments to the territory and among the people, the Kemalist regime engaged in re-writing 'national' history and disseminating it within the borders of Anatolia through claiming the ownership of many other civilizations. The interesting thing was that in this process the sources of the regime and those of state-seeking nationalist movements were the same. Their basic aims were to prove the existence of Turks in the world since antiquity. Actually, two varieties nurtured one another although one was a challenge to State's 'limited' nationalism because of irredentist aims. The relation between the two varieties, of course, did not make them entirely the same. They were the same, but they were also different; one established a nation-state with limited borders no matter what some of its people might have been longed for; whereas the other, both ideologically and politically, aimed to build a Turkish Empire, let us say, by incorporating the Turkish-speaking lands of other states. In the case of *Gök-Börü*, the cross-fertilization can be realized with a close examination. However for a truer analysis, one should not fall into the trap of only emphasizing similarities; therefore should keep in mind that despite them, the two versions did not become completely the same since the ultimate political goals were different.

CHAPTER II:

CREATING TURKISHNESS: FROM OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO TURKISH REPUBLIC

*"Dile geldi BOZKURTlar, başladılar duaya,
Ulular haykırdı: Haydın Kızıl Elmaya*

...

*Kızıl elma, diyordu, özgeye şan verenler,
Kızıl elma diyordu, göğe çıkan Atatürk...*

...

*Kızıl elma diyordu, çadır söken bir Hakan
Kızıl elma, diyordu, dökülen her damla kan..."*

R. Arda, Gök-Börü (13: 20 May 1943)

The transition from the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to the nation-state of Turkish Republic was also a transition from an Islamic and imperial heterogeneous conception of identity to a secular and homogeneous one. During this period, 'Turkishness,' as 'a secular religion' that Anderson may call, aimed to substitute Islam. It was redefined and freed from its previous meanings referred to Turkish-speaking Muslims or ignorant villagers. Instead, it was attributed certain political, historical and cultural meanings. From then on the basic definition can be assumed as the following; 'Turks are a glorious and superior nation existing since an immemorial time, they were the creators of the earliest civilizations. However now they are now going through a period of recess because of they have been subjugated by foreign cultures. They should return to their origins to find their uncorrupted essence, and so should end this accidental period of decadence.'

The important point is that all nationalisms use similar elements in their definitions for their 'nation.' They hit the road with antiquity, then heroic features and superiority follow as the second element, a golden age is referred as the third one, and lastly in order to justify what happened now, 'a period of somnolence,'⁶⁴ in Gellner's

⁶⁴ Gellner, *Nationalism* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), p. 93.

terminology, comes to the scene. Now the mission is very much determined; to save the nation from that period. In our case *Gök-Börü*, ‘Turkishness’ was built exactly on these points which Kemalist History Thesis also made references to as its building blocks. This definition, of course, did not suddenly appear in a vacuum without any basis. As it was in other nationalisms, it was produced through various cultural, political and social transformations. Historically, an Islamic and imperial reflex played the big role in not only creation of that definition but also its imposition over the ‘nation.’ Thus this part of the thesis traces the creation of the elements of Turkishness in *Gök-Börü* through late Ottoman and early Republican intellectual and political life in order to grasp the environment that prepared *Gök-Börü*’s discourse and drew its intellectual map. For the intellectuals, the focus is going to be on the ones that *Gök-Börü* considered as its ‘leaders.’

2.1. From ‘Ottomanness’ to ‘Turkishness:’

The first attempts for defining ‘Turkishness’ were largely products of nineteenth century modernization of the Ottoman Empire. As was the case in Europe, transformation to a centralized modern state was realized through various reforms in military, education and bureaucracy. Most importantly, a Constitution was adopted to reinstall the legitimacy of the empire which had been lost because of waning power in economics and politics. New conceptions for citizenship pursuing equality of rights for all ethnic and religious groups living in the empire formed the novel foundation of the Constitution. With a territorial understanding of nationalism,⁶⁵ the feeling of belonging to the same territory, regardless of religion was aimed to be created.

Namık Kemal (1840-1888) was one of the prominent intellectuals that thought on this new understanding of belonging. In his writings, Namık Kemal tried to create a notion of Ottoman citizenship which began to incorporate new elements combining Islam, Ottoman and Turkish loyalty expressed towards dynasty. Geography was his first reference point, and then he emphasized emotional attachment to common ancestors and common past. For this purpose, in his play *Vatan yahut Silistre* (1873), he narrated

⁶⁵ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 323.

the military valor and heroic deeds of the ‘Turk.’ Namık Kemal used the term ‘Ottoman nation’ interchangeably with the ‘Turks.’⁶⁶ Therefore, his use of ‘Turk’ does not imply that he had had this ethnic consciousness of being a Turk. He was an ‘Ottoman,’ but one emotionally attached to the land of the Ottoman dynasty. Thus he was thinking within an imperial framework; not within a national one. Despite this Namık Kemal’s emphasis on *la patrie* was adopted as one of the guiding principles of Kemalist nationalism and also the Pan-Turkism of the 1930s and 1940s. For the Kemalists *la patrie* was Anatolia and it needed to be defended, but for the Pan-Turkists it was *Turan*.

The creation of a common identity had come with centralization measures. State-seeking nationalist movements and also some peripheral communities like the Kurdish tribes challenged this inclusive identity of Ottoman and this centralization.⁶⁷ The reasons were carefully analyzed by Şerif Mardin. He proclaims that, in the Ottoman Empire, “the building blocks were not completely integrated.”⁶⁸ Therefore, the ‘modernizing’ reforms could not reduce already existing tension in the society; instead the tension increased more between social classes also within the architects of the state-seeking nationalist movements.⁶⁹ Consequently, it was proved that creating an Ottoman citizen as including people from different ethnicities, was not a feasible option in this age of nationalisms.

By the 1860s, Ottomanism had already been challenged by Islamism, which aimed to unify of the Islamic world and create an Islamic ‘nation.’ Adopted later by Abdulhamit II as the political ideal, Islamism had also the dimension of reacting to the Ottomanism’s emphasis on equality among people regardless of their religion. Besides, with large deportations of Muslim people following the gradual independence of the Balkan lands a much more Islamic population came to be realized within the remaining Ottoman lands. Abdulhamit also took some Islamist measures, for instance the institution of Caliphate again gained importance in the political arena. However unification of all Islamic lands was a hard project, in fact ‘West’ was also following an

⁶⁶ Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998), pp. 326-335.

⁶⁷ Şükrü Hanioglu, “Osmanlılık,” *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, v. 5 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p. 1390.

⁶⁸ Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vo. 11, No.3 (June 1969), p. 275.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*: p. 274.

expansionist ideology, therefore the interests of the center of the Ottoman Empire and ‘western’ interests clashed.⁷⁰ That is to say, the ideal became useless with that conflict.

While the Ottoman elite was trying to ‘save the empire’ with reforms that included creation of an Ottoman citizen or creation of an ‘Islamic nation,’ some European orientalist wrote a number of books on Turkish race and Turkish language in an admired manner. These books were largely read by the Ottoman elite. Some of them were even translated into Ottoman Turkish. In addition to political situation, it was these sources that helped to the creation of an image of ‘Turkishness,’ when other identities became obsolete. The most influential of those sources were; *Histoire Générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongoles, et autres Tartares Occidentaux* (1756-1758) by Joseph de Guignes (1721-1800), *A Grammar of the Turkish Language* (1832) by Arthur Lumley Davids (1852-1913), which was the first systematic survey of Turkish language, *Travels in Central Asia* (1864) and *Sketches of Central Asia* (1867) by Arminius Vambéry (1832-1913), which was on the common origins of Turkic groups as belonging to one race, but subdivided according to physical traits and customs, and *l’histoire de l’Asie* (1896) by Leon Cahun (1841-1900), which stressed the role of Turks in carrying ‘civilization’ to Europe, as a part of greater Turanid race that included the Japanese and Fin as well.⁷¹

Within these books the most popular one among the Turkists was that of Cahun. Şerafettin Turan, in his book on intellectual sources of Mustafa Kemal, declares Cahun as one of the books that Mustafa Kemal read.⁷² Türkkan, editor of *Gök-Börü*, also states for himself that he was mainly influenced by Cahun’s work during his high school years.⁷³ Besides Ziya Gökalp, another prominent Turkists writes that Cahun’s book was the first book that he bought when he came to İstanbul. According to Gökalp, this book was seemed to be written for encouraging the Pan-Turkist *mefkure*, ideal.⁷⁴ The first reason for this kind of a great influence rested on Cahun’s thesis on Islam. According to Cahun, after Turks adopted Islam, they forgot about their own culture and took Arabic and Persian elements. This led to their degeneration. Here Cahun’s negative emphasis

⁷⁰ Hostler (1957), pp. 93-96.

⁷¹ Kushner (1977), pp. 10-14; Landau (1995), p. 30.

⁷² Şerafettin Turan, *Atatürk’ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, Düşünürler, Kitaplar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999).

⁷³ Reha Oğuz Türkkan, *Kuyruk Acısı* (İstanbul: Stad Matbaası, 1943), pp. 54.

⁷⁴ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınları, 2001), p. 12.

on Islam became the guiding principle for both the Pan-Turkist and Kemalist varieties of Turkish nationalism. Cahun served them to ‘erase’ Islamic Seljukid and Ottoman past. The second reason for this influence lies in Cahun’s reference to Turks as honest administrators and militant soul.⁷⁵ These elements constituted the basis for such myths like Turks were a military nation since antiquity.

However a close examination of Cahun’s book reveals that there are some missing points in the pictures of Türkkan, Gökalp or Atatürk. As Taner Timur states, Cahun also makes many negative points about Turks. For instance, he declares that “Turks are emotional people who cannot use their reasons...They, together with the Mongols, existed in history not as the founder of any civilization; but as the intermediaries between Chinese and Iranian civilizations. They could not adopt any of them since they were thinking pragmatically.”⁷⁶ This part of Cahun’s argument was totally excluded in the Late Ottoman and Early Republican case. It seems that a selection from the source is on the scene. This example displays one of the ways that ‘national’ history was being written. Here it is also worth mentioning that Cahun was not really a scientific source. He was known as a man of letters; and despite this, his book was taken as reference. It can be also said that ‘creating a nation’ itself is an adventure, so Cahun might have been very well suited for fulfilling that mission.

Hence the common emphasis in these books is the Central Asian origins of the Turks. At this point another question to should be asked; why were those Europeans interested in Turks? It is known that they were orientalists and orientalists were being interested in the empire since the sixteenth century. They were considering the Ottoman Empire as the representative of the despotic face of the East. However in the nineteenth century, some of the orientalists turned to sources; particularly the Chinese archives. Of course making research in records did not change their classical thinking of the world as being divided in two parts. The point is that this group was not just writing stories on it; but was ‘interested’ in the Ottoman Empire as ‘a different culture’ in the nineteenth century. Very basically orientalism considers ‘East’ as the spiritual. In this age of nationalisms this kind of an ‘interest’ can be the result of searching for the lost spirit.

⁷⁵ Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Kimliği* (Ankara: İmge Yayıncılık, 1998), pp. 112-114.

⁷⁶ Ibid.; Timur, “Batı İdeolojisi, Irkçılık ve Ulusal Kimlik Sorunumuz,” *Yapıt*, n.5 (June-July 1984), pp. 7-30. in www.geocities.com/tfpsikoloji/timur/01.htm, (20.06.2005).

This gives clues for drawing the whole picture. At this time, not only the Ottomans was in an identity crisis, but also the Europeans were trying to define themselves through a search for new references.

At the center of this intellectual and political environment, some of the Young Ottomans were writing on ‘Turkish’ civilization and language as well. Among them, Ali Suavi (1838-1878) occupied an important place. Combining two elements in his definition, he stated that Turks were the foundational element of the Ottoman Empire⁷⁷ and ‘Turk’ was a race that also included people living in Central Asia. Ali Suavi’s formulation is a good example of duality in the minds of the day’s intellectuals. There were other intellectuals who displayed this dilemma between empire and nation-state. Ahmet Vefik Paşa, in his *Lehçe-i Osmani* (1890) claimed that the Ottoman Turkish was originated from the same source with the Central Asian dialects. Ahmet Mithat, on the other hand, called Central Asia as the fatherland of the Turks.⁷⁸ The other significant work was *Kamus-u Türki* (1889) by Şemseddin Sami (1850-1904), through which Sami argued that speaking the same language is the first and foremost condition of belonging to the same race.⁷⁹ Two other significant works were *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes* (1869) by Mustafa Celaledin Pasha (Constantin Borzecki) (1826-1875) and *Tarih-i Alem* (1876) by Süleyman Paşa (1838-1892). The first one extensively dealt with racial origins of the Turks and considered the Turks and Europeans as belonging to a great Touro-Aryan race, whereas Mongols belonged to another race. This work was very much influenced from Guignes. The second work also used the information in Guignes in order to glorify ‘militaristic qualities of the Turkish nation.’ Lastly Necib Asım is worth mentioning. He translated Cahun’s book into Ottoman Turkish in 1896, then published it in 1900.⁸⁰

These sources by the Ottomans were mostly written after the European ones. This indicates that the earliest sources about the origins were created by the orientalisists. The Ottoman intellectuals made use of them either by translating or using information already presented. The research of the Ottomans was mainly shaped by these works then. In other words, most of the Ottoman intellectuals began to discover or create their

⁷⁷ Mardin (1998), p.371.

⁷⁸ Kushner (1977), pp. 61-72.

⁷⁹ Ibid.: p. 96.

⁸⁰ Ibid.: pp. 61-72.

identities through Europe's gaze and most of them did not make any further research. Seeing themselves through European orientalist eyes might have led to a feeling of self-hate. This might have contributed to 'westernization' ideal and at the same time to the ignorance of the continuity between new Turkish Republic and the Ottoman Empire. The sources were really useful for serving to this end of rejection. On the other hand, they were also used for correcting the barbaric and Islamic image of the Turks in the 'West.' This was a product of the feeling of inferiority in front of the 'West.' Then the combination of those to led to a complete and fast rejection.

Furthermore, the political and intellectual currents within the empire were nurtured by Russian-originated intellectuals. Independently from what was going on in the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Turkist nationalism developed within the Russian Empire among Turkic-speaking people. With their migration to the Ottoman lands following the Soviet Revolution, these intellectuals became very active in Ottoman cultural and political life.⁸¹ One of them was Ismail Gasprinski (1851-1914), a Crimean Turk. He emphasized a spiritual and linguistic unity of all the Turks of the Russian Empire. His motto was 'Unity in language, thought and action.'⁸² Another prominent figure was Aĝaoĝlu Ahmet (1869-1939), an Azerbaijani who published *Türk Yurdu*, the journal of Turkish intellectuals.⁸³ This variety of Turkish nationalism had developed in its specific conditions. Turkic speaking people were seen as 'prisoner Turks,' so that they should be saved somehow. This element also contributed to the formation of another myth in Turkish nationalism.

Besides, the ideas of these Russian-originated intellectuals presented the Ottomans another solution to give an end to empire's collapse; unification of all Turks. Hence Turcology works of Europe and the books of Ottoman intellectuals were joined by Pan-Turkism, which came to the scene as the last imperial option in front of the Ottoman political elite. Its aim for unification was the guiding principle of the Pan-Turkists of the 1930s and 40s. In the case of Kemalist nationalism, Pan-Turkist policies showed themselves especially during the Second World War when Germany was in war

⁸¹ Gün Soysal, "Rusya Kökenli Aydınların Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliğinin İnşasına Katkısı," in Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol.4, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 483-484.

⁸² Kushner (1977), p. 12; Landau (1995), pp. 9-11.

⁸³ Kushner (1977), p. 13.

with the Soviet Union. Before this time it is hard to get any example of irredentism-inspired discourse in official ideology. The most interesting point is that many of the Pan-Turkist intellectuals of the late Ottoman Empire continued to situate themselves among the leading cadre of the new Turkish Republic. This did not constitute a contradiction in their minds, because they were all developed through the same pool. In that case, although their ultimate ends were different; both Kemalist nationalism and the Pan-Turkism of the 1930s and 40s used the same sources, writings of the late Ottoman early Republican Pan-Turkists or writings of European orientalist, as their references. This is sign of continuity and complementariness in these varieties of Turkish nationalism along with disattachments among them.

Among the Russian-originated intellectuals, Yusuf Akçura (1878-1935), a Tatar historian, was the most important one to affect Turkish nationalism. He was the first intellectual that systematized the transformation of the Turkist movement from Phase A to B, meaning from a cultural into a political one. In his article entitled *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Systems of Government) (1904), Akçura clearly stated that Pan-Turkism is the best strategy for the Ottoman Empire. He rejected Ottomanism, because it minimized the rights of the Turks; and Pan-Islamism, since it alienated non-Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁴ In that case, for him, Turkism appears as the only viable opportunity. He argues that a union of all Turkic groups, meaning all Turks speaking Ural-Altay or Fin-Magyar languages should be established. In that political system, Turkey should be at the center.⁸⁵ For Akçura Pan-Turkism comes as a matter of fact.

Here Akçura still thinks in the notion of an empire and argues against the universalistic concept of French citizenship; which was based on will, not race. According to him, this kind of an understanding is illegitimate in the case of the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁶ Islamism also will work for the disadvantage of the empire because of its internal historical conflicts. The most useful solution is to establish a union of Turks based on common traditions, language, religion and also common heritage of

⁸⁴ Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1976), pp. 19-20.

⁸⁵ Ibid.: p. 23.

⁸⁶ Ibid.: p. 20.

state-making.⁸⁷ In that context, Akçura uses *Turan* for referring to Central Asian origins; not as a romantic symbol or ethnic nationalism.⁸⁸ For him *Turan* is the basis of the political project, not a romantic myth.

Akçura makes a secular definition of Turkishness. Therefore his race concept was different than that of the popular Europeans; such as Gobineau's. According to Akçura, race signifies a common ethnic and cultural heritage, so that it is distinguishing criteria. Together with language, traditions and religion; race constitutes the commonalities that is going to provide Pan-Turkist unity. In that case the non-Turks should be Turkified.⁸⁹ Therefore concepts like blood tie, pure race, and the superiority of a certain race do not really mean anything to Akçura. His approach is an analytical one that shows the possible strategies. It is, in a way, an outline of the nationalist project.⁹⁰ He does not deal with any romantic ideal, so does not really establish his ideas on certain myths. Instead, like an economist Akçura focuses on the possibility of the project.

Another important intellectual that became the guide for the later nationalists is Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924). He is the one that intensely romanticizes a historical land, ancient origins, along with a silence period which would result with awakening. In fact, he was quite influenced by the German Romantics. According to him, nation is a community of people who speak the same language, who have gone through the same education, who have religious, moral and aesthetic ideals, and who have the same culture and religion.⁹¹ This definition of nation very much resembles Herder's *Volk*. Herder also considers culture and language as the foundations of a nation.⁹² Based on this definition, Gökalp argues that no nation is homogeneous in terms of race. Therefore there is not any relation between racial characteristics of a particular nation and national characteristics. He emphasizes language as the hallmark of nationality and regards linguistic independence as a necessary condition to political independence.⁹³ In that

⁸⁷ Ibid.: p. 33.

⁸⁸ François Georçeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura 1876-1935* (İstanbul: Türkiye Economic ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1996), pp. 29-30.

⁸⁹ Akçura, Ibid.

⁹⁰ Özdoğan (2002a), p. 71.

⁹¹ Gökalp (2001), p. 16.

⁹² For Herder; Barnard (1967); Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder* (London: Pimlico, 2000).

⁹³ Gökalp (2001), pp. 15-16.

case, for Gökalp, empires, since they were constituted by many nations, are doomed to collapse. Nationalism should be the supreme ideal for nations. In the unity, individual does not have an absolute value. In that case, unification of all Turks, formation of *Turan* is the ideal, but a distant one; because it can be realized gradually.⁹⁴ He declares that there are steps for *Turan*. The first is Turkeyism which in fact was realized, the second is Oghuzism meaning unification of Oghuz Turks along with Turkmens of Azerbaijan, Iran and Khwarizm and the last step, *Turan* which is the unification of all Turkic-speaking people, such as the Yakuts, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Kipchaks and Tatars who speak the same language with the Turkish people, but not have the identical culture. These form the Greater Turkestan or *Turan*.⁹⁵ In Gökalp's *Turan*, there is not a place for Hungarians or Magyars.

On the way realizing unification, Gökalp attributes a functional aspect to Islam. In his collection of articles published in 1918 under the title of *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, he states that Islamic religious beliefs can be a unifying factor of different Turks living in different areas. Here it is worth mentioning that Gökalp pursues mainly the religious aspects of Islam; not the political ones, such as political, legal and social traditions. Gökalp, like other intellectuals of his time, tries to conciliate modernization and nationalist project. He carries the duality of becoming like 'West,' but being lost in it. Gökalp's solution was that Turks should accept from the West only material achievements and scientific methods. According to Gökalp; the rest, other than religion and material things, should be thoroughly Turkish. This includes all elements of culture, particularly emotional and moral values.⁹⁶ No matter its feasibility, this point of Gökalp became the guide for later nationalists.

For Gökalp and most of the later intellectuals, nationalism had two sides; material and spiritual. The interesting thing is that material is always associated with 'modern,' 'western' or 'rational.' However spiritual stands for traditional. Considering 'modernization' and 'westernization' as inevitable, late Ottoman-early Republican intellectuals tried to combine two elements; 'nationalism' and 'westernization.' It is of course debatable to what extent this project became successful, but it is very important

⁹⁴ Ibid.: pp. 24-26.

⁹⁵ Landau, Ibid.: p. 38.

⁹⁶ Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1997).

to note that this mindset was resulted from the fatal conflictual relation between becoming like the 'west' and becoming like 'us.' For the late Ottoman-early Republican intellectuals, as it was the case for many of the European nationalists, nationalism meant returning to origins and rediscovering the lost essence. Therefore particularly in the Ottoman-Turkish case, nationalism was taken as something related with traditions although it is a modern phenomenon, it was different than modernization; sometimes completing it but sometimes against to it since 'westernization' could degenerate the culture, the real essence. This love-hate relationship with the West has been an indispensable myth in Ottoman-Turkish intellectual and political life.

Furthermore, Gökalp believes that Turks were now in a period of silence since they were drifted away from their national traditions because of the impact of other cultures. Therefore they should 'return to their origins.' This can be done through a search for authentic cultural values. Here, similarly to Herder, Gökalp emphasizes the value of 'uncorrupted folk.' In order to reach the real essence, popular folk's culture, its arts, crafts, morals and customs should be examined. Accordingly, Gökalp glorifies the ancient Turks, pre-Islamic states, and heroes like Attila, Chingiz Khan in addition to some of the Ottoman Sultans. With his emphasis on the pre-Islamic origins, Gökalp contributed to the rejection of Islamic roots although Gökalp himself was taking Islam as one of the founding elements of the Turkish nation. Gökalp declares that these conquerors tried to unite all Turkish communities; they did not have any other aim like oppressing. Turks has that mission of realizing highest virtues such as hospitality, modesty, and courage.⁹⁷ Gökalp-kind of glorification of the Turks as the heroic peace-makers; not barbaric ones, was one of the recurrent themes used by both the first generation of the Turkists, the Kemalist History Thesis and the Pan-Turkists of Turkey.

