Statement
by Ann
M. Corkery,
Senior Advisor,
on the 2002 IAEA Annual Report, in the General Assembly, November 4, 2003
On
behalf of my government, I would like to thank Dr. ElBaradei
for his presentation.
The
task of managing nuclear materials safely and securely will be
with the international community for the indefinite future. One of the essential tools on which we have long relied to
deal with this fundamental reality and to protect and promote
our common interest is the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). The IAEA has served us well in this task, and we will
continue to rely on it.
In
the early years of the IAEA, it was common to hear references
to the notion of balance between its promotional and
verification functions. After
the mid-1980s, it became common to hear more about the three
pillars of its work: safety,
technical cooperation and verification.
As the 2002 Annual Report documents (A/58/312), IAEA's work today
has become even more complicated and diverse.
Today, countries encounter IAEA personnel pursuing
programs as wide-ranging as water management, cancer
treatment, border security, research reactor safety, nuclear
material accountancy, animal health, and much more.
The breadth and diversity of this work reflects both
the multi-faceted character of nuclear technology and the
growing dependence of states across the globe on the IAEA to
help use and manage this technology.
The
international community's reliance on the IAEA was never more
apparent than in 2002. Rarely
did a day go by that nuclear issues were not mentioned in the
headlines of major newspapers worldwide.
The 2002 events generating the headlines demonstrated
unambiguously the critical need to know how our world is using
nuclear materials and technology. Regrettably, a few states seemed determined to misuse nuclear
materials in violation of their nuclear non-proliferation
commitments. Concerns
about nuclear terrorism escalated.
Support intensified for measures to verify how nuclear
materials were being used.
To deal with these and other related issues, the world
again turned to the IAEA.
Confronting
Cheaters
Some
of the most contentious issues of 2002 arose because a few
countries opted to pursue nuclear activities in violation of
their nuclear non-proliferation commitments, including those
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
While only a few among the more than 180 NPT parties
were engaged in such activities, the implications of their
successful acquisition of nuclear weapons would be enormous in
terms of regional and international peace and stability, as
well as the viability of the NPT itself.
Since
May 1994 the IAEA had maintained a continuous presence in
North Korea at its Yongbyon nuclear site to monitor the freeze
under the Agreed Framework.
It turned out that for years while this freeze was
supposedly in place, North Korea was pursuing a clandestine
uranium enrichment route to nuclear weapons, an activity it
acknowledged last October.
North Korea then rapidly escalated its brinksmanship,
culminating with the expulsion
of IAEA inspectors at the end of 2002.
Since then, North Korea has announced its withdrawal
from the NPT and failed to respond to calls by the
international community to abandon its nuclear weapons
programs. DPRK contravention of the NPT and its other nuclear
non-proliferation commitments has led to one of the most
serious threats to international security that we face today.
For
12 years, Saddam Hussein defied the resolutions of the UN
Security Council. Today,
the threat of a nuclear-armed Iraq has been removed, and
efforts to promote peace in that region can move forward freed
from the need to address this threat.
IAEA's diverse role over the years in dealing with the
Iraqi nuclear issue has been commendable.
Iran's
nuclear weapons ambitions became far more visible in 2002.
As evidence mounted confirming Iran's illicit
nuclear-related procurement and numerous nuclear-related
activities, which Iran failed to declare to the IAEA as
required by its safeguards agreement, the world has become
increasingly alarmed. Recent developments give some grounds for hope that Iran will
be responsive to the concerns of the international community.
We are hopeful but remain skeptical.
There is a long way to go before this hope can be
transformed into reality.
Iran must completely and verifiably abandon its efforts
to acquire nuclear weapons.
As
regrettable as the actions of North Korea, Iraq and Iran, we
should not overlook the important lessons we have learned in
dealing with their actions that have violated the NPT.
The world community must confront promptly and firmly
any activities that raise questions about an NPT party's
obligation not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.
Cheating cannot be tolerated and must be addressed
without delay and with conviction.
There must be real consequences.
Any state tempted to violate its nuclear
non-proliferation commitments needs to know it will be quickly
detected and firmly confronted.
Failure to do so affects us all.
Confronting
Nuclear Terrorism
In
response to the tragic events of September 11, the IAEA moved
quickly to establish an expanded program for nuclear material
security. This
program was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in March
2002, and work under the Nuclear Security Action Plan is
on-going. This
Plan is sub-divided into eight program areas, providing a
comprehensive approach to material security.
My
government is pleased to support this important work with both
funding and expert services, and we urge all IAEA member
states to contribute generously in whatever way they can.
The fact that both developing and developed states have
requested IAEA assistance in nuclear security reflects broad
international recognition that this work is both essential and
urgent.
Permit
me to highlight in particular IAEA's work in improving the
security and safety of radiation sources worldwide.
The widespread use of these sources and the prospect
that terrorists could seek to use some of these sources to
make so-called "dirty bombs" underscores the need to
enhance their security in all aspects, including transport,
use, storage and disposition.
Strengthening
IAEA Safeguards
In
1997 the IAEA Board of Governors approved a new "Model
Protocol" to expand safeguards activities and give the
IAEA important new tools for detecting "undeclared"
or secret nuclear activities.
This Protocol is the culmination of several years of
intensive efforts to devise ways to strengthen the
international safeguards system and make it even more
effective as a tool for enhancing confidence in IAEA’s
ability to detect diversion and other violations of the NPT.
Every
state that concludes its own Additional Protocol based on the
"Model" agreement makes a contribution to
international security. I
am very pleased to recall that on May 9, 2002 President Bush
transmitted the proposed U.S. Additional Protocol to our
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. We are working hard to complete all the steps necessary for
Senate consideration of the proposed Protocol and we urge all
states that have not yet done so to conclude and implement an
Additional Protocol. We also urge those states that have not
completed a safeguards agreement to do so as soon as possible.
Effective safeguards offer a critical means to promote nuclear
transparency and provide essential assurances that states are
using nuclear material solely for peaceful purposes.
Conclusion
Included
in the extensive media coverage of nuclear issues in 2002 are
repeated references to the IAEA.
Behind the headlines are the men and women in the IAEA
Secretariat who were dealing directly with some of the most
sensitive nuclear proliferation issues of our time.
We are grateful for their commitment and
professionalism in confronting these difficult issues.
I
would be remiss not to highlight the dedicated work within the
IAEA Secretariat of the men and women who each day help make
available to IAEA member states in a safe and efficient manner
the beneficial applications of nuclear technology.
It is less common to see major headlines about improved
groundwater supplies in South America or Asia, or use of
radiotherapy to treat cancer in Africa. Yet on a daily basis IAEA staff are working in these areas
and many others to make our world a better and safer place.
Whatever
and wherever the nuclear challenge confronting the IAEA, the
organization can only be as effective as its member states
want it to be. As the 2002 IAEA Annual Report demonstrates,
the world community is well served by this organization.
Those of us who are members of the IAEA will continue
to support its important work.
Thank
you very much.
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