



LONE-WOLF TERRORISM

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Case study for Work Package 3

'Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society'



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1. INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in the case of the notorious 'Italian Unabomber' have reasserted the perceived threat of lone-wolf terrorism. The Italian Unabomber, nicknamed by the Italian media because of the similarities between his or her bombings and those of American serial bomber Theodore Kaczynski, has been striking fear across the country with over thirty explosions in thirteen years. Despite the recent arrest of a 49-year-old engineer, on 3 October 2006, the bomber remains unidentified and continues to instill fear into the Italian population and prompt expensive countermeasures.

In the United States, lone-wolf terrorism has been regarded as a serious threat to public safety in recent years. Despite their divergent nature, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, on 19 April 1995, and the events of 11 September 2001 have increased the perceived threat of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States. Law enforcement officials and terrorism analysts emphasize that lone terrorists are particularly hard to identify before they act and therefore pose a major security threat. According to the FBI, lone extremists represent an ongoing threat to the United States, both domestically and overseas (Johnston & Risen, 2003: 15). FBI director Robert S. Mueller III stated in 2003 that 'the threat from single individuals sympathetic or affiliated with al-Qaeda, acting without external support or surrounding conspiracies, is increasing' (Mueller, 2003).

In contrast with the current political concern about the threat of lone-wolf terrorism, terrorism scholars predominantly focus on group dynamics in explaining individual pathways into terrorism. Terrorism is commonly viewed as essentially a collective activity. Academic explanations of terrorism stress the influence of leaders, recruitment, training, moral disengagement, in-group solidarity, conformity and obedience, among other factors (Horgan, 2005; Moghaddam, 2005; Forest, 2006; Meertens et al., 2006; Post, 1998; Hudson, 1999; Borum, 2004; Horgan and Taylor, 2001; Bandura, 1998; Poland, 1988). For example, Moghaddam (2005: 166) argues that:



Commitment to the terrorist cause strengthens as the new recruit is socialized into the traditions, methods, and goals of the organization. ... [C]onformity and obedience will be very high in the cells of the terrorist organization, where the cell leader represents a strong authority figure and where nonconformity, disobedience, and disloyalty receive the harshest punishments.

The imbalance between the perceived threat of lone-wolf terrorism on the one hand and the almost exclusive scholarly focus on group-based terrorism on the other hand indicates the need for more conceptual and empirical analysis to enable a better understanding of lone-wolf terrorism. It is often unclear to what extent contemporary explanations of terrorism can be applied to the actions of lone individuals. A number of fundamental questions regarding the nature, extent, motivations, modus operandi and prospects of lone-wolf terrorism merit our attention. This exploratory study addresses these questions.

1.1 What is lone-wolf terrorism?

In our analysis of lone-wolf terrorism, we adopt what may be called a 'narrow' definition of the phenomenon. The purpose of this narrow definition is to isolate, as much as possible, the phenomenon of lone-wolf terrorism from other types of terrorism in order to explore a number of key questions. We use the term 'lone-wolf terrorism' interchangeably with the term 'individual terrorism' to distinguish terrorist activities carried out by lone individuals from those carried out on the part of terrorist organizations or state bodies. The element of terrorism highlighted in this distinction is the *subjects of terrorist acts* (individuals, terrorist organizations, state bodies) rather than, for example, their political, ideological or religious aims (Vasilenko, 2004: 54).

In this study, terrorism refers to 'intentional acts that are committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international



organization' (Council of the European Union, 2002). In the case of lone-wolf terrorism, such intentional acts are committed by persons:

- (a) who operate individually;
- (b) who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network;
- (c) who act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy;
- (d) whose tactics and methods are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or direction.

Let us make four important points to which attention should be paid when examining the proposed definition of lone-wolf terrorism.

First, we prefer the term 'lone-wolf terrorism' over what has been called 'freelance terrorism' (Kushner, 2003: 144-145; Hewitt, 2003: 79). Hewitt (2003: 79) defines 'freelancers' as 'individuals who are not members of a terrorist group, or members of an extremist organization under the orders of an official of the organization.' Though largely corresponding with our definition of lone-wolf terrorism, the term free-lance terrorism, in our view, precisely evokes the image of an individual carrying out an act of terrorism on behalf of some organization in the form of a gun-for-hire.

Second, following our definition, terrorist attacks carried out by couples or very small terrorist cells do not qualify as lone-wolf terrorism. This excludes certain infamous terrorist attacks that are commonly ascribed to lone individuals, most notably the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Although the attack was carried out by an individual, Timothy McVeigh, his accomplice Terry Nichols played a significant role in the preparations for the attack (Kushner, 2003: 224-226, 269-271; Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Juergensmeyer, 2000: 127-128). A group is thus seen here as consisting of two or more people. In adopting this definition, our position also differs markedly from Hoffman (1998: 42-43), who argues that 'to qualify as terrorism, violence must be perpetrated by some organizational entity with at least some conspiratorial structure and identifiable chain of command beyond a single individual acting on his or her own.' In the present study we explore acts of terrorism that are perpetrated by unaffiliated individuals, that is, individuals who operate outside established terror organizations, networks or cells. Although we acknowledge that the vast



majority of those who are arrested for terrorist offences are members of, or in some way connected to, known terrorist organizations, a small proportion (2 percent) of those arrested have been identified as 'lone individuals' (Hewitt, 2003: 57).

Third, our focus on the subjects of terrorist acts implies that lone-wolf terrorism should not be viewed as a separate category with regard to its ideological foundations. Lone-wolf terrorists may identify or sympathize with extremist movements, but they do not form part of these movements. The spectrum of motivations and validations that has been described for terrorist organizations equally seems to apply to lone-wolf terrorists. Juergensmeyer (2000: 11) argues that 'even those acts that appear to be solo ventures conducted by rogue activists often have network of support and ideologies of validation behind them'. These ideologies of extremism and validation, so-called 'communities of belief' (Post, 1998), clearly extend beyond the scope of formal organization. Moreover, although lone-wolf terrorists are by definition not tied to any established terrorist group, this is not to say that at one time they might have been a member or affiliate of some type of terrorist organization; they might even have obtained some training or support in the past (Kushner, 2003: 144). Their terrorist attack or campaign, however, results from their solitary action during which the direct influence, advice or support of others, even those sympathetic to the cause, is absent.

Fourth, the boundaries of lone-wolf terrorism are often vague, for example in relation to crimes carried out for personal reasons, for example political assassinations or serial murder (cf. Hewitt, 2005: viii).¹ Some of the most striking political assassinations in history were carried out by lone individuals rather than groups (Laqueur, 1999: 36-7). This includes the assassinations of US Presidents James A. Garfield (1881), William McKinley Jr. (1901) and John F. Kennedy (1963). Should these assassinations be regarded as acts of lone-wolf terrorism? Crucial to answering this question is the *intent* (or *purpose*) of the subject. In our definition, terrorism does not include violence for financial profit or personal vengeance because terrorism is generally directed in

¹ Serial murder is the killing of three or more people over a period of more than 30 days, with a significant cooling-off period between the murders (Holmes and Holmes, 1998: 1).



pursuit of larger political, ideological or religious aims. The immediate victim of the attack is usually not as important as the broader message or effect. These larger aims distinguish terrorism from other types of criminal activity. While the violent act itself may be similar, the purpose or motivation is not (Hoffman, 1998: 41).²

The question of whether acts of violence serve larger political, ideological or religious aims leaves plenty of room for debate. Assigning purposes and motivations to individual acts of terror is inherently subjective and open to considerable interpretation, especially when terrorist groups do not claim responsibility for the attack (Quillen, 2002: 287). These difficulties similarly apply to lone-wolf terrorism. Hoffman draws a distinction between terrorists and 'lunatic assassins', who may use identical tactics and perhaps even seek the same objective (e.g. the death of a political figure), but who have different purposes. In contrast with the terrorist's larger political, ideological or religious aims which transcend the immediate target of his or her attacks, the lunatic assassin's goal is more often 'intrinsically idiosyncratic, completely egocentric and deeply personal' (Hoffman, 1998: 42).

It is in many cases difficult to adequately draw a distinction between these static categories, even when researchers closely engage with their subjects. Consider the case of Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani immigrant to the United States who shot several CIA employees in 1993. Even after conducting an intensive personal interview with Kansi, terrorism expert Jessica Stern still has doubts as to his true motives:

He seems to have been moved, at least in part, by the anti-American fervor he was exposed to in his youth. However, terrorists often use slogans of various kinds to mask their true motives. It is, therefore, not inconceivable that Kansi's primary motivation was to exact personal revenge against an organization he believed had betrayed his father [...] When Kansi says he was seeking revenge, was it for some perceived slight – either to his father or to himself? We may never know. Kansi was executed by lethal injection on November 14, 2002 (2003: 181).

² It should be noted, however, that many extremist groups have both political and criminal elements. See for example Dishman, 2001; Gheordunescu, 2000.

1.2 Research outline

The questions addressed in this study concern six dimensions of lone-wolf terrorism: historical background, micro-dynamics, interactions, modus operandi, impact and responses. The seven dimensions and attendant key questions are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 Framework for the study of lone-wolf terrorism

Dimension	Description	Key questions
Historical background	Origins and development of lone-wolf terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the origins of individual terrorism? • How has (have) (perceptions of) the phenomenon of lone-wolf terrorism developed over time? • Have there been changes in motivation patterns and/or tactics over time?
Micro-dynamics	Personal motivations, circumstances and radicalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What motivates the individual terrorist? What is the purpose of the attack? How do these motives relate to the ideological, religious or political aims of terrorist organizations? • Under what social and psychological circumstances do these individuals get involved in terrorist activities? • How do individuals 'drift' towards terrorism? How should processes of radicalization be understood?
Interactions	Relations between lone-wolf terrorists and their environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the links between individual terrorists and other terrorist subjects, organizations, networks and ideologies, social movements or political parties? • What are the relations between individual terrorists and state bodies (e.g. state sponsors of terrorism)? • What are the relations between the subject, his/her sympathizers, his/her opponents, the target audience, the state, society, media and academia?
Modus operandi	Weapons, targets and methods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which are the main targets of lone-wolf terrorism? • How are acts of lone-wolf terrorism planned and carried out? • What are the preferred weapons of attack?
Impact	Consequences of acts of lone-wolf terrorism for the state and the society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do acts of lone-wolf terrorism influence threat perceptions, societal responses, government policies, judicial measures and academic discourse?
Responses	Responses to acts of lone-wolf terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the nature of responses to individual terrorism - e.g. were the

		<p>government responses predominantly military, diplomatic, judicial?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were the implications of these responses? • Are there lessons to be learned from application of (un)succesful tactics to counter the terrorism in a particular case?
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We will address the questions identified in Table 1 using different types of data. To explore the historical background and development of lone-wolf terrorism, we will make use of both literature on (lone-wolf) terrorism and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. With regard to the latter, we will examine the nature and distribution (in time and space) of potential incidents of lone-wolf terrorism as registered in the database. We will focus on the sample countries of the TTSRL project, taking the twelve countries included in the research sample as a starting point: the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Russia. Three non-European countries are also included in the sample to enable cross-continental comparison: Canada, the United States and Australia.

The other dimensions listed in Table 1 will be addressed principally through a number of case studies. These cases are selected on the basis of four criteria: (1) their high profile – domestically and/or internationally; (2) their variable number of fatalities and injuries; (3) their variable time span – ranging from a single attack to a prolonged terror campaign; and (4) their variable geographical distribution. The cases included in this study do by no means present an exhaustive or representative overview of lone-wolf terrorism, nor do all cases fully correspond with the proposed definition. Rather, the case studies are used in an explorative way, in order to explore the nature and boundaries of the phenomenon. We will assess to what extent the high-profile cases fit the concept of lone-wolf terrorism as described in the previous section. Table 2 lists the five cases included in the study.

Table 2 Case study sample

Name	Location of attack	Time span	Fatalities/ Injuries
David Copeland	United Kingdom	13-day spree in 1999	3/129



Volkert van der Graaf	Netherlands	Single attack in 2002	1/-
Franz Fuchs	Austria	1993-1996	4/15
Theodore Kaczynski	United States	1978-1996	3/23
Yigal Amir	Israel	Single attack in 1995	1/-

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In this section we examine the historical dimensions of lone-wolf terrorism. We first explore the origins of lone-wolf terrorism and its historical interpretations. We then analyze the extent and nature of lone-wolf terrorism through time and space.

2.1 Historical interpretations of lone-wolf terrorism

Lone-wolf terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Equivalents of this type of terrorism can be found in nineteenth-century anarchism.³ Individual acts of violence have been regarded by some anarchists as part and parcel of revolutionary activity, most notably by the Russian anarchist theorist, Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876). Bakunin proposed the strategy of 'propaganda by deed', stating that individuals or small groups of people should kill those who represented an existing social order. He argued that since creating a vast and hierarchical organization would inevitably come to involve the use of coercive power, the anarchist revolutionary should preferably act individually or form small groups of like-minded individuals acting on their own initiative. Bakunin's ideas inspired terrorist attacks in large parts of Europe. Individual anarchists were involved in an extensive series of assassinations and attacks against institutions and organizations that represented the values of bourgeois society (Kushner, 2003: 28-31). In the twentieth century anarchists ceased, both in theory and practice, to view individual terrorism as an important and rewarding strategy (Novak, 1954: 176; Laqueur, 1978: 139).

In the second half of the twentieth century lone-wolf terrorism was associated particularly with white supremacists and antigovernment extremists in the United States, and especially with the strategy of 'leaderless resistance'. Kaplan (1997) defines leaderless resistance as a 'lone wolf operation in which an

³ There is no necessary association between anarchism and terrorism since many anarchists reject violence of any form. The association between the two seems to owe principally to a series of historical events in Russia and Eastern Europe rather than to some necessary feature of anarchist philosophy (Taylor, 1988: 102-103; Novak, 1954).



individual, or a very small, highly cohesive group, engages in acts of anti-state violence independent of any movement, leader, or network of support.' Kaplan traces the development of leaderless resistance back to the early 1970s. For example, Joseph Tommasi, founder of the National Socialist Liberation Front (NSLF) in 1974, promoted 'to act resolutely and alone' against the state. The willingness to act alone was in contrast to the prevailing organization of contemporary terrorist groups, where a rigid, centralized command structure existed.

The strategy of leaderless resistance was popularized by white supremacist Louis Beam, a former Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nations member. Beam published an essay advocating leaderless resistance as a strategy to counteract the destruction by law enforcement agencies of hierarchical US militias (Beam, 1992; see also Hamilton, 1996: 76-77). His vision was one where 'all individuals and groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction.' Beam gave credit for the lone-wolf concept to Cold War anti-Communist Colonel Ulius Louis Amoss, who, in the early 1960s, proposed the strategy as a defense against a Communist takeover of the United States. Beam wrote: 'Like the fog which forms when conditions are right and disappears when they are not, so must the resistance to tyranny be.'

In the late 1990s white supremacists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis popularized the term 'lone wolf' (Anti-Defamation League, 2002). They envisioned lone-wolf and small-cell activism to be considerably more difficult to detect than conventional terrorism. Curtis encouraged fellow racists to act alone in committing violent crimes so that they would not incriminate others. Both men recognized the opportunities the Internet offered for the dissemination of information and the communication with fellow militants.

2.2 The development and geographical distribution of lone-wolf terrorism

In recent years lone-wolf terrorism has been portrayed in the American media as a rapidly ascending threat (Marks, 2003; Johnston & Risen, 2003; Thomas,

1999). Hewitt's (2003; 2005) findings support this claim. Hewitt (2003: 79) notes that this type of terrorism 'has greatly increased in recent decades'. His research also indicates important cross-cultural variations in the incidence of lone-wolf terrorism. 'American terrorism', he argues, 'differs from terrorism in other countries in that a significant proportion of terrorist attacks have been carried out by unaffiliated individuals rather than by members of terrorist organizations.' During the period from 1955 to 1977, 7 percent of all victims of terrorism in the United States were killed by unaffiliated individuals, but during 1978-99 the proportion rose to 26 percent (ibid.: 78). Hewitt's analysis of 'freelancers' also includes attacks by couples and by three persons (which account for approximately one-quarter of the cases), since he considers a terrorist group to consist of at least four individuals, and is therefore not entirely compatible with our definition of lone-wolf terrorism. Table 3 (Annex A) gives an overview of the incidence of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States between 1940 and 1 May 2007 following our own definition.

Table 3 raises a number of methodological concerns. Of particular relevance for present purpose are its limitations concerning the geographical distribution of lone-wolf terrorism. As a consequence of the US-bias in most chronologies and encyclopedias of terrorism, an overview as extensive as presented in Table 3 is not available for other countries. To partly rectify this imbalance, we have analyzed the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base to identify cases of lone-wolf terrorism in the sample countries of the TTSRL project.⁴ This database originally contained only incidents of *international* terrorism (defined as incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel or equipment), but from 1998 it registers also *domestic* terrorist attacks (incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target).⁵ This data source enables us

⁴ The total numbers of registered terrorist incidents in the sample countries are listed in Annex A.

⁵ We prefer to use the RAND-MIPT database over the ITERATE database because the latter focuses exclusively on incidents of *international* terrorism. For a comparison of the two databases see Scott, 2003. The methodology and definitions of the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base can be found at <http://www.tkb.org/RandSummary.jsp?page=method>.



to provide some insight into the historical incidence of lone-wolf terrorism outside the United States.

From the outset, we should emphasize that it is extremely difficult to accurately assess, let alone quantify, the historical development of lone-wolf terrorism due to discontinuities in RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base and other pressing methodological issues. The data for 1968-1997 cover only international incidents, whereas the data for 1998-present cover both domestic and international incidents. These periods can therefore not be systematically compared with regard to the prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism. Furthermore, it is very difficult to adequately quantify the extent and development of lone-wolf terrorism due to gaps in RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base incident descriptions. First, certain incidents have not been registered in the database, for example the attacks by British national David Copeland in 1999. Second, many incidents (approximately two-third) are registered as being caused by 'other' or 'unknown' perpetrators or groups, making it impossible to judge whether these incidents qualify as lone-wolf terrorism. The following example illustrates this methodological problem:

Denmark, 15 September 1985, Unknown group.

Coinciding with the Jewish New Year, a bomb exploded at an Israeli travel agency in Copenhagen. No one claimed responsibility for the blast. Twelve people were injured.

Third, in some cases terrorist groups are suspected but not identified as perpetrators (e.g. 'Islamist extremists' or 'Croatian terrorists'). This could be either individual or collective, but it is impossible to determine the type of terrorism involved to any real extent. Consider the example below:

Australia, 23 November 1971, Other Group.

A bomb was thrown at a Yugoslav travel agency in Sydney. Croatian terrorists were believed responsible.

Fourth, in some cases the authors of the database relate seemingly individual acts of terrorism to broader terrorist networks; consider for example the alleged

connections between 'shoe bomber' Richard Reid and members of the Al Qaeda network (see also Elliott, 2002). Although individuals' ties to terrorist organizations are sometimes merely speculated without further corroboration, we have excluded them from our list of likely cases of lone-wolf terrorism.

Considering these substantial methodological problems, we have sought to focus on *likely* cases of lone-wolf terrorism, although a degree of arbitrariness inevitably remains present, largely due to the often limited incident descriptions in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. We have sought to corroborate the registered incidents of lone-wolf terrorism through an analysis of media reports, aviation security reports (e.g. Branum, 2001) and chronologies of transnational terrorism (e.g. Mickolus, 1980). This has led to the exclusion of a number of incidents due to either the profound confusion about the identity of the perpetrator,⁶ the perpetrator's alleged connections with known terrorist groups, or the absence of a 'terrorist purpose' corresponding with our definition. In some cases we have not been able to trace the exact circumstances of the attacks. Table 4 (Annex B) lists the historical incidence of lone-wolf terrorism in the sample countries of the TTSRL project for the period between 1968 and 1 May 2007. Table 5 (Annex C) gives an overview of the prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism over the same period for Canada and Australia.

On the basis of Tables 3, 4 and 5 a number of preliminary conclusions can be drawn with regard to the prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism. It can first be concluded lone-wolf terrorism accounts for only a marginal proportion of all terrorist incidents in the sample countries. The tables record a total of 72 likely incidents of lone-wolf terrorism during the period between 1 January 1968 and 1

⁶ The arson attack on a refugee house in Lübeck, Germany, on 18 January 1996 is a case in point. The attack resulted in the death of 10 people and injured 38 others. Investigators suspected Safwan Eid, a Lebanese national living in the house. Others claimed that it was the work of neo-Nazis and that the accused was in fact a victim. Eid has been acquitted in two trials over a period of four years for lack of evidence. The case may be reopened due to evidence that four neo-Nazis were in fact the perpetrators of the arson attack.

May 2007.⁷ This accounts for only 1.28 percent of the total number of terrorist incidents (5646; see Annex A) in the sample countries during this period.

A second conclusion is that lone-wolf terrorism is far more prevalent in the United States than in the other sample countries, with the US cases accounting for almost 42 percent of the total (see Table 6).

Table 6 *Prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism in TTSRL sample countries, 1968-2007 (N=72)*

Country	No. of identified lone wolves	Country	No. of identified lone wolves
United States	30	Netherlands	2
Germany	9	Russia (USSR)	2
France	7	United Kingdom	2
Spain	6	Denmark	1
Italy	5	Portugal	1
Canada	3	Poland	1
Australia	2	Sweden	1

Note: A series of attacks by a single individual have been counted as one case of lone-wolf terrorism.

This finding corresponds with Hewitt’s (2003) conclusions and can be explained in part by the relative popularity of this strategy among right-wing militia and anti-abortion activists in the United States. A process of diffusion within and across militant groups in the United States from the 1970s onwards, and increasingly in the 1990s, seems to have led to the gradual spread of the tactic of leaderless resistance and lone-wolf activism. On the basis of the data presented in this section it is not clear, however, how and to what extent early advocates of these tactics have influenced other militants. The case studies presented in the remainder of this study may shed more light on this issue.

