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Jihadi terrorism, from Iraq to
Kuwait
By B Raman
Iraq
continues to be the main hub of jihadi activity,
with a very high level of suicide terrorism
indicating that there has been no weakening in the
morale and motivation of the terrorists and
resistance fighters. Nor has there been any
noticeable improvement in the
intelligence-collection capabilities of the US-led
coalition, despite periodic claims of the capture
of terrorists of various hues. In an
insurgency-cum-terrorism affected situation,
captured suspects are generally an important
source of preventive intelligence, but apparently,
despite such claimed captures, the US intelligence
continues to grope in the dark about the plans and
preparations of the terrorists and resistance
fighters.
There are two striking aspects
of the ground situation in Iraq. On the one hand,
there has been a seemingly inexhaustible flow of
volunteers from inside Iraq as well as from other
countries - mainly Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait,
Jordan and Pakistan - for suicide missions. On the
other hand, despite the repeated attacks of the
terrorists and resistance fighters on the
newly-raised Iraqi police and other security
forces, resulting in a very large number of
casualties, there does not seem to be any shortage
of volunteers joining these forces either.
One does not know how many of these
volunteers joining the police and other security
forces come from the Shi'ite and Kurdish areas,
and how many from the Sunni triangle. Even
assuming that the majority of the volunteers must
be Shi'ites and Kurdish Sunnis, the fact that they
have not let themselves be intimidated by the
suicide attacks against the security forces is a
positive factor in an otherwise bleak situation.
The terrorists owing allegiance to
al-Qaeda of Iraq, Ansar-al-Sunnah and other
organizations, who were focussing their attacks on
the security forces and other public servants
before the elections of January 30, have since
turned their attention to the Shi'ites,
particularly in Baghdad, killing over 60 of them
in various suicide attacks since January 30.
Strict checks of motor vehicles by
security forces has led the suicide bombers to
resort to other means, such as carrying explosives
on cycles or on their person. This is not the
first time that there have been concentrated
attacks on Shi'ite targets. Last year, too, there
were such attacks, particularly around the day of
observance of the Ashura by Shi'ites.
In
Pakistan, which has had a long history with the
Sunni-Shi'ite divide extending over 20 years, the
rift gets sharpened around Ashura, with an
increase in the number of attacks on Shi'ites by
Sunni terrorists. Iraq, which had remained free of
Shi'ite-Sunni violence under Saddam Hussein, who
used to suppress the observance in public of
Shi'ite as well as Sunni religious occasions with
equal ruthlessness, has overtaken Pakistan in the
sharpness of the sectarian divide.
In a
message issued in the beginning of 2003, Osama bin
Laden stressed the importance of the Shi'ites and
the Sunnis of Iraq forgetting their sectarian
differences and fighting jointly against the
invading US forces. Subsequently, in their
psychological warfare, the Americans had sought to
project Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda
of Iraq, as anti-Shi'ite. They even circulated a
written message of dubious reliability purported
to have been issued by him calling for attacks on
Shi'ites. The leaders of the Shi'ite community
themselves did not take the US allegations
seriously, despite some targeted attacks on
Shi'ites by terrorists of unknown origin, and did
not allow the casualties suffered by the Shi'ites
to lead to any acts of reprisals against Sunni
Arabs.
It was announced last year that
Zarqawi had accepted bin Laden's leadership,
which, one imagined, meant that he would refrain
from targeted attacks on Shi'ites. Do the
post-January 30 attacks on the Shi'ites indicate
any change in the policy of al-Qaeda? Are these
merely ephemeral manifestations of anti-Shi'ite
anger from the Sunnis, which one sees in Muslim
countries such as Pakistan around Ashura? If so,
will they die down once Ashura is over? Or are
these deliberately planned acts of reprisals
against Shi'ites for participating in large
numbers in the elections? If so, will they
continue even after Ashura? If that happens, will
it lead to a parting of the ways between Shi'ites
and Sunnis?
