



CHAPTER 1

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Cold War Counterintelligence

Introduction

The distinguished American historian Richard Hofstadter suggested that periodically in American history, during times of great worry, many individuals turn to “conspiracy theories” to explain away their anxieties. The early post-World War II scene was such a period. To some Americans, President Franklin Roosevelt sold out the European nations that fell victim to the Communists. The peace that Americans expected after fighting the Nazi attempt to subvert the European continent was not there. Unable to rationally explain why they failed to achieve any security, the American public believed the answer was the result of widespread treason and subversion within the nation.

President Harry Truman was bogged down in Korea but unwilling to commit the resources to win because the United States had to build up NATO to defend Europe. Because of Truman’s actions in promoting loyalty oaths for the US Government, some rightwing Republicans in Congress accused the Democrats of being soft on Communism. If there were indeed traitors in the country, then the Democratic Party was responsible for them because they had controlled the government since 1932.

In 1948, Whittaker Chambers, a journalist who admitted he was a Communist Party member and Soviet spy, accused Alger Hiss, a middle-level aide to President Roosevelt, as having provided classified documents to the Soviets. The case might have faded into the dustpan of history except that Hiss lied about knowing Chambers. Caught in that lie he was convicted of perjury. Elizabeth Bentley, another former Soviet spy, also came forward at this time with her story of Soviet intelligence penetration of the government.

The next event fueling American anxiety was the Soviet Union’s detonation of the atomic bomb. The US intelligence community had convinced American leaders that the United States was five years ahead of the Soviets in this area yet the country now faced this new menace. The arrests of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Harry Gold, and several other Americans revealed that through them Soviet intelligence had penetrated the Manhattan Project, as the A-Bomb program was called.

A senator from Wisconsin by the name of Joseph McCarthy rode the nation’s apprehension about Communist subversion to political stardom. McCarthy constantly told people he had the names of Communists within the government. Yet, he never released a single name to the press nor did he identify a single

Communist in the government. He actually had nothing but was able to convince people that what he said was true. McCarthy was an alarming symbol of just how anxious American society had become. In the end he went down in flames.

The identification of the Communist party spy rings caused Soviet intelligence to end this recruitment practice. The intelligence services looked to running “illegals”—a Soviet national documented as a citizen of another country who emigrates to the targeted nation. This practice was revealed when Rudolph Ivanovich Abel was arrested by the FBI in 1957.

It was the start of the Cold War. Every presidential administration beginning with Harry Truman had to design its foreign policy around the overwhelming fact that the United States was locked into a deadly competition with the Soviet Union that left very little room to maneuver. To the Counterintelligence Community, this meant its resources and energy had to be focused on that threat.

Military Security

The sudden Korean outbreak found the military security (counterintelligence) effort of the Office of the Acting Chief of Staff Intelligence Division, Department of the Army (OACofS G-2, D/A), in a noticeably unsatisfactory state. Although the new conditions of Cold War had served to increase all phases of this effort to a marked degree, the Army had not only been prevented by higher authority from carrying out the domestic intelligence operations it needed to support prior planning for the possible use of federal troops in local emergencies but had also been denied any direct control over the establishment of policies and procedures aimed at uncovering subversion or sabotage within its own ranks. Moreover, due mainly to defense economy considerations, the total authorized strength of the two security branches that formed part of the earlier merged Security and Training Division had been reduced to 36 officers and 41 civilian employees just when the demands of the security clearance program for personnel, requiring access to classified information of the Government, had reached a new peak in intensity. On 25 June 1950, under the terms of a special regulation dated 14 September 1949, which was still in force, these branches were being called upon to perform the following functions:

Operations Branch—Formulates, promulgates, and supervises counterintelligence programs pertaining to the Army; establishes countermeasures against efforts to gain unauthorized access to classified information pertaining to plans, operations, and capabilities of the Army; and initiates, controls, reviews, and recommends final action on certain types of security investigations of military and civilian personnel connected with the Army.

Security of Military Information Branch—Formulates, promulgates, and exercises supervision over measures for censorship and for safeguarding classified military information; and promulgates and interprets policy on the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and their nationals, the United States Government, nongovernmental agencies, and individuals.¹

The most pressing counterintelligence problem right after the opening of the Korean Conflict had to do with the establishment of military censorship, especially armed forces and public information media censorship. This was the case despite the fact that anticipatory planning both for national and military censorship in the event of an emergency had been accomplished during the previous Cold War period. Furthermore, on 7 February 1950, the Secretary of Defense had formally directed the Secretary of the Army to assume primary responsibility for:

Coordinating all aspects of censorship planning, as it concerns the Department of Defense, with a view to developing censorship programs which are soundly conceived and integrated with those of the Federal Agency having primary responsibility for censorship.

Providing consultation and coordination with the National Security Resources Board through a working group comprising appropriate representation from each military department and such representation as the NSRB may desire.

Informing the Secretary of Defense from time to time of programs and developments in the field of censorship planning.²

One result of this timely directive from the Secretary of Defense was the prompt creation of a working group on censorship planning, which came to be known as the National Censorship Readiness Measures Coordination Committee (NCRMCC). Enjoying appropriate National Security Resources Board (NSRB), Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Army, Navy, and Air Force representation, the NCRMCC started without delay to prepare an emergency plan for armed forces participation in the implementation of national censorship if it was ever ordered into effect.³ Even though the letter of instructions to the field regarding that plan could not be actually issued until 29 August 1950,⁴ it was already in the process of Army–Air Force staff coordination at the time of the Korean outbreak, so its chief provisions were generally understood and accepted by all concerned.

This planning effort had been founded on the thesis that national censorship would be immediately imposed by the Chief Executive following some kind of declaration of war. The Korean conflict, however, was then being officially regarded as a United Nations police action led by the United States, which presented an entirely new concept in the matter. Besides, neither the Air Force nor the Navy seemed to feel in 1950 there was any compelling need for the establishment of censorship and the National Censorship Adviser to the NSB had already expressed an opinion that “in view of the diplomatic and political implications, the President would not give his approval to the imposition of national censorship.”⁵

Nevertheless, the problem of affording a suitable military security for troop movements, combat operations, and the introduction of new weapons into the Korean conflict soon became both real and acute. Since there were at first almost no curbs at all on reporting about those matters, serious security breaches repeatedly occurred during the early weeks of the fighting. These security breaches thoroughly alarmed the operating personnel within the OACofS G-3, D/A, and prompted the G-2 security officials to undertake a comprehensive study of the entire censorship situation.

Upon completion, this study reached the rather indefinite conclusion that only total national censorship embracing the armed forces, mail, and public information media could possibly hope to solve the



Interrogating a North Korean.

problem effectively; but, under the existing conditions such a course of action was plainly out of the question. The three major press services in the United States, though, were persuaded to agree not “to compile or publish state or national round-ups of National Guard or Reserve units being called to active duty.” Additionally, on 9 August 1950, when the Secretary of Defense cabled Commander-in-Chief Far East (CINCFE) to express his grave concern over the recurring breaches of security displayed in dispatches emanating from Korea, General MacArthur stated that he preferred a code of voluntary press control to one calling for an imposed censorship and also noted as follows:

In Tokyo previous directives from Washington forbade such direct procedure but something of the same general effect has been accomplished by constantly calling attention to correspondents to published dispatches which jeopardized security. The results are progressively encouraging. The practical difficulties involved with nearly 300 correspondents representing 19 foreign countries of varying attitudes and with the constant demands for more rapid transmission of copy to their home offices render the problem of arbitrarily checking dispatches almost insurmountable. Of course, whatever system is applied here will not prevent violations through stateside or other foreign outlets and unless something of the same sort is applied there articles violating security can rapidly be transmitted by airmail delivery or even faster methods of communication. To attempt a complete censorship in Japan would require the employment of thousands of persons to check the various communications systems involved. This is completely beyond the resources of this command. In addition it would involve international complications which would be practically insurmountable. If any change in the present system is to be made I suggest that for general coordination and understanding it be formulated and announced by the government from Washington after due consultation with other nations involved.⁶

Military security problems bearing upon the establishment of armed forces and public information media censorship then continued to plague the Army authorities both in Washington and the Far East. They were soon made even more difficult when a heated dispute broke out in the Department of the Army over whether the press censorship function should be performed within a theater of operations by G-2 or Public Information Office personnel. This particular

dispute was presumably settled on 30 January 1951, at least for the Department of the Army, with general staff responsibility for supervising press censorship being definitely assigned to the OACofS G-2, D/A, but the Chief of Information (CINFO) was also designated as a “proponent agent” for such matters.⁷ In the meantime, Gen. A. R. Bolling had submitted a recommendation through channels to the Chief of Staff that military censorship, including press censorship, should be ordered into effect without delay in Korea.⁸

