

CHERISHING

**MEN FROM AFAR**

*Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*

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## 2 A MULTITUDE OF LORDS

### *The Qing Empire, Manchu Rulership, and Interdomainal Relations*

Chinese and Euro-American scholars uniformly treat the Qing imperium as a stage of Chinese history, the last in a string of dynasties beginning with the reign of Qinshi Huang (221 B.C.E.)<sup>1</sup> This sinocentric approach to Manchu rule obscures many differences between the Qing and earlier imperial formations in East Asia. For example, with the exception of the Mongol Yuan (itself a conquest dynasty), the Manchus forged the largest and most culturally heterogeneous empire in East Asian history- by the Qianlong reign it had also become the most populous. If the effort to fit the Qing dynasty into “Chinese” history appears awkward at times, it also does not sit comfortably with the rhetoric of the post-1911 Chinese nation-state<sup>2</sup> Twentieth-century Chinese nationalists and state agents have at times condemned and at other times applauded the Manchus, seeing them sometimes as the cause of China's backwardness and at other times as the transmitters of Chinese traditions.

There are, however, growing reasons to doubt that the Manchu emperors and their advisors were the passive receptors of Chinese political and cultural institutions as they are normally portrayed.<sup>3</sup> While there is still no consensus on this issue) there is sufficient evidence to indicate that at least until the nineteenth century the Qing leadership not only adopted existing Ming institutions to their rulership) but set off in highly innovative directions of their own. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide an introductory overview of the Qing empire and to suggest areas in which Qing rulers constructed an imperial formation that deviated in a number of significant ways from its predecessors.

#### 2.1 The Qing Empire in the Eighteenth Century

A central precept in the Qing imagining of empire was the notion that the world was made up of a multitude of lords over whom Manchu emperors sought to position themselves as overlord.<sup>4</sup> Such concerns are quite evident if, for example, we consider some of the titles associated with and claims made about Hongli, the Qianlong *huangdi*, an epithet which might be more informatively rendered as “supreme lord” or “king of kings” rather than the

<sup>1</sup> I do not believe it a great exaggeration to say that the Manchus have only been of interest insofar as they were part of Chinese history. This particular view of the Qing has been shared by American sinologists and by Chinese nationalists on both sides of the Taiwan straits.

<sup>2</sup> Twentieth-century Chinese nationalism opposed itself both to European imperialism and to the Qing dynasty. At the same time, however, it never acknowledged Manchu imperialism as such, preferring instead to include territories conquered by the Manchus into the “natural” sovereign nation-state of China.

<sup>3</sup> In portions of their work, Chia 1992; Crossley 1992; Elliot 1990, 1992, and 1993; and Millward 1993 and 1994 suggest as much. From conversations, it appears that Evelyn Rawski's forthcoming study of the imperial family is in tune with this shift in emphasis.

<sup>4</sup> I use the notion of a multitude of lords because it focuses attention on concerns that appear throughout Qing imperial rites, especially Guest Ritual. The notions of rulership I develop here and in other parts of this study have certain affinities with the work of Crossley, especially her 1992 article. Where we differ is in her overt use of organic- functional metaphors to describe Qing rulership.

conventional term “emperor.” Hongli was also the Chinese Son of Heaven; the successor to the rulership of Genghis Khan, and to the Jin and Yuan dynasties, and hence Khan of Khans; cakravartin king and “Chinese *Aśoka Dharmarāja*” (Lessing 1942:61-62); overlord of Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet; pacifier of Taiwan, Yunnan, Vietnam, Burma and the Zungars and Gurkhas; the incarnate bodhisattva Manjuśrī; and head of the Aisin Gioro, the dominant clan among the Manchus.<sup>5</sup>

These titles were not hollow hyperbole, but signifiers which indicated the nature of the Qing empire and Manchu imperialism. The Qing domain was multinational, multiethnic and multilinguistic, comprising all of what had been Ming China and much, much more. Military campaigns from the reign of the Kangxi emperor forward extended Manchu dominion of the most powerful imperial formation in eastern Eurasia to the borders of Tsarist Russia on the north and west, and to the Himalayas on the south. The khanates of Inner Asia, Buddhist and Muslim, scattered along the old Silk Road as far west as Yarkand and Kashgar, were added in campaigns during the Qianlong reign. As the *Poems and Prose of the Ten Great Campaigns of the Qianlong Reign (SWSQJ)* indicate, the final “pacification” of Inner Asia was completed by the 1770s and the Manchu position in Tibet strengthened by the successful repulsion of a Gurkha invasion in 1790-1791. By the time Lord Macartney arrived at the Qing court bearing George III's letter, the Qing empire was the largest, wealthiest, and most populous contiguous political entity anywhere in the world.

In order to maintain their paramount position over this diverse polity, Qing rulers formulated policies designed to guarantee that no combination of forces came together to challenge the supremacy of the Aisin Gioro house and its claim to paramount overlordship in East and Inner Asia. Fully aware of their own minority position, the Qing elite developed a number of geopolitical strategies for maintaining their dominant position. The strategies involved at least three main considerations: (1) subduing potential counterclaimants to supreme lordship in Inner Asia, while building coalitions that acknowledged Qing supremacy;<sup>6</sup> (2) pacifying and maintaining control over China's diverse population; and (3) assuming a defensive position in the Pacific coastal regions of the empire. In the following sections of this chapter, I will review some of the characteristic features of Qing imperial power and empire building, beginning with their construction of multiple capitals and palace complexes.

## 2.2 Multiple Centers, Multiple Powers

Faced with numerous lords, all of whom were potential rivals to the Manchu claim of overlordship in East and Inner Asia, Qing emperors maneuvered to include the powers of

<sup>5</sup> See Hevia 1989; Crossley 1992 provides details on these many claims of Qing emperors. On cakravartin kingship in Buddhism see Tambiah 1976:39-53.

<sup>6</sup> One of the central ways of building such coalitions was through marriage ties, first with the clans that came to be designated as Manchu and then with sublords that headed various Mongol and Turkic groups; see Rawski 1991 and Millward 1993:329. According to Lattimore (1934:60) such coalition building was an important factor in the Qing conquest of Inner Asia (cited in Rawski 1991:178).

other lords in their own rulership. Inclusion involved participation in guest rites and the court audiences that were part of it, a process which organized a center relative to the peripheral kingdoms of other lords. The same principles appear to have been at play whether the lord in question was a Mongol prince or the king of England. The relationships constituted in Guest Ritual were hierarchical, with the Qing emperor accorded the position of supreme lord (*huangdi*) and the lords of the periphery that of lesser lord (*fanwang*; see chapter 5 for a detailed discussion). In addition, the audiences themselves were held at sites of historical import, ones which might evoke the genealogy of Manchu overlordship and/ or address new conditions in the distribution of lordly powers in the world.

