Do Critics Misrepresent My Position?
A Test Case from a Recent Academic Journal

Ken Wilber

Christian de Quincey recently published "The Promise of Integralism: A Critical Appreciation of Ken Wilber's Integral Psychology." It's a little hard to tell exactly what he thinks about my system, because on the one hand he offers what seems to be a genuine appreciation (e.g., "Perhaps other than Kant and Hegel, no one has presented a comparable comprehensive framework for integrating the 'three cultures' of science, morality, and art.... More than any other individual, he has pieced together a truly remarkable map of the mind"). But in the next breath he is engaged in intense ad hominen attacks on me as a person. Although de Quincey does not know me--in fact, he has never met me--he gives the reader a lengthy, intimate psychoanalysis of me as a person completely lacking in feeling, emotions, caring, and compassion, and therefore a person utterly bereft of any spirituality at all. Just how spiritual can I be, he implies, when I am such a nasty, vitriolic, mean person?

To complicate matters, de Quincey has a tendency to take one detail and excoriate me for "completely misunderstanding" it, but then in footnotes he concedes that I actually do understand it, often quite perfectly, but I should emphasize the point more. As we will see, there is not a single major issue where de Quincey categorically rejects my model, although he gives that impression at every turn, with each theoretical criticism followed by yet another ad hominen attack. I must confess that I came away from reading his essay with an almost complete confusion about what was said and how I should respond. This is no doubt due to the fact that I lack all feelings and thus have no interpersonal compass (:-).

As is often the case with my critics, I happen to agree with much of what de Quincey has to say; it is simply that, in trying to establish his own view, he finds it necessary to distort my own, perhaps to better emphasize the differences between us. In doing so, de Quincey either takes a partial aspect of my position and claims that it is my total position (he does this quite often); or he simply does not present my actual position in the first place. I will try to point out where and how this occurs in his critique. As students of my work have been quick to point out, misrepresentation of my work is quite common, simply because there is so damn much of it, and many of my actual positions are buried in obscure endnotes; I have not helped much in this regard, a situation I am doing my best to rectify (as I will explain below).

But, as I said, I happen to agree with virtually all of de Quincey's main points (and my overall writing, when accurately reported, makes it very obvious that I agree with him). There is an old saying, "Scholars spend their time maximizing their minimal differences," and it strikes me that de Quincey is trying to make room for his contributions by attempting to aggressively muscle me out of the picture in the areas that reflect his own special interests and concerns. Still, he asks (in one of those footnotes that quietly retract his criticism of my model), "I hope he [Wilber] sees me as an ally in the project to put the second-person perspective on the radar screen in consciousness studies and philosophy of mind. I think there is room in his four quadrants for true intersubjectivity, and I'm just trying to clarify what I think it is." Well, I do see de Quincey as an ally in that regard, and I have ever since I tried to help him get his important book on intersubjectivity published; and I still consider his position a very important contribution vis a vis the profound significance of intersubjectivity not only for consciousness, but for the Kosmos as well. I will try to emphasis these important points of agreement as we go along, since de Quincey does not.

There are three main areas of my work that de Quincey especially criticizes: the nature of intersubjectivity, the mind-body problem, and panpsychism. In all three cases, de Quincey severely misrepresents my position. Unfortunately, this type of misrepresentation happens so often that I now have something of a reputation for crying "wolf"--every time a critic disagrees with me, I complain that, poor me, I've been misunderstood. I can see how people would get very tired of hearing me make this charge (believe me, nobody is more tired of it than I). So what I would like to do is, as several people suggested, use de Quincey's article as a test case, and simply give point-by-point comparison between what he says my position is and what my works actually say. By giving direct quotes from the work de Quincey is ostensibly summarizing, and putting them next to what de Quincey claims is my view, I hope the reader will get a clear sense of just where and to what extent my actual view is simply not being presented fairly.

Therefore, in all three cases I will indicate what de Quincey says is my position, and then give quotes from my work showing what my position actually is. Because, again, there are two separate issues here: whether my work is portrayed accurately before it is criticized, and the nature of the criticism itself. I do not feel that de Quincey does a very good job of the former, but he does a fine job with the latter (most of which, as I said, I agree with), and I am more than glad to be an ally in those many issues about which we agree.


"So there is intersubjectivity woven into the very fabric of the Kosmos at all levels."

