The State Department Bureau of Arms Control supports U.S. participation in the bilateral and multilateral arms talks taking place in Geneva. Since the integration of the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department in 1999, the Bureau of Arms Control has been responsible for international agreements on conventional, chemical/biological, and strategic forces, and supporting ongoing negotiations, policy-making, and interagency implementation efforts.

The Bureau of Arms Control leads efforts to negotiate future arms control agreements, including START III, and leads negotiating efforts in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on such issues as the cutoff of fissile material production and antipersonnel landmines. This Bureau also has the equally important task of implementing a large number of existing agreements, including ABM, INF, START I, CWC, and BWC, and of preparing to implement START II and CTBT.

Geneva's reputation as an international city and a city of peace is closely linked to its role as the locus of many critical bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations. The 1972 U.S.-USSR SALT-I agreements called for implementation talks to take place in Geneva and the SALT-II negotiations began in Geneva in the fall of 1972. This was followed by the "NST" negotiations between the U.S. and USSR, begun in the early 1980s, that led to the INF Treaty concluded in 1987, the START I Treaty in 1991, and the START II Treaty in 1993.

In the post-Cold War era, arms control priorities shifted to eliminating the overarmament of the Cold War; preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; pursuing agreement to enhance nonproliferation objectives; applying arms control solutions to regional problems; and establishing global norms for the control of arms.

The 1990s were a productive period in multilateral disarmament, and at the CD in Geneva the United States was involved in the successful negotiation of two major new treaties: the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (banning the acquisition, use, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons); and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (banning nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions). The Bureau of Arms Control provides the staff of the U.S. delegation to the CD, which is based permanently in Geneva, and headed by U.S. Permanent Representative to the CD, Ambassador Eric M. Javits.(See CD Chapter).

The Geneva Office of the Bureau of Arms Control also provides support to visiting U.S. delegations to the commissions charged with addressing implementation issues associated with three major arms control treaties: the Special Verification Commission for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the Standing Consultative Commission for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. These commissions, and the treaties they are associated with, are described in detail below.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
The START I Treaty was negotiated by the United States and the Soviet Union over a nine-year period between 1982 and 1991. Five months after the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union dissolved and four independent states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory came into existence - Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Through the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty signed on May 23, 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine became Parties to the START I Treaty as legal successors to the Soviet Union. The treaty entered into force in December 1994 after Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had all acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states.

START is the first treaty that actually reduces strategic offensive weapons. It will lead to the reduction of 9000 warheads on both sides, and produce stabilizing changes to the composition of the deployed strategic offensive forces of both sides. The overall deployed strategic warheads of each side will be reduced by 30 to 40 percent, with a reduction of as much as 50 percent in the most threatening systems. The treaty has a 15-year duration, and can be extended for successive 5-year periods by agreement of the parties.

The START Treaty requires the U.S. and former Soviet Union to make deep reductions in their deployed strategic offensive systems of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. These reductions take place in three phases spaced over seven years and limit the Parties to 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery systems and 6,000 accountable warheads that those missiles and bombers can carry. At the end of the second phase of Treaty implementation in December 1999, the number of delivery systems deployed by the U.S. stood at 1,451 with 7,763 attributed warheads while the former Soviet Union had 1,397 deployed delivery systems with 6,998 attributed warheads. The final START limits are to be met by December 2001, by which time no strategic offensive arms will remain on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

To assist in verifying compliance with these limits, START incorporates the most extensive verification regime in history, which includes the exchange of ballistic missile telemetry tapes (radio signals containing test data from missile launches), the permanent monitoring of mobile ICBM assembly facilities, 12 kinds of on-site inspections, cooperative measures, and data exchanges to complement national technical means of verification.

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
The Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) is the body charged with overseeing implementation of the START Treaty. It held its first session in Geneva at the end of 1991. The U.S. Representative to the JCIC is Ambassador Steven E. Steiner.

The JCIC was established under Article XV of the START Treaty to promote the objectives and the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, to resolve questions relating to implementation and compliance with the Treaty, and to agree upon additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The JCIC meets on a date when the U.S. and at least one of the other Parties to the Treaty have agreed to hold a meeting. The JCIC has effectively resolved issues unforeseen when the Treaty was written. For example, through the Commission, the Parties have agreed on procedures reflecting the multilateral nature of the START regime following the break-up of the Soviet Union; to extend the time required to submit certain telemetry reports; and updated the Treaty to expand the list of aircraft allowed to support inspection teams. The JCIC is currently discussing several on-going implementation and compliance issues that involve all Parties to the Treaty.

START II
The START II Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Arms was signed by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation in Moscow on January 3, 1993. START II is designed to reduce U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces together by an additional 5000 warheads beyond the 9000 warheads being reduced under START I. The comprehensive START I verification regime will apply to the START II Treaty and will be augmented in certain areas. It also builds upon and surpasses the achievements of START I by further reducing the total number of deployed strategic forces to 3000 - 3500 accountable warheads, and by banning the deployment of the most destabilizing type of strategic weapons system-land-based ICBMs with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads.

The U.S. Senate ratified START II in January 1996. In September 1997, the United States and Russia agreed to extend the START II deadline from January 2003 to December 2007, which will reduce the cost of implementation. This START II Protocol facilitated Russia's ratification of START II in April 2000. In ratifying the treaty, Russia linked its entry into force to U.S. action on other arms control agreements. Specifically the Russian legislation on ratification states that the treaty will not enter into force until the United States has ratified both the 1997 START II Protocol and the 1997 agreements relating to the ABM treaty. The U.S. government is studying the conditions Russia attached to its ratification and will consult with Congress on when to submit the START II Protocol for the Senate's advice and consent.