Moreover, methodological issues limit the reliability of the aforementioned conclusion. As we noted before, the non-US cases for the period between 1968 and 1997 contain only incidents of international terrorism, and not domestic incidents. This means that the total incidence of lone-wolf terrorism in countries other than the United States is probably under-represented in comparison with the US cases. The observed differences may therefore (partly) reflect

⁷ The total number of cases listed in Tables 3 to 5 is 74. For the sake of comparability, however, we have excluded the two US incidents prior to 1968. This results in a sample total of 71 cases for this particular comparison.

discrepancies in incident registrations rather than 'real' dissimilarities in the prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism.

The impact of the latter methodological concern is also particularly significant in establishing the rate between domestic and international incidents of lone-wolf terrorism (Table 7). Following our definition in Deliverable 2, domestic terrorism involves an attack in a specific country by (a group of) national citizens against a domestic target. If one of these elements deviates, the attack is referred to as international terrorism (TTSRL, 2007). In practice this distinction is sometimes problematic, for example in the case of Sirhan Sirhan. The Palestian born US citizen murdered Senator Robert F. Kennedy because of his alleged support for Israel. Although the direct target is domestic, the incident clearly has an international dimension due to both the perpetrator's Palestinian origins and his hatred towards Israel. We nevertheless count this incident as domestic terrorism since it complies with the proposed definition.

Table 7 Domestic versus international lone-wolf terrorism, 1968-2007 (N= 72)

	Domestic	International
United States	24	6
Canada	0	2
Australia	1	1
Other sample countries	10	28

It is not possible to draw any firm conclusions from these figures due to the under-representation of non-US incidents of domestic terrorism. The only solid conclusion that can be drawn is that the vast majority (80%) of lone-wolf terrorism incidents in the United States have been of a domestic nature.

A fourth conclusion is that lone-wolf terrorism in the United States has increased markedly over the past two decades (see Table 5). This confirms the findings by Hewitt (2003; 2005).

Table 8 Development of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States

Decade	No. of identified lone wolves
1940s	1
1950s	1
1960s	2
1970s	5
1980s	6
1990s	13
2000s	8

Note: Lone wolves active in multiple decades have been counted for each decade in which they were active. For example, George Metesky has been included for both the 1940s and 1950s.

The development of lone-wolf terrorism in other countries is more difficult to assess due to the aforementioned discontinuities in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base concerning the 1968-1997 and 1998-2005 periods. Table 9 shows the fluctuations in the prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism from the 1970s onwards, peaking in the 1980s and 2000s. Taking into account the fact that the pre-1998 incidence of lone-wolf terrorism is probably under-represented, this seems to indicate that *there has not been a significant increase in lone-wolf terrorism in the other TTSRL sample countries over the past two decades*. The aforementioned methodological issues thwart a more conclusive answer in this regard.

Table 9 Development of lone-wolf terrorism in TTSRL sample countries (excluding the United States, Canada and Australia) (N=38)

Decade	No. of identified lone wolves
1968-69	0
1970s	7
1980s	13
1990s	7
2000s	11

Note: Although the Italian Unabomber appears to have been active since the mid-1990s, no incidents were registered in the RAND-MIPT database prior to 2000, probably due to the database’s exclusive focus on international terrorism prior to 1998. We have therefore counted this case of lone-wolf terrorism only for the 2000s.

In the remainder of this study we will examine the data presented in this section in relation to five case studies of lone-wolf terrorists in order to explore a number of key dimensions of lone-wolf terrorism. We will now turn to two of these dimensions: the micro-dynamics of lone-wolf terrorism and the interactions between lone wolves and their environment.

3. MICRO-DYNAMICS AND INTERACTIONS

In this section we analyze the micro-dynamics and interactional dynamics of lone-wolf terrorism. We successively discuss lone terrorists’ motivations, social and psychological circumstances, processes of radicalization and the relations between individual terrorists and their environment.

3.1 Motivations

Table 10 categorizes the identified incidents of lone-wolf terrorism in terms of their ideological underpinnings. The main ideological sources of the listed incidents are white supremacy, Islamist fundamentalism, nationalism/separatism and anti-abortion activism. The ideological sources of the attack vary significantly across countries. In the United States white supremacy (9), Islamist fundamentalism (5) and anti-abortion activism (4) are the main ideological categories of lone-wolf terrorism. In other countries, nationalism/separatism (i.e. Palestinian, Catalan, Chechen) (5) is the most prevalent category, followed by white supremacy (3). It is important to note that the proportion of cases in which perpetrators’ motivations are unknown is considerably higher for non-US countries than for the United States (24 versus 6). This discrepancy is mainly due to the often very limited incident descriptions in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.

Table 10 *Ideological sources of lone-wolf terrorism in all sample countries (N=74)*

Ideology	No. of identified lone wolves
White supremacist	12
Islamist fundamentalist	7
Nationalist/separatist	6
Anti-abortion	5
Black militant	3
Left-wing	2
Other	9
Unknown	30

Table 10 is inconclusive, first and foremost, because of the large proportion of cases in which perpetrators' exact motivations are unknown (40%). The ideological categories identified in Table 10 are also static and superficial; they show neither developmental processes nor ideological mixtures. Stern (2003: 172) has argued that lone wolves 'often come up with their own ideologies that combine personal vendettas with religious or political grievances'. Table 10 fails to capture these dynamics. Even in certain high-profile cases, such as those of Eric Rudolph, Mir Aimal Kansi and John Allen Muhammad, the perpetrators' motivations are far from straightforward. We have included these cases in the 'unknown' category. For example, Schuster and Stone (2005: 356), in their analysis of the Eric Rudolph case, ask:

So who is the real Eric Rudolph? Did he bomb and kill in the name of Christian Identity, some religiously twisted version of white supremacy? Or had he genuinely been motivated by antiabortion fervor alone? ... It could easily be a combination of both. Eric Rudolph may simply not know or at this point be able to distinguish why he said he bombed and killed from what he actually felt and intended at the time.

This illustrates our earlier observation that assigning a motive or purpose to collective or single actors is often a problematic exercise. Reviewing the contradictory scholarly accounts of the motivations of Timothy McVeigh, who was responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Quillen argues that:

If identifying the motivation of a single actor in such a heavily analyzed attack as Oklahoma City is so problematic, identifying group motivations across multiple bombings is no doubt an even more daunting challenge. Like the individual actor, the same group can be motivated by different factors at different times from the religious to the nationalist to the political. Moreover, not all bombings are a direct result of the group's principal motivation (2002: 287).



It is therefore essential to examine in detail the motivations of individual terrorists and shifts in these motivations, as we will do below for the five case studies included in the research.

David Copeland

David Copeland, dubbed the 'London nailbomber', was responsible for a thirteen-day bombing campaign in April 1999 aimed at black, Asian and gay communities. Over three successive weekends, Copeland placed homemade nail bombs in public locations. The first bomb detonated outside a supermarket Brixton, South London, an area known for its large black and minority ethnic population. The second bomb went off in Brick Lane, East London, which has a large South Asian community. The third and final bomb detonated in the busy Admiral Duncan pub in Soho, central London, a focal point for London's gay community. The bombing attacks killed a total of three people, including a pregnant woman, and injured 129 others. Though some groups, like the British neo-Nazi groups Combat 18 and White Wolves, claimed responsibility for the bombings, Copeland maintained he had worked alone and had not discussed his plans with anyone. This version was accepted by police investigators and the prosecution.

Police interviews with Copeland and the subsequent trial provide insight into the motivations and purpose of the attack, revealing a combination of political and personal motives. As for the political nature of the attacks, Copeland stressed his right-wing ideology: 'The aim was to spread fear, resentment and hatred throughout this country ... My aim was political. It was to cause a racial war in this country.' When asked what he believed in, he stated: 'A National Socialist state ... For this country, well for the entire world ... it means the Aryan domination of the world.' When asked why he targeted ethnic minority communities he said: '... I don't like them. I want them out of this country. I'm a national socialist. Nazi whatever you want to call me. You know what I mean I believe in a really master race ...' In Copeland's view, black and minority ethnic communities 'are inferior ... in everything really ...' Copeland said he also hated homosexuals: 'I'm just very homophobic ... I just hate them.' He described homosexuals as 'perverted degenerates' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000).



While these statements clearly indicate Copeland's racist and homophobic views, other extracts from the police interviews point to his desire to become famous at any price: 'I wanted to be famous ... I believe in what I believe in and I took that belief to the extreme.' He was reported as having admitted he wanted 'to get on the news as the top story' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000; *The Guardian*, 6 June 2000). His response to the question if he sought to circumvent camera or police surveillance when carrying the bombs is also telling in this respect: 'Personally I wanted to get caught ... To be famous in some sort of way ... If no one remembers who you were, you never existed' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 7 June 2000; *The Independent*, 30 June 2000). In addition to right-wing literature, neo-Nazi material, explosives and weaponry, police found press cuttings, pictures and other items relating to his own bombings at Brixton and Brick Lane in Copeland's flat. Copeland called the right-wing groups that claimed responsibility for the Brixton bombing as a bunch of yobs trying to take his glory (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000; *The Guardian*, 7 June 2000).

There are many indications that Copeland's bombing campaign involved a combination of political and personal motives. In addition to the aforementioned political and personal motives, during the trial it became clear that the third bombing was predominantly a result of Copeland's hatred of gay men, which he claimed to have developed during his childhood (see section 3.2). Also, Copeland at times hinted at a religious motive, although his statements on this issue were highly inconsistent and contradictory. A consultant psychiatrist who interviewed Copeland said that he 'described being controlled by God when carrying out the bombings' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 15 June 2000). On another occasion Copeland said: 'I am not a religious person, but I believe in God and regard the Bible as against racial mixing' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000).

Volkert van der Graaf

On 6 May 2002 animal rights activist Volkert van der Graaf shot and killed the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in Hilversum. The assassination took place only days before the Dutch national elections, in which Fortuyn featured as a popular candidate and a potential Prime Ministerial candidate. Van der Graaf fired five shots, penetrating Fortuyn's neck, head and back and wounded him in the heart,



brain, neck and left lung. The assassin's exact motives are still unclear due in part to his prolonged refusal to speak about his actions. Upon arrest Van der Graaf informed the police he would not speak until his lawyer was present. He kept silent for six months. Meanwhile speculations on Van der Graaf's motives, as expressed in the Dutch media, ranged extremely. Van der Graaf's silence ended when the police investigation was completed. The prosecution viewed this as an advantage for Van der Graaf as he could avoid stating aspects that the police didn't know at that time and he in this situation could make sure that nobody would find out. The prosecution also argued that this advantage does not prove his individualism, for Van der Graaf was in a position to suppress information about any accomplices. Therefore the lack of evidence that leads to accomplices makes Volkert van der Graaf an individualist.

After breaking his silence, Van der Graaf stressed his sympathy for animal rights activism, describing his 'ideology' in terms of 'animals being equal to humans'. He mainly fought his battle against animal-rights violators in the courtroom. Pim Fortuyn had ventilated his position in animal-rights issues – he was in favour of lifting the ban on the breeding of fur animals, not long before his death and these ideas opposed to Van der Graaf's ideology (Parker, 2005). Furthermore, Fortuyn had been quoted as telling an established Dutch green group: 'The whole environmental policy in the Netherlands has no substance any more. And I'm sick to death of your environmental movement' (*The Independent*, 8 May 2002).

However, Van der Graaf's confession also pointed to other elements of his intentions. Murdering Fortuyn enabled Van der Graaf to stand up for the 'weaker and vulnerable members' of Dutch society, reflecting Van der Graaf's involvement in general politics in the years preceding the attack (see section 3.3). Dutch politics was experiencing the upsurge of a more right-wing, anti-immigrant discourse in the years before the assassination. Many saw Fortuyn as the embodiment of this development. Fortuyn was criticized by prominent politicians and analysts for his right-wing leanings and likened him to controversial foreign politicians such as the Belgian right-wing politician, Filip de Winter. Minister of Finance Gerrit Zalm called Pim Fortuyn 'a dangerous man'. Fortuyn, on the other hand, has always objected this comparison, claiming that



he was being 'demonized' in public discourse and thereby marginalized in expressing 'the people's thoughts'.

Van der Graaf stated his deed had a political motive and he declared to agree with Zalm's statement: 'Motive? Minister Zalm thinks he is a dangerous man. So do I. He speaks in criminal terms when talking about certain groups, because he knows he will score some points. He is floating on feelings of discontent, but does not try to come up with solutions. With regard to that a parallel can be drawn to the 1930s' (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003). 'Comparing Fortuyn's rise to that of Adolf Hitler, he said he had felt compelled to eliminate him as a favour to the Muslim minority and other vulnerable sections of society (*The Guardian*, 16 April 2003). With this declaration Van der Graaf linked his attack to the wider public debate in Dutch society with respect to the perceived threat of Fortuyn in the early 2000s. He also explained the attack in the light of a more general critique of contemporary society, claiming that Pim Fortuyn embodied opportunism, fanaticism and a lack of spirit to sacrifice, and that he was driven by power. These attributed features contrasted markedly with Van der Graaf's personal beliefs. Although Van der Graaf admires Fortuyn for his verbal skills, something he lacks himself.

The declarations of his relatives and acquaintances are opposite to the political statement of Van der Graaf. No one remembers Van der Graaf being very political engaged, his only passion was the well-being of the environment and animals. One of Van der Graaf's colleagues at VMO declared he never knew about Van der Graaf's special attention for Fortuyn. Whenever they spoke about politics the name Fortuyn was only mentioned in a general matter. His girlfriend stated the same; she was never acquainted with Van der Graaf's worries concerning the rise of Fortuyn within Dutch politics.

The psychological and psychiatric reports drawn up by the Pieter Baan Centre (PBC) – the institute that evaluated Van der Graaf's mental state after his arrest – stated Van der Graaf's motive was a combination of aversion to the opinions and the manners of Fortuyn. The victim personified a great ever-closer catastrophe according to Van der Graaf. In a sense, the person Fortuyn became more dangerous and powerful in the opinion of Van der Graaf than in reality. Psychiatrists concluded that when Van der Graaf gunned down Fortuyn it was 'an opportunistic attempt to follow through his personal political assessment' that he



was a danger to Dutch society (Agence France Presse, 15 April 2003). With regards to the motive, the public prosecutor stated the following conclusion: 'during the creation of his fatal plan, Van der Graaf's political thoughts turned into personal aversion towards the victim, because of his vanity and perverted exercise of power' (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003). With regards to the latter observation, the assassination can be seen as the result of the moral principles of Van der Graaf instead of a political statement.

During his trial Van der Graaf stated he committed the murder 'guided by my conscience'. He argued: 'Normally I find killing someone morally reprehensible. At the time on May 6 I felt it was justified, now I struggle with the question if it was right' (Agence France Presse, 15 April 2003). However, the real motive will perhaps never be revealed, while Van der Graaf wrote in a letter dated 21 July 2002, to his girlfriend Petra Lievense: 'whenever I will give a statement to the court or the media, I do not have to tell the truth necessarily. For the public at large the truth is not important, whereas it ought to be functional' (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003).

Franz Fuchs

Franz Fuchs was responsible for a bombing campaign in Austria and Germany that lasted nearly four years between 1993 and 1996. His bomb attacks killed four people and injured fifteen others. The bombing campaign principally targeted immigrants and organizations and individuals who Fuchs considered to be 'friendly to foreigners'. Fuchs expressed himself, and was characterized in the media, as xenophobic and racist. In his letters, Fuchs mentioned the discrimination of German Austrians and urged the government to alter its immigration policy. But although his statements and target selection were consistent with a right-wing ideology, there has been profound confusion about Fuchs's exact motives.

Fuchs operated on the basis of a combination of personal and political motives. The former type of motive appears to have overshadowed his political purpose. Fuchs was characterized by profound self-hate and an accumulated hatred of the outside world. Although his attacks were principally directed at foreigners and related organizations and individuals, Fuchs's hatred of the



outside world seems to have been more all-encompassing, leading him to live in seclusion. The trial of Franz Fuchs focused almost exclusively on this personal aspect of the bombing campaign – portraying Fuchs as a mentally ill loner – leaving the political dimension of the attacks out of consideration. Fuchs himself never provided a coherent statement of his purpose and motivations following his arrest in 1997. Many questions concerning the exact motives of the bombings therefore remain up to today (*Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999; Scheid, 2001).

Theodore Kaczynski

Theodore (Ted) Kaczynski was responsible for placing or mailing sixteen package and letter bombs that resulted in three deaths and 23 injuries in the United States. Kaczynski's bombing campaign went on for eighteen years between 1978 and 1995. The FBI codenamed the case 'Unabom' after the initial attacks on universities and airlines ('un' was short for university and 'a' referred to airlines). Kaczynski was subsequently dubbed the 'Unabomber'.

Kaczynski appears to have been motivated by a combination of personal and political motives. His social and political views seem closest to anarchism and contain elements of Luddism. He railed against technology, modernity and the destruction of the environment, calling for the destruction of the worldwide industrial system. In one of his essays, Kaczynski stated that the continued scientific and technical progress of society would inevitably result in the extinction of individual liberty. He described that the power of society to control the individual was rapidly expanding. His proposal was to found an organization dedicated to stopping federal aid to scientific research in order to prevent the inevitable outcome of the ceaseless extension of society's powers (quoted in Johnson, 1998).

In the first chapter of his 1995 manifesto, entitled 'Industrial Society and Its Future', Kaczynski asserts that:

Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human race. They have greatly increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in 'advanced' countries, but they have destabilized society,



have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human beings to indignities, have led to widespread psychological suffering ... and have inflicted severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology will worsen the situation (Kaczynski, 1995).

He noted that industrial-technological society 'cannot be reformed in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing the sphere of human freedom.' Kaczynski condemned 'leftism' as 'anti-individualistic' and 'pro-collectivist', opposing it to what he envisioned as 'anarchy'. Anarchy, he argued, would leave people 'able to control the circumstances of their own lives.' The anarchist opposed to technology 'because it makes small groups dependent on large organizations' (Kaczynski, 1995).

The manifesto also presented justifications for his bombings, stating: 'In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression, we've had to kill people' (ibid.).⁸ On another occasion, Kaczynski said that 'people who willfully and knowingly promote economic growth and technical progress, in our eyes they are criminals, and if they get blown up they deserve it' (*The Washington Post*, 19 September 1995). During his trial, Kaczynski tried to justify his bombing campaign as an attempt to slow the march of technology blindly crushing man's freedom (*The New York Times*, 15 December 1996).

Kaczynski's bombings in 1994 and 1995 indicate his affinity with radical environmentalism (see section 4). It has been argued that these attacks were inspired by radical environmentalist publications (Arnold, 1997). An FBI investigation into radical environmentalist organizations reported that Kaczynski had attended a meeting of several hundred environmentalists at the University of Montana in 1994 (Kushner, 2003: 379). At that meeting speakers suggested that Burson-Marsteller had designed the public relations campaign for Exxon following the Exxon Valdez incident, in which a tanker ran aground and spilled oil in Alaska in 1989. One month later, Kaczynski killed Thomas Mosser, an advertising executive at Young & Rubicam, the parent company of Burson-Marsteller. A letter from the Unabomber, excerpts of which were published in the *New York Times* in April 1995, said that Mosser had been killed because his

⁸ Kaczynski often referred to 'we' in his writings, but appears to have acted alone; see section 3.4.



company had 'helped Exxon clean up its public image' (*The New York Times*, 2 October 1996). Others have argued that Kaczynski was not an environmentalist, and was only pretending to be one in order to recruit environmentalists into his campaign (Chase, 2003).

Kaczynski's political motives were inextricably related to personal resentments. He described his sources of hatred as his perceived social rejection and the 'fact that organized society frustrates my very powerful urge for physical freedom and personal autonomy'. In his journal he wrote:

What makes a situation intolerable is the fact that in all probability, the values that I detest, will soon be achieved through science, an utterly complete and permanent victory throughout the whole world, with a total extrication of everything I value. Through super human computers and mind control there simply will be no place for a rebellious person to hide and my kind of people will vanish forever from the earth. It's not merely the fact that I cannot fit into society that has induced me to rebel, as violently as I have, it is the fact that I can see society made possible by science inexorably imposing on me (quoted in Johnson, 1998).

Although Kaczynski principally targeted individuals and organizations that he held responsible for scientific and technological progress and the destruction of individual freedom and the environment, his resentment was also related to his personal situation, for example his inability to establish a relationship with a female (see section 3.2.). Furthermore, Kaczynski's first package bomb, in May 1978, was addressed at a professor at the University of Illinois. The package was sent back to the return address, at Northwestern University (see section 4). Later reports suggested that professors at both universities had rejected his attempts to publish a treatise he wrote (Kushner, 2003: 379).

Yigal Amir

On 4 November 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated at a peace rally in Tel Aviv. Rabin was walking to his car after the rally when he was shot. His killer, the 25-year-old Jewish male Yigal Amir, shot Rabin in the back



with hollow-point bullets in full view of Israeli security officers. Rabin later died in surgery at Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv. After his arrest, Amir justified his deed with Jewish theology, historical precedents, and biblical examples. He stated that he 'acted alone on God's orders' and that he had no regrets (*The New York Times*, 6 November 1995).

Rabin's assassination needs to be placed in its political and social context. Although Amir acted alone, his act was preceded by an unparalleled campaign of delegitimation of the Israeli government and by character assassination of Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres by Israel's extreme right (Sprinzak, 1999: 245; *The New York Times*, 19 November 1995). The radicalization of the Israeli extreme right was triggered by the ratification of the Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), signed on 13 September 1993, and the repeated acts of Palestinian terrorism. Mostly expressed in antigovernment demonstrations, the radicalization of Israel's ultranationalists was particularly expressed in their rhetoric. Not only was the government, duly elected in 1992, seen as an 'illegitimate' government, but its leaders had begun to be labelled as 'traitors' due to their commitment to the peace process. Following a string of Palestinian terrorist attacks from November 1993 onwards, Rabin and Peres had increasingly been portrayed as 'assassins' and 'collaborators with terrorism' (Sprinzak, 1999: 4-5). Some militant right-wing protests compared Rabin with Adolf Hitler, distributing posters that showed Rabin in a Nazi uniform and in an Arab headdress. A right-wing parliament member, Rehavam Zeevi, even vowed to bring Rabin to justice before a state tribunal (*The New York Times*, 6 November 1995).