The palace complex at Shenyang (Mukden), for example, recalled the Jin dynasty and Nurhaci's reconstitution of it. It also made reference to the more recent enfeoffment of the Korean king by Nurhaci's successor and founder of the Qing, Hung Taiji.<sup>7</sup> The Yuan and Ming capital at Peking was the site where Qing emperors established themselves as descendants of the Jin and as Sons of Heaven over China proper. Embassies from the lords of Burma, Siam, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian kingdoms as well as European emissaries were granted audiences there in the Hall of Supreme Harmony (*Taihe dian*). Rehe (present day Chengde), located north of Peking and west of Shenyang, was established during the Kangxi emperor's reign to encompass Inner Asian lordship and Tibetan Buddhism. There Qing emperors received Mongol and Turkic lords in a tent reminiscent of that of the Mongol Great Khan, and the Qianlong emperor built replicas of the palaces of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas as emblems of his patronage of Buddhism (see Chayet 1985 and Forêt 1992). By segmenting and zoning other lordships in this way, it would appear that the Manchu emperors attempted to position themselves as the only agency capable of addressing the diverse population of the *Da*, or Great, Qing.<sup>8</sup>

These multiple "capitals" or "in-state" residences of the emperor were augmented by audience halls located at the Encompassing Illumination or Yuanming and Eternal Spring (Changchun) Gardens northwest of Peking. In the former, buildings modeled after the palace styles of France and Italy were erected by the Qianlong emperor's European missionaries and then enclosed within the walls of the larger Chinese-style palace complex (see Malone 1934). Once it is acknowledged as a significant aspect of Qing rulership, palace building might be understood as part of a general process through which the Qing domain addressed contingencies that arose in their efforts to organize hierarchical relations between themselves and other centers of power. Palaces were, in other words, sites where audiences took place, and as such point to the political nature of the relations formed in imperial ritual. These relations were not predetermined, nor were they easily organized and maintained. They

<sup>7</sup> H. Chun notes that Korean embassies stopped in Shenyang on their way to Peking, where they presented part of their tribute; see 1968:97.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, Hongli's claim of a great unity (*datong*) that transcends the linguistic differences of the imperium's peoples. Hongli is, of course, the pivot of such unity. The citation is in Millward 1993:2.69. Also see Zito's discussion, wherein Hongli appears to make reference to having extended cities to nomads (1987:347). Also see Crossley 1987:779.

required ongoing dialogues which were often charged with competing claims and explicit strategies designed to delimit such claims.<sup>9</sup>

From the time of the establishment of the Qing in China, Manchu rulers had to find innovative ways for managing these complex relations. In China proper, for example, where they were a tiny minority, the Qing court developed a number of strategies for holding their paramount position. First, while they retained the core of the Ming governmental structure, they staffed the highest-level offices with equal numbers of Manchu and Chinese officials.<sup>10</sup> Second, over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Qing rulers inaugurated a number of new institutions and launched campaigns either to circumvent the routine practices of the administration, or reform and discipline it.<sup>11</sup> Third, they sought to maintain control over the intellectual and economic center of China proper, the lower Yangtze or Jiangnan region, with carrot-and-stick approaches. Members of powerful groups found positions open to them at the highest levels of the Qing government, including the Grand Secretariat, the Grand Council (see below), and the various governmental boards. At the same time, emperors frequently railed against "factionalism" as a war to curb the power of the Jiangnan literati, particularly as it was centered in private academies.<sup>12</sup> Fourth, the Qing rulers appear to have taken a keen interest in the minute details of rulership, particularly as it related to the conditions of the common people. Part of this interest no doubt involved concern over the possibility of disorder from below that might challenge Manchu hegemony (Kuhn 1990). It also seems to have included concern for the people's livelihoods and, as Rowe has argued, a willingness to use market mechanisms to improve general economic conditions (1993).

While these various concerns and strategies might very well have been conditioned by a sense of the Manchu minority position, it might also have involved a more general acknowledgment of how lightly the imperial order touched the lives of its subjects, how much room there was in fact for all sorts of "heterodox" and heterogeneous practice, especially among a rapidly growing population, many of whose members had about as much connection to the classic books in the Qianlong emperor's text-editing projects as they had to the editors themselves. There is, in other words, evidence of fear of "disorder" from below, but such would probably have remained the case if a Han emperor (however defined) had sat on the throne.

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<sup>9</sup> This was particularly the case in Inner Asia where the Qing repeatedly exhibited a high degree of flexibility; see Fletcher 1978a, the recent studies by Chia (1992) and Millward (1993), and section 2.3 below.

<sup>10</sup> See Hsü 1990:47-59 for an overview of governmental structure. For figures on the distribution of Manchu and Chinese in the positions of governors-general, who oversaw two provinces and provincial governors, see Kessler 1969. Also see Naquin and Rawski's 1987 survey of eighteenth-century China and their accompanying bibliography on this and other topics covered by my all-too-brief discussion.

<sup>11</sup> Such institutions included the Imperial Household Department, which, among other things, oversaw the imperial salt monopoly and maritime customs; see Spence 1966 and Torbert 1977. On problems of corruption, see Zelin 1984, especially 241-252.

<sup>12</sup> For an overview of Jiangnan see Naquin and Rawski 1987:147-158. Bartlett provides figures on Chinese membership on the Grand Council. The majority from the Qianlong reign forward are from this region, see 1991:181-182. On the Jiangnan literati and Qing concerns with factionalism see Elman 1989 and 1990. Kuhn has characterized Manchu attitudes toward Jiangnan as combining "fear and mistrust, admiration and envy" (1990:70-71).

If China proper posed a number of challenges to Qing overlordship in East Asia, so, too, did the regions to the north and west of China. To deal with Mongol lords who submitted to the Qing, in 1638 Hung Taiji established the *Lifan yuan*, or Ministry of Outer Dependencies.<sup>13</sup> Eventually, the duties of the Ministry were extended to include Qing relations with all Inner Asian lords, whether Mongol or Turkic, Buddhist or Islamic. To facilitate matters, the Qing had the Ministry train linguistic and "cultural" experts, and supervise what might be called imperial knowledge projects. These consisted of the creation of dictionaries and grammars, and research on the geography, history, and the genealogies of important personages of Inner Asia.<sup>14</sup> As will be discussed in more detail in section 2.3, during the Qianlong reign, projects were extended to include research into and translation of Tibetan Buddhist sources. In addition, the Qianlong reign saw the compilation of the *August Qing's Illustrated Account of Tribute-bearing Domains (HQZGT)*, a text in which the costumes of the subjects of sublords are pictured and the special products of their domains listed.<sup>15</sup> In these various textual projects, Qing emperors, especially Qianlong, positioned themselves and the Aisin Gioro as the singular political authority that bound together the disparate parts of the far-flung Qing imperium and linked them to the Cosmos.

Like the more famous *Four Treasuries of the Emperor's Library (SKQS)*, the powers associated with constituting these imperial knowledges had, by the reign of the Qianlong emperor, come under the purview of the Grand Council, an inner court of advisers and administrators, whose authority was such during the Qianlong reign that they gave Qing rulership a strong hint of collective or collegial decision making.<sup>16</sup> A few words should be said about the Council both because of its important role in Qing internal and external affairs, and because it was primarily members of the 1792-1793 Council who managed the British embassy and with whom Lord Macartney had almost exclusive contact.

The Grand Council has become the acceptable form of translation for the Chinese term *Junji chu*; a more literal translation might render it the Office of Military Strategy.<sup>17</sup> In her study of the Council, Bartlett has noted its shifting responsibilities from the Yongzheng to the Qianlong reigns (see Bartlett 1991, part 2). Though never made up of more than five or six members at a time, most of the councilors were Manchus who, by the Qianlong reign,

<sup>13</sup> The term has been translated variously as Barbarian Control Office and Court of Colonial Affairs. For a comprehensive discussion on the translation of the term, see Chia 1992:84-86; here is also offered the Manchu term, which she translates as "Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces." I think this a useful corrective except for the reference to province. As I will argue in chapter 5, the Qing court constructed relations with the various leaders of the groups that came under *Lifan yuan* jurisdiction as sublords; therefore, I believe an English rendition that hints at feudalism is appropriate.

<sup>14</sup> For some idea of these sources, see Fletcher 1978a and band the citations in Millward 1993. Also see the entries in Fairbank and Teng 1941:209-219.

<sup>15</sup> The same sorts of concerns that generated these Qianlong-era projects also appear present in efforts to compile histories of the Manchu banners and research the origins of the Manchus; see Crossley 1985 and 1987, especially 779. The significance of these projects may lie in establishing unimpeachable sources on the genealogy of Qing rulership. Hongli's efforts to clarify Manchu origins had the effect of placing the Aisin Gioro at the head of the Manchus and himself at the head of the clan, while undercutting the authority of the other Manchu clans.

