The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the world's principal multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Its members negotiated the landmark Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which bans nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and the Chemical Weapons Convention which totally prohibits chemical weapons. The current Director-General of the UN Office in Geneva, Vladimir Petrovsky, also serves as the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament. Chairmanship of the conference rotates among its member states. The U.S. Representative to the CD is Ambassador Eric M. Javits.

Deriving its existence sui generis from its original, limited membership, the CD is not a UN body, but an autonomous body which receives support from the UN system. It was established by its members in 1979, and it succeeds several predecessor organizations dating back to 1962. In adopting its agenda, the CD takes into account the recommendations of the UN General Assembly, and informs the Assembly annually of its activities. The budget of the CD secretariat is included in the UN budget, and the CD holds its meetings at the UN Palais des Nations in Geneva. All CD decisions are taken by consensus.

The CD meets each year in Geneva for a three-part annual session to consider and negotiate multilateral arms control and disarmament measures. The CD currently has 66 member states, with the latest expansion (by five) taking place in August 1999. The members represent every geographical region, and include the five nuclear-weapon states (United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, and China). There were 42 non-member participant states (observers) in the CD in 2000: they have the right to attend meetings of the CD's ad hoc committees, and can speak, circulate papers and make contributions, but cannot deny consensus on any issues. They have to renew their status as NMP states each year, whereas CD members maintain their status permanently.

The CD's overall task, as agreed by its members, is to promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Its standing agenda covers: nuclear weapons; new weapons of mass destruction; radiological weapons; conventional weapons; reduction of military budgets and armed forces; disarmament and development; disarmament and international security; a comprehensive program of disarmament; negative security assurances; and collateral disarmament measures such as confidence building measures and effective verification methods. The CD establishes a working agenda each year based on its standing agenda, and carries out its work in various ways, including ad hoc committees for detailed work on particular topics.

The CD and its predecessor bodies have served over the years as the focal point for negotiations leading to: the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water); the 1970 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT - halting the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them, and preventing the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes); the 1972 Seabed Arms Control Treaty (prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed); the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (banning the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons); the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention (banning all significant hostile use of environmental modification techniques); the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (banning the acquisition, use, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons); and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (banning nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions).

U.S. Objectives
The U.S. was an original member of the CD and its predecessors, and has looked to the CD to provide the venue, format and framework in which its members can negotiate realistic international instruments which improve international security conditions, such as the treaties listed above. The key U.S. objectives for the CD at the present time include the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and a Ban on the Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines. The U.S. also seeks to persuade CD members to allow work to proceed on individual agenda items whenever possible. (Since 1997, some CD members have refused to permit work on any item to proceed until agreement is reached on a work program encompassing all CD issues. This has effectively blocked CD progress on virtually its entire working agenda.)
Major CD Treaties

Chemical Weapons Convention
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was the first treaty negotiated by the CD in its post-1979 configuration. It is an unprecedented multilateral treaty which totally prohibits chemical weapons and any activities aimed at or contributing to their use. The ban extends not only to chemical warfare agents as such, but also to the means of delivery. The CWC was concluded on September 3, 1992, by the CD, and opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. As of March 2001, the CWC had 143 states parties including the United States, which ratified the treaty on April 25, 1997. The treaty entered into force in April 1997, and is administered by a special international body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has its seat in The Hague.
The CWC is historic in the scope of its provisions and in the number of countries involved in its development. The CWC is both a disarmament and a non-proliferation treaty. It bans the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons (CW). The convention also prohibits preparations for using chemical weapons and assistance, encouragement or inducement of anyone else to engage in activities prohibited by the convention.