Available evidence does not
permit clear-cut answers to these questions. While
analyzing the growing political assertiveness of
Shi'ites and the emergence of the United Iraqi
Alliance of the Shi'ites as a party with a small
absolute majority in the elections, it would be
premature to view these trends as likely to lead
to a growth in Iran's influence in Iraq. This need
not necessarily happen.
The Arab identity
of the Shi'ites, as well as the Sunnis, had
remained strong in comparison to the Persian
identity of Iranian Shi'ites, and during the
Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s a large number of Iraqi
Shi'ites, many of them occupying senior positions
in the Iraqi armed forces, fought valiantly
against the Iranian army and repulsed repeated
efforts of Tehran to induce large-scale
desertions. There is no reason to believe that the
Arab identity of the Shi'ites has since been
diluted and that they now think of themselves more
as Shi'ites than Arabs. One should not be
surprised if there is eventually a split among the
Shi'ites themselves between those with a strong
Persian identity following the guidance of Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and those with a strong
Arab identity following Muqtada al-Sadr.
Next to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, a country
of growing concern in the so-called "war against
terrorism" is Kuwait. Just as sections of
Pakistani society became radicalized as a result
of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the
1980s, there are indications of a creeping
radicalization of sections of Kuwaiti society as
result of the jihad in Iraq, and there is every
possibility of this spreading to Jordan.
Reports from reliable sources speak of
dozens of Kuwaitis joining al-Qaeda in Iraq and
fighting the US troops and the local security
forces there. According to these sources, at least
11 Kuwaitis have died in suicide missions in Iraq,
though the Kuwaiti authorities admit to the deaths
of only two.
The growing concern of the
Kuwaiti authorities over the emergence of
religious and anti-American extremism in their
society became evident last August when they set
up a government committee to counter the spread of
what they described as "deviant ideas". The
Islamic Affairs minister, Abdullah al-Maatouk,
announced the formation of the committee following
the reported unearthing of a network that was
recruiting volunteers to join al-Qaeda in Iraq. He
stated at that time that extremist and deviant
activities in Kuwait had reached a dangerous
level. On February 6, he formed a panel of
religious scholars and academics under the earlier
committee to "strengthen moderate [Islamic]
ideology and confront extremism". The Islamic news
site Mufakkirat al-Islam reported on January 31
that about 17 religious clerics had been arrested
for objectionable activities inside their mosques.
The formation of this panel followed a
series of clashes and other incidents (at least
five of them) between suspected terrorists and the
local security forces in different parts of Kuwait
since the beginning of this year. In these
incidents, at least eight alleged terrorists were
killed and 40 Kuwaiti, Saudi, Jordanian and other
suspects arrested. Four police officers lost their
lives. It has been reported that among those
arrested three are women - two Kuwaitis and one
non-Kuwaiti. One of the Kuwaitis is the wife of a
cell leader and she was allegedly helping him
prepare improvised explosive devices and the
non-Kuwaiti was allegedly hiding a machine gun
under her abaya, the traditional cloak for
women.
Kuwaiti security forces killed five
suspected al-Qaeda militants and captured three,
including the group's leader, on January 31
following a gun battle, the fourth in January. A
police officer died of injuries sustained in the
clash. The terrorists were identified on the basis
of information gathered during the interrogation
of the captured terrorists, including Amer Khalef
al-Enezi, the cell's suspected spiritual leader,
who subsequently died in police custody allegedly
due to a heart attack. The authorities were
searching for two others - Kuwaitis Khaled
al-Dosari and Mohsen al-Fadli.
Among
others arrested for questioning was Osama
al-Munawer, a Kuwaiti lawyer who represents
Islamists in courts. On February 1, Kuwaiti
parliament unanimously passed a law giving police
wide powers to search and seize illegal weapons.
The Interior Ministry banned veiled women from
driving, to prevent terrorists from masquerading
as women.
