

ENEMY PROPERTY COMMISSION

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTIETH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

ON

H. R. 873 and H. R. 1823

BILLS TO CREATE AN ENEMY PROPERTY COMMISSION, TO
PROVIDE FOR THE DISPOSAL OF CERTAIN ENEMY
PROPERTY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

AND

H. R. 1000

A BILL CREATING A COMMISSION TO EXAMINE AND RENDER
FINAL DECISIONS ON ALL CLAIMS BY AMERICAN NATIONALS
WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND WHO WERE PRISONERS OF WAR OF
GERMANY, ITALY, OR JAPAN, FOR PAYMENT OF ITS
AWARDS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

AND

H. R. 2823

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR A COMMISSION TO ADJUDICATE
CLAIMS OF AMERICAN NATIONALS WHO WERE PRISONERS
OF WAR OF JAPAN, FOR PAYMENT OF ITS AWARDS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

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STATEMENT OF THEODORE D. STEVENSON, M. D., MEDIA, PA.

Dr. STEVENSON. My name is Theodore D. Stevenson, 133 East Third Street, Media, Pa.

I am an American physician living in Media, Pa., a graduate of Princeton University and Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine and a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons. At present I am on the surgical staff of the Lankenau Hospital, Philadelphia, Pa. From 1934 until 1939 I was a medical missionary under the Presbyterian Mission of the United States of America at Canton, China.

In December 1941, en route to China, I was caught in Manila, and subsequently served on the medical staff of the Santo Tomas and Los Banos internment camps. As medical director of the Los Banos camp, and later chairman of the medical staff of Santo Tomas camp, I was familiar with all phases of health conditions in those camps. Shortly before the United States Army rescued the internees of Santo Tomas, I was put in special confinement in the Japanese special prison because I refused to alter death certificates which I had signed to read "starvation" or "malnutrition." Thus I can speak from personal experience of the sufferings of those internees for more than 3 years in the Japanese internment camps in the Philippines.

I might add here that the situation at that time, in the summer of 1944, was a very critical one in that camp because of the food situation and it had to come to a time when we were loosing internees every day from actual starvation, so that when the matter came up of death certificates, I felt as chairman of the medical staff and senior medical officer who had to sign out these death certificates, that it was impossible to alter them.

Curiously enough, the Japanese used a form of death certificate which was copied after the one put out by the Geneva Conventions for prisoners of war and they agreed that these death certificates would subsequently be registered with Geneva, in spite of the fact that in many respects they refused to conform to the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, it seemed impossible for me to agree to change these death certificates, and furthermore, it is not the practice of a doctor to alter death certificates.

I feel, therefore, because of my experiences and because of my position in the camps that I can speak from personal experience of the sufferings of those internees for more than 3 years in Japanese camps in the Philippines.

It was inevitable that in such camps, with people, closely confined in a tropical country, without adequate sanitary facilities, that many would suffer from diseases prevalent in the Orient. Amoebic dysentery was ever present. At one time it was estimated that 12 percent of the camp was suffering from this condition, and I believe this was a low estimate. The debilitating effect of amoebic dysentery combined with nutritional deficiency left its mark on many. During the summer of 1943 at the Los Banos Camp 40 percent of the internees contacted bacillary dysentery.

I would add here that in the other camps this was also the case. At one camp, Baguio Camp, nearly 80 percent of the internees there had bacillary dysentery at one time. This was a result of overcrowding and open sewage, a condition which was repeatedly called to the

attention of the Japanese to no avail. The condition of many internees suffering from chronic diseases such as malaria and sprue was markedly aggravated by the scanty diet.

The food rations supplied by the Japanese up to February 1944 were woefully inadequate since the actual caloric value was less than 2,000 calories per day; after that time, when the camp was taken over from Japanese civilian control, by the military bureau of prisons, conditions rapidly deteriorated. The military agreed to supply 1,750 calories for adults and half rations for children under 12 years.

You must understand that 3,000 calories is required for the average man on light labor. Many men in the camp were doing heavy labor such as wood chopping, kitchen detail, and so forth. The internees never received the 1,750 calories. By September 1, 1944, it was down to 1,350, October and November 1,100, December and January 1945, 650-800 calories per day per person. This diet was made up of rice, corn, a few beans and green vegetables of poor caloric value. The quality of food brought into all camps by the Japanese was poor. The greens received were wilted and slimy, the rice was frequently dirty; the corn moldy and had weevils, the camotes, a type of sweetpotato, were often rotten. There was loss in food value owing to the necessity of cooking in very large open vessels, called cawas, and of using green wood as fuel.

