

[CHRONICLES, January, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*The New Shape of American Politics*

(The following remarks were delivered in a panel discussion, "The New Shape of Politics," at the International Conservative Congress in Washington, D.C., on September 27, 1997)

First of all, I want to thank John O'Sullivan for asking me to take part in this panel, and secondly I want to issue a fair warning to my colleagues on the panel as well as to many in the audience. Many of you -- perhaps most of you -- will not agree with what I have to tell you about the new shape of American politics, and some of you may actually find it repellent. For some years I have been known as, for lack of a better term, a "Buchananite" conservative (at least that is one of the less objectionable things I have been called), and it is a fair description. But my allegiance to "Buchananitism" goes beyond support for the Buchanan presidential candidacy in the last two elections. In my newspaper column as well as in my monthly columns in Chronicles (many of which are now collected in a new book called Revolution from the Middle, which has been sedulously ignored by the conservative press), I have argued that the Buchanan candidacy is but the formal political expression of a deep social and cultural transformation I have called the "Middle American Revolution." The essential concept and to some extent the term are derived from the studies of the late Donald Warren, a

sociologist, whose 1976 book, The Radical Center, analyzed the underlying social and political forces that make up the Middle American Revolution.

Professor Warren identified a distinctive group in American society that he called "Middle American Radicals" or MARS, who are essentially middle-income, white, often ethnic voters who see themselves as an exploited and dispossessed group, excluded from meaningful political participation, threatened by the tax and trade policies of the government, victimized by its tolerance of crime, immigration, and social deviance, and ignored, ridiculed, or demonized by the major cultural institutions of the media and education. MARS possess objective statistical characteristics, but these are not their defining features. Warren identified as their defining feature an attitudinal characteristic -- that they view themselves as sandwiched between -- and victimized by -- an elite (in government and politics, the economy, and the dominant culture) that is either indifferent to them or hostile to them and an underclass with which the elites are in alliance and whose interests and values the elites support at the expense of the interests and values of Middle Americans.

In Professor Warren's original analysis, MARS were the backbone of George Wallace's national political following, but in later years the categories of "Reagan Democrats," "Perot voters," and more recently "Buchanan supporters" are largely identical to them. In my own development of Warren's work, Middle American Radicals represent both the central political base of the American Right, from at least the time of George Wallace and probably going

back to Joe McCarthy, as well as the core or nucleus of American culture and the American nation. Any movement of the right that wishes to succeed in national politics must mobilize Middle American forces, as both Nixon and Reagan did and as George Bush, Bob Dole, and Jack Kemp have failed to do. A convenient statistical definition of Middle Americans is that they are the middle income categories, making between \$15,000 and \$50,000 a year, a group that composes about 50 percent of the voting electorate. Exit polls show that while in 1980 and 1984 Reagan won an average of 57% of this category, in 1992 and 1996 Bush and Dole won only an average of 37% -- a precipitous decline of 20 percentage points. If the Republican Party continues to ignore MARs, it will find itself reduced to minority status and may even eventually cease to exist as a major party, and if the conservative movement continues to ignore them it too will dwindle in cultural and political significance. The "crisis of conservatism," the "conservative crack-up," that beltway and Manhattan conservatives today fret over is due precisely to the alienation of Middle American Radicals from the mainstream and neo-conservative Right. If, however, the American Right seriously wishes to govern, it will have to base its ideas and its policies on Middle American Radicalism or Middle American Populism and to incorporate the interests and values of MARs into its own political agenda.

My time is brief, so I will merely list some of the main

issues that currently and in the foreseeable future are important issues for Middle Americans, illustrate why they are important, and how conservatives and Republicans have managed to blow them. Some of these issues are controversial among conservatives, but there will be debates and discussions of their merits in other panels at this conference, so I prefer to leave discussion of their merits for the most part to those others.

The first and perhaps the most important Middle American issue that conservatives and Republicans have failed to address is immigration, both illegal and legal. There has been a fairly consistent trend in national opinion polls showing that large percentages of Americans of all ethnic and class backgrounds generally oppose immigration and want it reduced or stopped. Last year a Roper poll showed that some 83 percent of the public favor reducing or halting entirely immigration. I think this poll speaks for itself; you cannot get public responses on most polls better than 83 percent. It is probably fair to say that Americans who don't oppose immigration probably don't know that immigration is a problem or an issue.

Yet the Republicans have consistently failed to take up the immigration reform issue. Last year virtually the first thing Bob Dole did after securing the party nomination was to repudiate the GOP platform plank on immigration, and Jack Kemp has long been notorious among immigration restrictionists for his unqualified support for immigration. Prior to his attempt with Bill Bennett

in 1994 to sabotage California's Proposition 187, Kemp was actually in favor of both illegal and legal immigration, and as HUD Secretary he refused to allow the INS to enforce federal laws against illegal immigrants in federal housing projects. This year the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on immigration is Sen. Spencer Abraham, who refused to countenance any effort to reduce immigration; and the great fear within the beltway right is that by even mentioning immigration the Republicans will alienate the Hispanic vote -- a concern that tends to confirm MAR perceptions that political elites are allied with an underclass against the middle class. Hence, the trend of thought within the Republican Party and among its Beltway strategists is that the Republicans should do nothing whatsoever about immigration, except to restore welfare benefits to immigrants as the Congress did earlier this year.

In addition to the immigration issue, there is also the very salient Middle American issue of trade policy. I understand this is not just controversial but actually anathema to most conservatives, but the fact is that last year Buchanan acquired some of his most impressive vote counts in areas harmed by trade policy -- well after Dole had effectively secured the nomination in the primaries, Buchanan won nearly 34 percent of the vote in the Michigan and Wisconsin primaries, both states where crossover voting is allowed and both manufacturing states now facing economic decline because of foreign competition. In the 17th

congressional district of Ohio, Ohio's Mahoning Valley, also a center of Middle Americans who hold or have held manufacturing jobs, Buchanan took 40 percent of the vote, again well after Dole had effectively won the nomination. Trade and economic nationalism therefore are key Middle American issues that can help regain for the Republicans the Reagan Democrats forfeited by the 1992 Bush-Quayle and 1996 Dole-Kemp tickets.

Once again, Republicans and mainstream conservatives have blown these issues, just as they have immigration. Clinton was able to enact NAFTA only with Republican help, and today he stands to win passage of fast track and the extension of NAFTA again with Republican help. Although polls indicate that 54 percent of the public opposes fast track, as do 67 percent of self-identified Republicans, fast track has been editorially endorsed by virtually all leading conservative newspapers and magazines and by the Republican leadership in Congress, and free trade ideology remains dominant among most conservatives everywhere.

I could go on with a variety of issues that are of vital importance to Middle Americans on which Republicans have either refused to act or have actually come out on the other side of -- affirmative action, Second Amendment rights, perceived erosion of national sovereignty not only through NAFTA and the World Trade Organization but also in the enhancement of UN peacekeeping operations and the continuous needless involvement of the United States in foreign conflicts irrelevant to our national interests,

and the whole range of cultural issues from the failure of the Republicans to abolish the National Endowment for the Arts to the actions against the Confederate Flag by South Carolina Republican Governor David Beasley. On issue after issue the Republicans have failed to support Middle Americans. Instead of taking these issues seriously and trying to address them, what we have from the Republicans is the Beltway policy-wonkism of the Contract with America, and we are now advised by GOP pollster Frank Luntz to avoid all issues, to mouth merely sound-bites that will make voters think their concerns are being addressed and will make them feel good, while Bill Kristol tells us, in a sentence worthy of Leonid Brezhnev, that you cannot love your nation if you criticize its government and, as Mr. Kristol told E.J. Dionne a couple of weeks ago, that conservatives should have no problem with FDR, JFK, or LBJ. With advice like that, no wonder there is a conservative crack-up, and it would be interesting to know why there should be any conservatism at all or why it should ever have existed.

It is therefore no wonder that GOP presidential candidates lose Middle American allegiances and with them also lose elections, that we see the emergence of third party rivals, and that a fringe is turning to groups like the militias, talking seriously about secession, and endorsing the most bizarre conspiracy theories about the government and its leadership.

What we are seeing in this alienation of Middle Americans

from mainstream conservatism and the Republican Party is, in my view, essentially the emergence of a new paradigm in American politics, not James Pinkerton's new paradigm or the Third Wave of Mr. Gingrich, but a paradigm that is essentially nationalist rather than right or left as we have historically known those labels. Immigration, trade, sovereignty, and cultural issues all revolve around national identity, and the new shape of politics in the future will see the emergence of a new nationalism -- not Bill Kristol's nationalism -- that will demand that these issues be addressed. It may not be Pat Buchanan who carries the new paradigm to political and cultural power, but if not he then someone else will. Mainstream conservatives and Republicans can either take up the issues that the Buchanan campaigns have identified or they can ignore them, as they have done and are doing, and eventually expect to vanish from the national political scene.



[CHRONICLES, February, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

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*An Infantile Disorder*

"Why, we could lick them in a month!" boasts the hot-headed Stuart Tarleton soon after the Confederates fire on Fort Sumter in Margaret Mitchell's Gone with the Wind. "Gentlemen always fight better than rabble. A month -- why, one battle." At that point, young Mr. Tarleton's naive and tedious boasting is interrupted by Rhett Butler, a rather darker character in Mitchell's novel than the swashbuckling playboy created by Clark Gable on the screen. Butler coolly points out that the Southerners do not possess what modern strategists would call the industrial and logistical infrastructure with which a modern war must be fought -- the cannon factories, iron foundries, railroads, and woolen and cotton mills that the North has in abundance. "But, of course," he concludes, with the sarcastic smirk that is ever on his lips, "you gentlemen have thought of these things."

But of course they hadn't thought of those things, at least the fictional cavaliers gathered at John Wilkes' barbecue that spring day in 1861, and if the leaders of the new Confederacy had thought about them more, too many other Southerners failed to give such mundane matters the consideration they merited. What they did think about was the glories of the coming conflict and the rights they were going to vindicate by force of arms, and within a

few years and a few more battles than Stuart Tarleton had anticipated, he and his twin brother were dead, along with most of the others who had listened to them, the Confederacy itself, and the society on which it rested. As for Rhett Butler, he not only survived but flourished, confident in his philosophy that there are two times when a man can easily make a fortune for himself -- once when a civilization rises, and once when a civilization falls.

Today, 130 years after the disasters to which the chatter of valiant fools like Stuart Tarleton led, secessionism purports to rise from the ashes, this time embodied mainly in the League of the South, of which most of the editors of this magazine except me appear to members. Its leaders foreswear the use of violence, so we need not anticipate that the results will be similar -- at least not until a good many more Southerners sign up than seem to have done so in the four years of the League's existence and until the federal government pays more attention to them than it has done to date. Nevertheless, if the physical extermination of 600,000 white men over the burning issue of whether four million black men are to be slaves or serfs is not on the agenda this time, secessionism promises to be no less a disaster for those of the American right than it was for the pretty belles and beaux of Mitchell's novel. It is unfortunate that many of those gentlemen most dedicated to secession seem not to have thought of the weaknesses of their position any more than the guests at the Wilkes barbecue had.

Two main forces appear to drive the resurrection of Southern

secessionism. In the first place, the American right as a serious political movement has collapsed, leaving its most dedicated adherents with no obvious vehicle for pursuing its goals of dismantling the federal leviathan and ending the cultural and demographic inundation of the South and the rest of the nation. In the second place, a concerted onslaught against Southern and Confederate symbols and traditions, most clearly represented in the attacks on public display of the Confederate Battle Flag, rightly excites the wrath of Southerners who remain loyal to the memory of the Confederacy and the culture that the flag and the war have come to represent. Correctly lacking any confidence in the Republican Party or the neo-conservative-dominated "conservative movement," Southerners of the right have decided to chuck it all and set off on their own, with the goal of invoking the traditions and identity of their own land and culture as the basis for resisting federal tyranny and their own racial and cultural destruction.

Yet neither of these two forces provides an adequate justification for secession, and neither suggests any realistic prospect of success. There are, to put it simply, two strong reasons why secession, for the South or any other part of the nation, is not a good idea. In the first place, it is not practical; in the second place, even if it were practical, it would not be desirable.

Leaders of Southern secessionism often point to sister

movements abroad -- to secessionist movements in Northern Italy, Quebec, Scotland, the Balkans, and other places -- as well as to perennial discussions and controversies about a kind of secession in various states, cities, and regions in this country. Both the foreign movements and those in the United States are irrelevant to what Southerners actually propose, however. Abroad, where secessionism has gathered significant support, it has done so because those pushing it can claim to be the heirs of real and ancient nations or at least of subnational regions that exhibit far more distinctiveness than the American South, today or at any time in its history, can claim. Scotland, Quebec, the Balkan peoples, and even Northern Italy all can boast of distinctive linguistic, religious, ethnic, and historical heritages, far more distinctive than those of the South, and some can point to some period in their past when they actually constituted autonomous states. Indeed, compared to some of these nations or regions, the American South under close scrutiny begins to vanish as a cultural unity. There is at least as much difference between Tidewater Virginia and East Tennessee or between northern and southern Louisiana as there is between Scotland and England or Northern and Southern Italy today.

Within the United States, the periodic demands for breaking Staten Island off from New York City or East Kansas from West Kansas or Southern California from Northern California are not secessionist movements in the same sense as what the Southerners

advocate. None of these other movements contemplates leaving the national political unity of the United States, and how they re-arrange or fail to re-arrange their own borders and jurisdictions is largely a matter of their own concern. It makes sense that over time some borders and jurisdictions will become outmoded, and to redraw the map every now and then to suit contemporary interests and needs is unobjectionable. But it is not secession in the sense that Southerners and most dictionaries use the term, and to cite such movements (none of which has so far been successful) as examples of the rising dissatisfaction with the unified nation-state is fallacious.

Nor do contemporary Southern secessionists make any compelling case for the separation of their own region from the larger national unity. Historically, the Southern people have had an arguable case for separation, and in 1860, with the prospect of their slave-powered economy being gradually gutted by Northern dominance, their case was more arguable than ever, though even then there was less than a universal consensus in the South for separation. Today, that case simply does not apply. Today, the modern South has probably profited from federal largesse more than most other regions, and the argument for States' Rights, which Southerners invoked from Jefferson to George Wallace, is silenced by the demands of Southern politicians for more farm subsidies, more defense contracts, more military bases, more federal highways, and -- if we include blacks as Southerners, which the

League readily does -- more "civil rights," more affirmative action, more federal marshals to enforce them, and more welfare.

