

**SCMS-20**

# **Software for LaGrande Technology: Impact to the Software Development Process**

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Intel Corp.**

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# Safer Computing Track – Fall IDF

## Tuesday

LT Overview  
SCMS-16

TCG & TPM v1.2  
SCMS-17

LT Architecture  
SCMS-18

Tech Showcase  
Every Day  
Birds of a Feather  
Lunches  
Tuesday & Wednesday

## Wednesday

Privacy Method for  
Assuring Trust  
SCMS-19

Opt-In Strategy  
SCMS-156

Trusted Mobile KB  
Controller  
SCMS-21

Software for LT  
SCMS-20

Fundamentals of  
NGSCB  
SCMS-21




Migrating Apps to  
NGSCB  
SCMS-22

## Thursday

TPM Recovery  
SCMS-25

TCG Credentials  
SCMS-157


TPM Mfg & Testing  
SCMS-180

-  = Overview
-  = Medium Technical
-  = Highly Technical

# Outline

- **LaGrande Technology (LT) Overview**
- **Why Design for LT?**
- **The LT Software Development Process**
  - Security Analysis
  - Design
  - Development
  - Testing
  - Maintenance
- **Example: Order Entry**

# LaGrande Technology Overview



- LT is a general-purpose security foundation
  - LT is application and OS agnostic

# Why Design for LT?

- **Robust security is easier and more maintainable**



- **Today's methods: tamper resistant software (TRS), obfuscation, hardware security modules (HSMs), etc.**
  - Requires specialized knowledge, proprietary, very complex, difficult to maintain, expensive
- **LT allows standard, straightforward designs and implementations**
  - Standard algorithms, re-use existing code, simple and easy to maintain
  - Hardware protection—not obscurity—provides security

# Why Design for LT?

- **New security functionality**
  - **Protected execution (aka domain separation)**
    - Program operations and data cannot be observed nor interfered with
  - **Protected input and graphics**
    - Keystrokes and mouse input are protected from software attacks
    - Displayed information can't be captured by software
  - **Sealed storage**
    - Data can be sealed to specific software environment
    - Once sealed, can be persisted anywhere
  - **Attestation**
    - Remote verifiers can be assured of software and platform they are talking to
      - Protected kernel may extend this to applets ➔ code identity

# The LT Software Development Process

- **Security Analysis**
- **Design**
- **Development**
- **Testing**
- **Maintenance**

# Security Analysis



# Security Analysis

## Threat List

- **High-privilege attacks difficult to prevent today**
  - Bypass many OS security mechanisms
  - Very powerful for attacker
  - Difficult for applications to secure against OS compromises
  - E.g. executing code as root/administrator to install a device driver
- **LT can maintain security in face of OS compromise**
  - Expands threat list to include OS compromises
  - May require new mindset for finding threats

# Security Analysis Mitigation Strategy

- **LT enables mitigations not possible before**
- **Mitigations should be fine-grained and include partial solutions**
  - To permit incremental value add over time
- **Need to understand entire system design**
  - **Some LT mitigations may be incomplete**
    - Third party code dependencies
    - Functionality not present in protected partition
    - Data needs to be available outside of protected partition
    - Data is available on un-securable systems
  - **Moving the attack vector may be valuable**
    - E.g. from client to server, etc.













# Security Analysis

## Solution Prioritization

- **Prioritization is about balancing the cost of a mitigation against the risk its threat represents**
  - Many risk factors to consider
    - Severity, frequency, business, etc.
  - Many cost factors as well
- **LT reduces some mitigation costs**
  - Reduces need for costly alternatives (TRS, HSM, etc.)
  - Permit use of common algorithms / existing code
  - Often mitigates multiple threats with single solution
- **... but may increase others**
  - Effort to write / move code to protected partition
  - May have to re-create or move libraries or infrastructure
  - Potentially multiple code bases for non-LT platforms

