THE DISCURSIVITY OF THE NEGATIVE: KOJÈÈVE ON LANGUAGE IN HEGEL

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The fame and influence of Alexandre Kojèève's six year course on Hegel under the auspices of l'ÉÉcole pratique des Hautes ÉÉtudes is beyond question. In attendance were Andréé Breton, Jacques Lacan, Raymond Aron, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Bataille, Pierre Klossowski, Eric Weil, Henry Corbin, Raymond Queneau, as well as perhaps Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Blanchot. The extent of Kojèève's significance, however, is generally framed as taking one of three forms: (1) his reading is marked as historically important for its role in reintroducing Hegel to French intellectual life and turning a generation of thinkers toward the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; (2) his strong interpretations of Hegel's historical claims are taken to strike the first sparks of existential marxism, culminating as they do in the 'end of history' thesis that has undergone a recent, if somewhat specious, revival; or (3). his insistence on the overwhelming centrality of desire to the Hegelian project is seen as providing the philosophical ground for the explosion of Hegelian discourse into psychoanalysis, literature, and art. Indeed, it may today be somewhat difficult to imagine a presentation claiming to focus on Kojèève's reading of Hegel that does not concern itself primarily with the role of desire in the dialectic of mastery and servitude. This essay, however, investigates a somewhat different aspect of Kojèève's interpretation, one whose effects were no less decisive -- both for his own position and for its influence on later twentieth century French philosophy -- for their being unremarked. Namely, Kojèève insists that it is not merely the case that language turns out to entail negation, but also that the negative itself is infected and structured by discourse.

The first year of the course, 1933-1934, ended with a tour de force of textual interpretation focusing on a number of key passages from the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* -- a text remaining untranslated into French until Jean Hyppolite's 1939/1941 publication. Reworked by Kojèève into essay form and published in full under the title "*L'idéée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel*" in Raymond Queneau's still somewhat fragmentary edition of the proceedings of the course, the text of the final two lectures are the only fully remaining account of that explosive year.[1] More conscious than the later lectures of the tensions between Hegel's project and the force of his own interpretation, this essay clearly marks Kojèève's truly original contributions to a philosophical inquiry into the relationship between language and negativity.

But first a few words on the relation between the uses to which Kojèève puts Hegel and Hegel's own philosophical position. On the one hand, the interpretive tradition initiated by Kojèève is anything but orthodox. While relying on a close engagement with the text, he often freely disregards those aspects of Hegel's work that conflict with his own philosophical and polemical stance, and exaggerates the centrality of those that accord with it. Most crucially in this context, Kojèève's claims with regard to the status of language focus almost exclusively

on the role it plays in the preface and dialect of sense-certainty in the *Phenomenology*, generally ignoring Hegel's claims in later sections of that work (such as in the figure of "the beautiful soul" and the "Religion in the Form of Art" section). Neither does Kojèève discuss the explicit theorization of the status of language and signs in the third section of the *Encyclopedia*.[2] And even in the sections of the *Phenomenology* that he addresses, he is much more concerned with the identification of naming and negativity than with the structural role that such activities play in the dialectical unfolding of absolute knowledge. Indeed, Kojèève's emphasis on the separating work of the understanding (discussed in detail below) clearly appropriates elements of Hegel's interpretation and criticism of the Kantian position, hypostatizing their contents into something like an independent ontological position. Furthermore, Kojèève attributes a somewhat wider signification to the status of negation and negativity than Hegel. Where the latter largely accepts Spinoza's identification of negation and determination, adding that the negation of a stance or proposition remains precisely as determinate as that which is negated, Kojèève conflates the role of Hegelian *Negation* with Heidegger's reflections on the ontological role of "the nothing" (*das Nichts*) which generates the ontological angst by which the world as such is disclosed to a being.[3] This is *not* to claim that Kojèève imports the entire range and power of Heidegger's "nothing" into his reading of Hegel. Rather, he overlays its basic ontological status onto Hegelian logical negation.