The Chief of Staff, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, disagreed with the G-2 proposal for establishing an armed forces censorship in Korea but did feel that press censorship ought to be imposed there just as soon as possible, and he promptly forwarded a recommendation along those lines to the JCS. On 8 September 1950, the JCS informed CINCFE they considered his voluntary press censorship system ineffective and intended to notify the Secretary of Defense that a more positive censorship of all public information media in FECOM was now necessary. General MacArthur then sharply reminded them he had no personnel trained or available to perform detailed censorship work and reiterated an earlier belief that the implementation of censorship should be a United Nations activity. On the basis of this reply and numerous indicated problems concerned with personnel requirements, shipping space, and day-to-day regulation of some 60 non-English-speaking war correspondents, the JCS finally decided to forego any further moves toward imposing censorship on public information media in the Far East. CINCFE was carefully cautioned, however, to continue “positive pressure in support of the principles of voluntary censorship at all levels in order to provide maximum security of force deployment.”⁹

Another major counterintelligence problem that confronted the departmental intelligence agency of the Army during the early part of the Korean Conflict period was connected with developing more effective removal procedures for personnel, both civilian and military, who were found to be either serious security risks or disloyal. In January 1950, the Secretary of the Army had asked the Personnel Policy Board, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to make a study of the procedures currently in use for that purpose by the three Service Departments, so more uniform policies could be established regarding the dismissal of such employees. The Army, for example, was still utilizing the summary authority

contained in the Public Law 808 to process both its security risk and disloyalty cases but the Navy and Air Force were now using that particular authority only for security risk cases and EO 9835 procedures, through the Civil Service Commission, for handling their disloyalty cases. One result of this study, therefore, was to have the Secretary of the Army, on 12 May 1950, notify the Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board that in the future the Army would conform to the Navy and Air Force system for all removal cases.¹⁰

Meanwhile, at an Armed Forces Policy Council meeting held on 10 May 1950, the Secretary of Defense himself had requested the Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board “to undertake a general review of the present policies and procedures for determining the loyalty and security of Department of Defense civilian personnel.” The Korean outbreak thus found the OACofS G-2, D/A, in the midst of preparing several informative memorandums dealing with this complicated subject for the guidance of Army representatives participating in two major personnel security reviews.¹¹ Less than two weeks later and before either review could be actually concluded, though, Mr. Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, ordered the service secretaries to take immediate steps to accomplish pre-employment investigations for all civilian employees being assigned to sensitive positions requiring access to Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential material in their respective departments.¹² These early actions were then strongly influenced by other closely related developments within the personnel security field as follows:

1. Passage of Public Law 733, 81st Congress, on 26 August 1950, not only repealing the initial suspension section of PL 808 but also providing for the establishment of Loyalty-Security Hearing Boards to receive testimony from civilian employees who were answering charges for their removal on loyalty-security grounds.
2. Passage by Congress, on 20 September 1950, over President Truman’s veto, of a new Internal Security Act (PL 831, 81st Congress, commonly known as the McCarran Act), which was intended to furnish an effective legal basis for prosecuting members of the Communist Party seeking to subvert the US Government.

3. Issuance of Army-wide directive by the Adjutant General, dated 20 September 1950, covering the establishment of Loyalty-Security Hearing Boards in compliance with PL 733 and also giving official notice that the existing Special Regulation 620-220-1, Civilian Personnel, Loyalty-Security Adjudication, was being rewritten to conform to this new law.

4. Approval by Secretary of Defense George Marshall, on 2 October 1950, of a recommended list from the Personnel Policy Board of "Criteria for Determining Eligibility for Employment for Sensitive and Non-Sensitive Duties in the Department of Defense". Among other things, this list indicated the need for a special regulation to assist the appropriate commanders in determining security qualifications and requirements for the employment or assignment of personnel to sensitive positions throughout the US Army.¹³

Since these measures were all aimed primarily at establishing effective procedures for handling civilian loyalty and security risk cases, they did not alter in any significant degree the currently prescribed methods for disposing of disloyal, disaffected, or subversive military personnel. To serve that latter purpose, the Army had already devised a workable program based upon the provisions of a Special Regulation 600-220-1, originally issued on 10 November 1948 and then slightly revised in January 1950, supplemented by additional instructions contained in a Special Regulation 600-220-2 (SECRET) dated 9 June 1949. This program normally involved one or more of the following administrative actions:

1. Each Army inductee or enlistee was initially called upon to fill out and sign a standard Loyalty Certificate (NME Form 98). If that certificate failed to mention membership in any organization designated by the Attorney General as being inimical to the US Government, no further action was taken. When it did so indicate, however, then more security checks were accomplished and proper authority eventually made a decision on the enlistment of continued induction of the person in light of them.

2. Similar procedures were utilized to eliminate disloyal or subversive Regular Army personnel and Army Reserve personnel either on active duty or in an inactive duty status, under the terms of a 615-370, Enlisted Personnel, Discharge, Disloyal, or Subversive.

3. Army Reserve personnel on whom fragmentary disloyal or subversive information was already known were deliberately not recalled to active duty until such time as a suitable investigation could be conducted to determine whether or not they should be eliminated through AR 615-370 procedures.

4. Under the provisions of SR 600-220-2 (Secret), the duty assignments of suspected military and civilian personnel were fittingly restricted pending the completion of a full-scale investigation to determine whether or not they should be eliminated through AR 615-70 procedures.¹⁴

While the departmental military security officials were not entirely satisfied with the powers they possessed under this adopted program for eliminating known or suspected subversives from the Army, they had generally come to accept the situation in that respect by the time the Korean conflict started. As a matter of fact, during its total period of operation from 10 November 1948 to early August 1950, the program did succeed in producing some interesting statistics, as follows:

Action Under SR 600-220-1

Cases Received	107
Cases pending (discharge recommended)	15
Personnel discharged	55
Cases returned for further investigative action ..	
.....	100

Action Under Reserve Recall Program

Total cases	1147
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(a) Derogatory cases (will not be recalled until investigations can be conducted or may be discharged under SR 600-220 -1) 480

(b) Derogatory cases (may be recalled but will be placed under surveillance) 420

(c) Derogatory cases not identified to persons of Army service 68

(d) Pending classification to (a) or (b) above 179

Action Under SR 600-220-2 (Regular Army Personnel)

Class "A" Restricttees – 21

Class "B" Restricttees – 45¹⁵

The advent of the Korean conflict made it virtually imperative, of course, to eliminate all disloyal or subversive persons from the US military establishment as soon as possible. At a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council held on 8 August 1950, therefore, Secretary of Defense Johnson not only requested the three Services to review their security files and separate any personnel with Communist leanings but also announced he intended to advise the White House when this action had been completed. Because the Army felt that its existing program was well suited for such purpose, no important changes were recommended in it. Nevertheless, all four of the basic special regulations supporting the program were promptly revised in order to render them more applicable, and they were reissued before the end of the year, as follows:

SR 600-220-2 (S), Personnel, Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Personnel, 6 September 1950.

SR 620-220-1, Civilian Personnel, Loyalty-Security Adjudication, 13 November 1950.

SR 600-220-1, Personnel, Disloyal and Subversive Military Personnel, 6 December 1950.

SR 380-160-2, Military Security, Determining Eligibility for Employment on Sensitive Duties, 28 December 1950.¹⁶

Other events bearing upon the military security field that occurred during the early Korean conflict period and appear to warrant special mention were, as follows:

1. The IIC, on 8 June 1950, had approved a change in the current Delimitations Agreement on Security activities by governmental agencies, which was designed to transfer responsibility for performing certain counterintelligence investigations aboard Military Sea Transport Services (MSTS) ships from the Army and the Navy. This change then necessitated a corresponding revision of the latest SR 380-320-2, "Military Security, Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies, Supplementary Agreements" that was duly accomplished, effective 16 August 1950.¹⁷

2. Congress, on 16 June 1950, had passed a law (PL 555, 81st Congress) amending the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, in order to permit the entrance into the United States of 500 additional DPs as "national interest cases" provided they were recommended by both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. Investigating the DP applicants for such entrance from the security viewpoint, however, presented some almost insuperable problems for all concerned. With the Army CIC representing the only possible means of performing satisfactory overseas investigations for that purpose, the Secretary of Defense chose to delegate his own assigned responsibility in the matter to the Secretary of the Army. Col. William H. Brunke, Chief of the Exploitation Branch, ID, OACofS G-2, D/A, was then selected to organize this new Army effort. Representative committees were also soon formed to develop and coordinate workable procedures for clearing the DP applicants, so that, late in November 1950, detailed instructions could be sent out to the various occupation commanders covering the entire conduct of screening operations in the field.¹⁸ Shortly thereafter, arrangements were likewise concluded to speed up the local DP processing by establishing joint Army-State clearance committees in Frankfurt, Germany, and Salzburg, Austria.