Beyond rhetoric, the process of radicalization culminated in the Hebron massacre, on 25 February 1994. Dr. Baruch Goldstein, a fierce opponent of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, fired 111 bullets on a crowd of Muslims kneeling in a Ramadan prayer at the Cave of the Patriarchs in the Israeli-occupied West Bank town of Hebron. Twenty-nine people were instantly killed, including Goldstein who was killed by surviving worshippers, and over one hundred were wounded. Yigal Amir admired Baruch Goldstein, who also acted on his own. He is said to have decided at Goldstein's funeral that he also had to conduct an exemplary act (Sprinzak, 1999: 280). Amir convinced himself that he was on a divine mission and that in killing Rabin he was acting in accordance



with Jewish religious law, *Halakha*. Days after his arrest, Amir stated to reporters that the Israeli government was surrendering the biblical heritage of the Jews and betraying settlers in the West Bank, and that the new Palestinian autonomy taking shape in once-occupied lands put Israel in great danger (*The New York Times*, 7 November 1995; *The New York Times*, 28 March 1996). 'He was sure that in order to save the land and the nation, Rabin had to die. He was certain that this was God's will, which other believers recognized but were hesitant to carry out' (Sprinzak, 1999: 281). As Amir expressed it during a hearing at the Tel Aviv Magistrate Court:

Maybe physically I acted alone, but what pulled the trigger was not only my finger, but the finger of this whole nation, which for 2,000 years yearned for this land and dreamed of it (*The New York Times*, 21 November 1995).

3.2 Social and psychological circumstances

It has long been argued that terrorists should not be regarded as 'mad' or suffering from any identifiable psychopathology (Post, 1998; Horgan, 2005). There is no systematic evidence to support the view of terrorists being psychologically different from non-terrorists. Crenshaw (1981: 390) has noted that 'the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality. Terrorism often seems to be the connecting link among widely varying personalities.' An important question for present purpose is if, and to what extent, this observation applies not only to members of terrorist organizations but also to lone-wolf terrorists. In this context, Hewitt has noted that although most terrorists are 'normal', the rate of psychological disturbance is considerably higher among lone wolves (Hewitt, 2003: 80). To test these observations, In this section we explore the social and psychological circumstances of lone-wolf terrorism for each of the five cases.

David Copeland



David Copeland was born in 1976 in Isleworth, Middlesex, and brought up in Yateley, Hampshire. He was the second of three sons. His father was an engineer and his mother a part-time helper in a centre for handicapped people. He left secondary school when he was sixteen to start an engineering apprenticeship. He began to experiment with alcohol and drugs, including LSD and heroin. This was followed by three minor convictions for assault. In 1997 he moved to London to work as an engineer's assistant on the London Underground. That year he joined also British National Party (BNP), acting as a steward at some BNP meetings. During this period Copeland came into contact with BNP leaders. He left within one year due to his disappointment with the fact that the BNP did not advocate violence. He moved back to Hampshire at the end of 1998 and joined a small neo-Nazi organization, the National Socialist Movement. Copeland became the organization's regional unit leader just weeks before the start of his bombing campaign.

After his arrest, Copeland claimed he had been having sadistic dreams from the age of 12. He said he had thought about killing his classmates. He also stated that, from the age of 16, he dreamed of being an SS commander with female sex slaves (*The Guardian*, 16 June 2000). Neither his family nor his friends recall him showing any interest in Nazism or white supremacy, despite his claims to police that he was already an admirer of Hitler during childhood. He also repeatedly told the police his hatred of gay men stemmed from childhood and was a reaction to his parents thinking he was homosexual (*The Independent*, 30 June 2000). His parents denied this. Copeland was also described as 'sexually confused'. Psychologist Jackie Craissati said Copeland believed he was sexually inadequate and had violent fantasies about raping and drugging women. She stated that Copeland felt his desire to maim and kill gay people was related to humiliation as an adolescent. He felt his parents had wanted a girl (*The Independent*, 30 June 2000).

In 1998, he was prescribed mild anti-depressants to help him cope with anxiety attacks and told his General Practitioner he was 'losing his mind', citing difficulty concentrating and sleeping. Copeland stated that the idea of conducting a bomb attack would not leave his mind and that he had to do it (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000). He claimed that he did not want to kill anyone, but that if anyone died it would not bother him either. 'I feel nothing. I don't feel



sadness but I don't feel joy. I did what I had to do ... I'm sorry for the woman and the child. I think the woman was pregnant. I feel sorry for her. But I don't feel no guilt for the others ... I mean I knew they'd be casualties and I'm very glad that the child will make a full recovery.' He later described his actions by saying it was his destiny to commit the offences (*The Daily Telegraph*, 7 June 2000).

Copeland appears to have been suffering from some form of mental illness, but the nature and severity of the condition was contested. Five defence psychiatrists reportedly concluded that he was suffering from schizophrenia. One of them said the visions Copeland spoke of as a teenager were consistent with the first stages of a schizophrenic condition. This diagnose was challenged by prosecutors, who were under pressure not to concede to his pleas of guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility (*The Daily Telegraph*, 15 June 2000). When Copeland was arrested, he reportedly insisted to a psychiatric nurse that he had 'logically and rationally' planned the explosions' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 13 June 2000). Another consultant psychiatrist concluded that Copeland was not suffering from schizophrenia, but did have a less serious personality disorder that was not serious enough for him to avoid a murder charge (*The Independent*, 29 June 2000). Concerns that some psychiatrists had exaggerated his condition were heightened when it was discovered that Copeland had been writing to a woman, Patsy Scanlon, while on remand. In one of his letters he told Scanlon that he had fooled experts over his illness. Copeland did not know Scanlon was not a penfriend. His correspondence had been with a man called Bernard O'Mahoney, who had sold the letters for a substantial sum to the *Daily Mirror* newspaper (*The Observer*, 2 July 2000).

Volkert van der Graaf

The Pieter Baan Centre psychology report describes Van der Graaf as an intellectually highly gifted, physically fit person with obsessive-compulsive disorder. This makes him a perfectionist which obstructs him from finishing tasks and makes him extremely devoted to his work excluding relaxing activities and friendships. His disorder makes him excessively conscientious and fixed on morality, ethics and values. He shows stubbornness and fixation. Nevertheless,



his disorder did not have any influence on the act. According to the report he had been willing to bare utmost consequences for his political believes and principles. Because of his narcissism and dependency he is very keen on confirmation, while at the same time he is hindered by his stubborn, fixated, and fanatical passion. Van der Graaf seems to be emotionally blocked, except in his pugnacity. He considers physical and mental violence equal.

Fighting battles in a calculative manner and stubbornness were ever present features in the life of Van der Graaf, according to a psychiatrist at the PBC. He fought an ongoing battle against everything unjust in society, form his early years on (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003). At the age of 15, Van der Graaf started working for a bird sanctuary, but he quit because birds caught in oil slicks were left to die slowly. 'At that place it was a taboo to end a life. The others thought you simply had no right to end it. At the same time they put out mousetraps to kill the mice that were stealing the bird food. I left that place, I didn't want to be inconsistent any longer,' he explained (*The Independent*, 8 May 2002). Furthermore, Van der Graaf seems to have liked provoking people and envied people who seemed to enjoy life more than he was capable to.

Born in 1969 in Middelburg, Van der Graaf was raised along a religious ideology with norms like honesty, soberness, helpfulness, and being a model towards others. However, other opinions and the display of deviant behaviour were not tolerated by his parents. His father was a hard-working man; intelligent and conscientious, but always tensed, and like his son very stubborn. He died of cancer when Van der Graaf was nineteen years old. His mother can be described as an over-caring and outstripped mother; with her overwhelming love and care she still up till now considers Van der Graaf a child instead of an adult. The relation with his only brother has always been good and close.

During his puberty Van der Graaf was not able to 'free' himself, although he became more non-conformist as opposed to the middle-class mentality of his mother, but with the same compulsiveness like his father. According to the PBC psychiatrist this was the result of a lack of confidence and not being accepted as the person he really was. For instance, he liked to become a vegetarian but his parents refused to let him give up meat (*The Independent*, 8 May 2002). Van



der Graaf was a good student during secondary school, although introvert and inconspicuous, he was not considered a loner.

In 1988 Van der Graaf moved from the province of Zeeland to Wageningen to study environmental hygiene at the Wageningen agricultural university and he became more radical. He failed to complete his studies, choosing instead to devote his time to protecting the environment (see section 3.3). No longer a vegetarian but a vegan, he tightened up in ideological sense: his viewpoint with regards to the equality of men and animal became more inflexible and he developed a more pessimistic view upon the world. During this time, he became even more depressed, and when his first girlfriend broke up their relation in 1990, Van der Graaf tried to commit suicide by scratching his wrists. After the murder of Fortuyn she describes Van der Graaf as a closed person, however willing to help others. According to the PBC psychiatrist he subsequently tried for over a half year after this suicide attempt to buy drugs in order to do an other attempt, but fails to obtain them. This attempt was considered a lack of self-confidence by Van der Graaf and he tried subsequently to find confidence in integrity and moral principles, instead of skills (Closing speech public prosecutor, 2003).

Early 1992, Van der Graaf and his friend Sjoerd van de Wouw founded the Association Environmental Offensive (VMO), an organisation that systematically challenges permits awarded to fur and cattle farmers in court to force those businesses to shut down (Agence France Presse, April 15, 2003). Van der Graaf lived for his work; he turned his hobby into his profession and he worked more than 80 hours per week, according to his mother.

In 1994 he starts studying environmental administration at the IJsselland College in Deventer during the evenings, but again fails to complete this study, although he obtained first-class results. He becomes more and more obsessed by his work and is in danger to become overstrained due to his perfectionism.

In summer 2001 Van der Graaf moved in with his girlfriend Petra Lievense, with whom he has a relationship since 1990, in Harderwijk, a town in the central bible belt of the Netherlands. Van der Graaf and Petra have met each other via the foundation Lekker Dier (Tasty Animal) and the relationship between them is considered good and intimate, according the PBC report. In December 2001 their daughter Sabien is born to early and with complications.



Because of the difficulties with his daughter and the pressure of work Van der Graaf describes, during his stay in the PBC, this period a being very hectic.

However, in the months before the assassination of Fortuyn Van der Graaf is being described by relatives and friends as more relaxed. According to his brother he seemed to have had a very easy attitude. This observation seems to correspond with a statement of Van der Graaf during the period in the PBC: the idea of killing Fortuyn was not obsessive and did not absorb him. Instead, he was mainly occupied with his work and family and did not want to make a big 'project' of his intention to kill Fortuyn. Otherwise he would rationalize endlessly over the attack and would block eventually, and no action would be taken after all (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003).

Franz Fuchs

Franz Fuchs was born in 1949 in Gralla, Austria. During his primary and secondary education teachers recognized Fuchs's exceptional intelligence. Fuchs was especially skilled in Physics and presumably outdid teachers on many subjects (*Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999). After secondary school Fuchs studied Theoretical Physics at the University of Graz. He worked at Volkswagen in Wolfsburg as an assembly line employee to earn money for his studies. Fuchs decided to abandon his studies after only a few weeks because he could 'not bear the miserable student life' (*Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999). He started a job at a Mercedes factory in Germany, where he worked as an assembly line employee. He was known to be friendly towards his foreign, mainly Yugoslavian, colleagues.

In the mid-1970s Fuchs returned to Austria, where he remained unemployed and without a girlfriend. In the face of his failure to find employment or a partner, Fuchs became seriously depressed. He regarded himself a failure and allegedly planned to commit suicide. On 8 August 1976, he wrote to his parents: 'My meaning and existence for mankind is zero'. His father had him admitted into a psychiatric hospital. Fuchs was released after two months and declared recovered (*Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999).

After his release, Fuchs found a job as an assistant at an institute for hydrogeology, where he worked until 1984. He then worked for an electricity



company and an engineering company. During the latter position his extreme precision led to conflicts with building companies and he was eventually forced to resign. Following his resignation Fuchs decided to stop looking for jobs. He refused to receive unemployment benefits or any other type of social security due to his refusal to be like people who did not want to work. During this period Fuchs came to live in isolation and lost contact with his parents. He later confessed that during this period he also noticed 'the increased discrimination of German Austrians and the growing self-consciousness of other ethnic groups and religions' (*Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999).

Fuchs was described by criminal psychologists as a highly intelligent but socially inept loner. The promising student with an IQ of 139 had the potential to develop an academic career, but this career never took off. Meanwhile Fuchs began to hate his life and developed a hatred of foreigners. Living in reclusion, in 1993 Fuchs began to take revenge for the perceived humiliations he experienced during his life (Müller, 2006: 115).

Theodore Kaczynski

Theodore (Ted) Kaczynski was born in Chicago, Illinois, in 1942. He had one brother, David, who was seven years younger. Ted Kaczynski was viewed as a bright child and was described by his mother as not being particularly comfortable around other children and socially reserved (Johnson, 1998). The family moved several times, gradually bettering their housing status. They eventually moved to the middle-class suburb of Evergreen Park, Illinois, in the early 1950s.

A highly intelligent student, Kaczynski twice skipped a grade in school, once in elementary school and once in high school. He described skipping a grade in elementary school as a pivotal event in his life. He identified this as the cause of his lack of development of social skills. He remembered not fitting in with the older children and increasingly being the subject of verbal abuse and hostility from them. He did not describe having any close friends during that period of time. In his writings, he described himself as having frustrated resentment towards school, parents, and the student body 'which often was



given outlet through snotty behaviour in the classroom which often took a sarcastic or crudely humorous turn' (quoted in Johnson, 1998).

During the final years of high school he was encouraged to apply to Harvard University, and was subsequently accepted as a student. He was sixteen years old at the time. Kaczynski completed his undergraduate degree in mathematics in 1962. He began his first year of graduate study at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in the fall of 1962. He completed his Master's degree and Ph.D. by the age of 25 and was highly rated by his supervisors. He became involved in some research and succeeded in publishing papers concerning mathematical theory and problem solving. Following graduation, he accepted a position as assistant professor in the Mathematics Department at the University of California at Berkeley, and remained in that position from September 1967 until June 1969.

Kaczynski wrote about his time at Harvard as a very isolated existence, with only infrequent interactions with other students, and as him having virtually no social life. It was not until his sophomore year that he made a few brief friendships, but they did not persist (Johnson, 1998). Chase (2003) has noted that Kaczynski's arguments against science and technology were very similar to those that had been drummed into Harvard students of the 1950s. The Harvard experience that, according to Chase, had had the most detrimental impact on Kaczynski was his participation in a three-year-long psychological study coordinated by Professor Henry Murray, which looked at the psychological functioning of young men at Harvard.

After resigning his position at Berkeley, Kaczynski held no permanent employment. He returned to live with his parents in Lombard, Illinois, and began looking for land, where he could live in seclusion. In 1969 he obtained some temporary employment at warehouses and factories. From 1971 onwards, he was for the most part unemployed, receiving some limited financial support from his family. Intermittently, he held down masonry and grounds-keeping jobs to obtain money. In 1978 and 1979 he worked a few months at a foam cutting company in Lombard, Illinois, where his father and brother were employed. He was fired from that job after inappropriate behaviour towards the female manager and subsequently worked briefly at the Prince Castle Restaurant & Equipment Company (Johnson, 1998).



Kaczynski had a history of brief contacts with mental health organizations. While studying at the University of Michigan he sought psychiatric contact on one occasion. He had been experiencing weeks of intense and persistent sexual excitement involving fantasies of being a female. During that period he became convinced that he should undergo sex change surgery. He recounts that he was aware that this would require a psychiatric referral, and he set up an appointment at the university's Health Center. During the consultation, he did not discuss these concerns, but rather claimed he was feeling some depression and anxiety over the possibility that the deferment status would be dropped for students and teachers, and that he would face the possibility of being drafted into the military. He later described feeling rage, shame and humiliation over his attempt to seek evaluation (*ibid.*). He referenced this as significant turning point in his life (see section 3.3).

Beginning in the spring of 1988, Kaczynski made several contacts with mental health organizations around the issue of establishing relationships with women. He indicated that in 1988 he was suffering from insomnia and a renewed interest in getting advice and moral support to establish a relationship with a woman. Kaczynski also indicated that he suffered serious depression in the late 1980s for several months. Although the depression lightened eventually, it remained there to some degree until 1994 (Johnson, 1998). In the spring of 1991, he set up an appointment with psychiatrist Dr. Goren, seeking evaluation and treatment for symptoms of palpitations and stress. Following his visit to Dr. Goren and his belief that perhaps the potential of an ongoing relationship existed with her, he made the decision to acquire a more conventional career. He decided to attend school at the undergraduate level to obtain a degree in journalism, but he never matriculated (*ibid.*). Prior to his current legal situation, Theodore Kaczynski has had no significant criminal record of arrests or incarceration. He had no significant history of substance use, including alcohol or nicotine.

During his trial, Kaczynski did not want his defense to be based on the claim of mental illness. The psychiatric evaluation was inconclusive. Kaczynski was found competent to stand trial and competent to represent himself, but Dr. Sally Johnson also stated that he was probably a paranoid schizophrenic, involving the presence of preoccupation with two principle delusional beliefs; one



that he was being controlled by modern technology, the other that his dysfunction in life, particularly his inability to establish a relationship with a female, was directly the result of extreme psychological verbal abuse by his parents. Dr. Johnson provisionally concluded that:

These ideas were embraced and embellished, and day to day behaviors and observations became incorporated into these ideas, which served to further strengthen Mr. Kaczynski's investment in these beliefs. Preoccupation with these issues has been an ongoing factor in his life. ... Consistent with this diagnosis, for a significant portion of time since the onset of his illness, Mr. Kaczynski has shown marked social and occupational dysfunction in the areas of work, interpersonal relations, and possibly at times self-care. ... Mr. Kaczynski's delusions are mostly persecutory in nature. The central themes involve his belief that he is being maligned and harassed by family members and modern society. ... [H]e is resentful and angry, and fantasizes and actually does resort to violence against those individuals and organizations that he believes are hurting him (Johnson, 1998).

This finding has been contested by sceptics who claim that there was no credible evidence to suggest that Kaczynski was mentally ill or 'out of touch with reality' apart from his unconventional social and political views (Hewitt, 2003: 74).

Yigal Amir

A court-ordered psychiatric evaluation revealed that Yigal Amir was neither mentally ill nor emotionally disturbed. Amir meticulously planned the assassination over several months and calmly carried out the crime (*The New York Times*, 27 March 1996). A student of law and computers at Bar Ilan University, Amir was known to his friends as an intelligent young man. Amir was born in Herzliya in 1970 to a middle-class family. Amir's mother, Geula, the dominant figure in an eight-child family, was a long-time kindergarten instructor. She was known for extremist views, expressed, among other things, in a pilgrimage she made to Baruch Goldstein's grave (Sprinzak, 1999: 277).



However, it is reported that although his parents supported the idea of Greater Israel, 'they always preached brotherhood and unity, and said Jews should not fight one another' (*The New York Times*, 6 November 1995). Amir's secondary education was in Yeshivat Hayeshuv Hehadash, a *haredi* yeshiva in Tel Aviv. After graduation, he moved to the Hesder Yeshiva of Kerem de-Yavneh. Nothing in this early training indicated future exceptional radicalism. Kerem de-Yavneh, a highly respected school, was always known for the relative moderation of its instructors and graduates (Sprinzak, 1999: 277-278). It seems that Amir's political views became radicalized more profoundly during his tenure at Bar Ilan University (see section 3.3).

The psychological evaluation of Amir reveals additional dimensions of his deed. Amir had a complex personality of a highly intelligent young man who sought love and admiration at any price. From a young age, Amir was a loner who refused to take orders. He acted against the consensus, thought very highly of himself, and believed he had original solutions that no one else recognized (*ibid.*: 282). Amir described his struggle for excellence through his computer science study. He told that law and criminology, which he had originally chosen as majors, quickly bored him and led him to skip classes. So he turned to the study of the really challenging computer science. The ability to kill Rabin was built by 'a self-courage test'. Rabin's assassination may have been, from this perspective, the act of a megalomaniac seeking to demonstrate his strength of will in public (*ibid.*: 283). He had a desire to prove to himself and others that he could go further than anybody else.

Another dimension to Rabin's killing was Amir's depressive personality, which had been sensitized by his dogmatic ideology. Amir 'had within him depressive elements which preceded his act. Emotional drives, including rage and frustration, may have burst out despite his effort to fully control his emotions and act only according to pure reason.' Amir's only girlfriend, Nava Holtzaman, left him in January 1995 after five happy months to marry a good friend of his. Amir is said to have gone into deep depression over this. Yigal's father said after the murder that had his son married Nava, he would never have committed the crime. Geula Amir also spoke about her son's deep depression after the split. Amir's brother, Haggai, also did not believe that Yigal, under normal circumstances, was capable of murder. He confirmed the reports that

following the break with his girlfriend, Yigal went into deep depression and started to talk about sacrificing himself (Sprinzak, 1999: 283).

3.3 Processes of radicalization

In addition to asking 'why' individuals commit terrorist offences, we should also ask 'how' they come to engage in terrorism. The latter question stresses the processual dynamics of lone-wolf terrorism and urges a search for (micro)developments that contribute to the onset of the individual's terrorist 'career', that is, processes of radicalization. In the context of terrorism, radicalization can be defined as a person's growing willingness to pursue (or to support or spur on others to pursue) profound societal changes through violence or the threat of violence (cf. AIVD, 2004b: 13-14; COT, 2006: 5). Radicalization can result in an activist attitude involving the public expression of one's beliefs and an active search for verbal and physical confrontation with 'adversaries'.