While today we are prone to reject what might be charitably describe a the "looseness" of Kojèève's reading -- and this stance dominates most contemporary reactions to his work -- the influence of his lectures on 20th century French Hegelianism ought not be underestimated. While it gained a much more textually rigorous style via Hyppolite's translation and commentaries, it is Kojèève's thematic obsessions with language and negativity that dominated Hegel reception among the existentialist and structuralist traditions. That said, I would now like to turn to Kojèève's essay, beginning with a few words about its intellectual context.

Roughly divided into two sections, "*L'idéée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel*" concentrates both on readings of a section of the preface to the *Phenomenology*[4] and a number of relatively fragmentary parts of Hegel's earlier writings (generally taken from the 1803-1806 Jena lectures). While most explicitly dealing with links between the social nature of reason, freedom, and death in the latter section, much of Kojèève's interpretation there can be directly traced to Alexandre Koyréé's earlier attempt to introduce the young Hegel to France in his capacity as Kojèève's predecessor and mentor at l'ÉÉcole pratique des Hautes ÉÉtudes.[5] But the *earlier* section is the location of Kojèève's most powerful interpretive work, and marks the commencement of a project linking negativity and language as the touchstones of Hegelian thought.

While this thrust of Kojèève's reading is also undoubtedly inspired by his teacher's work, it also stands as the most radical break between them. From Koyréé, Kojèève inherits a linguistically reflexive interpretive apparatus that recognizes the powerful centrality of language in the Hegelian project. In the Jena writings Koyréé had found an inseverable link between language and Hegelian *Geist,* taking language to be the spiritual motor that dialectically drove consciousness through its various incarnations and self-interpretations.

"Language is thus the lower frontier of spirit," Koyréé wrote, "the creation of a proper world, the only world that possesses being." All later 'spiritual' (*geistige*) evolution in Hegel would thus, as Koyréé writes, "have language for its medium and vehicle," and would "incarnate itself in language."[6] For Koyréé, language -- and here he means not only 'language in general' or 'the fact of language' but also the very material and specific terminological language of Hegel the philosopher -- this language actually *effects* dialectical synthesis both within the text and in the 'journey' of consciousness of which it offers an account. Language, in other words, functions simultaneously as a trope of the dialectic and a dialectical trope.

Tempting though the interpretive possibilities that this performative reading of the role played by language (both 'language' and *Hegelian* language) may be, Kojèève (under Heidegger's influence) rightly rejected Koyréé's insistence on the instrumentality that the latter's reading required. Kojèève also places language in its materiality at the heart of the negation and action that drive spirit. He stops short, however, of Koyréé's assertion that this means that Hegel can have nothing to say *about* language, that the internality of language with regard to *Geist* and *Sein* means that Hegel must pass over it in silence. And this had been precisely the result of Koyréé's investigation: Hegel cannot speak of language itself, merely of its bad use. Because, Koyréé writes, "the history of language, the life of language, is at the same time the history and life of spirit," Hegelian philosophy in general, and the *Phenomenology* in particular, must remain mute with regard to language in that it *uses* it.[7] For Kojèève, such a position was tantamount to demanding a divorce between language and negativity and thus placing language (in Hegel) in a position exterior to death. But because Kojèève was to insist on an *identification* (different than Koyréé's because dialectical and shot through with the negative) between and among language, negativity, death, human existence, and spirit, he was unable to countenance Koyréé's reading. Without rejecting the rhetorical movement and textual reflexivity of *Hegel's* language (even strengthening it via his emphasis on the historicity of the *Phenomenology* itself), Kojèève attempts to explore *language* in Hegel.