--A Brief History of Everything

De Quincey's major criticism, and the one he spends the most time on, is that I identify intersubjectivity solely and exclusively with verbal linguistic exchanges. This is pretty much the opposite of my view. When de Quincey's essay appeared, I was flooded with letters and emails pointing this out this considerable distortion, and several long articles have already been written in an attempt to correct his obvious misrepresentation of my position (portions of some of those critical articles are included below). I will try to suggest how I believe de Quincey got his inaccurate impression, and then point out my actual position.

Here is the gist of de Quincey's criticism: "Wilber leaves no doubt what he means by 'intersubjectivity': It is a subject-to-subject connection mediated by language and interpretation--and 'only... by interpretation.' There is no unmediated, direct experience of the other." While de Quincey gives two examples of this, both taken out of context, it flies in face of hundreds of examples and statements such as the above quote from Brief History, which clearly state my overall position: "Intersubjectivity is woven into the very fabric of the Kosmos at all levels"--not just the linguistic levels, but all levels, right down to atoms and quarks.

De Quincey arrives at his conclusion by focusing on a specific example where I am talking about one type of interpretation, in this case linguistic (so that I give an example of talking or having a conversation), and I am trying to drive home the point that, in those cases, we must add an interior interpretation to the exterior surfaces, or else we will never reach any sort of understanding. However, never do I say, at any point, that in the entire Kosmos this is the ONLY type of intersubjectivity. (When I talk about having "only" linguistic interpretation, I mean that, as far as the linguistic signifiers themselves go, we must add interior interpretation, the shared intersubjective signifieds known by empathic resonance). I never say there is only linguistic intersubjectivity in the entire Kosmos; that flies in the face of my entire "all-quadrant, all-level" model, which sees intersubjectivity as one of the four quadrants that goes all the way up, all the way down.

That I maintain there is only linguistic intersubjectivity is something that de Quincey himself adds to my work, and he does do only by excluding an enormous amount of what I have to say on the subject. Even in the above example that de Quincey quotes, where I give linguistic exchange as one type of intersubjectivity, and I say that interpretation is mandatory to get at the interiors, de Quincey again assumes that interpretation only means linguistic interpretation (as we will see, this is a standard pattern in all three of de Quincey's main critiques: he takes one or two examples out of the whole of my work, latches onto them, and ignores dozens or even hundreds of other statements to the contrary. When my actual overall position is pointed out, he simply repeats his two or three quotes, which are indeed true--and very partial). But in many places I define interpretation as a "sympathetic resonance from within"; I give examples of how interpretation functions in deer, in wolves, in geese, and even in electrons. To assume that the intersubjectivity found in electrons is verbal is silly, but this is the view that de Quincey ascribes to me.

If we move from his presentation of my position to his presentation of his position, things are quite different. As I said, I happen to agree with much of de Quincey's ideas on intersubjectivity, and I heartily applaud his endeavors to bring second-person intersubjectivity to consciousness studies, thus putting flesh on the "2" in the 1-2-3 of consciousness studies. (This is also, I feel, why articles such as de Quincey's recent essay in JTP fare much better than his critique, because he can focus on his own important work instead of having to subtly or not so subtly distort mine in order to highlight the importance of his own contributions).

De Quincey usefully describes three major meanings of "intersubjectivity." Intersubjectivity-1 is defined by isolated, atomistic subjects coming together through communication of signals; this is a type of Cartesian or mediated intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity-2a is a coming together of subjects that mutually condition each other in the process; a type of immediate mutual apprehension. Intersubjectivity-2b assumes that the relationship between subjects is primary, and individual subjects co-emerge out of this prior relationship; a very strong, immediate, coming-into-being together.

To begin with, de Quincey claims that I do not understand or include in my work the most important version of intersubjectivity, namely Intersubjectivity-2b (where relationship is primary and subjects are secondary); he maintains that I allow ONLY Intersubjectivity-1. And yet de Quincey himself gives my primary definition of intersubjectivity by correctly using the following quote from me: "Subjective experiences arise in the space created by intersubjectivity." In other words, intersubjectivity is primary, and subjects arise in that field--which is exactly Intersubjectivity-2b. The way I usually state intersubjectivity is even stronger: "Intersubjectivity is the field in which both subjects and objects arise" (SES, BH, ES, IP). This is an even stronger form of intersubjectivity than de Quincey allows, since for him subjects mutually co-create, but for me, both subjects and objects co-create, all the way up, all the way down.