The CWC requires the destruction of all CW stockpiles and existing CW production facilities and the monitoring of the chemical industry to ensure non-production of CW. It contains effective verification measures, including on-site inspection of suspected violators. Inspection procedures provide for routine inspections of industrial chemical plants (which produce or could produce chemicals listed in the convention), as well as "challenge inspections" - under which countries could be challenged to open up facilities suspected of producing chemical weapons to international inspection. Built-in safeguards, including sanctions, will deal with situations where the basic obligations have not been respected.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was negotiated between January 1994 and August 1996 by the CD. The negotiations were fraught with difficulties. China and France both conducted nuclear tests in the midst of the effort to conclude a treaty, and some non-aligned nations insisted that the CTBT be linked to multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament within the CD. Because of objections by the government of India, the text of the treaty was never formally adopted by the CD. The CD acts exclusively on consensus. Rather than being forwarded to the U.N. General Assembly by the CD - which would have been the usual procedure - the treaty was transmitted to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) by means of a resolution sponsored by the government of Australia. The UNGA voted on September 10, 1996, to adopt the CTBT by a vote of 158 in favor, three opposed and five abstentions, and the treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. As of March 2001, 160 states had signed the CTBT and 75 had ratified it. It has not yet entered into force.

The CTBT's Central Features
The CTBT will ban any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. The treaty establishes an organization - the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization - to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification measures. The Organization includes a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat.
The treaty's verification regime includes an international monitoring system comprising seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound monitoring; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence building measures. The use of data from national technical means is explicitly permitted. Requests for on-site inspections must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. The Executive Council must act within 96 hours of receiving a request for an inspection.

The provisions for the CTBT's entry into force are complex. The treaty will take effect only after 44 specific CD member states, listed in "Annex 2" of the Treaty, have ratified it. The Annex 2 list includes all CD members that participated in negotiating the Treaty with nuclear power or research reactors. If the treaty has not entered into force three years after its opening for signature, a conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification may convene to consider and decide by consensus what measures may be taken to accelerate the ratification process. Similar conferences may be held annually thereafter. The first such conference, which took place in October 1999, issued a declaration calling for those states among the 44 that have not signed or ratified to do so in order to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force.

In 1998, following nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, 46 CD member states signed/agreed to a joint statement calling on India and Pakistan to "abandon immediately the course of action they are pursuing and to settle their security concerns and differences through political engagement." Subsequently both India and Pakistan individually declared moratoriums on testing and indicated that they would sign and ratify the CTBT under certain conditions. However, as of the beginning of 2001, neither nation had done so.

Of the 44 states required for entry into force, 41 have signed (all but India, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and 31 have ratified (but not China, the Russian Federation or the United States). The U.S. has said it will continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. It will continue to urge others to do likewise and is urging all states to ratify the Treaty.

Major CD Issues

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
In December 1993 the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution recommending the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad Hoc Committee to pursue such negotiations. Subsequently, all the NPT Parties endorsed the immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. In spite of these auspicious beginnings, real negotiations have yet to commence. In the intervening years, an FMCT AHC was re-established only once - late during the 1998 CD session. The AHC was not reestablished in 1999 or in 2000.

The United States has maintained a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices since 1992. The negotiation of an FMCT is a high priority for the United States, and the international community's inability to engage is a continuing source of disappointment. The U.S. continues to believe that an FMCT is in the interest of all states. It would constitute a decisive turn away from nuclear arms races and unsafeguarded fissile material production, as well as cap the amount of fissile material available for use worldwide in nuclear weapons, thus limiting the number of nuclear weapons that could be produced. In Geneva, in capitals, and in other appropriate fora, the U.S. will continue to lead international efforts to get these negotiations underway.

Nuclear Disarmament
The CD's agenda also includes an item on Nuclear Disarmament, and many members of the CD have openly expressed their wish that the CD undertake multilateral negotiations in this area. The U.S. and other nuclear weapons states have replied that reductions in nuclear arms can best be carried out directly by the states which possess them, in view of the many complexities involved. The nuclear weapons states also point to the record of nuclear disarmament achieved with Russia over the years, and the ongoing efforts to continue this process.

The nuclear weapons states have consistently reaffirmed the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and have worked within the CD to forward this goal where possible multilaterally. The CTBT is an example of such multilateral work on nuclear disarmament, and an FMCT would be the next logical step. In the context of FMCT negotiations, the U.S. is also ready to begin general discussions in the CD on endeavors towards nuclear disarmament and on further prospects that could help attain this objective.