To find out how practical secessionism is in the South today, visit any large Southern city -- Atlanta, Charlotte, Nashville, Richmond, Dallas, Fort Worth, let alone New Orleans and Miami -- and ask yourself if the residents (even those who are still recognizably American) are ready for another Pickett's Charge. It's all conservative Southerners can do to keep the Battle Flag flying and Confederate monuments from being obliterated, and the most vociferous enemies of the flag and the monuments are not the "Yankees" of yore or even the federal government but Southerners themselves, either the manipulated blacks of the NAACP or white Southerners of Confederate antecedents like South Carolina's Republican Governor David Beasley. The South today and the Southerners who inhabit it are simply too well connected to Washington and the rest of the nation to contemplate any serious movement for the national independence of their region.

But even if secession were possible, it would be a bad idea. Today, the main political line of division in the United States is not between the regions of North and South (in so far as such regions can still be said to exist) but between elite and non-elite. As I have tried to make plain in columns in this magazine and many other places for the last fifteen years, the elite, based in Washington, New York, and a few large metropolises, allies with the underclass against Middle Americans, who pay the taxes, do the

work, fight the wars, suffer the crime, and endure their own political and cultural dispossession at the hands of the elite and its underclass vanguard. Today, the greatest immediate danger to Middle America and the European-American civilization to which it is heir lies in the importation of a new underclass from the Third World through mass immigration. The danger is in part economic, in part political, and in part cultural, but it is also in part racial, pure and simple. The leaders of the alien underclass, as well as those of the older black underclass, invoke race in explicit terms, and they leave no doubt that their main enemy is the white man and his institutions and patterns of belief.

The only prospect of resisting the domination of the Ruling Class and its anti-white and anti-Western allies in the underclass is through Middle American solidarity, a solidarity that must transcend the differentiations of region, class, religion, party, and ideology. White Southerners are a vital part of the Middle American core, as are their northern counterparts, and neither is the enemy of the other. Both regional sections of Middle America face the same threats, experience much the same problems, and ought to be joined in the same political-cultural movement to meet the threat together.

If, however, Southerners were to secede, they would be engulfed by the same forces that threaten the nation as a whole. By the year 2020, the Census Bureau reports, the only parts of the South that will have more than a 75 percent white population will

be a thin strip of western Virginia, most of Tennessee, and northern Arkansas; the rest of the region, especially Texas and the Deep South, will be dominated by populations more than 50 percent non-white, in some places far more. Dr. Brent Nelson has calculated that even today, even if 80 percent of the white population of South Carolina were to support secession in a referendum, that would amount to only 55 percent of the state's total population. I mention this racial dimension of the secession controversy not because of the obvious conflicts that will arise in its wake but to suggest that the majority populations of the South in the near future will either be blacks, who have only hostile memories of what secession and the historic South meant to them and their ancestors, or Hispanics, who will sympathize with secession only if it means union with Mexico. It is unlikely that either the black or the Hispanic populations will evince much sympathy for Jefferson Davis and his legacy.

But the racial composition of the future South is significant also because the racial consciousness and solidarity non-whites will exhibit is already plain, in the frenetic, hate-driven language of their leaders and organizational vehicles, in their political behavior, and in the whole fabric of their subculture. It is a consciousness that readily identifies whites as an enemy and their institutions and values as alien and oppressive.

The only prospect of white Middle American resistance to this racial and political engulfment is our own solidarity; instead of



snorting at white Northerners as "Yankees" who lack good table manners and the rudiments of culture, white Southerners should be standing firm with them in opposition to more immigration and more domination by the federal leviathan that serves as the political instrument of the overclass-underclass alliance.

The key to resisting that domination does not lie in resort to the dormant right of secession but in revival of the real federalism to which both Southerners and Northerners subscribed at the time the Constitution was ratified. It may be argued that the 10th Amendment is itself dormant, but it remains more alive than secessionism. The Supreme Court has cited the 10th Amendment in striking down a federal gun control law in the Lopez case in 1994 and the Brady law last year, and even poor old Bob Dole used to brag about carrying a copy of the amendment around in his vest pocket. Of course Mr. Dole didn't understand or care what the amendment meant, but the fact that even he would invoke it means that it remains a living part of our Constitution. With its revival as a serious political tool, most of the dangerous and stupid overgrowth of the federal leviathan would disappear, and its disappearance would be welcomed not only by Southerners but by most Middle Americans of other regions who suffer from it.

I do not, of course, believe that secessionism will prosper as a serious political movement, but I do worry that it will prosper to the point of becoming a serious political distraction - a distraction from the imperative that Middle Americans now face

of constructing their own autonomous political movement that can take back their nation rather than assisting the new underclass and the globalist Ruling Class in breaking it up. The time left for us to do so is shorter than it has ever been in our history, and until we outgrow the infantile disorder that secessionism offers, the construction cannot begin. If the gentlemen who talk of secession have not yet thought of these things, I invite them to do so soon.■

[CHRONICLES, April, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*The Other Face of Multiculturalism*

"The values of the weak prevail," wrote Friedrich Nietzsche, "because the strong have taken them over as devices of leadership." This brief and rather cryptic remark in fact contains virtually all we need to know about why contemporary movements like multiculturalism, feminism, homosexuality, and anti-white racism are such powerful trends in modern American and other Western societies. It is easy enough to say that these movements are merely the revolt of Nietzsche's untermenschen and the natural consequence of mass democracy and civilizational decline. But what Nietzsche grasped that many modern conservatives, who dislike Nietzsche almost as much as Karl Marx and Hillary Clinton, don't grasp is that what looks like decline, decadence, and decay to conservatives appears to the champions of such trends as progress and the birth of a new civilization. Hence, because conservatives often fail to understand this, they perceive an apocalyptic collapse into anarchy and disorder where there is really simply an emerging structure of alternative power.

The strong -- those who like and want to use power -- make use of unfashionable and forbidden ideas to gain power for themselves. In so far as they are successful in their efforts, what results does represent the decline of the kind of social and political

order that conservatives are disposed to defend, but that doesn't mean that some sort of order is not at the same moment about to lurch forth from the apparent chaos.

Multiculturalism, for example, is less the result of ignorance and uninformed fantasies than a deliberately designed device by which the power-hungry can subvert a culture the moral codes of which deny them power and begin building an alternative culture whose different moral codes yield power for themselves and none for their rivals. Much of the multiculturalist agenda that today rots the minds of children and students from day care centers to the post-graduate level of education and research in fact originates in an important but little-known organization that calls itself the National Association for Multicultural Education, or NAME. Every year NAME holds a convention that is attended by more or less innocent but nonetheless power-hungry educators -- not only teachers but also school administrators, superintendents, and education professors -- as well as by an inner circle of what can be described only as the professional nucleus from which most of the nutty concepts of applied multiculturalism derive. This past year the NAME folks convened in Albuquerque, New Mexico -- a suitably obscure location for plotting the subversion of civilization -- and wove their many-tangled webs.

The 600 attendees spent their time in seminars with titles like "Power Consciousness: Understanding Educator Power in the Classroom," "Building Race Unity," "Racial Identity, Jungle Fever, and the Politics of Interracial Relations," "Enhancing Diversity from Self to Others," "Challenging Cultural and Educational

Hegemony," and "Educating for Equity and Excellence: A Challenge for Black Learners to Use Anger as a Catalyst." There were at least two keynote addresses, one of which was delivered by one Peter McLaren of the University of California at Los Angeles and was entitled "Towards a Revolutionary Multiculturalism," and another, by Ward Churchill of the University of Colorado at Boulder, called "Assimilation or Liberation? Crossroads for Multiculturalist Theory." Essentially what NAME and similar organizations do is transmit multiculturalist doctrine to the general run of fairly dim-witted school teachers, show them how to apply it in classrooms, defend it against angry parents and skeptical community leaders, and in general construct a national cadre through which their Will to Power may blossom.

In a statement of "NAME's philosophy," the organization tells us that "Xenophobia, discrimination, racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia are societal phenomena that are inconsistent with the principles of democracy and lead to the counterproductive reasoning that differences are deficiencies." The premises of that statement, of course, are that the social institutions and identities -- the "phobias" and "isms" listed -- that define a particular order are (a) pathologies (hence the pseudo-psychiatric nomenclature) and (b) undemocratic. The implicit meaning of "democracy" in the statement is perhaps not what most Americans understand by the term, nor for that matter are most of the phobias and isms mentioned of the truly anti-social variety. The

statement also assumes (indeed, explicitly says) that NAME "rejects the view that diversity threatens the fabric of a society."

But in enunciating such disclaimers the statement, like multiculturalists in general, wears two faces. One face tells us that American society is imbued with exclusionary and repressive pathologies and calls for the extirpation of the basic mechanisms by which the pathologies and repression are sustained; the means to extirpate them is through the enhancement of "diversity" and the challenging of the dominant institutional categories that in effect define the social order. The other face denies any such goal and assures us that diversity is no threat at all. Pointing to this contradiction is important, not so much to expose and refute the muddled thinking of the multiculturalist mafia, but rather to make clear the tactics by which the mafia seeks power.

Multiculturalism is entirely correct in one of its major premises, that American society or any other kind of social order defines itself by the exclusion or subordination of some kinds of beliefs, behaviors, and values and therefore also the partial exclusion of those groups that are culturally wedded to them. A moment's reflection shows that this is universally true, that the pagan Roman Empire or Christian medieval monarchies could not have been the kind of societies they were had they not excluded and repressed alternative beliefs and groups that did not share their identity. In the United States, where Americans have historically

boasted of their tolerance and openness, the processes of exclusion and repression have generally been lacking in the formal apparatus of the state, and the absence of state action against social deviance has enticed many Americans into believing that those processes don't exist, that America is a unique and exceptional society that defines itself by its tolerance and "openness."

The fact is that American society, in part because of the weakness of its national state throughout its history, has relied on informal mechanisms of exclusion and repression to control deviations from its norms and enforce its own identity, and those informal mechanisms are located primarily in what we think of as the "culture." What the multiculturalists call "xenophobia" (the restriction of membership in American society to people who are culturally identifiable as Americans), "discrimination" (the exclusion of certain groups from certain kinds of participation because they do not adhere to an identifiable American identity), and all the rest of the "isms" they list are rooted not in the formal laws and constitutions of the American state but in the family, religion, communities, and schools.

The multiculturalists are entirely right in grasping this fact and also in their resulting strategy, that in order to challenge the mechanisms of exclusion and repression, overthrowing the state is not terribly important. What is important is to overthrow the culture. If it's revolution and liberation from

these "pathologies" and forms of repression you're looking for, forget the Pentagon, the FBI, and the CIA. The real enemies with whom you have to grapple are the family meal, the Sunday School, and the barber shop and the ideas, values, and commonly held beliefs that are discussed, re-enforced, and transmitted in those places.

Given this strategy and the correctness of its assumptions, the other face of multiculturalism acquires considerable importance as a tactic in carrying it out. The other face of multiculturalism insists that its challenge is not really radical or revolutionary at all but merely the fulfillment of "democracy" and what the NAME statement of philosophy elsewhere calls "the individual's noble quest to define one's relationship and responsibility to our global society." In other words, the other face of multiculturalism mobilizes its revolutionary agenda by using commonly accepted words and icons of the contemporary dominant culture -- "democracy" and the "global society," not to mention the ubiquitous cliches that "America is a nation of immigrants" or the "first universal nation" or is "founded on a proposition" too abstract to permit real cultural content. It uses these words and icons in order to gain entrée to and a sympathetic hearing from the commonplace centers of cultural power. And, in other words again, what this suggests is the reason why multiculturalism is today as powerful as it is -- that the groundwork for its revolutionary attack on traditional



American culture has been laid for it by the contemporary dominant culture and the jargon that the dominant culture has popularized and with which it defines itself.

What we have in the United States today, then, is ostensibly three different cultures (or subcultures, if you will). One is the traditional patriarchal, family-centered, Euro-American culture that defines and enforces itself through largely informal mechanisms and with which most who call themselves conservatives identify to one degree or another. The second is the dominant culture of the imperial metropole -- the dominant media, the major universities, and national politics. The third is the largely imaginary culture championed by the multiculturalists as the alternative to the first two (though they usually don't distinguish between the first two in the delusion that the dominant culture is simply an extension of the traditional one).

But in fact multiculturalism is not distinct from the dominant culture. It survives because of the ascendancy of the dominant culture's beliefs (embedded in such terms as "democracy" and the "global society") and enforced behaviors; it flourishes because it is lodged in the educational and governmental bureaucracies of the dominant culture; it is legitimized by the propaganda apparatus of the dominant culture; and its agenda is simply an intensification and a continuation of the agenda of the dominant culture, which is the replacement of the traditional culture by itself. Under the Clinton administration in particular

(though not confined to it), the dominant culture has been intensifying its combat against the traditional culture and in explicit alliance with multiculturalist legions. Hence, the president's fatuous "race initiative," which presides over a "dialogue" in which only one voice -- that of non-white resentment and white guilt -- is allowed to be heard, and hence its obsession with "hate crimes," the "stealth agenda" of which, as Robert Knight of the Family Research Council recently noted, is to "elevate homosexuality [and for that matter, all other victim categories excluded and subordinated by traditional cultural identity] to specially protected minority status."

It is true that multiculturalism differs from the dominant culture in much of its rhetoric and some of its tactics. The "diversity" it is always chattering about is not characteristic of the dominant structures of the state, media, and the higher perches of the economy, but because the dominant culture does not define itself through the same exclusions and repressions that traditional culture does, "diversity" is no real threat to it. What the dominant culture excludes and represses is the traditional culture itself, and "diversity" is today the principal weapon by which it seeks to achieve that goal. By enforcing "diversity" as an ideal and as an actual practice through affirmative action, forced integration, mass immigration, and multiculturalism itself, the dominant culture undermines the defining mechanisms of the traditional culture and renders its

continued functioning impossible. Since the dysfunctions in traditional culture that result often engender genuine pathological behavior, that simply re-enforces the image of traditional culture as inherently pathological that its dominant rival seeks to promote.