It is precisely this dialectical movement and rhetorical doubling that are at issue for Kojèève in his reading of Hegel's preface; at stake in the relationship between the being of discourse and the discourse that 'describes' being *is* (or better, *becomes* in Hegel) that of a circular self-grounding which enacts itself. Kojèève begins his reading with the well-known passage that announces Hegel's explicit break from his contemporaries (most specifically Schelling) and substance metaphysics in general: "everything turns on expressing and grasping the True [das Wahre], not only as *Substance,* but also *Subject.*"[8] Kojèève interprets the Hegelian opposition between *Wahrheit* and *das Wahre (la Vééritéé* and *la Vrai,* for Kojèève) in terms of the relation between language and the real. He defines *la Vééritéé* as "the complete and correct 'revelation' (= description) of Being and the Real by coherent Discourse (*Logos*)," while *la Vrai* is "Being-revealed-by-discourse-in-its-reality (*l'ÊÊtre-réévééléé-par-le-discours-dans-sa-rééalitéé*" (529)). Kojèève claims that Hegel's demand is a simple one: language that claims some type of correspondence with the real is nevertheless itself something real. Any philosophical discourse, then, that claims to speak of being must speak of the being of language in the course of its own exposition; and more crucially, it must speak of the being of the language that it itself is.

Describing the totality of what is and exists, in other words, must include a description of this description itself. "It therefore does not suffice for the philosopher to describe Being," Kojèève writes,

> He must still describe revealed-Being (*l'ÊÊtre-réévééléé*) and give an account of the fact of the revelation of Being by Discourse.... it does not suffice for him to speak of the Being that is given to him; he must still speak of himself and explain himself to himself as that which speaks of Being and of self. (530)

For Kojèève, this means philosophy is charged with becoming an anthropology, of accounting for being's realization as human being, language, and history.

Thus far Kojèève might be accused of falling (or following Hegel) into the error of finding language to be an essentially reflexive thing, an entity (in Kojèève's Heidegger-inflected terminology) present-at-hand whose reflexivity has simply hidden it from pre-Hegelian philosophy *as* a thing. Without doubt Kojèève's insistence on reading the *Phenomenology* as a philosophical anthropology has immediately disqualified it for many interpreters. Indeed, there is a sense in which Kojèève forgets or neglects his hermeneutic starting point in his strong interpretation of historical closure, particularly in the later lectures on Hegel's sixth chapter. (98-107 and 145-154)[9] And finally, Kojèève remains faithful to Hegel's insistence on totality and the possibility of its disclosure: substance does become subject (and vice versa); absolute knowledge does realize itself.

But precisely because language (in relation to death and negativity) is the site and ground for this 'anthropology,' Kojèève's interpretation is obliged to become far more nuanced than this simple dismissal allows. To say 'anthropology,' for Kojèève, is not to refer to an ensemble of human customs or a historical narrative of cultural events. Rather, it is to speak of human existence and language as radically interpenetrating each other, each simultaneously the ground and the annihilation of the other. His point is not to speak of the logos *of* anthropos, but of the identification of human existence and language with negativity and finitude. In these early lectures, the history that hegelianism posits and uses is not that of an entity located in a world of other entities, but rather (to use the Heideggerian terminology that Kojèève adopts) of being-in-the-world, of the historicity of human existence and of language. In the course of "*L'idéée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel*," the condition for the possibility of this historicity becomes discursive consciousness of finitude and death.

Even in the midst of his affirmation of Hegel's claim for the possibility of an absolute philosophy, Kojèève's insistence on the historicity of language and man (*l'homme*} moves to the foreground. The true, he says with Hegel, is not a simple identity, but a result. "True knowledge" (the reunification of subject and object by the negativity which occasioned their split) remains a coincidence of discourse (subject) and the being which it "reveals" (substance). This coincidence is born of what he calls "the adequate description of the *totality* of Being and the Real by 'absolute' philosophy." (530-531) But because what Kojèève calls "the totality of the real" includes human reality and discursive action, absolute knowledge can be nothing other than circular description.