In accordance with this intellectual environment, in 1913, Turkish nationalism became the central ideology of the Ottoman state with the seizure of power by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). In fact, the loss of Balkan lands with the Balkan wars and rebellions among Muslims like that of Albanians had resulted with a certain disillusionment with the Ottomanist and Islamist ideals among the Unionists. This, of course, did not lead to a total abandonment of the Ottomanist and Islamist

⁹⁷ Gökalp (2001), pp. 20-25.

elements. What was on the scene was the triumvirate these and Turkist elements. Actually, many members of the late Ottoman military and bureaucratic elite had been born in the Balkans. Therefore losing those lands did not only mean losing the productive *tımar* of the empire, but also losing roots and origins. These people were now ‘imprisoned’ in dry and barren Anatolia. For them, now, two choices were available as political strategies or as political outcomes of shrinking boundaries. They either had to accept what happened and so to create attachments to this piece of land or had to adopt an irredentist and aggressive stance concentrated on Turkish-speaking lands. At this stage, none of the strategies seem to be more solidified than the other.

Thus, using the same references of Turkish nationalism, there gradually emerged two major groups. One was led by Enver and Talat Pashas, the other was led by the later Kemalists. In the First World War, the former hit the road to Sarıkamış by launching a military operation. However the catastrophic deaths of a large number of soldiers stopped them. This first defeat of the Pan-Turkist ideal was later followed by incorporation of the Turkish speaking lands to the Bolshevik Russia after the Revolution through the end of the First World War. The result was the possible functionality of the other part of the Unionists which had gradually converted to a more limited and defensible project that was, in fact, completed with the First World War. Their project constituted the basis of the Kemalist thinking. This, of course, did not mean that the Pan-Turkist ideal was totally left. It was only marginalized from the political center in the first years of the Republic. Very basically, the ultimate goals of the two varieties of Turkish nationalism were not similar; however they had the same sources so that they fed one another. Therefore the Pan-Turkist ideal was always somewhere as being nurtured by the Kemalist ideal and waiting to be awakened in a convenient time.

In other words, the group following Enver and Talat was not formed by a handful of adventurers which deviated from the ‘normal path.’ They were the products of certain historical and political transformations as the Kemalists. What both groups did was to choose one out of two major ways and later to follow their ideal by pursuing very similar strategies since both attempted to create a Turkish nation out of the ruins of an empire.

2.2. ‘Turkish Nation-State:’

The National Pact of 1920 drew the framework of the Kemalist definition of ‘Turkishness.’ This outline, based on Anatolia, determined the defenseline in the War of Independence. The Kemalist group was supported by many people living in Anatolia and Rumelia at that time, who actually had the motivation of protecting their lands from the ‘others.’ In fact, if one considers the later crises in the Kemalist regime, it is seen that the notion of a certain future project of building a Turkish nation was not really on the agenda of these people. On the other hand, the war had already awakened in them the feeling of a certain unity and cohesion, and this was further enhanced by the declaration of Republic. The single party regime, led by Mustafa Kemal was there to create the ‘Turkish nation’ within those legal boundaries through institutional, social and economic reforms as a part of the creation of a Turkish nation-state; so was neither an Ottoman state nor an Islamic state.

Thus, it was not the ‘Turkish nation’ which established Turkish Republic; as it was not the one which fought in the War of Independence. Instead Anatolian-Rumelia people living in Turkey fought⁹⁸ for the only space at their hands, as Zürcher states. The Pact of 1920 defined the borders for these people. From then on ‘Turkish nation-state’ was there with its boundaries, territory and people. Now the ultimate mission was to create a nation-a Turkish one within the boundaries, at the same level with ‘contemporary civilizations’ differently than the previous multi-ethnic and multi-religious political entity. The main strategy was to legitimize the war and the Republican claims of Anatolia while blocking the territorial demands of Greeks and Armenians. Here for describing the strategy, what Anderson states for the Russian Empire can be applied; what the Kemalists did was to “stretch the short, tight skin of the nation over the vast body of nation-state [empire].”⁹⁹

The torturous project of creating Turkishness within the borders first came with an ideological motivation. The foremost aim was to become ‘westernized.’ Therefore the new regime, with its defined borders, had to prove itself in the international arena as

⁹⁸ Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: IB Tauris, 2004), p. 133; Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları: 1919-1938* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 101.

⁹⁹ Anderson (2001), p. 35.

a nation-state which was different from the previous Islamic empire. The only way to realize this seemed to reject the Ottoman and Islamic heritage. Following the war, several international agreements were signed for keeping the borders safe. These agreements did not give any chance to any aggressive action. In this case, the newly established Turkish state had to be more careful in its relations with the ‘Outside Turks’ who were now under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union.

As a consequence of this new construction of the Turkish nation-state and the reshaping of the world, the three systems of government, which had appeared as available choices to the Ottoman elite in the past, were declined. Besides these, Mustafa Kemal, in his various speeches, continuously emphasized that the new regime did not adopt any of Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism or Pan-Turkism.¹⁰⁰ Turkish Hearths, which were intellectual platforms mostly for Russian-originated Turkists, adjusted their programmes to this vision. They changed ‘all Turks’ to ‘people of the Turkish Republic’ for implying their target group.¹⁰¹ Thus in 1924 Constitution, Turkish nation was defined on the basis of territorial citizenship as “people living in Turkey, regardless of their religion or race.”¹⁰² The second step was to identify minorities of Turkey. The Treaty of Lausanne served this purpose. Despite the inclusiveness in the definition of Turkishness, in Lausanne non-Muslims living within the borders were counted as non-Turks.¹⁰³ This nature of Treaty shows that the Kemalist elite were sometimes taking the advantage of previously created identities in order to form its nation. The interesting thing is that the new regime was trying to get rid off the Islamic heritage, while at the same time using Islam as the primary indicator of Turkishness within the existing borders. The reason for this might be the fact that there were not any other inclusive references of belonging except religion.

Then in the mid 1920s a series of radical reforms were realized by the new state. In Gellner’s words; a high culture was begun to be imposed over the low culture. At first, the sultanate and the caliphate were abolished. A new law was passed to centralize education. The alphabet changed into Latin, new civil and penal codes were adopted

¹⁰⁰ Ayşe Afetinan, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ten Yazdıkları* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971), p.121.

¹⁰¹ Özdoğan (2002a), p. 85.

¹⁰² Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri: 1789-1980* (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), p. 237.

¹⁰³ Sevin Toluner, *Milletlerarası Hukuk Açısından Türkiye’nin Bazı Dış Politika Sorunları* (İstanbul: Beta Yayınları, 2000), pp. 216-221.

from the ‘West.’ These reforms made possible and were accompanied by an authoritarian single-party regime, in fact a single-man regime. Mustafa Kemal had already been holding all decision-making powers as the ‘Great Chief’ since the time of the War of Independence. These powers were increased in 1925 with the promulgation of the Law of Maintenance of Order¹⁰⁴ which was passed after the Sheikh Said rebellion in the eastern part of Turkey. This rebellion is worth mentioning. It was neither purely religious nor purely ethnic;¹⁰⁵ however it was so influential that the Turkish state considered it as a big challenge to the authority of the Turkish state. Mass deportation of the Kurds and mass recruitment from the Kurdish male population into the national army¹⁰⁶ were the two of important measures taken by the Kemalist elite.

Following the rebellion, İsmet İnönü, the Second Man of the regime, made a speech at the center of Turkish Hearths in which he stated: “Only the Turkish nation is entitled to claim ethnic and national rights in its country. No other element has any such right. Our duty is in any case, to Turkify non-Turks within Turkish fatherland. We are going to eliminate any opposition to Turks and Turkishness.”¹⁰⁷ The speech of İnönü demonstrates that ‘internal enemies’ was also one of the elements of Turkishness. The criterion was that if certain ethnic community challenged to the authority of the super-identity at the top or not. If it is understood that it challenges, this community of people are entitled as ‘traitors.’ This is the actual way that the Kemalist regime drew the boundaries of the Turkishness. First, one should be a Muslim living in Turkey, should speak Turkish, and also should be absolutely loyal to the great ideal-*ülkü*, *mefkure*, one may call this as Kemalism’s *Turan*, which aimed to Turkify all people living in Turkey and protect the ‘State,’ differently than Pan-Turkism which had the goal of unifying all Turks. This speech was a signal for the 1930s, which witnessed step by step incorporation of all institutions and associations into the ‘State.’

The centralizing measures required homogenization of minds willingly or unwillingly. In that context, some intellectuals overtly inspired by the Pan-Turkist idea

¹⁰⁴ Zürcher, *Ibid.*: pp. 185-187.

¹⁰⁵ Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992), p. 298.

¹⁰⁶ Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 85.

¹⁰⁷ Bilal Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye’de ‘Kürt Sorunu’ 1924-1938: Şeyh Said, Ağrı ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1975), p. 58; Cf. Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1997), p. 120.

were integrated into the system. For instance, Halide Edip, whose novel *Yeni Turan* had become one of the inspiring books for the Pan-Turkists and who saw Azerbaijan's independence as the first step towards *Turan*, subsequently abandoned Pan-Turkism. The Turanist poet Mehmed Emin Yurdakul changed the words 'Turan' to 'vatan' (fatherland) in his poems.¹⁰⁸ This was followed by a limitation of the activities of Turkish Hearths in 1927. These constituted a challenge to the supremacy of the regime since they became the scene for Pan-Turkist discussions.¹⁰⁹

The step by step incorporation into the system reached to its peak in the 1930s. The RPP re-legitimized its position with a party programme. The closing down of Free Republican Party, which had turned out to be an anti-Kemalist forum, further strengthened the RPP by way of displaying that it was the only legitimate owner of the regime. The rising oppositions to the regime and reforms from different parts of the society were in fact the marks of the tension between active and passive or high and low cultures in Gellner's terminology. Realizing the tension, the next step to be paved by the Kemalists was to block the opposition in front of the fulfillment of the nationalization mission through reforms. This could be done only by creating a super-ideology in that environment. Indeed it was the elite which established the 'nation-state;' however being a nation-state did not mean anything to average people living within the borders.

The only *mefkure*-ideal of the people had been to 'defend Anatolia.' With the War of Independence, they had fulfilled that ideal by unifying under its umbrella. However after the regime was established there was not any reason for people to feel themselves attached to it. Shariah was still the dominating unifying facet among the people. The regime, since its very beginning had rejected the Ottoman and Islamic heritages; therefore there was nothing at the hands of intellectuals for creating the same unifying influence that especially Islam had. Although it was, by and large dismantled during the Ottoman times, Shariah still stood as a detailed manual for people. On the other hand, the Kemalists could not present this kind of a handbook. Therefore formation of anti-Kemalist or anti-modernist platforms by average people or by the ones who were not included in the founder elite was not a surprise. Most of the opposing

¹⁰⁸ Landau, *Ibid.*: p.76.

¹⁰⁹ Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması: 1923-1931* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), p. 306.

voices were actually taking their ground from religion. This could only be discarded with an ideological basis as strong and influential as Shariah. By this way, strong and deep attachments among people to the nation, state and regime could be realized. Then the mission of nationalization could be fulfilled; because people would have reasons to feel themselves attached to the regime.

To clarify, as Yıldız argues, the Kemalist elite had failed to supply the necessary romanticism to provide the continuation of what it had established.¹¹⁰ There were not any objective criteria except sharing the same territory that would keep these people together. Then ethnicity and race came to the scene as the defining criteria of the Turks and ‘others.’ Therefore it was not really a regime based on civic citizenship. It was territorial only because it had clearly defined borders; but this project did not have enough ‘ideological supply’ to fill this territories. Besides, since the Ottoman and Islamic heritages were rejected, the new regime could not justify Turks’ existence in Anatolia. Despite the rejection, referring to Islam, Muslims were somehow incorporated; they were not even counted as ‘nations.’ However there were also Greeks and Armenians living there. In fact, the mass deportation of the Armenians in 1915 for homogenizing Anatolian population had already resulted with the death of many Armenians. The new nation-state had to deal with this issue somehow. There was also the Greek factor. They were considered as ‘the traitors’ by the Turkish nation state. However they were praised in the ‘West’ since they fulfilled the image of romantic, independent and democratic ‘Greek miracle’ that Renan had constructed in 1876. Thus, Turkish existence should also be justified in such a way to disclaim any other nation’s existence, to correct its image of barbarians in the ‘West,’ and also to prove that it was as ancient, democratic, and independent as Greece or other European nations were.¹¹¹

Thus with these considerations mainly depended on the psychology of ‘defending’ and ‘proving,’ the emphasis was put on ethnicity flavored with religion. Every Muslim living in Turkey was called Turk or some ‘mountain-Turks’ who had

¹¹⁰ Yıldız, *Ibid.*: pp. 160-161.

¹¹¹ Etienne Copeaux, “Türk Milliyetçiliği: Sözcükler, Tarih, İşaretler,” in Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol.4, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002)pp. 48-49; Herkül Millas, *Türk Romanı ve Öteki: Ulusal Kimlikte Yunan İmajı*, (İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2000)

forgotten their Turkishness as the Kurds.¹¹² On the other hand, there were non-Muslims, these should be assimilated somehow. This is the ‘dark side’ of Kemalist nationalism within the borders of the Turkish state as Parla mentions,¹¹³ which was made visible through various policies and laws.¹¹⁴ At that point, science and history were used for legitimizing the nation’s existence against the non-Turks and also to create attachments among the Turks. Racial proofs were searched for filling ‘Turkishness’ independently from Islamic or Ottoman elements. These proofs while displaying who was the real Turk and who was not, at they had to be in such a way that the barbaric image of the Turks’ would be eliminated. This would scientifically prove that the Turks were as developed and talented as the ‘West.’ It was this point that racist elements, which were already there as the ideological production of late Ottoman Empire Pan-Turkist and European orientalist heritage. In fact, the Kemalist elite had bypassed the Ottoman and Islamic heritages at the official level and now they had that available package: European racism, orientalism, and Pan-Turkist works in this era of rising dictatorships.

2.3. The Outline for Turkishness: Turkish History Thesis:

Despite the rejection, the new Turkish Republic inherited the tenets of its intellectual structure from the Ottoman Empire. This inheritance also included the influence of European modernity. This package of two hundred years drew the mental map of the Kemalist elite. With that accumulation of knowledge and above-mentioned considerations, they decided to rediscover the identity of the Turkish Republic, Turkishness, through a rewriting of its history by referring to such disciplines as archeology, philology and anthropology. As in other nationalisms, the original homeland and the defining characteristics of the Turks were going to be uncovered and the autochthon identity was going to be shown with proofs, documents and records. This would erase any ambiguity or contradiction in the identity; so that eliminate the

¹¹² This discourse towards the Kurds continued later. For instance in Aydın Taneri, *Türkistanlı Bir Türk Boyu Kürtler* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1983); M. Fahrettin Kırzioğlu, *Her Bakımdan Türk Olan Kürtler* (Ankara: Çalışkan Basımevi, 1964); Hayri Başbuğ, *Kürttürkleri ve Fanatik Ermeni Faaliyetleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1984); Şükrü Kaya Seferoğlu and Halil Kemal Türközü, *101 Soruda Türklerin Kürt Boyu* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1982).

¹¹³ Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Oku*, vol.3 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p. 209.

¹¹⁴ Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), p. 128.

critics with the power of science at back. Most importantly the sleeping beauty would be awakened by the help of a golden age reference which was going to supply the necessary romanticism and *mefkure* through a depiction of the glorious past, silence present, and the mission of re-glorifying the nation in future. This agenda would help to create a homogeneous population with homogeneous aims within the borders of Turkey, so any opposition to the regime could be blocked.

Thus the rediscovery and creation of Turkishness began under the control of the Turkish State. This implies that this was a political project, not a scientific one. At first a history commission was established as a branch of Turkish Hearths in 1930. Its members included leading nationalists-politicians of the day, such as Afet İnan (1908-1985); Mehmed Tevfik [Bıyıkoğlu], the General Secretary of Mustafa Kemal and President of the Commission, Samih Rifat (Deputy to Çanakkale); Akçura (Deputy to İstanbul and Professor of law); Reşit Galip (Deputy and the General Secretary of the Commission); Hasan Cemil [Çambel] (1879-1967), (Deputy to Bolu); Sadri Maksudi [Arsal] (1880-1957), Deputy; Şemseddin [Günaltay] (1883-1961) (Deputy to Sivas); Yusuf Ziya [Özer] (1870-1947), Professor of law at İstanbul University.¹¹⁵ Under the direction of Mustafa Kemal and at the request of the Ministry of Education, the commission wrote a new textbook titled *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (The Main Tenets of Turkish History) in 1930. However it was found unsatisfactory by Mustafa Kemal; just its summary was published one hundred copies and distributed.¹¹⁶

The book summarized the basics of the Turkish History Thesis. In its introduction the aim was stated as “to reveal the secret of intelligence and characteristics of the Turk, to show this special character and strength of the Turk to himself and to declare the deep racial roots of our national evolution.”¹¹⁷ Besides, it s declared that the book comes up with an alternative to the genesis theories of different religions.¹¹⁸ This indicates that the book also had the aim of presenting an alternative history which was ‘universalistic’ and ‘scientific;’ hence an alternative not only to Islam

¹¹⁵ Büşra Ersanlı, “Bir Aidiyet Fermanı: Türk Tarih Tezi,” in Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol.4, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 804.

¹¹⁶ Uluğ İğdemir, *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1973), pp. 15-23.

¹¹⁷ *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları: Kemalist Yönetimin Resmi Tarih Tezi* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları: 1996), pp. 25-26.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*: pp. 27-51.

but also other monotheistic religions. The main problem of the book is that nation-builders were using the methodology of making presumption and then providing the evidence to verify. Then, they were claiming it to be scientific.

This was a monopoly of the state and it was further enhanced in 1931 when the Turkish Hearths were closed. Under the control of RPP, People's Houses were opened. These would serve for spreading 'Turkish national culture' and 'westernizing reforms.'¹¹⁹ A new organization, *Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti* (The Society for the Study of Turkish History), which later took the name of *Türk Tarih Kurumu* (Turkish Historical Society) was formed. It was followed by *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Linguistic Society). These two societies were given the duty of filling inside of 'Turkishness' through making research to find 'racial proofs.'¹²⁰ Turkish Historical Society then published a four-volume history textbook for high schools for the academic year 1931-1932. The book was written as the result of collective work of above-mentioned authors and through a continuous consultation with Mustafa Kemal. In the book, the Ottoman Empire did not occupy much place unlike 'the ancient Turks,' 'their fatherland' and 'their migrations.'¹²¹

Following the publication of the book, the first history congress was gathered in Ankara in 1932. The primary aim of the congress was to introduce Turkish History Thesis and so, 'Turkishness' to the public.¹²² The participants were predominantly high school teachers who were the potential users of the textbook. In the papers delivered at the congress, race was emphasized as the determining factor of any civilization. It was argued that national history should be written by referring to the racial origins. On this way to rewrite, 'correcting' the image of the 'barbarian' Turks was the first goal. This would be done by explaining that the Turks were the establisher of earliest civilizations in the world. Eugene Pittard, one of the race-ideologues that Mustafa Kemal read, was shown as the major reference. He argued that race is connected to blood, and it does not

¹¹⁹ Tunçay, *Ibid.*: p. 36.

¹²⁰ Maria Antoinette Czaplicka, *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day: An Inquiry to the Pan-Turanian Problem and Bibliographic Material Relating to Early Turks and Present Turks of Central Asia* (London: Curzon Press; NY: Barnes & Noble Books: 1973), pp. 14-16.

¹²¹ Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu* (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1992), p.119.

¹²² *Ibid.*

change as time passes. Pittard's emphasis on ethnic continuity became the guiding principle of the Society.

Here it is worth mentioning that Gobineau was the other author that Mustafa Kemal read. However he was not as influential as Pittard among the nation-builders, because Gobineau argued exactly the opposite of Pittard. According to him, races lose their homogeneity in time. Therefore the superior class-white became contaminated by the inferior yellow one. In that hierarchical picture, Gobineau placed Turks among the Mongoloid yellow race and argued that their purity and homogeneity also had been contaminated with the Ottomans and Seljuks.¹²³ If Gobineau was chosen as the main reference by the nation-builders, the assumed continuity between the Turks of 1930 and the ancient ones could not be explained. In order to reject the Islamic and Ottoman heritage, on the other hand, Gobineau's theory was needed but in an incomplete way which remarked that Turks were not contaminated by Islam; but their real essence and identity were shadowed by it as a consequence of hundreds of years of alienation. It seems that a total discrediting of Islam was not that possible unlike the nationalists had assumed.

In the same direction, "the designated historian of Atatürk," Afetinan presented a paper in which she argued that Turks did not belong to the Mongoloid yellow race, because they had already been in the highest stage of civilization at a time when Europe was living in ignorance and savageness.¹²⁴ This was the basis of her Ph.D. thesis, *Türk Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri ve Türkiye Tarihi* (On the Anthropological Character of the Turkish People and Turkish History), which she wrote under the supervision of Pittard. This thesis was produced as the result of an anthropometrical research on the skulls of sixty five thousands Turks the main argument being that the Turks were a brachycephal (broad-headed) race, a characteristic that defines Alpine group of the white race.¹²⁵ Contributing to İnan, Reşit Galip, in his article, depicted the physical characteristics of the Turkish race; "tall, white skinned, mostly blue-eyed, as

¹²³ Turan, *Ibid.*: pp. 46-47.

¹²⁴ Afetinan, "Tarihten Suret ve Tarihin Fecrinde," pp. 18-41. *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi: Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları, Münakaşalar* (İstanbul: T.C.Maarif Vekaleti, 1933). This depiction of Europe before the arrival of the Turks is actually very much similar to the depiction of the situation of the Arab Peninsula before the arrival of Mohammed in textbooks.

¹²⁵ Yıldız, *Ibid.*: p. 186.

being one of the most beautiful representatives of the white race.”¹²⁶ Another nationalist, Hasan Cemil [Çambel] referred to the anthropometric and linguistic data by Hommel, a German anthropologist and argued that the creators of the Crete civilization were the ancient Turks.¹²⁷

Until the following history congress, making ‘scientific research’ depending on race became very popular. For instance, in 1935 Sinan’s skeleton was examined by the members of Turkish History Society in order to reach his perfect intelligence and scientific personality.¹²⁸ Within this environment of popularization of science for determining the racial characteristics, the second history congress was gathered. In the congress Pittard also presented a paper. In it he argued that Turks are the members of brachycephal Homo-Alpinus race, which migrated to Europe from Central Asia by passing through the Straits and Danube. They are the ones who taught European people to domesticate animals and cultivate.¹²⁹ Another interesting paper was by Nurettin Onur. He argued that, more importantly than anthropometric research, blood group is the determinant of race. According to his data, the A group was specific to Europe and Asia, and the B group was seen in India and China. In Turkey, the percentage of type A increases from the east to the west. Onur takes this as evidence for that Turks were the main root of that A group and transmitter of it to Europe.¹³⁰

Şevket Aziz Kansu presented a remarkable paper as well. Examining the skeletons of Seljuk Turks, he argued that there was ethnic continuity in Anatolia.¹³¹ Moreover, Sadi Irmak, in his research, emphasized the importance of blood types and finger print in distinguishing different races from one another. According to his research, Turks’ blood groups and fingerprints are very similar to those of people living in Southern Europe. By Irmak, this similarity was taken as an evidence of that these people had common ancestors. The argument then reaches to its direction with the

¹²⁶ Reşit Galip, “Türk Irk ve Medeniyetine Umumi Bir Bakış,” in *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*, p. 159

¹²⁷ Hasan Cemil [Çambel], “Ege Medeniyetinin Menşesine Umumi Bir Bakış,” in *Ibid.*: pp. 199-214.