The seriousness of the food situation in the internment camps in 1944 became more apparent when a survey was made by the medical staff in August of that year. About 3,000 adult internees were examined and evidence of marked nutritional deficiency was found. Beriberi and hypoproteinemia, low protein, resulting in marked swelling of the ankles and legs was common. Other signs indicated severe deficiencies.

By January 1945 the average weight lost for men was 51 pounds and 32 pounds for women. Several men who formerly weighed 200 pounds were down to 100 pounds. The death rate rapidly rose. Whereas an average hospital census early in internment was 80. By January 1945 it was over 300. This was in the Santo Tomas Camp. Some suffered permanent disability from neuritis of beriberi.

I would like to add here that this condition of neuritis of beriberi is one that is often extremely persistent. It has been known that sometimes it takes several years before the symptoms disappear. With this condition of neuritis there is what we call a foot drop, with the patient unable to flex the foot due to the involvement of the peroneal nerve and this would constitute almost a total disability.

Others, especially in the older age groups, will never recover from heart conditions brought on by overexertion in a state of nutritional deficiency.

Here again there were many older people with what might be called a mild heart disease who of necessity were forced to work in gardens and do other labor that they were totally unable to do, in order to exist.

Some of the latent effects of this nutritional deficiency have already been manifest by various kinds of eye conditions.

Recently an article was published by another of the doctors in camp on the involvement of the optic nerve as a result of beriberi, and he has shown very conclusively that some of the latent effects on the optic nerve are irreversible. If treatment can be instituted early, some-

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until I was repatriated to the United States in 1945 after the liberation of the Americans in Santo Tomas.

During the war I spent 16 months, the first 16 months of the war, as a political prisoner. I was the first political prisoner arrested in the Philippine Islands. I was arrested not for any offense that I had committed, but because I was an American newspaperman, and the Japanese arrested me to suppress that which I represented in the Philippine Islands. I was 13 months in a cell of torture. You have heard from a Catholic sister, Sister Mary Trinita, about the horrors of Fort Santiago Prison. I know those horrors first hand. I spent 389 days in that prison; but I am not here particularly to report a personal experience story. I am here essentially to report on the build-up to the situation that was climaxed by the Japanese against the Americans at Pearl Harbor and then later their conquest throughout the Pacific, and in that connection I speak in behalf of the American community—the American community who contributed to building an American institution, a democratic institution, in the Philippine Islands.

I consider that the Americans who stayed in the Philippines to be trapped by the Japanese in occupation paid the price—their own personal price—for American unpreparedness. They were war casualties just as certainly as were those of the armed forces wounded or killed in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the enemy drive through the vast areas which the forces of democracy were unprepared and unable to defend.

We of the ill-fated group of civilian Americans caught and tortured by a successful enemy force of aggression in the Philippines now find that in effect we were expendables. We do not presume to say that there was any cold and calculated plan so describing us officially, but the job that fell to us resolved itself into just that. Whatever might be our fate in the ultimate course of the war, for all practical purposes in the early phases, in the period of enemy successes, we simply had to be written off in order that the long-range program for the eventual defeat of the then victorious enemy could be carried out.

We were too much in the dark on points of broad strategy to comprehend fully our own fate. We often developed false hope, based upon propaganda, designed to deceive and confuse the enemy; we heard and treasured the reports that help and rescue were on the way. We bolstered our spirits with the hope that the turn in our favor might come soon—far sooner than it ever did come.

But with all of the confusion and chaos of the occasion, the realities of the situation were accepted in a manner creditable to the American spirit and the determination to carry through at whatever price.

Apparently, some persons in the United States, who have only a vague conception of what the Americans in the Philippine Islands took and why they took it and why they continued to take it, are under the impression that those caught by the enemy were responsible for their own fate in that they stayed on when they were offered the means of escape in advance. The practical fact is that they had neither official advice nor transportation facilities to escape while the road home was yet open.

Although it is true that some individuals could have, and if duly warned would have, withdrawn and sought safety in the homeland, it

is a positive fact that the American community in the Philippines could not have been liquidated without a complete reversal of the whole American policy in the Philippines and a defeat of the program under which the aggression build-up of the enemy was met with a solid front.