3. The Informant and Observer system that had been in force during WWII was abolished, effective 20 August 1945, and not replaced. While the need for a similar system without some of the

more objectionable features of this earlier organization had become clearly apparent during the subsequent Cold War period, no attempt was made to introduce another one into the Army until after the Korean outbreak. On 20 October 1950, the deputy Chief of Staff for Administration did approve, but for planning purposes only, the distribution of a G-2 sponsored "Counter-subversive Plan" to be instituted in all units of the Army Field Establishment upon specific direction by the Secretary of the Army. Regardless of the fact that this new system had been most carefully designed to operate through the regular chain of command and was plainly "non-punitive, non-investigative and non-mandatory if other coverage existed," it was never put into actual effect.¹⁹

4. Having been beset by many serious personnel problems throughout the entire preceding Cold War period, the CIC was finally able to get a new AR 600-148, "Personnel, Assignment to Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)" published in August 1950, which served to tighten up several of the mandatory qualification requirements governing the selection of personnel for CIC assignment. Notwithstanding, the sudden Korean emergency had found the CIC with a shortage in officer strength of 15 lieutenant colonels and 55 majors and needing five lieutenant colonels and 50 majors for immediate duty in the Far East. The desired raising of CIC personnel standards, therefore, especially for field grade officers in most cases again had to be postponed.²⁰

5. Under the current SR 10-5-1, "Organization and Functions, Department of the Army," date 11 April 1950, the OACofS G-2, D/A, had been charged with "planning, coordinating and supervising the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence information concerning the strategic vulnerability of the United States and its possessions." Because the term "strategic vulnerability" was so broad and elastic, though, the other three general staff divisions continued to remain deeply involved in activities impinging directly upon that function. During December 1950, for example, the ACOF S G-3, D/A, addresses a letter to the six Continental Army Commanders on the subject of "Department of

the Army Responsibility for Industrial Security" and instructed them to accomplish a "Facility Security Survey" for the industrial plants located within their respective areas that were being carried as "Key Facilities" by the national Munitions Board. Since these surveys might well produce some valuable information both from the strategic vulnerability and military security (sabotage) standpoint, the ACOF S G-2, D/A, not only arranged to receive a copy of each for use in the departmental military intelligence agency but also advised the ACOF S G-2s of the Continental Armies to make similar arrangements at their own headquarters.²¹

6. A law (PL 679, 81st Congress) was passed on 9 August 1950 that authorized the President to prescribe regulations for safeguarding American ports and waterfront facilities. President Truman then issued an Executive Order (EO 10173), dated 18 October 1950, establishing a limited port security program to be implemented by the US Coast Guard of the Treasury Department. In accordance with a written request from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Army, therefore, the ACOF S G-2, D/A, in January 1951, was called upon to take necessary steps to ensure that all the Army Commanders and Attaches would urgently report any information which might give:

(a) Warning of the actual or suspected departure for the United States or approach to the United States of any vessel known or suspected of carrying materials for attack.

(b) Warning of the actual or suspected departure for the US vessels owned, controlled, or in the service of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, Eastern Germany, or Eastern Austria.

(c) Any other information of value to the Coast Guard in carrying out its tasks.²²

7. Early in January 1951, the Director of Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, proposed to make the formation of a joint

Service agency to develop needed equipment for physical or investigative security use. The Army did not favor the formation of such an agency because the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had already taken action in the same matter, which included the CIA. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense ignored this obvious duplication and announced the establishment of Physical Security Equipment Agency (PSEA), effective 6 February 1951. Under management direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the PSEA was then held responsible to provide for the “development of physical security and related investigative equipment as a common service for all agencies of the Department of Defense.” Army participation in the new agency was subsequently covered by the publication of SR 380-410-1, dated 23 February 1951.²³

The establishment of the G-2 Central Records Facilities (CRF) at Fort Holabird, Maryland, on 17 August 1951, was a most progressive step in the direction of improving the Army’s entire counterintelligence effort. Not to be confused with the Central CIC Files, which had recently been microfilmed and consolidated in the CIC Center at Fort Holabird, this new field facility was originally intended to furnish a centralized repository for all closed personnel security cases of the Continental Armies, Military District of Washington (MDW), and OACofS G-2, D/A. Remaining under G-2 control but supervised directly by the Commanding General, Fort Holabird, who was also Chief, CIC, the CRF was officially charged with the “maintenance, processing, and administration” of the files in its custody. It was not in any sense an investigative agency nor was it capable of making any loyalty evaluations. In January 1952, its specific functions could thus be described to the Commanding Generals of the Continental Armies and MDW, as follows:

- a. To provide a central repository for all intelligence investigations which have been or are being conducted by the above-named commands.
- b. To provide a master index to all intelligence investigations which have been or are being conducted by the above named commands, which will be furnished a copy thereof, including changes when issued.

- c. To consolidate all intelligence information that has been developed on an individual by the above-named commands, eliminating duplicate and nonessential material.

- d. To prevent duplication of intelligence investigative effort by investigative agencies of the above-named commands.

- e. To provide a standardized filing system for all intelligence personality investigative files within the above-named commands.

- f. To facilitate the use of personality investigative files by furnishing the files or information therefrom to the above named commands.²⁴

While the new CRF was promptly recognized by all concerned as representing a major contribution in simplifying and facilitating procedures for checking the security background of persons who had previously come under the cognizance of an Army counterintelligence investigative agency, it soon ran into severe personnel difficulties of its own. Initially, the CRF was allocated just eight military and 32 civilian spaces; these totals were raised to 11 military and 86 civilian on 29 October 1952, in view of the increased emphasis that was being placed upon personnel clearance matters throughout the US Government. This favorable action did not provide much real relief for the CRF, however, because it could only employ trained civilians possessing the highest possible security qualifications, and by that time there were very few such persons readily available for such procurement. The facility was thus forced to operate during most of the Korean conflict period by utilizing whatever “pipeline” military personnel happened to be passing through the CIC Center from time to time on temporary duty or other transient status.²⁵

Early in 1951, the Secretary of Defense had queried the Secretary of the Army with reference to the current security status of the Panama Canal. The result was that Secretary Pace ordered Maj. Gen. John K. Rice, Chief, CIC, and Col. Duncan S. Somerville, from the OACofS G-3, D/A, to visit the Canal Zone as his personal representatives for the purpose of examining the “question of counterintelligence measures...now

being taken to provide for the protection and security of the Panama Canal.” During their visit, they discovered that CIA activity within the Canal Zone and surrounding areas had been quite limited, and most of the required counterintelligence operations were being performed by CIC personnel assigned to Headquarters, United States Army, Caribbean (USARCARIB). This was an Army command that functioned under the Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB), who acted in the capacity of Executive Agent for the JCS.²⁶

After Lt. Gen. Horace L. McBride, U.S.A., became CINCARIB on 1 April 1952, the question of responsibility and means for conducting counterintelligence operations within his command again came to the fore. He felt that because of his JCS mission he ought to assume operational control of the 470th CIC Detachment, Headquarters, USARCARIB, but this view was not shared by either Maj. Gen. Lester G. Whitlock, CG, USARCARIB or Maj. Gen. Richard C. Partridge,

the newly appointed ACoS G-2, D/A.²⁷ Following an exchange of several unyielding letters on the subject between Washington, DC and Quarry Heights, CZ, it appeared that the problem could probably best be settled through personal contact. On 22 October 1952, therefore, Generals McBride, Whitlock, and Partridge, along with Brig. Gen. Martin F. Hass, Chief of Staff, Caribbean Command, conferred together at Quarry Heights in the matter and reached an agreement that:

1. CINCARIB would assume direct control of the 470th CIC Detachment but leave a small group of its personnel with CG USARCARIB for his own investigative use. CINCARIB would then not only be responsible for the “investigation, collection, and reporting of intelligence matters in the Republic of Panama and the Canal Zone” but also “accept requests for information on these areas from the Department of the Army” while acting as Executive Agent for the JCS.