Conventional conservatives are generally correct that the dysfunctions they perceive in American society are signs of decadence -- the weakening of families, the erosion of communities, the inversion of sexual morality, and all the other chants in the litany of decline. But these are symptoms of the decadence of traditional culture, whether induced by its enemies or not; they are also signs of the triumph of the dominant culture, which regards them at worst as insignificant irritants or at best as indications of impending liberation from traditional restraints and the defeat of its adversary, traditional culture. The values of the weak, the weird, the excluded, and the repressed prevail because those who inhabit the dominant culture have taken them over as devices by which their own leadership is entrenched.

Nietzsche understood this long before the tactic had a name and long before groups like NAME discovered how to use the tactic to entrench their own power. ■

[CHRONICLES, May, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*Abraham the Unready*

(This is a shortened version of an address delivered at a "Colloquium on Lincoln, Reagan, and National Greatness" sponsored by the Claremont Institute in Washington, D.C., on February 12, 1998.)

I want to thank the Claremont Institute for inviting me to take part in this colloquium on Abraham Lincoln, especially since my views of Lincoln are rather radically at odds with those of most of the scholars associated with Claremont. Not only do I believe Lincoln was not a great man, I believe he was, as I called him in a recent article in Chronicles, "an ill-prepared man who has a strong claim to being the most incompetent President in American history," and that his presidency was a disaster, not only for those who lived (and those who did not succeed in living) through it, but for the nation as well.

Of the fifteen Presidents who preceded Lincoln in the White House, Lincoln enjoyed less preparation for high office than any.

He had served in the militia during the Black Hawk war but saw no action; he served only one term as a congressman and four as a state legislator. By 1860, he had twice run for the U.S. Senate and had been defeated both times. In 1860, nominated as the candidate of a new splinter party widely regarded as eccentric if not extremist, he was elected to the White House as a fluke, because of the split within the Democratic Party, with less than

40 percent of the popular vote. It is quite true that Lincoln was a skilled local politician and that he had become a prominent lawyer in Illinois, but he was not a nationally known lawyer, and most of his cases seem to have been rather ordinary ones.

In fact, Abraham Lincoln displayed all his life the world view of a small-town politico, and it was the immediate source of the disaster of his administration that he carried this mentality into the White House at the greatest crisis in American history.

Lincoln's small-town political mentality is fairly clear in the period between his election and the bungled resolution of the Ft. Sumter crisis. Lincoln simply could not bring himself to believe that Southerners felt strongly enough about the issues that animated them to secede; he could not bring himself to recognize that some people engage in politics for reasons of high principle and do not regard politics merely as a bottomless bucket of patronage. This is clear in what an Ohio journalist, Donn Piatt, discovered about him during the campaign. Piatt asked Lincoln what he planned to do if the South did secede, and he records that Lincoln simply refused to believe that that would happen:

He considered the movement South as a sort of political game of bluff, gotten up by politicians, and meant solely to frighten the North. He believed that when the leaders saw their efforts in that direction unavailing, the tumult would subside. "They won't give up the offices," I remember he said, and added, "Were it believed that vacant places could be had at the North Pole, the road there would be lined with dead Virginians."

Others who heard Lincoln talk about secession during this

period confirm what Piatt reported, and once Lincoln was inaugurated, it was to dispensing patronage that he devoted his immediate and almost total attention, despite the formation of the Confederacy and the looming specter of Ft. Sumter. His most recent biographer, David Donald, recounts how "The new President allowed office-seekers to take up most of his time. From nine o'clock in the morning until late at night, his White House office was open to all comers, and sometimes the petitioners were so numerous that it was impossible to climb the stairs." Indeed, when Charles Francis Adams, recently appointed ambassador to Great Britain by the administration, came to the White House with Seward to thank Lincoln and expected to discuss Anglo-American diplomacy at a critical moment when it was imperative for the Union to prevent British recognition of the Confederacy, Lincoln showed no interest. He dismissed him with the rude remark, "Very kind of you to say so, Mr. Adams, but you are not my choice. You are Seward's man," and he changed the subject to what he was really interested in: "Well, Seward, I have settled the Chicago Post Office."

Lincoln betrayed no indication of what he planned to do about the crisis of the Union that confronted him by the time of his inauguration, the secession of seven states and the formation of the Confederate government. He repeatedly insisted that neither he nor his party had any intention of interfering with slavery as it legally existed and that his sole purpose was to preserve the Union. Yet, given that goal, he issued no statement after his

election or his inauguration that made clear what he would do. Had he done so, his statement could have meant crucial support for Southern Unionists and avoidance of war.

Throughout the crisis Lincoln took his stand on formalities and evasions -- that as president-elect he had no authority, that compromise proposals were only efforts to subvert the Constitution or compromise with revolutionaries, that any meeting with Confederate representatives would imply recognition of Confederate independence and the right of secession. Technically, he may have been correct in some of these claims, but his insistence on them in the face of the dissolution of the Union and the prospect of war and at a time when even radicals on both sides were suggesting compromises reveals his mediocrity as a national political leader.

Seward, Adams, Sen. Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, Sen. John Crittenden of Kentucky, and the Virginia legislature all advocated or offered compromises, as did commissioners from the Confederacy, but Lincoln rejected them out of hand or ignored them.

When he first polled his Cabinet about re-provisioning Ft. Sumter, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior advised against it. Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase advised against it if it would mean war. Winfield Scott warned him that it would mean secession of the Upper South and that Sumter could not be re-enforced without a major military and naval commitment. Both Stephen Douglas and Horace Greeley also favored evacuating the

fort.

And yet he decided at last to re-provision it. His decision to do so was the greatest single blunder in American history, since it clearly invited and virtually forced the Confederacy to fire on the fort and allowed Lincoln to call for 75,000 troops in response. His call for troops in turn provoked the secession of the Upper South and the completion of the Confederacy, including the secession of Virginia. It allowed the Confederacy to add immeasurably to its own strength, placed its borders adjacent to Washington itself, and gave the Confederacy its greatest military commanders, Lee and Jackson.

While Lincoln insisted on formalities and legalisms when confronted by the secession crisis, he showed no such punctiliousness when dealing with Southern sympathizers in the North or with border states. The man who could not risk a meeting with Confederate commissioners because it might imply recognition of the Confederacy had no problem with illegally suspending habeas corpus, allowing the arbitrary incarceration of political opponents, and using federal troops to prevent secession of the border states, nor did the champion of perpetual unionism have much problem with the secession of West Virginia from its parent state. "The next years," writes Professor Donald, "would see greater infringements on individual liberties than in any other period of American history."

The result of his blunder was the self-inflicted genocide of



the Civil War and, so far from accomplishing his stated goal, the preservation of the Union, caused its mortal wounding. What kind of "Union" is it when half of it is forced back into it at the cost of military devastation and conquest, and much of the remainder has to be held under martial law and the suspension of civil liberties?

One of Lincoln's claims to greatness lies in his mastery of language, and I readily grant that his command of language in his major speeches is masterful; but the magnificence of language often serves as a mask for ignorance and distortion of fact and the torture of logic.

The centerpiece of Lincoln's political thought as it emerged in his debates with Douglas was that the equality clause of the Declaration of Independence applies to blacks as well as to whites. Very well, but in the debates with Douglas, Lincoln at once retreated from this concept. He denied that equality with whites implied that blacks should be allowed to vote, hold political office, serve on juries, or marry whites, and he consistently supported the deportation of blacks once emancipated.

Nor did he ever criticize the legal exclusion of free blacks from his own state of Illinois, let alone from other northern states. His claim was that blacks were equal to whites in some respects -- that they shared equally with whites the rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" of the Declaration. But in Lincoln's own democratic theory, it was precisely those rights

that gave whites the right to vote, hold office, marry whom they wished, and move where they wanted. By denying those same rights to blacks, he simply reduced his commitment to equality of rights to a nullity. It was like saying that 2 equals 4, except 4 is larger, and it undermined whatever force his argument might have.

His argument against secession in the First Inaugural shows the same sophistical bent. Nowhere does he respond to the real (and in my view, entirely valid) secessionist argument -- that the 10th Amendment reserved to the states the powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government and that, since the power of forcing the states to remain in the Union was never delegated to the federal government and was explicitly rejected by the 1787 constitutional convention, states have a right to secede.

Moreover, Lincoln distorts the whole meaning of secessionist doctrine and the compact theory of the Constitution on which it rested. If a state may secede, he argues, why can't smaller subdivisions secede from the seceders? That, of course, is exactly what West Virginia did, but it did so illegally even in terms of secessionist theory. Under that theory, it is the states that are sovereign and fundamental, not counties, cities, or towns, which in fact are the creatures of the state governments. While it is perfectly legitimate, in secessionist doctrine, for a state to secede, the same doctrine rejects the claims of a subdivision of a state to secede from it. Lincoln was either entirely ignorant of this elementary principle of secessionist

theory or else he deliberately distorted it.

In almost all of Lincoln's thought and speeches there is the strong aroma of the clever shyster, resorting to whatever legalisms or sophistries may win his case. Lincoln's reasoning is at times ingenious, but it is not the reasoning of a statesman, let alone of a serious political thinker.

I do not argue that Lincoln's course of conduct or his language was deliberately deceptive, that he intended all along to provoke war, overthrow the Constitution, and make himself dictator in a Caesarian grab for power. But the character that emerges from his conduct is that of a small-town politico, more concerned with the spoils of office and the garnering of votes than with the interests of the nation, and too inexperienced and poorly educated to meet the challenges his office demanded. He is simply the classic case of the Peter Principle -- a man promoted beyond the level of his competence.

Nor do I believe that he ever intended to re-found the American political order along lines radically different from what it was as he found it. Lincoln subscribed to a fairly conventional Whig nationalism, as conventional as it was questionable from a constitutional and historical viewpoint, but nonetheless useful for what he considered the great practical object of government, the encouragement of economic affluence, and his doctrine of equality was intended to justify that role of government. "On the side of the Union," he told Congress in his

message of July 4, 1861, the war "is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men -- to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all; to afford men an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life." As Harry Jaffa has put it, "The principle of Equality, far from enfranchising any leveling action of government, is the ground for the recognition of those human differences which arose naturally, but in civil society, when human industry and acquisitiveness are emancipated." I do not agree that the principle of equality does not enfranchise leveling -- the very lifting of "artificial weights" by the state is itself a process of leveling -- but it does serve to justify the egalitarian scramble for wealth, and in Lincoln's mind its purpose was exactly that.

But Lincoln failed to see the flaws of such a theory or where it would lead -- to the unlimited expansion of centralized state power, the destruction of the power and authority of the states, the enthronement of Economic Man as the summum bonum of human endeavor, and the destruction of the Old Republic. Both the late M.E. Bradford and liberal historian James McPherson rightly see Lincoln as the godfather of the "fundamental transformation of the relationship between power and liberty" that the war brought. The result was the launching of the federal leviathan on the course it has followed ever since. The political and plutocratic corruption

of the late 19th century and the eventual marriage of plutocrat and bureaucrat in the modern managerial state of our own day are Lincoln's legacy, whether he intended them or not.

Today, conservatives gaze in dismay as an American public expresses indifference to the moral conduct of the chief executive and praises him for his successful management of the economy. Last week the Wall Street Journal quoted a citizen of Illinois, the "Land o' Lincoln," who said, "Don't tell us that we have a bad guy in there [the White House]. We can see for ourselves that things are better," and her husband added in agreement, "He has kept up the economy." Why should we be surprised that the triumph of Economic Man results in indifference to and denial of the moral degradation of the presidency and the nation it serves? It was Abraham Lincoln, wittingly or not, who set us on the road to the destination at which we have now arrived. ■

[CHRONICLES, May, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*Abraham the Unready*

(This column is based in part on an address delivered at a "Colloquium on Lincoln, Reagan, and National Greatness" sponsored by the Claremont Institute in Washington, D.C., on February 12, 1998.)

L'affaire Lewinsky was the obsession of the headlines and conversations of Washington throughout February, obscuring even the jolliness promised by another airborne stomping of Iraq and the possible obliteration of the American economy by the Asian stock market crash. All through the month, one femme after another seeped from the woodwork of the Clinton administration -- not only the lovely and talented Monica but also her mother, her literary agent, her friend Mrs. Tripp, the president's secretary, the elusive Miss Willey, the interminable Paula Jones, and, of course, the fat-mouthed First Lady herself, who on national television fabricated fantastic conspiracy theories to preserve her husband's office and the illusion of a normal marriage a few days longer. On top of these eruptions came Mrs. Albright bellowing for blowing Saddam Hussein out of his combat boots, the solemn Janet Reno, and the giggly Donna Shalala. Never in American history has John Knox' horrid regiment of women waxed so prominent and so vocal, and all that was missing was former Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders haranguing the public on the virtues of tutoring pre-schoolers in bondage fantasies.

One would have thought the public, even without Dr. Elders, would at last have had enough, but according to opinion polls they only craved more. The president's popularity not only survived but appeared to flourish, and even those who said they believed he had an affair with the former intern also reported that, as long as the stock market held, they didn't much care. How is it that we have come to this sad passage in the history of the nation and its president? Is it too far-fetched to suggest that the indifference of the American people to the moral character of the chief executive is in fact the chief legacy of Abraham Lincoln?

In a recent article in Chronicles I characterized Lincoln as not only not a great President but "an ill-prepared man who has a strong claim to being the most incompetent President in American history." Yet, despite his incompetence and the immediate disasters his administration wreaked on those Americans who had the misfortune to live (and those who did not succeed in living) through it, he did leave an important legacy that is not unconnected to the present contentment with the present occupant of Lincoln's office that a majority of Americans seem to harbor.

Of the fifteen Presidents who preceded Lincoln in the White House, Lincoln enjoyed less preparation for high office than any.

He had served in the militia during the Black Hawk war but saw no action; he served only one term as a congressman and four as a state legislator. By 1860, he had twice run for the U.S. Senate and had been defeated both times. In the same year, nominated as the candidate of a new splinter party widely regarded as eccentric if not extremist, he was elected to the White House as a fluke,

because of the split within the Democratic Party, with less than 40 percent of the popular vote. It is quite true that Lincoln was a skilled local politician and that he had become a prominent lawyer in Illinois, but he was not a nationally known lawyer, and most of his cases seem to have been rather ordinary ones.