The whole official attitude in the Philippine Islands—as revealed in Army, Navy, and civil government offices—was that public morale must be maintained and that the Americans, collectively and individually must set an example to the Filipinos, an example to give no encouragement to the enemy through admission of weakness or unwillingness or unreadiness to meet any emergency which possibly might arise.

If I may supplement this part of the report, I should like to inform your committee that on numerous occasions I personally, and members of my staff, as editor of the Manila Daily Bulletin, contacted the American High Commissioner, Mr. Sayre; the high commands in the Army and the Navy; and asked for suggestions as to how we might best support the American cause; how we might inform the public, both American and Filipino; what our duties were; what our responsibilities were; what our course of action should be. Only a short time before the war I personally called on Mr. Sayre. I informed him, "I am not here to ask an interview. I am not here to get anything for publication. I am here to get guidance, if I may. I should like to know what we should do in informing the public as to the situation as it is now developing and is expected to develop. I should like to know whether the course that we are pursuing now is the correct one; whether it is the course that our Government wants and expects us to pursue." I was informed that the course that we were pursuing was correct and that we—I personally—and the newspaper—were performing a valuable patriotic service in the support of the American flag and the cause of democracy. I asked him specifically if at any time there should be a tip, that this line or that line was to be taken, we should be glad to have his suggestions.

I told him that as an American newspaper publisher I considered it our duty to print the news, to be honest, but that we wanted to know what the official American attitude was, what the public attitude should be, so that we might be guided by that.

I got from him and then directly and many times indirectly through other sources, only outright praise of the policy that we were pursuing.

Only a few days before Pearl Harbor I had occasion to talk to Admiral Hart, the commanding officer of the Asiatic Fleet, and the same day to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, then the high commander of American Army forces in the Far East, and in effect I asked that same question, with precisely the same results. In fact General MacArthur asked me—there was several in the conference—General MacArthur asked me if I would stay for a little talk after the others had gone. He thanked me for the course that we were following. He said it was basically correct and thoroughly right, and in that course I must explain our basic policy was to maintain morale, to encourage an attitude of readiness on the part of the Americans and the Filipinos to meet the emergency and to set an example, an American example, to the Filipinos in a crisis; to inspire in them confidence in that which the American flag stood for.

When American Navy families, and later Army families, were ordered home, official press releases and comments studiously avoided the impression that this was intended as the start of a general American exodus. Emphasis was placed on the explanation that this action was taken for the convenience of the defense services, that the service wives were removed to make room for increased numbers of servicemen and defense equipment.

At the same time, a quiet campaign of reassurance was carried on based on several readily apparent facts, among them the fact that the family of the American High Commissioner was staying on, likewise the family of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the high commander of American Army forces in the Far East.

If it were not betraying a confidence I should like to report the conversations between representatives of the American community including my own wife, as one American, and representatives of the official American offices, including the High Commissioner's office there.

I can say here only that direct inquiries were made as to whether it was the intent that we should slip out while we were maintaining the attitude of standing by and setting an example. We asked in many ways whether on the quiet we should steal away.

The answers that we got, I think without exception—I know all of the answers that I got—were that “we are staying, are we not?” by “we” meaning the families of the High Commissioner and others. “What would the Filipinos think if we left? What would the Filipinos think if you left? You as Americans?”

The editorial and news offices of the Manila Daily Bulletin were in constant touch with the offices of all responsible authorities of the Army, Navy, and civil government—American and Filipino. Through these contact channels, we never once gained the impression that a general withdrawal of Americans was desired or considered practicable. On the contrary, we had every reason to feel that we were rendering a patriotic service and that our policy had complete sanction when news treatment and editorial comment were along lines calculated to build public morale and maintain normal community life.

Many were the occasions on which it would have been easy to spread panic, which, undoubtedly, would have resulted in immediate efforts of Americans to get home. However, shipping facilities did not exist for a volume of travel materially in excess of normal, and there was never indication of an official intention to provide emergency facilities or to create the demand for such extra facilities.

Elsewhere in the Far East, Americans were ordered home; ships were dispatched for their repatriation. But in the Philippines such was not the case, and such was not indicated as officially desirable. The Philippines as American flag Territory—and I might add that the official designation is “Territory” under the sovereignty of the United States—was in a status entirely different from the surrounding territories under other flags.

Americans in the Philippines, through the years of American building in and for democracy, never considered the undertaking in which they were participating essentially military. The undertaking as a whole was in fact far more civilian than military. Had it been otherwise, progress in the establishment of democratic institutions would have been deplorably less than it was.