2. Utilizing his retained group of personnel from the 470th CIC Detachment for such purpose, CG USARCARIB would continue to undertake the reporting of “purely Army intelligence matters.”

3. This new CIC organization was to remain on a trial basis until the end of March 1953. At that time, it would revert back to the prior organization if the ACoS G-2, D/A or CG USARCARIB felt “things were not working out properly.”²⁸

With military security problems thus continuing to demand a large share of attention within the departmental intelligence agency of the Army, the Security Division, OACoS G-2,²⁹ now formed into four functional branches designed respectively as Personal Security, Special Operations, Security of Military Information, and Censorship, was mainly engaged during the periods from 9 September 1951 to 31 December 1952 in supervising the following activities:

Personal Security Branch—called upon to handle all matters relating to policies and procedures for the investigation and clearance of personnel from the military security standpoint; this branch was faced with these principal problems:



K-Map

a. Investigation and Clearance of Foreign Personnel for Entrance into the United States under Auspices of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA)—On 8 May 1952, a new SR 380-160-12 (C) was issued to govern the granting of “limited access” security clearances to foreign personnel brought into the United States under JIOA auspices. One noteworthy feature of this regulation was that it authorized the substitution of a polygraph test for such components of the required background investigation as could not be properly accomplished due to inaccessibility of the geographic area from which the subject personnel had originated. Moreover, an announced aim of the regulation was to ensure that the respective skills of these foreign personnel would be exploited by the Military Departments concerned to the fullest extent possible.

b. Security Clearance of Aliens by Private Industry—While the publication of SR 380-160-12 (C) did help to ease the security clearance problem in connection with the employment of foreign personnel by the Military Departments, the polygraph substitution that it authorized still could not be applied to aliens who were under consideration for employment within private industry. Feeling that some of these latter aliens were probably being denied advantageous employment from the US viewpoint on classified contracts by private industry, the ACofS G-2, D/A, asked the Department of Defense Munitions Board to grant the same type of exemption to them as the others. Even though this request had been concurred in by all the Army agencies concerned, the Munitions Board, on 13 June 1952, chose to act unfavorably upon it.

c. Investigation and Clearance of Aliens Serving in the US Army—Strongly indicated at this time was a need to have the polygraph exemption also cover enlisted aliens serving in the US Army, so that their individual skills could be fully utilized within the appropriate military commands. After a G-2 recommendation to permit such an exemption had been approved first by the Department of Defense and then by the Munitions Board, a new SR 380-160-13 (C) was issued, on 15 August 1952, to implement it.

d. Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation—Because the three Military Department were now dealing with private industry on an ever-increasing scale, the necessity for having a single Armed Forces Security regulation to control it soon became plainly apparent. During May 1952, therefore, the Munitions Board decided to form an Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulations Committee to accomplish that particular task. This committee was composed of two members from the Munitions Board staff plus two representatives from each of the three Military Departments. Initially, the two Army representatives on it were Lt. Col. Donald C. Landon, OACofS G-2, D/A, and Lt. Col. David G. Fitch, OACofS G-4, D/A. Capt. A.H. Ladner, OACofS G-3, D/A, however, was later permitted to attend the committee meetings and to receive copies of its agenda and minutes without holding a formal membership. The eventual result was the publication of a far-reaching SR 380-405-5 in January 1953, designed to establish a single personnel investigative and clearance system at all private industrial plants performing classified contracts for any of the Military Departments. It also returned to the OACofS, D/A, several functions bearing upon safeguarding classified information, which had been given to the Provost Marshal General’s Office during World War II, in order that administration of the Army part of the new Industrial Security Program would come under complete control by the departmental military intelligence agency. This work then soon grew to be so demanding that a separate Industrial Security Branch, Security Division, was formed in March 1953, in accordance with a directive received from the Secretary of Defense.

Special Operations Branch—Until 19 September 1951, the entire counterintelligence responsibility for the Pentagon Building had rested with a small 118th CIC Detachment functioning directly under the Special Operations Branch, OACofS G-2, D/A. On that date, the Secretary of Defense instructed the Secretary of the Army to install a much more comprehensive program, which would not only encompass the Pentagon Building proper, but also its “grounds and appurtenant buildings.” In view of these additional demands, the 118th Detachment was inactivated, effective 8 January 1952,

and replaced by a larger Sub-Detachment “A” from the 902nd CIC Detachment that had recently been organized at Fort Holabird, MD, to execute special counter-intelligence missions for the ACofS, D/A. On 1 December 1952, the Special Operations Branch was renamed the Special Investigation Section, Security Division, but its duties continued to remain essentially unchanged.

Security of Military Information (SMI) Branch- Held responsible for handling all Army matters concerned with the security of classified military information; this branch was involved in a remarkably wide variety of activities along such lines, as follows:

a. Tripartite (US-UK-France) Security Agreement—The US Government, in August 1951, formally accepted a set of “principles and standards” for safeguarding information that had been agreed upon by a Tripartite Security Working Group made up of top-level security experts from the United States, United Kingdom, and France. This Working Group, with Col. Gordon E. Dawson, Chief of the SMI Branch, OACofS G-2, D/A, acting as Chairman, had completed a detailed survey of the regulations and methods in current use within those three countries for that particular purpose. By May 1952, both the United Kingdom and France had also announced similar notice of acceptance in the same matter. The Tripartite Security Working Group, with its Army representation now consisting of Brig. Gen. J. H. Phillips, Deputy ACofS G-2, D/A, as Principal, and Col. John F. Schmelzer, newly appointed Chief of the SMI Branch as Alternate, then met successively in Washington, London, and Paris during the period from October to December 1952 to examine and judge at firsthand the progress stemming from this key international security of information agreement. The true significance of these meetings becomes well illustrated by the fact that they ultimately led to the military security arrangements that were adopted for NATO.

b. Eligibility of Foreign Representatives to Receive Classified Security Information- In compliance with a National Security Council (NSC) directive issued during November 1950, the security officials of the member agencies of

the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) were finally able some two years later to agree upon a proposed list of procedures for determining the eligibility of individual representatives of foreign governments to receive US classified information. As recommended to the ICIS, each individual representative would be required to furnish an identification document, including a suitable photograph, for check by the FBI and other appropriate internal security agencies before any classified information could be given to him. While certain exceptions were authorized for high- ranking foreign diplomatic or consular personnel and invited guests of the American Government, the procedures were meant to apply fully to all Foreign Service Attaches. No definite action was taken by the ICIS on this touchy position, however, prior to the end of the Korean conflict period.

c. Security Agreement Between the Departments of Defense of the United States and New Zealand—In September 1952, the United States and New Zealand Department of Defense concluded an agreement with reference to taking coordinated measures for the security of their own military information. This agreement called for each Department to maintain military security classifications based upon mutually approved criteria and to disclose classified information to other nationals only under regularly established rules and procedures.

d. Security Policy Toward the European Defense Community (EDC)—The signing of the EDC Treaty, in May 1952, posed a new and difficult security of information problem to the US authorities because the German Federal Republic, a non-NATO member, was included in it. Moreover, the treaty itself provided for the formation of an advance Interim Committee to get the EDC ready to function effectively just as soon as it had been ratified by the legislative bodies of the nations concerned and also activated a staff organization to commence immediate EDC military planning under the direct guidance of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). In July 1952, therefore the ACofS G-2, D/A, forwarded a request to the State-

Defense Military Information Control Committee (S-DMICC) recommending the establishment of a temporary disclosure policy toward the EDC to be maintained strictly on a “need to know” basis. The S-DMICC then officially approved the disclosure of the US information classified as high as SECRET on that limited basis to the Interim Committee of the EDC, if such information was deemed necessary for accomplishing its defense planning objections.

e. Security Policy toward the German Federal Republic—With the advent of German participation in the European Defense Forces of EDC, it became clearly evident that West Germany would soon have to be included within the framework of the national disclosure policies being formulated by S-DMICC. Arrangements were thus made for a combined State-Defense team to visit West Germany during October 1952 and examine the security of information system currently in use therein. Published by the State Department on 3 December 1952, the report of this team expressed general satisfaction regarding the legal basis of West German security, a lesser satisfaction with the actual security of some of its governmental agencies, and no satisfaction at all with West German industrial security. On the other hand, because of the sound legal basis and strong will to achieve suitable information security it had observed in West Germany, the team felt that S-DMICC should “proceed with those measures which may be expected to bring about rapid improvements in the German security picture.”