In fact, Abraham Lincoln displayed all his life the world view of a small-town politico, and it was the immediate source of the disaster of his administration that he carried this mentality into the White House at the greatest crisis in American history.

Lincoln's small-town political mentality is clear in the period between his election and his bungled resolution of the Ft. Sumter crisis. Lincoln simply could not bring himself to believe that Southerners felt strongly enough about the issues that animated them to secede; he was temperamentally unable to recognize that some people engage in politics for reasons of high principle and do not regard politics merely as a bottomless bucket of patronage. This is clear in what an Ohio journalist, Donn Piatt, discovered about him during the campaign. Piatt asked Lincoln what he planned to do if the South did secede, and he records that Lincoln simply refused to believe that that would happen:

He considered the movement South as a sort of political game of bluff, gotten up by politicians, and meant solely to frighten the North. He believed that when the leaders saw their efforts in that direction unavailing, the tumult would subside. "They won't give up the offices," I remember he said, and added, "Were it believed that vacant places could be had at the North Pole, the road there would be



lined with dead Virginians."

Others who heard Lincoln talk about secession during this period confirm what Piatt reported, and once Lincoln was inaugurated, it was to dispensing patronage that he devoted his immediate and almost total attention, despite the formation of the Confederacy and the looming specter of Ft. Sumter. His most recent biographer, David Donald, recounts how "The new President allowed office-seekers to take up most of his time. From nine o'clock in the morning until late at night, his White House office was open to all comers, and sometimes the petitioners were so numerous that it was impossible to climb the stairs." Indeed, when Charles Francis Adams, recently appointed ambassador to Great Britain by the administration, came to the White House with Seward to thank Lincoln and expected to discuss Anglo-American diplomacy at a critical moment when it was imperative for the Union to prevent British recognition of the Confederacy, Lincoln showed no interest. He dismissed him with the rude remark, "Very kind of you to say so, Mr. Adams, but you are not my choice. You are Seward's man," and he changed the subject to what he was really interested in: "Well, Seward, I have settled the Chicago Post Office."

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Seward, Adams, Sen. Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, Sen. John Crittenden of Kentucky, and the Virginia legislature all advocated or offered compromises, as did commissioners from the Confederacy, but Lincoln rejected them out of hand or ignored them.

When he first polled his Cabinet about re-provisioning Ft. Sumter, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior advised against it. Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase advised against it if it would mean war. Winfield Scott warned him that it would mean secession of the Upper South and that Sumter could not be re-

enforced without a major military and naval commitment. Both Stephen Douglas and Horace Greeley also favored evacuating the fort.

And yet he decided at last to re-provision it. His decision to do so was the greatest single blunder in American history, since it clearly invited and virtually forced the Confederacy to fire on the fort and allowed Lincoln to call for 75,000 troops in response. His call for troops in turn provoked the secession of the Upper South and the completion of the Confederacy, including the secession of Virginia. It allowed the Confederacy to add immeasurably to its own strength, placed its borders adjacent to Washington itself, and gave the South its greatest military commanders, Lee and Jackson.

While Lincoln insisted on formalities and legalisms when confronted by the secession crisis, he showed no such punctiliousness when dealing with Southern sympathizers in the North or with border states. The man who could not risk a meeting with Confederate commissioners because it might imply recognition of the Confederacy had no problem with illegally suspending habeas corpus, allowing the arbitrary incarceration of political opponents, and using federal troops to prevent secession of the border states, nor did the champion of perpetual unionism have much problem with the secession of West Virginia from its parent state. "The next years," writes Professor Donald, "would see greater infringements on individual liberties than in any other

period of American history."

The result of his blunder was the self-inflicted genocide of the Civil War and, so far from accomplishing his stated goal, the preservation of the Union, caused its mortal wounding. What kind of "Union" is it when half of it is forced back into it at the cost of military devastation and conquest, and much of the remainder has to be held under martial law and the suspension of civil liberties?

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His doctrine of equality was intended to justify that role of government. "On the side of the Union," he told Congress in his message of July 4, 1861, the war "is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men -- to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all; to afford men an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life." As Harry Jaffa has put it, "The principle of Equality, far from enfranchising any leveling action of government, is the ground for the recognition of those human differences which arose naturally, but in civil society, when human industry and acquisitiveness are emancipated." I do not agree that the principle of equality does not enfranchise leveling -- the very lifting of "artificial weights" by the state is itself a process of leveling -- but it does serve to justify the egalitarian scramble for wealth, and in Lincoln's mind its purpose was exactly that.

But Lincoln failed to see the flaws of such a theory or where it would lead -- to the unlimited expansion of centralized state power, the destruction of the power and authority of the states, the death blow to the Old Republic, and the enthronement of Economic Man as the summum bonum of human endeavor. Both the late M.E. Bradford and liberal historian James McPherson rightly see Lincoln as the godfather of the "fundamental transformation of the relationship between power and liberty" that the war brought. The

result was the launching of the federal leviathan on the course it has followed ever since. The political and plutocratic corruption of the late 19th century and the eventual marriage of plutocrat and bureaucrat in the modern managerial state of our own day are Lincoln's legacy, whether he intended them or not.

The ethic of acquisitive scramble and the politics of a leviathan state busying itself with the systematic removal of "artificial weights" that impede acquisition are today the common bond that most mainstream conservatives share with the general public, and it is the only ethic that remains accessible to most Americans of any persuasion or social stratum. The moral reflexes that demand at least the appearance of integrity and sobriety in public leaders are themselves "artificial weights" from which the Lincolnian leviathan is committed to emancipating us. Today, conservatives who are still animated by such reflexes gaze in dismay as an American public expresses indifference to the moral conduct of the chief executive and praises him for his successful management of the economy. In February, the Wall Street Journal quoted a citizen of Illinois, the "Land o' Lincoln," who angrily retorted to its reporter, "Don't tell us that we have a bad guy in there [the White House]. We can see for ourselves that things are better," and her husband added in agreement, "He has kept up the economy." Why should we be surprised that the triumph of Economic Man results in indifference to and denial of the moral degradation of the presidency and the nation it serves? It was Abraham

Lincoln, wittingly or not, who set us on the road to the destination at which we have now arrived.■

[CHRONICLES, June, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*Prophesying War*

Back in 1994, The Atlantic Monthly published a notable article by journalist Robert Kaplan entitled "The Coming Anarchy."

The article dealt with what Kaplan took to be global indications of impending chaos as resources dwindle, infrastructures decay, weapons are peddled, gangs and armed bands replace states, and ethnic, racial, and tribal loyalties prevail over less ferocious identities. The article was illustrated with several photographs of pitiful and chaotic scenes in such picturesque localities as Beirut, the Balkans, and Central Africa. One of the photographs, indistinguishable from the others, is from Los Angeles during the "Rodney King riots" of 1992.

To look at the last photograph and suddenly realize it's not Rwanda or Belfast but the second largest city in North America is jarring, and perhaps it was intended to be. If nothing else, the picture serves as a reminder that it can happen here, that it almost did happen here, and that it might well happen here in a short time to come.

That it is going to happen here is the thesis of a new monograph, Civil War II, by an ex-mercenary named Thomas Chittum, which has attracted no attention whatsoever in the mainstream book reviews but over the last few months has been a hot topic in what



can today only be called the "Underground Right" -- the buzzing hive of Internet sites, short wave radio stations, one-man newsletters, guerrilla fax warriors, and other dissidents who use new and alternative technologies to construct their own counter-culture. When it comes to warfare, Mr. Chittum seems to know what he's talking about. He's a Vietnam veteran and former artillery expert who served in Rhodesia as well as in Croatia. Now he's settled down to prepare for the coming Armageddon that his book prophesies.

The premise of his prediction that the United States sometime in the next generation or so is going to collapse into an anarchic civil war is the ethnic and racial fragmentation of the nation that the U.S. Census Bureau has been projecting since 1992 and which President Clinton so far has been the only American President to mention. By 2050, according to the projections, whites will constitute 52.5 percent of the national population (down from the current 74.8 percent), blacks will constitute 14.4 percent, Hispanics 22.5 percent, Asians 9.7 percent, and Indians .9 percent. "It's as if every day 3,000 whites were disappearing and being replaced by 3,000 minorities. Every single day! This is a sort of statistical ethnic cleansing engineered through liberal immigration laws and unchecked illegal immigration."

But Mr. Chittum's point is not that whites are ceasing to be a majority. His point is that whatever the mix of races and ethnic groups, the mix itself is the problem. He offers a list of several other countries that have collapsed into ethnic conflict when the mix reaches certain levels. He allows that "Multiethnic

and multilingual nations can and do work. However, all evidence clearly indicates they work only if each group is allowed to conduct its own affairs without undue meddling by the central government." Switzerland and Belgium are examples of highly decentralized federal multiethnic states where the different ethnicities appear to be able to live with each other without cutting each others' throats. Such is not the case in the United States, however.

In the United States, federalism and decentralization are not happening and are not going to happen. The United States is in fact an empire, not only with regard to external relations but also with regard to its own internal structure. Authoritarian trends in the central state itself, the increasing stratification of the social structure into an overclass and underclass, the destruction of the middle class, and the pattern of immigration itself all suggest an "imperial conversion" of the American nation-state.

But the imperium will be unable to control its own domain, for the simple reason that weapons, funds to buy them, and the will to use them, driven by ethnic-racial loyalties and hatreds, will outdraw the empire. The Los Angeles riots themselves are a kind of paradigm for Mr. Chittum's grim predictions. In the course of the riots, armed street gangs undertook most of the actual violent action, and Mr. Chittum points out that while the City of the Angels alone sports no fewer than 100,000 gang

members, the entire United States contains only about 554,000 full-time police officers. If the gangs wanted to, they could simply take over Los Angeles by force, and it will be recalled that during the riots, police units actually retreated from armed rioters whose weapons were heavier than those of the cops. There were a number of incidents in which police squad cars deliberately ignored looting of stores -- probably because they lacked the instruments of force to stop the looting -- and Korean shopowners collectively armed themselves to protect their shops and homes that the police refused to protect.

Of course, the state and federal governments could stop the rioting and the takeover by the gangs, couldn't they? Well, no, as a matter of fact, Mr. Chittum argues. Federal military bases within the United States are highly vulnerable to armed attack and neutralization. Designed to placate civilian tastes and sensibilities as much as military needs, military bases typically lack a cleared field of fire within which an invader could be cut down like ripe wheat, defensive perimeters of mine fields and armored bunkers that could deter invaders, adequate manpower, and adequate facilities for withstanding sieges. Moreover, no small number of the defenders of the bases will be co-ethnics of the attackers and will provide "fifth columns" inside the bases that will help turn them over. The same is true of local and state police and national guard units. Your local military base might be terrific for entertaining the kids with a Veterans' Day parade,

but don't count on the troops protecting your neighborhood during Civil War II.

In addition to the incipient ethnic and racial fragmentation of the nation, Mr. Chittum also points to political and regional schisms already appearing. All of these will, in his view, enhance the likelihood of chronic armed violence throughout the country in the near future. "When civil authority breaks down in America, our criminal gangs will instantly fill the power vacuum, just exactly as has been the pattern in other lands. The gangs have their organization and firepower to serve as the nucleus for actual armies. And since they will be self-financed in the coming time of chaos, they will grow like wildfire. Militias, cults like the Nation of Islam, and other armed organizations will also rapidly grow into full-blown armies."

Mr. Chittum also has some fascinating scenarios of how the conflict will actually fall out in various areas of the country, particularly the South, where the ethnic and racial composition will be so mixed that certain "enclaves" may survive. Finally, he has some practical advice on how to survive even if you don't live in such an enclave: Stockpile food, get a gun (he doesn't like handguns but recommends military semiautomatic rifles that fire easily available standard cartridges), and select the part of the country for your stronghold based on its capacity for economic self-sufficiency and distance from likely areas of conflict. Also, don't tell anyone what you're doing since otherwise you may

enjoy unsolicited and none-too-friendly visits when your friends and neighbors realize you're prepared and they're not.

Mr. Chittum has no doubt that all this is going to happen, and indeed he makes a powerful case for it. But there are also reasons to think that it probably won't happen, and those reasons can tell us something about a future that may be more likely though by no means as much fun as the bloodbath Mr. Chittum foresees.

In the first place, with all due respect to ethnic and racial loyalties, there are other social relationships that are often no less powerful as group bonds. Given a chronic breakdown in the infrastructure of economic supply and governmental enforcement of order, it is just as likely that regional, economic, class, and religious bonds will divide the population into mutually competing and conflicting groups as race. Race appears to mean very little either to Christian evangelicals or to most militia members, and at least some urban gangs are already ethnically mixed. Areas that depend on agriculture or on serving economic demands that could still be served and can't sustain themselves any other way would probably continue to function as fairly peaceful communities of mixed ethnic, class, religious groups.

Moreover, even if ethnicity and race do become the primary identities for group existence and action, it does not follow that they will go to war with each other. Urban street gangs haven't made a bid to take over entire cities yet, despite the large funds

from drug trafficking and the availability of sophisticated weaponry, precisely because they are criminals, not soldiers or empire-builders, and because they provide a certain sense of community and group bonding to otherwise socially crippled adolescents. It's more likely the gangs will insist on pushing crack and running girls than that they'll look for chances to attack military bases, however soft and flabby the latter might be. As for the militias, strange religious cults, "white separatists," and similar underground movements, I've seen and read nothing about any of them that would convince me they're a serious danger to anybody. Most of their burned-out members seem to spend more time smoking dope and reading pornography than they do plotting guerrilla warfare. The fact is that, apart from criminals and a few lunatics, Americans in general today are couch cabbages whose closest approach to guerrilla warfare is the weekly argument over who gets to hold the remote during Melrose Place.

But the major argument against Mr. Chittum's predictions is that the overclass, as flabby and crooked and imperial-decadent as it might be, is not about to let Civil War II take place. What Mr. Chittum doesn't entirely grasp is that the overclass, the Ruling Class, as I have argued before, rules mainly through manipulation, not through force or intimidation. Ruby Ridge and Waco, which he sees as signs of impending reliance on force, are more likely signs of the incompetence of the Ruling Class at using force at all. Ruling classes that do rely on force like the Nazis

or the Communists would have gobbled Randy Weaver and David Koresh at a single bite and not spent weeks pondering how to get them to come out peacefully. It's quite true that there is an emerging federal police state, but our incumbent Ruling Class, Republican or Democrat, simply isn't constructed to rely on it as its primary mode of power. Instead, it relies on manipulation, the deliberate inculcation of an apparently spontaneous and voluntary desire to obey, and soap operas, game shows, and professional sports are far more useful instruments of control for its purposes than BATF goon squads.