After quietly acknowledging that I actually do understand "real" intersubjectivity, de Quincey ignores that fact and then seizes on the wording in one example (and only one example out of hundreds) to claim that I allow only Intersubjectivity-1, that generated by linguistic signs. This is categorically false.

But the real difficulty here is that my writing on the whole makes it clear that I acknowledge and actually include all three of those forms of intersubjectivity--I believe that all three of them exist, and I have given examples and explanations of all three of them in my writings (see below).

Moreover, I add at least two more types of intersubjectivity not dealt with by de Quincey. I will focus on one of these, which in many ways it is the most important of all. With reference to de Quincey's numbering scheme, we could call it Intersubjectivity-3, namely: the agency of all holons opens directly, immediately, onto Spirit itself, and thus all holons share a deep, nonmediated, nonlocal, profound intersubjectivity due to the fact that all holons immediately touch each other via the Spirit that each of them fully is. This "ultimate" meaning of intersubjectivity is for me the primary meaning, and I believe that all of the other forms of intersubjectivity issue forth from this all-pervading Ground. As Schopenhauer noted long ago, without a common Self in and to all people, you can't get any form of intersubjectivity going in the first place--and that certainly includes de Quincey's Intersubjectivity-2b, which by comparison is very a limited and partial conception of intersubjectivity, in my opinion.)

Students of my work are quite clear about all five types of intersubjectivity that I believe exist. Here are a few excerpts from Sean Hargens' work-in-progress, The Evolution of Intersubjectivity.

Sean begins by pointing out that "What is needed is a clarifying framework that can hold simultaneously the many dimensions of intersubjectivity. I believe that Ken Wilber's 'all-quadrant, all-level' (AQAL) ontological-epistemological model is such a framework. It provides an evolutionary/developmental continuum that can serve to clarify many of the misunderstandings that occur in discussions of intersubjectivity. De Quincy isolates a number of these confusions and offers three different definitions of intersubjectivity as a way of overcoming these impasses.... Despite the fact that de Quincey acknowledges Wilber's model to honor intersubjectivity, he tends to focus on only one part of what it has to offer, namely the intersubjectivity that is a result of an exchange of linguistic tokens [Intersubjectivity-1]. A closer reading of Wilber's model reveals a much more comprehensive approach to intersubjectivity. Although the fullness of Wilber's model, as it relates to intersubjectivity, is often buried in footnotes and/or is simply implicit, nevertheless, enough pieces do exist within the body of his writings to see a different picture than the one de Quincey paints."

Sean outlines five types of intersubjectivity that I include in my work (and which Sean unpacks at length, adding enormously to anything I have written on these types; I have included, as Appendix B, Sean's summary of these five types of intersubjectivity recognized by my work). He then says, "Now that I have highlighted some of the limits of existing approaches to intersubjectivity, and stated that even de Quincey leaves some important dimensions of intersubjectivity unaddressed, I will turn to Wilber's model as a starting point for articulating an integral approach to intersubjectivity.... The five dimensions discussed above are all considered to constitute the Lower-Left quadrant of Wilber's integral model. Thus when de Quincey claims that 'unlike Habermas, Jacques, Buber, or Mead, intersubjectivity is not a central concern for Wilber,' I beg to differ. After all, de Quincey only cites one book (out of 18) to support this claim--although that one book, surprisingly, contains passages which speak to all five dimensions.

"I agree with de Quincey, insofar as Wilber's writings cover a variety of topics, he doesn't deal exclusively with intersubjectivity. Thus it is not the central concern, but it is definitely a central concern. However, the sense I get from de Quincey's article, which has been confirmed in personal communication, is that he means it in a more pointed way. But Wilber's entire integral agenda is in part the stated need for us to honor 'The Big Three' (subjective, intersubjective, and objective domains of the Kosmos). Thus, arguably you could claim that Wilber actually elevates intersubjectivity to a place unequaled by most theorists who have dealt with it. I can think of no other metaphysical frameworks that have explicitly stated that Intersubjectivity is one of three legs stabilizing the Kosmological stool. I imagine that de Quincey's retort is that while Wilber deals with intersubjectivity he is only dealing with one of three types of intersubjectivity and fails to see that intersubjectivity as context (de Quincey's Intersubjectivity-2b) is ontologically prior to intersubjectivity as mutual understanding (de Quincey's Intersubjectivity-1). However, as we saw in Part I above, Wilber actually provides a system that not only recognizes the three types of intersubjectivity that de Quincey highlights but goes beyond those to offer five distinct dimensions, several of which have sub-dimensions."