Radicalization is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon which involves a variable combination of individual processes (e.g. search for identity), interpersonal relations (e.g. influence of radical leaders or literature) and socio-political and cultural circumstances (e.g. social polarization, collective sense of injustice and relative deprivation) (COT, 2006: 7-8). Individual terrorists are 'subject to an array of influences related to self-perception, family, community and identity' (Horgan & Taylor, 2001: 16). For present purpose, it is crucial to note that in addition to 'top-down' recruitment into terrorist collectives, individuals may go through a radicalization process on their own initiative, which may be termed 'autonomous radicalization' or 'self-radicalization' (AIVD, 2006: 29).

Together with the issues covered in sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4, an exploration of the processes of radicalization in the five cases enables us to identify some of the main influences that shape the lone wolf's onset and evolution.

David Copeland



David Copeland racist and homophobic views appear to have become radicalized during his late teens and early twenties. Although his occasional involvement in right-wing organizations appears to have contributed to the radicalization of his political beliefs, the process of his radicalization seems to have been, to a large extent, autonomous. His parents stated that by the time of their divorce, when David Copeland was 19, he did not show any real interest in white supremacy. Two years later, in 1997, he joined the BNP and became more profoundly influenced by right-wing ideology. He read racist and anti-Semitic literature, including *The Turner Diaries*, the infamous novel written by neo-Nazi William Pierce. When Copeland was arrested, he confessed that he had been influenced by the book. During this period Copeland first learned how to make bombs using fireworks with alarm clocks as timers. He obtained the information on how to make bombs from Internet sources, such as *The Terrorist's Handbook* and *How To Make Bombs Book Two* (*The Guardian*, 1 July 2000; *The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000). He bought and stole the materials from high-street shops and hardware stores and began experimenting with small explosives. It turned out that he could not assemble the necessary ingredients indicated in the web-based guides and instead resorted to a less sophisticated bomb made out of fireworks material (Walker, 2006: 645).

Apart from his contacts with other British white supremacists and his use of right-wing literature, Copeland confessed that he had been particularly inspired by the explosion in Centennial Park during the Olympics in Atlanta, United States, in 1996. This explosion was later attributed to lone wolf Eric Rudolph. As he watched news reports from the scene, Copeland presumably wondered why nobody had bombed the Notting Hill carnival. He said he gradually became fixed on the idea of carrying out his own bombing and that he 'woke up one day and decided to do it' (*The Independent*, 30 June 2000). Copeland stated: 'I had a thought once. It was that Centennial Park bombing. The Notting Hill Carnival was on at the same time, and I just thought why, why, why can't someone blow that place up? That'd be a good'un, you know, that would piss everyone off' (transcript of BBC Panorama, *The Nailbomber*, broadcasted 30 June 2000). Copeland also stated to idolize the dictators Hitler, Stalin and Saddam Hussein, as well as the American serial killer Henry Lee Lucas (*The Guardian*, 6 June 2000 & 7 June 2000). Police found two Nazi flags and a



picture of Rudolf Hess in his room as well as abundant right-wing and racist literature.

Volkert van der Graaf

Van der Graaf started as an idealistic supporter of animal welfare. During his puberty he became a vegetarian. In a column on a website devoted to animal rights, animalfreedom.org, Van der Graaf wrote in 2000 why he became a vegetarian: 'I used to fish with my brother who was two years older. I used to get a kick out of catching fish. My brother put the worms on the hook. ... It just wasn't right, but apparently everyone thought it was normal' (*The Washington Times*, 20 May 2002). At a young age he became active within the world of animal rights activism, like his membership of the Dutch WWF youth movement and his job at a bird sanctuary in Walcheren (Siebelt, 2003:12). He wanted to stand up for animal rights: 'People think it normal that you eat animals and that you let fish suffocate in nets when you catch them. But inside me arose a sense of justice - such things shouldn't be happening in a civilised country, I thought, but there is no one to stand up for them' (*The Independent*, 8 May 2002).

When he moved to Wageningen in 1988 to start studying he became a vegan and became more radical. Van der Graaf starts participating the Dutch Federation Against Vivisection. Together with his friend Sjoerd van de Wouw Van der Graaf became an active member of several environmental and animal protection movement-organizations, like Milieudefensie (Environmental Defense), the local political party De Koevoet (The Crowbar) Stichting Lekker Dier (Foundation Tasty Animal). In the latter foundation Van de Graaf met his current girlfriend, Petra Lievense in 1990 (see section 3.2). She was at that time an editor of The Tasty Animal magazine. In March 1990 Van der Graaf and a colleague were on a picture in this magazine with bloody shirts on their body and a butcher knife in their hands, standing before a butcher's shop, while demonstrating against genetic manipulation (Siebelt, 2003). Moreover, according to a fellow student Van der Graaf was a member of the radical action group Ziedende Bintjes (Fuming Potatoes), which destroyed an experimental field with genetic-manipulated potatoes at the ITAL institute in Wageningen.



In 1992, he founded the Association Environmental Offensive (VMO), an Animal Rights Group together with Van de Wouw. Prior to this, Van der Graaf had although still in his teens, founded Zeelands Animal Liberation Front. VMO had direct ties to other animal rights organizations, including the organizations mentioned above and Bont voor Dieren (Fur for Animals), Animal Freedom. Since they started with VMO, Van der Graaf and Van de Wouw conducted 2220 legal procedures primarily against intensive cattle operations by filing legal objections against applications for environment licenses submitted by stock breeders in need of expansion. Whenever a license was granted to stock breeders VMO brought on an appeal and delayed the procedures as long as possible. In cases where a license was refused the stock breeder might face financial troubles and eventual closure. Similar to the Animal Release Front (see section 3.4), 'VMO operated just like the Animal Release Front by targeting smaller more vulnerable operations where action would more likely yield success' (Parker, 2005). Stock breeders considered the overwhelming volume of objections to be a form of blackmail and accused Van der Graaf of abusing the legal system. However these accusations were never proved during an official investigation.

Subsequent to the foundation of VMO Van der Graaf starts receiving treats from the cattle breeding industry. Nevertheless, he waited until 1996 before he bought himself a gun, a illegal second-hand semi-automatic Star Firestar M-43 pistol in a Turkish bar in Ede, and the 9mm cartridges in The Hague. Considering the material, that has been taken possession by the police, Van der Graaf already became interested in fire arms before 1996. He kept several newspaper cuttings and ads from magazines on arms dated back till the early 1990s. Van der Graaf kept his gun in the same place where he saved his anarchistic literature. Police found several pieces of writing in a suitcase in his attic, including: *Resistance is Possible - Handbook for Activists*, *The Anarchist Cookbook*, *Modern small arms, Pistols and Guns Encyclopaedia*, *Handbook Against the Copper*, and *Interrogation Methods*. Van der Graaf also kept addresses of chemical suppliers, a list with books on fire weapons, explosives and pyrotechnics, two walky-talkies, a scanner and two balaclavas. Furthermore, police found sensitive information on cattle farms, including maps stating where to cut a fence and the placement of oil barrels that could be climbed on to obtain



access. In his shed Van der Graaf kept a box with chemicals, which fits the image of a violent activist, furthermore a 'shopping list' for the making of the explosive TNT and a time power unit were founded.

The idea of killing Fortuyn started with the thought that the populist politician needed to be stopped. According to Van der Graaf himself, he did not hate Fortuyn, but had the opinion that Fortuyn was a danger to the democratic state. The PBC report stated that Van der Graaf is a highly intelligent perfectionist, who is emotionally uncommunicative and intolerant of those with different values to his own, nevertheless sane. This statement is in accordance with an observation from a former friend of Van der Graaf, Robert: 'In my opinion, Volkert devoted all his time in doing stuff for VMO and animals. His life was all about that. Whenever a person like Fortuyn comes along and says fur animals can be breed again, I can imagine Volkert losing his temper. Volkert is a rational person, who thinks always carefully over the purpose of his actions and consequences' (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003). Van der Graaf started following Fortuyn in the media. From 21 April 2002 onwards he searched the Internet for information on Fortuyn and eventually committed the assault on 6 May 2002 (see section 4.2).

Franz Fuchs

Franz Fuchs had a history of depression. At the age of 27 he was admitted for treatment in a psychiatric hospital. After his release, Fuchs seems to have experience a more stable phase, during which he held down a number of jobs. From the late 1980s Fuchs's condition appears to have worsened. He increasingly lived in seclusion and had no or very little contact with family and friends. He developed a deep-seated hatred towards the outside world and regarded himself as a failure. He also increasingly formulated his resentment towards immigrants and the immigration policy of the Austrian government. In December 1993 Fuchs began to put his frustrations into practice through mail bombings.

Theodore Kaczynski



In considering the radicalization of Theodore Kaczynski, three issues in particular merit our attention. The first is his growing resentment about his social 'dysfunction' and about the consequences of modern society in general. He appears to have experienced the onset of his illness in the mid-1960s, while involved in graduate studies at the University of Michigan. He described that prior to that point in time he had chronic suspicions that he was suffering from a mental illness and that the problems he experienced were internally generated rather than a product of his environment. At that 'turning point', as he called it, he completely abandoned that idea and projected the cause of his problems onto the environment and his family (Johnson, 1998). There are, however, indications that his views of science and technology were shaped to a large extent at an earlier age, during his studies at Harvard (Chase, 2003). It is nevertheless likely that over the years Kaczynski increasingly attributed his personal frustrations to external factors, leading him to develop a deep-seated hatred toward modern society in general.

The second aspect of Kaczynski's radicalization can be found in his increasing isolation from society. After leaving his job at the University of California at Berkeley, he spent approximately two years attempting to locate a piece of land upon which he could live in isolation from society. He claimed that already during his college years he had started to think about breaking away from society. In 1971 he built a small cabin on a piece of wilderness land near Lincoln, Montana. From 1971 to his arrest in 1996 he lived a solitary life in the cabin. Kaczynski remained there, except for several short periods where he travelled and sought employment to earn some money. He was provided with a minimal stipend from his parents throughout this time period and used the money he had originally earned at Berkeley and other intermittent jobs to support himself. The cabin was situated a short distance off a road, but the land provided him solitude and ready access to wilderness area. He made an effort to live off the land and gradually developed necessary skills in tool making, gardening, food preservation and hunting. While residing in his cabin, he would regularly travel to town for supplies and to use the local post office and library. Periodically he would travel beyond Lincoln, usually by bus (Johnson, 1998). Kaczynski wrote in his journal that he felt he did not, nor did he want to, fit into



organized society. His move to Lincoln was a way of escaping from modern society.

The third element of Kaczynski's radicalization involved the growing willingness to use violence against those he hated, in particular the people who he perceived as responsible for scientific and technological progress and the destruction of the environment and individual liberty. He claimed in his writing that already during his high school years he had uncomfortable fantasies of violent revenge. In his journal he wrote that during high school and college he would often become terribly angry, but could not express that anger openly because he 'was too strongly conditioned ... against any defiance of authority.' Kaczynski's anger and resentment appear to have deepened following a consultation concerning a sex change surgery in the mid-1960s (see section 3.2). He described this event as a major turning point in his life:

I felt I wouldn't care if I died. And so I said to myself why not really kill the psychiatrist and anyone else whom I hate. What is important is not the words that ran through my mind but the way I felt about them. What was entirely new was the fact that I really felt I could kill someone. My very hopelessness had liberated me because I no longer cared about death. I no longer cared about consequences and I said to myself that I really could break out of my rut in life and do things that were daring, irresponsible or criminal (quoted in Johnson, 1998).

He described to have decided at that point to kill and also to 'make at least some effort to avoid detection so that I can kill again.'

Furthermore, it has been suggested that Joseph Conrad's 1907 novel, entitled *The Secret Agent*, may have provided a rationale for the bombing of scientists. After Kaczynski's arrest it was discovered that, like the character known as 'The Professor' in the novel, Kaczynski had given up a university position to live as a recluse. Investigators learned that Kaczynski grew up with a copy of the book and had admitted during interrogation to have read it more than a dozen times (*The Washington Post*, 9 July 1996).

Yigal Amir



Yigal Amir grew up in a heavily politicized environment which was characterized by a growing polarization between the more moderate sections of Israeli nationalists and the extreme right on the issue of how to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the years leading up to his attack, Amir's political views radicalized considerably, including not only a fierce hatred of Muslims but also an increasing distrust of the Israeli government. Amir's military experience was obtained in Golani Brigade, a leading combat unit in the Israeli Defense Forces. Friends of the assassin later testified that while serving in the occupied territories during the Intifada, the young man tortured local Palestinians and took pride in his deeds (Sprinzak, 1999: 278).

After completing military service, Amir went back to Herzliya to register for Bar Ilan University's law school. His political views became greatly radicalized during his tenure at Bar Ilan University, Israel's only religious university. Though enrolled in two prestigious university programs, law and computer science, he devoted a lot of time to the study of Jewish religious law. Amir's free time was increasingly spent in right-wing political activities. He became the driving force behind student protests and discussion groups at the university (Sprinzak, 1999: 278; *The New York Times*, 6 November 1995). He started organizing student support groups for several Jewish settlements. The government's threat to evacuate a settlement in Hebron had a profound impact on Amir. Determined to fight both the Israeli government and the Palestinian population, Amir started to organize solidarity weekends in Hebron, allegedly in part to recruit individuals willing to defend the settlements by force if the government decided to evacuate them (Sprinzak, 1999: 279). Amir also participated in the events organized by Zo Artzenu, a right-wing movement which was successful in intensifying the atmosphere of delegitimation surrounding the government. During these events participants vented their frustrations and shared struggle experiences. Some of them started to speak and chant freely about the need to execute the 'traitors', referring to Rabin and Peres (ibid.: 274).

Amir thus appears to have been influenced particularly by the maturing right-wing counterculture in Israel. Of great significance in the maturation of this small radical fringe was the publication of a 550-page edited volume, *Baruch Hagever* (Baruch, the Man), published in March 1995 written and published by



Baruch Goldstein admirers (ibid.: 258-259). Most of the essays in *Baruch Hagever* addressed the Jewish-Muslim conflict with a Goldstein-like interpretation of what should be done in time of crisis. One essay, however, also addressed the failure of the Jews to display determination towards the Palestinians. This essay was written by Benjamin Ze'ev Kahane, the son of the slain rabbi Meir Kahane and the influential young leader of Kahane Chai. Kahane argued that had the Jews displayed determination towards the Palestinians – expelling them by force and abandoning the fiction of 'Jewish democracy' – there would have been no Arab question and no Goldstein tragedy. Kahane emphasized that a cultural war between the real and Hellenized Jews was forcefully being waged, with the secular Hellenized on the winning side. The problem, then, is not the Arabs, it is the Jews. In his essay Kahane had identified the delicate passage between targeting Arabs, which was the 'virtue' of Goldstein, and targeting Jews, so tragically expressed by Amir (ibid.: 264-265). Yigal Amir avidly read *Baruch Hagever* and later spoke about Rabin's cultural war against the real Jews.

It seems that the vast majority of the organizations and individuals who spoke the language of delegitimation and engaged in character assassination did not really wish to see Rabin dead. Even the most radical activists were probably not mentally ready to murder him (Sprinzak, 1999: 276). By late 2005, Yigal Amir was an exception to the rule, a true believer convinced that the killing of the prime minister was God's will. Amir's personal convictions, reinforced by his radical friends and by the language of certain extremists, told him that only an extraordinary operation could save the people of Israel from the growing threat (ibid.). His depression following the break with his girlfriend seems to have enhanced his feeling of a growing moral mission and a religious commandment to kill the Israeli Prime Minister.

3.4 Relations between lone wolves and their environment

In the introduction we noted that although lone-wolf terrorists do not form part of any existing terrorist organization, they often identify or sympathize with extremist movements. They may at one time have been a member or affiliate of an extremist organization or have obtained some training or support. In the

concept of leaderless resistance, as discussed in section 2.1, ideologically linked individuals or small cells deliberately operate independently from each other. Lone-wolf terrorists may also be inspired by certain literature or Internet statements. To shed more light on these issues, in this section we examine the interactions between lone wolves and their environment for each of the five cases.

David Copeland

In the previous section we noted the influence of racist and anti-Semitic literature and contacts with British neo-Nazi groups on David Copeland's political views. Despite his occasional involvement with right-wing organizations like the British National Party and the National Socialist Movements, Copeland was described by relatives as 'a loner with few friends'. He acted alone during his experiments with explosives and also during his bombing campaign, though he occasionally discussed the bombings with others. Paul Mifsud, an engineer who worked with Copeland, stated that they had talked about the high-school shootings in America and the bombs in Brixton and Brick Lane, among others. According to Mifsud, Copeland commented: 'Great isn't it, all these things happening' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 13 June 2000). Mifsud was also the person who later called the police saying the picture of the suspect released by the authorities bore a close resemblance to his colleague. This phone call eventually led to Copeland's arrest, but not until after he placed his final bomb.

The symbolic aspect of Copeland's bombing campaign indicates his concern with the wider audience and his search for attention by the most evil means. Copeland argued that he wanted to 'cause mayhem, murder, chaos, damage' and spark a racial war throughout the country (*The Independent*, 30 June 2000). He claimed to have told police that he had planted the bombs because he 'knew it would piss everyone off, especially, like, Blair and Mandelson and them lot, Mr Boateng.' Copeland explained that he thought Peter Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, was homosexual and Home Office minister Paul Boateng was black (*The Daily Telegraph*, 23 June 2000).



Furthermore, Copeland was explicitly concerned with becoming famous through his actions. He stated his desire to 'be famous in some sort of way ... If no one remembers who you were, you never existed' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 7 June 2000; *The Independent*, 30 June 2000). A police surgeon stated that Copeland 'seemed happy to talk about what he had done and showed no concern or stress and was looking forward to appearing in court' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 13 June 2000).

Volkert van der Graaf

Animal-rights activism is believed to be characterized by a pattern of interlocking networks and associations. A recent report by the Dutch General Security and Intelligence Service describes this pattern as follows:

In the Netherlands animal rights activism covers a wide range of activists, including both (ultra) left and (extreme) right-wing activists, but also individuals who are not inspired by political motives. ... Left-wing and right-wing animal rights activists may sooner or later catch the public eye because of their other – political – activities. The apolitical activists, however, who usually operate in clandestine cells, keep a low profile, because they consciously avoid contacts with the activist scene (AIVD, 2004a).

Van der Graaf was one of the founders of VMO and other organizations described in previous sections, VMO had direct ties to other animal rights organizations. However, no real evidence is provided that could link Van der Graaf to clandestine operations, merely rumours, such as his membership of the Ziedende Bintjes (see section 3.3). According to his brother, Van der Graaf was fairly radical during his first student years, around 1990, but when the brother returned to the Netherlands in 2000 he considered Van der Graaf less radical. He was still committed to the welfare of animals and admitted to have contacts within the field of activists (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003). When asked about the anarchist literature in the suitcase on his attic, Van der Graaf

admitted the literature might have influenced him in his preparations for the murder, for example by the brochure *Resistance is Possible – Handbook for Activists*, which advises activists to wear discreet clothing and gloves.

According to a report by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service '[a] small part of the animal rights activists seek to alter animal welfare-related policy and practice in a conspiratorial and violent manner', and are '... dangerously sliding towards what should be qualified as terrorism' (AIVD, 2004a). The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) could be considered in such a manner, this multinational organization, with English roots, advocates the use of violence through their websites and printed material (Parker, 2005). ALF activists are taught to distrust everybody and to work alone or with one or two other tried and true friends. According to *A Declaration of War: Killing People to Save Animals and the Environment* by 'Screaming Wolf', the spokesman of ALF, this implies: '... that liberators have no leader. We are not organized in the traditional sense of the word. We are independent people accepting the responsibility of freeing our family members from human oppression. We don't take responsibility for one another's actions. We are empowered to do our own actions in accordance with our own conscience.' Although Van der Graaf can not be linked directly to ALF activists, he acted in a manner consistent with their tactics.

Franz Fuchs

A major controversy surrounding Franz Fuchs's terror campaign has been the question whether or not Fuchs acted alone. This controversy was initially fuelled by a number of written statements sent by Fuchs in 1994 and 1995, in which he claimed responsibility for the bombings. He stated that the attacks were carried out by the *Bajuwarische Befreiungsarmee* (Bajuvarian Liberation Army; BBA), of which he was a member. In a number of subsequent letters, he also gave the impression that the attacks were committed by a larger terrorist organization with different units. After his arrest, Fuchs again stated that he was merely a messenger for the BBA.

Although the BBA Fuchs spoke about was determined by the prosecution to never have existed as a terrorist organization, doubts remain whether Fuchs



had actually committed the attacks without any support from sympathizers (ORF, 2007; Pühringer, 2003). Journalist Hans-Christian Scheid suggests that Fuchs might have been part of an existing terrorist group (Scheid, 2001). It remains unclear, for example, how Fuchs, who lived in seclusion, obtained the detailed information mentioned in some of the letters. The profound confusion over the identity of the perpetrator(s) fuelled speculations on links to right-wing groups, and on a few occasions even left-wing groups were accused of committing the attacks. According to Thomas Müller, a criminal psychologist who profiled Fuchs and investigated the case, this confusion was first and foremost a consequence of Fuchs's skilful manipulation and anticipation. He maintains that Fuchs acted alone (Müller, 2006: 53).

A related issue is Fuchs's interaction with right-wing groups in Austria and Germany. The official version maintains that Fuchs never had any contacts with extremist organizations. In his letters, however, Fuchs states to have 'an intimate knowledge of the right-wing spectrum in Austria'. After his arrest Fuchs received fan mail from neo-Nazis sympathizing with the BBA.

A type of interaction that featured centrally in the bombing campaign of Franz Fuchs is the communication with his audience through a number of letters that consisted of over 40 pages in total. In addition to short letters consisting of one or a few phrases, Fuchs sent a 28-page letter in which he claimed responsibility for the attacks in the name of the BBA. The letters were characterized by their flawless German (Müller, 2006: 115-116). They also displayed an extensive historical knowledge and a meticulous knowledge of current politics. The letters also contained detailed information that presumably had not been published before, referring for example to the profiles developed by investigators. This information is seen by some critics as evidence that Fuchs did not act alone, since he lived in seclusion and allegedly did not read newspapers or political commentaries (Pühringer, 2003; Scheid, 2001).