f. Security Policy Toward Japan—The establishment of an adequate policy covering the disclosure of US military information to Japan had been under active consideration ever since 1949. At that time, the Japanese Diet (legislature) had enacted a National Public Service Law, which provided stiff penalties for divulging government information and rendered members of the subversive organizations ineligible for government employment. This law, though, promptly came under heavy internal attack and was never firmly implemented. Nevertheless, in October 1951, the ACoS G-2, D/A, did recommend the adoption of a limited information disclosure policy toward

Japan on an interim basis, and a course of action along those lines was duly approved by S-DMICC. With the Japanese passing of additional laws aimed at tightening their security producers in May and July 1952, the situation appeared to be clearing up but the country shortly experienced another serious political crisis. S-DMICC then decided to postpone any further action in the matter, at least until after this latest governmental crisis had been successfully resolved.

g. Executive Order 10290—Designed to establish basic standards throughout the Executive Branch of the Government for safeguarding information affecting the security of the United States, this EO became effective on 27 October 1951 and caused several changes in the current Army security regulations. It required, for example, that all information of such nature should be positively identified as “Security Information.” Changes in AR 380-5 incorporating the minimum requirements of EO 10290 were published without delay, but a rewritten version thereof, covering the entire provisions of EO 10290, could not be prepared and issued until 6 June 1952.

Censorship Branch—Being primarily a planning group, this branch was seldom called upon to perform any actual operation or supervisory censorship functions. Its activities from 9 September 1951 through 31 December 1952 were, thus principally, as follows:

a. Civil Censorship—Although US policy had for some time been to encourage the unconditional abolishment of civil censorship throughout Austria, there was still a small island of it remaining in Vienna. The main reason for this anomaly was that the Soviet element within the Censorship Technical Committee of the quadpatriate Allied Council for Austria kept pressing for numerous “compromises,” which were obviously calculated to assure Soviet control over all Austrian communications. It was felt best, therefore, to allow the original situation to continue unchanged.

b. National Censorship—As Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense in connection with planning for the imposition of National Censor-

ship, the Censorship Branch was required to monitor the active duty training of Army and Air Force Reserve Officers holding national censorship mobilization assignments. Arrangements were thus made to have appropriate training courses in censorship work conducted for these personnel at Fort Benning, Georgia, from 1-15 June 1952, and at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, from 16-30 June 1952. A special activities course was also given to selected censorship military reservists at Washington, DC, on methods of detecting messages written in code, cipher, or secret ink. Other important events relating to national censorship planning at this same time were the submission of a detailed staff study to the Secretary of Defense, which recommended the completion of needed censorship agreements with several Western Hemisphere countries and the initiation of coordinated planning between the Censorship Branch and all governmental agencies engaged in psychological warfare.

c. Armed Forces Censorship—Censorship activities within this field were centered mostly upon accomplishing the following three tasks:

1. Arranging for the training of censorship units at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
2. Shipping the 1st Military Censorship Organization to EUSOM so it would be readily available there to open Armed Forces censorship in the event of hostilities.
3. Developing the Armed Forces Censorship Play for Exercise Long Horn, scheduled to be held at Fort Hood, Texas, during March-April 1952. This exercise not only uncovered a number of valuable indoctrination procedures but also furnished an excellent guide for the reassessment of previously accepted censorship personnel qualifications.³⁰

The first mention of mail being received within the United States from American Prisoners of War held in North Korea or Red China was contained in a report forwarded to Washington by the ACofS G-2, Fifth Army, dated 5 April 1951. It stated that according to the Post

S-2 at Camp Carson, Colorado, Mr. and Mrs. R. W. Wegner of Denver, Colorado, had recently received a letter from their POW son along with 23 other letters written by America's POWs in North Korean or Red Chinese prison camps. The Wegners had proceeded to remail the enclosed letters to the respective addresses shown on them, as requested. Shortly thereafter, the ACofS G-2, Second Army, took note of a similar report that 11 POW letters had been received at Mayfield, Kentucky, accompanied by the same sort of remailing instructions. This sudden POW mail influx plainly represented an integral part of a vigorous Communist psychological warfare offensive, which was also featuring anti-American propaganda disseminated through radio broadcasts, news organs, typical hate pamphlets, and undercover agents on a global basis.³¹ The offensive undoubtedly aimed at gaining a cease-fire with complete exchange of all POWs for the Communist truce negotiations at Panmunjam, regardless of whether or not the North Korean or Red Chinese POWs in UN prison camps wished to be repatriated. As a matter of fact, a large number of these prisoners had actually signified a desire to refuse such repatriation and to remain on the Free World side of the Iron Curtain.³²

In May 1951, the ACofS G-2, D/A, forwarded a summary sheet to the Chief of Staff on the subject of POW mail, the terms of which had already been discussed with the ACofS G-1, D/A, and the interested CIA, FBI, ONI, and Air Force Office of Intelligence (AFOIN) officials. It not only called attention to the favorable worldwide reaction that the publication of POW lists in Communist news organs was receiving but also pointed out that the Chinese were encouraging correspondence between selected POW's and their relatives within the United States for the obvious purpose of distributing Communist propaganda. The feeling was, therefore, that an appropriate explanatory statement should be devised and forwarded to the next of kin of American POWs, in order to offset any psychological warfare gains the Chinese may have achieved by releasing their POW lists in a seemingly forthright manner. The Communist propaganda drive then showed signs of becoming so increasingly successful that the departmental military security officials, during March 1952, joined with the CIA in preparing a plan for the censorship of all communications, including POW mail, passing between the United States and the Chinese

mainland. A series of representative conferences were soon held under Army G-2 sponsorship to inquire into the feasibility of establishing that type of censorship without further delay. On 11 August 1952, though, it was decided that two separate studies ought to be initiated in the matter, one to cover just the censorship of the POW mail problem and the other to explore “larger-scale censorship.”³³

Meanwhile, late in December 1951, the Chief of Staff had approved an intelligence project authorizing the ACofS G-2, FECOM, to read and microfilm prior to re mailing, all POW mail turned over to the UN negotiators by the Communists during the truce talks, which were taking place at Panmunjam. Although most of the propaganda included in these letters was so specious that it could be considered dangerous, some of them did contain invidious remarks or potentially valuable military information, and they were sent directly to the ACofS G-2 to D/A for final review and disposition. This mail inspection effort promptly proved to be such a major drain on G-2 FECOM’s limited personnel resources, however, that he was forced to request permission to discontinue it. In May 1952, General Bolling did grant permission for G-2 FECOM to cease examining by not microfilming the POW mail, and at the same time, forwarded a so-called “Watch List” to him presenting the names of seven officers and 24 enlisted men who had either given “definite evidence of Communist indoctrination” or were “suspects of successful indoctrination.” Any letters received from them were to be placed at the beginning of the microfilm and after that handled in a special manner.³⁴ The Watch List, which was carefully kept up to date in accordance with the latest available information, then served to provided the initial indication to the departmental military intelligence authorities of the true nature and extent of the indoctrination being given to the UN POWs held by the Communists.³⁵

With ACOofS G-2, D/A, having thus already embarked upon a program of seeking to collect as much information as possible about the Communist indoctrination of American POWs held in North Korea and Red China, that distressful subject suddenly became of serious national concern late in 1952, when the truce talks at Panmunjam gave distinct promise of yielding an agreement for the large-scale exchange of captured personnel from both sides. Since no firm policies had

as yet been announced for handling such returnees, the Secretary of the Army, during January 1953, addressed a number of pertinent questions to the Secretary of Defense regarding the Communist employment of “brain washing” techniques on the US military personnel, in order to obtain proper guidance. Secretary Wilson’s³⁶ reply dated 19 February 1953, first took note that the Department of the Army had a primary interest in the matter and then requested it to “develop immediate screening and deindoctrination procedures designed to both determine and overcome any adverse mental effects found to exist among personnel of any of the services who have been released or escaped from prisoner of war camps in Korea.” He further asked the Department of the Army to supply the national Psychological Strategy Board with any data it managed to obtain from the screening of returned prisoners of war.³⁷