The Americans there, thousands who were caught and tortured by the Japanese, were missionaries of democracy. They were school teachers, Government employees, scientists, merchants, lawyers, doctors, miners—persons of varied interests, and degrees of accomplishment. Many of them had been brought there by their own government; as a class they had come with official encouragement. Very few of them were imperialistic exploiters, or undesirable beach-combers.

They were Americans, most of them worthy Americans made to feel a pride in their accomplishment. They had established homes; they considered themselves a part of the country, an essential part. Some had been successful in business; many others had accumulated no substantial reserve of earnings. All in all, they had contributed substantially and up to the time of their falling into the clutches of the invading enemy were continuing to contribute to the upbuilding of the country. It would have been next to impossible for the vast majority of them to pull up and leave. Furthermore, they were not given the impression that such was their duty.

All of the defense preparation the Americans in the Philippine Islands saw or heard about was carried out along the lines of building a defense adequate to any occasion that might be expected. They were made to feel that they had a specific place in that program, that both their duty and their continuing safety lay in the direction of complete support for such a program.

They were not only ignorant of any plans to get them out, if ever any such plans existed, but also they were made to feel that they were definitely needed where they were, that their duty was to perform the task at hand, the task of helping to make democracy and the democratic Territory of the Far East safe and secure.

For myself, I might say that home leave was overdue by almost 2 years when the Pacific war started. I had postponed vacation in the United States simply because I considered it my duty to carry through the critical period, whatever it might be. I had many words of commendation from responsible American Government representatives on my attitude and my effort in this connection.

I should like to explain my own attitude further by saying that, after I had spent 16 months under torturous "special treatment" as a political prisoner and had been transferred to Santo Tomas Internment Camp for hospitalization, I was officially approached with an offer for possible repatriation. I tried in vain, as it turned out to be, to get permission for my wife and two small children to be repatriated without me. I decided it was my duty to stay on in order to be ready to resume my work at the earliest possible date on the return of American forces—whenever that might be.

While the question of my possible repatriation was pending before the Japanese authorities of Santo Tomas Internment Camp word reached the Manila Daily Bulletin Filipino employees in Manila, and from A. H. Escoda, the top Filipino editorial man of the Bulletin, came—through the underground—this message to me:

Please do not leave. The Filipino employees of the Bulletin are standing loyal and are enduring much. If you, the top American of the paper now in the country, should leave, they would feel that you and that which you represent, American leadership, were deserting them.

I might add that both Mr. Escoda and his wife later were executed by the Japanese after long periods of torture, for their pro-American activities.

This incident is mentioned as an example of the Filipino attitude and what it meant to Filipinos in general to have Americans stand by them in the extreme emergency. It is an example of that which forms the background for the statement that by standing true to their flag and to the responsibilities in the Philippines, true to the friendship between Americans and Filipinos, civilian Americans of the Philippines were largely responsible for the spirit of loyalty on the part of Filipinos, a spirit which is credited with making the effort of the enemy vastly more difficult, and helping very greatly in the operations that resulted in the retaking of the islands.

If Americans generally had attempted to run away, the feeling of Filipinos would have been vastly different from what it was.

I was arrested by the Japanese a few hours after the victorious invading forces had occupied the city of Manila. The newspaper which I edited was immediately seized and later completely destroyed—the printing plant, physical properties, and everything the Japanese could find to identify as belonging to the newspaper were destroyed. I was 16 months a political prisoner, 389 days of that time in a cell of torture. I was never given a trial, never faced with charges; I was denied opportunity of defense or the opportunity to answer charges if any such were recorded against me. I was starved, beaten, and otherwise abused until I was near death.

All of this punishment was heaped upon me not because of any specific acts which I had committed but because I represented one aspect of American democracy, one phase of Americanism, the democratic press. I could never have stood what I lived through had it not been that I had confidence in the return of the American forces and the constant feeling that I had the duty of upholding my part of the American responsibility in that torturous emergency. That which kept me alive in a cell of torture was basically the same thing that sustained hundreds of other Americans under conditions of horrible mistreatment. I was singled out merely because I was in a conspicuous position in a program which caused several thousands of Americans to accept and carry through a job, for which they deserve recognition.

I might supplement this written report by references to the newspaper which I edited. I should be glad to do so, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. BENNETT. Under date of October 22, the Manila Daily Bulletin—I should like to digress just far enough to call attention to the masthead on this paper. The masthead gives a map of the Philippine Islands with the American eagle lighting on the map. That, to the best of my thinking and the thinking of others who were working with me, represented the task that we were there trying to do. That represented that which caused me to stay; that which I believed caused others to stay.