Theodore Kaczynski

Largely living in seclusion since the early 1970s, Theodore Kaczynski did not have any connections with known terrorist organizations or extremist groups.



Although in his writings Kaczynski referred to himself as either 'we' or 'FC', meaning 'Freedom Club', he appears to have acted alone. To date, no other members of the alleged Freedom Club have ever been named. Inside his remote cabin near Lincoln, Montana, FBI agents found a fully constructed, unaddressed package bomb, countless bomb-making materials, the two typewriters that were used to write the Unabomber letters and the manifesto, and over 22,000 pages of personal notes – in English, Spanish and mathematical code – that linked him to eighteen years of bombings (Kushner, 2003: 379-380). Kaczynski's writings indicate that despite living in self-imposed exile, he was explicitly concerned with the audience of his actions. In hindsight, had Kaczynski not been as obsessed with publicity as he was, he might never have been unmasked and arrested (Hoffman, 1998: 155).

In his 1979 autobiography, Kaczynski wrote that he was concerned people would perceive him to be a 'sickie'. His writings were an effort to prevent the facts of his psychology from being misrepresented (Johnson, 1998). In the 1990s he started to engage in direct communication with the media in order to get his statements published. In 1993 Kaczynski sent a letter to the *New York Times*, claiming that the bombings were the work of the anarchist group 'FC'. Following this letter, investigators from three different federal agencies were immediately committed to the case. In April 1995 Kaczynski sent another letter to the *New York Times*, explaining that he was targeting scientists and engineers, especially those involved with computers and genetics (see section 4). He called for the destruction of the worldwide industrial system.

The Unabomber also stated he would renounce terrorism, which he defined as 'intended to cause injury or death to human beings', if his 35,000-word manifesto were published. But, Kaczynski argued, he reserved the right to engage in sabotage 'intended to destroy property without injuring human beings.' If the *New York Times* or another widely read publication did not print his manuscript, he would 'start building our next bomb.' At the end of June 1995, The *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* received copies of a 56-page text, plus 11 pages of footnotes and other material. The Unabomber said he would wait three months for a decision. Both newspapers promptly turned the material over to the FBI (*The Washington Post*, 19 September 1995; *The Washington Post*, 1 July 1995).



Five months later, on 19 September 1995, the newspapers co-published the Unabomber's manifesto. The US Justice Department recommended publication out of concern for public safety. The newspapers, which split the costs of publication, agreed with the Justice Department and hoped that someone would recognize the writer by his choice of words or philosophy. The publishers stated that:

From the beginning, the two newspapers have consulted closely on the issue of whether to publish under the threat of violence. We have also consulted law enforcement officials. ... Both the attorney general and the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have now recommended that we print this document for public safety reasons, and we have agreed to do so (*The Washington Post*, 19 September 1995).

The *New York Times*, in considering whether to publish the Unabomber's manifesto, worried over the role that the news media was being coerced into playing. The editors contemplated whether the newspaper's coverage, and especially its willingness to publish the bomber's writings, would reduce terrorism by helping to identify the bomber or inadvertently encourage other activists to seek media exposure. The publisher of the *New York Times*, Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., lamented the idea of 'turning our pages over to a man who has murdered people.' But he added that he was 'convinced' that they were 'making the right choice between bad options' (*New York Times*, 19 September 1995).

The fact that the publication of the manifesto eventually led to the identification of Ted Kaczynski as the bomber by his brother David would seem to vindicate the decision of the publishers (see section 6). Still, it is unclear whether other activists might have been spurred on by the newspaper's capitulation to a terrorist's media demands (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 141). Parallels have been drawn, for example, between Theodore Kaczynski and other lone-wolf terrorists such as Eric Rudolph and the Italian Unabomber (see Tables 4 and 5).

Yigal Amir



In examining Yigal Amir's interaction with his environment, two types of interactions merit special attention. The first is his relationship with people within and on the fringe of the Israeli extreme right. The second is the performative aspect of the assassination, that is, the interaction with his wider audience.

Amir was a loner who felt uncomfortable as a registered member of any recognized protest group or ideological movement. But although he acted alone, Amir participated in, and was influenced by, the Messianic Zionist movement in Israel. Amir's obsession with the campaign of the radical right brought him in touch with several organizations and a large number of leading activists. He showed up at several Zo Artzenu activities, participated in demonstrations and was visible in several settler confrontations with the army (Sprinzak, 1999: 279).

A major issue of debate in the aftermath of the Rabin assassination was the alleged prior knowledge and justification of the attack by friends of Amir and by right-wing rabbis. His friends heard him speak repeatedly of the obligation to kill Rabin and Peres. No one took him seriously (see also section 6). His brother, Hagai, was later put on trial as an accomplice in the murder. Hagai had manufactured the hollow-point bullets used in the assassination. The brothers entertained several spectacular ideas of killing Rabin, although it appears that only Yigal was completely serious about the action (Sprinzak, 1999: 279-280). A third person close to the brothers was Dror Adani, who had served in the army with Yigal Amir. Adani was also accused of plotting the assassination with Amir. The Amir brothers and Adani had considered a variety of ways to kill Rabin, including putting nitroglycerine into the plumbing of his house and setting it off, planting a bomb in his car or shooting a missile at his home or at his car (*The New York Times*, 6 December 1995). Two other Bar Ilan University students, Hila Frank and Margalit Har Shefi, also belonged to Amir's close circle. It appears that Amir conducted serious talks with Har Shefi, in which he tried to include her in an antigovernment underground. Learning of his desire to kill the prime minister, an idea she rejected, Har Shefi told Amir she would join only if no violence were involved (Sprinzak, 1999: 280).

Israeli officials suggested that ultranationalist rabbinical authorities, citing provisions of Jewish law that someone threatening others may be killed in self-



defense, had approved the murder of Rabin (e.g. *The New York Times*, 12 November 1995). Amir has always denied these suggestions, insisting that he had decided on the killing alone after careful deliberation. He reportedly declared:

If you knew me, I'm an individualist, I always was. I don't feel influenced, I never felt influenced. I think about everything a very great deal, like my faith and like what I did with Rabin. What I did with Rabin was done after a great, great deal of thought and after many, many other attempts I had made to awaken the nation here. I tried to do everything else, but the Government's method here is to silence demonstrations (*The New York Times*, 1 December 1995).

Amir told investigators that he had discussed the issue with several rabbis, but none of them was ready to approve the assassination. Dror Adani told the court a similar story. He claimed to have consulted with an unidentified rabbi about whether Rabin could be defined as a 'pursuer' under Jewish law. According to Adani's lawyer, 'The unequivocal answer of that rabbi was that it is forbidden to murder a Jew, certainly not the Prime Minister.' Adani reportedly gave this message to Amir (*The New York Times*, 24 November 1995). Amir said he was disappointed with the rabbis that disapproved the assassination because they were all 'soft and political'. Rather than ruling on this matter according to Jewish law, Amir said, the rabbis introduced irrelevant political considerations into the discussion. Amir also told his investigators that he admired no prominent rabbi in this generation. He believed he was fully cognizant of the relevant Jewish law and had a sufficient understanding of the misery of the Israeli people to act on his own (Sprinzak, 1999: 280-281).

The second type of interaction that features centrally in the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin is that between Yigal Amir and the wider audience. The Rabin assassination was both a performance event and a performative act. Not only did it make a symbolic statement, but Amir also tried to make a difference – if not in a direct, strategic sense of changing the political order in Israel and to 'save the land and the nation', then in an indirect way as a dramatic show so powerful as to change people's perceptions of the world (Juergensmeyer, 2000:



124). In his confession to the interviewers of the investigation committee, Amir said that the media ignored the protests and demonstrations of the right. He told the investigators that had the protest operations been properly covered by the media, he might not have assassinated the prime minister (Sprinzak, 1999: 277).

Importantly, as we noted before, Amir was also involved in a struggle for personal excellence. He had to prove to himself and his peers that he could go further than anybody else. Amir testified in court that before he committed the murder, he prayed that he would succeed in killing Rabin without hurting himself because he did not want to be a dead hero. He was quick to give the police his identity card, lest there be a mistake about his identity. Amir seems to have wished that all who did not believe he was capable of murdering the prime minister would know that he did indeed do it (ibid.: 283). He admitted that he was afraid someone else would kill Rabin, and thereby steal his chance for fame.

4. MODUS OPERANDI

In this section we examine the methods of lone-wolf terrorism. We first discuss the weapons and targets of terrorism in the listed incidents of lone-wolf terrorism. We then analyze the five cases with regard to not only the weapons and targets but also the organization, financing and implementation of the attacks.

4.1 Weapons and targets

Table 12 lists the weapons used by lone-wolf terrorists during their attacks. It shows that firearms are the main weapon of choice to lone-wolf terrorists, followed by explosives and armed hijackings. There exist important cross-national variations in the weaponry of lone-wolf terrorists. The use of firearms is considerably more common in the United States (24) than in other sample countries (a total of 10), which may in part be due to the relative accessibility of firearms in American society. In contrast, none of the cases of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States involved armed hijackings, while in non-US cases these are the most common weapons of lone-wolf terrorism (13 in total). The latter finding should be qualified on the point that the hijacking category is likely to be over-represented in the non-US sample due to the methodology of the RAND-MIPT database. Aircraft hijackings are comparatively often classified as acts of international terrorism. Since the database exclusively recorded international incidents prior to 1998, this category may well be over-represented in comparison with other types of weapons. It is nevertheless striking that *none* of the lone-wolf attacks in the United States have featured armed hijackings.

Only one lone wolf, Muharem Kurbegovic (a.k.a. The Alphabet Bomber), has threatened to use chemical or biological weapons. Kurbegovic threatened to release sarin in populated areas and claimed that he was already conducting experiments with it. He may also have been experimenting with other chemical agents in addition to sarin. Kurbegovic acquired various chemicals, including a large amount of sodium cyanide (Simon, 2000: 87).

Table 12 Weapons of lone-wolf terrorism

Weapon	Incidence
Firearms	34
Explosives	17
Armed hijacking*	13 (aircraft: 11; bus: 2)
Arson	4
Other	2
Unknown	2

Note: Some lone wolves used multiple types of weapons, all of which have been included.

*Includes the use of firearms, explosives or knives.

Table 13 categorizes the types of targets in the listed cases of lone-wolf terrorism. Lone-wolf terrorism is principally targeted at civilians. This observation holds for both Europe (24) and non-European countries (24). Interestingly, the second most common target of lone-wolf terrorists in the United States is medical staff (5), while none of the incidents outside the US targeted this category. This dissimilarity can be explained by the strategy of anti-abortion extremists in the US, whose principal targets are doctors performing or supporting abortions. No cases of anti-abortion lone-wolf terrorism were registered for the other sample countries.

Table 13 Targets of lone-wolf terrorism

Target	Incidence
Civilians	48
Government officials and politicians	10
Property of public and private companies	6
Medical staff	5
Religious leaders	4
Businesspeople	3
Members of law-enforcement agencies	2
Other	4
Unknown	1

Note: Some lone wolves have attacked multiple targets, all of which have been included.

4.2 The methods of lone-wolf terrorism

The incidents of lone-wolf terrorism listed in Tables 4 to 6 contain very limited information on the organization, financing and implementation of the attacks. We therefore examine these aspects exclusively on the basis of the five cases.



Below we explore the five cases with regards to the weapons, targets, organization, financing and implementation of the attacks.

David Copeland

As noted earlier, Copeland obtained information on how to make bombs from Internet sources, such as *The Terrorist's Handbook* and *How To Make Bombs Book Two*. These manuals go into great detail about bomb making. Some of the devices are fairly sophisticated but others are much simpler, using materials easily available in high street shops. In the local shopping centre at Farnborough, Copeland bought sports bags, alarm clocks for timing devices, hundreds of nails and other materials he needed to make explosive devices. He bought large quantities of fireworks, for a total of up to £1,500, from two shops in Farnborough to provide gunpowder. He stole the chemicals he would need to make high explosives (*The Independent*, 30 June 2000). Copeland confessed that he finally succeeded in producing a less sophisticated bomb that 'was plastic pipe about a foot long. It was glued at both ends. I put it in a cardboard box and covered it with nails. They'd smash into windows, stick into people, maim people and kill people' (transcript of BBC Panorama, *The Nailbomber*, broadcasted 30 June 2000).

The first attack, on Saturday 17 April 1999, took place off Electric Avenue, Brixton, targeting the area's predominantly Afro-Caribbean population. Copeland taped the bomb inside a sports bag. He took a train to Waterloo and then a taxi to Brixton. He had never been to the area before and walked up and down the busy High Street for more than an hour exploring. He finally planted the bomb outside the Iceland supermarket and took a taxi back to Waterloo (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000). Local market traders became suspicious of the bag. At first they assumed that the bag belonged to somebody at the bus stop but about 5 minutes later they noticed that the bag was still there and decided to look inside it. Inside the bag they saw a clear plastic Tupperware box with a coloured lid which was on top of a larger cardboard box. Inside the plastic box were two square batteries and a round object suggestive of an old-fashioned alarm clock. The cardboard box appeared to be full of nails. Concern grew that it might be a



bomb. The bag was moved away from the stalls and on to some wooden pallets (Metropolitan Police Service, 2000a).

The bomb eventually detonated while the police were still evacuating people (*The Independent*, 30 June 2000). Approximately fifty people were injured, including two who lost an eye. Nine people needed surgery to have nails removed and 28 suffered serious cuts. Over 1,500 nails of various sizes were recovered from the scene. Copeland later confessed he planted the bomb there because he 'knew that Brixton was the focal point for the black community.' He said: '... I put it there to get the people, the people walking by and the people at the bus stop' (Metropolitan Police Service, 2000b).

The following Saturday, 24 April, Copeland planted his second bomb. This time he targeted Brick Lane, the centre of the Asian community in East London. Copeland sought to plant the bomb during the busy street market, but arriving on Saturday afternoon he found the market was held the following morning. Rather than return to his home with the bomb he was carrying in another sports bag, he dumped the device in its bag in a side-street between two vehicles (*The Independent*, 30 June 2000). Copeland later explained:

I presumed there was going to be a market of some sort up there, but it wasn't. So then I was in two minds whether to disassemble the device and go, you know, come back Sunday. Then I just ... you know, decided. I walked up Brick Lane looking for somewhere to plant it. It was about an hour to go before detonation. I didn't want to be seen planting the device, so I went down Hanbury Street. There was two big vans and I slipped in between them and walked out, they masked my escape. It was like an aborted mission you could call it (transcript of BBC Panorama, *The Nailbomber*, broadcasted 30 June 2000).

The sports bag was spotted by a member of the public, who called the police. While on the phone to the police, the bomb exploded. Thirteen people were injured. Four days later, after extensive investigation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage, police identified a man in Brixton who had been carrying the sports bag. The CCTV images were given to the media. His photograph was



given widespread publicity. Copeland saw his own photograph in a newspaper as police appealed for information (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000).

On his way home from Brick Lane, Copeland went to Soho, the centre of London's gay community. In Old Compton Street identified the Admiral Duncan public house as a gay pub. Copeland later stated he thought the Admiral Duncan was a 'queer pub full of men hugging each other; (*The Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 2000). He reportedly planned to bomb the pub next week, but due to the publication of his photograph he decided to bring the date forward. He took his bomb-making materials to London where he stayed in a hotel under a false name (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2000). He planted the bomb on the evening of Friday 30 April inside the Admiral Duncan, killing three people, among whom a pregnant woman. The explosion injured 79 others, many of them seriously. Four people required limb amputations. Over 500 nails were recovered from the scene.

Before the attack, Copeland sat at the bar in the pub and ordered a drink. Copeland seemed uneasy and kept looking at this watch and up and down the bar. A man at the bar asked Copeland whether he was waiting for someone and he said he was waiting for his boyfriend. Copeland then asked where the nearest bank was and left. The man offered to look after Copeland's drink and he accepted. Other customers near the bar noticed a sports bag on the ground. The assistant manager of The Admiral Duncan was directed by one of the bar staff to the bag. He examined the outside of the bag and asked a number of the customers who were standing or seated near to it if it was theirs and they all said no. He became concerned and began to move people away before he went back to the bag to read the writing on it; as he was standing over it the bomb exploded.

Volkert van der Graaf

Van der Graaf had planned his attack on Fortuyn thoroughly. On nine different days, in over thirteen hours in total, he searched the Internet for information on Fortuyn's whereabouts. He looked for references under the name, place of residence and daily schedule of Fortuyn. The night before the assassination Van der Graaf searched for over 2 hours on websites for the programme of Fortuyn



for the following day – of which he made notes, subsequently he searched for a map of the Mediapark in Hilversum and the 3FM building, in which Fortuyn was expected for a radio interview. He brought (amongst other things) the notes and plans, a backpack with his gun, the cartridges and a balaclava with him the next day (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003).

On the day of the murder, he attended VMO and left at the end of the morning; taking the afternoon off because of the beautiful weather. During his trip to the Mediapark van der Graaf stopped several times, among other things to purchase shaving gear to remove his stubble, which together with a baseball cap and dark glasses he brought along, and the removal of his earrings would disguise his appearance. He wore a pair of latex gloves to avoid fingerprints on his gun, which he had cleaned with benzine in his car, together with a plastic bag. When Van der Graaf arrived at the Mediapark around 4 pm, he first inspected the area before he went on hiding in the bushes next to the 3FM-building. Prior to his inspection he buried the plastic bag with his gun, in case he was checked. While hiding, he could hear fragments of Fortuyn's interview from a speaker on the outside of the building. Shortly before 6 pm, he dug up his gun and moved away from the bushes in the direction of parked cars, next to which he laid down with his face towards the entrance of the 3FM building. Fortuyn emerged from the building in the company of several others and Van der Graaf walked in the direction of Fortuyn, passing him and then turned and opened fire at Fortuyn's back. Van der Graaf stated:

I had figured out that if I would approach Fortuyn from the front, he might be able to see the attack coming. Shooting Fortuyn from behind would be least problematic. In that case he would not be able to duck away, which could cause danger for the others present at the scene. Next to that, I did not want Fortuyn to suffer more than necessary. Shooting from behind would make it possible to deadly wound him immediately (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003).

Although Fortuyn was surrounded by several people, Van der Graaf did not hesitate; he held his gun with both hands, still with the plastic bag around it – to collect the bullets, and shot Fortuyn from less than 1.5 meters, hitting him in



the back and head five times. Fortuyn fell down immediately and probably died instantaneously, although the local doctor tried to resuscitate him for over an hour.

After the shooting, Van der Graaf ran off and continued the same line through and out of the Mediapark, pursued by Hans Smolders, Fortuyn's chauffeur, later joined by two others. After they had left the Mediapark onto a public road, Van der Graaf threatened Smolders by raising his gun towards him with the intent of stopping Smolders chasing him. During the chase, Smolders had been reporting their position to the police by mobile phone. Van der Graaf gave up when policemen emerged from their car and pointed their pistols at him (Public Prosecution of the Netherlands, 2003).

Franz Fuchs

Franz Fuchs's mail bombing campaign started in December 1993 and came in different series. He used a total of 28 homemade bombs; 25 mail bombs and three improvised pipe bombs. The first mail bombs were planted on 3 December 1993, targeting the priest August Janisch and journalist Silvana Meixner. Janisch was presumably targeted because of his public statements that Austrians were morally obligated to help refugees from the Balkan region. The priest lost part of his thumb after a bomb exploded in the vicarage. Only an hour later Silvana Meixner, an ORF journalist for minority issues, was injured in a mail bomb explosion.

Two days later Fuchs targeted the Mayor of Vienna, Helmut Zilk. Zilk lost a large part of his hand in an explosion at his house (*Berliner Zeitung*, 30 March 2001; *Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999). The fourth victim, on 6 December 1993, was the secretary of Viennese lawyer Klemens Dallinger. The secretary opened a mail bomb addressed to the Islamic Foreigners Help Organization. Six other mail bombs were discovered and disarmed before they could explode. The bombs targeted Helmut Schüller, director of the humanitarian organization Caritas, Green Party politicians Terezija Stoisits and Madeleine Petrovic, and Women's Minister Johanna Dohnal. Fuchs planted his first pipe bomb, weighing around five kilos, at a bilingual school in Klagenfurt, on 24 August 1994. While attempting to



disarm the explosive device, police officer Theodor Kelz lost both his hands. Two of his colleagues were also injured.

The second series of bombings consisted of four mail bombs sent between 30 September and 6 October 1994. The mail bombs were directed at various organizations, including a publishing company and the HR department of a paper factory. None of these bombs exploded (Scheid, 2001). The most devastating bombing took place on 4 February 1995 in Oberwart. Four men, all of them residents of the nearby Roma settlement, were killed an explosive device attached to a sign that read 'Roma zurück nach Indien' ('Roma back to India') exploded. Fuchs later stated that it was never his intention to kill these people (*Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999). Two days after the attack in Oberwart Fuchs planted an explosive device on a square in Stinatz, injuring an employee of the environmental service.

The third series of bombings, consisting of three mail bombs, took place in June 1995. One bomb, on 9 June in Munich, targeted television host Arabella Kiesbauer, but instead injured an employee of the television channel Pro Sieben. Two days later Fuchs targeted Dietrich Szamelt, the vice-mayor of Lübeck, Germany, and a Hungarian woman who runs a dating agency in Linz, injuring two people.

The fourth series of mail bombs, in October 1995, was directed at two medical doctors and a refugee aid worker. Syrian-born doctor Mahmoud Abou-Roumie received injuries to his hands after a mail bomb exploded in his office in Stronsdorf, on 16 October. That same day refugee aid worker Maria Loley was injured in a mail bomb attack at the Poysdorf post office. A third mail bomb, directed at the doctors' couple Dr. Chang-Sik Chung and Dr. Hye-Shuk Chung, both of South Korean origins, was discovered and disarmed in Mistelbach (Scheid, 2001).

