It was a month full of activity leading to years of consequences
for Haitian migrants and the United States. These consequences
included a 1993 Supreme Court decision, the 1996 statutory adoption
of a new legal standard, and a special 1998 law permitting certain
Haitian migrants to apply for permanent residency in the United
States. The month was November 1991.
Background:
A September 23, 1981, agreement between the United States
and the Republic of Haiti, permitted the U.S. Coast Guard to stop
(interdict) boatloads of Haitians attempting to come to the United
States, bring them aboard Coast Guard cutters, and then return
them to Haiti. This Agreement provided the legal basis for President
Reagan's September 29, 1981, finding (Presidential
Proclamation No. 4865, 3 CFR 50-51 (1981-1983 Comp.))
and authorization (Executive
Order 12324, 3 CFR Sec 2c(3), p. 181 (1981-1983 Comp.)) for
what became known as the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Operation
(HMIO). (This name was later changed to the Alien Migrant Interdiction
Operation (AMIO), reflecting the fact that some of the interdicted
migrants were not Haitians. In March 1991, the name was again
changed -- this time to the Asylum Pre-Screening Operation (APSO)
-- to better reflect the INS' important but limited role in the
Government's larger interdiction program.) The Executive Order
expressly forbade the return of any Haitian who was a refugee.
The Refugee Act of 1980 defined "refugee" in U.S. law;
it became section
101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. This definition was modeled on the international
definition of "refugee" contained in the
1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol].
As a result, INS sent officers to conduct interviews while migrants
were still aboard the cutters. The purpose of the interviews was
to assess migrants' claims of having a refugee-like fear of returning
to Haiti. Based on these interviews, INS officers determined whether
a migrant would be "screened in" and transferred to
the United States to pursue formal asylum claims or "screened
out" as an economic migrant and returned to Haiti. This program
was a persistent source of controversy, particularly among those
concerned with human rights and refugee matters. Between 1981
and 1991, more than 25,000 migrants had been interdicted, while
only six had been "screened in" for transfer to the
United States.
On September 30, 1991, a military-led coup overthrew the government
of Jean Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically-elected president
in Haitian history.
Despite the coup and the events that followed, no Haitians immediately attempted
to leave by boat. Then, in late October, the first boatload was
spotted carrying a small number of mostly young males from an
Aristide-sponsored school in Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti. Following usual practice, this boat was interdicted by the U.S.
Coast Guard, its passengers taken on board the Coast Guard cutter,
and then the boat was sunk (for reasons of safety on the high
seas). The passengers were interviewed for "refugee-like
characteristics" by INS officers flown to the cutter by helicopter.
Events of November 1991:
By this time it was November. Policymakers in Washington,
DC, met frequently concerning events in Haiti and over what to do about departing Haitians. Using an informal and still unwritten legal
standard ("credible fear of return") developed only
in May 1991, INS officers screened the migrants and cabled their
conclusions to Washington. Due to the sensitive nature of this
determination, final decisionmaking was transferred from
the INS officers aboard the cutters to INS supervisors in Washington.
After reviewing the initial records cabled to Washington, the
INS officers on the cutters were told to cable their entire interview
notes to Washington. On the basis of this still inconclusive record,
INS officers were told to reinterview the migrants to obtain additional
details and then recable their notes to Washington.
Meanwhile, the Coast Guard cutter with the Haitians and INS interviewers
still on board circled in the Caribbean.
By early November, more Haitian boats were spotted and interdicted,
and as one cutter became crowded, additional cutters were brought
into the area. Still, Washington could not decide what exactly
to do with those "screened in" or those "screened
out." As the number of Haitians on board cutters grew into
the hundreds, the health and safety of the Haitians and the American
crews became problematic. By mid-November, several hundred Haitians
were on board Coast Guard cutters circling in international waters
in the Caribbean between Hispanola (the island home of Haiti and
the Dominican Republic) and Cuba.
On November 18, the Government announced that the program of forced
repatriation of "screened-out" Haitians would resume. The next day, the first
of what would become many legal challenges against the Government
was filed by the Haitian Refugee Center (HCR, Inc. v. Baker,
949 F. 2d 1109 (1991)). The lawsuit contended that the Government
did not have in place screening procedures sufficiently adequate to protect refugees
from being returned to Haiti, which they asserted was a violation
of the international law of non-refoulement
or "no forced return."
The judge in the case suspended all forced repatriations until
February 1992. Therefore, the Government had to do something with
the Haitians still on the cutters. Consequently, the U.S. Naval
Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was opened to accept these migrants.
A tent camp, then several tent camps, were erected as hundreds
and then thousands of Haitian migrants were interdicted and brought
for further processing.
Just before Thanksgiving 1991, INS, under Commissioner
Gene McNary, established a presence at Guantanamo Bay and began
sending officers from the then new U.S.
Asylum Officer Corps to conduct interviews. The Asylum Corps,
mandated by the July 27, 1990 final asylum rule, had begun work
only six months before: on April 2, 1991. The informal legal standard
of credible fear of persecution on return on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion -- was formalized administratively in
a memorandum from the INS Deputy Commissioner.* At the same time,
the Asylum Program's Resource
Information Center started sending to INS Asylum Officers
at Guantanamo what became a series of updates on the evolving
human rights situation in Haiti.
By the end of November 1991, the first major migrant screening
program at Guantanamo Bay was fully functional.
Fast Forward
This program ended in May 23, 1992, when President Bush issued
Executive Order 12807 (57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (1992)) (also called
the "Kennebunkport Order") authorizing the repatriation
of interdicted Haitians to Haiti to pursue their claims through in-country
U.S. refugee processing established under section
101(a)(42)(B) of the INA.
Before it ended, the migrant screening program interviewed nearly
34,000 interdicted Haitians. More than 10,000 established a "credible
fear" and were transferred to the U.S. mainland to file formal
asylum claims.
Over the years, the legal actions against the Government that
began with the 1991 lawsuit filed by the Haitian Refugee Center,
Inc, had many permutations. One of these was a lawsuit filed on
March 18, 1992, by organizations representing interdicted Haitians
as well as by some of the Haitians being detained at Guantanamo.
They alleged that screening procedures aboard the cutters and
at Guantanamo did not protect adequately the rights of interdicted
Haitians to apply for refugee status and avoid forced return to
Haiti. This suit ultimately went all the way to the U.S. Supreme
Court and was finally resolved in the Government's favor in the
June 21, 1993, decision in Sale
v HCC.
The "credible fear" standard was given a statutory foundation
by its inclusion in sec. 302(a) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
and then codified as section
235(b)(1) of the INA and incorporated into INS procedures
in 8
CFR 208.30 in the Code of Federal Regulations.
After many years of stopgap administrative measures, the Haitian
Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) was signed into law
on October 21, 1998. This law permits certain Haitians, including
those screened in under the 1991-1992 APSO screening program at
Guantanamo Bay, to adjust their status to lawful permanent residents
and begin the process toward naturalization.
And, on November 13, 1998, Harold
Hongju Koh, one of the people instrumental in bringing the
March 1992 lawsuit that resulted in Sale
v HCC, was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. As Assistant Secretary, Mr.
Koh advises Secretary of State Madelaine Albright on U.S. policy
on democracy, human rights, labor, the rule of law, and religious
freedom.
* = "This standard appears nowhere in the government's asylum
law or regulations; it was created [by INS] to give the Haitians
the benefit of the doubt during the relatively hasty first interviews."
From an interesting article by Susan Beck, "Cast Away: How the INS Tried to Save the
Haitians, and How Bush Administration Hardline Policies Prevailed,"
The American Lawyer, October 1992, at 54-59.