Although the OACofS G-1, D/A, was designed to be the staff agency for monitoring the entire program involving the return and reassignment of the US POWs from Korea, now officially known as the “Returned or Exchanged Captured American Prisoners—Korea (RECAP-K) Program,” the OACofS G-2, D/A, continued to remain fully aware of its own fundamental intelligence and security responsibilities in connection therewith. These responsibilities not only called for deriving all possible intelligence of tactical or strategic value from it but also collecting information on Communist indoctrination means and methods, which might serve as a basis for developing effective counter-measures.³⁸

Having recently prepared detailed letters of instruction to CINCFE and the Commanding Generals of all Major Commands relative to the intelligence processing of RECAP-K personnel, which had first been carefully coordinated with G-1, G-3, G-4, Chief Psy-War, TAG, CINFO, and the Surgeon General, and then duly approved by the Chiefs of Staff, these letters were dispatched on 13 March 1953.³⁹ Shortly thereafter, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Robert N. Young, the ACofS G-1, D/A, appointed an ad hoc committee, composed of representatives from the Offices of the ACofS G-2, Surgeon General, Chief of Psychological Warfare and Chief of Information, to “study and prepare methods and procedures for deindoctrination of U.S. personnel” being returned from POW camps in North Korea or Red China. The proposed plan was to have the members

of this committee assigned to Valley Forge General Hospital, Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, where they would be able to observe personnel suffering from Communist “brain washing” techniques and, after studying the problem, submit to the OACofS G-1, D/A, adequate deindoctrination procedures “for immediate use to overcome any adverse mental efforts found to exist among those present and recommend disposition in each case.”⁴⁰

It soon became imperative that some sort of a definite plan should be agreed upon by all concerned for handling returnees from Korea, because the initial exchange operation of captured personnel who were sick and wounded, subsequently known as “Little Switch,” had already begun on 19 April 1953 and the American ex-POWs involved were scheduled to start to arrive by air at designated ports of debarkation in the Sixth Army Area within a few days. During a meeting held in the Office of the Chief of Staff on 20 April 1953, therefore, General Collins first asked several pointed questions in the matter and then approved an information seeking program calling for a preliminary interrogation at Valley Forge General Hospital or in the proper Continental Army area, depending principally upon the physical condition of the individual returnee concerned. It was also understood that when these returnees were finally discharged from the Army their respective security files would be turned over to the FBI if an additional investigation seemed indicated.⁴¹

Of the 149 American persons processed under this Operation “Little Switch,” a total of 127 (three officers and 124 enlisted men) were from the Army. Only 21 of this total required special Army or FBI investigations but one person did turn out to be a “hard core” Communist and was eventually discharged without honor for “security reasons” in the Sixth Army Area.⁴² It was however, most productive from the standpoint of collecting information for both future intelligence and counterintelligence use.⁴³

The close of the Korean conflict period thus found the OACofS G-2, D/A, not only faced with an ever-mounting number of difficult military security problems but also right in the midst of conducting a highly sensitive counterintelligence operation that was fraught with disquieting implications. The most striking development of the entire period, though, had

undoubtedly been the rapid growth of a vast personnel loyalty-security program, which demanded numerous and varied investigations by many different agencies before appropriate clearance could be granted for an individual to have access to certain classified information of the US Government. The inordinate growth of these investigative activities after the Korean outbreak becomes clearly apparent from the following table, designed to compare the average weekly load of security cases in six different categories handled within the Security Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, during the months of June 1950 and June 1951:

	1950	1951
Civilian Removal Recommendations	3	18
Military Discharge Recommendations	3	10
National Agency Checks	750	2000
FBI Loyalty Investigations	3	17
G-2 File Checks	5000	13250
CIC Investigations	940	2280 ⁴⁴

One of the chief results of this huge expansion in counterintelligence activities during the first year of the Korean conflict period was to render the already difficult CIC personnel procurement problem almost insolvable. Although from June 1950 to August 1952 the total worldwide strength of the CIC did increase by approximately 1,200 enlisted men, it also decreased over the same period by 100 officers. Furthermore, most of the new enlisted men could only be hastily trained on an emergency basis and the existing qualification standards for CIC duty assignment had to be habitually lowered in order to procure them. This adverse personnel situation unquestionably contributed materially to the fact that the backlog of unfinished clearance cases kept getting larger and larger while the conflict progressed. The tremendous extent of that backlog seems aptly illustrated by a report forwarded from the CIC Center to the OACofS G-2, D/A, on 21 August 1952, giving the average number of personnel clearance cases completed per month within the ZI and Overseas Theaters, along with the companion backlog, during a nine-month period ending 31 March 1952, as follows:

Average number of ZI cases closed per month	18,694
Average number of Overseas cases closed per month	102,363
Average backlog of ZI cases per month	28,441
Average backlog of Overseas cases per month	61,428 ⁴⁵

Not all of these listed investigative cases, of course, fell under the same category. Of a total caseload of 42,889 ZI cases current on 15 November 1952, for example, 25,301 were Background Investigations, 16,776 National Agency Checks, and 812 Complaint Type Investigations. The latter investigations were the least numerous by far but they represented the more serious cases and always required special handling. The bulk of the normal backlog was ordinarily made up of National Agency Checks, due to the large number of different agencies that had to be consulted before an individual clearance could be granted. Brig. Gen. P. E. Gallagher thus described the system then in use for that particular purpose, Chief CIC, at an Army Command Conference held in December 1952, as follows:

This National Agency Check, in brief, is initiated by the requesting agency or facility and is processed to the G-2 of the Army Area. From this office it is sent to the ACofS, G-2, Department of the Army, who, in addition to checking their own files, obtains a check from the FBI and the House Committee on Un-American Activities. When leads so indicate, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of Special Investigation, Civil Service Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization are also checked. In many cases it has been found that a bottleneck often occurs, as far as time is concerned, in clearing a name through some of the National Agencies which I have outlined.⁴⁶

By the end of 1952, the number of investigative cases assigned to the CIC had finally commenced to decline, especially within the ZI. The effort was still a major undertaking, however, and, on 31 December 1952, the CIC called for the full services of a total of 7,030

persons, including the 1,428 officers, 384 warrant officers, 4,622 enlisted men and 596 civilians. At that time, the caseload status of all CIC investigations for the past six months was officially estimated to be, as follows:

Personnel Security Investigations

Pending 1 July 52	21,677
Opened these 6 mos.	50,420
Closed these 6 mos.	44,611
Pending 31 December 52	27,486

Contractor Personnel and Facility Clearance Investigation

Pending 1 July 52	5,739
Opened these 6 mos.	13,123
Closed these 6 mos.	11,286
Pending 31 December 52	7,576

Other Personnel Investigations

Pending 1 July 52	20,273
Opened these 6 mos.	37,848
Closed these 6 mos.	40,386
Pending 31 December 52	17,735

Counterintelligence Investigations

Pending 1 July 52.	1,898
Opened these 6 mos.	6,529
Closed these 6 mos.	7,080
Pending 31 December 52	1,347

All other types of Investigations

Pending 1 July 52	8,689
Opened these 6 mos.	43,726
Closed these 6 mos.	45,203
Pending 31 December 52	7,212

Grand Total

Pending 1 July 52	58,276
Opened these 6 mos.	151,646
Closed these 6 mos.	148,566
Pending 31 Decembers 52	62,356 ⁴⁷

The military security function was intimately connected in a great many different ways during the Korean conflict period with the intelligence training effort. Training considerations were not only an important influence in limiting the prompt execution of all CIC investigations but also represented a

controlling factor in proper development of such basic counterintelligence measures as censorship, industrial security, and the security of military information. Since there were not nearly enough intelligence specialists on hand at the opening of the conflict to satisfy the sudden demands of a major Army expansion, in most cases they had to be immediately procured regardless of established qualification standards and then hastily trained on the job. Unfortunately, the matter of agency or staff responsibility for supervising the conduct of intelligence training remained so obscurely drawn that training along those lines was often badly neglected.

The Communist Party and Soviet Intelligence

Soviet intelligence activities in the United States apparently began in 1919 when Ludwig Martens, a Russian-born communist residing in the United States, assumed the mantle of representative of the new revolutionary Soviet government. The United States, like most other nations at the time, did not extend diplomatic recognition to the regime that had in effect, declared war on other nation states and called for violent revolution to overthrow the existing order. The attitude of the United States, like most other states at the time, was generally hostile. It must be remembered that it



Nick Dozenberg

seemed that the worldwide convulsion that the Soviet Government called for was in fact a real possibility.