<sup>16</sup> The extent of council oversight of the SKQS project is discussed by Guy 1987:79-104. On the origins of the Council see Wu 1970 and Bartlett 1991.

<sup>17</sup> Although I will use Grand Council throughout, a sense of the literal translation seems especially important during the Qianlong reign.

frequently had close personal ties to the Aisin Gioro through marriage. The Council oversaw the many military campaigns of the eighteenth century, with at least one of its members, Agui, frequently serving in the field.<sup>18</sup> It was also responsible for the production of the official history of these campaigns (*SWSQJ*) through the Office of Military Archives (*Fanglue guan*); the organization of Hongli's southern tours (which themselves seem to have been run much like military campaigns); the management of matters pertaining to Rehe and imperial hunts at Mulan; and the oversight of the Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu*). Councillors frequently held concurrent positions in other government bureaus, providing emperors with eyes and ears across the discretely compartmentalized agencies.

The seeding of councillors in multiple offices and agencies highlights one of the central roles of the Grand Council, that of providing emperors with extra-administrative sources of information on the workings of the imperial government in the form of private palace memorials. In this capacity, the Council acted as the center of a vast, secret communications network running parallel to the official administration. Eventually, the palace memorial system, and hence the Council's staff, expanded under the Qianlong emperor. By the end of the reign, the Council dealt with an average of sixteen memorials per day. The memorials themselves were recopied by clerks into a common, easy-to-read script; the emperor then made comments in vermilion ink (hence the name “vermilion rescripted palace memorials” or *zhupi zouzhe*). Nearly all of the communications from officials handling the British embassy traveled to the court through this channel.<sup>19</sup>

### 2.3 Qing Inner Asia

Qing Inner Asia comprised the territories of present day Outer and Inner Mongolia, the provinces of Xinjiang and Qinghai, Tibet, and Manchuria. Sparsely inhabited, these vast territories were populated by Mongol and Turkic nomadic herders, as well as some sedentary farmers around the oases of Xinjiang and in the Tibetan highlands. The oases were also commercial centers linked to the markets of Khokand, Bukhara, and Samarkand via caravans that traveled along what is familiarly known as the Silk Road. Most of the peoples of these regions were organized around headmen whose basis of authority was both competency and lineage. In the latter case, whether Buddhist or Islamic, leaders often claimed descent from Genghis Khan. In other cases, especially where Tibetan Buddhism was influential, they might also claim to be reincarnations of famous historical personages or use titles associated with Buddhist kingship such as cakravartin king.<sup>20</sup> These various claims and associations were

<sup>18</sup> On Agui see *ECCP*, 6-8. Many members also held concurrent posts in other government departments; see, for example, the posts of Fuheng, father of Fuchang'an (himself a Grand Councillor), and Fukang'an, in Bartlett 1991:186. I mention the sons of Fuheng here because both figured prominently in the British embassy; for biographies of all three see *ECC*, 249, 252-2.55.

<sup>19</sup> On the palace memorials see Wu 1970, Bartlett 1991:171, and Kuhn 1990:12.2-12.4. The palace memorials can be contrasted with the routine form of memorial (*tiben*). With respect to the Macartney embassy, the emperor's response were in the form of instructions (*shangyu*) dispatched via court letters (*tingji* or *ziji*) under the names of Grand Councillors. See Kuhn 1990:12.4 on the form of these communications.

<sup>20</sup> Ligdan Khan (1603-1634), for example, bore the following epithets: Cakravartin Saint, Conqueror of the Directions, Turner of the Golden Wheel, King of the Law, Tang Taisong, Wise emperor of the Great Yuan, and Marvellous Genghis Daiming Setsen (Bawden 1968:34). On reincarnation and Tibetan Buddhism see Wylie

staples of politics in Inner Asia. From the time of the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, they were also central elements in any assertion of rulership over this region. Qing emperors made similar claims.

By the reign of the Qianlong emperor, Qing hegemony in Inner Asia was virtually complete. It had been achieved through direct conquest, marriage alliances, and peaceful submissions.<sup>21</sup> When Lord Macartney arrived in 1793, the various Inner Asian lords had been organized into a rotational system (not unlike that of the Tokugawa *sank in kōtai*) by which they, Mongol lamas, and Turkic Muslim nobles were to appear at the Qing court periodically.<sup>22</sup> In fact, Macartney participated in one such occasion where members of all three categories were present - the annual celebration of the Qianlong emperor's birthday at the palace complex of Rehe.

Qing emperors also attempted to consolidate the imperium by patronizing Tibetan Buddhism, and did so to a degree and on a scale unmatched by previous dynasties. Manchu interest in Tibetan Buddhism is instructive. In the first place it went beyond simply conceding the importance of Buddhism for the empire's subjects; it included, for example, the construction of monasteries and temples at sites such as Rehe, the launching of military campaigns that during Qianlong's reign helped to extend the dominion of the dGe-lugs-pa sect of Tibet (see, e.g., Martin 1990), and the participation of emperors in Tantric initiation rites. Because of its significant place in Qing rulership, I will briefly discuss the relationship between Qing emperors, especially Qianlong, and Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>23</sup> I have selected this particular example because it touches on many of the issues of imperial politics during the Qianlong era, especially as it relates to Mongol rulers and other Inner Asian lords.

### 2.3.1 Manchu Rulership and Tibetan Buddhism

In his *Pronouncements on Lamas* (*Lama shuo*, 1792), the Qianlong emperor indicated that Qing interest in Tibetan Buddhism was connected to previous relations between the Yuan and Ming dynasties and Tibetan lamas from Inner Asia. In the Yuan period, a lama-patron (Tib. *Mchod yon*; see Ruegg 1991) relationship was forged between Khubilai Khan and the lama 'Phags-pa of the Sa-skyapa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. During the early Ming period, the Fifth Karmapa Lama visited the court of Ming Chengzu (the Yongle emperor) in 1407. In both cases, emperors bestowed titles on the lamas and lamas bestowed tantric initiations on emperors. In the Ming case, Tibetan sources add that the lama recognized the emperor and empress as the incarnations of the bodhisattvas Mañjuśrī and Tārā.<sup>24</sup>

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1978.

<sup>21</sup> See Bawden 1968 and Rossabi 1975 for an overview of the Qing conquest of Inner Asia. On Tibet see Petech 1950. On Qing relations with Turkic lords see Millward 1993. Also see D. Farquhar 1968.

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, Jagchid 1974:46-50. This process appears to be what Chia refers to as "pilgrimage" (1992 and 1993).

<sup>23</sup> For empirical accounts of Qing Inner Asia, see, for example, Bawden 1968, Fletcher 1978a and b, Millward 1993, and Rossabi 1975.

<sup>24</sup> A printed version of the text of the *Lama shuo* can be found in WZTZ, 1:23-16. Also see Lessing 1942:58-62 for a translation. On Yuan relations with Tibetan lamas see Franke 1978 and 1981; and Rossabi 1988. On the Karmapa Lama's visit to Peking see Sperling 1983, especially 80-99, and Wylie 1980. On Tibetan incarnation see Wylie 1978.



In addition to these historical affiliations between Tibetan Buddhism and the two dynasties that preceded the establishment of the Qing, the Manchu ruling house was perennially concerned with the possibility of the reemergence of a Mongol kingdom in Inner Asia that might challenge their own preeminence.<sup>25</sup> Such concerns existed before the formal inception of the dynasty in China and were fueled by more than simply the fact that same Mongol Khans refused to submit to Manchu overlordship. Among other things, only a few decades before Nurhaci began to consolidate the Manchus, Altan Khan and the Third Dalai Lama had met in Mongolia and, invoking the relationship between the lama 'Phags-pa and Khubilai Khan, forged a lama-patron relationship (Bawden 1968:29-30 and Rossabi 1975: 118). Matters were further complicated when in 1639 the Tüsiyetü Khan, Gombodorji had his son, later titled by the Dalai Lama as the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu accepted by the Khalkha Mongols as an incarnate lama. According to Bawden (1968:53-54), the Khan's purpose here may have been to provide a counterforce to the power of the Tibetan dGe-lugs-pa sect, while at the same time hedging against a potential alliance between the Tibetans and the newly declared Qing dynasty of Hung Taiji (Abahai). For their part, the Manchu rulers seemed to have been intent on preventing either the dGe-lugs-pa sect or the Khalkha Khutukhtu from providing a focal point for Mongol restorationists (Grupper 1984:51-52).