Under date of October 22, 1941, this paper, which I have been able to get only through the courtesy of the Congressional Library, reports a rally celebrating the anniversary of the coming to the Philippine Islands of Francis B. Sayre, as High Commissioner. This is a rally which was really promoted by some leaders of the American community with the cooperation of the office staff of the High Commis-

sioner. It was promoted for a purpose, the purpose of presenting the American position, the American policy, the American appeal, as it were, to the people of those islands in a time of approaching crisis.

The paper of this date devotes a large part of its attention to this rally. I should like to read into the record, if I may, a quotation from the High Commissioner, words which he spoke standing before the American community assembled in Manila on an occasion representing a call which was very much like a Red Cross rally here.

I quote from the High Commissioner:

Here in the Philippines we stand at guard on the American frontier, and the whole future of the civilized world today hangs upon the strength and the unity of groups like ours, devoted to a common cause. It is not a question of race or blood. It is a question of defending a way of life based upon faith in individual liberty and democracy.

That was a High Commissioner's challenge or appeal to us on the occasion of an American rally in Manila, a rally actually in honor of him; in effect, in honor of our flag.

I should like to read, too, a Filipino expression. President Quezon was sick and was not at this rally. He sent his secretary of finance, the man who is now President of the Philippine Republic, Manuel Roxas. Mr. Roxas said, and I quote:

Let us hope and let us pray that the scourge of war may not reach our shores and that we may continue to aid in the fulfillment of our capacity those fighting to preserve their right to life and to live freely; but if Providence should will that these fair isles be drenched in blood, we shall thank God for the opportunity to share the perils and the suffering of the ordeal with our brother Americans, with whom we will fight for common cause under the blended shadows of the American and Filipino flags.

That was a Filipino response to the American spokesman at an American rally in the Philippine Islands just a short time before the real emergency came.

I should like to read a little bit more, and that is an American response to these American and Filipino expressions. This I am quoting is from Ewald Selph, who was the toastmaster at this banquet and who was the spokesman for the American community on this occasion. Mr. Selph said that—

The High Commissioner has a hard job. It is your duty to support him in all of those things necessary for the defense of our country, which includes the Philippines. If there is anything the American community can do we want him to call on us and we will be at his service.

That, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, represents the American attitude at that time, the American attitude through this period of build-up to that which brought upon us the suffering that we later endured, the suffering we endured as Americans together and Americans performing an American task as best we knew how to perform it under most trying circumstances.

I have other references here which I may present either to the committee now or should like the opportunity to read into the record later, expressions indicated by editorials which I myself wrote; American editorials which were published for American officials, among others, to read; American editorials on which I had the thorough endorsement of the American representatives there.

These editorials, these expressions, indicate that we were there in line of duty, that we were there in the performance of a service as

best we knew how to serve. If it will be of any service to this committee, I can read these or any part of them at the present time or I can leave this to be incorporated in a supplementary report as best suits your convenience.

The CHAIRMAN. I would suggest, in view of the great number of witnesses to be heard today, that you prepare a supplementary statement that will include such editorials or extracts therefrom as you think would be helpful to the committee in its consideration of this matter. We will see that it is then made a part of the record.

The testimony that you have already given has been sufficiently interesting and important enough to indicate to us that anything that you have written in the form of editorials or otherwise would be helpful to the committee. For the purpose of preserving the time of the committee today, I would suggest that the course that I have indicated be pursued.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, it is your convenience.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any further statement you wish to make?

Mr. BENNETT. I might show here a book which has just been presented to me showing myself among others in Fort Santiago Prison at the time I was there. That shows a photograph of myself and others who were with me. This book, however, is not mine. It was loaned to me by a fellow prisoner, Gaston Willoquet, who was the consular representative of the De Gaullist government there and who was imprisoned and tortured as such.

The guard took this picture to try to humiliate us, and, by a fluke, Mr. Willoquet, who was sent to the United States, was able to get a copy of the picture and it came to the United States in that way and is a part of his book. It gives a little bit of an idea of how we were treated, although it does not show the inside of a cell and does not give more than a very superficial impression of the action.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that book to which you refer in the Congressional Library?