Hargens summarizes: "Again, de Quincey's position is based on a limited and selective reading of Wilber. Admittedly, Wilber hasn't unpacked these dimensions in his writings to date but that is a far cry from claiming that Wilber doesn't make intersubjectivity a major concern. Clearly, Wilber's 'all-quadrant, all-level' model can give voice to the complexity of intersubjectivity far more comprehensively than any other contemporary approach."
Although de Quincey did not send me his paper and allow me to check for any misrepresentations, he circulated it to numerous others. Several people approached me warning of the severe distortions in the paper. Keith Thompson sent de Quincey a series of emails outlining my actual position in an attempt to help de Quincey correct his obvious errors. Thompson checked his summary of my position with me first in order to see if he had correctly presented my view, and I told him that I found his representation to be very accurate. Here are those sections where Thompson is correcting de Quincey misrepresentations (reprinted with permission)[1]:

The heart of de Quincey's argument is that Ken's "intersubjectivity" is derived merely from the exchange of linguistic signifiers and is really "interobjective." I disagree. Wilber could not be more clear that he derives the Left-Hand or interior quadrants ultimately from Spirit or nondual consciousness, which is single (or more accurately nondual), and therefore is identical in all holons (e.g., all beings have buddhamind or buddhanature). His intersubjectivity thus arises from the direct and immediate contact of all interiors with Spirit--which is equally and immediately present in all beings, and thus all beings are immediately co-present in Spirit--and not from the exchange of objective signs (or anything else objective), although, as he makes clear, those exchanges also occur (but they are of the manifest realm, not of ever-present, omni-present Spirit).

Wilber has said there are forerunners of this position (namely, that intersubjectivity in itself comes directly from nondual Spirit) in Vedanta, Fichte, and Emerson, among others. I can't remember all the places he has said this, but I remembered one--I looked up Emerson in the index of SES and found an endnote where Wilber explicitly says this. He is talking about one of the strongest forms of intersubjectivity in reference to an Emerson quote, where Emerson says that all interaction between people assumes a common point, and that common ground (the ground of intersubjectivity) is God. Wilber emphatically agrees. So in the endnote (note 1 for chap. 8), Wilber contrasts the way in which Emerson derives intersubjectivity (namely, from the fact that there is but one Over-Soul common in all beings) and the way Habermas derives it (namely, from the exchange of linguistic signifiers). Wilber believes that both forms exist, but as to which is more fundamental, Wilber decidedly sides with Emerson against Habermas in this regard.

[For reference, here is the full endnote--KW:

Notice that Emerson handles Habermas's "identical signification" in a very direct way: it is not that we merely assume identical signification in order to get the conversation going; it is that on the deepest level we share a common Self or Nature, namely, God, and that is why the conversation can get going! Habermas's omega point of mutual understanding, while still true, is outcontextualized by Emerson's omega point of mutual identity (and in this Emerson is in a long line of descendants from Plotinus through Schelling to Emerson, as we will see). For Habermas, the "who" of Dasein is found in the circling of the intersubjective circle; for Emerson, the "Who" is simply God.

Thus Emerson refers to the Over-Soul as "that common heart of which all sincere conversation is the worship." Hölderlin: ". . . we calmly smiled, sensed our own God amidst intimate conversation, in one song of our souls."]

This is why Wilber often says that intersubjectivity is the ground in which both subjects and objects arise. That could not be the case if intersubjectivity were derived from exchanges of subjects and objects, although those also occur, and Wilber sometimes just talks about those, but this must be seen in the context of his overall position.

In other words, Wilber criticizes Habermas exactly for what de Quincey incorrectly ascribes to Wilber. I believe Wilber (and others) will call de Quincey on this. For Wilber, intersubjectivity is ultimately possible because of a common nondual Spirit (or the simultaneous presence of Presence in each holon), and then within that, exchanges of signifiers can occur, and so on. Wilber sometimes talks about the latter, but he clearly takes the former as its real ground. The latter is a special case of the former, and the former is logically prior to (transcends and includes) the latter.