With the founding of the Qing dynasty, the triangular relationship between Manchus, Mongols and Tibetans became more elaborate. The Dalai Lama and occasionally the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu acted as if they themselves were rival lords. They invested, entitled and provided seals for Mongol Khans, arbitrated disputes between Khans and like emperors and Khans, received and dispatched embassies, commanded populations - in some cases, even armies.<sup>26</sup> In addition, each of these lamas professed to be incarnate bodhisattvas, the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, Vajrapāṇi and the Dalai Lama, Avalokiteśvara, two bodhisattvas who with Mañjuśrī formed a triumvirate.<sup>27</sup> It is perhaps not so surprising, therefore, that a cult of the emperor as the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī would emerge under the early Qing emperors (D. Farquhar 1978).

At the same time that Manchu emperors showed concern over the activities of lamas and khutukhtus, they also demonstrated a keen interest in the doctrines and practices of Tibetan Buddhism. They built temples, worshipped specific Tibetan deities such as Mahākāla, and, in the case of Hongli, authorized monumental projects of translating and editing texts of the Buddhist canon<sup>28</sup> Qing emperors also joined with Tibetan and Mongol Buddhist hierarchs in the promotion of the cult of Mañjuśrī on Mount Wutai.<sup>29</sup> It also seems significant that

<sup>25</sup> See Rossabi 1975 and Petech 1950. Here it is useful to follow Crossley's distinction (1990) between the dynastic house and the Manchu clans in general. This is particularly the case in the Qianlong era, when Manchuness was literally constituted by order of the emperor; see Crossley 1987, which admittedly does not draw the same conclusion I have drawn here.

<sup>26</sup> See Bawden 1968:31,34, 48-50, 63-69; Ishihama 1992; Rossabi 1975:112-114, 119; and Ruegg 1991:450. Also see Rahul 1968-1969.

<sup>27</sup> These celestial bodhisattvas embodied the universal totality of the three aspects of the Buddha: power (Vajrapāṇi), compassion (Avalokiteśvara), and wisdom (Mañjuśrī).

<sup>28</sup> I have dealt in greater detail with this subject in my 1993b:149-151.

<sup>29</sup> On Wutai see D. Farquhar 1978:11-16. On lamas and emperors at Wutai see Bawden 1961:58, Hopkins 1987:18-19, and Pozdnevcev 1977:336. On the basis of these and other examples, Grupper argues that the early

emperors received consecrations from Tibetan Buddhist lamas (Grupper 1980 and 1984) and were willing to accept names and titles such as cakravartin king and the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī.<sup>30</sup>

The last of these titles is particularly interesting. According to Grupper, various Tibetan works "urged consecrated sovereigns to adopt the twin goals of Bodhisattvahood and universal dominion" (Grupper 1984:49-50). Equally compelling are those aspects of Buddhist notions of divine rulership which seem to make a link between the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī and a cakravartin king. Snellgrove has observed that there had been an association of rulership with Mañjuśrī from very early on in Buddhism. In a text that discusses the construction of a mandala for the deity, Mañjuśrī is placed at the center like a "great cakravartin-chief," he has the color of saffron, and turns a great wheel (Snellgrove 1959:207). While this description may be usefully compared to the various pictorial representations of the Qianlong emperor as a bodhisattva,<sup>31</sup> it extends, more importantly, the range of possible meanings for imperial interest in Tibetan Buddhism.

For example, consider some of the implications of claims that Manchu emperors were involved in Tibetan initiation rituals. This issue is especially important because it seems just as plausible to assume that emperors could have achieved the sort of political manipulations of Buddhist populations with which they are often charged simply by patronizing Buddhism from a distance. It was not, in other words, necessary for them to participate in these rituals to benefit from being identified with Buddhism. What, then, could have been the motive of Manchu emperors? One explanation may have to do with the promises implicit in the ritual technologies of some tantric teachings. They offered the possibility of achieving buddhahood in a single lifetime, rather than through eons of rebirth (Snellgrove 1987:236). Of great significance in this regard was the knowledge certain lamas commanded for the construction of mandalas and for the initiation of others into rites that allowed them to achieve buddhahood.

By the time of the reign of the Qianlong emperor, certain changes in lama-emperor relations had occurred. The Sa-skya-pa sect, which had had close affiliations with Nurhaci and Hung Taiji, seems to have been downgraded; in its stead was the Yellow or dGe-lugs-pa sect. Of particular interest in this respect was the association between the Qianlong emperor and the Mongolian scholar and dGe-lugs-pa adept, the Lcang-skya Khutukhtu.<sup>32</sup> Lcang-skya (1717-1786) studied Manchu, Chinese, and Mongolian at the court of the Yongzheng emperor, where he became close friends with a classmate, the emperor's fourth son, Hongli, the future Qianlong emperor. In the early 1730s, he journeyed to Tibet, studied with the Dalai

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Manchu kingdom was "indistinguishable" from those of Mongol Khans (1984:51-54,67-68).

<sup>30</sup> While it seems to be the case, at least in Chinese sources, that Qing emperors did not claim to be the reincarnated bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, they also seem to have done little to discourage others from making the claim on their behalf; see D. Farquhar 1978. Emperors may also have been drawn to Tibetan Buddhism because lamas possessed extraordinary supernatural powers. For some examples see the discussion and sources cited in Hevia 1993b:151-153.

<sup>31</sup> Depictions of the Qianlong emperor as the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī have him dressed in saffron robes and holding a wheel in his left hand; see D. Farquhar 1978:7, Kahn 1971: 185, and Palace Museum 1983:117.

<sup>32</sup> He appears in Qianlong era Chinese sources as Zhangjia Hutuketu and was the second incarnation, the first having been enfeoffed by the Kangxi emperor and given the title "Teacher of the Kingdom" (*guoshi*).

Lama, and was ordained by the Panchen Lama in 1735. In addition to placing his magical powers at the service of Hongli, he was also involved in translating Indian commentaries and tantras from Tibetan into Mongol and Manchu; teaching Hongli Tibetan and Sanskrit; establishing colleges (1744) for the teaching of philosophy, tantrism, and medicine at the Yonghe Palace; and, according to the Tibetan biography of the Khutukhtu, bestowed Tantric initiations on the Qianlong emperor.<sup>33</sup> Finally and perhaps most significantly for the subject of this study, Lcang-skya acted as the emperor's personal emissary and mediator between Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus.<sup>34</sup> The many duties and achievements of Lcang-skya, as well as his special role as the bestower of Tantric initiations on the emperor, highlights the degree to which Hongli was involved in Tibetan Buddhism. Through the agency of the Lcang-skya Khutukhtu, the emperor apparently sought to center Tibetan Buddhism within his own rulership and patronize it with the wealth Qing emperors drew from the Chinese part of their empire.<sup>35</sup>

This brief review of Manchu affiliations with Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs suggests a connection between such relations and the constitution and reproduction of Qing emperorship. Far from being discrete aspects or images of rulership, politics and religion appear to have been fused, both embedded within cosmologies. The overall significance of such fusion might be more apparent when considering the form of encounters between emperors and lamas. In particular, I will focus attention on audience rituals, bodily practices within these rites, and differential accounts of such meetings. My purpose is to demonstrate that the events of the Macartney embassy having to do with audience form were in fact not unusual. These were contentious issues across East and Inner Asia, issues which indicate the contingent and provisional nature of Qing overlordship.