Mr. BENNETT. I assume that it probably is, because Mr. Willoquet spent some time in Washington, but he has since returned to Manila as a diplomatic representative to the Philippine Government.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask the clerk to take the name of the book and the author of the book and ascertain whether it is in the Congressional Library.

In the meantime it would probably be of interest to the committee if you would just hand the book around among the members in order that they may see the picture that is referred to by the witness and also any other material that may be of interest.

Do you have any further statement?

Mr. BENNETT. I have nothing further other than the report that I have given. I shall be glad to answer any questions, particularly the questions relating to the American position there and the American purpose there; any questions that may be asked.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, gentlemen?

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hinshaw.

Mr. HINSHAW. I think that Mr. Bennett has set forth quite clearly the fact that the United States policy in the Philippines was that

the Americans residing there had not only not been invited to leave, but were in fact encouraged to stay. That, of course, is contrary to the general impression in the United States, probably gained from the fact that others of our country who were elsewhere in the Far East were directed to have their families, certainly, returned to the United States.

I would like to bring out one or two small matters, perhaps, but they are important at this juncture. It has been generally noised around among our people at home that Americans in the Philippines who were taken by the Japanese and either placed in prison, as you were, and tortured, or who were sent directly to Santo Tomas, that great indignities were heaped upon them for the purpose of impressing the Filipinos of the high power of the Japanese Imperial Government.

I have heard personally that our people were required to bow to Japanese private soldiers and others, and I would like to ask you to describe some of the indignities that were heaped upon our people for the propaganda purpose of impressing Filipinos.

Mr. BENNETT. Among other things I was beaten in the face with a Japanese shoe, for no reason whatsoever that I knew; so far as I could see it was merely to make me lose the white man's face that is so important to the Oriental. I was slapped. I saw others slapped. We were ridiculed. We were stood up on the floor or made to sit on the floor of the cell in which we were kept. It had no furniture in it whatsoever. We sat on the floor or we stood up, as the case might be.

I have been stood up in front of the Japanese guard who said, "You American," and then in American language which I can hardly repeat here. I was cursed, and as an American, before Filipinos, in at least three languages, names, English,—that is, broken English—Tagalog, native Filipino language, and Japanese. I understood some of the Tagalog language. I did not understand the Japanese at all, so it did not bother me that he cursed me in Japanese. But we were reduced to indignities constantly, all of the time.

Even the very nature of our imprisonment was such as to indicate the desire to humble us as Americans. They would point to the sky. "Japanese! Japanese! Japanese planes! Japanese! Very powerful! Americans! Pooh, pooh, pooh!"

We were made to bow to the guards every time we walked by, and we must bow from the hips, not with the head merely. We must bow with our eyes to the ground, not even looking at the guard to whom we bowed. If we did not bow, we were beaten, and we were frequently beaten.

I might say, if I might add further, in answer to your question, that not only was it an apparent effort to humble, humiliate us, as Americans; it was also very evident that they intended to humble Filipinos. They tried to humiliate the Filipinos. They kicked them. They beat them. Filipinos who sat in the cell with me were so disabled as the result of torture that they could not even stand, could not even feed themselves, could not even dress themselves.

And one Filipino asked me to pray for him every night. He asked me to pray for two things; two things only; always asked the same things. He was there as a representative of guerrilla organization from the hills. He had come to Manila to try to raise money for the

guerrilla organization. He had been picked up by the Japanese guard. He was being tortured to try to make him give the names of Filipinos who were contributing to the guerrilla organization. He asked me for my prayers for him. He asked for these two things, always; always these two things only.

"Pray that my report," that was the story that he was telling to the Japanese, "and my companion's report," his companion was a Filipino in another cell whom he could not see, "that my report and my companion's report may coincide." In other words, that they may tell the same story to the Japanese.

"Pray that I may be able to endure it." He did not ask me to pray that he might escape or even that they might stop torturing him.

"Pray that I may be able to endure it."

I asked him if he were giving names. I knew that they were trying to make him give names. He looked at me in a very frightened sort of a way, looked all around to see if anybody was near that might hear, because there were spies in the cells all of the time, Japanese included. He said, "I give names. All pro-Japanese."

He was giving the names of every Filipino that he knew who was helping the Japanese. He was not giving the names of Filipinos who were helping the guerrillas.

I saw that man go out to his execution. I saw him go out with his chin up.

I believe that is a result of the example that I was setting—and I am not speaking as Roy Bennett now—I am speaking as an American. I believe that the example that I was setting; I believe that the American example was making that Filipino more loyal, more determined; I believe that I helped him to endure it; I believe that I helped him; it is my conviction of that that causes me to say that I could not have done otherwise, other than I did as to the action that I took.