Anti-personnel Landmines
Many CD members are also interested in adding the issue of Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL) to the CD agenda. Although the Ottawa Treaty banning APL in their entirety came into force in 1998, the treaty was not signed by most of the countries which are major APL producers and users; hence its provisions do not apply to them. The CD has agreed to add APL to its working agenda for the past several years, but has been unable to agree on a mandate for work in this area.
CD member countries that wish to work on APL in the CD have agreed that it would be appropriate to negotiate a ban on the transfer of such weapons. Although the Ottawa Treaty already includes such a ban as a part of its overall prohibition of APL, a treaty on this specific subject as negotiated in the CD would capture many states which have not signed the Ottawa Treaty. Such a step would forward the goal of stemming the supply of APL and thereby significantly reduce the humanitarian problem caused by APL.

The United States has been active on landmines issues in a variety of fora outside the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, the United States would like to see the 2001 Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons adopt new and stronger restrictions on landmines. In May 2000 during a CCW preparatory meeting in Geneva, the U.S. presented a set of proposals to make all mines detectable, including anti-vehicle mines, and to ensure that all remotely deployed mines are equipped with reliable self-destruct features.
The Amended Mines Protocol is the only international agreement to cover all types of landmines and affects the majority of the world's anti-personnel landmine stocks. The Protocol is different from the Ottawa Convention in that it does not ban APL use. Instead, it strengthens international restrictions on the use and transfer of landmines.

OTHER CD ISSUES

Transparency in Armaments
In 1991 the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 46/36-L entitled "Transparency in Armaments" (TIA), which initiated a series of activities related to promoting openness and transparency in the field of military matters. One consequence of the resolution was the establishment of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The resolution also requested the CD to take up the issue of TIA and specifically asked the CD to address interrelated issues arising from the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. No time frame was attached to the CD's work.

The CD added TIA to its agenda in 1992, the first new agenda item in over ten years. TIA was also the CD's first agenda item related to conventional arms control. Since the topic was brand new to the CD, member states decided to conduct a year of informal meetings as a way of getting the CD introduced to the subject. In 1993 the CD established the TIA Ad Hoc Committee, which began working to develop practical means for increasing openness and transparency in military matters. During the 1994 session, efforts were directed at narrowing differences and determining where agreement could be reached. The Ad Hoc Committee has not been re-established in the years since then.

Negative Security Assurances
This agenda item, known as NSA, is dedicated to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The CD has been debating this issue for years with little progress, but the completion of the CTBT negotiations and the unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 caused the CD's nonaligned members (the G-21) to increase their demands for a multilateral, legally binding treaty granting them such assurances. The nuclear weapons states (U.S., UK, France, Russia and China) have not favored such a treaty because of numerous problems involved, especially in verification; instead, they have provided individual assurances as appropriate, primarily through protocols to Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties. Nevertheless, the NSA Ad Hoc Committee continued to search for a basis to prepare a draft treaty which would provide acceptable assurances to the NNWS. At the same time, in April 1995, the five nuclear powers issued updated unilateral security assurances with a number of common elements. In April 1995, the UN Security Council also passed an updated and improved resolution on security assurances (UNSC Resolution 984). The NSA Ad Hoc Committee was reestablished in 1998 but did not meet in 1999 or in 2000.

Radiological Weapons
The CD also has on its agenda the negotiation of a ban on radiological weapons (RW), arms which could kill by dispersing radioactive materials without a nuclear explosion. Such weapons could include waste material from peaceful nuclear applications such as spent reactor fuel. In 1979 the U.S. and USSR jointly submitted to the CD major elements of a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Conclusion of a multilateral treaty within the CD has been held up because no such weapons presently exist and because of questions about verifiability. Some states also insist that, under this agenda item, discussions be held on a treaty to ban attacks against nuclear facilities. The RW item is currently in abeyance in the CD.

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
A committee began work in 1985 to examine outer space arms control issues, including the current legal framework. The U.S. believes that existing legal regimes for outer space activities are adequate and that no changes are needed at this time, but is willing for the CD to keep the question under review. Under teh current circumstances, the U.S. does not believe any outer space topic has been identified that is suitable for negotiation in a multilateral forum such as the CD. The Outer Space committee has not met since 1994.

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