¹²⁸ Soner Çağatay, “Otuzlarda Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Irk, Dil ve Etnisite,” in Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol.4, p. 256.

¹²⁹ Pittard, “Neolitik Devirde Küçük Asya ve Avrupa Arasında Antropolojik Münasebetler,” in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi: Kongrenin Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler* (İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1943), pp. 65-84.

¹³⁰ Nurettin Onur, “Kan Grupları Bakımından Türk Irkının Menşei Üzerine Bir Etüd,” in *Ibid.*: pp. 845-851.

¹³¹ Şevket Aziz Kansu, “Selçuklu Türkleri Hakkında Antropolojik Bir İlk Tetkik ve Neticeleri,” in *Ibid.*: pp. 440-456.

Irmak's claim that Turks were not contaminated like most of the Europeans, particularly Germans, and Greeks.¹³² Here by referring to the Germans, Irmak actually made a remark about the rise of racist ideals in Germany. In that context, what Irmak argues for is that Turkish nation is a more homogeneous nation than that of the Germans'. Not surprisingly, the other degenerated and contaminated nation is the Greeks which had claims in Anatolia. Irmak left no space for any Greek interest in Anatolia, and in any civilization with that argument as the other Kemalist theses.

Besides ethnic continuity, the 'civilized genius' of the Turks was declared through emphasizing their state-making ability. Sadri Makdusi Arsal argued that nomads had the ability of unifying many tribes in case of a war. This made them talented in establishing states. In the Turkish case also nomads played a role in terms of defense; but the real founders were sedentary Turks.¹³³ Here Arsal engages in a big attempt of 'correcting' the image. On the one hand, he accepts that Turks were nomads; on the other he argues that the ones who established many states were not sedentary having the nomadic nature of the Mongols in his mind. In the correction of image, Kemal Kepelioğlu stresses the importance of sports for the Turks. According to his presentation, many types of sports that were thought as the innovations of Europe were actually belonged to the Turks who even had a branch called Sports.¹³⁴ Again Kepelioğlu paves the way of claiming the ownership of European civilization with no emphasis on the Ottomans; but along with a presentation of heroic deeds and life-time fitting nature of the Turks.

The rejection of Islamic heritage was also on the scene. Aarsal states that the intellectuals were waiting for Mustafa Kemal as the savior, chief like the Arab intellectuals who waited for Muhammad.¹³⁵ This sentence monopolizes the leadership in Mustafa Kemal while also taking the benefit of a widely-known historical incident. By this way, a similarity in terms of impacts is established while at the same time reducing the striking importance of Mohammed in the eyes of people. In fact, the rejection of Islamic heritage was also on the scene. First Psalty, an Athenian participant, made a

¹³² Sadi Irmak, "Türk Irkının Biyolojisine Dair Araştırmalar: Kan Grupları ve Parmak İzleri," in *Ibid.*: pp. 841-845.

¹³³ Sadri Maksudi Aarsal, "Beşeriyet Tarihinde Devlet ve Hukuk Mefhumu ve Müesseselerinin İnkişafında Türk Irkının Rolü," in *Ibid.*: pp. 1062-1093.

¹³⁴ Kemal Kepelioğlu, "Türklerde Spor," in *Ibid.*: pp. 939-148.

¹³⁵ Aarsal, *Ibid.*

presentation on the Christian Turks, the Gagaus.¹³⁶ The main argument was that Turk did not mean Muslim every time. Another presentation was by Şerafettin Yaltkaya. He stated that Islam had some similar customs to the Turkish ones. As one of the examples he declared the tradition of rain-stone; meaning to rub one stone against the other with the belief of making it rain, in ancient Turks, and rain-prayer in Islam. According to Yaltkaya, this shows that Islam borrowed from the ancient Turks.¹³⁷ While being aware of Islam's prominence among the people, one presentation emphasizes Christians, and the other Turkicizes Islam. Both contribute greatly to reducing the importance of Islam.

In the second history congress, the Sun-Language Theory was also publicized with Hasan Reşit Tankut and İbrahim Necmi Dilmen's presentations. According to this theory, Turkish is the earliest language in the world. Other great languages like Arabic, Persian and French, were originated from it.¹³⁸ The theory then goes on by displaying some of the similarities between other languages and their Turkish counterparts. Özdoğan here makes a very interesting point. The Sun-Language Theory had already been presented by Enver Celalettin Pasha in 1917, but it did not become that popular.¹³⁹ This may be related with the fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century the intellectual elite was not that ready for this kind of an inclusive idea. Their language 'reforms' were just including literature, education and press.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, Celalettin's ideas presented Turkish as being independent from the Ottoman Turkish. This could be a radical idea for the day's intellectuals. However the Kemalist elite had the claim that the Turks were the earliest civilization in the world. This naturally led to the idea that all languages originated from Turkish. Legitimizing the attempts of 'cleaning' the language from Arabic and Persian elements, this new theory also 'proved' that Turkish was the origin of European languages. This perception meant that Turks were a part of the western civilization since the very beginning; they were even the creators of it. This eliminated the existence of other languages. The rejection of linguistic heritage through inventing a pre-Islamic tradition also justified the reforms like transition to Latin alphabet and translation of the call to prayer into Turkish.

¹³⁶ Fr. Psalty, "Türkelide Hristiyanlık," in *Ibid.*: 887-895.

¹³⁷ Şerafettin Yaltkaya, "Eski Türk Ananelerinin Bazı Dini Müesseselere Tesirleri," in *Ibid.*: pp. 690-698.

¹³⁸ Hasan Reşit Tankut, "Dil ve Irk Münasebetleri Hakkında," in *Ibid.*: pp. 221-223; İbrahim Necmi Dilmen, "Türk Tarih Tezinde Güneş-Dil Teorisinin Yeri ve Değeri," in *Ibid.*: 85-98.

¹³⁹ Özdoğan (2002a), p. 85.

¹⁴⁰ Ersanlı (1992), p. 75.

To elaborate more on the theses, firstly, the nation-builders were fighting against the image of the Turks as barbaric and not enough talented for establishing civilization. It was argued in the theses that Turks were the members of the superior Arian race. Then it was declared that they were an ‘ancient civilized nation,’ which was already democratic and egalitarian since the 7th century BC. Besides, it was the Turks who civilized Central Asia and established the earliest civilizations in China, India, Mesopotamia, Nile Valley, Anatolia and the Aegean coast by disseminating their talents and values.¹⁴¹ Then the Thesis challenges to the ancient Greece mythos of the European civilization which has been used by the Europeans to claim that they were already established the highest civilization which was at the same time the basis for the contemporary democracy. The Thesis claims that in the formation of ancient Greece, Turks played a great role; therefore ancient Greek was actually originated from the ancient Central Asian Turkish language with small differences in the dialects. Indeed, claiming a share in the Greek civilization was such a big project among the late Ottoman early Republican intellectuals. Particularly Yakup Kadri and Yahya Kemal were interested in taking the roots back to the ancient Greece, under the title Neo-Hellenism movement, through their writings. They argued that *Bahr-i Sefid Havza-i Medeniyeti* in Anatolia nurtured the ancient Greek civilization.¹⁴² As a production of this understanding, Yakup Kadri in his novel, *Nur Baba* depicts the rituals of a Bektashi tekke for showing the similarities with Dionysus rituals.¹⁴³

As the second point, the theses implied that the original homeland of the Turks was Central Asia. Turks migrated from there as a result of climatic changes, mainly drought. With the migration they scattered everywhere to establish civilizations.¹⁴⁴ This point of the Thesis was giving the Turks their pre-Islamic roots while at the same time explaining the reason for their existence in Anatolia. Climatic changes, ‘the reason for

¹⁴¹ Aarsal, *Ibid.*

¹⁴² Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, *Siyasi ve Edebi Portreler* (İstanbul: İstanbul Fethi Cemiyeti, 1968), p. 10.

¹⁴³ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Nur Baba* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000). This novel is particularly important for seeing how history interrupts fiction in the process of nationalization. Yakup Kadri writes the novel in 1915. In its very crude form the novel depicted the rituals of Nur Baba tekke. However when the novel was published as a book in 1922, it had been changed. Firstly, a preface was added in which Yakup Kadri states that the ancient Greeks and the contemporary ones are different. As the second, a Zeyl was written in which the corruption of the tekke is narrated. These changes served for two purposes; otherization of Greeks but claiming a share in ancient Greece and also secularization with an anti-Islamic reaction to the concept of tekke although the Bektashis were used for showing the ancient Greek roots of Turks or the Turkish roots of ancient Greece.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*: p. 19.

the migration' was providing an 'objective' and 'scientific reason' that could not be challenged by social or political ones.

The third point of the theses was that from the immemorial time Turks established eighteen states including; ancient Egyptian civilization and state, the Hittites in Anatolia, Sumerians in Mesopotamia, the Great Hun Empire in Asia, the Seljuks, Timur's empire, the Mongol Empire in India, the Turkish-Ottoman Empire and finally the Turkish Republic. The best one among those was considered to be the last one. State-making here is attributed only to the Turks, so it provided a powerful stance for the modern Turkish state against minorities. This state-making talent was also an explanation for why Turks did not go through a barbaric phase.¹⁴⁵

The last point was that, from the very beginning Turks were there as 'a nation' with their military and state. This point at the same time reduces the importance of the Ottoman Empire in the 'national' history of the Turks.¹⁴⁶ This marginalization of the Ottomans did not mean discrediting of it completely. It was still needed for justifying the present period of somnolence or the period of darkness when all glory was lost. It was argued that the Ottomans, because of their bad administration, shadowed the real essence of the Turks, such as Turks ability to establish egalitarian, democratic and ethnically pure states. This claim also helped to another one; the ethnic continuity of contemporary Turks with the ancient ones. According to the theses, since the Bronze Age and the Hittites, Turks did not live through a racial or political interruption; therefore they kept their continuity. This claim was at the same time, historically Turkifying Anatolia.¹⁴⁷

With all these elements and 'proofs,' the Ottoman-Turkish history was re-written. The result was a complex road map shaped by the mixture of different legacies. Gökalp and Akçura were the two most influential ideologues of the building process. A combination of their views, as culture and race, was at the hands of the elite. In his *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, Gökalp emphasizes common culture, morality, aesthetics and religion as the elements that make people a 'nation.' He does not count race or blood

¹⁴⁵ Halil Berktaş, *Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi ve Fuat Köprülü* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983), pp. 51-54.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ersanlı (2002), pp. 805-806.

tie. For him people living in a country might belong to different races, after some time, if they do not mix up with people from other countries, they turn into a single nation. People of other cultures but having the same aim of becoming a nation, might learn the nation's culture through education.¹⁴⁸ Similarly to Gökbalp, the Kemalist elite emphasized culture as one of the unifying factors for a nation. In that case, both Gökbalp and the Kemalist elite declared that westernization or *muasırlaşmak* should include borrowing of technical matters; not anything cultural. However the Kemalist elite added ethnic heritage into the picture. According to them, 'national culture' is hereditary, cannot be learnt through education if a person was not carrying the real essence of it.

The Kemalist elite borrowed the 'hereditary' aspect of 'nation' probably from Akçura, who stresses common ethnic heritage. For the Turkish case, Akçura argues that despite conversions to different religions throughout history, Turks protected their common cultural and ethnic heritage. Among the elements of this culture, Akçura states patrimonial political system, the talent of administration and establishing powerful states. His is a more secularized approach in comparison to Gökbalp's. For Akçura, religion has a functional role of unifying people; it makes things easy for founding the Pan-Turkist unity. Except the point on irredentism, at the official level, Kemalist elite seemed to take Akçura as the guide in creating history. Since Akçura did not base his argument on religion, he was able to present a secular approach for the elite. This can be the reason why Gökbalp's *Türkçülüğün Esasları* was not published for a second time until 1939.¹⁴⁹ Most importantly, Akçura's emphasis on continuity became the main tenet of the Turkish History Thesis in order to 'prove' that Anatolia belonged to Turks, the clearly and distinctly identifiable ethnic community throughout history. Thus Akçura's approach helped to write a 'racialized history,' in fact he was one of the authors of History textbook by the Turkish History Society.

¹⁴⁸ Gökbalp (2001), p. 21.

¹⁴⁹ Parla, *Ziya Gökbalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989), pp. 118-119.

CHAPTER III:

SUPREMACY OF 'STATE' AND REACTIONS TO ANONYMITY

3.1. The Kemalist Regime and 'Outside Influences:'

*"Almanya'da nasıl Hitler varsa,
bizim de Atatürk'ümüz var."
İbrahim Tatlıses, Milliyet, 04.04.2005*

The dissemination of the Turkish History Thesis, centered on an anonymous race-based definition of Turkishness, was not as smooth as the thesis' creation. The identity was created by the 'State,' therefore any opposition to it carried the same meaning with opposing to the 'State.' This Weberian understanding of 'State' shaped the nature of the regime. In order to block the oppositions to the collective homogeneous identity, centralization of the State through various mechanisms and measurements was required. The measures were implemented through a single-party regime. Although there took place two experiences for transition to multi-party regime system, they were short-lived. The most important reason for their failure was that they actually formed an anti-regime, so 'anti-modern' platform as Kemalists thought. They were considered as challenges to the 'State,' and so the two political parties were closed down.

The main aim of the Kemalist elite was to provide supremacy of the 'State' similarly to late Ottoman intellectuals who tried to cure the 'ill man.' The Kemalist elite were trying to defend the 'State,' eliminate challenges in any way, for 'reaching contemporary level of civilizations.' This approach to State further empowered the equation of nation to state, which came to mean that nation could not exist without 'State.' In this case the leader was the embodiment of 'nation-State.' Mustafa Kemal was the only charismatic leader of the movement, who had all powers at his hand. He was the Grand Chief, later the 'Father' like *Duce* or *Führer*, he was the personification of the system whose authority was legitimized through various laws. This is the reason

why in *the Speech*; Mustafa Kemal tells the ‘War of Independence’ or the reforms by using ‘I,’ as if he tells his own personal story.¹⁵⁰ After the death of Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü immediately declared himself the ‘National Chief’ and at the same time the Constitution was revised to make İnönü the permanent general president of the RPP.¹⁵¹ However, the foremost reason for this centralization was not to challenge Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, but to protect permanency, supremacy and integrity of the ‘State’ in that environment of power vacuum after his death.¹⁵² Then, İnönü adopted a tight control over the decision-making process.¹⁵³

Despite this centralization of decision-making, Turhan Feyzioğlu in his article, *Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik*, states that Kemalism, ‘the ideology of Turkey,’ cannot be equalized with any kind of dictatorial or theocratic system like fascism, communism, and racism. It is rational, modern, civilized, humanist, democratic, peaceful, and unifying.¹⁵⁴ However historically it is not a good starting point to think Kemalism as independent and isolated from other contemporary political systems of the time. It was not located in a vacuum, so that it developed in the same pool with other nation and state-building ideologies of Europe; such as the dictatorships in Germany and Italy. To look from a broader aspect, following the First World War, democracy was a trend in the world; Europe and also Turkish Republic went into democratization by adopting territorial understanding of citizenship. However during the period between 1918 and 1945, that ‘temple,’ in Mazower’s allegory, was left as a consequence of a series political and economic crisis, including the world economic crisis of 1929 and the crisis in the universalistic territorial citizenship which was challenged by ‘local.’¹⁵⁵ The race-fetish of the nationalists became visible in the 1930s in Europe leading to chauvinism.¹⁵⁶ In that case, as Koçak states there were other national chiefs in the international arena as Mustafa Kemal.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁰ For a critical and detailed examination of *the Speech*: Parla (1991), v.1., *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları*, v.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991).

¹⁵¹ Deringil, *Ibid.*: p. 48.

¹⁵² Koçak, *Ibid.*: p. 67.

¹⁵³ Hale, *Ibid.*: p. 80.

¹⁵⁴ Turhan Feyzioğlu, “Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik,” in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Yetmişbeş Yılı Armağanı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1998), p. 60. Cited in Yıldız, *Ibid.*: pp. 122-123.

¹⁵⁵ Mark Mazower, *Karanlık Kıta: Avrupa’nın 20. Yüzyılı* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 22-45.

¹⁵⁶ Berktaş, “Dört Tarihçinin Sosyal Portresi,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, n. 54 (Summer-Fall 1991), pp. 30-31.

¹⁵⁷ Koçak, *Ibid.*: p. 67.

Thus this period witnessed the rise of dictatorial regimes, and already existing racist nature, under powerful leaders. Within this picture, ‘Grand Chief’ and ‘National Chief’ of the Kemalist regime were very similar to nation-leader equation of the corporatist and fascist regimes. In fact some of the Kemalist elite imply that they admired from these dictatorships. The General Secretary of the RPP, Recep Peker, in his class notes of History of Revolution that he gave between 1934 and 1935, mentions them in a positive manner¹⁵⁸ particularly by emphasizing the authoritarian, statist and corporatist sides of them.¹⁵⁹ Besides, in his memoirs, Niyazi Berkes, Professor of sociology at İstanbul University in the mid-1930s, makes the point of the Kemalist elite’s borrowings from the authoritarian regimes. He states that being against Mustafa Kemal carried the same meaning with being anti-nationalist very similar to national socialism in which being anti-Nazi meant being not a real nationalist.¹⁶⁰ This remark of Berkes is more understandable if the remaining part of above-mentioned speech of İnönü after the Sheikh Said Rebellion is considered; “We are openly nationalists...and nationalism is our sole unifying element.”¹⁶¹ These sentences imply that nationalism only meant Turkish nationalism since ‘Turkishness’ is assumed to be the only anti-Ottoman, anti-Islamic and also ‘modern’ unifying element.

In the mid-1930s, one Party, one State, one Leader, and one nation equation was empowered. Here nation is not written with capital n, because it was the passive element, object of this equation. Turkish citizens were considered to be natural members of the RPP. Therefore getting rid of any opposition was a mission for all.¹⁶² The RPP increased its measures for centralization as new challenges within the borders emerged. Then many associations were closed down together with various newspapers.¹⁶³ Berkes declares the political environment of the day as follows; “closing down of the newspapers became a part of our daily lives.”¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, in its fourth congress, the RPP also prepared a political programme. The influence of fascism and national socialism can also be followed from that programme. In the fiftieth article it was stated that “Turkish youth is going to be gathered under a national organization

¹⁵⁸ Recep Peker, *İnkılab Dersleri Notları* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935), pp. 63-65.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*: pp. 86-88.

¹⁶⁰ Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), p.162.

¹⁶¹ Poulton, *Ibid.*: p. 120.

¹⁶² Yıldız, *Ibid.*: p. 195

¹⁶³ Özdoğan, “Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Turancılık,” in *Modern Türkiyede Siyasi Düşünce* (2002b), p. 399.

¹⁶⁴ Berkes, *Ibid.*: p. 269.

which will inculcate them love of homeland and revolution together with a pure morality.” Accordingly, “physical education will be given to all Turkish youth in order to equip them with the necessary physical and mental skills for defending the country by dedicating themselves with their whole existence.”¹⁶⁵ This article absolutizes State’s control over ‘its’ people.

After RPP’s first programme in 1935, Law of Physical Education was promulgated. These policies concerning sports and physical education were shaped under German influence. Turkish government itself invited doctors and athletes to Turkey in order to strengthen Turkish population.¹⁶⁶ The control of body by the State was also prevalent in population policies. As in the case of national socialism, the main idea was to prevent population from degeneration, so that to create a mentally and physically fit population¹⁶⁷ in this world of struggles and war.¹⁶⁸ This qualified population was seen as the potential army in fact whole ‘nation’ was an army, since the Turks were a military-nation.¹⁶⁹ Therefore only Turks were given permission to study at Military schools.¹⁷⁰ The campaign for speaking Turkish and also the Wealth Tax eliminated non-Muslims who had a big share in trade.¹⁷¹

Thus, in the larger context, Kemalist regime developed in the same pool with other contemporary ideologies of the time. Its absolutist and totalitarian understanding of state was accompanied by racism in creating a homogeneous nation. These were mainly the heritages of the nineteenth century positivism, German Romanticism, and also the Ottoman Empire. For the Turkish case, together with the future prospect of westernization, Turkism of the previous century constituted the major vein that those different layers of influence were mixed and poured down. In fact as in the case of the age of nationalisms, neither the Ottoman Empire nor Turkey can be taken as isolated from what was happening in the world at that time. In the middle of these different influences Turkish nationalism was established on racial presumptions as many other

¹⁶⁵ Yiğit Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar: Erken Cumhuriyet’te Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 72.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*: p. 70.

¹⁶⁷ Ayça Alemdaroğlu, “Türkiye’de Öjeni Düşüncesi, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 414.

¹⁶⁸ Hasan Ünder, “Türkiye’de Sosyal Darwinizm Düşüncesi,” *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 429.

¹⁶⁹ Altınay, *Ibid.*: p. 28.

¹⁷⁰ Akın, *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Yıldız, *Ibid.*: pp. 298-299.

nationalisms of the time. Through science these presumptions or myths were ‘proven’ and so turned into absolute, unchallengeable ‘realities.’ Any critique was perceived as a challenge to the permanency of the ‘State.’ However there were critiques to that homogeneous identity which laid down westernization as the sole aim and explained the Turks contributions to the civilization by referring to ‘western’ civilization. The critics were kept away from the state circles, because they were challenging the absolute monopoly of the state on intellectual production.

3.2. Reactions to Anonymity:

Thus the nation-builders acted as historians or *vice versa*. No matter who they were, their mission was to prove the original thesis through history and anthropology. Writing state-sponsored history provided the legitimacy for an understanding of history that was limited to political powers.¹⁷² Especially with the closing down of the Turkish Hearths, intellectual production was monopolized by the ‘State,’ there was no space for interpretation. In the first congress few scholars could able to criticize that religion. Their critiques were mainly about the methodology, because the sources used by these nation-builders were secondary sources imported from European anthropologists and philologists. In other words, like Ottomans did, ‘Turks’ were also learning themselves through European gaze nurtured by the considerations of ‘proving.’