In the period following World War I, Marxist revolutions and leftist agitation that spread to virtually all countries shook Europe and the United States. The Soviet Government had established an organization known as the Comintern to coordinate and direct revolutionary movements and communist parties around the world. It is against this historical backdrop that Marten's activities must be viewed.

In the absence of diplomatic relations, which extended to 1933, the Soviets operated unofficially through envoys like Martens and Amtorg, a corporation that ostensibly was to facilitate US-Soviet trade. At this time, around 1920, espionage against the United States was not the highest priority of the Soviet intelligence apparatus. The activities of Russian anti-Communist expatriates, operating primarily from European nations, especially France, commanded their interest. However, the United States did not escape the attention of the Soviet leadership as a valuable target for their intelligence services. Lenin had specifically directed that the intelligence arms of the Soviet state function in the United States.

Probably the first identified Soviet intelligence officer operating in the United States was Arthur Adams, who was described officially as director of the unofficial embassy's "technical department." Adams was deeply involved with the theft of American technology and would appear periodically in the United States over the next 30 years. Both Adams and Martens were deported in 1920 as aliens affiliated with an organization that advocated the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States.

It is important to describe the beginnings of the American Communist Party (CPUSA) that was developing at the same time as the Soviet espionage apparatus in the United States. The CPUSA was founded in 1919 in Chicago and was an outgrowth of the Socialist Party, founded in 1900. The early CPUSA was noteworthy for several reasons, among them was the fact that the overwhelming majority of members were foreign born and did not speak English. Most of the early members were Russian or emigrants from other Eastern European nations, and a large number also were Jews.

From its earliest beginning, the party was wracked by severe divisions. Some were ideological, and some were linguistic. Another aspect of the party was its slavish devotion to Moscow. The CPUSA never deviated from the Moscow line at any time in its history.

In 1920 with the CPUSA badly divided, the Comintern, acting as sort of a referee, dispatched functionaries with orders to the party to reunite. At a series of secret meetings, the different wings of the party were fused into one organization. During the early 1920s, the party apparatus was to a great extent underground, with a small legal aboveground element, the Workers Party.

As the Red Scare and deportations of the early 1920s ebbed, the party became bolder and more open. By 1930 it adopted the title Communist Party, USA. However, an element of the party remained underground permanently. It was through this underground party, often commanded by a Soviet official operating as an illegal in the United States, that Soviet intelligence coopted CPUSA members.

The Soviet intelligence apparatus, which was introduced into the United States around the same time as the CPUSA was founded, maintained intimate relations with the party from the start. The CPUSA provided a ready pool of eager volunteers, anxious to be of service to the revolutionary state. Party members such as Nick Dozenberg found themselves assigned to Soviet intelligence by party leaders. Usually, when this occurred, the party member was instructed not to engage in open party work or associations.

By the mid to late 1920s, there were three elements of Soviet power operating in the United States, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations. They were the Comintern, military intelligence, and the forerunner of the KGB, the GPU. It appears that during the early 1920s, the Comintern was the dominant arm of service in the United States, although it was not unusual at that time for agents or officers to be switched from one service to another.

What was US counterintelligence doing? After the Red Scare collapsed in 1924, the Department of Justice and its investigative arm, the Bureau of Investigation, declined to investigate "radicalism." The US military

intelligence services, ONI and MID, to a certain extent filled the void, but these organizations were poorly funded after the war and not able to counter the scope of activities of the Soviets in the United States. The US State Department was investigating international communism and also had jurisdiction over investigations of passport fraud. However, there was no central direction or focus to countering or investigating Soviet espionage during the 1920s and early 1930s. As a result, the Soviets had almost free run for about 12 years before the FBI was given the task again of monitoring Communist and Fascist activities in the United States.

The fact is that few Americans had any awareness of the existence of Soviet espionage in the United States and would have been shocked if such a thing were to be made known. At that time, no state openly admitted engaging in peacetime spying, which was considered disreputable and underhanded.

During the 1920s, Soviet intelligence in the United States focused on industry, specifically the aircraft and munitions industries, and to penetrating the mainline federal government bureaucracies such as the Departments of State and War. A favorite Soviet tactic in gathering intelligence on US industry was to exploit the desire of US firms to do business in Russia.

A Soviet representative would call on an American business and dangle the possibility of a lucrative contract with the USSR. However, the Soviets would insist on extensive plant inspections prior to actually signing a contract. After numerous visits and inspections by Soviet representatives, actually intelligence officers, some excuse for not doing business would be found. By then the Soviets would have extracted whatever technical information they were seeking. This tactic was repeated scores of times over the 1920s.

Another success of Soviet military intelligence in the United States was obtaining of the complete plans of the British warship, *Royal Oak*, from the Navy Department. The Soviets recruited an American, Robert Switz, as an agent, along with a US Army corporal, Robert Osman. The two provided US military information to the GRU. Osman was tried in 1933 for illegal possession of secret documents relating to national defense. He was convicted, but the conviction was overturned on appeal.

The role of Amtorg (a Soviet trading company) in Soviet intelligence operations was first revealed in 1929 by the first senior Soviet intelligence officer to defect to the West. Using the name George Agabekov, he had served in Turkey in the GPU residency. After his defection he wrote, "The first GPU resident in the U.S. was Tschatzky. As there was no Soviet diplomatic representation in the US, he was known as an employee of Amtorg...."

The case of William Disch alerted some in the United States to what the Soviets were doing behind the doors of Amtorg in New York. A US Navy defense contractor working on fire-control mechanisms employed Disch as a draftsman. An Amtorg employee who called himself Mr. Herb approached Disch. Herb told Disch that he was willing to pay two thousand dollars a year, a considerable sum in 1931, for classified information on the fire-control apparatus. Disch informed the company what had transpired and Naval Intelligence conducted a surveillance of meetings between Disch and Herb, who was identified as Moshe Stern, alias Mark Zilbert, of Amtorg. Eventually, Stern broke contact with Disch, but no legal proceedings against Herb or Stern were forthcoming.

The decade of the 1930s saw a dramatic increase in activities of both the Soviet intelligence apparatus in the United States and the CPUSA. There were several factors at work that gave impetus to both phenomena. The economic depression, which gripped the industrial world, seemed to bear out Marxist predictions of the impending collapse of capitalism. Many American intellectuals embraced Marxism as the inevitable wave of the future. The international scene also worked to the Communists' favor. The rise of Fascist and Nazi dictatorships seemed threatening to many, and the anti-Semitic nature of both regimes seemed to many Jewish Americans cause to defend the interests of the USSR, and by extension, the CPUSA.

Another boost to Soviet prestige, and also to Soviet intelligence in the United States, was the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933. At last the Soviet intelligence organs in the United States could function under the protection and cover of diplomatic immunity. At the time, the United States had no real intelligence service operating in Moscow, other than a few military attachés. Aside from the embassy in Washington, the

Soviets also established consulates in several large cities, including San Francisco and New York.

The relationship between the CPUSA and the Soviet espionage apparatus is best illustrated by the examples of Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers.⁴⁸ Both cases exemplify the success the CPUSA, and by extension the Soviet espionage services, had in attracting bright, well educated native born Americans to do their bidding.

Whittaker Chambers was a remarkable intellectual. He had translated the German novel *Bambi* into English. As a result of his literary ability, Chambers was named editor of the Communist party magazine, *New Masses*. Chambers was approached by Max Bedacht, chief of the party's underground arm, and instructed to enter underground work himself. He was told to leave the overt party and report directly to Bedacht. Chambers main function in the underground was as a courier, bringing material Soviet agents had procured to Soviet intelligence officers.

Chambers joined the party in 1924, left in 1929 after a factional dispute, and returned a year later. He left the party and its underground apparatus for good in 1938. For years he tried to alert the American public about the activities of Soviet intelligence and the CPUSA without success. Finally, in 1948 he was given a serious hearing when he testified before Congress about Soviet espionage and its use of CPUSA members as assets.

In 1938, the year Whittaker Chambers left his underground service to the Soviets, Elizabeth Bentley joined. Bentley had entered the Communist Party (CP) in 1935. She had joined a CP front group, the American League Against War and Fascism in New York, and was soon brought into the party proper. She was introduced to Jacob Golos, a high-level CPUSA official, who became both her lover and her supervisor in espionage activities. Bentley later testified that she served as a courier for two Soviet spy rings operating in the federal government in Washington and that she turned documents gathered by the agents over to Golos, who provided them to Soviet officers. Golos also was head of an organization called *World Tourists*, which while posing as a travel agency actually facilitated international travel to and from the United States by

Soviet agents and CPUSA members. World Tourists was also deeply involved in passport fraud. In 1940, Golos had specifically named for her the three branches of Soviet espionage operating in the United States as military intelligence, the Comintern, and the United State Political Directorate (OGPU).