Mr. Chittum is entirely right about the ethnic, racial, social, and cultural fragmentation -- "Balkanization" -- that mass immigration is engendering, but it doesn't follow that the Ruling Class that permits, wants, and indeed commands that this fragmentation take place won't be able to control the results. Balkanization and fragmentation are themselves means of manipulation (it used to be called the tactic of "divide and conquer") by which the elites prevent the formation of any enduring national community that can challenge its own power. The real future, perhaps less exciting than that of Civil War II, is what various writers have called "Brazilianization," the disintegration of traditional community, class, and nation at the base of American society and the domination of a technically skilled, affluent if not luxurious overclass at the top that is no less multiethnic in its composition but is bound together by its

control of wealth, status, and political and cultural power. That is why American society becomes more and more "diverse" through the fragmentation that immigration creates at the same time it becomes more and more homogeneous through the uniform disciplining exerted by the federal leviathan in conjunction with the mass consumer economy and mass instruments of culture and communication.

Mr. Chittum is aware of this line of criticism and tries to respond to it.

The overall tendency is for establishment types to predict a crime and poverty-stricken multiracial banana republic, something like Brazil. Brazil is wracked by violence, but has so far avoided massive bloodshed like Bosnia. In such a society, the establishment reckons it can endure quite nicely behind its razor wire, walls and security guards. This optimistic view is based on their utter contempt for working-class whites. I'm confident they will be proven wrong, but time will tell.

I guess you can put me down as "an establishment type," though (a) I don't consider the prophecy of Brazilianization an "optimistic view" and (b) I don't harbor "utter contempt for working-class whites," even if they do tend to be couch cabbages.

But you don't have to harbor "utter contempt" for anyone to believe that there is nothing in most Americans' background to prepare them for the kind of stockpile-and-shoot first future Mr. Chittum is licking his chops to encounter. You do have to believe, as the Ruling Class has already figured out, that most Americans can see no other option for themselves but a passive



endurance of the regime the Ruling Class has created, and of course that is a narrow vision that the Ruling Class does all it can to maintain. But who knows, maybe Mr. Chittum will turn out to be right after all. If and when Americans are able to glimpse an alternative future in which they can displace the Ruling Class and its regime of manipulation through their own resistance, Mr. Chittum's book may pop up on the best sellers list.■

[CHRONICLES, June, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*Mr. Clinton's 'Third Revolution'*

For the last twelve months, President Clinton's "National Advisory Commission on Race" has been prowling about the country like a medieval monarch on his yearly progress through his realm.

The commission is the central part of what has come to be known as the President's "race initiative" or the "national dialogue on race," and its ostensible purpose is to examine the state of race relations in the United States and undertake their improvement. But whatever its supposed purpose and however the commission's members conceived of implementing it, the commission quickly revealed what it meant by "dialogue." When Ward Connerly, a black Californian who led the campaign for the state's Proposition 209, which outlawed state affirmative action policies, sought to testify before the commission, he was bluntly told by its chairman, black historian John Hope Franklin, that his testimony wasn't wanted and that consideration of affirmative action was not part of the commission's purview. So much for "dialogue." If affirmative action, the most controversial race policy of the national government, was not a subject the commission was prepared to examine, what exactly would it discuss?

By the end of the year, the answer to that question was sufficiently clear to an increasing number of citizens. When the

commission met in Fairfax County, Virginia in December, a white man interrupted its proceedings by complaining that "there's no one up there talking about white people." The gentleman was brusquely removed from the "dialogue" by police officers, and Virtue Czar Bill Bennett, who happened to be schmoozing with the race commission that day, promptly denounced him as a "fool." The next month much the same kind of incident occurred at the commission's meeting in California, though this time without the helpful insights of Dr. Bennett. Anyone who imagined that the purpose of the commission or the "national dialogue" was to instigate a real dialogue on race that would rise above what a New York Times editorial dismissed as "banal chatter" on the subject had been disabused.

Yet from the very beginning of the commission and the President's "race initiative," the real purpose was clear enough.

The purpose was not to initiate or maintain a conversation on race that reached beyond the usual banalities, let alone to examine in an impartial and fruitful way the very material threats to domestic harmony that our current immigration policy, coupled with various trends of racial thought and behavior, represents. The real purpose was evident in Mr. Clinton's own remarks at the time his "dialogue" was initiated, and the various hearings of the race commission over the last several months have done nothing but reflect that purpose.

Kicking off his "race initiative" in a commencement address at the University of California at San Diego last June, the President beamed to the gaping graduates that "A half century from

now, when your own grandchildren are in college, there will be no majority race in America." Mr. Clinton is to be commended for being the first President to say what has hitherto been unsayable -- that U.S. Census Bureau projections show that by the middle of the next century, barely 50 years from now, non-Hispanic whites for the first time in American history will cease to be the majority of the U.S. population. That projection, first reported by the Census Bureau in 1992, let alone its cultural and political implications, has yet to sink into the American public consciousness, and had Mr. Clinton chosen merely to make Americans aware of the significance of that transition and its meaning or even to suggest ways by which it might be stopped or slowed, there would be no fault to find with him.

But instead, both the President and the commission that he appointed only a few days before the San Diego speech have taken the demographic and racial transformation of the United States as both a given, an inevitability that cannot be stopped or reversed, and a charter for national reconstruction. Indeed, the President himself shortly before his San Diego speech even welcomed the transformation. Speaking to a group of journalists in Boston, Mr. Clinton remarked, "This will arguably be the third great revolution in America ... to prove that we literally can live without in effect having a dominant European culture. We want to become a multiracial, multiethnic society. We're not going to disintegrate in the face of it."

Again, Mr. Clinton is correct that the racial and demographic transition from a majority white to a majority non-white population will indeed mean the end of the "dominant European culture" that has prevailed throughout American history and on which our civilization -- our form of government and laws, our language and literature, our religion, our habits of work and economic invention, and our manners, customs, and tastes -- is based. Unlike many supporters of an "open borders" immigration policy, Mr. Clinton apparently does not believe that we can alter the racial composition of our population without also altering the cultural character of our nation, and if he had seen this transformation as a problem to be avoided, again there would be no fault to find with him.

Yet the fact that the President of the United States appears to welcome the end of our "dominant European culture" is ominous, because it means that the chief executive no longer considers that cultural identity to be worth conserving or even able to be conserved, and it is in this that the real purpose of Mr. Clinton's race initiative and his commission on race emerges. Just as the two earlier "great revolutions" (presumably the War for Independence and the Civil War) required subsequent political reconstructions of the nation, so does this "third revolution," and the beginnings of or preparation for that reconstruction is the mission of the President's race initiative. The real purpose of the initiative and the commission, in short, is simply to

accommodate white Americans to the racial transformation of their country, the imminent dethronement, if not destruction, of their culture, and the entrenchment of the new "multiracial, multiethnic" culture that twinkles in the President's fond eye.

Hence, from that perspective, it is hardly surprising that the commission spends little time listening to the critics of affirmative action or finds that whites who resent their exclusion from the commission's deliberations are fools to be thrown into the streets. What its proceedings seem to have occupied themselves with instead are such matters as showing that all racial problems in the United States are really the fault of whites, that these problems can be resolved only when whites are made conscious of their guilt and responsibility, and that the guilt and responsibility of whites for racial problems are rooted in the very dominance of the European culture whose termination the President welcomes. Nor is it surprising, given that real purpose of the initiative and the commission, that various members of the commission in the last few months have positively discussed national reparations for slavery or that non-white failures, racial animosity, and "hate crimes" are never mentioned.

The President himself set the tone for this way of framing the "dialogue" in his remarks in San Diego last summer. "We still see evidence of bigotry from the desecration of houses of worship, whether they be churches, synagogues or mosques, to demeaning talk in corporate suites," Mr. Clinton remarked. "There is still much

work to be done by you, members of the class of 1997." "Bigotry," in other words, is entirely confined to white arson of black churches and to cases, such as the one alleged against Texaco in 1996, of white corporate managers discriminating against non-whites -- both of them instances of "bigotry" that have now been widely challenged if not actually discredited.

We have yet to hear from Mr. Clinton or his race panel any mention of instances of black or other non-white bigotry, such as the kidnapping, gang rape, and torture of Melissa McLaughlin in South Carolina in 1992 by blacks in retaliation for what one of the perpetrators called "400 years of oppression" by whites, or the obviously racially motivated assault, rape, and murder committed against three white youths by a group of six black men in Flint, Michigan on June 19, 1997, less than a week after Mr. Clinton's San Diego address, or any number of other racially motivated crimes committed against whites by non-whites or against non-whites by other non-whites for ethnic or racial motives. The chatter of the "national dialogue" is indeed largely banal, but the banalities are confined to only one perspective and one overriding purpose, that of holding whites alone responsible for all racial wrongs.

Yet the fact is that whatever wrongs whites may have perpetrated on non-whites in the past or in the present, today the responsibility of non-whites for a small legion of social failures and problems must be discussed if the "dialogue on race" is to

have any real meaning. Although today blacks constitute only some 12 percent of the national population, they commit more than half of all rapes and robberies and 60 percent of the murders in America.

Their illegitimacy rates, infant mortality rates, unemployment rates, venereal disease rates, and welfare utilization rates are far higher than those of whites. In addition, while 66 percent of the perpetrators of "hate crimes" in 1996 were white, 20 percent of the perpetrators were black. In other words, "hate crimes," while conventionally held to be confirming evidence of the continuation of violent white bigotry and "racism," are in fact disproportionately committed by blacks; and whites, composing some 74 percent of the population, are underrepresented as "hate crime" perpetrators. I do not mean to single out blacks in particular. Hispanics also show similar but usually less dramatic indications of social failure and dysfunction, with high crime rates, welfare dependence, venereal disease rates, and chronic illegitimacy. The teen-age illegitimacy rate among Hispanics (at 11 percent) now exceeds that of blacks (at 10 percent), but both exceed the illegitimacy rate for non-Hispanic white teenagers (4 percent).

Taxpayers, particularly white middle-class taxpayers, are those who pay the public burden of these failures of non-whites, and they also are often the victims of non-white crimes and social dysfunctions. In addition, of course, the fiscal burden and the administrative impact of civil rights enforcement, affirmative



action, and other state-enforced privileges for non-whites are also borne by whites, especially white males. But on top of bearing most of the financial burden for public costs arising from these non-white dysfunctions, in addition to having to confront every day the physical danger of non-white violence and crime, and in addition to enduring the larger national social decomposition that non-white failures and dysfunctions cause, whites now must endure the President's chirping that all racial bigotry is due to them, that the "dominant European culture," by the norms of which most white Americans continue to abide, is going to come to an end, and that he welcomes its termination.

The purpose of the President's race initiative, then, whether manifested in his own words, in the actions of his race commission, or in what the race commission and the President fail to discuss or forbid to be discussed, is not "tolerance," "diversity," "harmony," "equality," or "justice." The real purpose is to accommodate white Americans to the end of their culture and their dominance as a majority of the American nation and as the cultural core of the nation and to manage their adjustment to the coming non-white dominance of the near future. The real issue of the President's race initiative, then, is, as so many things are, a question of power -- in this case, racial power.

White Americans today are confronted with the two most overwhelming facts of our time -- first, the coming demographic

transformation of American society that the Census Bureau projects, and, secondly, the emergence of what can only be described as an explicit racial consciousness among non-whites that identifies whites as their enemies and oppressors, a racial consciousness that is encouraged and exploited and certainly is seldom challenged by many whites themselves, whether liberal or conservative. If the President's commission had any interest in real racial harmony or reconciliation, it is this non-white and anti-white bigotry it would address and not the mythology of black church burnings and the Texaco jelly bean counters. In the absence of any such interest on the part of the commission, white Americans need to ask themselves what will be their fate as a white minority in a non-white society where the racial demonology created by non-whites prevails, and they need to think hard about the answers they reach.

White Americans also need to question and indeed reject the very premises of the President's "dialogue" -- that the racial and cultural transition to a non-white America is inevitable or desirable; that whites somehow possess a monopoly on racial bigotry, the perpetration of racial injustice, or racial consciousness and solidarity; and that it is morally incumbent on whites to alter their behavior, their culture, and their sense of moral and social responsibility in deference to non-white and often anti-white demands. The President's commission has had a full year to begin addressing these matters, but it hasn't done

it, shows no interest in doing it, and, given its real purpose of chartering the dispossession of whites and the reconstruction of the nation, doesn't plan on doing it. If white Americans wish to remain a majority in their own country and to preserve the dominance of their "European culture," they will therefore have to commence a race initiative of their own.■

[CHRONICLES, July, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*Whose Modernity?*

When Pat Buchanan's new book, The Great Betrayal, appeared in bookstores last April, the hysteria that greeted it among most reviewers was entirely predictable. Not only does Mr. Buchanan challenge the free trade orthodoxy that is dominant among most economists and policy-makers in both political parties but also he makes clear throughout his book that the economic nationalism he champions is only a part of a much larger and deeper challenge to the whole structure of power by which the United States is ruled. The "new nationalism" that he advocates and develops is thus a bit more than a deviation from economic orthodoxy, and the hysteria that greeted the book represented a bit more than the outrage that the guardians of orthodoxy always experience whenever their pet dogmas are found to have made a mess on the living room floor. What was especially disturbing to Mr. Buchanan's conservative critics was the perception that what may have begun as the eccentricities of a single maverick journalist and commentator still refuses to shut up and go away and that it is now beginning to blossom into a full-scale political movement with a vision of the nation and its identity radically at odds with that of the chieftains of the "mainstream right." What drove the paranoia about Pat this time was not so much fear of the consequences his

ideas might have as the grim realization that he and his ideas just might be on the eve of actually having consequences at all.