Fuat Köprülü, as one of the critics, attracted attention to the use of sources and declared that the European sources on Turkish history were so new to present efficient arguments; Chinese sources should be used for discovering the ancient Turks. Zeki Velidi Togan also argued that the findings were not seemed to be scientific. He articulated that big climatic changes happened much earlier than Turks’ migration from Central Asia. Therefore drought could not be the reason. In order to find out the reasons Chinese archive should be examined especially for understanding the rivals between Turks and other people living in Central Asia.¹⁷³ In the minds Togan’s suggestion on looking at the relations with other people, could lead to the feeling that ‘Turks escaped from their homeland.’ This was unacceptable, because Turks were brave fighters since

¹⁷² Ersanlı (1992), p. 13.

¹⁷³ *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi: Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları, Münakaşalar*

an immemorial time. Taking an old climatic change and pasting it to the time that Turks were supposed to migrate was the solution, because it seemed to be more ‘scientific’ with its focus on only Turks, not also other communities. Therefore, the questions of these two scholars raised a big negative reaction to themselves. The interesting thing is that the only target was not Togan’s ideas. After some point the debate turned into a personal one.¹⁷⁴ Then without answering any of the questions, the congress was closed by Yusuf Akçura.

The reactions to the critiques had become too influential that there was not even small critique to the thesis in the second congress, which Ersanlı calls as the ‘victory of scienticism.’¹⁷⁵ Another remarkable point by Ersanlı is that the critiques and responses to them also show who was closer to the center.¹⁷⁶ As a Pan-Turkist, but more of a functional and analytical one, Akçura incorporated into the Kemalist elite; he was one of the architects of the Thesis which was pursuing Turkism in Turkey. Togan was also a Pan-Turkist like Akçura. In fact, according to Copeaux, the Thesis was completely based on Togan’s book *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş* (Introduction to General Turkish History), in which Togan argued that Turks had relations with Chinese, Indian, Mesopotamian, Asian, Egyptian, and even Central American civilizations. The only difference was with the Thesis was the degree of emphasis on the role of Turks.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, Togan did not support all of the Kemalist reforms, such as the transition to Latin alphabet. According to him, since it could not be read by other Turkish-speaking communities unlike the Arabic one, Latin alphabet would prevent the intellectual connection between Turkey and other Turkish speaking lands. For a ‘westernizing,’ the permanency of Arabic alphabet was unacceptable. Besides, Togan argued that an independent academic linguistics commission of all Turkish-speaking lands should be established for making an evolution in Turkish language, not a revolution.¹⁷⁸ He was suggesting alternative things to the Kemalist elite. However this was not acceptable by the intellectual monopoly that was striving to eliminate every reference to Islam.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.: pp. 167-193, 369-400.

¹⁷⁵ Ersanlı (2002), p. 806.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.: pp. 805-806.

¹⁷⁷ Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1933) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), pp. 28-29.

¹⁷⁸ Soysal, ibid: p. 489.

Togan was a politically active Pan-Turkist in the Turkish-speaking lands whereas the Kemalist elite were trying to keep itself away from Pan-Turkist discussions at the official level. However the nation-builders of Turkey still needed Pan-Turkist ideas in order to bypass Islamic and Ottoman roots. Emphasizing that they were not Pan-Turkists, the elite at the same time pushed for ‘cultural Turkism’ through a ‘racialized history.’ The Thesis defined Turkishness in such a way to instill pride to people as being ‘the descendants’ of a glorious race. This was the agenda-mission-*mefkure*; to reawaken that ‘essence’ in deep inside of every ‘Turk.’ This could be realized only by pumping ‘cultural Turkism.’

Accordingly, the Turkish History Thesis has become a part of educational curriculum. Besides, the People’s Houses published a series of books for spreading the Central Asian thesis to the older generation. One of the books was Fuat Şükrü Dilbilen’s *Turan ve Türkler*. This included poetry which idealized *Turan* and longed for the land.¹⁷⁹ Here the longing for the land geographically was not necessarily a Pan-Turkist image, but might be a milder version of it used deliberately. Another book was A. Avni Çandar’s *Türklüğün Kökleri ve Yayılışı*. In its first chapter, the greatness of the Turks is emphasized.¹⁸⁰ Besides, the Sun-Language Theory was publicized through books on the issue.¹⁸¹ In addition to these, a mass use of Central Asia paganist figures was on the scene as a part of daily life. The Grey Wolf figure was reproduced every where; on money, cigarette packages, on the hats of school children, as the emblem of the Ministry of Education, Turcology Institute, National Turkish Students Association, Turkish Hearths, first ‘national’ oil company-Petrol Ofisi, Turkish scouts.¹⁸² It is not wrong to say that in every aspect of the life the Turkish History Thesis, ‘the glorious origins coming from the Central Asia’ was reproduced. The process was like Gellner’s. Through the use of education and communications, the high culture, the super-identity disseminated itself to everywhere without considering any alternative.

¹⁷⁹ Fuat Şükrü Dilbilen, *Turan ve Türkler: Şiir* (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1931)

¹⁸⁰ A. Avni Çandar, *Türklüğün Kökleri ve Yayılışı* (İstanbul: Necmi İstiklal Matbaası, 1934), pp. 10-15

¹⁸¹ Türk Dil Kurumu, *Prof. H. Reşit Tankut’un Güneş-Dil Teorisine Göre Pankronik Usuller ve Paleo-Sosyolojik Dil Tetkikleri Adlı Tezinde Geçen Örnekler* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1936); H. Reşit Tankut, *Güneş-Dil Teorisine Göre Dil Tetkikleri; Güneş-Dil Teorisine Göre Toponomik Tetkikler* (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936); Naim Onat, *Güneşin Uzaklaşmasından ve Batmasından Doğan Anlamlarla Bunları Anlatmaya Yarayan Sözler Üzerine Güneş-Dil Teorisine Göre Türkçe-Arapça Karşılaştırmalar Tezine Bağlı Örnekler* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1936).

¹⁸² www.bozkurt.net (21.07.2005).

Thus, with the closing of the Turkish Hearths and marginalization of the alternative ideas, history-writing was monopolized. This led to strong pronouncements of who are ‘we’ and ‘they.’ Combined with the efforts to create an agenda for the future generations, ‘Turkishness’ was defined anonymously. This definition was ‘verified’ through science, and myths were turned into ‘proven’ realities; so that the critiques were blocked at the official level whereas Pan-Turkists ideas were still referred in order to establish the Thesis within the society. This certainly implies an ideological continuity in Turkish nationalism. However the problem was not the use of Pan-Turkist ideas as long as they stayed at the cultural level. In fact, they had to be kept at that level also because of the Soviet Union factor. The problem was basically a struggle for getting power to be at the center; it was a struggle to become a part of history.

The ‘reactionaries’ came together under another discussion platform for Turkist ideas, which, in a way, replaced the Turkish Hearths.¹⁸³ This new platform was journals. They also constituted a platform for anti-‘modern’ values of the center, so also anti-center, accordingly anti-regime as Kemalists considered them despite the fact that they were coming from the same vein except the Kemalist strong emphasis on westernization. From then on, these journals became the prominent part of history of Pan-Turkism¹⁸⁴ and history of Turkish nationalism after the Thesis. For choosing the medium of journal as a platform instead of others, Türkkkan in his article states that publication of a journal did not require a large capital investment. Indeed the Turkish Press, particularly the newspapers, was being controlled very rigidly. In that case, journal was a good choice, because if it was suspended by the State for any reason, a new one could be published immediately.¹⁸⁵

The first journal was *Atsız Mecmua*, which was published one month after the suspension of the Turkish Hearths, May 15 1931. It appeared as seventeen issues until 25 September 1932. Its publisher-editor was Nihal Atsız, a student of Togan. The contributors included Zeki Velidi Togan, Abdulkadir İnan, Nihad Sami Banarlı, Orhan Şaik Gökyay, Sabahattin Ali, Abdalbaki Gölpınarlı, Pertev Naili Boratav, Ali İhsan Sabis, Ahmet Caferoğlu, Şakir Ülkütaşır, and Fuat Köprülü. If the 1944 feud between

¹⁸³ Önen (2005), p. 251.

¹⁸⁴ Landau, *Ibid.*: p. 87.

¹⁸⁵ Reha Oğuz Türkkkan, “The Turkish Press,” *Middle Eastern Affairs*, v. 18 (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, May 1950), p. 143.

Nihal Atsız and Sabahattin Ali is considered, it can be said that the journal was an umbrella for ‘marginalized’ intellectuals of different sides. In other words, *Atsız Mecmua* brought together different intellectuals who were anti-center, not necessarily Pan-Turkists always. However there is also the point that Atsız himself was writing a large percentage of the articles. The writings mostly focus on cultural aspects; Turkish history and literature, with considerable attention given to the Turkish-speaking people. There are articles on Uzbek and Turkmen music,¹⁸⁶ and popular literature of Azerbaijan.¹⁸⁷ A series of articles concerned with the statistical data of Turks living in Soviet lands.¹⁸⁸ In the end it is stated that there are 16.462.381 Turks living in Soviet lands. The loyalty to Mustafa Kemal is also emphasized despite the fact that Atsız was a Pan-Turkist; “Turkish history met with its genius and accepted him deeply as the eternal masterpiece.”¹⁸⁹

The most important article of Atsız for showing his reaction to the Turkish History Thesis is “Which race Turks are belonged to?” In the article, Atsız opposes to the argument that Turks were belonged to the same race with the Europeans. He declares “are we going to be the member of same race with the gypsies while trying to escape from the wild Mongols?” He then continues that “there is no need to claim the ownership of the civilizations of foreign tribes” “for arguing that Turks are the first comers to Anatolia,” “this is not scientific.” At that point, his militaristic ideas come to the scene. According to him there is no need to be the oldest tribe in a particular land to claim its ownership. The most important thing is to provide the superiority of the Turkish race in that land. The foremost aim, *mefkure* for Atsız is the unification of all Turks, so that the formation of Great Turkey under one flag and one army.¹⁹⁰ Therefore Atsız gives some militant messages to the Turkish youth.¹⁹¹ Although the geographical reference of Atsız is not limited with Anatolia, he argues that the real essence of Turkishness is found in the Anatolian villagers. Atsız does not look for a pure blood tie among the conditions of being Turk. For him ‘consciousness is enough, but it is hereditary. Therefore he considers the ones who carry Turkish blood as Turk. Atsız does

¹⁸⁶ Viktor Belayef; Abdülkadir (transl.) “Özbek Musikisi,” in *Atsız Mecmua* (2:15 June 1931), pp. 30-33; “Türkmen ve Özbek Musikisi,” in *Ibid.* (5 : 15 September 1931), pp. 103-109.

¹⁸⁷ Abdülkadir, “Azerbaycan Halk Edebiyatında ‘Sayacı’ Türküsü,” in *Ibid.* (9: 15 January 1932), pp. 228-231.

¹⁸⁸ Abdülkadir, “Türkistan (Orta Asya) Cumhuriyetleri Nüfusu,” in *Ibid.* 1-4: 15 May to 15 August 1931.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.* (1: 15 May 1931), p. 9.

¹⁹⁰ Atsız, “Türkler Hangi Irktandır?” in *Ibid.* (1: 15 May 1931), pp. 6-7, 22.

¹⁹¹ Atsız, “Askerlik Aleyhtarlığı,” in *Ibid.* (17: 25 September 1932), pp. 100-103.

not completely ignore the Ottomans, but does not mention the political elite surrounding the Sultan. In the journal, there are also articles that praise Ziya Gökalp.¹⁹² In a way Atsız tries to balance his militarist views with ‘cultural Turkism’ of the center. Atsız divides Turkish history into two as inside of the homeland, outside of it. In the homeland there is Turkistan, and outside of the homeland there is Turkey which starts with the Seljuks. Therefore, Atsız also does not bypass the Seljuks either. The journal was closed down after its seventeenth issue in which Atsız criticized Darülfünun because of its lack of discipline,¹⁹³ and then Atsız was dismissed from assistantship.¹⁹⁴

The other important journal was *Orhun*, which was again published by Nihal Atsız. The first nine issues of *Orhun* appeared from 5 November 1933 to 16 July 1934; however the next seven were issued from 1 October 1943 to 1 April 1944. The contributors were almost the same with those of *Atsız Mecmua*; Orhan Şaik Gökyay, Nihat Sami Banarlı, Pertev Naili Boratav, Ali İhsan Sabis, Fethi Tevetoğlu and Fevziye Abdullah Tansel. Again most of the articles were written by Nihal Atsız himself. The themes were the same as the previous journal; glorification of the Turkish race through Turkish language, literature, and history. *Orhun* was more militant in mentioning the ‘outside Turks.’ In addition to cultural emphasis, there are also articles in political tones. For example in one of the articles, Atsız argues that the Tatars are Turks and accordingly he praises Tatar activity in the Russian assembly.¹⁹⁵ In another article, İsmail Gasprinski is praised because of his political activities.¹⁹⁶ Atsız’s emphasis on carrying Turkish blood to be counted as Turk becomes very apparent. He argues that there are Turks living in Lithuania. However there are non-Turks who carry ‘foreign blood’ in Turkey although some of them speak Turkish such as Jews and blacks.¹⁹⁷ Atsız also criticizes the history textbooks of the Ministry, and then the journal was closed.

The point is that the Kemalist elite in order to establish the homogeneous definition of Turkishness which was based on race pushed for Turkism. However when

¹⁹² Namık Kemal, “Ziya Gökalp’in Hayatı ve Malta Mektupları,” in *Ibid.* (6: 15 October 1931), pp.143-144; Namık Kemal, “Kadro ve Ziya Gökalp,” in *Ibid.* (12: 15 April 1932), pp. 302-304.

¹⁹³ H. Nihal, “Darülfünun Islahatı ve Yüksek Muallim Mektebi,” “Darülfünunun Kara, Daha Doğru Bir Tabirle, Yüz Kızartacak Listesi,” in *Ibid.* (17: 25 Eylül 1932), pp. 97-99, 166-170.

¹⁹⁴ Güven Bakırezer, “Nihal Atsız,” *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 357.

¹⁹⁵ Atsız, “Edirne Mebusu Şeref ve Hakimiyet-i Milliye Muharriri A. Muhip Beylere Açık Mektup,” *Orhun* (5: 21 March 1934), pp. 106-108.

¹⁹⁶ “Büyük Bir Türkçünün Hatırasının Kutlanması,” in *Ibid.* (7: 25 May 1934), pp. 136-137.

¹⁹⁷ Atsız, “20. Asırda Türk Meselesi,” in *Ibid.* (9: 16 June 1934), pp. 4-5.

they challenged to the center, it took some precautions to obstruct them. Indeed with the centralizing measures of the RPP, many Pan-Turkist journals were closed down and importation of others from Europe was banned.¹⁹⁸ In addition to this ‘internal threat,’ there was also a rising ‘external threat.’ The restoration of Germany’s internal strength and its ambitions had already produced a great threat for Turkey. Italy was emerging as a new potential threat in Mediterranean. In order to keep the borders safe, Turkey signed regional pacts. The main aim was to provide a balanced foreign policy, meaning making alliances with every state. Therefore not to involve any dispute with any state in this era of rising dictatorships, while at the same time appreciating Germany’s military and economic power.¹⁹⁹ In that context, the Pan-Turkist journals with irredentist tones might result with a bitter struggle with the Soviet Union. This was the last thing that the Turkish government wanted. The consequence was the closing down of Pan-Turkist journals for providing the supremacy, permanency and integrity of the Turkish State.

The journals remained silent until 1939 when Mustafa Kemal died and İnönü called many Pan-Turkist leaders for appeasing with them so that pursuing calm internal affairs.²⁰⁰ In fact, taking their grounds from the same sources, what the Kemalists and journals pushed was basically same thing, Central Asian roots, except one being irredentist, and the other being ‘westernist.’ This led to the considerations for preventing the ‘State.’ However the Pan-Turkist journals were already popularized among the new generation that learnt its Central Asian roots and the glory of Turkish race in schools. It was this environment when the Second World War broke out.

3.3. New Hopes: Second World War:

The outbreak of the Second World War stirred new hopes in the Pan-Turkist circles within Turkey and “outside Turks” for reaffirming their goals. Since the mid-1930s, their activities were limited with the centralizing measures of the RPP. However the imposition of a race-based definition of Turkishness led to a symbiotic relationship with Pan-Turkism although the journals had remained silent until 1938. After the death of Mustafa Kemal, the call of some Pan-Turkist leaders like Rıza Nur and Zeki Velidi

¹⁹⁸ Özdoğan (2002b), Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Hale, Ibid.: p. 79.

²⁰⁰ Önen (2005), p.267.

Togan back to the country encouraged the new generation of the Pan-Turkists.²⁰¹ In fact they already went through a Kemalist education through which they rediscovered their glorious origins. Indeed, the Second World War was near and it created the real motivation. Then depending on the government's foreign policy considerations, the movement gained power also with the influence of German propaganda.

At the top-official level, the Pan-Turkists were never supported overtly. The most important reason was that in the international arena, the Turkish government preferred to follow 'active neutrality' which was basically to make security alliances with all parts and keep Turkey outside the war. This was actually a 'not-to join war' policy.²⁰² Therefore an overt support to the Pan-Turkists might lead to reactions from the Soviet Union. This was the last thing that the Turkish government wanted as the elite with the considerations of providing the integrity, sovereignty and permanency of the 'State.' Indeed the 'National Chief,' İsmet İnönü pursued a very cautious and prudent foreign policy.²⁰³ However, this necessitated taking stern measures to control political activities in the internal arena.²⁰⁴ Policies, like the Wealth Tax, which aimed at marginalizing the 'non-Turks,' were reached to their peak in this tense environment. These policies fertilized the racist ideas through creating a more strict definition of Turkishness within the borders of Turkey and also encouraged the Pan-Turkists at the ideological level.

Indeed, the 'active neutrality' policy was largely the product emerging threats for Turkey. Since the mid-1930s, Italy was the major threat in Mediterranean. In order to secure its borders against Italy, Turkey signed a Balkan Pact with the small Balkan states. However the pact did not reach to its aim with the influence of the fact that there was no great power involved in it. Turkey found new allies with the Tripartite Alliance that it signed with Britain and France in October 1939. According to Hale, by this alliance Turkey accepted some responsibilities related with its possible assistance during the war, therefore this alliance indicates that Turkey was actually ready to enter

²⁰¹ Ibid.; Koçak, Ibid.: pp. 68-71.

²⁰² Weisband, Ibid.: p. 52.

²⁰³ Ibid.: p. 38.

²⁰⁴ Deringil, Ibid., p. 48.

into a war.²⁰⁵ However the French army collapsed just at the beginning of the war in June 1940. Then Turkey's plans were changed. In fact, the French army was thought to be the best army in Europe by the Turkish government, and now with this catastrophic incident discouraged Turkish government very much. In fact, Turkey's possible participation in the war had depended on the assumption that the French fleet would be available to oppose Italy in Mediterranean.²⁰⁶

Following the French defeat Italy entered the war in 10 June 1940 and invaded Greece from Albania.²⁰⁷ The invasion of that close areas incited great anxiety in Turkey. Then a rapid rapprochement with a great power, Germany was on the scene. The two governments had already close relationships since the First World War in terms of trade and technical assistance. However İnönü and his close circle did not trust Germany for keeping Turkey's integrity.²⁰⁸ They were right, because Germany was not really caring Turkey's future for itself. The main aim of the German government was to provide itself a Lebensraum by attacking the Middle East which was controlled by Britain.²⁰⁹ In order to guarantee Turkey's support, Germany signed another friendship agreement with Turkey. Only four days after this agreement in June 1941, Germany attacked Soviet Union.²¹⁰ The German forces began taking areas of the Soviet Union inhabited by the Turkish-speaking people, then the German officials tried to convince Turkey. The reason was that if Turkey could be convinced, it might enter to the war and help the Germans to defeat the Soviet Union.²¹¹

Germany had already launched an intensive and expensive Pan-Turkist and anti-Soviet propaganda campaign in Turkey, through use of communications, schools and associations.²¹² It also got help from various Pan-Turkist youth associations in Turkey. In Turkey the number of pro-Germans was increasing day by day. Most of them were seeing this war as an opportunity to get new lands, therefore propagating war also with the influence of Germans. Some journalists even some among state-circles were calling

²⁰⁵ Hale, *Ibid.*: p.

²⁰⁶ Deringil, *Ibid.*: pp. 97-98.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*: p. 102.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*: p. 63.

²⁰⁹ Weisband, *Ibid.*: p. 52.

²¹⁰ Deringil, *Ibid.*: p. 123.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*: p. 130.

²¹² For a detailed survey of the propaganda affairs see: Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası* (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, ?).

Turkey to join the war near Germany. In *Cumhuriyet*, for instance Nadir Nadi wrote several times on Turkey to join the war. Some other articles appeared in *Tasvir-i Efkâr*.²¹³ Furthermore since 1941, there had been confidential semi-official contacts between Turkey and Germany considering the Turkish-speaking groups under the Soviet Union. The main participants of the meetings were Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador to Ankara, Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet, Tatar originated General and author of several articles in Pan-Turkist journals, Ali Fuad Erdem, a General and Nuri [Killigil] Pasha, the brother of Enver Pasha, who became a hero for the Pan-Turkist after he died on the way to reach *Turan*. These mainly discussed the possibility of a German-Turkish collaboration in propagating war. The focus of Germany was to gather soldiers from the Turkish-speaking prisoners of war in German camps.²¹⁴

Landau states that the Turkish government was very well aware of these semi-official contacts with the Germans.²¹⁵ If the status of the German participants to the meeting is thought there comes out an unequal relationship at the official level. Franz von Papen was an ambassador and the Turkish participants were retired generals. How these generals get this much power is needed to be discuss, there is also the possibility that they were not needed to be entitled by a higher authority in order to establish such contacts. They might have been encouraged from the political environment or they might have been entitled unofficially to realize those contacts. The conflict lies in the fact that while these unofficial contacts were going on, Turkey's Ambassador to Berlin, Hüsnü Gereade, stated that Turkey had no territorial ambitions. The reason for this kind of an expression can be again Turkey's cautious policy. Indeed in a report, von Papen declared that Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs-later Prime Minister, had told him; "until Germany defeated the Soviet Union definitively, Turkey could not join Germany for fear of Soviet appraisals against the Turkic minorities there."²¹⁶ This shows the close circles were also in favor of war to get its opportunities.²¹⁷ However at the official level, in order not to attract the attention of the Soviet Union, the Turkish government denied all irredentist claims.²¹⁸ As Koçak argues the Turkish government wanted to keep the Pan-Turkist movement, which had

²¹³ Emre Arslan, "Türkiyede Irkçılık," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 413.

²¹⁴ Landau, *Ibid.*: p. 113.

²¹⁵ Karpat, *Ibid.*: pp. 264-265.

²¹⁶ Hostler, *Ibid.*: p. 177

²¹⁷ Deringil, *Ibid.*: p. 130.