But what is it about discourse that can be accounted for only by a circular, self-grounding description? In terms of what might be called the ontic level, it is true that Kojèève seems not to have much more in mind here than the brute materiality of discourse as a thing or series of things amidst a multitude of others (an element of the manifold). Kojèève, however, is far more interested in the ontological level of language, writing that the fact that "[dialectic taken in its] totality also implies the discourse which reveals it" means that it implies the *becoming* of this discourse. (532) The being of the absolute (as absolute discourse) must thus be the very becoming of language and signification: a negativity that enthrones itself at the very height of self-identity. It is not the fact or given existence of language (what Kojèève calls *l'ÊÊtre donnéé* or *l'ÊÊtre-statique-donnéé,* translating *Sein*) that calls forth the circularity of the absolute, but rather its negativity. The totality 'revealed' by language is thus reflexively grounded on the very being of discourse in its materiality, such that Kojèève eventually defines this very totality simply as "the ensemble of creative or dialectical movement which produces Discourse in the midst of Being." (532)

Kojèève's account of language in the *Phenomenology* becomes most explicit in his interpretation of Hegel's engagement with the question of the understanding (*l'Entendement* for *der Verstandes*) where, writes Hegel famously, "The activity of separation is the power and work of the *Understanding,* the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power." (540)[10] Language, on Kojèève's reading, is precisely this separation; it is abstraction -- the work of the understanding (which he not merely locates in, but *identifies with* human existence).

For Kojèève, the understanding is precisely that which is specifically human in *l'homme:* "la facultéé du discours." (541) Again, what is at stake for Kojèève is language in its becoming. Words "reveal" the particular singularities or events that constitute the totality of being. Language effects (or rather, is) an act of negation that separates ontological events from the being in which they are embedded. But as particular and singular, these events remain fragmentary and resist totalization. Only the totality of discursive acts can bring the totality of the real to knowledge, which is to say, separate it from itself in order to constitute itself as other than itself. Kojèève writes:

> Man [*l'homme*] does not reveal instantaneously, as in a flash, the totality of the real: he does not know this totality in a sole word-concept [*mot-concept*]. He reveals the constituent elements of the totality one by one, through isolated words or partial discourses, *separating* them from this [totality] in order to make them. And it is only the ensemble of this discourse extended in time which is able to reveal the total reality, even if [it be] simultaneous. (542)

Here Kojèève is careful to retain a rich notion of totality, insisting that neither the vertical plane of historical, temporal, and diachronic becoming nor the horizontal plane of structural, simultaneous, and synchronic being escape the fragmentation of language. Which is to say that not only will any single (non-absolute) discursive event quail before the negativity of time and history, but also before the negative which constitutes the historicity of a synchronic and relational moment of that history. At stake here, in other words, is more than the relatively

simple problematic of the disappearance of the *nunc* as articulated in Hegel's critique of sense-certainty. *This* would be the case if Kojèève's "ensemble of discourse" -- the totality of language in its materiality -- merely signified all words which have been spoken. The question and difficulty of totality, for Kojèève, is rather that of the possibility of an absolute discourse that would encompass all that can be said, all that can be meant, and all that can be intended precisely in and by its own articulation of itself.

The activity of the understanding, again, is the discursive separation of singularity from its totality. The catch that makes this activity of separation into a "miraculous" or "absolute" power, Kojèève continues, is that these singularities ("constituent elements") are inseparable from the totality which they constitute in that they are *material;* they are temporally and spatially related to every other element of the totality in which they occur. They exist, in other words, as relational entities, elements that are constituted in their very being precisely by their relation to everything other. Kojèève's *totalitéé* or *ensemble,* then, is a question of more than simple mathematical quantification. Rather, it signifies a relational context of meaning and existence in and through which each singular entity is born *as* singular. Nevertheless, the discursive act of the understanding accomplishes this separation. Abstraction can and does occur.