The main attack on Mr. Buchanan's book from the right appeared in a cover-story in National Review of April 20, with something like a book review by Wall Street Journal editor Robert Bartley, followed by a kind of review-essay by the magazine's reporter, Ramesh Ponnuru, followed yet again by a largely sympathetic analysis of the Buchanan political phenomenon by the magazine's ex-editor, John O'Sullivan. The issue sported a cover photograph of Mr. Buchanan during the 1996 Arizona primary wearing a black cowboy hat, holding aloft a hunting rifle, and emitting the irrepressible grin that seems to gloat over the anticipated pleasure of blowing the heads off his adversaries. Although the magazine "tactically" endorsed Mr. Buchanan's presidential efforts in 1992, National Review is now edited by Mr. O'Sullivan's successor, Richard Lowery, who makes no secret of his animosity to Mr. Buchanan and his ideas, whether on trade policy, limiting immigration, or an "America First" foreign policy. Devoting the cover story of the magazine to yet another attack on Buchanan may therefore be read as a kind of declaration of principle by Mr. Lowery as well as a declaration of war against "Buchananism" by the magazine itself, despite the presence of Mr. O'Sullivan's friendly piece.

The kindest thing to say about the "reporting" piece by Mr. Ponnuru is that it is mostly wrong. Devoted mainly to misleading or inaccurate characterizations of Mr. Buchanan's columns opposing the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, the article sedulously searches

out what its author imagines are elementary contradictions and bloopers in Mr. Buchanan's thinking. Thus, seeking to discredit Mr. Buchanan's case against NATO expansion, Mr. Ponnuru smirks that "In the old days, he thought the Soviets would interpret conciliatory moves as weakness; we could help Kremlin doves only by shooting down hawks. Now that Russia is weaker, it's imperative not to provoke her nationalists by expanding NATO." Mr. Ponnuru evidently thinks he's really got Mr. Buchanan by the tonsils. Someone needs to explain to him that even though Russian communists and Russian nationalists live in the same country, the one were our enemies whom it was appropriate not to conciliate while the other are not (at least yet) our enemies, whom it is appropriate not to antagonize by the needless threat that they take an expanded NATO to be. To those of Mr. Ponnuru's strategic genius, of course, the distinction between enemy and non-enemy is meaningless. What is meaningful is whether Russia and other foreign states on the global-democratic hit list do what we tell them. It is that mentality that has been a main target of Buchanan and other paleo-conservatives ever since the Gulf War, but Mr. Ponnuru still misses the point.

Mr. Ponnuru's piece is perhaps the magazine's concession to old-time Buchanan-bashers who can't forgive Buchanan for his wisecrack about the "Amen corner" at the time of the Gulf War mass neurosis, but it is Mr. Bartley's "review" that represents the magazine's piece de resistance, over which old-timers as well as

newcomers to Buchanan-bashery will smack their lips. Mr. Bartley's review, entitled "The Great Betrayal," is less a consideration of the merits of The Great Betrayal (in Mr. Bartley's mind it has none) than a protracted accusation that it is Buchanan himself who is the real traitor -- to American conservatism.

Mr. Bartley, of course, has long been one of the main spokesmen for a version of neo-conservatism that glories in unrestricted free trade, virtually unlimited immigration, and equally virtually unlimited foreign military intervention for the purpose of "spreading democracy." During the Gulf War, his editorial page hectored the Bush administration not to stop in Kuwait but to go on to Baghdad for the purpose of overthrowing the regime and establishing a "MacArthur regency" that would dispense the lollipops of American democracy, capitalism, and Hollywood culture. Yet for all the ferocity of the foreign policy he champions, Mr. Bartley is no chauvinist. Indeed, in his review, he makes sport with a quotation attributed to him by National Review editor Peter Brimelow and cited by Mr. Buchanan that "The nation state is finished." Mr. Bartley claims Mr. Brimelow "put this hyperbolic phrase in my mouth" and that "it bears only a passing resemblance to my views." Personally, I have no doubt that Mr. Brimelow quoted him correctly, and we shall shortly see how passing the resemblance between the quotation and his views is.

Mr. Bartley commences his review with recalling that "the initial manifesto of National Review famously declared that its posture would be that it 'stands athwart history, yelling stop,'" a posture of which he evidently approves and which he believes was justified with the collapse of Soviet communism. He then goes on to rehearse the various elements in the "conservative coalition" that National Review built and its triumph in the presidency of Ronald Reagan. But now appears Pat Buchanan and his call to renounce free trade, internationalism, open immigration, and the global economy. We can see how far from the coalition Mr. Buchanan has strayed by the fact that in his book he actually quotes approvingly John Sweeney of the AFL-CIO on the need for an increase in American wage levels. Indeed, pronounces Mr. Bartley, "Politically, it's difficult to see what Mr. Buchanan's platform has to do with conservatism, except perhaps in the sense that Mr. Sweeney's AFL-CIO is the most reactionary force in American politics today."

But in the first place, nowhere in his book does Mr. Buchanan support the labor union hierarchy that Mr. Bartley so fears. What he does support are the interests of American workers, which the unions sometimes make noises about representing, against those of both foreign competitors and domestic free trade ideologues and the corporate elites, foreign and domestic, that sponsor them. The distinction between supporting unions and supporting the interests of their members sails quite happily past Mr. Bartley's



head.

In the second place, Mr. Bartley's characterization of the "conservative coalition" bears little resemblance to what that movement actually thought and advocated. It's true that the coalition was supportive of free trade, but trade policy was never much of an issue for it at all. It's also true that the coalition was generally internationalist, but mainly because of its anti-communism, which saw in the Soviet Union a global menace that ultimately threatened American national security. The old "conservative coalition" never supported the kind of mindless and bellicose internationalism that Mr. Bartley and most neo-conservatives advocate, a perpetual crusade to carry the torch of "American democracy" to every nook and cranny of the planet, complete, one might add, with the much-dreaded labor unions that Mr. Bartley's neo-conservative Social Democrat allies admire.

Mr. Bartley also gets it wrong on what constitutes conservatism today. "In our time ..." he writes, "smaller government is the essence of what we call conservatism." That too is simply not true. Conservatism is a defense of a particular way of communal life (what Mr. Buchanan in his book calls "a moral community [that] must share values higher than economic interest"), and while the leviathan state today is certainly one of the main enemies of the American way of life, it is not the only enemy, nor is denying the state the authority to perform its legitimate functions an effective means of conserving the way of

life. Federal restrictions on immigration and protection of national economic interests by the state are governmental measures that can assist the conservation of the national way of life. Moreover, the test of what is and is not "big (i.e., illegitimate) government" in the American way of life is not the ideology of classical liberalism or "anarcho-capitalism" but the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly authorizes federal regulation of foreign commerce and implicitly authorizes immigration control. Whatever the merits of controlling immigration and regulating trade, neither lies beyond the legitimate scope of the federal government, and neither constitutes "big government."

Yet despite Mr. Bartley's historical illiteracy in characterizing the conservatism of the 1950s and '60s, his tactic is a clever one. Previous attacks on Pat Buchanan came mainly from neo-conservatives who never voiced any allegiance to or interest in the ideal of "standing athwart history and yelling stop" but who denounced him precisely because he was too much a conservative of the old school. Mr. Bartley's tactic is different. By associating himself with the old conservatism, he is trying to deny that label to Buchanan and indeed to make out that Buchanan himself is the defector. Thus, while the neo-cons attack Buchanan for being "too far to the right," Mr. Bartley attacks him for having nothing to do with the right at all.

But the dog won't hunt. Quite aside from his misunderstanding of what the old "conservative coalition" was and

believed, Mr. Bartley's own rhetoric and beliefs betray his own allegiances, which, in a word, are to liberalism. It is no accident that while Mr. Bartley accuses Mr. Buchanan of betraying conservatism because he dares to quote a labor leader, Mr. Bartley and his own editorial page (and most "mainstream" conservatives) in the last several years have devoted themselves to defending virtually every major trade and foreign policy proposal advanced by the Clinton administration. The Journal, and for that matter, National Review, have supported Clinton on NAFTA, the World Trade Organization, and sending U.S. troops to Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. They support Bill Clinton today on NATO expansion, and, if not National Review in the past, then certainly Mr. Bartley has pushed for an immigration policy all but indistinguishable from that of Bill Clinton, Ted Kennedy, and the National Lawyers Guild. Yet here they squat, squealing that the traitor to conservatism is really Pat Buchanan.

As for where Mr. Bartley stands himself, he makes his posture toward the march of history entirely clear. Denouncing Mr. Buchanan's "thumping the drum for a kind of tribal solidarity in the name of 'sovereignty,'" he writes, "We globalists view this as a rejection of modernity. Mr. Buchanan proposes to stand athwart not only the march of Communism, but also powerful trends driven by the information revolution.... Attempts to dam up change bear heavy costs...." In short, after affirming the need for conservatives to stand athwart history and cry stop, Mr. Bartley

proceeds to excommunicate Mr. Buchanan for standing athwart history and (eek!) "rejecting modernity." Is it surprising that Mr. Bartley's flawed account of the old "conservative coalition" conveniently omitted mentioning such figures as Russell Kirk, M.E. Bradford, Richard Weaver, and a host of other conservative thinkers whose ideas centered precisely on the rejection of modernity? He does try to conscript Whittaker Chambers, but Chambers was perhaps the most radically anti-modernist of all.

That it is a fairly conventional liberalism to which Mr. Bartley subscribes and has confused with conservatism is clear not only in his rejection of the nation-state and its "tribal solidarity" and his affirmation of political and cultural universalism, but also by his reliance on the very codewords and epithets by which the left has always sought to deny legitimacy to the right. Buchanan is aligned with "reactionary forces"; historical trends of which Mr. Bartkey approves are irresistible; and any ideas that question their irresistibility are simply dismissed with sneers as irrationalism and the product of ignorance. This is precisely the way that Arthur Schlesinger and John Kenneth Galbraith used to write about William Buckley. If we hear their voices echoed in Mr. Bartley's mouth, that is no accident either.

But, after all, Mr. Bartley is partly right about his main target, Mr. Buchanan. The New Nationalism Mr. Buchanan advocates is not identical to the old conservatism, for the very clear

reason that the anti-communism of old conservatism is now irrelevant. It is irrelevant not because communism has ceased to flourish, but because its location in the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Communism does indeed flourish, in the premises and assumptions that Mr. Bartley and his neo-conservative allies at the Journal and National Review harbor, and the utopianism and universalism that creeps out of those premises and assumptions are indistinguishable from what that great free-trader Karl Marx himself believed was the inevitable future of mankind. When the nation-state is abolished and "we globalists" have excommunicated everyone who resists the march of the new world order that has replaced it, we will see whether Mr. Buchanan might have had a point after all. Until then, those American conservatives who still reject modernity and still want to conserve their nation and its way of life can find no better reason for rejecting what the modern "conservative coalition" now offers than what Mr. Bartley and National Review have revealed about where the mainstream in which they swim will carry us. ■

[CHRONICLES, September, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*After the Cold War*

*(This column was originally delivered as the keynote speech at a meeting of the Lord Byron Society in Chicago on May 8, 1998.)*

Probably the most remarkable aspect of the public discussion of American foreign policy in this decade is that, listening to it, one would never guess that the Cold War really is over. Both political parties and almost all commentators on foreign policy always start off their speeches or articles by performing an obligatory knee bend to the "end of the Cold War" and then continue to talk about our foreign policy as though the Cold War were still going on. They still chatter about "America's global responsibilities"; they still worry about the scale of U.S. military defenses; they still dither and dabble in world affairs, perhaps even more recklessly than in the 1950s and 1960s.

We still dole out immense sums of money in foreign aid to various client states; we still maintain the cold war alliances with Asian and Latin American states that were set up as a global defense system, and in NATO we have even expanded the alliance to undertake a still undefined new mission. Occasionally, we stop to realize that our major adversary in the Cold War, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, but to this very day we have not even begun to think, let alone act, on the vast implications of the Soviet collapse. Most of all, we still conduct our foreign policy

on the unquestioned assumption that the United States faces a serious threat to its vital interests and national security, even though no one seems to be able to tell us precisely what that threat is. Indeed, American foreign policy in the post-Cold War period could perhaps be defined as a Search for a New Enemy, since only the existence of an enemy could justify the continuation of the basic framework of Cold War foreign policy.

In fact, the end of the Cold War represents a new era in American foreign policy of the kind that we have not seen since at least the early 1930s and perhaps not since before 1914. All during that era, our foreign policy was exclusively defined by the need to defend the United States against a real or perceived enemy -- the Kaiser, the Axis, or the Kremlin. As a result, most of us, especially those whose profession is foreign policy, have simply lost the capacity to think about foreign policy in the absence of an enemy, and, to paraphrase what Voltaire said of God, if an enemy does not exist, it is necessary to invent one.

It is necessary for two reasons. In the first place, as I just remarked, it is almost impossible today for American foreign affairs professionals to think of a foreign policy that does not revolve around an enemy, and secondly, those same professionals possess a powerful vested interest in identifying an enemy and telling us how we ought to defeat or contain him. If they do not get paid for doing that, then they have no other function, and as I think back on my colleagues in Cold War, Inc., some years ago, I know that many of them have had to undertake some fancy footwork to adjust their professional lives to a Cold War-less world. They

do not want to believe the Cold War is over; they find it difficult to imagine that it is over; and they have a strong material interest in making sure that if, indeed, it is over, we nevertheless need to be involved in a new one.

There have been a number of candidates for the new Enemy -- Saddam Hussein, Somalia's late warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, and more recently various Balkan or Arab leaders have popped up on the screen much like the cut-outs of 1930s gangsters that the FBI still uses for target practice at its training academy. Clearly, the basic personality of the Enemy is always Hitler, and he always exhibits the same demonic cruelty, the same maniacal aggressiveness, and the same psychotic ambitions as Der Fuehrer.

But sometimes today the enemy is cast not as a personality but as a force -- Islamic fundamentalism or transnational crime, which is usually lumped together with international terrorism, and all of which are then identified with domestic white separatists and militia groups. Islamic fundamentalism seemed for a while to be a very credible enemy, especially after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, but it soon faded after the Oklahoma City bombing. Transnational organized crime is perhaps a more plausible enemy, although it too lacks a conveniently defined face. Drug smuggling, arms smuggling, and people who smoke cigarettes on international air flights seem to compete for the role of the foe against whom our military, political, economic, and intelligence resources must be mobilized. A few years ago,



Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry was quite explicit in identifying transnational crime as the new enemy. "The overall international organized crime threat to our interests is more serious than we had assumed," Sen. Kerry trembled. "Organized crime is the new communism, the new monolithic threat." All that is lacking is a large photograph of the Insidious Dr. Fu Manchu.