²¹⁸ Kocak, *Ibid.*: p. 192.

sympathizers in government itself, under close control. The main idea was to provide an emergency plan for applying in the case of a German victory.²¹⁹

Pan-Turkist groups in Turkey had the idea that this could be a great opportunity for realizing their aims. When Germany invaded Crimea and Caucasus in spring 1942, the Pan-Turkist hopes of both the official and non-official circles increased. In fact the speech by Şükrü Saraçoğlu, the Prime Minister; “We are Turk, Turkist will always be Turkist. For us being a Turkist is a matter of blood, culture and conscience” carried the expectations to the highest level. During Stalingrad, there became a flow of Pan-Turkist journals that were propagating for joining the war.

3.4. “Ready to Fight!”

*“He so immersed himself in those romances that
he spent whole days and nights over his books;
and thus with little sleeping and much reading his brains dried up to such a degree
that he lost the use of his reason”*

Cervantes, Don Quixote de la Mancha, Book I, Part I

Through the new journals of the late 1930s and 1940s, *Ergenekon*, *Kopuz*, *Bozkurt*, *Tanrıdağ*, *Çınaraltı*, *Türk Yurdu*, *Geçit*, *Birlik*, *Büyük Ülkü*, *Kara İnci*, and *Gök-Börü*, a pumping of the superiority of the Turkish race was on the scene. The journals constituted an alternative platform for the Turkists who did not have the opportunity of voicing their ideas in anywhere after the Turkish Hearths were closed. The interesting thing was that they were in general pursuing an ‘anti-Westernization’ discourse, which was the opposite of what the Kemalists strove for. However in order to eliminate Ottoman and Islamic roots, the Kemalist History Thesis pushed for Central Asian roots and the glory of the Turkish race like other nationalisms during this era of transition from empire to nation-states. Therefore the already existing symbiotic relationship between the varieties of Turkish nationalism was grown even more. Indeed the Kemalists had a huge intellectual accumulation since the eighteenth century. This accumulation had basically three elements; European racism, Ottoman modernization, and Russian dominance over the Turkish-speaking people. The Kemalist elite had the

²¹⁹ Ibid.: p. 203.

motivation of eliminating Islamic and Ottoman components through a new consciousness of belonging which would instill people pride and the desire for becoming together. This could be realized through a Hobsbawmian invention of golden age, which would provide enough space for having a claim on the western civilization by negating Ottoman and Islamic pasts. The solution was to take roots back to the Central Asia and pushing for Central Asian-based Turkish nationalism. On the other hand, the people, the receiver of this identity, had to be kept together for the formation of a nation-state, while also had to be controlled for preventing any challenges to the common ideal. This was the point that created problems. Hence the construction of a homogeneous identity, Turkishness, and a Gellnerian imposition of it through the mechanisms of the modern state was both the quandary and solution.

The journals of the Second World War were actually the products of this pushing for a Central Asian rooted Turkish race, which was assumed to be superior and establisher of many civilizations including ones that Europe took its roots. Their reactions mainly concentrated on the effort to make Turks part of ‘western civilization.’ The pushing of the Kemalists and the accumulation of knowledge for two hundred years were so great that these journals argued for Turks existence, not through ‘westernizing,’ but as being more Turkified, as being the center of the Turkish civilization. In that case, the Second World War, also with the influence of Germany, might provide ‘the sole opportunity’ for the unity of the Turks, Turkey being at the center. Then there happened a mushrooming of journals propagating war or at least propagating the superiority of the Turkish race at this period when Turkish nation needed an ideal-*mefkure* in the case of a possible entrance to the war. They all had different conciliation levels with the center. However in general, their closeness to the center at ideological level was encouraged them to pursue an irredentist political vision which had also supporters within the ‘non-irredentist’ government. In addition, theirs was a clearly defined project; unification of all Turks; whereas the Kemalist project had a complex agenda that included different motivations. As a result, the latter failed to provide a life time *mefkure*, which would replace Shariah, for the ‘Turkish nation.’ The *mefkure* was supplied by the Pan-Turkist sources; such as the increasing number of Pan-Turkist journals which included articles on the superiority of the Turkish race, what to do’ lists for reaching to *Turan*, or poems of longing to the imaginary land of *Turan*.

Indeed, this flow of journals, during the war, had already given its signals in 1938 with an ardent racist-nationalist; Reha Oğuz Türkkan, who was actively engaged in publishing journals and organizing the ‘nation.’ Born in 1920, Türkkan was among the second generation of the Pan-Turkists. In his high school years, he took classes from Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, the editor of *Ülkü*-the journal of People’s Houses, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Mükrimin Halil Yinanç and Enver Benhar Şapolyo, all of who were known as the renowned teachers of the Kemalist period. His first writings were on nation and *patrie* which later carried him to the idea of the superiority of Turkish race probably as the result of pushing too much of Turkish race by the Kemalists and also their failure to draw a line between racists and themselves except the case of irredentism that they continuously referred. *Ergenekon* became the first and, for this thesis, one of the most important platform that Türkkan voiced his racist and war-prone opinions. This journal was published in Ankara starting from 10 November 1938. Only four issues appeared. Its slogan was “The Turkish race above everything and the Turkish race above any other race.” There were also anti-Nazi writings of Türkkan along with the anti-communist ones.²²⁰ Then *Ergenekon* was closed down mainly because of its militant tone against Germany.²²¹ In fact it was the time when Germany appeared as a strong state. Therefore Türkkan’s writings might lead to aggression.

After *Ergenekon*, Türkkan began to publish *Bozkurt*, which had a more militant tone than the previous one with the influence of the on goings of the Second World War. *Bozkurt* at first appeared in 1940, then suspended since it published a map of Turkish lands in July 1941 with a writing addressing to İnönü in which Türkkan stated that the Turks were ready to fight and just waiting for his signal. *Bozkurt* resumed publication as a weekly on 5 March 1942 and continued irregularly until July. Its slogan was the same as that of *Ergenekon*: “Turkish race above all others.” The contributors were Nihal Atsız, Nejdet Sancar, Hüseyin Namık Orkun, Fethi Tevetoğlu, Peyami Safa, Ali İhsan Sabis, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Zeki Velidi Togan, Abdülkadir İnan and Besim Atalay. A total of seventeen issues came out. This time Türkkan manly focused on educating the Turkists, in his words the *Bozkurtçu*s. In his article called “The Credo of *Bozkurtçu*,” Türkkan at first informed the possible target group on what they believed: “the given superiority of the Turkish race and Turkish nation which is rooted from our

²²⁰ Önen, “Reha Oğuz Türkkan,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, pp. 362-364.

²²¹ Türkkan, *Tabuluktan Gurbete* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1975), p. 452.

blood.” Therefore “Turks should not mix with other bloods.” *Bozkurtçus* need that blood “to war whenever it is necessary,” “to establish a Turkish State of sixty five million people.”²²²

In August 1941, *Çınaraltı* began to be published by Orhan Seyfi Orhon and Yusuf Ziya Ortaç. It was a weekly journal appeared in İstanbul from 9 August 1941 to 15 July 1944, reaching to 146 issues. It was republished in 1944, then also in 1948. Among the main contributors were Hüseyin Hüsni Erkilet, İsmail Hakkı Akansel, Nihal Atsız, Nejdet Sançar, and Hüseyin Namık Orkun. Its slogan was İsmail Gasprinski’s ‘unity in language, thought and action.’ In comparison to *Ergenekon*, *Bozkurt*, or the other journals, such as *Tanrıdağ* and *Gök-Börü*, *Çınaraltı* was more moderate generally. Its contributors were closer to Ziya Gökalp’s understanding of nation as a cultural unity, so that the creation of a national consciousness based on a common culture and common language was the ideal-*mefkure* of *Çınaraltı*.²²³ Accordingly, it had also an emphasis on Islam as one of the unifying factors. Instead of an irredentist blood-fetish that Türkkan clearly states in the Credo, Orhon drew the limits of Turkey and emphasized national unity in the ‘Credo of the Turkist.’²²⁴ The articles of *Çınaraltı* were mostly on history, language, literature and education. There were also attacks on communism.²²⁵

The interesting thing is that *Çınaraltı* sometimes put emphasis on race conflicting with its general understanding. For instance, it writes on a project of building the honor gallery of Turkish history, in which “carrying pure Turkish blood” is counted as one of the principal criteria of being in the list.²²⁶ Besides, in the letters from readers, mostly teachers and students, blood tie and race are emphasized as the building elements of the Turkish nation. This double-sidedness implies that Ortaç and Orhon were close to the political circles; therefore they drew such a large framework that they could gather many different elements under the same roof. However, the readers were mostly the missionaries of the Kemalist History Thesis which learned or taught the

²²² Türkkan, “Bozkurtçunun Amentüsü,” in *Bozkurt* (1: 5 March 1942), p. 6.

²²³ Orhan Seyfi Orhon, “İdeal,” in *Çınaraltı* (1: 9 August 1941), p. 3.

²²⁴ Orhon, “Türkçülüğün Amentüsü,” in *Ibid.*, (47: 15 August 1942), p. 3.

²²⁵ For ex.: Orhon, “Tehlike,” “Tan Gazetesi,” in *Ibid.*, (93:3 July 1943), pp. 3, 6-7.

²²⁶ Adnan Giz, “Türk Tarihinin Şeref Galerisi,” in *Ibid.*, (83: 24 April 1943), pp. 8, 10, 15.

glorious history of Turkish race. This pushing, combined with the specific conditions of the war might nurture more an exclusionary discourse.

Furthermore, the central writings of Çınaraltı did not seem that aggressive about the 'outside Turks.' For instance while *Bozkurt* makes calls to İnönü to take action, *Çınaraltı* states that "Turkish state does not have an intention of attacking to any other state,"²²⁷ however "we should not forget that we are the children of a glorious nation." In that context, it can be said that *Çınaraltı* adopted a parallel stance to the government in the case of neutrality during the war; however it is also not very happy for seeming peace-prone or neutral. In fact, *Çınaraltı* was trying to walk on the line between showing aggressiveness to the government and conciliating with it. This must be the explanation for its long-time survival in the Turkish Press.

Tanrıdağ was the other important journal of the Second World War. It was published as weekly from 8 May to 4 September 1942. After the death of its editor, Rıza Nur, it was closed until 5 November 1950. Although Rıza Nur was setting the tone with his articles, there were other important contributors; Nihal Atsız, Nejdet Sançar, İsmail Hakkı Akansel, Hasan Ferid Cansever, Fethi Tevetoğlu, and Hüseyin Namık Orkun. One of the aims of the journal was to purify the Turkish language; therefore pure Turkish words are used in titles and dates. Similarly to other journals, writers of *Tanrıdağ* also discussed the superiority of the Turkish race.²²⁸ The general tone is militant and there are calls to war. For instance in one of the articles Nejdet Sançar writes that "army and war is the oldest friend of Turk." "In this world of struggles, Turkish nation should bring up fighters."²²⁹ In that context "our nationalism should be a racist one" depending on the unifying nature of race, and separatist nature of nation. Therefore Turkish nationalism should be neither peaceful nor utopian but based on a historical analysis.²³⁰

²²⁷ Orhon, "Yeni Yıl," in *Ibid.*, (67: 2 January 1943), p. 3.

²²⁸ Mustafa Hakkı Akansel, "Türk Irkının İstikbali Büyüktür," in *Tanrıdağ* (3: 22 May 1942), pp. 4-7; Akansel, "Yabancı Kan ve Devletlerin Batması" (8: 26 June 1942), pp. 5-8; Z. Gögem, "İrk Tayininde Kan Gruplarının Değeri I" (16: 21 Aug 1942), pp. 11-13; Gögem, "İrk Tayininde Kan Gruplarının Değeri II" (17: 28 Aug. 1942), pp. 6-7, 11-12.

²²⁹ Nejdet Sançar, "Türk, Ordu ve Savaş," in *Ibid.*, (3: 22 May 1942), pp. 8-9.

²³⁰ Sıtkı Tunçer, "Milliyetçiliğimiz Nasıl Olmalıdır?" in *Ibid.*, (10: 10 July 1942), pp. 11-12.

Besides, *Tanrıdağ* included addresses to youth. One of them is very interesting in the sense that it makes a call to learn history by making research not by reading the works of Europeans.²³¹ In another one, it is argued that the current decayed situation of the world was mainly rooted from the lack of discipline.²³² The publisher-editor, Rıza Nur, contributes to these aggressive calls with his classification of Turkist movements. According to him, there are three kinds of Turkish nationalism: Turanism, Turkism and Anatolianism. The first one is being integrated to the second one, because the real *Turan* origin belonged to Central Asia which was the Turks' homeland. The second one includes all Turks, and the third one is so isolated so that does not accept any other Turks than the ones living in Anatolia. It is true that Anatolia should be paid special attention, but Anatolianism is absolutized the definition of Turkishness, and so that weakened the impact of nationalism through centralization. Hence he concluded that 'racial Pan-Turkism' is the most viable and living option.²³³

Thus in this intellectual environment, on 5 November 1942, *Gök-Börü*, a militant and aggressive journal as *Tanrıdağ*, *Bozkurt* or *Ergenekon*, appeared. It was published by Türkkan after his elimination from *Bozkurt*. This incident, in fact, crystallized the leadership struggle between two Atsız and Türkkan. Then, *Gök-Börü* became the medium that Türkkan attempted to prove his leadership by distinguishing him and his group from others. Therefore, *Gök-Börü* was extra aggressive and militant in that war atmosphere. Having a combination of these interests in mind, Türkkan engaged in systematizing the Turkist movement probably for claiming its ownership. In the journal, he gave both theories and actions through a master pumping of Turkist elements most of which could conciliate with both the Kemalist History Thesis and the general political environment that the war had created. This pumping served for another purpose as well; exclusion of Atsız, who did not have an easy relationship with the government historically, firstly because of his emphasis on the existence of a national spirit instead of racial purity among the Turks; and secondly because of his closeness to Zeki Velidi Togan, who was taken from his post in the İstanbul University following his reactions in the first history congress. *Gök-Börü* became the platform for that feud between Türkkan and Atsız. Combined also with the aggressiveness of the war years, it

²³¹ Hasan Ferid Cansever, "Yeni Bir Tarih İlmine İhtiyacımız Vardır," in *Ibid.*, (3: 22 May 1942), pp. 11-12.

²³² İhsan Unaner, "Olaylar Karşısında Durumumuz," in *Ibid.*, (4: 29 May 1942), p. 2.

²³³ Rıza Nur, "Türk Nasyonalizmi," in *Ibid.*, (1: 8 May 1942), pp.4-6.

presents a good concretization of how the accumulated knowledge was used in a time of war between states and war between the Turkists.

CHAPTER IV:

GÖK-BÖRÜ

*“Sor Tunaya nedendir bu ağlayışı
Kıyılarındaki Türk kalelerinden
Suyuna bir destan yası vurunca!*

....
*Sor Tunaya nedendir bu ağlayışı
Rüyasında bir TÜRK’ün akışı durunca.”*

Bülent ECEVİT, Gök-Börü, (6: 1 November 1943)

4.1. The birth of Gök-Börü:

Gök-Börü is the product of an aggressive period very basically. The Second World War incited new hopes for the Pan-Turkists by making them reaffirm their goals. The long term accumulated knowledge of two hundred years was combined with the propaganda machine of Germany. The result was a concrete and determined agenda fertilized by the Kemalist History Thesis which created Turkishness depending on a golden age myth. As the German forces began to conquer areas close to the Soviet Union which dominated Turkish-speaking people of Central Asia, the Pan-Turkist circles and also some nationalists of the government, taking the opportunity of the day, made calls for joining the war near Germany. Although İnönü, the Prime Minister, did not actually follow a war-prone policy particularly because of his concern on the integrity of the Turkish state, the racist policies of the Turkish ‘State’ mechanism had already created the suitable environment for the militant and racist propaganda. *Gök-Börü* was one of these propagandist platforms with its aggressive leaning on homogenizing Turkey and unifying all ‘real’ Turks.

Besides the specific conditions that the Second World War had already created, *Gök-Börü* was rather aggressive since it was born out of an internal struggle in the Turkist movement. Nihal Atsız and Reha Oğuz Türkkan were the two prominent writers of *Bozkurt* since 1939. Türkkan, being a young and talented Turkist, was appreciating Atsız since he was the “second great Turkist after Ziya Gökalp in this struggle of

Turkism.”²³⁴ In the movement, Atsız had a very charismatic Nietzschean stance; so that he could wait for years without publishing a journal after the suspensions of *Atsız Mecmua* and *Orhun*. On the other hand, Türkkan was an ardent racist-nationalist who was very active in publishing journals and brochures and also organization of the movement. In 1939, right after the first suspension of *Bozkurt*, he established *Kitapsevenler Kurumu* (Booklovers’ Association) headed by Fethi Okyar, the minister of Justice²³⁵ and Türkkan’s father’s close friend, in order to gather both old and new Turkists under the same roof and organize their publications as to balance the new translations from western literature by the government.²³⁶ As the first work, Ziya Gökalp’s *Türkçülüğün Esasları* was published. After a short time, the association was closed in April 1940.²³⁷

Objectively, with his arduous work and his father, Halit Ziya Türkkan²³⁸ who had very close relationships with official circles, Türkkan was the biggest rival for Atsız. The closing of *Bozkurt*, particularly because of Atsız’ writings created a big tension between the two figures; the publisher of the journal, Türkkan warned Atsız about his writings. The reaction of Atsız was bitter; the general directors and owners Sami Karayel and Nurullah Barıman were on the same side with Atsız. As the result, Türkkan was dismissed from the journal’s editorial board, and then Atsız took the control of *Bozkurt*.²³⁹

The product of the feud between Türkkan and Atsız was *Gök-Börü* which was began to be published by Türkkan in November 1942. This new journal became a new platform for the dispute. Through various articles, Türkkan and his group blamed Atsız. The article by Cihat Savaş Fer, in the first issue of *Gök-Börü*, was the first and foremost important one in presenting the inner side of the Turkist movement along with the future prospect of Türkkan and his group. In “Hesap Veriyoruz!,” Fer declares that they eliminated the unreal Turkists among themselves because of their inappropriate behaviors. These unreal ones are emotional and irrational Atsız, embezzler Nurullah

²³⁴ Türkkan, *Türkçülüğe Giriş* (İstanbul: Arkadaş Matbaası, 1940), p. 75.

²³⁵ Önen (2005), p. 271.

²³⁶ Türkkan, “Türkçülüğün Tarihi,” *Yeni Orkun* (9: November 1988), pp. 16-17. Cited in Özdoğan (2002a), p. 212.

²³⁷ Türkkan (1940), p. 78.

²³⁸ Önen (2005), p. 269.

²³⁹ Önen (2005), p. 282.

Barıman, who took the money of *Bozkurt*, and traitor *Çınaraltı* writers, who did not support the republication of *Bozkurt* themselves. The real ones are one who remained loyal to the movement. Those are real *Bozkurtçus* gathered around Türkkan.²⁴⁰ The dispute continued with Atsız' brochure of "*Hesap Böyle Verilir!*" Then as a reaction, Türkkan published *Kuyruk Acısı* (The Grudge). Besides, in the writings, at first Atsız blamed Türkkan for his disrespectful and immoral, so non-Turkish behaviors and then called him as *Ermenikan* (Armenian-blood, instead of Türkkan-Turkish-blood). Türkkan, in return, accused Atsız of having a dolichocephalic skull unlike real Turks who are brachycephal.²⁴¹ This kind of insults were the last things that those 'real Turks' might want to hear.

Actually, Atsız and Türkkan were not the substitutes of each other. Their racism understandings were different. Atsız claimed that the Turks had ethnic consciousness which was transferred by birth even in the case of a semi-pure Turkish blood, meaning having an alien parent. Therefore instead of a racial purity, it is this factor of ethnic consciousness and national spirit which constituted Turkish states, each of which can be taken as the continuation of the other. In the picture of Atsız, the Turkish Republic stands as a continuation of the Ottoman Empire. Türkkan, on the other hand, focused on unchanged specific features that made Turks establish different states. His guide was anthropological elements through which he argued that Turkish race is hereditary and its superiority should be prevented from degenerating through exclusion of alien elements.

For the Kemalist History Thesis and *Gök-Börü* followers, this understanding based on racial purity provided enough space for the inclusion of the Sumerians and Hittites into the picture of Turkishness via anthropological research. On the other hand, for Atsız, this claim of ownership of some alien civilizations, in order to prove the superiority of the Turkish race, was irrational. Turkish race did not need these alien ones for displaying its superiority. Despite this difference in their understandings, both Atsız and Türkkan were writing together in *Bozkurt* in 1939. However their leadership struggle uncovered the difference. This may show that the main problem among them was actually their race for leadership. Thus, in addition to the impact of the Second

²⁴⁰ Cihat Savaş Fer, "Hesap Veriyoruz!" in *Gök-Börü* (1: 5 November 1942), pp. 3-4.

²⁴¹ Türkkan (1943), p. 44.

World War, *Gök-Börü*, as a journal, was the product of this dispute between two prominent men of the movement. Then it continued its life as a stage for the efforts of self-defining of a group of Turkists in this war environment.

4.2. Gök-Börü at the First Sight:

The journal was first published in 5 November 1942 in İstanbul. It regularly appeared twice a month until 20 May 1943 as thirteen issues. In general, the number of pages is 23 to 25. There are mostly articles, in addition are memoirs, small stories, poems, caricatures and several photographs. Its slogan is the same as *Ergenekon* and *Bozkurt*; “Turkish Race above any Race!” Besides, in accordance with the previous disputes it is continuously stated that “This journal is belonged to real Turkists.” The symbol of the journal is a grey wolf which is situated in the middle of a crescent. In the first issue the meaning of the journal’s name and symbol is explained. According to this, *Gök-Börü* means Grey Wolf which is considered to be the unifying symbol of all Turks. It is believed that the Turks are the descendents of the Grey Wolf which leaded them since an immemorial time. Whenever they are decentralized the flag of Grey Wolf has become the unifying signal so that the Great Turkish Unity has been formed. It is the Father of all Turks and its spirit always observes the Turks. If there is a hard situation, the God sends to Turks a grey wolf manifested in the body and spirit of the most superior Turk. The brave, militant, and hardworking spirit of the first grey wolf is manifested in these other grey-wolves. In that case all Turks should work idealistically for the rise of Turkish race, in order to be grey wolves.²⁴²

Besides, in almost every issue of *Gök-Börü* is a special section titled “Grey Wolves in Turkish History.” These are; the Seljuk ruler Alparslan, who opened the gate of Anatolia to the migrated Turks and provided their settlement in Anatolia in the eleventh century; the ruler of Turkestan Timur, who was a great organizer in terms of

²⁴² “Gök-Börü Tabiri ve Manaları,” in *Gök-Börü* (1: 5 November 1942), pp. 1, 23.