Six days before the Austrian federal elections, in December 1995, Fuchs sent four mail bombs, all of which exploded prematurely. Two bombs exploded in a letter box, while the other two mail bombs exploded during a mail transport to Vienna. The bombs were directed at the United Nations Refugee Aid department, a dating agency, an Indian family residing in Vienna and Angela Resetarits, the mother of a well-known cabaret artist, a singer and an ORF editor (ORF, 2007).



The final bombing, in December 1996, consisted of a letter addressed to Lotte Ingrisch, the stepmother of Home Office Minister Caspar Einem. The letter was handed over to the police but exploded during police investigation. This was the final bombing before Fuchs's arrest on 1 October 1997. It remains unclear up to today how and where Fuchs obtained the chemicals for his 25 mail bombs and three pipe bombs.

Theodore Kaczynski

Theodore Kaczynski placed or mailed a total of sixteen letter and package bombs. Over time, his attacks increased both in frequency and lethality. Kaczynski also expanded the scope of his targets (Kushner, 2003: 379-380; *The New York Times*, 5 May 1996). He let police know that the bombings were linked by engraving the initials 'FC' on parts of the bomb or spray-painting them nearby. While the explosive devices varied greatly through the years, all but the first few contained these initials.

His first package bomb targeted Professor Buckley Crist at Northwestern University. The package was found in a parking lot at the University of Illinois at Chicago, on 25 May 1978, and sent back to the return address at Northwestern University. It exploded at the return address, injuring a police officer who opened the package. The bomb was crudely made with plumbing pipe and electrical wire from a lamp. It contained smokeless explosive powders and the box and the plugs that sealed the pipe ends were handcrafted of wood. A more efficient technique, later employed by Kaczynski, would be to use batteries and heat-filament wire to ignite the explosives faster and more effectively.

Kaczynski struck three more times in the Chicago area: at Northwestern University, at the home of the president of United Airlines and in the cargo compartment of American Airlines Flight 444 flying from Chicago to Washington DC. In the latter case, the pilot was forced to make an emergency landing after detecting smoke inside the aircraft. Many passengers were treated for smoke inhalation. A faulty timing mechanism prevented the bomb from exploding. Following these attacks, Kaczynski expanded the scope of his targets to universities throughout the country, including two mail bombs directed at the



University of California at Berkeley, where he had been an assistant professor between 1967 and 1969.

Kaczynski's attacks increased in frequency and lethality in 1985. He bombed a computer room at the University of California at Berkeley in May, injuring a graduate student. He sent another bomb to the Boeing Co. in Auburn, Washington, the following month, which was safely disarmed. In November a package bomb exploded at the home of a University of Michigan professor, injuring two people. On 11 December 1985 Kaczynski placed his most lethal bomb to date in the parking lot of a computer store in Sacramento, California, killing the owner. This was the first casualty in Kaczynski's seven-year bombing campaign. A similar attack against a computer store took place on 20 February 1987 in Salt Lake City, Utah, injuring vice-president Gary Smith. A secretary observed a man in a hooded sweatshirt placing an object on the ground. Her description of the man was used in the famous Unabomber sketch. Following the publication of the police sketch, Kaczynski stopped his bombings. He remained inactive for six years.

The bombs re-emerged in June 1993, when Kaczynski mailed two similar bombs; each contained in a wooden box and packed in a padded envelope. Kaczynski sent one letter bomb to the home of Dr. Charles Epstein, a University of California geneticist. The bomb exploded when Epstein opened the package, causing major injuries to his arms, chest and face. The second bomb was addressed to David Gelernter, a computer science professor at Yale University. Gerlernter faced a long and difficult recovery from the explosion, which ripped off part of his right hand, destroyed the sight in one eye and hearing in one ear (Gerlernter, 1997). In December 1994, a package bomb killed advertising executive Thomas Mosser at his home in New Jersey (see section 3.1).

Kaczynski's final attack took place five days after the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, on 24 April 1995. He sent a package bomb to the offices of the California Forestry Association, Sacramento. Gilbert Murray, a timber lobbyist and the association's president, was killed in the explosion. In a letter to the *New York Times*, Kaczynski explained that he was targeting scientists and engineers, especially those involved with computers and genetics. He mailed three more letters in which he detailed his political philosophy and



resentments. Some experts suggested that he may have felt upstaged by the Oklahoma City bombing (*The Washington Post*, 19 September 1995).

Yigal Amir

The assassination of Rabin was carefully planned and implemented. On Saturday night, 4 November 1995, Yigal Amir left Herzliya, a suburban town north of Tel Aviv, and aboard a southbound bus. He carried a pistol that he had loaded at home. He bought the gun in 1993 after obtaining a gun license. Near the Tel Aviv City Hall, Amir moved among the large crowd that gathered for a peace demonstration addressed by Rabin and Shimon Peres. After inspecting the area, he stood in a parking lot and waited for his targets. His original plan was to shoot both Rabin and Peres when they left the peace rally. But when the two walked down separately from the podium, Amir focused on Rabin, who was his primary target (*The New York Times*, 6 November 1995). Amir told his investigators that on at least two previous occasions, he was armed and ready to kill Rabin. But on both occasions he had a 'sign from Heaven' not to act. On one such occasion Rabin did not show up; on another, he was heavily protected by security (Sprinzak, 1999: 284).

In the period leading up to the attack, Yigal had taken his brother Hagai on numerous visits to Rabin's house. Together with Dror Adani they discussed ways of killing the prime minister. But although the three young men had long plotted to murder Rabin, on 4 November Yigal Amir acted without their knowledge. Police found various weapons in Amir's home, including guns, grenades and explosive devices, several of which were attributed to Hagai Amir. Amir allegedly stole weapons and ammunition from the army during his military service. Another soldier was indicted by a military court on Monday for supplying stolen arms and ammunition to the Amir brothers (*The New York Times*, 6 December 1995).

5. THE IMPACT OF LONE-WOLF TERRORISM

It has been argued that lone terrorists are likely to have relatively little impact on society when compared to large terrorist organizations (Stern, 2003: 173; Schuster & Stone, 2005: 362). The organizational capability and resources of terrorist organizations generally make them more threatening than lone individuals. Although this appears to be true at least for most sustained terrorist campaigns and high-profile coordinated attacks, it is also clear that the lone wolf can strike fear. Scholars have asserted that lone-wolf terrorists 'can be exceptionally dangerous' and that 'if such lone terrorists have access to high technologies, their acts may be very destructive' (Vasilenko, 2005: 54). Laqueur (1999: 269) notes that lone individuals are among the most likely candidates to use weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, scholars have argued that lone-wolf terrorists might be more difficult to detect and pose specific challenges for counterterrorism (e.g. Stern, 2003: 173; Laqueur, 1999: 269). They are 'hard to identify before they act' and often 'hard to track down afterwards' (Hewitt, 2003: 79). Below we will address these issues in our discussion of the impact of the attacks of lone-wolf terrorists.

David Copeland

David Copeland's bombing campaign mainly had an impact on the local communities that were directly affected by the attacks as well as on the British far right. Copeland's third and most devastating attack in particular shocked the London population and the British authorities. From the first attack in Brixton the police had launched a major investigation into the bombings, soon realizing that these might have been committed by the same person. The police also invested, through so-called Family Liaison Officers, to support the victims during their recovery from the explosions (Metropolitan Police, 2000a). In the aftermath of the attacks, police sought to strengthen their ties with the local communities in order to prevent future terrorist attacks. Apart from these consequences,



Copeland's bombing campaign does not seem to have had any serious long-term effects on the affected communities.

Copeland's deeds transformed him into a martyr for the British far right, though he has never received the kind of publicity that white supremacists such as Timothy McVeigh got. Right-wing extremists claimed a parallel between David Copeland and the American terrorist Timothy McVeigh. One British extremist reportedly said that he wrote to Copeland at his cell and to McVeigh: 'Copeland doesn't get the kind of publicity McVeigh gets, and we need action here to make that link clear.' A spokesman for the anti-fascist magazine Searchlight said: 'A lot of Nazis are waiting for McVeigh to die so they can celebrate their martyr. They are bitter that David Copeland never got the same kind of attention, so they'll take McVeigh as a hero instead' (*The Observer*, 27 May 2001).

Volkert van der Graaf

The murder of Pim Fortuyn constituted the first political assassination in the Netherlands since 330 years (this excludes any known and unknown political assassinations in times of war). Although Fortuyn had started his political career only recently before his assassination, the immediate impact on society was great. The Dutch were shocked to know that a murder had taken place in Hilversum, the centre of Dutch media activities only 6 days before the national elections. It was said the Netherlands had lost its innocence and the essential trust in democracy had been seriously violated.

Fortuyn was the leader of the populist party List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and was running for a seat in parliament. During the campaigns for the parliamentary elections, which were scheduled for 15 May 2002, Fortuyn gained much support with outspoken statements on 'hot topics', like his rejection of multiculturalism and the 'backwardness' of Islam and the assumed discriminatory stance towards homosexuals and females of this religion. With his rise in Dutch politics Fortuyn became the representative of a new movement: a different approach to politics, open government and listening to voters. His ghost kept on haunting Dutch politics even during the next elections in 2003. According to a political editor at Radio Netherlands: '[e]verybody's trying to



learn the lesson of Mr Fortuyn: Don't speak in difficult political jargon, try to speak simply and naturally so that everybody can understand what you mean, and do not be afraid of saying things that might not be popular (BBC News, 21 January 2003).

On the evening of 6 May riots broke out in downtown The Hague in response to the murder. Ministers had to be escorted to their homes by police. In the days following on the murder emotions ran extremely high and a number of leftist politicians received police protection after death threats, because they allegedly 'demonized' Fortuyn in public discourse and therefore were thought to be (partly) responsible for the killing. A large part of Dutch society took the murder quite personal. The assassination of Fortuyn was strongly condemned by the entire far left-wing movement, as well as by animal rights activists when it was made public that the killer was an animal rights activist. Thousands of people mourned over the death of Fortuyn and participated in a huge procession in Rotterdam. The procession was led by the mayor of Rotterdam, not because he personally believes, but as a part of his responsibility.

Although or perhaps because, its leader was killed the LPF gained a huge victory (17% of the votes) on 15 May 2002, mostly at the expense of the previous governing coalition partners. The LPF became the second party in parliament and had to take part in a new government, which resulted in an overnight search for ministerial candidates in 'an almost nonexistent, chaotic party that had centred completely on the personal charisma of Fortuyn' (Van der Veer, 2006). After half a year the coalition of LPF, Liberals and Christian Democrats fell apart and during the next elections the LPF was wiped out.

Franz Fuchs

Franz Fuchs's bombing campaign contributed to the polarization of the Austrian left-wing and the far right (e.g. *Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999). Left-wing politicians have accused the Austrian government for failing to acknowledge Fuchs's right-wing ideology, claiming that this added to the proof that the government did too little to contain xenophobic political parties such as the FPÖ (Socialistische LinksPartei, 1997). The FPÖ, on the other hand, linked Fuchs to



the far left. FPÖ leader Jorg Haider said that the actions might well be provocations by the extreme left to discredit right-wing organizations. In addition to its political effects, the bombings also seem to have had a negative impact on community and interorganizational relations. According to representatives of NGOs, the bombings contributed to the polarization of certain local communities, leading some representatives to move their aid campaigns to Vienna (Socialistische LinksPartei, 1997).

An important side-effect of police responses to the bombings was a major crackdown on the right-wing scene in Austria, as the police suspected the perpetrator to belong to the far right. For example, the neo-Nazi group Volkstreue Außerparlamentarische Opposition (VAPO) was almost entirely eliminated. Alleged neo-Nazi members of VAPO were arrested in relation to the first series of bombings in December 1993. Along with other alleged neo-Nazis, they were eventually convicted only for relatively minor offences unrelated to the bombings. Meanwhile the bombings continued.

In recent years Franz Fuchs's terrorist campaign has become commodified, catching the bombings and the subsequent police investigations on film. It was the basis for the German movie *Der Briefbomber*, which focused principally on the role of the psychological profiler. In 2007 the ORF broadcasted a television film entitled *Franz Fuchs: Ein Patriot*.

Theodore Kaczynski

Theodore Kaczynski's bombing campaign challenged FBI operations and, by doing so, appears to have had some success in temporarily diminishing the public's confidence in the federal authorities due to their prolonged failure to unmask and capture the Unabomber. On a number of occasions Kaczynski explicitly addressed the authorities' lack of success. In a letter sent to the *New York Times* in April 1995, he mocked the FBI as 'surprisingly incompetent' and unable 'even to keep elementary facts straight' (*The Washington Post*, 19 September 1995). Meanwhile the FBI launched one of the largest and most expensive investigations in the nation's history (see section 6). Kaczynski was finally caught after an eighteen-year run.



Kaczynski's prolonged bombing campaign had a major impact not only on FBI operations and, of course, on his direct victims, but also on American society more generally. Public anxiety over the Unabomber attacks appears to have culminated in the 1990s, especially in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center terrorist attack and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, adding to the perceived threat of terrorism in the United States. Unlike these other bombings, Kaczynski struck repeatedly, sixteen times in total. His actions generated major publicity, in particular concerning the publication of his manifesto in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* in 1995.

Recently Kaczynski gained renewed publicity following his attempts to reclaim his writings and correspondence. On 10 August 2006, Judge Garland Burrell, Jr., ordered that personal items seized from Kaczynski's cabin after his arrest in 1996 should be sold at an Internet auction to raise money for four of his victims. Kaczynski began a legal battle to undo this ruling, arguing that the government was not entitled to his writings and had no right to alter them. The four victims pursuing restitution from Kaczynski were initially reluctant to agree to the auction, fearing the sale of his possessions would generate more publicity for him. His brother, David Kaczynski, also opposed the auction. Yet some of them were equally horrified by the prospect of Kaczynski reclaiming his writings (*The New York Times*, 22 January 2007). The character of the Unabomber has also become increasingly commodified, inspiring a variety of novels, movies and other popular culture references.

Yigal Amir

As we have noted, the assassination of Rabin needs to be placed in its historical and cultural context. Together with the 1994 Hebron massacre, the event was 'the peak of intense Jewish-Muslim and Jewish-Jewish confrontations in territories captured and occupied by Israel in 1967' (Sprinzak, 1999: 7). The murder of Rabin stunned the nation and generated fierce debate on the radicalization of the extreme right. As such, while the murder was committed by a lone individual, its impact was much broader and implicated a wider ideological movement that engaged in the delegitimation of the government and the character assassination of Rabin and Peres. The national and international media



published several reports on the views of the Israeli far right (e.g. *The New York Times*, 7 November 1995). The Israeli authorities initiated a renewed crackdown on domestic right-wing extremist groups.

6. RESPONSES TO LONE-WOLF TERRORISM

Lone-wolf terrorism is usually dealt with within existing counterterrorism policies. In the United States, however, the events of 9/11 and the ensuing 'War on Terrorism' also triggered important (proposed) changes in the legal provisions for dismantling and preventing lone-wolf terrorism. The controversial draft version of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (DSEA) (Department of Justice, 2003) contains new law enforcement powers beyond those contained in the USA Patriot Act of 2001. The previous mandate for obtaining a foreign intelligence warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §1801-1862, required the government to show probable cause that the targeted individual was acting on behalf of a 'foreign power' (Scahill, 2006: 78). Under 50 U.S.C. §1801, the definition of a 'foreign power' includes groups that engage in international terrorism, but does not reach unaffiliated individuals who do so. The DSEA would change this definition to include *all* individuals, regardless of whether they are affiliated with an international terrorist group, who engage in international terrorism (Department of Justice, 2003, §101). This change is believed to enhance the investigation of lone-wolf terrorists and ' sleeper cells ' who may not have active ties to an established terrorist group.

In 2004, the United States Congress adopted a significant change to FISA with the introduction of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The Act amended the definition of 'agent of a foreign power' in FISA, 50 U.S.C. §1801(b)(1), to add a 'lone wolf' provision. Under this new provision, a non-United States person who engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation for international terrorism is deemed to be an 'agent of a foreign power' under FISA. This amendment permits the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to issue a court order authorizing electronic



surveillance and physical search orders without having to demonstrate a connection between the target of the electronic surveillance or the physical search and a foreign government or terrorist group (Bazan, 2004; see also Bellia, 2005). The new 'lone wolf' provision makes it easier for the US government to conduct surveillance of suspected lone-wolf terrorists who either act in sympathy with the aims of an international terrorist group but not on its behalf, or whose link to an international terrorist group cannot be demonstrated.

At a practical level, official responses to lone-wolf terrorism appear to vary in focus and content. Below we examine the specific responses to episodes of lone-wolf terrorism in the five cases. Rather than providing a complete overview of the strategies and tactics adopted by the authorities, we seek to highlight dominant elements of the official responses to the attacks.

David Copeland

The investigation by the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police, codenamed 'Operation Marathon', led to the arrest of David Copeland in a remarkably short space of time, which probably prevented further attacks. Copeland confessed that he had Peckham, Southall and Tottenham, all multicultural areas, on his list of future targets (*The Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 2000). The large-scale investigation was initiated immediately following the Brixton bombing. A total of 1,097 CCTV videotapes were seized, containing around 26,000 hours of footage. There were technical complications in checking the tapes. The majority of tapes were recorded using 'multiplex' systems, which means that each tape holds footage from between two and sixteen cameras. In many cases there were problems with image quality. Some tapes were worn because they had been re-used many times over and some systems were faulty or badly adjusted. Police officers were lucky to recover intact the black sports bag in which the bomb was planted. They were then able to begin searching the video footage for people carrying bags of that type. This eventually led to Copeland's identification.

On Thursday 29 April 1999 the police release CCTV images of Copeland to the media with appeals to trace the man identified. The police received 571 calls from members of the public and information relating to potential suspects was



received. Over 1,600 statements were taken (Metropolitan Police, 2000a). A taxi driver rang the Anti Terrorist Hotline and stated that he had collected a man fitting the description of the suspect from Waterloo station the previous Saturday. The man had asked to be taken to the Brick Lane area. This was the first indication that the suspect came from Southern England. CCTV footage from cameras at Waterloo indicated that he had travelled by train from the direction of Hampshire. Police also recovered fragments of the alarm clock that Copeland had used as a timer. They found that the Littlewoods 'Index' chain of catalogue stores sold both items. When Copeland was later arrested, receipts for clocks and sports bags from the Littlewoods 'Index' store in Farnborough were found among his possessions. On Friday 30 April, about 80 minutes before the Soho bombing, Paul Mifsud alerted the police that the suspect might be his work colleague, David Copeland. Copeland was eventually convicted of three murders and three offences of planting bombs. He was sentenced to six life sentences on 30 June 2000 (*The Guardian*, 1 July 2000; *The Times*, 1 July 2000). On March 2 2007, reviewing the sentence as part of new legislation, a High Court judge recommended that this should be a minimum of 50 years.

Police were careful in the immediate aftermath of the Brixton bombing not to rule out any possibility, including terrorism linked to the Kosovo conflict or rivalry between local drugs gangs. Investigators soon assumed that the bomber probably had a deep hatred of certain minorities and that the campaign of attacks was designed to foster fear and division in London's richly diverse community. It also became clear that people with no involvement in the bombing used the attacks as an opportunity to spread their hate messages by making false claims of responsibility. To address the concerns of the targeted communities and to try to avoid rumour and speculation that could have made the investigation more difficult, officers liaised closely with community representatives and with members of London's black, Asian and gay and lesbian communities (Metropolitan Police, 2000a).

Volkert van der Graaf

The murder of Pim Fortuyn triggered a great response within Dutch society. In the days after the killing people were mourning Fortuyn's death in a way that by



the international press has been compared to the outburst of collective emotion over the death of Princess Diana. (*The Guardian*, 11 May 2002 and *The Guardian*, 12 May 2002) A Dutch political scientist at the Catholic University of Brabant said: 'I am convinced that the voting ballot will be an open condolence register.' (*The Guardian*, 11 May 2002). As discussed in section 5, Fortuyn's party LPF gained 17% of the Dutch votes during the national elections.

The act of terrorism committed by Volkert van der Graaf mainly triggered a long-term response from the Dutch government. During a longer period of time in which Dutch society was in a state of emotions and panic, the main response followed the debate about the security of Pim Fortuyn and the government's responsibility to protect its politicians. After the assassination it was argued that the Dutch government was responsible for the protection of Pim Fortuyn, who frequently received threats endangering his life, and had despite this knowledge failed drastically to do so.

In order to determine whether the Dutch government was neglectful in the protection of Fortuyn a commission was ordered to investigate the issue. This commission 'Van den Haak' judged the assassination as 'a serious attack on the democratic constitutional state.' The commission concluded that the existing Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen (System of Protection and Security) required a revision. This revision should amongst other things ensure the coherency between the different responsibilities, measures and also the companies concerned with protection and security. This in order to prevent the different bodies working separately. Therefore a security coordinator was appointed within the Ministry of Justice.

The Commissie Van den Haak also responded that an individual is firstly and mainly responsible for his or her own safety. When the individual is not able to protect him- or herself (any longer) the government will take (a part of) the protection in hands. Nevertheless the commission stressed that complete safety cannot be guaranteed. With this the commission stated that the government had no responsibility for the death of the politician. Even with protection murder or violence cannot be prevented (Commissie feitenonderzoek Pim Fortuyn, 2002).

Ministers Donner (justice) and Remkes (Home affairs) have evaluated the System of Protection and Security in 2005. The list with individuals, objects and organisations (of national importance) over which the government special



responsibility as it comes to protecting and safety, was enlarged. The Dutch government received extended responsibility for the protection and security of the Dutch royalties, the prime minister and other politicians, ambassadors, embassies and certain international (military) organisations (press report Ministry of Home affairs, 2003).

Several politicians received protection in the aftermath of the murder of Pim Fortuyn. Protection was needed for politicians at both left and right side of the political spectrum amongst them politicians Ayaan Hirshi Ali, Rita Verdonk and prime minister Jan-Peter Balkenende.