Keith includes a discussion of my view of holographic interpenetration and its important but limited role in intersubjectivity, which I include as an endnote.[2]

To return to de Quincey's critique. The most common pattern in all three of de Quincey's main criticisms is this: each time I address an issue (such as intersubjectivity or the mind-body problem), I outline several different meanings (or aspects) of the problem, and I state that I believe that all of them must be included in any integral theory. I do that with the five meanings of intersubjectivity, and I do that with the three major meanings of the mind-body problem. In each case, de Quincey quotes me where I am emphasizing the importance of one of the aspects, then he quotes me emphasizing another aspect, then he charges me with contradicting myself (or being ambiguous, confused, or befuddled). I feel that this gives the impression that de Quincey seems to have a hard time holding multiple perspectives in mind; he wants to me to choose just one aspect and privilege it above all others, and when I don't do this, he charges me with ambiguity. It's very hard to respond to such charges, especially the way that de Quincey will cut and splice quotes to show that I have several different meanings in mind (and I have several different meanings in mind because surely there are several different meanings in reality).

But, as previously suggested, in each of his main criticisms, de Quincey eventually backs off and subtly retracts his charges (although he will often preface this retraction by repeating his charge of ambiguity). With regard to Intersubjectivity-2b, which de Quincey first says I completely lack, he finally states: "Wilber does talk the language of presence--the foundational experience of intersubjectivity." He then quotes me (correctly):

Consciousness is an inseparable mixture of experience and mental-cultural molding.... Every experience is a context; every experience, even simple sensory experience, is always already situated, is always already a context, is always already a holon.... As Whitehead would have it, every holon is already a prehensive unification of its entire actual universe: nothing is ever simply present.

... but contexts touch immediately. It does not require "mystical pure consciousness" to be in immediate contact with the data of experience. When any point in the mediated chain is known (or experienced), that knowing or prehending is an immediate event in itself, an immediate "touching." The touching is not a touching of something merely present but rather is itself pure Presence (or prehension).

Let me repeat that I see all five or so forms of intersubjectivity as being profoundly important. I include several forms of intersubjectivity not addressed by de Quincey, including a nondual spiritual ground (which in one sense is the most fundamental of all), but all forms of intersubjectivity have, I feel, a very important place and thus should be honored and embraced in a more integral approach to the topic.

What is perhaps most embarrassing for de Quincey is that, in an article in the same issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies in which de Quincey's critique appears--and in which he says I really only allow linguistic intersubjectivity--I clearly state my actual position, and it contradicts everything de Quincey claims:

Both the Lower-Left quadrant and the Upper-Left quadrant are postulated to exist "all the way down"; that is, this is a form of modified panpsychism ("pan-interiors"), which seems to be the only model capable of faithfully rendering this "master template." This implies that intersubjectivity also goes "all the way down" and that humans, as "compound individuals," contain all the pre-human forms of intersubjectivity as well. Thus, in humans, intersubjectivity is not established merely by exchange of linguistic signifiers, which is the commonly accepted notion. Rather, humans contain pre-linguistic intersubjectivity (established by, e.g., emotional or prereflexive co-presence with and to the other); linguistic intersubjectivity (established by the co-presence of interiority whose exteriors are linguistic signifiers but cannot be reduced to those exteriors); and trans-linguistic intersubjectivity (established by the simple presence of Presence, or nondual Spirit). In short, intersubjectivity is established at all levels by an interior resonance of those elements present at each level, a resonance that appears to span the entire spectrum of consciousness, pre-linguistic to linguistic to trans-linguistic. The suggestion that I limit intersubjectivity to the exchange of linguistic signifiers is quite off the mark.

And yet, some fifteen pages later in the same journal, de Quincey is claiming that I acknowledge "only the exchange of linguistic tokens," and therefore, as he summarizes his entire point: "Bottom line: This is not an incidental or 'nit-picking' critique. Basically, to spell it out: One quarter of Wilber's four quadrants is left void or vacant" (his emphasis).

De Quincey finishes this particular critique, as he does all of the others, by saying that the "highly significant" reason that I leave out the Lower-Left quadrant is that I personally am out of touch with my feelings, and therefore I cannot recognize the importance of non-linguistic intersubjectivity.