Libertarians who refused to see an enemy in the Soviet Union argued that the fake enemy was invented for the purpose of justifying the vast enlargement of the federal state in the wake of World War II and for the perpetuation of the state machinery established during the earlier conflict. But even if their premise, that the Soviets were really not an enemy, is wrong, their conclusion contains a great deal of truth. The recognition by the American foreign policy establishment in the 1940s that the Soviets were a threat, as belated as it was and as blinded as the establishment had been by its reliance on the counsel of outright traitors like Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and Lauchlin Curry, was followed by a resolution to fight communism in the same way as New Deal liberals had tried to fight domestic social problems. In announcing the Truman Doctrine in 1947, Truman announced that "The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. they spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died," and in 1965 Lyndon Johnson boasted of his plans to construct what he called "the TVA on the Mekong" that presumably

would liberate the Vietnamese peasants from communism in the same way that the TVA was supposed to liberate Tennessee peasants from bootlegging and snake-charming. The strategy by which Cold War liberals sought to fight communism, then, was simply an extension of their strategy for domestic social reform, and it was a strategy that promised much the same rewards for the bureaucratic and managerial elites that were to supervise it.

The insight of James Burnham, in his trilogy on communism in the 1940s, that communism simply used "bad social conditions" much as it used any problem to advance its own power was missed by those establishment leaders who were otherwise influenced by Burnham. They followed him in exploiting his premise that the Soviets were engaged in a "struggle for the world," but they merely used that premise to construct and perpetuate a foreign policy apparatus that was committed to preserving and enhancing its own bureaucratic leverage and to making certain that the struggle for the world would last forever, or at least until they started receiving their own pensions from the federal government.

In the 1990s conservatives crow about our "victory in the Cold War," but virtually nothing we did during the Cold War deserves the name of victory. We armed our enemies with trade deals and grain deals even as we sent American troops to fight against the war machine that American capitalism helped build. We betrayed ally after ally to communism or its surrogates -- in Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Africa, and Southeast Asia; we refused to

extirpate the spies and traitors who infested the federal government and damned the characters of patriots and heroes like Whittaker Chambers and Louis Budenz who risked their careers and even their lives to expose the treason. Our politicians in both parties used "Great Power Diplomacy" and arms treaties that could not be verified to advance their own careers, and even those who had spent their early lives fighting communism proved that they never understood it or its real goals. Historian Hugh Thomas in his history of the early years of the Cold War recounts how Harry Truman was perplexed after meeting Joseph Stalin. Whenever Truman unbosomed one of his diplomatic bromides, such as "Marshal Stalin, we are all working for world peace," Stalin would respond, "God will it." This confused Truman, who had been told that communists don't believe in God, so how could Marshal Stalin invoke Him? Perhaps it would have been easier for Truman to understand if Stalin had met the president's platitudes with the response, "God damn it."

My point is that, yes, there was a real enemy in the Soviet Union and the communism it espoused, but no, we never did much to win victory over it, and even in the Reagan era, I can tell you, as one who worked on foreign policy issues in the U.S. Senate, neither I nor any of my colleagues believed in the 1980s that "we" were winning the Cold War or defeating communism. Having won a victory we did not deserve, we now devote ourselves to continuing to fight the war we regret is over. Last year I spoke to this

group on the subject of imperialism, and I frankly described our recent policies of foreign interventionism as a form of imperialism. It is that, but it is also something different, namely globalism.

Globalism differs from imperialism in that under imperialism, one nation or political unit conquers other political units; while under globalism, there is a transcendence of the political unit itself. We see this today in the erosion of and the deliberate attack upon national sovereignty, in treaties like NAFTA, the WTO, and the European Union; in the efforts at the enhancement of the United Nations toward a world government, replicating virtually every function of national government -- proposals for a standing U.N. army, for a new international currency, for direct U.N. taxation, and for a permanent U.N. criminal court to try "human rights" violations, as well as in various U.N. covenants that seek to regulate domestic subnational laws and policies on such social and cultural issues as the treatment of women and children, regulation of the environment, civil and political rights, infliction of the death penalty, and most recently even global gun control. The identification of transnational crime as the new enemy fits into globalism well, since it involves transnational law enforcement and the supersession of domestic law enforcement and indeed of domestic law itself.

The driving force behind globalism, again unlike imperialism, is not the ruling class of any distinct nation but rather a new

ruling class that is transnational in its scope and interests, an elite that has effectively disengaged itself from the underlying institutions and cultures that define nationality, so that today a corporate executive in New York has more in common with his counterpart in Tokyo or Kiev than he does with his co-national in Kansas or Wisconsin. A number of social critics, not all of them terribly critical, have pointed to this phenomenon, including Zbigniew Brzezinski and the late Christopher Lasch. Pat Buchanan's new book, The Great Betrayal, offers quotation after quotation from American corporate leaders who disavow the interests of their own country and explicitly identify themselves and their companies as non-American. We see the results of this disengagement in the recent controversy over importing foreign skilled workers. There are hundreds and perhaps thousands of Americans who are perfectly well qualified to work as computer engineers but who cannot get jobs in the computer industry because the companies, run by deracinated and avaricious geeks who have lost all sense of national identity, insist on hiring Third World workers at lower salaries.

And of course we see the results of globalism in uncontrolled immigration, which occurs not just because agri-business demands cheap labor; so does the meat packing industry in the Midwest; so does the poultry produce industry in the South; so, as I just remarked, does the computer industry in Silicon Valley; and so does almost every other organized institution in American life --

labor unions, eager to refill their depleted ranks with foreign workers; churches, desperate to attract new congregations after their ministers have driven away their old ones with their bloodless sermons and their theology without thunder; and most of all the vast complex of government, education, social work, and therapy that perpetually seeks a new underclass on which to work its voodoo. The result is the further disintegration of the nation under the ideology and interests that globalism represents and the managed evolution of a new global regime, what we know as the New World Order.

Of course, globalism makes use of imperialism and of the underlying nations that it seeks to erode and transcend, just as a nest of termites makes use of a house. The corporations that boast of being transnational rather than American could not exist without the American economy, American workers, American consumers, and the American culture and legal system that creates them in the first place. The United Nations and similar transnational organizations could not exist without the funds supplied by American taxpayers. The Glorious Multicultural America that twinkles in the mind's eye of the advocates of open borders and the abolition of national boundaries could not exist without the old, mono-cultural America, based on its British and European inheritances and populations. Globalism, just as much as the "struggle for the world" against communism, is an illusion, and it can become a reality only when it has destroyed the reality

of nation, race, culture on which it rests.

But if globalism cannot easily become a reality, that does not mean that it cannot triumph, at least by the very destruction of the house on which it feeds. The New World Order that George Bush so indiscreetly disclosed as the goal of globalist policies back in 1990 is more than just a new configuration of the post-Cold War world. It involves a domestic transformation just as much as it does an international one, and while its international agenda may stumble and falter on the intractable rocks of an American population that distrusts the United Nations and the promises of perpetual peace won through perpetual war, its domestic agenda proceeds apace. The transformation of American civilization through immigration, through the permeation of our schools and universities by multiculturalism, and through the ever advancing power of the federal government over its citizens is integral to building the globalist illusion, and it is a transformation that both political parties, the Stupid Party and the Evil Party, and both the right and the left have signed on to and help with. The real conflict today, in this country as well as in Europe, is not between right and left, capitalist and socialist, and certainly not between nation and nation, but between nationalist and globalist. There are of course many forms and faces of that conflict, because the globalist agenda contains so many different facets, but it is no less a struggle for the world than the earlier struggle against communism was or should

have been. In this new struggle we cannot depend on our ruling elites in government or the economy or the culture to fight it for us, any more than we could depend on their fighting communism in the earlier conflict; indeed, we can depend on them fighting against us, but we will have to fight it ourselves. If it's a new enemy we're looking for, we don't have to go very far, and certainly not to the Balkans or Baghdad. The enemy is here, and it is no less an enemy -- of freedom, of nationality, of our whole way of life -- than the communists ever were. Once Americans awaken to the reality of its existence and the threat it represents, as many Europeans are awakening now, we should be able to defeat it far more effectively than we ever defeated our earlier foes.



*[CHRONICLES, November, 1998]*

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*Inside History's Dust Bin*

Ever since I committed the blunder, nearly thirty years ago, of signing up with the "conservative movement" during my first year in graduate school, a certain pattern of behavior has enforced itself on my decreasingly callow mind. The pattern is, as a colleague of mine once remarked to me, that there seems to be no other purpose of any conservative organization than to ignite a faction-fight as soon as possible and thereby destroy the organization. In graduate school the rule proved true. There was no campus chapter of Young Americans for Freedom because the leaders of that group had already fallen upon each other and dispatched the rest of the Yaffies to oblivion. The year I joined the only remaining conservative group on the campus, the Young Republicans, the ex-Yaffies decided to attack it and soon managed to leave it a shattered vessel lurching helplessly through the dark seas of the academic left. The child is father to the man, and what I observed as a mere stripling conservative back then has turned out to be something close to a law of the universe ever since. The "Right," whatever its philosophical content and whatever its political agenda, appears to be inherently flawed by tendencies to schisms and factionalism, and these tendencies go far to explain why it always loses, no matter how compelling its

ideas or how repulsive its political and cultural enemies on the left. Why is this so, and what can be done about it?

That it is so remains true today. The conservative organizations that prevailed in the 1960s and '70s -- like YAF itself -- are now largely defunct or mere shells of what they used to be, and not a few destroyed themselves by their own internal factionalism. Today, there is virtually no "conservative movement" worthy of the name, apart from the ever-thriving hive of neo-conservative Beltway condottieri whose simulation of "populism" keeps their kids in private schools and high-priced cars. Even these quarters are not exempt from the law of conservative self-destruction, and most of them periodically titillate the Beltway rumor mill with stories of their own internal purges, bloodlettings, bankruptcies, and the odd embezzlement by one or another of the patriotic Christians who run them.

No one should be surprised that the Beltway Right behaves pretty much like most other people in Washington, but the inherent factionalism of the Right is not confined to it, nor is it a product of serious philosophical and political antagonisms. On what may be called either the "Hard Right" or the "Old Right," I can think of perhaps half a dozen organizations that simply cannot work with each other because of the personal loathing, jealousy, and distrust that prevails between their leaders or members. But despite some ideological differences, these groups are all in essential agreement with each other, and all of them have the same enemies. If they could work together, they might actually

accomplish something, but they can't, and every effort among them to coordinate and cooperate has flopped. If the truth be told, there is very little practical purpose in anyone joining or aligning with any of them, let alone expecting them ever to accomplish any substantial goal other than remaining in useless existence. Signing up with the American Right today resembles nothing so much as picking up a loaded revolver and proceeding to shoot your own toes off one by one.

There are various explanations of the suicidal proclivities of the Right that come to mind, not least the theory that conservatism as it emerged in the 1950s was largely dominated by ex-communists of one stripe or another who insisted on importing into their new-found political allegiances the same demand for conformity and orthodoxy that had prevailed in the Party (whichever "Party," Stalinist, Trotskyist, or other, they had belonged to). The most notorious of these ex-communist grand inquisitors of the Right was perhaps the late Frank S. Meyer, a Communist Party functionary until 1945 who, once he had concluded that path was the wrong road to travel, at once set himself up as the chap who got to decide who was and who was not a "real" conservative. From the foundation of National Review in 1956 until his death in 1972, Meyer never failed to denounce, purge, read out, expel, and generally behave like the Andrei Vishinsky of the American Right. He tried to prevent the late Russell Kirk from writing for National Review, spread the rumor that his ex-

Trotskyist colleague at the magazine, James Burnham, was a CIA plant, and managed, in his major political-philosophical manifesto (In Defense of Freedom), to excommunicate just about every promising mind on the American Right of his generation. Admittedly, some of these minds never lived up to their promise, and some lived to break their promises as soon as it was profitable to do so, but Meyer's insistence on an "orthodoxy" or a "mainstream" largely invented and formulated by himself helped make the movement he came to shape as uninteresting as it was unimportant and impart his own doctrinaire habits of mind to the generation of younger conservative activists whom he influenced.

But blaming right-wing self-destructiveness merely on one man is a toad that won't hop. The truth is that the tendency arises from the historical situation of the Right in almost every historical context in which any movement of the Right appears. The suicidal tendencies of the Right emerge from the fact that the Right, almost by definition, is a collection of historical losers.

Probably the first historical conflict in which "right" and "left" were the main contenders was the English Civil War of the 1640s, and while the left side of the conflict, represented by the English Parliamentarians and their myriad "Puritan" allies and supporters, was notoriously schismatic, the same was true of the Right side, represented by King Charles I and his court. Anglicans vs. Catholics, civilians vs. military, absolutists vs. constitutional monarchists, and the usual baggage of nincompoop

courtiers and sycophants vs. serious advisers who had some glimmer of how to win and what needed to be done all significantly contributed to the loss of the civil war by the "Right" of the day, the eventual execution of the king himself, and the triumph for nearly a dozen years of Oliver Cromwell's dictatorship. Unlike Charles I, Cromwell dealt with his own side's tendencies to factionalism simply by kicking out or ruthlessly suppressing those rivals that bothered him.

The Left, whether Puritan, Jacobin, Bolshevik, or other, can do that because it generally represents history's winners, a rising social force that actually has an agenda with concrete interests and ideas, and sooner or later the victorious mainstream simply cuts adrift the nuts, crackpots, and perennial malcontents that deflect it from its main purpose. But the Right, whatever the historical context, tends to be composed of history's losers - - people whose interests, ideas, and values represent a social and political order that is on the wane. If it were not on the wane, there would be no emergence of "right" and "left" sides at all and hence no significant conflict between them. But precisely because the interests and ideas of the Right side are declining, it has immense difficulty in coming up with any practicable, concrete program by which its obsolescent wishes can be realized, and because it generally represents the losing side of history, it tends to attract folks who are losers in many different respects - - conspiracy nuts who worry about the fringe on the flag while the

substance of their national sovereignty and civilization is being destroyed; crackpots who have invented their own secret cures for AIDS and cancer; fanatics who have drafted vast, unreadable manuscripts exposing the real cause of everything that's going wrong in the Bankers, the Jews, the Masons, or the Clinton White House; and, inevitably, the sad sacks who have no social life whatsoever other than the potato chip-and-soda pop soirees in which history's discards get to know one another as human beings.