# Security Analysis

## Examples

-  **Scanning a process' memory for data**
  -   **Process sensitive data in protected applet (protected execution)**
-  **Altering stored security policy**
  -   **Seal policy before storing (sealed storage)**
-  **Capture user password**
  -   **Collect password from protected applet (protected input)**
-  **Capture data by scraping screen**
  -   **Display sensitive data from protected applet (protected output)**

# Design

# Software Design for LT

- **Move minimum necessary code to protected partition**
  - Functionality may be limited
  - Easier to secure and trust less code
  - Easier to develop and maintain
- **Avoid redundant UI**
  - Will condition the user, defeating purpose of protected graphics
- **Don't over-secure**
  - Adds complexity without security value
- **Understand global data flows**
  - Important for knowing what to protect where
- **Separate code and data**
  - Don't hardcode private or shared keys or passwords
    - Code is protected when executing, but not when stored on disk

# Managing the Code Base(s)

- **Basically, partitioning for LT is just distributed computing**
- **Easier in managed code**
  - **Becomes responsibility of managed runtime provider to support protected partition**
  - **Same basic interfaces, so mostly transparent where code is running**
- **Otherwise can use abstraction layer**

# Development



# Software Development for LT

- **Limited in-the-field debugging and performance tuning**
  - Will depend on protected kernel
  - Likely that ‘release’ protected kernels:
    - Will not be debuggable from standard partition
    - Disable event-based monitoring, debug registers, etc.
      - Time-based sampling is still supported
- **Protect data sent to un-protected I/O devices**
  - Only keyboard, mouse, graphics have hardware protection
  - Protected kernel could protect additional devices
  - Protect data before it leaves protected partition

# Software Development for LT

- **Make security-related configuration part of code identity**
  - E.g. trace level, data sealing, backward compatibility, etc.
- **Code reviews are important for security**
  - Need to be conscious of data movement between partitions
  - Also check for common security mistakes
    - Buffer overrun, array indexing, canonicalization, access control, least privilege, etc.
  - **Security vulnerabilities in protected applet can compromise protected data and operations**

# Testing

# Testing LT Software

- **Security testing may require special expertise**
- **Workload generation for sealed data**
  - Also applies to developer unit testing
  - May want to turn off sealing for intermediate builds
  - Otherwise need to re-generate or migrate for each new build/patch
- **Validating on legacy platforms and OSes is not an issue**
  - Since LT functionality isn't supported by legacy
- **LT does not require software to be certified**
  - LT does not make value judgments about software in the protected partition



# Maintenance

# LT Software Maintenance

- **Upgradeability must be built in**
  - Needed to migrate existing sealed data
  - Exact process depends on protected kernel support
- **Changes impact attestation verifiers**
  - Publish new code identity
  - Need to update any verifiers

# Example: Order Entry

# Security Analysis Threat List






# Security Analysis Threat List


Paul



User places  
order



Data can be  
captured by  
screen scraper



Data can be  
captured by  
memory  
scanner

# Security Analysis Mitigation Strategy


- 1. Capture password with keyboard sniffer**
  - ✓ Use multi-factor or non-password authentication
  - ✓ Collect password from protected applet
- 2. Password is extracted from browser memory**
  - ~ Ensure browser is secure from attacks
  - ~ Use non-password authentication
  - ✓ Collect password from protected applet
- 3. AutoComplete saves password on harddrive**
  - ✓ Disable AutoComplete
- 4. Data can be captured by screenscraper**
  - ✓ Display data from protected applet
- 5. Data is extracted from browser memory**
  - ~ Ensure browser is secure from attacks
  - ~ Use separate application for display
  - ✓ Display data from protected applet

# Security Analysis Solution Prioritization


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# Design

## Standard Partition



## Protected Partition



# Summary / Next Steps

- **LT provides security enhancements to applications**
  - Begin internal discussions on how your applications can leverage LT
- **LT's impact to development process can be successfully managed**
  - Begin planning for impact of LT on your product roadmaps
- **Early availability of LT Software Development Platforms**
  - Contact your Intel representative for information on the Intel Early Access Program (EAP)

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