This would hurt me deeply had I any feelings, but since I don't... (:-). Let me just say two quick things: one, academic writing generally shuns emotionally laden writing, but the fact that I often, of necessity, conform to that requirement does not mean that I personally lack feelings or that I can't write in a feelingful way. For an example of the latter, I suggest de Quincey read Grace and Grit, which he cannot possibly have done and still claim I lack feelings. I must say that I was a little bit shocked that the one book where I bear my soul to the reader--and the one book that people who know me claim is the "real" Ken Wilber--is completely overlooked in de Quincey's relentlessly ugly psychoanalysis of me.

Second, even in academic writing, I have a widespread reputation as a passionate and engaged writer, with page after page of ecstatic expression, especially of the Divine. I cannot believe de Quincey managed to willfully ignore all of these passages, there's so damn many of them! But because it is important for de Quincey to portray me as being--his words--"vehemently anti-feeling," he ignores not only all the sections of my work that don't fit his mold, but also entire books. He claims that I have "a fiery determination to invalidate any possible psychotherapeutic intervention that might open up to experiential (realities)," thus overlooking all the books I have done on centauric psychotherapy, experiential therapy, etc. (see, for example, chap. 8 in No Boundary, which is nothing but experiential therapy).

De Quincey continues this line of attack by saying that "Wilber's immense rational fortress has been erected to withstand any possible intrusion of ambiguity, paradox, or mystery, and is designed to shut out the messiness of intense feeling." But this is simply ludicrous, since that leaves out not only my insistence on the trans-rational realms of consciousness (which are the cornerstone of my entire approach), but also the entire spectrum of emotions that I have written about (see below). The fact that a large part of what I have to do is provide rational justification for trans-rational states is taken by de Quincey to mean that I have nothing but rationality, in me or my work.

Those of you who have read my work know differently. Here is the conclusion of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, which according to de Quincey is an "edifice complex" built entirely to screen out mystery, feeling, ecstasy, etc. Of course, because this is the conclusion to SES, it says what my final position really is. (Forgive me for having to do this....)

Let the world be quiet. Let the heavens and the earth and the seas be still. Let the world be waiting. Let the self-contraction relax into the empty ground of its own awareness, and let it there quietly die. See how Spirit pours through each and every opening in the turmoil, and bestows new splendor on the setting Sun and its glorious Earth and all its radiant inhabitants. See the Kosmos dance in Emptiness; see the play of light in all creatures great and small; see finite worlds sing and rejoice in the play of the very Divine, floating on a Glory that renders each transparent, flooded by a Joy that refuses time or terror, that undoes the madness of the loveless self and buries it in splendor.

Indeed, indeed: Let the self-contraction relax into the empty ground of its own awareness, and let it there quietly die. See the Kosmos arise in its place, dancing madly and divine, self-luminous and self-liberating, intoxicated by a Light that never dawns nor ceases. See the worlds arise and fall, never caught in time or turmoil, transparent images shimmering in the radiant Abyss. Watch the mountain walk on water, drink the Pacific in a single gulp, blink and a billion universes rise and fall, breathe out and create a Kosmos, breathe in and watch it dissolve.

Let the ecstasy overflow and outshine the loveless self, driven mad with the torments of its self-embracing ways, hugging mightily samsara's spokes of endless agony, and sing instead triumphantly with St. Catherine, "My being is God, not by simple participation, but by a true transformation of my Being. My me is God!" And let the joy sing with Dame Julian, "See! I am God! See! I am in all things! See! I do all things!" And let the joy shout with Hakuin, "This very body is the Body of Buddha! and this very land the Pure Land!"

And this Earth becomes a blessed being, and every I becomes a God, and every We becomes God's sincerest worship, and every It becomes God's most gracious temple.

And comes to rest that Godless search, tormented and tormenting. The knot in the Heart of the Kosmos relaxes to allow its only God, and overflows the Spirit ravished and enraptured by the lost and found Beloved. And gone the Godless destiny of death and desperation, and gone the madness of a life committed to uncare, and gone the tears and terror of the brutal days and endless nights where time alone would rule.

And I-I rise to taste the dawn, and find that love alone will shine today. And the Shining says: To love it all, and love it madly, and always endlessly, and ever fiercely, to love without choice and thus enter the All, to love it mindlessly and thus be the All, embracing the only and radiant Divine: now as Emptiness, now as Form, together and forever, the Godless search undone, and love alone will shine today.


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