### 2.3.2 *Encounters between Emperors and Lamas*

Meetings between emperors and lamas involved attempts by both parties to encompass and include the other in their own cosmologies. In imperial audiences, for example, Qing emperors frequently tried to establish with lamas relations of the kind that obtained between the supreme lord and a lesser lord, and thereby negate any claims by lamas to political superiority. But even this gesture was not without ambiguity. At the same moment they attempted to include lamas in their emperorship *as if* the latter were worldly lords, emperors also sometimes distinguished them from the category of sublord (see below on the Khalkha submission to the Qing).

<sup>33</sup> On one such initiation occasion, the emperor relinquished the highest seat to Lcang-skya, knelt before him during the consecration, and later bowed the top of his head (*dingli*) to the Khutukhtu's feet; see Wang 1990:57-58. For a full Chinese translation of the Tibetan chronicle of the Khutukhtu's life, see Chen and Ma 1988. I am indebted to Evelyn Rawski for bringing these sources to my attention. The significance of the emperor's action will be taken up below.

<sup>34</sup> On Lcang-skya's life I draw primarily from Hopkins 1987:15-35, 448-449; *The Collected Works of the 11th Dalai Lama* (1969); and Grupper 1984. The Lcang-skya Khutukhtu's activities on behalf of the Qing court led the Qianlong emperor to designate him "Teacher of the Kingdom," the only lama ever so titled by the court (*WZTZ*, 1:13).

<sup>35</sup> Chia (1991:224-227) has also argued that the Qing court attempted to make Peking a center of Tibetan Buddhism.

For their part, Tibetan lamas and Mongol hierarchs sought at various times to assert a long-standing Buddhist view that placed the lamas as the intellectual/ spiritual superior of a lord of the "mere" earth. In this relationship, referred to above as that of lama and patron, the lama claimed to command superior spiritual powers. As such he could recognize a lord, including an emperor, as a cakravartin king, instruct him in Buddhism, initiate him into tantric mysteries, and receive offerings from him for sustenance of the sect. The patron, in turn, would be expected to accept a position as inferior, protect the lama, seek his teachings, and promote Buddhism in his (the patron's) domain.<sup>36</sup> In either case-supreme lord-lesser lord or lama-patron - the relationship was hierarchical, with one party assuming the position of a superior, the other of an inferior.

To summarize, emperors and lamas made various claims to preeminence; no one could completely ignore the claims of the others. Nothing high- lights these political realities more than the contradictory accounts of meetings between Qing emperors and various Buddhist hierarchs from Inner Asia. What these accounts tend to show is that while the Qing court did at times defer to Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs, increasingly over the course of the eighteenth century, Manchu emperors asserted supreme lord-lesser lord, rather than lama-patron, relations in their intercourse with Tibetan lamas and Mongol khutukhtus. In the face of these Qing hegemonic gestures, lamas and khutukhtus attempted to retain the high ground of spiritual superiority.

After the establishment of the Qing dynasty in China in 1644, and well before the Manchus asserted hegemony over Tibet, the first significant encounter between an emperor and a lama occurred when the Fifth Dalai Lama journeyed to Peking in 1653. The court of the Shunzhi emperor was split over where the lama should be received. Thinking that it might be a useful war for winning over Mongol groups who had yet to submit to Manchu overlordship, the emperor's Manchu advisors thought it wise to meet the lama in Mongolia. His Chinese councillors objected, arguing that cosmic portents indicated that the lama sought to challenge the emperor's supremacy. In keeping with the spatial principles of imperial ritual, therefore, if he left his capital and went to Mongolia, he would be acknowledging the lama's superiority (*SZZSL*, 68:1b-3a, 31b).<sup>37</sup>

The emperor decided to give audience in Peking, but with certain modifications that vary from guidelines to be found in ritual manuals. The *Veritable Records (Shilu)* of the Shunzhi emperor of January 14, 1653, notes that

the Dalai Lama arrived and visited (ye) the emperor who was in the South Park. The emperor bestowed on him a seat and a feast. The lama brought forward a horse and local products and offered them to the emperor. (*SZZSL*, 70:20a-b)

<sup>36</sup> Ishihama (1992:507) notes that when granting titles the lama was the clear superior to an earthly lord. Ruegg (1991) argues that it is misleading to see the lama-patron relationship in terms of oppositions between secular/spiritual and profane/religious (450), but as historically variable.

<sup>37</sup> Bartlett provides an example of the significance of the movement of an emperor outside the imperial city. She notes the Qianlong emperor's greeting of Agui on the outskirts of Peking after the latter's defeat of the Jinquan; see 1991:183.

The differences in question include the holding of the audience in the large park to the south of Peking rather than in one of the outer palaces of the imperial city<sup>38</sup> (ritual manuals suggest the Supreme Harmony Hall) and the fact that the audience was characterized as a visit (*ye*), rather than as a "summons to court" (*zhaojian*), the usual form for recording such events in the *Veritable Records*. In the latter case, while *ye* connotes a visit from an inferior to a superior, I believe it suggests some sense of deference in this context. On the other hand, certain things were done in accordance with imperial audience as outlined in other sources such as the Ming and Qing ritual manuals. The emperor bestowed a seat and a feast on the lama. The lama, like other loyal inferiors, made offerings of local products (*fangwu*).

If this entry on audience appears anomalous when compared to imperial audience protocols, the account of the same audience in the autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama is even more unusual. While he does not mention the site at which the audience took place, the lama claims that the emperor descended from his throne, advanced for a distance of ten fathoms and took his hand! The lama also reports that he sat in audience on a seat that was both close to the emperor and almost the same height. When tea was offered, the emperor insisted that the lama drink first, but the lama thought it more proper that they drink together. On this occasion and over the following days the lama recorded that the emperor gave him numerous gifts fit for a "Teacher of the Emperor" (*Dishi*). The emperor is also said to have requested that the Dalai Lama resolve a dispute between two other lamas. On his return trip through Mongolia to Tibet, the lama displayed the presents given by the emperor and appears to have distributed some of them along the route (Ahmad 1970:175-183).

What is especially interesting about these two accounts is not simply that they differ, but that the dimensions along which they diverge involve ritual practice. The imperial records mention the lama's offerings to the emperor, all of which may be construed as his acceptance of a position of inferiority. The lama's account emphasizes offerings made by the emperor to him and includes many examples of the emperor deferring to the lama as a person of superior spiritual insight. The imperial records solved the problem of a meeting with an important and potentially dangerous personage by shifting the location to one outside the imperial audience-hall complex proper. The lama's account emphasizes that the emperor came down from his throne to greet him, an act of considerable deference.

A similar pattern of divergent accounts emerges in connection with meetings between the Shunzhi emperor's successors and the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu. Here, too, the court seemed

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<sup>38</sup> The South Park referred to here is probably the Nanhaizi or Nanyuan haizi, located outside the south wall of Peking. Apparently used as a hunting park by the Manchu court, it can still be seen on maps from the early part of this century; see Clunas 1991:46. I am indebted to Susan Naquin for this information. one cannot help wondering if the solution to the problem posed by the lama's visit might help to explain the use of other sites around Peking to address relations with Inner Asian lords. The example of the Pavilion of Purple Brightness (*Ziguang ge*) to the west of the main audience halls of the imperial city is well known, hut audiences and feasts also might take place at the Yuanming gardens. The *DQHDT*, 1818 edition, *juan* 21:6a-78, diagrams a feast in a round tent at the Yuanming yuan.