The Grey Wolf spirit is actually very much similar to the nomadic understanding of leadership that was also manifested in the Ottoman succession. It was believed that God has gifted the Ottoman dynasty with kut-grace, so that every member has equal rights to access to the throne. The hardworking one wins and charismatic sovereignty comes directly to him. This result is considered to be God’s decree. In this case, the Turks are believed to be graced among the greater Uruk-Tur; but they should work hard for manifesting this gift.

state mechanism, also took European lands and fought against Chinese Empire in the fifteenth century; Babürşah, who was the founder of Indian-Turkish Empire and favored the use of Turkish language in the sixteenth century; Atabek Gök-Börü, who dominated Kirkuk in the twelfth century; Barbaros, who made Mediterranean a Turkish lake in the sixteenth century; and lastly Yıldırım, who provided Turkish unity for the first time.²⁴³ This is probably an incomplete list since the journal was closed after its thirteenth issue; however it is still significant for grasping the main tenets of *Gök-Börü*'s perspective. As it can be seen from the names; there are both Islamic and pre-Islamic figures. Besides, the authors also call Atatürk as grey wolf in various places.²⁴⁴ This mixture shows that religion was not the determining criteria, but 'contributing to the efforts of reaching *Turan*' is the key element. With this emphasis on Turkish unity, religious or non-Central Asian sides of this particular figure are eliminated, in order to fit it to the general picture as in the case of Ottoman Sultans.

This general perspective of *Gök-Börü* was formed by the contributors to the journal. Although Türkkan was setting the general tone also using the pen-name of Reha Kurtuluş²⁴⁵ there were a large number of writers. These included; Cihat Savaş Fer, Prof. Dr. Zeki Velidi Togan, Besim Atalay (Deputy to Kütahya), Dr. Raşid Hatipoğlu (Minister of Agriculture), Aydın Yalçın (Assistant of Sociology), Reşat Nuri Güntekin (Deputy to Çanakkale), Mehmet Halit Bayrı, Prof.Dr. Abdülkadir İnan, Nuri Akgün, Prof. Mahmut R. Kösemihal, Şakir Ülkütaşır, Mehmet Öztürk, Dr Mustafa Hakkı Akansel, Ziya Tataç (Assistant Director in an Eti Bank branch), Tahir Olgaç, Zeki Sofuğlu, O. Bozkurt, Nebil Buharalı (Director of National Library), Kemal Hakkı Kut, Dr. A.N.Y., Dr. Osman Turan, Prof. Dr. Süreyya Aygün, Prof. Dr. Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, Prof. Dr. Akdes Nimet Kurat, Nuri Demirağ, Dr. Tevfik Zarakol, Hayrettin Karan (Deputy to Balıkesir), M.Altunbay, Tesbihçioğlu, Raif Samur, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, and Orhan Uygun.

In the list are both well-known and unknown names. The interesting thing is that there are deputies and ministers among them. Despite their being a part of the state

²⁴³ M. Şakir Ülkütaşır, "Alparslan" (3: 15 December 1942), pp. 7-8; "Aksak Temür" (4: 1 January 1943), pp. 8-9; "Babürşah" (8: 1 March 1943), pp. 8-9; "Atabek Gök-Börü" (9: 25 March 1943), p.10; "Barbaros" (10: 8 April 1943), pp. 16-17; "Yıldırım Bayazıt" (12: 6 May 1943), pp. 12-13.

²⁴⁴ "Gök-Börü Tabiri ve Manaları" (1: 5 November 1942), p.23.

²⁴⁵ Türkkan (1975), p. 453.

circle, they wrote in such an aggressive journal. This is a small example that the movement had its supporters in state circles despite the journals' continuous suspension. The other point that is worth mentioning is the professors. These were mostly Turcology professors supplying the cultural side of the journal. There are also doctors who wrote on biology. Actually, since everybody writes according to his/her own interests, the journal has writings on many issues from agriculture to books, of course all having the same discourse. This is an implication that the journal is an activist one which has its agenda in every aspect of the life. There are also several teachers and students writing in the part of reader letters. The letters came from Kars, Ankara, Kayseri, İstanbul, Adana, Manisa, Kırşehir, Eskişehir, Trabzon, Uşak, and Azerbaycan. If these letters are real ones, it can be said that the journal was fairly popular. On the other hand, these letters may be fake, written by the editorial board itself. This is a methodological problem that obstructs seeing the degree of popularity.

Furthermore, two important Turkists, Fethi Tevetoğlu and İsmet Tümtürk give some figures about the sales. According to them, the sales of Pan-Turkist journals increased after 1942. In that case, *Gök-Börü*, *Tanrıdağ* and *Türk Yurdu* sold almost three thousand issues, which was more than *Atsız Mecmua* of 1931.²⁴⁶ However the figures could not reach those of the journals of People's Houses and leftist ones. For the case of People's Houses, it is understandable. With a good communication network under the control of Turkish state, the People's Houses journals could easily reach to their places, they might be even being published in more than one places, and distributed to every official institution. This may increase their sales. However, for *Gök-Börü*, the communications network was limited. Therefore in the process of distributors met with a lot of problems as it is written in small notes. The editorial board asks the Post Office for one thousand copies which did not reach Ankara.²⁴⁷ Then one month after it is understood that the journals were sent to Erzurum mistakenly, and half of them were lost on the road.²⁴⁸ At the end, it can be declared that with some practical problems, *Gök-Börü* had nearly three thousand readers in accordance with the general trend of the day. If the letters are to be taken as real, it seems that it was read particularly by teachers and students.

□ Fethi Tevetoğlu, "Türkçü dergiler," *Türk Yurdu* (April 1988). Cited in Özdoğan (2002a), p. 222.

²⁴⁷ "Posta Teşkilatından Soruyoruz!" in *Ibid.* (5: 15 January 1943), p. 11.

²⁴⁸ "Posta İdaresinden Tekrar Soruyoruz!" in *Ibid.* (10: 8 April 1943), p. 2.

4.3. Gök-Börü's Self-Definition and other Pan-Turkists:

The feud between Atsız and Türkkan constituted the basis for *Gök-Börü's* definition of itself. The editor, Türkkan, and his close friend Fer, strove to show that *Gök-Börü* was different from other journals so that it signified the peak of a new era in Turkism after a period of silence. They continuously state that “this is a journal by ‘real Turkists’ for ‘the real Turkists.’”²⁴⁹ Through these words Atsız and others were called as ‘unreal’ ones. Besides, it is emphasized that “becoming a Turkist and seeming as Turkist are different things.”²⁵⁰ Here the stone hits again Atsız and the ones who supported him against Türkkan. In fact, Türkkan also claims that the cadre of *Çınaraltı* is total “enemies to the ideal,” because of their writings criticizing *Gök-Börü*.²⁵¹ In this case Türkkan, confidently from himself and his supporters, states that *Gök-Börü* writers could be sued because of their assumed insults to other writers, but they are right in the sense that they, themselves, are the real pure nationalists²⁵² whom were envied by the others²⁵³ that try to give harm to Turkism through lies and slanders.²⁵⁴

Accordingly, an outline is constructed by Fer to show the role of ‘real Turkists’-*Bozkurtçus*, in the history of Turkism. This outline is comprised of six different stages in Turkism. The first one is the period of separated Turkists, during which Turkism was not a unified movement. Its principals were gathered from many different and scattered sources like Mete, Orhun inscriptions, Kaşgarlı Mahmud, İsmail Gasprinski and Süleyman Pasha. The systematization of the movement begins with Ziya Gökalp in the second stage. That great philosopher created the movement by compiling its principles from different sources. The third stage is the period of advancement. Following the War of Independence Turkism became almost the official ideology with the great Grey Wolf Atatürk, the realizer of what Gökalp created. Turkish Hearths, the journal *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), Rıza Nur, Hamdullah Suphi, Hasan Ferit, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Yusuf Akçura were all influential during this period. Then the period of decadence and struggle comes. This is the period that the Turkish Hearths were suspended and so that

²⁴⁹ “Kandaş ve Ülküdaşlarımıza,” (1: 5 November 1942), p. 2.

²⁵⁰ Cihat Savaş Fer, “Hesap Veriyoruz!” (1: 5 November 1942), p. 9.

²⁵¹ “Kim Çatıyor, Kim Sabrediyor?” (5: 15 January 1943), p. 16;

²⁵² Türkkan, “Dahiliye Vekaletine, Cumhuriyet Müddeiumumiliğine Açık Mektup!” (7: 15 February 1943), p.2.

²⁵³ Türkkan, “Kuyruk Acısı,” (8: 1 March 1943), p. 2.

²⁵⁴ “İlerleyen Türkçülük,” (11: 22 April 1943), p. 2.

pursuing Turkist ideal was considered to be opposition. The Turkists dispersed. The fifth period is the period of silence that began in 1934 with the closing of Turkist journals. During this period the Turkish youth decayed because they had no ideal. Since 1935, the period of *Bozkurtçus* is on the scene. These are a group of idealist young men gathered around Türkkan. They are striving for the revival of Turkism despite various interruptions meaning both the suspensions and also treachery of Atsız and others. *Gök-Börü* is the product of this revival period.²⁵⁵

Thus *Gök-Börü* defines itself as the ‘real idealist’²⁵⁶ and ‘real *Bozkurtçu*’ differently than Atsız and others who continued to publish *Bozkurt*. It creates its own golden age discourse which includes all Turkists and also Mustafa Kemal, but which at the end excludes ‘non-idealist’ and ‘unreal’ ones. Claiming the inheritance of the movement since its very beginning, *Gök-Börü* eliminates others and presents itself as the sole owner of Turkism. At that point the inclusion of Atatürk as the realizer of what was created before is important for seeing the conciliation points with the center and legitimization of the movement. This conciliation was not a forcefully stated one; instead what he learnt and lived took Türkkan to that conclusion on Atatürk’s contribution to the Turkist idea. In his mind, he and *Gök-Börü* is to be understood in the same vein.

The second element in *Gök-Börü*’s self-definition against other Turkists is its project. According to the tableau by Türkkan, the ultimate aim of the *Bozkurtçus* is reaching the Greater Turkestan. However this can take for a while, because there are some other issues that should be dealt with. On this way purifying the blood in Turkey is considered to be the first step that goes to the Great Unity. The second issue is ‘nationality,’ which means providing nationalization in every aspect of life, the third one includes the issues of morality, youth and education, family and woman. Then the issues of village, industry, science, administration, and religion come. According to Türkkan, when these issues beginning with Turkey are settled, the ultimate goal will be realized. The point is that Türkkan does not make a distinction between a cultural and political unity in saying, nor other writers may be deliberately.

²⁵⁵ Fer, Ibid.

²⁵⁶ “Dost İtirazına Dost Cevabı!” (2: 24 December 1942), p. 2.

Türkkan then, with the anxiety of proving that *Bozkurtçus* are different, gives two tableaux of other movements for comparing their aims. In the *Turancı* one, there are only two issues to be dealt with; reaching *Turan*-Greater Turkestan and then creating a nation mostly not depending on race. In other words, *Turancıs* took Türkkan's first issues to deal with as the next ones after the unity was realized. Türkkan finds this unrealistic. In the *Anatolianist* one, on the other hand, the ultimate goal of reaching the *Turan* is not the determining characteristic. Although it starts with the same issues of *Gök-Börü*, the tableau is completed in the issue of administration. The 'Outside Turks' does not exist. Türkkan states that *Anatolianists* either believe in the unification of all Turks but however thinks that this can be realized only one or two centuries later or believe that Anatolia is enough for the Turks. According to Türkkan, the Unity is not that far away as the *Anatolianists* argue. It would be realized in a very close time if Turkists work hard for the rise of Turkish race.²⁵⁷

Thus, Türkkan, in the article, draws a road map for the Turkists by arguing that there are some issues within the borders of Turkey, and these should be dealt at first, then the Unity will be realized. By criticizing the others, Türkkan tries to explain that his plan is the most realistic and also determinant one on the way reaching to *Turan*. In this way, first the purification of the Turkish race comes to the scene as the first condition. In fact, Türkkan's classification of movements is very similar to Rıza Nur's threefold division. Rıza Nur also pays special attention to Anatolia and argues for elimination of non-Turks from Anatolia. From 1920s to his death in 1942, Rıza Nur was one of the prominent supporters of Turkification of Anatolia.²⁵⁸ However his ultimate goal was not to stay limited by Anatolia. He pushed for *Turan* as Türkkan did. In fact Rıza Nur, similarly to Türkkan, complained from *Anatolianists'* not caring of the ultimate end. Accordingly, *Gök-Börü* mentions Rıza Nur in an admired manner in its first issue and calls him as the greatest militant Turk.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ Türkkan, "Türkçülüğe Bakışlar" (1: 5 November 1942), pp. 5-7.

²⁵⁸ Faruk Alpkaya, "Rıza Nur," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, p.377.

²⁵⁹ "Dr. Rıza Nur" (1: 5 November 1942), p. 7.

4.4. Gök-Börü and Ülkü:

Gök-Börü legitimizes its existence in the eyes of its followers through claiming the ownership of the real Turkist movement. In fact since they developed in the same pool, the legitimization came naturally. There was also another point that the journal had to somehow provide its survival. It had to conciliate with the central ideology at some point also for practical purposes. In other words, the conciliation was a necessity for the continuation of the journal, but it was at the same time the natural outcome of the cross-fertilization between the Kemalist ideology and Turkism of *Gök-Börü*.

At the very basic level, the ideal of the Kemalist elite was to Turkify Anatolia and to make some reforms. The guiding principles, as later stated in 1931 in RPP's first programme, were the Six Arrows. They stand for unchallengeable and absolute tenets of the Kemalist project, which assign the Turks living in Turkey the duty of protecting their nation's integrity and sovereignty with their whole existence while at the same time elevating their nation-state to the level of contemporary civilizations. Therefore what the Kemalist elite outlined as the basis of the project is nationalism and nationalization; which can go even further to eliminate all foreign elements.

Taking this emphasis on nationalism as the reference point, *Gök-Börü* easily fits into the picture. The ultimate aim of it was reaching to *Turan*, on this way to *Turan*, Turkifying Anatolia and then flourishing of it constitutes the foremost levels as the Kemalists very basically aimed at. Here, if one adds the long years' accumulation of knowledge about nations and nationalism into the picture, it is seen that a synergy existed among all these. They were all nurtured from one another. This is the reason why *Gök-Börü* fits into the picture of 'normal' Turkish nationalism easily. This penetration is so clear that Reşat Nuri Güntekin, writing in *Gök-Börü*, could declare the Six Arrows as also the basic principles of *Gök-Börü*²⁶⁰ without feeling any disturbance or *Gök-Börü* writers could easily put Mustafa Kemal in the list of grey wolves. Very similarly the Kemalist elite pursued racism for Turkifying Anatolia by pushing for Central Asian roots. Of course they are two different ideological structures; however none of the myths, symbols, concepts, or images relating with the Turkish nation are

²⁶⁰ Reşat Nuri Güntekin, "Türk Genci İçin Tek Yol" (9: 25 March 1943), p. 3.

actually under the monopoly of two versions of Turkish nationalism. Both use them depending on the context since their springs were almost the same. Then, Six Arrows of the Kemalists can also become main *ülkü*s for *Gök-Börü* writers or some leftist writers of the time or even for today's writers.

Another point is that, very similar to the Thesis, the entire argument of *Gök-Börü* is based on the assumption that the Turks were a nation since an immemorial time and they established many states. Türkkan presents a brief story of these states beginning with Huns which was led by the Grey Wolf Mete, then Gök Türks and Timurid Empire come, and the list goes until Atatürk.²⁶¹ These are all 'nation-states' established by the 'Turks' as the Kemalist History Thesis emphasized. This means the Kemalists and *Gök-Börü* writers followed the same path for exalting the Turkish race, so the nation. Besides, in *Gök-Börü* the leader is very important for providing the unity. The same applies to the Kemalist project in which Mustafa Kemal is a cult figure. These are not surprising. Here a prominent point to make is that as Türkkan's Introduction to Turkism and Şerafettin Turan's work shows, the reading lists of Türkkan and Mustafa Kemal includes many common books. Thus, one should keep all these ideological penetrations in mind while reading *Gök-Börü*.

The main eye-catching ideological point that defines *Gök-Börü* is its anti-westernization stance. The Kemalist History Thesis was the product of the rejection of Islamic and Ottoman heritages; and so that the projection of present to the past with a golden age discourse. *Gök-Börü*, on the other hand, came out as a reaction to westernization along with the non-Turkish elements of Islamic and Ottoman legacies. The main of argument of *Gök-Börü* on this issue rests on the relationship between imitation and lacking of *ülkü*-ideal.²⁶² It goes as the following; Turks could not uncover their national consciousness despite the fact that they constitute a nation, a superior one since an immemorial time. They imitated different civilizations since the very beginning. At that point, Zarakol explains the reasons for their adoption in a very much similar to the Kemalist History Thesis. According to him, the main reason for this was

²⁶¹ Türkkan, "Büyük Türklük" (13: 23 May 1943), pp. 3-6.

²⁶² The use of word 'ülkü' instead of 'mefkure' must imply something related with Kemalization of the words. In that context, 'ülkü' is more Turkish and Kemalist if one does not take into account its later use for naming Nationalist Action Party's supporters as *ülküçüler*.

the high intelligence level of Turks; so that as soon as they understood that the other one could not adapt them, they adopted to the alien civilization.²⁶³

Türkkan, on the other hand, was not that optimistic on the imitation issue. He states that Turks did not have the proper national consciousness; therefore throughout history they remained under the influence of many other civilizations. For instance, while living in Central Asia, Turks tended to be like the ancient Chinese. Turkish begs used Chinese names and married Chinese women. After they adopted Islam, they turned out to be more Arabic, more Persian than the real Arabs or Persians.²⁶⁴ The Seljuks forgot their Turkishness as they became Islamic. Instead they enriched the Arabic and Persian culture by entering under the dominance of them. The Ottomans handed the administration over to the non-Turk devshirmes; Caucasians, Albanians and Rums, who later dominated artistic and intellectual life. The Turkish Law left its place to *Fıkıh* and *Mecelle*.²⁶⁵

Besides, the lack of consciousness led to conflicts among Turks themselves; so that Timur fought Bayazıt, Turkish Safavids fought Turkish Yavuz.²⁶⁶ In the nineteenth century, although Namık Kemal cried for his nation and homeland in his poetry, Abdulhamit's absolutism limited this revival of national consciousness, because of intriguers who wanted to stroke the nation from inside.²⁶⁷ Then the Turkish essence was again shadowed. Accordingly, the lack of national consciousness led to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Turks' humiliation in front of the whole world. Although there appeared a small revival during the War of Independence, it did not continue much.²⁶⁸

While mentioning the influence of Islam and Ottoman, Türkkan actually emphasizes very similar things to the Kemalist discourse. In the case for eliminating those roots, the nation-builders focused on the negative effects of these two legacies of the Turks' civilization. The difference is that Türkkan focuses on 'us' while mentioning lack of national consciousness unlike the Thesis which presents Turks as a fulltime

²⁶³ Tefik Zarakol, "Türk Tarihinden Irkçılığa" (12: 6 May 1943), p. 6.

²⁶⁴ Türkkan, "Milliyetsizliğe Doğru!" (3: 15 December 1942), pp. 3-4.

²⁶⁵ Türkkan, "Milliyetçiliğe Doğru!" (4: 1 January 1943), p. 4; Zarakol (12: 6 May 1943).

²⁶⁶ Türkkan, "Milliyetçiliğe Doğru!" (4: 1 January 1943), p. 4.

²⁶⁷ Nebil Buharalı, "Fikir Zorbalığı!" (12: 6 May 1943), p. 8.

²⁶⁸ Türkkan, "Milliyetçiliğe Doğru!" (4: 1 January 1943), p. 4.

nation having national consciousness; but badly influenced by Islam and the Ottomans. Türkkan connects that influence to Turks' lack of consciousness, instead of being deceived by 'external enemies.' Both take the War of Independence as one of their reference points for the revival of Turkish national consciousness.

However while the Kemalist elite pushes for Westernization with the aim of 'reaching to the contemporary level of civilizations,' *Gök-Börü* emphasizes more Turkification for becoming a rising civilization. In that case, for the journal, westernization is another danger like the Ottomans or Islam that leads to the decay of Turkish civilization. This discussion on westernization goes hand in hand with a critique of the Turkish History Thesis. According to Türkkan, the new history reform was going towards nationalization under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal; however at the end it turned out to claiming the ownership of all of world civilizations. In accordance with that claim, Türkkan states that, instead of national legends and Kutadgu Bilig; Odysseus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes were printed. Turkish students learnt not Yoluk Tigin, Bilge Tonyukuk, or Timur; but learnt Machiavelli, Xenophon, and Napoleon. The number of scholarships for the Turcology Institute was only six, whereas it was fifteen for the English and French branches.²⁶⁹

In the same vein, Türkkan emphasizes that the new generation which was mostly educated in Europe, brought Europe here to Turkey while returning. They adopted European culture and traditions; so that all weddings, ceremonies, clothes, entertainment, architecture, literature, language became the imitators of that foreign culture.²⁷⁰ As a result they became individualists who did not care national issues.²⁷¹ Tespihçioğlu adds America to the picture and complains Turkish youth's listening of American music According to him, Americans do not love their nation and homeland as Turks love.²⁷² Furthermore, this anti-westernization and its results theme is repeated in various caricatures by Sadettin Topuzoğlu in a teasing manner for explaining that these

²⁶⁹ Türkkan, "Milliyetsizliğe Doğru!" (3: 15 December 1942), p. 3.

²⁷⁰ Türkkan, "Milliyetsizliğe Doğru" (3: 15 December 1942), pp. 3-4; "Milliyetçiliğe Doğru!" (4: 1 January 1943), p. 4.

²⁷¹ Türkkan, "Yeni Genç!" (5: 15 January 1943), pp. 3-4.

²⁷² Tespihçioğlu, "Amerika Hayranlığı" (5: 15 January 1943), p. 6.

people became so funny since they adopted another civilization other than theirs.²⁷³ Tahir Olgaç contributes to the journal through some small stories in which he depicted the disrespectfulness of new ‘westernized’ youth and bad habits; such as admiring luxury, and gambling.²⁷⁴

What *Gök-Börü* very basically argues is that imitation of any civilization results with the weakening of the essence of the Turks. Since they adopted alien civilizations, their spirits became an artificial one that could be dissolved in any crisis as it happened now. While mentioning all these, the journal does not make any word for Mustafa Kemal’s westernization. This is understandable by referring to non-approachability and non-touchability of Mustafa Kemal even today. İsmet İnönü also was not mentioned in a negative manner. However there are critics to the state circles for leading to that corruption in social life, but these were not made through showing the target directly; just the problems of life, particularly in the economic arena, are declared. For instance Aydın Yalçın, in a scientific way, explains how and why inflation occurs.²⁷⁵ Raşid Hatipoğlu attracts attention to rising tax burden on villagers and then adds that “both the state and nation must think on this.”²⁷⁶ Similarly, Reha Kurtuluş (Türkkan) tells some economic problems and gives suggestions for solving them; while at the same time praises the government of Saraçoğlu for thinking on both the state officers and others in giving material aid.²⁷⁷

The point is that *Gök-Börü* does not establish a direct connection between the economic problems and the top-level of state; even justifies the policies of the top-circles by praising them. Instead, as in the case of Aşık Huzuri, who depicts the corruptibility of state officers in People’s House of Kayseri,²⁷⁸ the emphasis is on peripheral offices of the state. Within that picture, Mustafa Kemal is placed as ‘our Father’ and Bozkurt, after whom charlatans and treacheries increased; İsmet İnönü is

²⁷³ Sadettin Topuzoğlu, “Milliler” (3: 15 December 1942), pp. 12-13; “Millilerimiz: Nasıl Kutluyorlar?” (4: 1 January 1943), p. 13; “Gençlerimiz Tahsilden Dönüyorlar!” (5: 15 January 1943); “Gençlerimiz Yetiştiriliyor” (6: 1 February 1943), p. 13; “Çoğalmaya Başlayan Tipler” (11: 22 April 1943), p. 13.