In the United States, prior to the 1930s, it was not so. The Right back then was the organized political expression of a dominant social and political class, a class that sported at its top families like the DuPonts and at its bottom such happy warriors as Sinclair Lewis' George Babbitt and his friends. It was a class that dictated the tastes and manners of the day, was determined to keep immigrants out of the country, maintain the Constitution and the Free Enterprise System, put America First, preserve the white, Christian, Republican character of the nation, and crush the Bolsheviks and labor agitators wherever you could find them. As a ruling class, it was an amalgam of the Old Stock Protestant Establishment and the plutocracy that rose to national power after the Civil War. However poorly defined its ideas and however vapidly expressed its ethic, it was nevertheless a real class that really had something to conserve, and it generally knew that it could not conserve it unless it also conserved the social and cultural fabric through which it exercised social power.

In the Great Depression and New Deal, this bourgeois ruling class was effectively dislodged from social and political power. Its top ranks, if they survived at all, soon allied with the emerging managerial elites in state and corporation, and its bottom ranks, stripped of any real prospect of preserving or restoring the social order in which they had played a significant part, simply drifted. It was mainly those middle and bottom ranks of the old bourgeois elite that for the next forty years would effectively define "conservatism" and the Right as they were known to the generation between Herbert Hoover and Barry Goldwater. Unable to articulate its own ideas and values very effectively, it welcomed ideological allies in journalism and the academy that could express them, but the journalists and the academics were not for the most part of the same class or culture. Hence, the "conservatism" they defined displayed all the symptoms of rootless intellectualism and attracted all the odd and awkward personality types that could not fit anywhere else and would not fit with each other.

Once "conservatism" is decoupled from the social order and the social class that it naturally represents, it becomes simply one more ideological ghetto, angrily hunting down and kicking out those who deviate from its sectarian commandments and every now and then hurling a few mudballs at whoever passes by, and the kinds of personality it tends to attract are precisely those that are unable to work together for any serious purpose. It ceases to

defend authentic tradition because authentic tradition has ceased to exist in a coherent form, and what it defends is "traditionalism." It ceases to defend authentic liberty because the rooted liberty that once pertained in the defunct social order is no longer meaningful, and what it defends is "libertarianism."

It ceases to defend the people, culture, and institutions of the old order because they too have ceased to exist coherently as a fabric or have been conscripted into the new order, and what it defends is simply a pallid ghost of what was once a living civilization. All it can do is worry over who is and who is not a "real conservative," which merely means who does and who does not let the self-appointed swamis of the Right do his thinking for him. Depending on the personal strength and success of the particular swamis that lead them, the cults of "movement conservatism" may flourish indefinitely, continue to publish their endless series of unreadable tracts and sermons to their own choirs, and actually meet the payrolls of their staffs, but no one -- least of all the swamis in charge -- ever expects to gain substantial power or take charge of the rudders of history.

Is there anything that can be done to cure the incessant self-destructiveness of the Right or remove the causes of its own suicidal tendencies? Probably not, as long as the "Right" insists on defining itself in terms of social and historical forces that have already lost. The only thing it can do is try to grasp the truth that those forces have lost and that what they represented



cannot be restored and, instead of presenting itself as the champion of lost causes, to align itself with new forces able to challenge the established order and to do so in terms that will neither be co-opted by the new regime nor deflected by the phantoms of the old. Once in a while such a movement appears, but invariably it only excites the wrath of the "Right." It is too "populist," it appeals to Mass Man, it is too "statist," it is too "radical," or it deviates from the ideological orthodoxy of the Right in some other arcane way. Sooner or later, such a movement is either captured by its allies on the Right and simply becomes one more phone booth into which all the malcontents and oddwads try to cram themselves, or else it ignores them, wishes them a good day, and proceeds to make a little history all by itself, on its own terms and for its own purposes. But, of course, when the movement does the latter, it ceases to belong to the "Right" at all and actually begins to evolve into one of history's winners.■

[CHRONICLES, December, 1998]

*Principalities and Powers*

*Samuel Francis*

*Paleo-Malthusianism*

"Parson," wrote the Tory Radical William Cobbett in an open letter to Thomas Malthus in 1819, "I have, during my life, detested many men; but never any one so much as you." Cobbett's hatred of Malthus, the founder of modern population science, is comparable to the dislike that most conservatives feel toward him today, though they probably wouldn't care for Cobbett, an unsparing critic of the ravenous industrial capitalism of the early nineteenth century, any more than for the author of the Essay on the Principle of Population, the first edition of which was published exactly 200 years ago in 1798.

It's not surprising most conservatives have not exactly waxed exuberant about the anniversary. Malthus they regard as the father of "population planning" and the idea that too many people can be a bad thing, and in addition, growtho-maniacs like the late Julian Simon hold the harelipped demographer and English clergyman responsible for the even more wicked idea that maybe infinite and unrestricted economic growth isn't always a good thing. Thus, Malthus takes it on the lip from both wings of the "conservative movement," from the religious right and the anti-abortion, anti-birth control faction, as well as from the libertarians, who like to insist that there's no environmental or population problem that

can't be solved satisfactorily by building a few more strip malls.

As usual, both sides of the "conservative movement" are wrong, not least because they have completely lost contact with the conservative intellectual tradition and are not able to recognize it when it slaps them in the face. It is no small irony that a few years ago demographer Michael Teitelbaum pointed out that Karl Marx and his heirs hated Malthus at least as much as modern conservatives do, and that "right-wing thinking in the United States was moving dramatically toward the old-line Marxist tradition."

New right and libertarian think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, began to argue that rapid population growth was, at worst, a neutral factor in economic development -- and indeed might be a positive force so long as the "correct" economic system were in place. These arguments were energetically promoted in "backgrounders" aimed at a receptive Reagan White House.

The convergence of contemporary conservatism and communism on the issue of Malthusian ideas is simply part of the convergence of right and left that has been fairly obvious for a couple of decades now, a convergence represented by such major minds as those of Jack Kemp and Newt Gingrich, so you don't need to worry that you missed the gala sponsored by Heritage and Cato celebrating the 200th anniversary of Malthus' essay. There was no such gala, and even if there had been, those who did observe the anniversary wouldn't have been welcome.

The Malthus anniversary was in fact celebrated by The Social Contract, a quarterly journal devoted mainly to immigration and

the demographic, environmental, and cultural problems it causes, in a special issue published last summer and also by John F. Rohe in a short book, A Bicentennial Malthusian Essay: Conservation, Population and the Indifference to Limits, published by Rhodes and Easton in Traverse City, Michigan. Neither The Social Contract nor Mr. Rohe, a lawyer, mechanical engineer, and environmental activist, is conservative, at least not part of the "movement," but, through their sympathy for Malthus, they have quite independently rediscovered some of the fundamental concepts of the conservative tradition that the conservative movement has long since dispatched to the toxic waste dump.

The most famous principle articulated by Malthus was the dictum that while population increases geometrically, the food supply on which population depends increases only arithmetically.

The implication is obvious enough: sooner or later, there will be far more people than there is food to sustain them, and the result will be mass starvation. Malthus, as Mr. Rohe and other Malthusians today acknowledge, did not anticipate such goodies as the "Green Revolution," by which it is possible to make unproductive land yield more and more food and to crank out, through chemicals and artificial breeding, far more crops than could be produced in early 19th century England. Nor did he anticipate that the cultivation of vast new territories in North America, Latin America, and Asia would also increase the supply of food far beyond what could be produced in his day. These

omissions offer immense comfort to the anti-Malthusians, who never cease to whoop about how Malthus didn't know what he was talking about and how, if he'd only lived to see modern Hong Kong, he couldn't possibly have voiced any objection to such a utopia.

But the point is larger than Malthus' specific predictions. As Mr. Rohe makes clear in his book, the essential point that Malthus was making was that there are limits to what human beings can do and be, and that if we exceed those limits, we will have a problem. I will spare the reader the statistics on global food production, energy use, and population growth that Mr. Rohe offers, but whether those figures and the rather ominous extrapolations that Mr. Rohe and others calculate from them are correct or not, the larger point is surely true. Indeed, conservatives in particular ought to know that it's true because conservatism revolves around it.

"Conservatism," wrote the conservative historian Sir Lewis Namier, "is primarily based on a proper recognition of human limitations, and cannot be argued in a spirit of self-glorifying logic." Whether it can be argued or not, the recognition of limits has been a distinguishing characteristic of conservative thought from the time of Burke and de Maistre down to that of Russell Kirk and M.E. Bradford, and the denial of limits has been a characteristic of the left since it first crept from the womb in the Renaissance. The very recognition of "human nature" implies limits, since it means that human beings are one thing and not

another, that there are some things human beings can't do or be and some kinds of society that human beings can't create or sustain. And while conservatives have always insisted that human nature exists and doesn't change, it is the left -- mainly, in this century, in the work of Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and John Dewey -- that insists that it doesn't exist, that man is whatever his "environment" makes him, and that if we just manage the environment, we can also manage and manipulate human beings and their behavior.

Indeed, as Paul Gottfried in an article on Malthus in The Social Contract as well as Mr. Rohe point out, Malthus' essay was written in the first place to challenge the vapid historical optimism bubbled forth by the left of his day, mainly by William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet, both of whom prophesied their own utopias as the necessary future of mankind (neither would have been impressed by Hong Kong.) To Godwin and Condorcet, as to their radical colleagues and their modern-day "conservative" heirs, the future of humanity was to be one of unlimited peace, plenty, equality, justice, freedom, and happiness. Malthus admitted in the preface to the first edition of his essay that his work on population and food supply originated in an argument with a friend over the validity of the Godwin-Condorcet prophecies, and it is not entirely an accident that Mr. Rohe has entitled one of the chapters on Malthus' life and thought "Reactionary."

Moreover, Mr. Rohe also frames Malthus' general insistence on

human limits in the context of modern ecology and sociobiology, especially as formulated by one of the world's leading ecologists, Garrett Hardin. Ecology offers a perspective of nature in balance, so that the presence of one species of plant or animal in one physical location creates functions without which other species in the same locations cannot exist, and altering the balance leads to the destruction of the "eco-system." In Hardin's words, "We can never do merely one thing," a law that is perfectly consistent with what the classical conservatives understood about human society. As the late Robert Nisbet noted, one of the fundamental beliefs of the classical conservatives who (like Malthus) rejected the Enlightenment and French Revolution was the "principle of interdependence of social phenomena." "Since society is organismic in nature, there is always a delicate interrelation of belief, habit, membership, and institution in the life of any society. Each individual and each social trait are parts of a larger system of coherence." Enlightenment social planners failed to grasp this principle, with regard to nature or society, and the consequence of their reckless and rationalistic planning was the destruction of existing social orders as coherent systems. Ecology as a science of nature is essentially the transference of Nisbet's "principle of social interdependence" to natural rather than social systems, and you cannot do merely one thing in a meadow or a rain forest anymore than you can in an urban housing project, a primitive culture, or a tightly

interdependent industrialized society.

The general validity of the ecological and Malthusian perspective and its general consistency with the sociological and anthropological perspective of classical conservatism does not mean that everything modern environmentalists want to do (or not do) should be done. A good deal of what some of them demand is destructive, not only to the utopia of strip malls but to the livelihoods and social communities of those who have to put up with the restrictions they impose and the bureaucracies they create. If it's true that we can never do merely one thing, that means we ought to be a good deal more cautious about doing not only what the growth cult demands but also many of the things the environmentalist movement insists we do immediately. Nevertheless, the point the environmentalists make is essentially valid and one that conservatives, at least those who are serious about that term, ought to support.

As for abortion and birth control, Malthus himself, a clergyman and a fairly conventional moral thinker, advocated neither one and would have been outraged by the suggestion that either be practiced. His own solution to the demographic catastrophes he predicted was "moral restraint," which of course is exactly what the anti-Malthusian pro-life movement advocates today. It is hardly his fault if, in the 200 years since he wrote, Western society has sufficiently abandoned the morality in which he believed to demand them. But it has also sufficiently



abandoned traditional moral beliefs to the point that it can no longer bring to a halt the major source of population growth in the United States today, namely immigration. As Mr. Rohe emphasizes and as Dr. Hardin has written for years, immigration into the United States since 1970 is responsible for 50 percent to 60 percent of the nation's population growth since 1970, and halting it, aside from its cultural and political benefits, would more or less rip the muscles out of the environmentalist movement of the left. A good many of the problems they talk about and the state-imposed solutions they demand for them would simply vanish if immigration were halted; the burden on land use, technical infra-structure, water use, and other perishable resources would be 50 percent to 60 percent less than it is, and halting immigration to this country by the Third World overflow might eventually lead the countries from which the immigrants are coming to do something about controlling their own populations. With the availability of the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Australia and New Zealand as dumping grounds for excess and unwanted populations, these nations have no incentive whatsoever to reduce fertility rates.

Mr. Rohe's presentation of Malthus as essentially a reactionary, a critic of the modernist obsession with growth and material progress and the social chaos the obsession engenders, ought to be useful to real conservatives, and the Malthusian principles of the recognition of limits and moral restraint (not

necessarily confined to sex) ought to build a bridge between conservatives who are still serious about their conservatism and non-conservatives who have independently rediscovered what less-serious conservatives have thrown away. The "convergence" of right and left symbolized by Jack Kemp and Newt Gingrich need not be confined to them; there's no reason why a new cultural right, unified around the principles of limits and social as well as natural interdependence, cannot begin to flourish as easily as the new cultural left that denies limit and sees its main mission as the preservation of a political and economic system that revolves around mass gratification and the destruction of community and personal independence.

What is perhaps already happening is simply the re-definition of "left" and "right" away from the political polarities that have defined them since the New Deal era and toward a new polarity, indeed a new political spectrum, that opposes defense of social cohesion and national-cultural identity, on the one hand, to the demand for growth and gratification at the expense of cohesion and identity on the other. Thomas Malthus and those, like Mr. Rohe and Garrett Hardin, who understand his legacy would offer useful models for one side of this political and ideological antithesis; the other side, like Karl Marx and his heirs in the modern conservative movement, would keep Malthus' name at the top of its enemies list and continue to embrace the utopianism of unlimited growth that Malthus and the real conservatives of his age

rejected. ■