Holding audiences outside the main halls of the palace for problematic guests continued through the end of the dynasty. Between 1870 and 1900, no diplomat –European, American or Japanese ambassador – was received in the Hall of Supreme Harmony. They were hosted at the Pavilion of Purple Brightness or other halls; see Rockhill 1905.

willing to accord a degree of deference to the Khutukhtu, while still working to establish a supreme lord- lesser lord bond. So, for example, at the famous submission of the Khalkha Mongols to the Qing at Dolonnor in 1691, the *Veritable Records* indicates that when the Kangxi emperor received the Khutukhtu in an audience on May 29, the Khutukhtu knelt (*gui*) before the emperor. The emperor bestowed tea and other gifts on the Khutukhtu. The next day another audience was held for other members of the Khalkha nobility; they performed three kneelings and nine bows (*sangui jiukou*).<sup>39</sup> At the same time, all of the activities that occurred at Dolonnor were cataloged under the general rubric for classifying relations between the supreme lord and lesser lords, that is, "cherishing men from afar" (*huairou yuanren*; see *SZRS*, 151:23a). It appears, therefore, that the Khutukhtu assumed the position of a loyal inferior, but one who was in some way differentiated from the remainder of the Khalkha nobility by the greater deference with which he was received.

On its side, Mongol versions of encounters between the emperor and the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu closely parallel in form the Dalai Lama's version of his meeting with the Shunzhi emperor, a pattern which continued into the Qianlong era (see Bawden 1961:49-60 and Pozdneyev 1977:332- 336). In 1737, for example, the Second Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu journeyed to Peking, where he was met and honored by high officials and lamas at the Anding Gate. When he arrived at his quarters, the Qianlong emperor met him. Upon seeing the emperor, the Khutukhtu knelt, but the emperor insisted he not do so. Later in an audience that included a tea bestowal, the emperor asked the Khutukhtu to sit closer and higher than other guests (Bawden 1961:71 and Pozdneyev 1977:341). In addition, the Qianlong emperor lavished gifts on him and acknowledged his powers.<sup>40</sup>

Much the same sort of conflicting presentation occurred when the Panchen Lama visited Rehe and Peking in 1780. According to the Lama's account, the emperor left the throne and greeted him at the door to the reception hall. Taking his hand, the emperor led him to the throne, where the two sat facing each other and "conversed as intimate friends." Later the emperor visited the Lama at the special residence that had been prepared for him, a reproduction of the Panchen's palace at Tashilhunpo, and sought his teachings, Banquets and gift giving followed over the next several days. Various sources claim that during his stay the lama initiated the emperor into the Mahākāla and Cakrasamvara tantras.<sup>41</sup> Here again the lama is cast as teacher, the emperor as patron and pupil.

The *Veritable Records* provides quite another point of view, one that differs from both the Tibetan account and the *Veritable Records'* version of the visit of the Fifth Dalai Lama discussed above. In these records the emperor summoned the lama to audience (*zhaojian*) in the Hall of Luxuriant Clarity (Yiqingkuang dian) at Rehe. Three days later the Lama was again summoned to the round tent in the Garden of Ten-thousand Trees (Wanshu yuan), where Inner Asian lords of various ranks looked on while the emperor bestowed caps, gowns,

<sup>39</sup> The Khutukhtu appeared in this audience with the Tüsiyetü Khan, who was also recorded as kneeling. In the entry for the following day, however, the Khutukhtu is not mentioned, only Khalkha Khans and ranks of nobles, which would include the Tüsiyetü Khan; see *SZRS*. 151:8a, 10a.

<sup>40</sup> See Hevia 1993b:164 n. 35 for a discussion concerning the problem of dating this event.

<sup>41</sup> I follow Das's translation from an abridged version of the Panchen Lama's life; see 1882:39-41. On the initiations see Das and also Grupper 1984:59. Also see Cammann 1949-1950 on the lama's visit.

gold, silver, and silk on the Lama.<sup>42</sup> While these audiences constitute the encounter as one between the supreme lord and lesser lords, the lama was differentiated from the various Inner Asian lords, looking on much as the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu had been at Dolonnor. 'According to a directive in the *Rehe Gazetteer* (RHZ, 24:10b), the Lama was allowed to kneel (*gui*) before the emperor instead of bowing (*bai*), provided he was sincere (*cheng*).<sup>43</sup>

These records indicate that conflicting and contradictory accounts of the signifying practices of participants in ritual space (i.e., movement in time along fast-west and high-low axes, as well as bowing, kneeling, and enunciating) were possible when emperors received lamas in audience. Such differential presentations of bodily practices tell us much about the efforts of Manchu emperors and Buddhist hierarchs to incorporate each other as sublords, patrons, or pupils. Even when honoring lamas and altering audience protocols for them, the Qing court insisted that they were recipients of imperial grace (*en*), making it quite clear, at least by the time of the Qianlong reign, that the lama was a loyal inferior of the supreme lord. In contrast, Tibetan and Mongol accounts seem concerned with the superior knowledge or expertise of the lamas relative to that of their imperial hosts as well as with specific acts of bodily practice that differ from those described in imperial ritual manuals. They also tend to construct the emperor as an offerer of gifts, and hence a devotee/pupil, and the lama as receiver of alms.

For both emperors and lamas, therefore, meetings appear to have been a kind of pivot at which asymmetrical hierarchies were fashioned, in which the present and future were significantly addressed, and in which bodily action constructed highly consequential relationships (Hevia 1994b). In these senses, the disposition of bodies and the organization of ritual space were about who was actually submitting to whom, with the mutual recognition that such submission had wide political consequences. Yet, since participants vied to hierarchize each other in audiences, submission was a complicated affair. On their side, Manchu emperors wanted lamas to offer themselves sincerely to the emperor - that is, to accept loyally a position as inferior in a relationship with the supreme lord. For their part, lamas wanted emperors humbly to accept a position as patron and pupil of the lama. I do not think it would make much sense to either party for submission in such relations to be coerced. I suggest, therefore, that at least on the Qing court's side, meetings between lamas and emperors were about constructing scales of sincere loyalty. Participants scrutinized the bodily movements of others as outward signs of inner conditions in an effort to determine whether verbal statements or other kinds of action (such as gift giving), all of which presumably manifested loyalty and submission, were indeed sincere.

<sup>42</sup> GZCSL, 1111 :4a and 10a-b; other occasions of feasting and bestowal followed, including one in the Hall of Preserving Harmony (Baohe dian) at Peking on October 29, 1780; see GZCSL, 1112:17b-18a and 1116:4a.

<sup>43</sup> The reason given in this case for allowing the Lama to kneel was that it was customary in Buddhism to bow (*bai*) only to the Buddha. This particular reference to respect for the customs of others was not unusual. See the instructions to the imperial envoy to Tibet, Songyun, in 1795, To accord with the teachings of the Yellow sect, he was ordered not to bow his head to the ground (*koubai*) before the Dalai Lama; see GZCSL, 1458:34b-35a. There was another sort of deference that may have occurred at Rehe as well. According to a diagram to be found in the 1818 edition *DQHDT*, 21:7a, during feasts held at the round tent in the Garden of Ten-thousand trees, khutukhtus and lamas were seated closer to the emperor than Mongol nobles.

The Qianlong emperor's casting of the relationship between the Qing court and the Yellow sect in terms that privilege hierarchies of lords over hierarchies of spiritual powers makes, I would argue, the concerns of the Manchu court easier to understand. Lama hierarchs posed a threat because they challenged the very premises upon which an encompassing imperial sovereignty was grounded. That is, they embodied a competing and equally powerful hierarchical view of the cosmos that placed them above the multitude of earthly lords, even if the latter be patrons. Moreover, if Tibetan lamas had been able reliably and consistently to incorporate Manchu emperors as pupils, then any claims emperors made in Inner Asia to supreme lordship could be challenged on cosmological grounds. Lamas were also dangerous because they had the potential for confusing the loyalties of lesser lords, such as Mongol Khans. Yet the problems lamas posed to imperial sovereignty were not easily resolved (cf. Ruegg, 1991 :451). And if Hongli and other emperors were interested in tantric initiations, who is to say that they might not have seen them as one among other ways of fulfilling their cosmological responsibilities in a Manchu (as opposed to a Chinese) empire? The Qianlong emperor's solution seems to have been to construct an alternative center of Tibetan Buddhism under his auspices at Peking's Yonghe Palace and in Rehe. But the problems themselves hardly disappeared; the potential for fashioning claims on cosmo-moral grounds could never be eradicated.