²⁷⁴ Tahir Olgaç, “Nereye?” (5: 15 January 1943), pp. 5-6; (6: 1 November 1943), pp. 5-6; “Poker,” (7: 15 November 1943), pp. 6-7; “Değişen Kızlarımız” (9: 25 March 1943), pp. 7-8; “Büyüğe Saygı,” (11: 22 April 1943), pp. 7-8.

²⁷⁵ Aydın Yalçın, “Hayat Pahalılığı I” (2: 24 November 1942), p. 11; “Hayat Pahalılığı II” (3: 15 December 1942), p. 16.

²⁷⁶ Raşid Hatipoğlu, “Meşelerin Cenaze Alayı” (3: 15 December 1942), p. 10.

²⁷⁷ Reha Kurtuluş, “Buhran Karşısında: Yardım-Çare-Ceza” (4: 1 January 1943), pp. 10-11.

²⁷⁸ Aşık Huzuri, “Bugün Git, Yarın Gel” (3: 15 December 1942), p. 11.

the 'National Chief;' who encourages the Turkists with his populist sayings.²⁷⁹ It is also worth noting that in the picture, the ones who were against Mustafa Kemal and wanted American mandate are severely criticized by *Gök-Börü*.²⁸⁰ The authors have enough space to do this. Besides, they somehow combine the goals of the Kemalist elite, particularly those of Mustafa Kemal with their own goals. In that case, Mustafa Kemal, as the Bozkurt, paved the first step for reaching to *Turan*, however some other people around him opposed to this since they are so much westernized that they lost their Turkishness.

Gök-Börü, in general, emphasizes that this corruption in social and economic life can be the sign of future dissolution, in fact, what the Turks met throughout history was that dissolving of its unity as in the case of the Ottoman Empire. The solution, according to Türkkan, is to create a dynamic renaissance from this decayed civilization of the Turks through rediscovering nationality in both spiritual and material matters. By this way of nationalization in all aspects of the life, the Turks could return to their glorious age after long years of sleep.²⁸¹ What Türkkan argues is a more inclusive version of nationalization than Gökalp who declares that only technical matters should be borrowed. In fact, Türkkan states that Gökalp's formula of westernization was misunderstood by the Turks primarily because of lack of national consciousness and then they have forgotten their Turkishness. In this case, Türkkan sees his formula of nationalization as the solution to prevent this wrong going. While pushing for Turkification in every area, Türkkan also states that foreign books will be translated into Turkish, foreign music will also be listened; but the axis will not pass through the middle; instead Turkish will have more space. He shows Japan's rising as an example of this nationalization in all aspects of the life, but with small western nuances, which do not occupy a large space.²⁸² It seems that Türkkan considers these small nuances as a future prospect; therefore they can only have place after Turks provided their national unity; not in the process itself.

Hence, in order to bring the glorious days back, a deep revolution of nationality pursuing, not a moderate one, but the most ardent and extremist version of nationalism

²⁷⁹ Uluğ Turanhoğlu, "Samimiyet İstiyoruz" (10: 8 April 1943), p. 10.

²⁸⁰ Türkkan, "İleri Millet, Üstün Irk" (10: 8 April 1943), p. 3.

²⁸¹ Türkkan, "Milliyetsizliğe Doğru!" (3: 15 December 1942), pp. 4-5.

²⁸² Türkkan, "Milliyetçiliğe Doğru!" (4: 1 January 1943), pp. 6-7.

is required.²⁸³ This version of racism was planned to be helpful in terms of realizing the first issue on the road map of the *Bozkurtçus*; purifying and homogenizing the blood through a racist definition of Turkishness.

4.5. Race and Nationalization:

“Bir milletin iç bünyesini derin surette değiştirmek için elli nesil kafi değildir.”

Mussolini, 1942 Cf. Gök-Börü (3: 15 December 1942)

The definition of Turkishness in *Gök-Börü* constitutes of three elements; race, language and culture. In that case, a Turk is a member of the *Tur* race, speaks Turkish, and carries Turkish culture. These elements are hereditary, passes from one generation to the next and they are the determinants of the level of civilization. Hence the starting points of *Gök-Börü* are also the main tenets of Kemalist History Thesis. By this way the antiquity of Turkish nation is assumed, so that the nationalists-racists ‘rediscover’ the roots of that nation. This nation can be in somnolence now, but it comes from a glorious immemorial past from which lessons should be taken. These assumptions draw the road maps for the future. The ones who continue to walk on the road are the real Turks of Anatolia who can be understood through anthropological quest.

The end of the road, however, is the Great Turkestan for *Gök-Börü* and some official circles during the Second World War. The starting point, on the other hand, is to Turkify Anatolia for the Kemalist elite; and to clean non-Turks from Anatolia for *Gök-Börü*. This means the Kemalist definition assumes everyone to be Turk, this is inclusive; but if not, it tries to make everyone Turk no matter through which means it realizes. It supports the means through the use of science and so gains an absolutist nature to its assumptions. *Gök-Börü* uses references to science as well. It justifies racism through numbers and measuring. However for *Gök-Börü*, if a person is not a Turk, it cannot be a Turk either. On the other hand, every Muslim living in the boundaries of Turkey should ideally be Turks; if they are not accepting this they should be made accept. An example may help to understand; for *Gök-Börü*, Caucasian people living in Anatolia or Kurds living in the Eastern part of Anatolia are not Turks, they cannot be either; they should be eliminated somehow. For the Kemalist Thesis they are

²⁸³ Ibid.

all Turks, who have forgotten their Turkishness; they should be made remember it through education and communications. The main reason for this difference is mainly resulted from the geographic trauma of Kemalism that the elite lived when they were left with Anatolia. However *Gök-Börü*'s geography is much larger.

Within that picture both the Kemalists and *Gök-Börü* writers have this idea of superiority of the Turk. The first pushes this in order to have a claim on the Western civilization, whereas the latter's aim is to show that Turks do not need west; they are already superior to be able to create the greatest state as before. They both believe that Turks was a nation since the very beginning; but for the Kemalists Turks had national consciousness except brief periods of crisis which came out because of external threats; for the *Gök-Börü* writers on the other hand, Turks did not have national consciousness, that's why many Turkish states were dissolved. In order to prove all these, they both refer to 'science,' to the invention of some unchangeable criteria such as blood tie and race.

Türkkan claims that depending on physical and psychological characteristics, there are eleven races in the world. They are not equal to one another and there are differences in terms of abilities and talents.²⁸⁴ Among these races, *Tur* is the superior²⁸⁵ and the first one that transformed from monkey into human-being. Its members are long, brachycephal, white-skinned, having brown or black hair, aquiline nose, and symmetric body. The psychological reflection of these features is that to be brave, intelligent, idealist, at the same time spiritualist, heroic, excited, honest, philosopher-spirited, very talented in artistic matters and in establishing civilizations. The 'nations' of *Tur* are Finns-Uigurs, Japanese, Georgians and Turks. These 'nations' mixed with other races since the very beginning. The less mixed one and so carrying the most *Tur* blood is the Turks. In that case, the Turks are the superior nation of the *Tur* race as well as of all other nations in the world. Thanks to these talents, Turks established many civilizations in the world. These are Sumerians, Hittites, Uigurs, Seljuks and Ottomans. The *Tur* race also influenced other civilizations like Egypt, India, China, Persia, Greek, Arabic, and Europe.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ Türkkan, "İrk ve İrkçılık I" (9: 25 March 1943), p. 4.

²⁸⁵ Türkkan, "İleri Millet, Üstün İrk!" (10: 8 April 1943), p. 3.

²⁸⁶ Türkkan (1940), Appendix 3.

Here, it needs to be emphasized is that Türkkan, so *Gök-Börü* does not claim that Turks were the owners of the second group of civilizations above. The Kemalist History Thesis, on the other hand, has that big claim of establishing all great civilizations in the world, including the ones in the second group. Actually this difference displays the basic mentality of *Gök-Börü* writers and Kemalist elite. The Thesis is a civilization-hunger with the anxiety of proving the Turks' existence not only as a nation, but also as a superior nation; not in the future; but also in the past and present. *Gök-Börü*, on the other hand, distinguishes the Turkish rooted civilizations and reduces the role of *Tur* in the formation of non-Turkish civilizations unlike the Kemalist Thesis which attributes the Turks the main role. Another point is that while mentioning the second group of civilizations, the authors declare that it was the *Tur* race which influenced most of them. In the composition of *Tur*; there are also Finns-Uigurs, Japanese and Georgians. This also reduces the attributed role of Turks on the formation of non-Turkish civilizations.

Türkkan knows that it is impossible to find a pure Turk in Anatolia. In that case, he thinks very similar to Gobineau in arguing that the superior race usually mixes with others as time passes and this weakens the essence of the superior one. Too much mixing is very dangerous for the continuation of civilizations.²⁸⁷ *Gök-Börü* presents 'scientific' explanations for these dangers by implying that this is 'scientific racism,' not popular fiction.²⁸⁸ These scientific explanations come from Süreyya Aygün through examples of animals. She states that heredity rules determine the characteristics of races and continuity of species.²⁸⁹ If these natural rules were not paid attention and if different species mix, the result becomes a punishment by the nature. The hybridization leads to defects in future generations by creating real bastards.²⁹⁰ Even in the mixture of not very different races, the unique characteristics of each race are weakened.²⁹¹ If hybrids are mixed the result even becomes worse and this is sinful in fact.²⁹² However in Europe different species are united in order to obtain more powerful ones.²⁹³ There may be

²⁸⁷ Türkkan, "İrk ve İrkçılık I" (9: 25 March 1943), p. 5.

²⁸⁸ O. Bozkurt, "Her İrkin Üstünde Türk İrki Formülünü Anlamayanlar!" (4: 1 January 1943), pp. 2, 22.

²⁸⁹ Süreyya Aygün, "Saf İrklar Meselesi I" (8: 1 March 1943), pp. 4-5.

²⁹⁰ Aygün, "Saf İrklar Meselesi II" (9: 25 March 1943), p. 9.

²⁹¹ Aygün, "Saf İrklar Meselesi III" (10: 8 April 1943), p. 19.

²⁹² Aygün, "Saf İrklar Meselesi IV" (11:22 April 1943), pp. 5-6.

²⁹³ Aygün, "Saf İrklar Meselesi V" (12: 6 May 1943), p. 14.

powerful products at the end, but these would have certain defects such as being unproductive or more vulnerable to illnesses.²⁹⁴

Thus, *Gök-Börü* is in favor of the idea that races are not equal to one another. This is anthropologically and zoologically proven by examining the products of two different races. When two mix, inappropriate and incapable springs come out. In human-beings, this hybridization may appear also as bad habits, tendency to commit crimes like prostitution, gambling, burglary. The real disaster, for *Gök-Börü* writers and eugenics, is that these features pass to the next generations. For instance the child of a prostitute becomes again a prostitute.²⁹⁵ The Kemalist elite, guided by the motivation of Turkifying Anatolia tried to ‘correct’ these people through various mechanisms of the modern state such as the Kurds’ mass conscription²⁹⁶ in the first years of the Republic. However for *Gök-Börü*, these ‘degenerated, dirtied people’ are just lost bastards²⁹⁷ who play the biggest role in the corruption and decline of civilizations throughout history.

At this point, very similar to Gobineau’s ideas on the rise and decline of civilizations, Türkkan states that the decline of Turkish civilizations came out as the result of degeneration of Turkish race.²⁹⁸ For instance, the Ottoman Empire was collapsed because of rebellions by those degenerated semi-Turks or non-Turks like the rebellions of Janissaries.²⁹⁹ This point is exemplified more in the unfinished novel, *Kurtların İsyanı* (The Rebellion of Wolves) by Mehmet Öztürk. Only the first chapter of the novel, which is on the Patrona Halil Rebellion of the eighteenth century, could appear since the journal was closed after thirteenth issue. In the chapter; ‘the young, handsome, intelligent, excited, and brave’ Turkish *pehlivan*, the wolf, Mehmed from Aydın, defeats Patrona Halil, the ‘rebellious, evil, but coward, Albanian devshirme,’ that rebelled right before the campaign to Iran.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁴ Aygün, “Saf Irklar meselesi VI” (13: 20 May 1943), p. 9.

²⁹⁵ Vefik Vassaf Akan, “İrk Hıfzısıhhası,” *Bozkurt*, v.3. Cf. Türkkan (1940), p. 136.

²⁹⁶ Entessar (1992), p. 85.

²⁹⁷ Criminology is one of the products of modernity which was nurtured by racism, rising nationalism, rising reactions to State’s identity. These rebels, who can be ‘identified’ with their physical appearances, are either corrected in prisons, correction houses, military or just eliminated. In that case, Ottomans’ ilm-i kıyafe-(Ottoman psychognomy) must be understood in the same manner because of its contributions to the formation of prejudices or the contribution of prejudices in the eformation of all these ‘sciences.’

²⁹⁸ Türkkan, “Milliyetsizliğe Doğru” (3: 15 December 1942); “Milliyetçiliğe Doğru” (4: 1 January 1943)

²⁹⁹ A.N.Y., “İrkçılığın Doğru Olduğunu İspat Ediyorum” (7: 15 February 1943), p. 13.

³⁰⁰ Mehmet Öztürk, “Kurtların İsyanı,” nos: 1-3, 6-11.

The novel also shows that *Gök-Börü* does not reject the Ottomans entirely; instead it chooses the elements of ‘Turkishness’ and the elements of its opposing end; ‘non-Turkishness.’ In other words, it Turkicizes the Ottoman past; not by referring to the dynasty since they are ‘the Ottomans,’ but by referring to the Turkish component of the empire. The Turks come to the scene as faithful and loyal warriors as in the case of Mehmed *pehlivan* who fights for the supremacy and integrity of the Ottoman State; not for the domination of the dynasty. This portrait is the basis for the warrior of *Atsız* in *Deli Kurt*, that of Abdullah Ziya Kozanoğlu in *Kızıltuğ*, and Suat Yalaz’ *Karaoğlan* comics of 1950s and 60s. Here the State is considered to be a supreme entity in a Weberian meaning. The warriors fight against any challenges to the State’s supremacy and integrity. In that case, the most important one of these challenges come from the semi-Turks and the degenerated ones.

A similar example that Türkkan refers is from the War of Independence. According to him, during the war these hybrids, degenerated ones wanted to gift Turkish homeland to foreigners through mandate. The alien ones claimed the ownership of this land although they were just guests.³⁰¹ Therefore, these dirtied ones along with the alien ones challenged the supremacy of the State as they did every time in Turkish history. In the same vein, the Kemalist elite discarded the Ottoman Empire since it gave the administration to the hands of non-Turks. The difference lies in that Türkkan accepts existence of a mixture like Gobineau, however the Kemalist Thesis avoids declaring this; therefore takes the Ottoman Empire as if it existed in a dark age, or in a universe; so that it failed to harm the ethnic purity of the Turks. In that case, the Kemalist elite were much more anxious of not including the Ottomans at any point. *Gök-Börü* meets with the Thesis while searching for the decadence of the Turks; like the Kemalist elite who showed the Ottomans as responsible from shadowing Turks’ real essence. Türkkan argues that the reason for the backwardness of the Turks is their forgetting of Turkishness; although they are racially superior.³⁰² In that picture, the passivity of Turkishness is argued by both the Kemalist elite and *Gök-Börü* writers. Besides, it is also argued that despite this passivity, Turks did not lose their specific features that make them; the superior race and also superior nation as the Kemalists called; the most proper member of the superior *Tur* race and so the most superior

³⁰¹ Türkkan, “İlerleyen Türkçülük” (11: 22 April 1943), p. 3.

³⁰² Türkkan, “İleri Millet, Üstün İrk” (10: 8 April 1943), p. 3.

nation, as *Gök-Börü* writers called. To strip off this conceptual confusion, very basically both argue that the Turks are the most superior people of the world, who passed through some unlucky times.

Indeed both the Thesis and *Gök-Börü* externalize the reasons for decadence. They use references to external and internal enemies. The internal ones are influenced by the external ones. This picture actually creates the convenient basis for conspiracy theories, which, in fact, help nations to define themselves in relation to ‘others.’ Here, the decadence is related with something alien and different, an external effect. Then the classical theory or myth goes as the following; there are some foreign people who want to destroy the nation’s essence since they have interests on the homeland of this nation. Within that picture, any ideology that challenges to the supremacy of the State is considered to be originated by traitors since it is illogical. By this way, nationalization of all elements and rising as a homogeneous nation become the only legitimate ideology, the life-time mission for a nationalist.

In that case, *Gök-Börü* sees racism and purifying the country as the sole ideology of the Turkish nation. None of other ideologies of the West, including national socialism or fascism, can challenge to Turkish racism since they are all alien to the Turks. Therefore, *Gök-Börü* writers argue that they are not imitating national socialism or fascism as Jews, communists and masons argued.³⁰³ Instead, they are fighting for the continuation of thousands of years’ racial element which made Turks superior. While giving clues on the ‘others’ of the Turkish racism, this perception of *Gök-Börü* writers actually reveals a very important point; they believed that they are striving for an ‘immanent’ component of the Turkish nation. In that case with a time difference what they argued for can be considered as correct. Nationalism is a modern phenomenon, which was accompanied by racism in nation-building. In the Turkish case, racism comes as one of the indigenous elements of the nation-building process, as it happened in other nationalisms. Therefore, what *Gök-Börü* writers declare is very enlightening in the sense that it shows that racism does not necessarily come into the nation by the influence of external factors; such as importation of some ideologies like national socialism or racism. Instead, it develops independently as a part of nation-building; but

³⁰³ Bozkurt, “Her İrkin Üstünde Türk Irkı Formülünü Anlamayanlar!” (4: 1 January 1943), p. 22.

as a subset of what happens in the world. Therefore, of course this does not legitimate their actions; but Hitler, Mussolini, or *Gök-Börü* writers are not a handful of adventurers; along with İnönü or Mustafa Kemal, they are part of a larger picture with its insides and outsides.

However the classical assumption for the nationalists exemplified by *Gök-Börü* here is that ideologies other than racism have external roots. The picture is drawn like this; the ones forget their Turkishness and became westernized import some alien and harmful ideologies as the byproducts of westernization. These ideologies like communism, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, humanism and egalitarianism are superstitions which are resulted from the lack of knowledge on *Urukbiig-Raciologie*. Opposing to the laws of nature, they argue for illogical things such as the common use of goods and equality between races, states, and sexes.³⁰⁴ Thus, the supporters of these ideologies are all ‘heretics,’³⁰⁵ ‘bastards’ or ‘devshirmes’ who carry bad blood and totally forgot the real essence, Turkishness. They are all against national culture, national traditions,³⁰⁶ as it is depicted in the caricature by Sadettin Topuzoğlu, they want destroy the bridge between past and future³⁰⁷ by making Turkish culture rotten.³⁰⁸

At this point Türkkkan, by referring to Gobineau, states that these ‘bastards’ and ‘aliens’ are also against racism in order to disguise the degeneration of their bloods and to generalize this degeneration to everyone including the future generations.³⁰⁹ Besides they are enemies of *ülkü-ideal*,³¹⁰ therefore as Sofuoğlu adds, the supporters of these pernicious ideologies impose their ideas like opium in order to make other people indolent individualists who do not have any desire to fight for the ideal of Turkish racism.³¹¹ In other words, if a race is degenerated so much, after some time it loses its ideal and this leads to its collapse. Here as an example, Türkkkan gives France, which was an ally of Turkey, but defeated right at the beginning of the Second World War. According to Türkkkan, the collapse of France is mainly the result of this degeneration in

³⁰⁴ Türkkkan, “İrk ve İrkçılık I” (9: 25 March 1943), pp. 4-6.

³⁰⁵ Türkkkan, “Solcu Sapıklara Bozkurt Cevabı!” (5: 15 January 1943), p. 2, 21.

³⁰⁶ Türkkkan, “İlerleyen Türkçülük,” (11: 22 April 1943), p. 3-4.

³⁰⁷ Sadettin Topuzoğlu, “An’ane Köprüsü,” (8: 1 March 1943), p. 13.

³⁰⁸ Türkkkan, “İlerleyen Türkçülük,” (11: 22 April 1943), pp. 3-4.

³⁰⁹ Türkkkan, “İrk ve İrkçılık I” (9: 25 March 1943), pp. 4-6.

³¹⁰ “Kim Çatıyor, Kim Sabrediyor?” (5: 15 January 1943), p. 16.

³¹¹ Zeki M. Sofuoğlu, “Kökten Bir Değişiklik Lazım!” (5: 15 January 1943), pp. 7-8.

its race. This caused the loss of national consciousness,³¹² and any desire of fighting for the French nation. Then France surrendered its flag to the German forces.³¹³

Within that picture arises the ultimate solution to the decadence; to eliminate all foreign elements in the nation not only ideally but also practically through racist policies. This would save the Turkish race from more degeneration and reveal the real essence of it. The writers of *Gök-Börü* favor the exclusionary policies of the Kemalist elite for their contributions to the rise of Turkish race. The first of these policies is the rejection of non-Turks in military schools. *Gök-Börü* mentions this in a praising way.³¹⁴ Very similar to this policy, it was decided by the Kemalist elite that the Ministers of Maritime and National Defense would not be allowed to marry to foreigners. This policy is also supported by *Gök-Börü*.³¹⁵

The most praised and propagated one among those policies is the Wealth Tax taken from *azlıks*-minorities. The justification of this tax is depicted by Yalçın as a precondition for saving Turkish economy. According to him, while the Turkish soldiers are fighting for protecting the homeland of the Turks, these ‘guests’ dominate the market and become rich by profiteering from the war.³¹⁶ This resulted with the decaying of the Turkish market at the hands of degenerated Jews and Armenians, who do not even take any responsibility of this. Therefore they should give taxes without complaining, they should to this sacrifice.³¹⁷ If they do not, the Turks will not show them tolerance as they did before. They will be punished.³¹⁸ Indeed, nothing happens if a few Solomon is executed. This is even beneficial, because the punishment frightens others.³¹⁹ It is this method of harsh punishment, not communism, made Russia a powerful nation. It blocked challenges through pursuing an extremist version of Russian nationalism.³²⁰ This tax itself was very severe, so not surprisingly, the approach of *Gök-Börü* to the Wealth Tax is very militant. The tax again empowers the idea that ‘Turkey

³¹² Türkkan, “İrk ve İrkçılık I” (9: 25 March 1943), pp. 4-5.