Kojèève accurately traces the origin of this conception of totality as relational existence to Leibniz. Hegel diverges from Leibniz, he claims, where the latter thinker fails to specify that the relationality proper to Being is subject to an act of violent separation by discourse (that is, by the understanding). Leibniz missed the essential difference between nature and history, Kojèève claims, and was thus unable to formulate a monadic anthropology (which is to say, he could not account for the monad's language or death). (535-536n1)[11] On the same page, Kojèève claims that Hegel himself was never able to adequately articulate this difference, leading to his application of dialectical categories to the natural world. Thus Kojèève either neglects or brackets Hegel's complex relationship to Romantic philosophy of nature (as well as an entire volume of Hegel's own *Encyclopedia*) in favor of identifying negativity and language. Kojèève's caveat is important in that it is one of his few acknowledgments that his interpretive emphasis on the centrality of language to the Hegelian project moves beyond the scope of a rigorous reading of Hegel's text. While it was Hegel who so eloquently argued for the negativity of discourse, the radical thought of the discursivity of the negative belongs to Kojèève.[12]

Again, despite his Leibnizian conception of totality as a seamless and relational network of singularities, Kojèève holds that abstraction, and thus extraction from this totality, takes place. Kojèève's description of the process of abstraction is dual. In its first form, abstraction is simply a movement of generalization that creates concepts. The understanding annihilates the particularity of a singular really existing thing in order to create a concept in general. I speak of 'book' or 'books' and not of this particular book. This form of abstraction is a general account of the origin of categorical thought, and remains quite close to Hegel. More powerful and interesting, however, is Kojèève's second interpretation of the abstraction that results from the separation effected by the understanding: I *speak* of this *book*. I give it a name and a discursive existence. I signify it and thus separate it from its totality. It is not their referent,

on this second interpretation, that words or signs make abstract, but rather the whole of the relational totality in which that referent exits. Language signifies its referents, Kojèève writes, "as if they were alone in the world." (542)[13] It is the very totality of being that is negated by the discursive gesture of the understanding. Language does not merely negate singularity, it *is* the negative in general. Thus the labor of the negative is a discursive work; it is *language* that separates and recombines entities in such a manner as to annihilate the given.

Kojèève's subsequent insistence on the materiality of language -- on the very real and powerful existence of the "separated entities" that form fragmentary discourses -- pulls his reading into locating the "absolute power" of the understanding *in* discourse. The originality and force of Kojèève's interpretation lies here, even if he refuses to acknowledge it. For under this second interpretation of abstraction, rendering something conceptual (and thus discursively negating the world) does *not* mean situating that singular thing outside of time and space in an idealized and ephemeral realm. It is the totality of the real that has been transformed into abstraction, this act nevertheless paradoxically performed by a very real discourse that cannot be severed from its material existence in the very world it annihilates. Detached (by the understanding) from its material support, essence becomes meaning. "But 'meaning' (*sens*) does not float in the void;" Kojèève insists, "it is necessarily the meaning of a *word* or of a *discourse:* -- pronounced, written, or only thought, but still existing in the midst of the spatial and temporal world." (543) Under the rule of Kojèève's second interpretation of abstraction, no distance can be posited between a real thing and its concept. Because it is precisely totality that is negated, and not the materiality of the singular thing, a concept or meaning remains real, Kojèève writes, "a real thing detached from its *hic et nunc,* from its here and now." (542) Standing simultaneously as essence and existence both of itself and its referent, and collapsing the distance of referentiality into its own *becoming,* discourse remains ineluctably material even while resisting reduction to the status of mere entity. "Thus the absolute power of the Understanding," Kojèève writes, *"separates* the idea-essence (*idéée-essence*) from its natural support only in order to reattach it, as idea-meaning (*idéée-sens*), to the specific support of a discourse, which is itself also here and now." (543)