## 2.4 The Coastal Frontier

Qing policies along the eastern seaboard of their empire were, among other things, designed to organize the rulers of smaller kingdoms such as Korea and the Liuqiu Islands as Qing sublords, to ward off pirates, to prevent potentially seditious links between the mainland Chinese population and overseas Chinese communities, and to manage the "West Ocean" merchants who began to arrive in increasing numbers around the time the Qing was established.<sup>44</sup> From this perspective, what eighteenth- and nineteenth- century Englishmen termed Chinese "jealousy" and "exclusionism" was, in fact, no more than the practical politics of the Qing court. And, like its management of Inner Asian frontiers, the Qing imperium seemed to treat the Pacific coast of China as an area of both opportunity and of potential threat.

Controlled and managed trade allowed the court to tap a source of funding outside the usual bureaucratic channels, funds that could be used not only for the maintenance of the imperial lineage, but in various imperial projects, including warfare.<sup>45</sup> The maritime customs provided the court, in other words, with monies for empire building. At the same time, by limiting and managing contact on the eastern seaboard, the court also tried to prevent links between Chinese merchants and overseas communities, connections which they seemed to suspect might produce well-financed anti- Manchu factions. It also allowed the court a means of preventing collusion between "seditious" natives and foreigners. Finally, limiting contact to

<sup>44</sup> See Fairbank 1983:9-20 and Wills 1979a, 1988, and 1993. I also draw on remarks made by Erhard Rosner at the Chengde conference marking the bicentenary of the Macartney embassy, September 18, 1993.

<sup>45</sup> On maritime customs and their link to the Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu*) see Chang 1974; Wakeman 1975:19; and Torbert 1977:99-100.



a select few coastal ports may also have allowed the Qing court to manage the flow of technologies, particularly military ones, into their empire. In this sense, they may have been close to the thinking of their contemporaries, the Tokugawa leaders in Japan. Military technologies from Europe had their uses for gaining and remaining in power, but they were far too dangerous if they became available to rival lords.<sup>46</sup> In the following sections, I will survey Qing relations with kingdoms to the East and South in the order given in the *Comprehensive Rites of the Great Qing* and related texts.

#### 2.4.1 East and Southeast Asian Kingdoms

In addressing the differences among the many lords who might wish to form a relationship with the Qing emperor, the court utilized its various capitals to provide discrete zones of ritual activity for encounters with other domains. In the main, kingdoms on the east and south who sought audience with the emperor were received in Peking.

Korea appears to be the one exception to this general rule. The embassies of the Korean king, one of the first lords to submit to the Manchus, sometimes participated in rites at Shenyang, the first capital of the Qing, as well as in Peking. Korea also stands out because it sent embassies annually. These unique features help to account for the fact that Korea emerges in Qing court records as the loyal domain par excellence. For example, in the *Comprehensive Rites*, Korea appears first among other domains, and imperial envoys dispatched to the Korean court are always of a higher rank (*DQTL*, 45:5a). In a section that deals with dispatching an imperial instruction to the court of a lesser lord, Korea is used as the example of a correct reception (*DQTL*, 30:3b-5a). Special reference is also made to Korean emissaries in Audience and Feasting rites (*DQTL*, 19:9a and 40:34b).

Between 1637 and 1881 Korea sent a total of 435 special embassies to the Qing court.<sup>47</sup> These embassies gave thanks for imperial grace (*en*); offered congratulations, especially on the emperor's birthday; offered condolences; delivered memorials; requested the imperial calendar; and requested investiture (H. Chun 1968:92-93). Given this record, Qing-Korea relations appear clear-cut; the Korean king was a sublord to the Qing emperor. At the same time, however, the Korean king constituted his rulership through rituals similar to those of the Qing emperor, organizing, as it were, a cosmo-moral order unmediated by Qing rulership.

Similar observations could be made about Liuqiu and Annam, which appear to rank just below Korea among the domains to the South and East. During the Qianlong reign, Liuqiu, like Korea, received Chinese envoys for the investiture of Liuqiu's lord in a rite apparently prescribed by the Qing court.<sup>48</sup> And it, too, was supposed to send embassies to the Qing court annually. Yet, it also appears that Liuqiu was related as a lesser lord to the leader of the Satsuma domain on the island of Kyushu in Japan (Sakai 1968).

<sup>46</sup> Waley-Cohen (1993) has recently written about Qing interest in European technology; see especially 1534 ff.

<sup>47</sup> These were in addition to the annual appearance of Korean emissaries at the Emperor's Birthday, Winter Solstice, and First Day of the Year rites; see Kim 1981:6.

<sup>48</sup> Ch'en discusses the investiture of Liuqiu kings, see 1968:145-149. His description is virtually identical to that found in the *DQTL*, 45:5a-7a.

Relations with Annam, which was also to send annual embassies, were equally complex<sup>49</sup> and, in the instance considered here, indicative of the responsibilities implicit in the lord-servant relationship between the Supreme Lord and a lesser lord. During the Qianlong reign a rebellion occurred in Annam which eventually toppled the existing dynastic house, itself a loyal dependency to the Qing emperor. As the rebel forces approached Hanoi, the Le emperor sought sanctuary in Guangxi. Upon hearing of his loyal servant's plight, the Qianlong emperor dispatched an army to Annam. By 1788 imperial forces had retaken Hanoi, but were later forced to retreat. Soon afterwards the lord of the insurgent forces petitioned the emperor and was received and enfeoffed at Rehe in 1790 (Lam 1968:167-179).

The recognition by the Qianlong emperor of the passing of one dynastic house and the emergence of another in a domain perceived as loyal to him did not end the relationship with the Le emperor, however. Rather, it was reconstituted in another form. The Le family and its loyal supporters were incorporated into a Chinese banner, and the former lord of Annam was bestowed a military rank (*BCCP*, 680-681).

Relations with other kingdoms of Southeast Asia varied, but appear to have been organized, like those already discussed, to deal with context specific situations. Siam, for example, sent several embassies in the latter half of the eighteenth century, which included large contingents of ships desiring trade. Usually the embassies arrived to coincide with the emperor's birthday or to give thanks for imperial grace. Requests to carry on trade were in most cases granted. In addition, Siam was bestowed special rewards for aiding the Qing in a war with Burma (1766-1770; Viraphol 1977:140- 159).

Relations with the Burmese kingdom indicate another aspect of interdomainal relations. The Burma wars *were* not a resounding success *for* Qing *forces*, yet afterwards the Burmese lord again sent embassies to the Qing court.<sup>50</sup> Near the end of the Qianlong era, Burmese ambassadors participated in the many rituals that celebrated the length of the reign and long life of the emperor.<sup>51</sup> One might well wonder about the details of handling embassies from domains which appear to have effectively resisted Qing armies.

In addition to Siam and Burma, the Laotian kingdom of Nanchang sent at least ten embassies during the Qianlong reign, most of which *corresponded* to the emperor's birthday. On one such occasion, the emperor was in Rehe celebrating his mother's birthday. The ambassador, who normally would have been received in Peking, was given permission to proceed to Rehe (*RHZ*, 24:7a).