Mr. HINSHAW. In this heaping of indignities upon you and others, did the Japanese Army and Navy officers participate, or was it wholly enlisted soldiers of the Japanese—Japanese soldiers?

Mr. BENNETT. Japanese—now, remember that I was in two places, in two different categories. I was once a political prisoner in Fort Santiago. I was a political prisoner singled out, as they called it, for "special treatment" or torture. There we were guarded and handled entirely by enlisted men, although there was an officer who came any time that he wanted to.

The head of our guard was a sergeant, and the sergeant—that is, of the Japanese military police—the sergeant frequently, most commonly, was the most cruel of all. It was the sergeant who would make us sit for 2 hours at a time straight up in the middle of a cell with not even anything to rest our backs. It was both officers and individual men who were definitely humiliating and torturing us.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Bennett, the committee does not want to cause you to relate experiences which give you pain in relating them, but I think perhaps you can do so for the benefit of the record and the Congress, without too much personal feeling in the matter. Can you give us some description of some of these tortures that were heaped upon you in the 389 days that you spent as a political prisoner of the Japanese?

of starvation. Mr. BENNETT. I hope it will not be permanent. I am still under the treatment.

Before I came this morning I took medicine which had been given me, trying to build my system up.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions, gentlemen?

Mr. BECKWORTH. I have been interested in the statement of the gentleman, and I feel you have made a wonderful contribution in stating the facts in reference to the atrocities that took place.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Priest.

Mr. PRIEST. Just one observation also. I think Mr. Bennett not only has convinced everybody of his great Americanism, and the patriotism of his associates but as a former newspaper man, I have been considerably moved by the fact that throughout it all he has upheld the very finest traditions of the "fourth estate." That appealed to me personally very much in your very moving and touching story before the committee.

Mr. BENNETT. I thank you.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state that I have here these copies of the Manila Bulletin, from the Congressional Library, in order that Mr. Bennett might review the words that he had written or caused to be written in the days before Pearl Harbor in Manila.

I think that the last issue of that paper or any other newspaper in the Philippine Islands, which is in the Congressional Library, is that of November 28, 1941, is it not?

Mr. BENNETT. The last one I saw, Mr. Hinshaw, was the 27th, I believe.

Mr. HINSHAW. November 27, 1941.

Mr. BENNETT. The last issue printed was on January 2, 1942. The last copies of the paper, of this paper, that were printed, were distributed free in the streets of Manila to try to maintain quiet and calm even when the Japanese were at that moment moving into the city of Manila.

Mr. HINSHAW. The fact that the last issue of this Manila Daily Bulletin, which reached Washington and the Congressional Library, was dated November 27, is to me an indication that that was carried on the last ship that came through to the States from the Philippine Islands. I personally have examined some of these papers, Mr. Chairman, and nowhere in any of these papers, either that edited by the witness before us, or in the other papers which we have here in the file, temporarily, do I find any indication whatsoever, either of fear on the part of those who were in the Philippines, Americans, or any indication that they should withdraw, or had been told to withdraw, up to that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, gentlemen?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. If not, Mr. Bennett, I wish to express, as I have already indicated, my personal appreciation as well as that of the committee for your appearance before us, and your statement which has dealt with basic and fundamental principles that must be considered in legislation of this character. You have certainly demonstrated

not only by your own conduct but that which you have spoken as to others, that each exhibited a high order of American patriotism in the part that you took in remaining in the islands under conditions that were growing daily serious.

Mr. BENNETT. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. We did our duty as best we knew how to do it.

SUPPLEMENTARY TESTIMONY BY ROY C. BENNETT

Since I testified before this committee and requested and received permission to supplement my testimony by additional direct quotations from the Manila Daily Bulletin issues printed in the period preceding the outbreak of the Pacific war, a letter to this committee from Francis B. Sayre, prewar United States High Commissioner to the Philippines has been received into the record. The statement by Mr. Sayre that Americans were not advised to leave the Philippines, the statement that Washington instructed him against the issuance of such a warning, seems to me to go far toward removing the necessity for further testimony by me to supplement and support that already presented. However, it seems to me that one point still requires emphasis. This point is that not only were the Americans without instructions or transportation facilities, but that they were made to feel that their duty was to stay for the actual service they might render, individually and collectively, and for the carrying out of a Pacific policy in relation to Japan and for measuring up to the responsibilities of the American Government and American people to the Philippine government and the Filipino people. The following are quotations from copies of the Manila Daily Bulletin on file in the Library of Congress:

[Sayre on War, editorial printed in the Manila Daily Bulletin, October 18, 1941, p. 8]

High Commissioner Sayre's remarks on America's approach to the brink of war were made to a group of businessmen Thursday noon, at least 6 hours before the news of the fall of the Konoye Cabinet in Tokyo reached the Philippines. That his remarks fitted the circumstances of another nation's apparent headlong approach to war so closely was one of those chronological accidents that point up the headlines.