On the one hand, Kojèève immediately retreats from the radical implications of his identification of negation and language, reserving effective negation for 'physical' labor in the world and relegating discursive separation to the realm of project formation: "it is by separating and recombining things in and by discursive thought," he writes, "that man forms his technical projects which, once realized by work, really transform the face of the given natural world..." (542) This retreat is absolutely necessary for Kojèève's later eschatological account of Hegel's 'end of history' in and through the simultaneous advent of Napoleon and the System in the world. Faced with the magnitude and repercussions of his identification of discourse and negativity, Kojèève jettisons language into the future, leaving the present free for the 'real' action of 'actual' labor. In other words, Kojèève's dual commitment to Marx and Heidegger brings a tension to his project with which he can never truly contend.

But on the other hand, Kojèève complicates his own position by articulating the very being of the present as one dominated by the future, and by the discursive

7

projects that constitute it. His account of the temporality of being, in other words, undermines his attempt to free himself from his own Hegelian web. It is action itself (which is to say human existence) that results in the primacy of the future for time. Applying an interesting reading of early Heidegger to the Hegelian problematic, Kojèève argues that action reverses the given or natural conception of time that subordinates the past and the future to the present (in that only the present is being; the past has been and the future will be, but neither *are*). Action, which is to say human existence, has, Kojèève writes "a *real presence* in Being" as the realization of a project. This project, as a project, is necessarily futural; it is the nothingness of being in that it is necessarily a potential negation of the present and the given. And this nothingness of being, for Kojèève, is nothing other than *meaning* (*sens*).

In terms of its relation to the present -- given being -- a project need not be moored to a particular given existence. It is necessarily discursive, which is to say, it has already been subject to the radical separation effected by the understanding. This separation, it must be remembered, is simultaneously a reattachment of meaning to language in its materiality. Thus the futural discursive project reanchors itself in the present. The negativity of the future -- as discourse -- really and materially *is* in the heart of the present. This, for Kovjèève, means that the future has come to dominate the present. That domination is one of negation and action, which now finally appear as what they are: discursive projects. Kojèève writes, "the project *realizes* itself in the present, and it is in the past as already *realized*. But the present of the project, and therefore its past, are penetrated and determined by the future, which subsists in them in the form of discourse." (547n1) Kojèève evidently recognized the dangerous implications that this analysis of temporality (and the identification of language and negativity that it defends) posed for other aspects of his project. His response was to relegate the entire argument with regard to temporality to a footnote. The distance between a discursive project and its realization has collapsed with the irruption of the future in the heart of the present. And insofar as Kojèève insists on an identification of futural negativity with finitude and death, the death of the real that language incarnates installs itself in the heart of the present. The 'deferred' and futural death of the human being dominates present existence in the form of the materiality of discourse.

Kojèève goes to great lengths to avoid the impression that either the referentiality or the materiality of language can be taken as properties possessed by an entity (that is, he refuses to take Logos as present-at-hand). The concept is not simply an idea or a meaning, "but a *word*-having-a-meaning (*un* mot-*ayant-un-sens*), or a coherent discourse." Here Kojèève forces subject, predicate, and present participle to relinquish their grammatical specificity and collapse into a single term, all in the service of avoiding the reduction of meaning to a property of a word while at the same time preserving its material existence. For Kojèève, the result of the abstraction of the world (the work of the understanding) is a thing in the world, its essence precisely its very being-in-the-world.

Kojèève's argument might seem to be immediately undermined by the possibility of meaningless words, of discursive events unmoored from their sense. But because for Kojèève the *arche* and *telos* of discourse are strictly identical -- the understanding, itself discursive, produces discourse in its

materiality through its very act of the negation of the given world -- meaningless discourse is simply impossible, an a priori contradiction in terms. It is simply that the relationship between sign and referent is no longer natural or immediate. Kojèève writes:

> Here there has been, therefore, a *negation* of the given as it was given (with its 'natural' relations between essence and existence); which is to say there has been *creation* (of concepts or words-having-meaning [*de mots-ayant-un-sens*], which, as words, have nothing to do with the meaning that they incarnate); which is to say there has been *action* or *labor*. (545)

The "miraculous" power of the understanding, then, is this discursive act of separation that negates the natural relation of words and things in order to recombine and reconnect them in a new materiality. The labor of the negative, once again, is the work of language.