This review highlights some of the vicissitudes in relations between the Qing emperor and the domains of East and Southeast Asia, indicating that they *were* often in flux and that even in cases of loyal sublords, relations *were* far from unambiguous. Moreover, armed conflict did not preclude the possibility of reconstituting supreme lord-lesser lord relations. On the other

<sup>49</sup> Woodside has noted that the Anamese king was supposed to "domesticate" Chinese cultural elements, while including in his kingship elements particular to Southeast Asia; see 1971: 12 and 23.

<sup>50</sup> The Qing campaigns were led by such prominent Qianlong era figures as Agui and Fuheng; see *BCCP*, 7, 252. On the Qing-Burma war see Luce 1915.

<sup>51</sup> The clustering of embassies in the last ten years of Qianlong's reign is quite clear from the chart organized by Fairbank and Teng 1941:195. The Burmese ambassador was present in Rehe to celebrate the emperor's birthday when the British embassy arrived in 1793.

hand, there is no reason to believe that the imperial audiences in which such relations were forged were any less problematic than those discussed above concerning Inner Asian kingdoms.

#### 2.4.2 *West Ocean Kingdoms*

Qing relations with West Ocean kingdoms, the name *for* Europe in Qing court records, have often been characterized as confused because the imperial court lacked a clear idea of the different nations of Europe (Fairbank and Teng 1941:187). The *August Qing's Illustrated Accounts of Tribute- hearing Domains*, for instance, lists England separately, but also says that it, like Sweden, is another name for Holland (HQZGT, 1:47a, 61b). This “confusion” might be accounted for by the fact that only the Dutch and Portuguese had actually sent embassies to China when the text was published in 1761. Put another way, since contact with other domains was organized into lord-servant relations, these “mistakes” are somewhat understandable. The problem the Qing court faced with Europeans lay in distinguishing between an embassy from another lord and the random arrival along the coast of China of an undifferentiated collection of merchants who came to trade.<sup>52</sup> Either activity could be accommodated by the court, but classification distinctions had to be maintained if a properly ordered vertical hierarchy of supreme lord and lesser lords was to be realized. The point to bear in mind about this contact is that trade was entirely possible with or without an embassy actually making an offering to the emperor, because it was assumed that the largess of the land made possible by the emperor's virtuous conduct would naturally attract men from afar. Provided such men maintained a proper sense of decorum, they ought to be allowed to share in the imperial bounty. If they did not behave properly, then benefits would be denied. When, however, a kingdom dispatched an embassy and it was henceforth possible to identify a merchant as the subject of a specific lord, treatment might be altered.

Secondly, while the treatment of Europeans might at times have appeared arbitrary to participants and later observers, Qing officials in Canton had a relatively clear set of considerations to address when a European ship arrived. Are these men the subjects of an identifiable lord? If not, have they come as emissaries of a specific lord to constitute a lord-servant relationship with the emperor and, if so, do they have a communication from their lord addressed to the emperor naming them as his emissaries? Have they brought offerings and have they prepared a list of these offerings? If they are the subjects of an identifiable lord, have they come to renew the relationship with the emperor? Is that relationship verifiable? If they did not seem to fit any of these categories or if there were questions about their status, advice would be sought from the court and further inquiries made of the visitor.

If it proved that these men had come with no intent to make offerings, but to trade, then matters were easily disposed of. Officials would not have direct contact with the visitors, but would place them in the hands of a specially designated merchant guild (*gonghang* or Cohong), who were responsible for making all necessary arrangements to accommodate their

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<sup>52</sup> It is also worth mentioning that from 1644 the Qing court was undoubtedly in a position effectively to deny European traders any sort of access to coastal ports, yet did not.

requests to trade.<sup>53</sup> In other words, the visitors would be organized through channels outside imperial Guest Ritual, but within the regulation of the imperial domain. This process, which would be similar for any domain, sought to determine the proper classification of the visitors. In this sense, lordship was the paramount issue in organizing interdomainal relations, and as such provided the context in which trade was located.

Embassies from West Ocean domains were sporadic, while merchant vessels arrived on the China coast much more frequently. During the latter part of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century, European trade was allowed at a number of ports. At the same time, however, such contact created a number of problems, among which conflicts between local people and a ship's company were of particular concern to imperial officials. If it was determined that Europeans were at fault, the responsibility lay on the entire group, a proposition that often made Europeans bristle.

Finally, Qing officials presumed hierarchically organized social relations among a ship's company which, from their perspective, implied that superiors had obligations and responsibilities for the conduct of inferiors. This perception of social relationships had implications for exchange. Trade was organized through a complex of relations that linked the trader to linguists, *gonghang* merchants, local officials, and, since trade was perceived as a bestowal of imperial grace, to the emperor. This network of relationships provided the conditions of possibility for exchange. Without them, certain excessive attributes (e.g., selfishness, *si*) would be likely to emerge in the actors concerned and would adversely affect processes by which the Qing emperor's domain was properly ordered.

Trading privileges were bestowed by the emperor on a number of occasions to reward the loyalty of specific West Ocean peoples. For example, the Portuguese establishment at Macao was originally granted because the Portuguese had served the Ming court in driving pirates from the area and intercepting mutinous imperial troops (A. Chun 1983:190-191). Similarly, they were bestowed special trading privileges in the late 1670s because the Qing court desired Dutch naval support in their campaign against Ming remnants on Taiwan. When, however, a Dutch fleet failed to materialize after the emperor had requested their services, privileges were withdrawn (Wills 1968:136-142). At the same time, however, the Dutch seem to have remained in a unique position among West Ocean domains. In the Guest Ritual section of the *Comprehensive Rites of the Great Qing*, Holland is the only European domain specifically mentioned (45:1b).

The eventual defeat of Ming remnants by Qing forces brought peace to the China coast and the establishment by the Kangxi emperor of customs stations at Macao, Ningbo, Yantai Shan, and in Fujian. In 1686, however, the imperial court reduced levies and allowed ships to anchor at Whampoa Island in an effort to draw the West Ocean traders to Canton (Fu 1966, 1:61, 87). By the middle of the eighteenth century, trade was the dominant form of contact with West Ocean peoples. The British, whose king had yet to send an embassy to the

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<sup>53</sup> In general, these arrangements appear to have been the responsibility of the Imperial Household Department; see Torbert 1977:97-103. The merchant guilds also dealt with merchants coming from Southeast Asia and other areas, as well as Europe; see Hsü (1990 :143), who also provides an excellent summary of the Canton trade (142-154).

emperor's court, were prominent both in trading activities and incidents involving conflicts with local people and officials. Such incidents, coupled with the vast increase in merchant vessels requesting permission to trade, led the imperial court to restrict contact with Europeans to Canton. A variety of measures were introduced and continually evaluated that were apparently designed to clarify responsibilities and obligations for the conduct of West Ocean peoples and to provide a means by which they would be best organized to benefit from the largess produced through the emperor's virtuous actions.

This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the Qing imperium and introduce some themes that are of importance to the remainder of the study. I have tried to show that Qing rulers were fundamentally concerned with claims about the proper way of constituting supreme lordship in a world made up of a multitude of lords and multiple centers of power. Ritual techniques established cosmo-moral dominion, while extending Qing rulership spatially and temporally.

In exploring a few specific instances of the nature of these Qing claims or the means by which they were advanced, I have suggested that Qing notions of rulership informed relations with other domains. Rather than being a pre-given structure in interdomainal relations, Qing lordship was constructed through complex dialogues involving substantive claims by other lords, claims that any Qing emperor had to address if he were to establish himself as supreme lord, while still cherishing these men from afar. Just how such authority was realized through ritual practice remains to be explored (see chapter 5). Before doing so, however, I want to place the British embassy in the context of eighteenth-century European notions of relations between "nations" and British perceptions of the Qing empire. Working from these sources, it will then be possible in chapter 4 to reconsider Lord Macartney's account of his embassy to China as an artifact of the broader cultural issues involved in British expansion.