The Commissioner's comment on the brink of war led up to a warning against the spirit of defeatism, timely warning, wisely worded. Even more important to us in the Philippines was Mr. Sayre's calm statement that the United States already is engaged in warfare of the economic variety, through export control and restriction of trade via the freezing of belligerent aliens' funds here.

Whether we like it or not, everybody in the Philippines shares in this economic warfare. We are following a clear-cut policy. It is to the Commissioner's credit that he does no beating around the bush, no hiding behind sugar-coated phrases. Our duties and our individual share in the present stage of warfare are made plain to us. When our businesses suffer, when we have to pay higher prices for things, or do without, when the routing of our lives is uprooted by call to service or other demands of emergency preparations, we do it not blindly but with our eyes open.

High Commissioner Sayre was generously appreciative of the cooperation he has received in carrying out the requirements of his duties. This community appreciates his frankness in explaining things as they are and wishes he would do so more often. So far as it can be told to us, we want to know what we are up against.

[Issue dated September 23, 1941, p. 6, column 1, also on the Pacific]

It is absolutely right that the people should have full opportunity to reach a decision based on a comprehensive study of the major factors of the war issue. Regard for the democratic order and democratic processes calls for a decision by the people, a decision on war crises and a decision on what to do in support of the platform adopted.

The decision in regard to the Pacific requires an understanding between the American people and the Filipinos. It is a matter of official record and common knowledge that the understanding between the United States and the Philippines in connection with Pacific defenses has been and now is excellent insofar as the

I assure you that I appreciate your interest in the various questions relating to the disposition of enemy property in the United States. As you know, the Department is giving considerable time and thought to the various aspects of this problem.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clarence Alton Beliel, better known as Don Bell.

STATEMENT OF CLARENCE ALTON BELIEL (DON BELL), RADIO COMMENTATOR AND NEWS ANALYST, SILVER SPRING, MD.

Mr. BELIEL. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, my name is Clarence Alton Beliel, but I am more widely known by my radio nom de plume, Don Bell. Previously employed as a radio correspondent by National Broadcasting Co. and the Mutual Broadcasting System, I now am director of news and special events at radio station WGAY in Silver Spring, Md. I am an American citizen and resided, together with my wife and two children, in Manila, Philippine Islands, prior to World War II.

During the period of Japanese occupation of the Philippines, I and my family were interned by the Japanese. We lost all worldly possessions. I still am indebted for certain medicines and foodstuffs which it was necessary for me to purchase while imprisoned. Immediately following liberation—through suffering from beri beri and other results of malnutrition—it was necessary that I return to work as a war correspondent in order to provide for myself and family. My wife and both children were confined to a hospital following liberation. Even now, 2 years after liberation, I have found it impossible to liquidate all financial obligations incurred those 37 months of imprisonment.

Seemingly, there is a current belief concerning the conditions of our imprisonment about which I should like to speak at this time.

Previous to Pearl Harbor, in addition to being employed as publicity director for an American department store in Manila, I also was engaged as foreign correspondent for an American radio network, and as radio commentator with a local radio station (KZRH). Also with the knowledge and consent of General MacArthur's headquarters, I served as news coordinator with the British Ministry of Information, the Free French Committee, and the Free Czech Committee. These positions gave me access to information which was not publicly known at that time. And, I wish to state that no warning was ever issued by any official source calling upon, or even suggesting, that the civilian citizens of the United States leave the Philippine Islands. Upon inquiring as to what should be done, I was told—unofficially, of course—that no such warning should be broadcast; that all available transportation facilities were being used for the evacuation of the families of Army and Navy personnel. I was told further, that if civilian American families began leaving the islands on a wholesale scale, then Filipinos might believe they were being deserted by the United States Government.

We were not warned to leave the Philippines. American policy dictated that we remain in the Philippines. We were the expendables.