According to Agence France
Press, the French news agency, Enezi had been a
preacher at a mosque in Jahra, 40 kilometers
northwest of Kuwait City, until he was dismissed a
few months ago by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
because of his "extremist views". His younger
brother and alleged right-hand man, Nasser, was
reportedly killed on January 30 during another gun
battle with security forces. According to Kuwaiti
media reports, Enezi confessed during
interrogation that his group had links with al-
Qaeda and had planned to kidnap US soldiers and
other Westerners and film their murders, and to
attack US military convoys on their way to Iraq.
On February 5, the security forces blasted
their way into a concrete block home at
Sulaibiyah, about 18 kilometers west of Kuwait
city, and captured five suspected terrorists who
had taken shelter inside and were resisting
arrest. According to police, two of the arrested
men are Saudi citizens and the remaining three are
Jordanians. However, the newspaper al-Rai al-Aam,
quoting informed sources, said the men were
stateless Arabs who recently obtained Saudi and
Jordanian citizenship. There are about 100,000
stateless Arabs living in Kuwait, down from
250,000 before the 1990 Iraqi invasion. The
government has introduced a series of tough
measures to force them to reveal their original
identity.
The newspaper al-Qabas reported
on February 7 that the interrogation of the
arrested persons indicated that they had contacts
with Zarqawi, who had asked them to attack US
military convoys in Kuwait. The local media quoted
an Interior Ministry official as saying that the
arrested suspects had confessed that they had
planned to use ice-cream trucks packed with
explosives to attack US military convoys traveling
to Iraq.
What has been of great concern to
the Kuwaiti authorities is the fact that some of
the arrested terrorists had accomplices inside the
Kuwaiti security forces and the civilian
departments of the government, thereby indicating
an as of yet unquantifiable penetration of the
security forces and these departments by the
terrorists. Some of the arrested suspects
reportedly had fought against the Americans in
Fallujah in Iraq.
It has been reported in
the media that not all of the arrested suspects
belonged to a single organization. During the
interrogation, the names of a number of cells
emerged, which were apparently operating
independently of each other as has been happening
in Iraq. Among these are: the Mujahideen of
Kuwait, The Brigade of the Two Shrines, the Sharia
Falcons Squadron, the Peninsula Lion Brigade and
the Martyr Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin Brigade,
apparently named after a leader of al-Qaeda in
Peninsula's group, who was killed by Saudi
security forces last June.
However,
according to Kuwaiti authorities, three cells of
al-Qaeda operated in Kuwait. The first cell called
itself the Peninsula Lions and was led by Nasser
Khalif al-Enezi (killed on January 30 ) and his
brother Amer (died in police custody). The second
was named the Kuwaiti Mujahideen and was headed by
Mohsen al-Fahdli. The third, which did not have
any name, was commanded by Khaled al-Dousari and
Ahmad al-Mutairi.
Apparently helped by
intelligence from the Americans, the Kuwaiti
authorities acted promptly and ruthlessly
neutralized the groups and individuals planning
attacks on US military convoys to Iraq. However,
it is by no means certain that the Americans and
the Kuwaiti authorities have been able to
establish the full extent of the inroads made by
pro-al Qaeda elements in the local civil society
and their penetration into the government,
including the security forces.
Talking to
senior newspaper editors on February 7 on the
recent incidents involving terrorists in Kuwait,
Kuwait's Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed
al-Sabah warned that the Islamist violence, which
had rocked the emirate since the beginning of the
year, could spread to other oil-rich Gulf Arab
states. "The government and the security forces
have planned for a worst-case scenario," he said.
The previous day, the al-Rai al-Aam daily
quoted a Kuwaiti Islamic Affairs Ministry official
as saying that copies of an unlicensed book about
jihad had been confiscated from mosques. The
official did not say how many copies were found.