The response of the Dutch minister of Home Affairs made a clear statement to Dutch society and fellow politicians. More than six months after the murder he stated that 'The Netherlands had lost its innocence.' (Speech Minister Remkes at the presentation of the report Commission Van den Haak, 2002)

Franz Fuchs

The authorities' responses to the bombings not only featured a crackdown on Austria's extreme right, as noted in section 5, but also close involvement of criminal psychologists and their communication with Fuchs. In section 4 we described that Fuchs, in some of his letters, specifically addressed not only political developments but also confidential reports of criminal psychologists. Thomas Müller was one of the police psychologists who developed a profile of the perpetrator. He played a central role in the authorities' strategy to identify the bomber between 1994 and 1997. Müller developed a five-phase programme to identify Fuchs by means of a 'psychological duel' (*Der Spiegel*, 3 January 2005; *Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999). The first phase consisted of attempts to acknowledge the skills of the bomber, stressing his detailed knowledge of electronics, physics and chemistry. The next step was to install a 'bad conscious' into the perpetrator. In one of Fuchs's letters Müller found indications that the bomber liked small children. He visited a neo-Nazi who was imprisoned in relation to the bombings and recorded the man's complaints about the fact that he had not seen his newborn daughter since he was in prison. Müller forwarded the recording to the media.



During the third phase of the programme the psychologist provided two journalists with inside information and authentic photographs. The journalists wrote a book on the subject, which included Müller's profile of the bomber. According to the profile, the perpetrator is an Austrian male and probably over 50 years old. He lives in a family house, since he needs the space to keep his material. He possesses specialized tools and a hobby workplace, is a Catholic and has knowledge of hierarchies and religious titles. He probably completed secondary school. He also has knowledge of chemistry and has an interest in history, likes order and tidiness, and is extremely precise. Müller hoped that the bomber would read the book and to increase his stress and force him to make an error.

During the fourth phase of the investigation the director of Domestic Security proclaimed that Austria would introduce the legal arrangements for the strategy of *Rasterfahndung* in order to identify the bomber. *Rasterfahndung* consists of the ability to intelligently search and link different databases. It had been a central element of German counterterrorism policy since the 1970s, when security services used the strategy in an attempt to apprehend members of the Rote Armee Fraktion (TTSRL, 2007: 83-84). In the final phase the director stated that ten Austrian citizens had emerged from the investigation as potential perpetrators. He stated that these people were under close and continuous observation (*Der Spiegel*, 3 January 2005).

The *Rasterfahndung* arrangement was put into practice in Austria on 1 October 1997. That same night two women drove past Fuchs's house twice. They planned to buy wine in Slovenia but forgot their passports. For days Fuchs had been taking photographs of passers-by and writing down the number plates of cars that passed his house. He jumped in his car to follow the women, who he thought were undercover police officers. One of the women called the police. When police officers stopped him near Leibnitz, Fuchs tried to commit suicide using an improvised explosive device. He was convinced the police had stopped him to arrest him in relation to the bombings. His suicide attempt failed, but he lost both hands and injured a nearby police officer (*Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1999). The five-phase programme designed to identify Fuchs had clearly increased the pressure on him. Müller argued that although it was a mere



coincidence that the two women drove past Fuchs's home twice that day, it was certainly no coincidence that Fuchs reacted the way he did.

Fuchs was sentenced to life in prison on 11 March 1999. Many Austrians felt the trial had failed to uncover the details of Fuchs' terrorist campaign. Questions over whether or not Fuchs acted alone remain up to today. Less than one year after his conviction, on 26 February 2000, Fuchs committed suicide in his prison cell in Graz by hanging himself with the cable of an electric razor. The question how Fuchs, who lost both hands in a suicide attempt in 1997, could accomplish this was never satisfactorily answered.

Theodore Kaczynski

The FBI launched one of the longest and most expensive investigations in the history of the United States to identify and capture Theodore Kaczynski, involving agents, explosive experts and behavioural scientists. More than eighteen years after his first bombing, Kaczynski was eventually arrested on 3 April 1996 in his remote cabin near Lincoln, Montana. Through the years a number of offender profiles have been developed within police circles in order to identify the bomber. The focus and content of the profile varied over time as new evidence became available. In 1987 the police released a sketch of the Unabomber suspect, based on the description by a secretary of a Salt Lake City computer store. The bombings stopped immediately and the Unabomber remained inactive for six years.

Following Kaczynski's attempt to get his 1995 manifesto published, FBI agents began sending copies of the manifesto to Chicago-area professors and questioning them to see if any remember a student making such arguments or matching the description of the Unabomber. An FBI task force concluded that the bomber was probably exposed to the history of science, or some related discipline, in the late 1970s in the Chicago area, as this was the area where the Unabomber began his bombing campaign (*The Washington Post*, 19 September 1995).

The break in the investigation came when David Kaczynski recognized the similarities between the Unabomber manifesto and the writings of his older brother Ted, a brilliant mathematician who had left a tenure-track position at the



University of California to live a solitary life in a remote mountain cabin. After contacting the family attorney and handwriting experts, David Kaczynski eventually contacted the FBI (*The Washington Post*, 21 August 1998). By February 1996, investigators began staking out the one-room cabin near Lincoln, Montana, where Theodore Kaczynski had lived in self-imposed exile for more than 25 years. On 3 April 1996, FBI agents, disguised as local mountain men, arrested him. On 22 January 1998, in a plea bargain to avoid the death penalty, Kaczynski pleaded guilty to thirteen federal bombing offenses and was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.

Yigal Amir

The murder of Yitzhak Rabin sparked fierce debate on the operations of the Israeli security service, the Shin Beth, and provoked conspiracy theories about the alleged involvement of the security service. The risk of political assassination by a Jewish extremist was understood months before Rabin was killed (CNN, 5 November 1995). One report about a possible assassination of Rabin was made by two acquaintances of Amir, Hila Frank and Shlomi Halevy. Like other close associates, Frank had heard Amir speak often of the obligation to kill the prime minister. And like all of them, she did not normally take him seriously. Except after one conversation, when Amir told Frank of his readiness to kill the prime minister and of a confession he had already made in the synagogue. Fully aware that confession is a serious matter, Frank felt she now had to warn the authorities. Following an examination of the issue with Shlomi Halevy, who happened to serve in Israel's military intelligence, the two decided to inform the authorities. Since they were friends of Amir and unsure of the seriousness of his statements, they agreed to report the matter without identifying Amir by name.

The information was passed on to the Shin Beth, which filed it without additional investigation. The service's explanation for not pursuing the report further was that they had received hundreds of similar warning signals and were incapable of pursuing them all. It was also reported that security officials' concerns had centred on a possible car bombing in reprisal for the killing of a senior figure in the Islamic Jihad movement in Malta (*The New York Times*, 10 November 1995). Despite the advance knowledge of the threat to Rabin's life,



the prime minister was poorly protected during the peace demonstration in Tel Aviv. The VIP parking lot was not sealed off to the crowd. A large number of personal guards were present but they were not alert (Sprinzak, 1999: 285).

In the aftermath of the Rabin assassination, the Shin Bet stepped up security around Acting Prime Minister Shimon Peres. He has been provided with scores of extra bodyguards. The leader of the opposition Likud party, Benjamin Netanyahu, was also said by his spokesman today to have received death threats since the murder of Rabin (*New York Times*, 10 November 1995).

7. CONCLUSION

In this report we have sought to identify the major features of lone-wolf terrorism. To generate a better understanding of the phenomenon, we formulated a set of key questions concerning six dimensions of lone-wolf terrorism: historical background, micro-dynamics, interactions, modus operandi, impact and responses.

With regard to its historical dimension, it can first be concluded that lone-wolf terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Equivalents of this type of terrorism can be found in nineteenth-century anarchism and, more recently, in the strategy of leaderless resistance popularized by white supremacists. We also looked at the prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism and its geographical and temporal distribution. Lone-wolf terrorism accounts for only a marginal proportion of all terrorist incidents in the sample countries (1.28%). Furthermore, lone-wolf terrorism appears to be far more prevalent in the United States than in the other sample countries, with the US cases accounting for almost 42 percent of the total. This significant variation can partly be explained by the relative popularity of this strategy among white supremacists and anti-abortion activists in the United States. With regard to lone-wolf terrorism in the United States we also found that the vast majority of incidents (80%) have been of a domestic nature and that it has increased markedly over the past two decades. The latter finding supports the conclusions of previous research on American lone-wolf terrorism (Hewitt, 2003). Our findings further seem to indicate that there has not been a significant increase in lone-wolf terrorism in the other sample countries over the past two decades. Unfortunately, methodological difficulties thwart any firm conclusions on this issue.

The analysis of the micro-dynamics and interactions of lone-wolf terrorism focused on four aspects: motivations, socio-psychological circumstances, processes of radicalization and interactions between lone wolves and their environment. The most frequently cited motivations in the registered cases of lone-wolf terrorism are white supremacy, Islamist fundamentalism, nationalism-separatism and anti-abortionism. The prevalence of these

motivations varies considerably across societies, depending in part on socio-political and cultural circumstances and the pre-existing spectrum of extremist movements.

The identified motivational categories are rather static and conceal developmental processes and ideological mixtures. The qualitative part of the study, focused around five high-profile cases, paints a more dynamic picture of the motives of lone-wolf terrorists. In all five cases we found a variable combination of political and personal motives. We also found that, in accordance with Stern's (2003: 172) observation, lone-wolf terrorists tend to create their own ideologies that combine personal frustrations and aversion with political, social or religious grievances. The degree to which these ideologies correspond with those of existing extremist movements vary. For example, while Amir's religious and political views were shared by a small but significant section of Israel's extreme right, Kaczynski's beliefs were more a kind of bricolage, combining elements of different ideological traditions as well as personal frustrations. As such, the five cases signal the complex and dynamic motivations that underlie lone-wolf terrorism. Not only do their general ideological underpinnings vary – anarchism, animal rights activism/environmentalist, right-wing, Jewish extremism – their specific motivations often involve complex constellations of ideas and feelings that may change over time.

Although most terrorists do not suffer from any identifiable psychopathology, it has been observed that the rate of psychological disturbance is considerably higher among lone-wolf terrorists (Hewitt, 2003: 80). Our findings supports this observation. Three out of five lone-wolf terrorists were diagnosed as suffering from a personality disorder (Copeland, Kaczynski and Fuchs; Copeland and Kaczynski were also diagnosed with schizophrenia, though this diagnosis was contested), while one was diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (Van der Graaf). Copeland was also treated for anxiety disorder. Four out of five appear to have experienced serious depression during at least one stage of their lives (all but Copeland). These findings suggest that lone-wolf terrorists are relatively likely to suffer from some form of psychological disturbance.

This conclusion raises the crucial question whether socio-psychological conditions can be identified as a key variable in explaining why some individuals



are recruited into terrorist organizations, while others who display a similar willingness to pursue their political, social or religious aims through the use of violence act independently from existing terrorist networks. The social backgrounds of the five lone-wolf terrorists seem to confirm this thesis. All suffered from a variable degree of social ineptitude: they were, to varying extents, loners with few friends and generally preferred to act alone. With the partial exception of Van der Graaf, none of them appear to have felt particularly comfortable in extremist movements. Two of them, Fuchs and Kaczynski, lived in reclusion and shunned most forms of direct contact with the outside world. Interestingly, four out of five were also identified as highly intelligent persons (all but Copeland).

By definition, lone-wolf terrorists are not members of a terrorist organization or network. They may, however, identify or sympathize with extremist movements or have been a member or affiliate of such a movement in the past. In such cases, their ideology may reflect more closely the political, social or religious aims of existing movements, as in the case of Copeland, Amir and, to a lesser degree, Van der Graaf. These movements provide ideologies of validation and function as communities of belief. They play an important role in the psychological mechanism of externalization (Post, 1998) by channelling personal frustrations and attributing responsibility for all problems (personal as well as political, social or religious) to the 'other'. Others, like Kaczynski and Fuchs, were less directly influenced by existing movements, though Kaczynski's views appear to have been shaped in part by Harvard's counterculture of the 1950s.

These cases demonstrate the variable degree of commitment to and identification with extremist movements among lone-wolf terrorists. They show that although lone-wolf terrorism results from solitary action during which the direct influence, advice or support of others is absent, such action and its justification does not take place in a vacuum. The analytical distinction between lone-wolf terrorism and group-based terrorism is often problematic in practice, since group dynamics may also influence, to some extent, individuals who operate autonomously. Conversely, lone-wolf terrorists may also influence wider movements. The actions of Copeland and Amir, for example, were supported – publicly or at least implicitly – by sympathizers from affiliated ideological milieus,



portraying them as 'martyrs' for their cause. Kaczynski and, to a lesser extent, Fuchs have turned into well-known popular culture icons, references to whom can be found in movies, books and other consumer products.

Acknowledging that lone-wolf terrorism does not take place in a vacuum is also crucial to identifying processes of radicalization. The five cases illustrate how radicalization can result in an activist attitude involving the public expression of one's beliefs and an active search for verbal and physical confrontation with 'adversaries'. In the case of Fuchs and Kaczynski, this activist attitude coexisted with an 'isolationist attitude', meaning increased physical isolation from society in order to avoid direct contact with the existing social system. In both cases, communication with outsiders was largely confined to violent actions and written statements. Radicalization tends to result from a combination of individual processes, interpersonal relations and socio-political and cultural circumstances. The five cases indicate a number of key developments that influenced both the individuals' beliefs and their willingness to put these beliefs into practice through the use of violence. These influences include, to varying degrees and in variable combinations: personal aversion or depression, negatively perceived developments in personal life or career, interaction with extremist movements, socio-political polarization and radicalization, militant literature and Internet publications, and admired terrorism occurring elsewhere.

We examined three major elements of the modus operandi of lone-wolf terrorism: weapons, targets, and planning and implementation. Firearms and explosives are the main weapons of choice to lone-wolf terrorists. Furthermore, lone-wolf terrorists principally, though by no means exclusively, target civilians. The preferred arsenal and targets of lone-wolf terrorists appear to vary across cultures. In the qualitative part of the study, we found that in three of the five cases lone-wolf terrorists used explosive devices, while in the remaining two cases firearms were used. Three out of five targeted civilians. Only one, however, exclusively targeted civilians (Copeland). Both Fuchs and Kaczynski targeted a variety of categories (the former targeted civilians, journalists, religious leaders, government officials and medical staff, while the latter attacked scientists, civilians and businesspeople). Three out of five targeted government officials or politicians (Fuchs, Van der Graaf and Amir). In all cases,



the attacks were premeditated, often carefully planned and self-financed. The number of casualties was in all cases relatively limited, reflecting the comparatively minor lethality of the registered cases of lone-wolf terrorism. The largest numbers of casualties associated with attacks that correspond with our narrow definition of lone-wolf terrorism are eighteen (Joseph Paul Franklin, 1977-80) and ten (Mark Essex, 1972-73). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the lethality of lone-wolf terrorism has been on the increase in recent years, as opposed to terrorism in general (e.g. Enders & Sandler, 2005).

Our study shows the difficulty in preventing and detecting lone-wolf terrorists. Two out of five succeeded in escaping arrest for a long period of time, enabling them to strike repeatedly (Kaczynski and Fuchs). One was captured relatively quickly, but not before launching his most lethal attack (Copeland). The impact of lone-wolf terrorism is viewed by some scholars to be generally limited. The five cases indicate that the impact of terrorism committed by lone individuals is usually national rather than international in scope. We would suggest that under certain circumstances the impact of lone-wolf terrorism can be relatively large. These include prolonged terrorist campaigns (Kaczynski, Fuchs) and the assassination of high-profile political figures (Van der Graaf, Amir). With regard to the latter, our findings appear to confirm the potential 'shock value' of political killings, since 'the murder of a prominent politician is often seen as an attack on not only the victim, but also the socio-political structure the victim once represented' (Christensen, 2004: 23).

Our study also points to the potential 'contamination' or 'inspiration' effect of lone-wolf terrorism (see also Schuster & Stone, 2005: 362). Amir and Copeland both claimed to have been inspired by the attacks of Baruch Goldstein and Eric Rudolph, respectively. Kaczynski's bombing campaign may have been an inspiration for lone individuals such as the Italian Unabomber (there is, at present, no solid evidence to support this claim). This inspiration effect constitutes a potentially important, yet understudied, element of the indirect, long-term impact of lone-wolf terrorism on public safety.



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Annex A

Table 3 *Chronology of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States, 1940-2007*
(N=32)⁹

Date	Name	No. of fatalities	No. of injuries	Description
1940-1956	George Metesky (a.k.a. the 'Mad Bomber')	-	7	George Metesky planted approximately 30 bombs in New York City for a period of sixteen years. He placed his first bomb outside a building of utility giant Consolidated Edison in New York City, on 16 November 1940. A former employee, Metesky had suffered an on-site accident at the plant where he worked. He blamed his subsequent tuberculosis on that accident. After his disability claim was denied, Metesky had written several angry letters to the company. Although his anger was principally directed at his former employer, over the years the increasing sophistication and power of the bombings installed fear among the population of New York City. Metesky targeted public places, notably movie theaters, where he inserted his devices in the underside of seats. It was not until 1953 that his bombs caused any injuries. Metesky was arrested in 1957.
1963	Byron de la Beckwith	1	-	White supremacist Byron de la Beckwith murders the black civil rights leader Medgar Evers in Jackson, Mississippi. The killer seems to have acted on his own, although he later joins the Ku Klux Klan. On 26 September 1973, Byron de la Beckwith was arrested in Louisiana with a bomb in his car. He was allegedly planning to kill the regional director of the Anti-Defamation League.
5/6/	Sirhan Sirhan	1	5	Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy in Los Angeles, California. Five

⁹ The chronology excludes: (1) attacks that were presumably carried out or planned by couples or, more rarely, by three persons. This category includes, for example, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, on 19 April 1995, John Allan Muhammad and Lee Malvo, in the fall of 2002, and the assassins of white civil rights activist William Moore, on 23 April 1963 (on the latter incident see Lipsitz, 2006); (2) attacks which lack a political or social aim, for instance those motivated by personal grief or a desire to become famous. This category includes Arthur Bremmer, who shot presidential candidate George Wallace, on 15 March 1972; (3) attacks that are perpetrated by an individual, but who is (supposedly) a member or leader of a terrorist group. This category includes Gordon Kahl, who killed two U.S. Marshalls on 13 February 1983, and Fran Truitt, who attempted to murder corporate executive Leon Hirsch, on 10 November 1988. The list therefore deviates from the registered cases of lone-wolf terrorism listed in the chronologies of Hewitt and Kushner.

1968				bystanders are wounded. The Palestinian born perpetrator, Sirhan Sirhan, wrote in his diary that he hated Kennedy because of his support for Israel and his pledge to give jet bombers to Israel. Some investigators questions the validity of the official story that casts Sirhan as a lone gunman.
1972 - 1973	Mark Essex	10	13	Black militant Mark Essex was responsible for a number of shootings in New Orleans. As a former US Navy sailor, Essex claimed to be the victim of the Navy's institutionalized racial discrimination and developed an intense hatred of white people and police officers. On New Year's Eve 1972 he shot three police officers, killing two. On 7 January 1973, Essex shot several people at a hotel in downtown New Orleans. He was eventually shot and killed by police.
1972 - 1975	Neal Long	7	At least 10	White supremacist Neal Long was involved in a series of shootings from 1972 to 1975 in Dayton, Ohio. The first attack was the wounding of five black men by a shotgun blast from a car (31 July 1972). Long's attacks include the murders of three black males (on 26 September 1973; 3 July 1974; 22 July 1974) and the assassination of Rev. William Wright, a black minister, who was killed by a shotgun blast in front of his church (12 May 1974).
1974	Muharem Kurbegovic (a.k.a. 'Aliens of America' and the 'Alphabet Bomber')	3	35	Kurbegovic, a Yugoslavian-born engineer, was responsible for a series of bombings in Los Angeles. He also sought to produce and release nerve agents. Acting in the name of a fictitious group called 'Aliens of America', he targeted residents of Los Angeles, senior government officials in the Supreme Court, Congress, White House and Pentagon. Kurbegovic detonated a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport, which killed three people and injured 35. Kurbegovic was also convicted of trying to bomb the downtown Greyhound bus terminal and of firebombing the homes of several government officials. He was one of the first to threaten to release nerve agents in populated areas.
1978 - 1996	Theodore Kaczynski (a.k.a. 'The Unabomber')	3	23	Kaczynski was responsible for a placing or mailing 16 package bombs and letter bombs over a period of nearly 18 years. For six years, between 1987 and 1993, Kaczynski remained inactive. In June 1993 he restarted his bomb campaign. His final attack came on 24 April 1995, when a package bomb sent to the offices



				of the California Forestry Association killed the association's president.
1977-1980	Joseph Paul Franklin	18	5	White supremacist Joseph Paul Franklin commits a series of shootings and bombings, principally targeting black males, mixed-race couples and Jews. Franklin also shot and wounded <i>Hustler</i> publisher Larry Flynt, leaving him paralyzed from the waist down. Although he acted alone, Franklin may have had connections with the Ku Klux Klan.
1980	Joseph Christopher (a.k.a. 'The .22 Caliber Killer')	5	1	White supremacist Joseph Christopher engages in a number of shootings and assaults of black males in Buffalo and Niagara, New York. During a three-day killing spree, from 22 to 24 September 1980, four black males are shot to death with a .22 caliber gun. These killings cause the press to call Christopher 'The .22 Caliber Killer'.
1982	Frank Spisak Jr.	3	1	Neo-Nazi Frank Spisak Jr. shot and killed three black males, including the black minister Rev. Horace Rickerson in Cleveland, Ohio (1 February 1982).
8/12/1982	Norman Mayer	-	-	After threatening to blow up the Washington Monument, anti-nuclear weapons activist Norman Mayer was shot and killed by police after a 10-hour siege. The subsequent investigation disclosed that Mayer did not have any explosives.
19/12/1989	Roy Moody	2	-	Moody was responsible for a number of mail bomb attacks, killing Judge Robert Vance and civil rights attorney Robert Robinson. The same week, two more package bombs were intercepted en route to a federal courthouse and an office of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Jacksonville, Florida. The package bombs were disarmed.
25/1/1993	Mir Aimal Kansi	2	3	Pakistani Mir Aimal Kansi shoots five individuals working for the CIA outside CIA headquarters, killing two and injuring three others.
10/3/1993	Michael Griffin	1	-	Anti-abortion activist Michael Griffin murders Dr. David Gunn of Pensacola Medical Services, Florida. After shooting Dr. Gunn in the back three times, Griffin surrenders to police, who were at the clinic to monitor an anti-abortion demonstration. Although Griffin acted alone, he may have been connected with the Army of God.