³¹³ Türkkan (1940), pp. 9-11. Here Türkkan also presents a photograph taken from French front in which French soldiers ‘escaped’ by leaving their guns and helmets behind. The originality of the photo is of course suspicious.

³¹⁴ Tespihçioğlu, “Türk İrkından Olmak” (1: 5 November 1942), p. 11.

³¹⁵ İktibaslar (4: 1 January 1943), p. 9.

³¹⁶ Aydın Yalçın, “Hayat Pahalılığı II” (3: 15 December 1942), p. 16.

³¹⁷ Kurtuluş, “Büyük Bir İnkılap: Varlık Vergisi” (5: 15 January 1943), p. 11.

³¹⁸ Kurtuluş, “Buhran Karşısında : Yardım-Çare-Ceza” (4: 1 January 1943), pp. 10-11.

³¹⁹ Türkkan, “Ahlak-Korku-Menfaat” (2: 24 December 1942), p. 5.

³²⁰ Türkkan, “Rus Mucizesinden Ders” (7: 15 February 1943), pp. 3-5.

is belonged to Turks.’ By naming these non-Muslims as ‘guests,’ whose staying is ‘tolerated,’ the real owner of Anatolia is implied.

Thus, *Gök-Börü* writers, like the Kemalist elite are in favor of fighting with all these foreign elements. The aim is to elevate the Turkish race by eliminating any challenge to its purity. In order for the Turkish race to continue its purity and superiority this kind of a struggle is considered to be required.³²¹ The reason for this requirement is depicted by Nuri Akgün. From a Social Darwinist and Realist understanding, Akgün states that through struggles and fighting, the most capable race is distinguished; then nation-states are established. Therefore, not humanism or illusions of peace, it is war which protects the sacred presence of a nation since it strengthens national consciousness. As the proof of this, Akgün shows the United Nations which failed to preserve peace.³²² Besides, not being in favor of war indicates the weakening of national consciousness. The Turks, on the other hand, are soldiers since they are born because in their superior composition, war-making is another inherited talent. War is in their blood, so that they are military-nation since the very beginning.³²³ Therefore they were able to establish many different states, because war renovates civilizations.³²⁴ In this case, the Kemalist elite also refer to bravery of the Turks, but at the same time add that the Turks had the tendency of favoring peace. This difference between the understandings of the Kemalists and the *Gök-Börü* writers may be the result of international environment. The History Thesis was created at a time when Turks were trying to prove that they did not have any irredentist aims like the Ottomans. The *Gök-Börü* writers, on the other hand, actually make propaganda for Turkey’s involving into the Second World War. The interesting point is that they were joined by some people of the official circles. This glorification of war-making, in fact, justifies the action itself in the eyes of both enemies and the ones who fight. It, in a way, presents people a reason to fight while also legitimizes the nation’s struggle for existence.

In order to fight, the military-nation needs healthy, disciplined, active, hard-working and brave nationalist men.³²⁵ In Türkkan’s words, “Turkish young man, in

³²¹ Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, “Milliyetçilerin Cevabı” (4: 1 January 1943), p. 12.

³²² Nuri Akgün, “Savaş ve İnsanlık” (2: 24 December 1942), pp. 5-6.

³²³ Akgün, “Disiplinin Hüviyeti ve Unsurları” (3: 15 December 1942), p. 6.

³²⁴ Tespihçioğlu, “Harbe Dair” (3: 15 December 1942), p. 8.

³²⁵ Türkkan, “İş Halinde Milliyetçilik” (12: 6 May 1943), p. 3.

tomorrow's glorious wars, is more frightening than Huns, more enormous than Gök Türks, more undefeatable than the soldiers of Chingiz, and more impressive than the Ottomans. He is the future god of war."³²⁶ In order to prevent the collapse of this young man as in the case of French soldiers who did not have any ideal, he should be passed through a national education combined with national discipline.³²⁷ This disciplined national education should uncover the long-term hidden national consciousness of him.³²⁸ Then the young man gain national consciousness and by this way he will not degenerate his race with hybrid springs. At that point, the authors share the idea that the Turkish education system should be reformed in order to re-create this new man.³²⁹ Türkkan, here refers to the education system of Britain in order to display an ideal type in which body and mind are educated at the same time. According to his information, the British education aims at growing powerful, practical, intelligent, creative, and organized persons who are in good shape both physically and mentally.³³⁰

The Turkish young man, therefore, should educate both his mind and body since he plays the big role in defense of homeland. He should protect his health by practicing many types of sports. Ülkütaşır, at that point, introduces these sports that Turks practice since the old times; football, boxing, skiing, wrestling, polo, and carid. According to him, these ancient Turkish sports are the evidence that Turkish ancestors had already grasped the importance of a dual education of body and mind.³³¹ The interesting thing is that he actually Turkicizes these games. Abdülkadir İnan contributes by describing another game called Gök-Börü, which was played by the Kirghiz Turks.³³² Ülkütaşır adds that this game was also a common one among the Turks of Anatolia.³³³ Thus the games also serve for showing possible cultural connections with the 'outside Turks' along with a common geographic reference of the past.

³²⁶ Türkkan, "Yarının Genci" (6: 1 February 1943), p. 4.

³²⁷ Akgün, "Disiplinin Hüviyeti ve Unsurları" (3: 15 December 1942), p. 6.

³²⁸ Nebil Buharalı, "Milli Terbiye" (6: 1 February 1943), p. 12.

³²⁹ Zeki M. Sofuoğlu, "Kökten Bir Değişiklik Lazım" (5: 15 January 1943), pp. 7-8; Kemal Hakkı Kut, "Gençlik Davasının Maarif Cephesi" (6: 1 February 1943), pp. 18-19.

³³⁰ Türkkan, "Yabancı Ülkelerde Gençlik ve Terbiye Sistemleri" (5: 15 January 1943), pp. 9-10; "İngiliz Öğretim Sistemi" (6: 1 February 1943), pp. 9-11; (7: 15 February 1943), pp. 11, 20; (8: 1 March 1943), pp. 17-18; "Yabancı Ülkelerde Gençlik" (9: 25 March 1943), pp. 26-27.

³³¹ M. Şakir Ülkütaşır, "Eski Türklerde Toplu Oyun ve Sporlar" (6: 1 February 1943), pp. 7-8.

³³² Abdülkadir İnan, "Gök-Börü Oyunu" (6: 1 February 1943), pp. 6-7.

³³³ M. Şakir Ülkütaşır, "Gök-Börü Oyununun Anadoludaki İzleri" (7: 15 February 1943), pp. 15-16.

This understanding of a dual-sided education is actually an extension of racism's idea that physical characteristics are the determinants of psychological ones. In fact, here Türkkan corrects the body and mind of the Turkish young man along with instilling the ideal of racism as if it is a religion; because healthy mind is found in the health body in Mustafa Kemal's words. Within this picture of the ideal Turk; religion does not occupy much place. Türkkan sees it from an Andersonian side and takes national ideal as a substitution for religion as the other writers in the journal who do not make any reference to religion. However there are a few translations of Quran suras by Besim Atalay and Ömer Rıza Doğrul into Turkish.³³⁴ In that case, what they are actually against is not the religious loyalty itself, but an Islamic religion which negatively influenced Turkish unity since the Turks adopted it. A Turkicized Islam based on purely Turkish language or a Turkist religion in Turkish language can be the possible alternatives in the authors' mind.

Furthermore, a secularized education is what they put forward. In that case Türkkan's ideal of a complete education of Turkish youth is actually on the way of realizing through Nuri Demirağ Sky School, which is introduced by *Gök-Börü* in a detailed manner. This school was a private one opened for educating pilots in a much disciplined way, not only in aviation, but also in various other matters such as swimming and using guns. In addition to these psychical qualifications, the school also aims at filling the students with national ideal by creating morally proper young men. Accordingly, the advices by the owner of the school, Demirağ, go as the following; "Turkish young men, avoid all these!: drinking, gambling, dishonesty, laziness, shamelessness and cruelty."³³⁵ Türkkan mentions this school in a very much admired way firstly because of its contributions to create ideal Turkish youth. The second point by Türkkan is that as a Turkish enterprise, the school also contributed to the development of national industry. In fact, Nuri Demirağ was also the founder several plane-constructing factories.³³⁶ With all these, according to Türkkan, Demirağ

³³⁴ Besim Atalay, "Öz Türkçe Kuran Suresi" (1: 5 November 1942), p. 8; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Kur'andan İktibaslar" (3: 15 December 1942), p. 19; (4: 1 January 1943), p. 16.

³³⁵ Gök Bekçisi, "Nuri Demirağ Gök Okulu" (7: 15 February 1943), pp. 8-10; "Nasıl Yetiştiriliyor?" (9: 25 March 1943), pp. 28-32.

³³⁶ Gök Bekçisi, "Büyük Türk Müteşebbisi Nuri Demirağ'ın Uçak Fabrikaları" (9: 25 March 1943), pp. 22-24.

manifested the intelligence of the Turks to the world, along with his loyalty to the national ideal.³³⁷

Indeed the creation of a national industry with Turkish enterprises was one of the steps of *Gök-Börü* for the rise of Turkish race. It is stated that Turkish industry should be reorganized in order to get rid off bad influences of the war by developing indigenous sectors.³³⁸ Suggestions for reorganization of agriculture,³³⁹ and appliance of an agricultural insurance³⁴⁰ should also be considered within that framework of nationalization for the rise of Turkish race. In fact, then comes the emphasis on villager as the symbol of racial purity in a *Volkian* understanding. What the author writing on this issue mainly argues for is the ignorance of villagers in such issues as drinking, which may lead to their spiritual collapse.³⁴¹ Despite this critique, the author praises the Turkish villager because of his intelligence as a reaction to the Ottomans which claimed exactly the opposite for the villagers because of their laziness.³⁴² The point is that the Kemalist project also followed this way of nationalization of industry and agriculture while also putting emphasis on the Turkish villager as the spirit of the Turkish race.

Thus, the general vision of *Gök-Börü* is in favor of nationalization in every aspect of life for the rise of Turkish race. To clarify; pure Turkishness in blood, a Turkification of language, Turkification of religion, Turkishness in names, clothing, sports, architecture, literature, art, music,³⁴³ culture, a firm establishment of discipline, educating Turkish youth with Turkish mind, muscle and body, so that uncovering the brave, heroic, bold, powerful, nationalist, knowledgeable, sportsmen, and fighter essence of the young Turkish men. The list by Türkkan continues with Turkish education, Turkish cinema, the real Turkish history, national past, national culture, and national traditions. Then, not Christmas, but Turkish *bayrams* will be celebrated. In courts, the Turkish law will be adopted. In schools not Greek or Latin, but *Gök-Türk* language and Uighur language should be thought. Persian and Arabic letters should also be taught for getting a grasp of history and literature. Of course foreign works will be

³³⁷ Türkkan, "Rus Mucizesinden Ders!" (7: 15 February 1943), p.10.

³³⁸ Ziya Tataç, "Sanayimiz Teşkilatlanırken" (10: 8 April 1943), p. 20.

³³⁹ Tataç, "Ziraatimizin Teşkilatlanmasına Doğru" (9: 25 March 1943), p. 12.

³⁴⁰ Tataç, "Toprak Ürünlerimizi Sigortalama Yolunda" (11: 22 April 1943), pp. 16-17.

³⁴¹ Ş.Raşid Hatipoğlu, "Köylü ve İçki" (4: 1 January 1943), pp. 13-14.

³⁴² Hatipoğlu, "Köylümüzün Akli Nerede?" (1: 5 November 1942), pp. 10-11.

³⁴³ M. Ragıp Kösemihal, "Asırlar Boyunca Türk Musikisi" (2: 24 November 1942), pp. 9-10; (3: 15 December 1942), p. 9; (4: 1 January 1943), pp. 19-20; (7: 15 February 1943), pp. 19-20.

translated into Turkish, of course some people will also listen European music, but the axis will pass through the Turkish side, not through the middle.³⁴⁴

In this picture, *Gök-Börü* does not completely externalize Islamic and Ottoman factors. Even for the language, still Persian and Arabic are emphasized. Unlike the Kemalist elite that attempted to remove these elements at the ideological level. The main reason that lies behind all these is that *Gök-Börü* writers, the real *Bozkurtçus* had the claim of presenting a lifetime manual for the Turkish people. The ideal Turk, in fact, should also know his past, take lessons from it and then should look to the future with the ideal of reaching to the Turan. Therefore he should at first learn his own history by returning to the sources, the next step is to think and declare them in Turkish. Here, not surprisingly, *Gök-Börü* does not suggest Greek or Latin; since these are the languages of some alien civilizations that the Turks do not have a claim. The Kemalist History Thesis, on the other hand, also looked for ancient Greek roots in order to explaining Turks' existence in Anatolia without making any Islamic or Ottoman reference.

4.6. The Greater Turkestan- *Büyük Birlik Ülküsü*:

Within that picture of intensive Turkification, reaching to *Turan*, the formation of Greater Turkestan was considered to be the ultimate aim. However this project was not a total unification of the people of the same race. This means the Greater Turkestan does not include Magyars, Finns, Georgians, or Japanese although together with the Turks they are descended from the race of *Tur*. Türkkan states that the reason for their exclusion is not only the superiority of the Turks; but also the fact that these people do not speak Turkish and their traditions are different.³⁴⁵ In that case, Turkish speaking people of Russia constitute one of the building blocks of a future unity.

Accordingly, in *Gök-Börü* 'the Outside Turks' is placed with their culture and the history of their independence movements. For the cultural aspect, in addition to

³⁴⁴ Türkkan, "Milliyetçiliğe Doğru!" (4: 1 January 1943), pp. 6-7.

³⁴⁵ Türkkan (1940), p.146.

common sport games, the weddings are depicted in a very much documentarian way.³⁴⁶ This kind of a discourse may be the result of the future political entity in which Turkey would be at the center. Therefore a center-periphery perspective can be realized in-between lines. In that picture, Turkey is there for saving the ‘imprisoned Turks.’

Furthermore, the independence movements of ‘Turkish race against Russians invasions’ are depicted for showing how they strove for gaining their independence but they failed.³⁴⁷ After a general introduction, Bashkurts’ independence movement against ‘Russian imperialism’ is explained in a very detailed way.³⁴⁸ Then Russians’ policy of dividing the Turks and provoking those against one another is declared.³⁴⁹ What the authors mainly emphasize is the Russians’ efforts to destroy Turkish unity. In a very parallel discourse, Azerbaijan’s history and geography are presented. It begins with the etymology of the word Azerbaijan and continues until its invasion by the Soviet Russia. It is stressed that the constituting element of Azerbaijan, the Turks, fought for gaining independence, however Russians historically repressed even the use of Turkish language among them.³⁵⁰

Thus, these depictions, although justifying why these people are ‘imprisoned Turks,’ do not include any explicit reference to a possible future project. However in the thirteenth issue of *Gök-Börü*, which was published following the invasion of Azerbaijan by Russia, a requiem is presented for this lost land through some articles and poems.³⁵¹ Most importantly, Türkkan writes an article in which he outlines all the dangers that the Great Turkestan- *Büyük Birlik Ülküsü* met throughout history. In this article, focusing mainly on the invasion of Azerbaijan by Russia, Türkkan argues that Turkishness succeeded to survive despite the efforts to divide Turks and then degenerate Turkish blood. Although at the end of the article he declares that he and his followers’ aim is a cultural rapprochement,³⁵² this does not seem so. Combined with the other writings in

³⁴⁶ Abdülkadir İnan, “Özbeklerde Köy Düğünü” (1: 5 November 1942), pp. 17-18; “Kırgız-Kazak Düğünleri” (2: 24 November 1942), pp. 18-19, “Başkurt Düğünü” (8: 1 March 1943), p. 16; “Başkurt Düğünü II” (13: 20 May 1943), pp. 18-19.

³⁴⁷ Abdülkadir İnan and Akdes Nimet Kurat, “İstiklal Mücadeleleri” (9: 25 March 1943), pp. 17-19, 27.

³⁴⁸ Abdülkadir İnan, “İstiklal Mücadeleleri: Başkurt İsyanları” (10: 8 April 1943), pp. 9-10.

³⁴⁹ İnan, “Başkurt-Rus Mücadeleleri” (11: 22 April 1943), pp. 9-10.

³⁵⁰ S.A., “Türkler: Azerbaycan” (1: 5 November 1942), p. 19; G.T. “Türkler: Azerbaycan II” (2: 24 November 1942), pp. 15-17; S.A. “Azerbaycan III” (3: 15 December 1942), p. 14.

³⁵¹ M. Altunbay, “Azerbaycan Cümhuriyetinden Bir Sahne,” pp. 10-11; A.Cevat and Hüseyin Cavit, “Azeri Edebiyatından Parçalar: Yazık, Olacak, Birliğe Çağırış, İntikam, Türk Ecdadı,” p. 12; G.T. “Azerbaycan: İstiklali-İşgali-Temsil Teşebbüsleri,” pp. 14-16; (13: 20 May 1943).

³⁵² Türkkan, “Büyük Türklük” (13: 20 May 1943), pp. 3-6.

the issue, this article was actually a call for war. Türkkan's sentence on cultural union might be the result of the government's rising reactions following the defeat of Germany by the Soviet Union in Stalingrad. In fact this issue, chiefly the article by Türkkan, created enormous disturbance among the government circles. As a result, *Gök-Börü* was closed³⁵³ for preventing any reaction by the Soviet Russia.

However the flow of journals did not end. *Kopuz* became more political-focused. *Türk-Sazı* appeared as another Pan-Turkist journal which gathered Pan-Turkists under its roof. This continued until 1944 when the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union gained prominence in order to prevent its aggressiveness. On the other hand, as the influence of Soviet Union increased, the Pan-Turkist journals became very severe anti-communists. Their reactions became concretized with an extensive Pan-Turkist meeting of 1944 after which all of above-mentioned names were litigated except the old retired generals Ali İhsan Sabis and Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet. Ironically, the litigated Pan-Turkists defended themselves through an extensive survey of all the racist policies and discourses of the Kemalist elite. However they were imprisoned in 1944 with the claim of pursuing a racist understanding of Turkishness. The peculiarity is that these Pan-Turkists were released in 1947 when they persuaded the court that what they did was actually to defense Turkish nation's interests against the non-Turk communists.³⁵⁴ This result is a concretization of that there are ideological penetrations between two versions of Turkish nationalism independently from foreign policy; they are in fact fertilized by the same intellectual sources and same myths like 'non-national aliens.' In other words, 'nationalism' again defeated 'non-national, alien.'

³⁵³ Önen (2005), p. 18.

³⁵⁴ Özdoğan (2002a), pp. 104-120.

CONCLUSION:

“THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY...”³⁵⁵,”

*“Thus grew the tale of Wonderland:
Thus slowly, one by one,
Its quaint events were hammered out-
And now the tale is done,
And home we steer, a merry crew,
Beneath the setting sun.”*

Down the Rabbit Hole, in Alice in Wonderland

Nationalism has enough space of freedom for imagining a glorious past by selecting evidence, magnifying the realities or by just recreating in a wonderland. In that context, since the past has already gone, it was like a foreign country in which the nation-builders try to follow the traces of future. This is in a way to project future to the present. Then the findings by the nationalists are absolutized and become myths with proofs of pseudo-science. The next step is the dissemination of this imagination through communications or education. There may emerge reactions to this anonymity, but they are repressed with the totalitarian State which holds all the powers of narrating the past by monopolizing intellectual production. At that point, any alternative ideology was considered as challenges to the supremacy and integrity of the State.

The newly born Turkish nation-state passed through exactly the same process of invention. It was actually a part of the largest project which had already begun with the self-definition attempts of the Ottomans in order to find a solution to the dissolution of the empire. The sources that they had were mostly the European sources. Therefore they began to see themselves through European eyes. This was accompanied by the rise of a separate Pan-Turkist movement in the Russian dominated lands, which pushed for a possible unification of all the Turks. On the other hand, the Ottoman intellectuals had already worn that European glasses and begun to look for roots.

³⁵⁵ First line of the book *The Go-Between* by L.P. Hartley, 1953.

The War of Independence gave birth to a different kind of attachment for the people of Anatolia other than religion or the failed project of Ottoman citizen. However this did not continue for so long, after the war has finished and the borders were defined the mission was completed. Thus, When the Turkish Republic had been declared in 1923, Muslims living in Anatolia were not defining themselves as the Turks, but as Muslims of Anatolia. The 1930s, then, came with a creation of Turkishness through a rediscovering of its roots. The product of these efforts was the Turkish History Thesis which was prepared with several considerations such as anti-Islamicization and anti-Ottomanization. Therefore the Kemalist elite took the roots of Turks back to Central Asia in order to claim antiquity and non-Islamic origins which were at the same time secular. By this way, the Thesis claimed that the Turks was an ancient nation which had established many states. This Thesis actually served for westernization project through stripping the ‘nation’ off its barbaric and religious image while at the same time ‘proving’ that Turks were as talented as Europeans in establishing civilizations. Then a mass pumping of Central Asian roots came through education and communications mediums in the same vein with many racist and exclusive policies of the government.

On the other hand, the Kemalist elite’s claim for westernization met with several reactions. Some other nationalists argued that the Turks do not need that European claim in order to prove their greatness. Indeed, *Gök-Börü* came as a reaction to Kemalists’ claim for westernization during the Second World War when Germany was making extensive Pan-Turkist propaganda. There are three main tenets that defined *Gök-Börü*’s discourse. The very first was that *Gök-Börü* was published by Reha Oğuz Türkkan who passed through a Kemalist education. The other contributors were also mostly professors, teachers, students and librarians. The second is that *Gök-Börü* witnessed the ongoing dispute between two leaders of the Pan-Turkist movements. When compared with the second leader, Nihal Atsız, Türkkan was closer to the center also with the influence of his father’s official position. The third point is that it was already an aggressive period which incited new hopes for taking the Central Asian lands and realizing the aim of reaching to Turan.

Despite its Pan-Turkist emphasis, *Gök-Börü* could find various conciliation points with the Kemalist regime. The reason behind this was that both the Kemalist History Thesis and *Gök-Börü* were shaped by similar concerns of nation-building.

Therefore, they employed same themes, same myths, and same images. Of course, *Gök-Börü* had also the consideration of continuing its life as a journal, it was not uneasy for it to fit into the Kemalist discourse or vice versa. The result was a symbiotic relationship between the two, which taken together, created a complex nationalist discourse.

Indeed although their ultimate ends were different, both had similar definition for Turkishness which mainly based on the ultimate mission of nationalization and excluding all other un-national elements. This commonality revealed that nation-building discourses are mostly established on some assumptions and otherizations. Therefore, neither the racist face of Kemalist discourse, nor the racist journal *Gök-Börü* was anomalies. In the larger context, they were the products of the age of nationalisms.

However, nation-building can never be completed. States have to make people remembered themselves through various means. In that context, Turkish nationalism is also an unfinished project which meets with several crisis because of its absolutization of the 'nation,' State and nationalism solely to the Turks. Thus, new mixtures, different conciliations are still waiting to be explored for creating collective memories.

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