Kuwaitis and Pakistanis with Kuwaiti links
have long played an important role in bin Laden's
al-Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF)
formed by him in February 1998. Pakistanis Ramzi
Yousef, who played an active role in the New York
World Trade Center explosion of February, 1993,
and is presently in jail in the US, and Khalid
Sheikh Mohammad, the alleged brain behind the
September 11 terrorist strikes in the US, both had
a Kuwaiti connection and had played a role in the
recruitment of Kuwaitis for al-Qaeda and the IIF.
On October 7, 2001, when the US started
its air strikes on al-Qaeda infrastructure in
Afghanistan, there were about 150 Kuwaitis in the
training camps of al-Qaeda and the IIF. While
about 50 reportedly died in the air strikes, the
remaining fled into either Pakistan or Iran. Some
of them went to Iraq after March 2003, while
others managed to sneak back into Kuwait.
The spread of the jihad to Kuwait comes in
the wake of repeated calls from bin Laden and his
No 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri during the past two years
for the spread of the jihad to the states in the
region allegedly cooperating with the US in Iraq
and for the use of the oil weapon.
Annexure
Kuwaitis and
non-Kuwaitis with a Kuwaiti connection allegedly
involved with al-Qaeda who have come to notice in
the past (collated from media reports):
Al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Ghaith, who
was reported to have been given shelter by Iran -
knowingly or unknowingly, one does not know.
Saudi-born Sheikh Hamoud al-Aqla al-Shuebi.
Mohsen al-Fahdli, projected as a senior
al-Qaeda leader in Kuwait. He had allegedly served
in al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and headed a Kuwaiti
cell responsible for penetrating the Kuwaiti
security forces.
Adel Abu Hamid, a deputy of al-Fahdli. Before
September 11 he was reported to have visited
Afghanistan twice and met bin Laden.
Mohammed al-Motairi, another deputy, who had
also reportedly served in al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Sami Mohammed Marzouk Obeid al-Mutairi, an
employee of the Kuwaiti Department of Social
Affairs, who was alleged to have killed an
American civilian in Kuwait in January, 2003.
Mohsin al-Fadli, believed to be a relative of
the Mohsen al-Fahdli. He was allegedly involved in
recruiting volunteers for al-Zarqawi to fight in
Iraq when he was arrested by the Kuwaiti
authorities.
Fawwaz Tlaiq al-Otaibi, who was killed by the
Kuwaiti security forces during an encounter as he
was entering a shop in January last year.
Nasser al-Mutairi, captured by the US forces
in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay. He
was reported to have been released recently.
Mohammed al-Mutairi, arrested by the Kuwaiti
authorities in 2002 for financing al-Qaeda
activities in the Persian Gulf region.
Ahmed and Abdullah Mutlaq al-Mutairi, both
arrested in February 2003.
Hakim al-Mutairi, described by the Kuwaiti
authorities as the spokesman of the Kuwaiti
Salafist Movement.
Mehmas bin Mohammed Mehmas al-Hawashleh
al-Dousari, Bandar bin Abdul Rahman Menawer
al-Rahimi al-Mutairi and Abdullah Farres bin
Jufain al-Rahimi al-Mutairi, all three of whom
allegedly participated in a suicide attack in
Riyadh in May, 2003.
Abdelrahman al-Dousari, described as a senior
al-Qaeda recruiter.
Suleiman al-Dousari, who used to work for the
Voice of Jihad, a Saudi journal.
Abu Harith al-Dousari, who was reportedly one
of the 11 Iraqis to have died in suicide missions
in Iraq.
Turki al-Mutairi, killed by the Saudi security
forces.
Miejib Abu Ras al-Dousari, also killed by the
Saudi security forces in July 2004.
Fayyaz al-Khashman al-Dousari. He surrendered
to the Saudi security forces in July, 2004.
B Raman is additional secretary
(retired), Cabinet Secretariat, government of
India, and currently director, Institute for
Topical Studies, Chennai, and distinguished fellow
and convenor, Observer Research Foundation,
Chennai Chapter. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com.
(Copyright B Raman,
2005) |
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