Once the Treaty enters into force, a new commission, the Bilateral Implementation Commission will meet in Geneva to address START II implementation questions.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)
The U.S.-USSR Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) was signed by the U.S. and the USSR in 1972. The Parties added a Protocol to the Treaty which entered into force in 1976. Together they ban the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems except for one ABM system around each Party's national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. (Russia deploys an ABM system around Moscow, and the U.S. briefly deployed in the mid-1970s an ABM system at Grand Forks, North Dakota, around a Minuteman ICBM launcher area.)

The Treaty places limits on ABM systems, namely ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. It also places constraints on radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack, which could, because of location, orientation, and capability, contribute to an ABM defense. The primary objective of the ABM Treaty is to prevent the deployment of an ABM territorial defense. In the ABM Treaty's preamble, the parties also declared their intention to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic offensive arms.

The United States is committed to maintaining the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a key element in the U.S. relationship with Russia. But the United States also believes the threat posed by long-range ballistic missiles is growing. North Korea and Iran have active missile development programs, and Iraq, if freed from international sanctions, could restart its program. The United States is developing a National Missile Defense System (NMD) intended to shield all 50 U.S. states from limited ballistic missile attack; however, the United States has decided not to move forward with deployment of the system yet.

Beginning in 1999 the United States has held intensive discussions with Russia, China, and our allies to respond to their concerns about the possible deployment of an NMD system. The ABM Treaty provides for revisions to take account of changes in the strategic situation. The United States is discussing with Russia changes to the ABM Treaty required to deploy a limited NMD system.

Standing Consultative Commission
The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), established in December 1972, is the body charged with promoting the objectives and implementation of the 1972 U.S.-USSR Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (see ABM above), and of the 1971 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War. The latter, also referred to as the "Accidents Measures" agreement, requires notifications in the event of certain nuclear-related incidents - such as an accidental, unauthorized, or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war. The SCC is required to hold at least two sessions a year; to date, these have been held in Geneva. The terms of the Treaty specify that a review of the Treaty shall be conducted every five years; five such reviews have been conducted in Geneva.

The SCC provides a joint consultative forum to deal with questions bearing on implementation of the ABM Treaty. The SCC has negotiated agreements to govern implementation and to assist it in its work. These include protocols drawn up in 1974 and 1976 on procedures governing the replacement and dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms and of ABM systems and their components; a set of procedures in 1976 for speeding up transmission of the urgent notifications required under the agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War; a 1978 Agreed Statement that clarified certain aspects of the ABM Treaty; and two Common Understandings in 1985 - one clarified the mutual obligations of the two parties under the ABM treaty - and the other clarified obligations in the 1971 Measures agreement with respect to the exchange of notifications regarding incidents which could increase the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

With the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the composition of the SCC changed. Participants since, along with the United States, have included representatives of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. On September 26, 1997, in New York, representatives of all five of these countries signed a set of agreements intended to preserve the viability of the ABM Treaty as a foundation for further strategic arms reductions. These agreements clarify the line between strategic and theater ballistic missile defenses, settle the ABM Treaty succession issue following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and provide new SCC regulations that will govern multilateral operation of the Commission. These agreements require ratification or approval by each country prior to their entry into force; to date, only Russia has accomplished this.

The SCC has continued through 2000 to concern itself with questions pertaining to the continued viability and effectiveness of the ABM Treaty.

Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
The 1988 INF Treaty was negotiated in Geneva between 1981 and 1987. It was the first treaty to eliminate an entire category of weapons. It obliged the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their intermediate-range (1,000 - 5,500 km) and shorter-range (500 - 1,000 km) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles by May 31, 1991. The Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, also bans the possession, production and flight testing of such missiles.

The Treaty also contains an extensive inspection regime, including an annual quota of short-notice inspections (currently 10 per year) and continuous monitoring at missile assembly plants at Magna, Utah and Votkinsk, Russia. The inspection regime lasts through May 31, 2001.

The United States recognizes 12 states as successors to the Soviet Union for purposes of the INF Treaty (i.e., the 12 former Soviet Republics, excluding the Baltic States). All 12 successor states share the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union (FSU) with respect to the Treaty and are bound by the prohibitions contained in the Treaty. Among the successor states, only four states with inspectable INF facilities on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) participate in inspections and take part in the INF implementation body, the Special Verification Commission. The U.S. Representative to the SVC is Ambassador Steven E. Steiner.

Since dissolution of the FSU, multilateral mechanisms have been put in place that have made possible the continued implementation of U.S. inspection rights in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. These four states share among themselves the rights of the FSU to conduct inspections of U.S. INF facilities, and each has established a separate point of entry on its national territory and a direct communications link for Treaty purposes.

Special Verification Commission
The INF Treaty's implementation body, the Special Verification Commission (SVC), was established under Article XIII of the INF treaty. The SVC meets in Geneva, as needed, to agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the INF Treaty, and to resolve questions relating to implementation of and compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

The SVC held its first session in Geneva in June 1988. As of summer 2000, there had been twenty-four sessions of the commission.

Since its establishment, the SVC has concluded some 25 documents to help the parties effectively implement the INF Treaty's inspection regime. Examples include:

- A change of the SVC's internal operating procedures based on the multilateral composition of the commission following the break-up of the Soviet Union.

- Two changes to inspection procedures to facilitate U.S. monitoring of a ballistic missile final assembly plant in Russia and to facilitate Russian monitoring of a U.S. solid rocket motor production facility.

Internet
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On-line Info: Press releases, fact sheets, information on arms control treaties.