Kojèève had already provided another formulation of his insistence on the general ontological implications of thinking the temporality of being in discursive terms, one that foreshadows a number of lectures from the 1938-1939 course. He was to identify the concept with time,

> ... or what is the same thing, to affirm the *temporality* of Being itself [*l'ÊÊtre lui-mêême*]. For the *concept,* or more exactly the *meaning* of Being [*le* sens *de l'ÊÊtre*], barely differs from Being itself [*l'ÊÊtre lui-mêême*], if only through the absence in the *meaning* of the *being* of this Being [*sinon par l'absence dans le* sens *de* l'êêtre *de cet ÊÊtre*]. (544)

Note that in this second formulation, as in the later lectures, Kojèève is careful to avoid positing action as discursive negativity. Nevertheless, the "absence" he finds here is located precisely in the meaning of "the being of this Being -- *l'ê*être *de cet ÊÊtre*," which is to say *l'homme* in his human existence as taking *action* and thereby negating a given and natural world. The meaning of action, indelibly marked as discursive, is the human as the negative and as death. Kojèève writes, "It is only in understanding Man as Negativity that one understands him in his 'miraculous' human specificity, making of himself an 'I' who thinks and speaks...." (547)

Kojèève has thus established a circularity for his long chain of equivalencies: existence = action = negativity = language = death = existence. And it was the possibility of discovering the grounds for this process of identification in Hegel, along with the radical thought of the discursivity of the negative, that provided the passionate interpretive ground for much later French philosophy and theory. By reversing and expanding Hegel's subordination of language to negativity and finitude, Kojèève opened the textual and interpretive field that was to obsess French thinkers for generations to come: thinking the material discursivity of death and the negative.

NOTES

1. *L'idéée de la mort..* constituted the final two meetings (529-575). A. Kojèève, *Introduction àà la lecture de Hegel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947). References to the lectures collected in this text are cited parantheticall

2. See *Encyclopedia* §§451-464.

3. For Hegel on Spinoza's "omnia determinatio est negativo", see §§91 of the *Encyclopedia* and its Zusatz. For Heidegger, see *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), 184-191. Heidegger's claims regarding the status and role of *das Nichts* have a much wider role to play than this, and in fact dominate the whole of *Being and Time* for many interpreters. It is nevertheless the claims made in ¶40 of that text that dominate the reception of Heideggerian negativity in French existentialism and structuralism.

4. *Phenomenology of Spirit,* trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 9-14 and 18-19, ¶¶ 17-25 and 32.

5. Most specifically, see A. Koyréé, "Hegel àà Iééna," *ÉÉtudes d'histoire de la penséée philosophique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 147-189.

6. Koyréé, "La terminologie héégééélienne," ibid., 199.

7. Ibid., 200-201.

8. Hegel, 23/10.

9. These lectures are preserved only in fragmentary form.

10. This is to render Kojèève's more literal *sééparation* for *scheiden* rather than Miller's juridical "dissolution." This choice was generally upheld by Hyppolite even while in this particular sentence he uses *diviser.* See Hegel, 36/18, and G.W.F. Hegel, *La Phéénomééénologie de l'esprit,* vol. I, trans. J. Hyppolite (Paris: Aubier, 1939), 29.

11. While Kojèève's acknowledgment of Leibniz is accurate, the grounds for his ultimate denunciation of the latter is more dubious.

12. Kojèève was not to renew this acknowledgment of his divergence from Hegel until 1939, the final year of his course. See the closing pages of "Note sur l'ÉÉternitéé, le Temps et le Concept." (377-378)

13. Again, note the use of Leibnizian terminology.