19/8/ 1993	Rachelle Shannon	-	1	Anti-abortion activist Rachelle Shannon shoots and wounds Dr. George Tiller, an abortion provider in Wichita, Kansas.
7/12/ 1993	Colin Ferguson	6	19	Black militant Colin Ferguson opens fire with a handgun on a crowded commuter train in New York. Six people are killed and 19 are wounded. All the victims are whites or Asians. Handwritten notes found on Ferguson express his hatred of whites and Asians. Ferguson was found not guilty because of insanity.
1/3/ 1994	Rashid Baz	1	2	Lebanese-born immigrant Rashid Baz fires on a van full of Hasidic students in New York City, killing one and wounding two other students. At his trial, it was claimed that the attack was a response to the massacre of Muslim worshippers by a Jewish extremist in the Israeli-occupied West Bank a few days earlier.
29/7/ 1994	Paul J. Hill	2	1	Anti-abortion militant Paul Hill fatally shoots Dr. John Britton and escort Jim Barrett in Pensacola, Florida. Escort June Barrett is injured.
30/12/ 1994	John Salvi	2	5	Anti-abortion activist John Salvi kills two employees and injures five other employees of the Planned Parenthood of Greater Boston clinic and the Preterm Health Services clinic in two separate gun attacks in Boston, Massachusetts.
12/4/ 1996	Larry Shoemake	2	10	White supremacist Larry Shoemake opens fire on a shopping center in a black neighbourhood in Jackson, Mississippi, killing one person and wounding ten. He then dies in a fire. Notes left at his home suggest the attack was racially motivated.
1996- 98	Eric Rudolph	3	At least 150	Rudolph was responsible for a number of bombing attacks in two states, Georgia and Alabama. His attacks included a bomb attack at Centennial Olympic Park during the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, killing one and injuring 111 other visitors. Rudolph also bombed, among others, two abortion clinics, on 16 January 1997 and 29 January 1998, and a gay nightclub on 21 February 1997.
24/2/ 1997	Ali Hasan Abu Kamal	2	6	A 69-year-old Palestinian fires a gun into a crowd on the Empire State Building's 86th-floor observation deck, killing two – including Abu Kamal, who shot himself – and injuring six others.
23/10/	James C. Kopp	1	-	Anti-abortion activist James Kopp kills Dr. Barnett Slepian, a doctor who legally

1998				performed abortions, by a single shot fired through the kitchen window of his home in Amherst, New York.
10/8/1999	Buford Furrow	1	5	White supremacist Buford Furrow walked into a Jewish community center in Granada Hills, California, and opens fire, wounding five people. Later that day, he shoots and kills a Filipino mailman. Furrow walked into the FBI office in Las Vegas the next morning and surrendered. He said that he 'wanted to send a message to America by killing Jews'.
1/3/2000	Ronald Taylor	3	2	Black extremist Ronald Taylor shoots five white people, killing three of them, in two fast-food restaurants in Wilkesburg, Pennsylvania. Police and FBI agents searching Taylor's apartment allegedly found writings referring to 'white trash' and denouncing Asians, Italians and the news media.
28/4/2000	Richard Baumhammers	5	1	In a shooting spree in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, white supremacist and lawyer Richard Baumhammers kills five people, an African American male, a Jewish woman, three Asian men.
May 2001	John Allen Muhammad	-	-	John Allen Muhammad fired shots at a synagogue in Tacoma, Washington. A year later, in October 2002, Muhammad, together with accomplice Lee Malvo, terrorized the Washington D.C. area in a series of sniper shootings, killing ten and wounding three people. ¹⁰
4/7/2002	Hesham Mohamed Ali Hadayet	3	3	An Egyptian immigrant opens gunfire at the El Al airline ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport, killing two people and wounding three others. The gunman left a letter stating that he was angered by Israel's treatment of Palestinians. Hadayet was finally shot dead by an El Al security guard.
3/10/	Steve Kim	-	-	A South Korean-born US citizen, apparently protesting the state of human

¹⁰ US Army veteran John Allen Muhammad and 17-year-old accomplice Lee Boyd Malvo were charged in thirteen sniper shootings that killed ten people and lasted more than three weeks throughout Washington D.C., Virginia, and Maryland in the fall of 2002. Muhammad was convicted of terrorism for intentionally instilling fear throughout the Washington D.C. community. His exact motives remain unclear, although he appears to have been motivated by a mixture of personal and political grievances (Stern, 2003: 172-173).

2002				rights in North Korea, fired pistol shots outside the United Nations headquarters in New York City. He threw a handful of leaflets condemning North Korea in the air.
17/3/ 2003	Dwight Watson	-	-	A tobacco farmer protesting cuts in tobacco subsidies and the government's treatment of Gulf War veterans drives his tractor into a pond near the Lincoln Memorial, Washington D.C., and threatens to detonate a bomb. He surrenders two days later. No explosives were found.
3/3/ 2006	Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar	-	9	A 22-year-old Iranian-born American citizen drove a Jeep Cherokee into a crowd of students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, injuring nine people. He was reported to be religiously motivated and to match the modern profile of the unaffiliated, lone terrorist.
28/6/ 2006	Naveed Afzal Haq	1	5	A 30-year-old American man of Pakistani descent opened fire in the offices of the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle, killing one woman and wounding five others. He allegedly said: 'I am a Muslim American, angry at Israel' and 'I'm not upset at people, I'm upset at your foreign policy.'

Sources: Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Kushner, 2003; Simon, 2000 (on Muharem Kurbegovic); Martin, 2006 (on Richard Baumhammers, Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph); Jenkins, 1997 (on Roy Moody); Juergensmeyer, 2000 (on Paul Hill and Eric Rudolph); *The Washington Post*, 19 March 1996 (on John Salvi); *The New York Times*, 23 February 2003 (on Hesham Mohamed Ali Hadayet and Paul Hill); Roth and Dolan, 2002 (on Steve Kim); *The News Observer*, 14 March 2006 (on Mohamed Reza Taheri-azar); *The Seattle Times*, 30 July 2006 (on Naveed Afzal Haq); Crime Library; Wikipedia.

Table 4 *Chronology of likely cases of lone-wolf terrorism in TTSRL sample countries, 1968-2007 (N=38)*

Date	Country	No. of fatalities	No. of injuries	Description
9/1/1970	France	-	-	A TWA 707 flight en route from Paris to Rome with 20 persons on board was hijacked by a lone Frenchman, Christian Belon, with a pistol. He said that he wanted to spite Americans and Israelis for their aggression in the Middle East.
30/5/1970	Italy	-	-	An Alitalia DC-9 flying from Genoa to Rome was hijacked by a young Italian armed with a toy pistol, who diverted the plane and its 35 passengers to Cairo in protest of the Middle East conflict. He forced the pilot to change course twice during the incident.
24/11/1972	Germany	1	-	An Air Canada DC-8 scheduled to fly from Frankfurt to Montreal and Toronto was hijacked on the ground by an armed gunman, Viktor Widera, who forced everybody off the plane except a stewardess, whom he held hostage for 24 hours. Widera demanded the release of a Czech being held by West Germany for hijacking an aircraft from Prague to Nuremburg, as well as the release of several other Czechs. When a radio was passed to him and he was attempting to close the cockpit door, police marksmen shot and killed him aboard the aircraft.
26/1/1973	France	1	-	A man armed with guns and grenades, who was reportedly a French Legionnaire, held five people hostage at Calvi Airport in Corsica. He had made an aborted attempt to hijack an Air Inter Airlines plane. The man was eventually killed by police gunfire.
24/4/1977	Poland	-	-	Polish police were reported to have stopped an aircraft hijacking attempt at Krakow airport by a Polish soldier who had seized a hostage and had attempted to take over a TU134 being prepared to fly to Nuremberg, West Germany. He fired several shots before being overpowered by soldiers dressed as mechanics.
6/6/1977	Italy	-	-	The Lufthansa office in Genoa was firebombed causing only minor damage. A left-wing student who was arrested and charged with the attack said it was to protest West Germany's policies concerning extremists.
12/8/1977	France	-	-	An Air France flight en route from Paris to Cairo via Nice was diverted by a lone Egyptian hijacker who claimed to have dynamite. The aircraft eventually landed in Italy. The hijacker was arrested when the crew locked him out of the plane. He said he had seized the plane in an effort to bring Egypt and Libya together after the recent fighting between the

				two countries. Police discovered an ax and small bozod of nonexplosive material.
15/1/1980	Italy	-	-	A Tunisian hijacker held 89 persons hostage on an Alitalia DC-9 flight for twelve hours, claiming he had an accomplice with a bomb. The 28-year-old hijacker demanded that the passengers be exchanged in Tunisia for 25 jailed union leaders who, he said, must also be given their jobs back. He had seized the aircraft midway through its scheduled flight from Rome to Tunis. However, the airport where he wanted the flight diverted was closed due to a sand storm. The plane eventually landed in Palermo where, after a stalemate, the hijacker surrendered to Italian authorities.
25/11/1980	France	2	1	An unidentified Arab terrorist broke into a travel agency in Paris and killed the owner and his wife and wounded his secretary. The owners of the agency were Egyptian-born Jews and were sympathetic to the Camp David Middle East peace accords and specialized in organizing trips between the cities of the two countries, naming them hope voyages. The attacker escaped, leaving behind his weapon, which was later announced to be of the same type as that used in the attack on former Iranian Premier Bakhtiar and the slaying of a Syrian exile earlier this year.
12/5/1982	Portugal	-	-	Juan María Fernández y Krohn was charged with attempted murder against Pope John Paul II. He received a six-year sentence though he served only three years and then was expelled from Portugal, after which he moved to Belgium. The former Spanish Roman Catholic priest tried to stab the Pope with a bayonet. At his trial Fernández y Krohn stated that he acted because 'the pontiff betrayed the church and encouraged communism through compromise with Soviet-Bloc countries.' He was again arrested in 2000 after climbing over a security barricade at the Royal Palace of Brussels, intent on killing either Belgian King Albert II or the approaching Spanish King Juan Carlos.
9/4/1983	France	-	-	A 22-year-old Polish man admitted to the shooting of the Soviet Consulate, resulting in thirteen bullet holes and broken windows. No motive was given for the attack.
19/8/1983	Russia (USSR)	-	-	A man in his early thirties roared past Soviet guards outside the British Embassy in Moscow and drove a car containing a homemade bomb into the diplomatic compound. The Russian guards followed him into the embassy courtyard and dragged the man out. The explosive device was removed without incident.
30/12/1983	Spain	1	1	An employee of the Jordanian Embassy was shot to death and another seriously wounded by a single assailant who fired a submachine gun into their car on a street in Madrid. Police said the attacker, who appeared to be an Arab in his mid-twenties, escaped after the attack. No group claimed responsibility.
1/11/1984	Spain	-	1	A gunman carrying a false Moroccan passport was arrested shortly after he shot and wounded a Lebanese citizen in a central Madrid shopping mall.

				It was the fifth attack on Arabs in Spain this year. An Arab man was arrested.
11/11/1984	France	2	3	A French citizen fired randomly into a cafe frequented by Turkish workers, killing two of them and wounding three others.
10/3/1985	Germany	-	-	The commander of Britain's Royal Air Force in West Germany was shot at by a passing motorist on the highway, but the assailant may have been firing blanks. Three shots were fired at the chauffeur-driven vehicle, but there was no sign of any bullets having hit the marshal's car.
27/3/1985	Germany	-	-	A lone hijacker with a knife forced a Lufthansa aircraft en route to Athens from Munich to land at Istanbul's Yesilkoy Airport. Upon landing in Turkey the 142 passengers were released, and the man, believed to be a Libyan, demanded the plane fly on to Libya. By this time sharpshooters had surrounded the plane and the man was forced to surrender to the authorities.
25/12/1986	Netherlands	-	-	A man from Rotterdam was arrested in connection with the arson attack against a car belonging to the Soviet Embassy in the Hague. The car was parked near the embassy at the time of the attack. The man has admitted to having set the fire in protest against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It was reportedly a one-man operation.
22/3/1988	Germany	-	-	Two Molotov cocktails were hurled at a US Army barracks in West Berlin by an unidentified man on a bicycle. The suspect escaped.
14/7/1988	Germany	-	-	An armed Lebanese man took hostages at the Libyan Arab People's Bureau in Bonn, threatening to use force if he were not transported out of Germany. The man was overpowered by German police eleven hours later. There were reports that the food and drink he received while in the embassy were tainted with sedatives by police.
26/2/1991	Germany	-	-	Three American employees of a US government agency were fired on and a grenade was tossed at the hotel in which they were staying in Berlin. A Lebanese man was later taken into custody in connection with the attack.
5/3/1991	Russia (USSR)	1	-	A man in Leningrad tried to hijack a flight to Sweden. The man threatened the crew with an anti-tank grenade which detonated. The hijacker was killed in the attack.
26/5/1992	Canada	-	1	A Sudanese Islamic fundamentalist leader was injured when he and his advisors were attacked by an exiled martial arts expert at an airport in Ottawa.
1/9/1993	Sweden	-	-	A right-wing Swedish citizen shot at immigrants with a laser-sighted gun. He is on trial for the shootings.
10/12/1993	France	-	-	An Algerian man armed with a knife attempted to hijack a domestic flight from Paris to Nice. He also claimed to have an explosive device. Upon landing in Nice the hijacker demanded that the flight continue on to Libya. The hijacker was eventually apprehended by police, and it was discovered that he did not have an explosive.

12/2/1998	United Kingdom	-	1	Police believe the 'Mardi Gras bomber' is responsible for an explosion that occurred in a man's car after he picked it up near a Sainsbury store. The explosive device was reportedly hidden in a plastic bag. The man was slightly injured.
23/6/1998	Spain	-	-	Sevillian Javier Gomez hijacked a domestic Iberia flight en route from Seville to Barcelona. The hijacker claimed to have an explosive device and requested that the plane be taken to Tel Aviv. It was later discovered that he had no explosives or weapons.
31/1/2000	Denmark	-	1	Boris Zhilko, a Russian diplomat, was injured when a bottle containing an incendiary mixture was thrown into the Russian Consular Office in Copenhagen. The attacker was detained and claimed he attacked the embassy 'in response to Russia's actions in Chechnya.'
2000 - 2005	Italy	-	At least 7	An Italian male, dubbed the 'Italian Unabomber', has been accused of planting dozens of explosive devices in consumer products, mainly food, since 1994. The Italian Unabomber has booby-trapped eggs, mayonnaise jars, tomato paste and is blamed for leaving explosives in public places like beaches, cemeteries and churches. Unabomber attacks are registered in the RAND-MIPT database for: 2/9/2000, 1/11/2000, 6/11/2000, 23/7/2002, 9/9/2002, 11/9/2002, 25/4/2003, 13/1/2005 and 26/1/2005. The following incidents are reported as causing injuries: 2/9/2000: A child was injured when an explosive device, planted in a bottle of bubble bath exploded. 6/11/2000: A woman was injured when a tube of tomato concentrate that she had just purchased at the supermarket exploded in her hand. 25/4/2003: An explosive attack injured two young girls. A booby-trapped marker that a nine-year old girl was playing with exploded in her hand. The blast caused her to lose three fingers and possibly one of her eyes. 13/1/2005: A small explosive device detonated in a church during mass, in the northern town of Motta di Livenza, injuring three people. The device had been planted inside an electric candle and seriously injured a 6-year-old girl as she inserted a coin into the machine.
14/12/2000	Germany	1	4	One woman was killed and four others injured – all immigrants from Eastern Europe – when a masked man entered a beauty salon in Berlin and shot one employee. He then hurled a grenade in the shop and escaped. The shop is located in a heavily Russian-populated area of the city. Authorities believe that this attack may be connected to another bomb attack against Russian immigrants in Dusseldorf in July 2000.
28/2/2001	Spain	-	-	A masked man entered a post office in Hernani at opening time, announced to everyone that he was planting a bomb and left. The device exploded but did not cause any injuries.
2002	Spain	-	At least 2	On 22 September 2003, Guillem G.B., an ex-member of the former Catalan separatist group, Terra Lliure, was arrested in connection with four attacks that took place in Barcelona in 2002. The

				<p>police found a number of fake personal documents, stolen bank cards, an imitation handgun, a real handgun, an air rifle, documents and publications of a radical nature, a computer and disks in the suspect's home. The following incidents are registered in the RAND-MIPT database:</p> <p>4/5/2002: The man used flammable liquid to set fire to a television and telephone connections booster station.</p> <p>13/5/2002: He allegedly planted a device made up of two camping-gas cylinders and several lead balls. The device exploded at an ATM machine, injuring two people.</p> <p>12/12/2002: A homemade bomb exploded in a tax office on Caballero Street in Barcelona, causing considerable damage to the inside of the building. The device started a fire that was extinguished by the fire brigade.</p>
6/5/2002	Netherlands	1	-	<p>Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn was shot six times upon entering his limousine after finishing an interview at a radio station in Hilversum. In November 2002, Volkert van der Graaf, an animal rights activist, admitted to murdering Fortuyn. He stated that he perpetrated the attack to protect Muslim immigrants and other 'vulnerable' members of Dutch society. He was tried in March 2003 and charged with premeditated murder, threatening Fortuyn's driver with a weapon and possession of weapons and ammunition. Van der Graaf was sentenced to eighteen years in jail for these charges.</p>
19/12/2002	Spain	-	-	<p>A homemade device, made of a 5 liters container full of petrol with camping gas refills attached and a rocket and detonator, was found at the Popular Party (PP) offices in Sanxenxo. The National Police Corps arrested a 44-year-old man in connection with this attack, another device left at a PP office and an arson attack on a military lorry that was assisting in cleaning up the recent oil spill.</p>
13/2/2003	United Kingdom	-	-	<p>A 37-year-old man, Rahaman Alan Hazil Mohammed, from Venezuela, was arrested at London Gatwick Airport after authorities found a live grenade in his luggage. Customs officials stopped him after he flew in to the United Kingdom from Caracas on a British Airways jet. Gatwick's north terminal was evacuated and closed while authorities disposed of the grenade. Mohammed has been charged with terrorism offences.</p>
25/4/2003	Germany	-	-	<p>A 17-year-old Lebanese boy hijacked a bus with about fifteen people on board near Bremen. The hijacker carried a starter's pistol and claimed that he carried a chemical weapon. The hijacking lasted about seven hours, no shots were fired and no one was injured. The perpetrator demanded the release of four al-Qaeda operatives and praised the work of the 9/11 hijackers. Though of Lebanese origin, the hijacker had lived in Germany for several years. Authorities believe the perpetrator acted on his own and was not part of any organized terrorist group.</p>
27/4/2003	Germany	-	-	<p>A 27-year-old Lebanese man hijacked a bus, holding eight people on board for about 45 minutes.</p>



				The bus had been traveling to Tegel Airport in West Berlin when the perpetrator took control of it. The bus remained stationary during the incident. The hijacker, who had a knife, demanded that Israel withdraw from the Palestinian territories. Police officers stormed the bus and no one was injured.
28/3/2004	Italy	1	-	Moustafa Chaouki, a 35-year-old Moroccan man, blew himself up outside a McDonald's fast food restaurant in Brescia. Investigators found a note, written by the bomber, protesting the war in Iraq but stating that he was not a member of al Qaeda or any organized terrorist group. Chaouki, who has lived in Italy for over fifteen years, filled his car with gas cylinders and set it on fire outside of the McDonald's. In the note, Chaouki says he was acting in the name of Allah for the war in Iraq, which he believed punished innocent people. Chaouki also criticized Italy for being too friendly with the US and Israel.

Source: RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base

Table 5 *Chronology of likely cases of lone-wolf terrorism in Canada and Australia, 1968-2007 (N=4)*

Date	Country	No. of fatalities	No. of injuries	Description
4/4/ 1979	Australia	1	-	A bomb-wielding hijacker holding a knife to a woman's throat was critically wounded by police who overpowered him inside a Pan American aircraft at Sydney's Mascot Airport. Police said the hijacker, identified as an Italian, Dimiscus Sperantzo, later died from his wounds. He allegedly attempted to gain passage to the Soviet Union via Singapore and Rome. An anti-hijack squad rescued the woman after her abductor snatched her from the customs hall of the airport terminal and forced her aboard the aircraft bound for Los Angeles. It was the first attempted hijacking in Australia of an overseas aircraft.
1/9/ 1984	Canada	3	29	A bomb exploded in a Montreal railroad station on Labor Day, killing three French tourists and wounding 29 others. A rambling, barely coherent note had been turned over to police three days earlier by a ticket agent at the station. The letter threatened the life of the Pope who was due to visit Canada. Shortly after the bomb detonated an anonymous caller warned a second bomb had been planted in the railroad station. A search failed to locate a second bomb. An American man from Rochester, New York, was ordered held in connection with the bombing.
26/8/ 1988	Canada	-	1	A 17-year old Sikh shot and seriously wounded the editor of a Punjabi-language newspaper in Vancouver.
16/7/ 2001	Australia	1	-	An armed security guard at an abortion clinic in Melbourne, the Fertility Control Clinic, was shot and killed by a lone gunman. The gunman was subdued by two bystanders and subsequently arrested.



Annex D

Incidents of terrorism in TTSRL sample countries, 1 January 1968 – 1 May 2007

Country	No. of incidents
United Kingdom	881
Germany	483
France	1163
Spain	1341
Italy	430
Poland	14
The Netherlands	76
Denmark	29
Sweden	45
Czech Republic	7
Portugal	50
Russia	506
United States	554
Canada	34
Australia	33
Total	5646

Source: RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base