In her testimony before Congress in 1948, Bentley named scores of Americans working for Soviet intelligence. She described two rings of spies of federal employees in Washington including penetrations of OSS, the State Department, and other agencies. She also indicated that most of the members of the rings were CPUSA members.

Hede Massing, an Austrian-born Soviet intelligence operative who served in the U.S. in the 1930s, provided another window into Soviet espionage in the United States at that time. Massing was a member of an OGPU apparatus and functioned under the direction of a Soviet illegal officer based in New York. Massing was assigned several duties, including that of a courier between the United States and Europe. However, her most important assignment was that of an agent recruiter, a task she apparently carried out with great skill. Massing was assigned targets for recruitment by her Soviet supervisor. She used appeals to ideology, especially preying on the strong anti-Nazi sentiments of New Deal liberals who dominated the Washington scene of the Roosevelt administration in the early 1930s. Massing left the Soviet intelligence apparatus in 1938 after a period of disillusionment with her Russian handlers. She provided a detailed resume of her activities to the FBI in the late 1940s.

As mentioned above, the FBI had virtually ceased investigations of subversive and "Communist" activity after 1924. Although J. Edgar Hoover never wavered in his distrust of American Communists or their Soviet comrades, he was aware that he had no political backing or support for launching a sustained campaign of investigation and scrutiny of the CPUSA or foreign communists and subversives in the United States.

This changed with the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. With the international scene degrading, Roosevelt had become concerned with the threat of domestic subversion and fifth columnists in the United States. Roosevelt made his first request for assistance

on domestic subversion to Hoover in 1933. In 1936 the White House instructed the FBI to provide systematic intelligence about subversive activities in the United States, particularly Nazism and Communism. That request from Roosevelt to Hoover on August 25, 1936 was the basis for more than 40 years of investigative and proactive actions against the CPUSA and their Soviet allies. Hoover created in the mid-1930s a division for overseeing domestic intelligence that overshadowed any other peacetime effort in American history.

The United States now had a permanent, civilian investigative authority with responsibility for looking into treasonable actions by American citizens. This is significant, because prior to this a violation of law was necessary to trigger an FBI investigation. Now, under the new operating procedures, American citizens who had not violated any law could be subject to wiretapping, mail cover, and other investigative techniques by the FBI.

In a memorandum to then Attorney General Homer Cummings, Hoover wrote that the new General Intelligence Division was to "collect through investigative activity and other contact, and to correlate for ready reference information dealing with various forms of activities of either subversive or so-called intelligence type." The Bureau already had on file identities of some 2,500 persons suspected of communist or Nazi activities, including espionage. It is interesting to note that the financing of this expansion of the FBI's span of activities was not reported to Congress, but put under the "cover" of a continuation of a request from the Secretary of State to investigate foreign-based subversion.

In 1938, Germany annexed Austria, which heightened international tensions. In the United States, there arose demands from Congress and the public for increased vigilance against spies and saboteurs. In May of that year, Congressman Martin Dies called upon the house to organize a committee to investigate foreign "isms" which threatened America. The House Committee on un-American Activities (HUAC) was established. In October 1938, Hitler moved into Czechoslovakia, and the FBI established new facilities for "specialized training in general intelligence work." In June 1939 President Roosevelt issued a directive allocating intelligence responsibilities between the military

services and the FBI, giving the FBI the Western Hemisphere.

After Hitler's invasion of Poland in September 1939, Roosevelt declared a state of emergency. Hoover appeared before the House appropriations committee and told the public what the FBI had been doing quietly since 1936. He revealed that what was now called the General Intelligence Division had compiled extensive dossiers on "individuals, groups and organizations engaged in subversive activities that are possibly detrimental to the internal security of the US."

This investigative mandate was somewhat ambiguous and could be interpreted broadly. In practice it meant the FBI could investigate groups who might come under subversive influence.

In 1940, Congress passed the Smith Act making the advocacy of overthrowing the US Government a federal crime. It also outlawed groups or organizations that advocated such an overthrow, and membership in such a group was also made a crime. However, officials in the Justice Department did not approve of the law, and little use was made of it until after WWII.

During the war years of 1941–45, the enemies were clearly Germany, Japan, and Italy. The focus of the FBI's domestic security program naturally was on the activities of those nations. The American Communist Party followed obediently its directions from Moscow and were kept in line by the Comintern representative in the United States Gerhart Eisler, former husband of Soviet spy Hede Massing.

After the invasion of the USSR by Germany in June 1941, the Soviets urged the CPUSA to agitate for US intervention in the war to save the USSR. This was a reversal of position for the American Communists, who



Igor Gouzenko

had opposed any potential intervention after the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was greeted with joy by the CPUSA, which foresaw salvation for the USSR, by the US declaration of war against Germany and Japan. From this point on, the American Communist Party engaged in what was known as the "united front" effort.

This meant, at least publicly, dropping anti-American rhetoric and actions. Strikes in defense-related sectors were discouraged. However, Soviet espionage and the CPUSA's role in supporting those activities never was suspended, even though the American Communist Party went through the charade of disbanding and renaming itself the Communist Political Association. Now, the motivation for participating in espionage was "fighting fascism."

Since the resumption of the FBI's domestic security program in the mid-1930s, the CPUSA was an obvious target, and the Bureau had infiltrated a number of informers and agents into the party. As a result, the FBI obtained a good view of the party's internal structure and also its divisions and weaknesses, which could be exploited. With the advent of World War II and the FBI's attention primarily on the Axis targets in the United States and Latin America, the focus of counter-intelligence shifted away from the CPUSA. However, even during the war, the FBI maintained a watch on the party and Soviet espionage.

Work begun on decryption of Soviet intelligence cable traffic during World War II and eventually led to the identification of Soviet espionage agents and activities after the war.⁴⁹ After the end of World War II, the alliance between the United States and USSR quickly faded.

The CPUSA reconstituted itself and resumed its strident pro-Moscow anti-US stance. The era of the united front was over. On Moscow's orders, the head of the CPUSA, Earl Browder, was dumped. His crime had been to follow Moscow's orders in 1941 and "disband" the party in a show of unity with the US Government. Now, that policy was in disrepute, and he had to go. The Soviet Union's actions in Eastern Europe in establishing subservient puppet regimes increased

tensions with the United States Communism was becoming a potent domestic political issue.

Public concern over the Communist threat to national security increased as a result of several high-profile incidents during the late 1940s. One was the defection in Ottawa of GRU cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko in 1945.⁵⁰ Gouzenko provided for the astonished Canadian Government proof of an extensive espionage operation directed from the Soviet embassy in the Canadian capital. He also provided the identities of Canadian citizens working for Soviet intelligence. His naming of the distinguished physicist Allan Nunn May as a Soviet spy had the greatest impact and not just in Canada.

Gouzenko had revealed that the Soviets had been engaged in a sustained effort, involving scores of agents from different nations, in obtaining information about the atomic bomb. Gouzenko's information led directly to the arrest and conviction of several Canadian and British citizens who had been working for the Soviets. But more importantly was the impact on public opinion of his revelations of Soviet spying and local communist party participation in that activity. Canadian public opinion was angered, particularly because Canada had been a close supportive ally of the USSR during the war, and a great deal of sympathy for the Soviet Union existed in Canada.

Now Gouzenko revealed that during the war years both the GRU and NKVD had been active in subverting Canadians. As naive as it seems now, Canadians were shocked that such intrigue had been practiced on their soil by a wartime ally. Overnight the popularity and prestige both of the USSR and the Canadian Communist party suffered. The information provided by Gouzenko



Allen Nunn May

was a windfall for the Canadian Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) security service as well as MI5 and the FBI, with whom Gouzenko's information was shared. Gouzenko's information about Soviet atomic espionage dovetailed with other indications from different sources about soviet atomic spying.

Despite the publicity generated by Gouzenko's defection, and the HUAC testimony of Bentley-Chambers, by 1948 there had not been a conviction of an American for espionage on behalf of the USSR in any major spy case. This was especially frustrating for FBI agents working Soviet espionage, because they knew the identities of scores of Americans who had spied for the Russians. They simply lacked the evidence needed for prosecution.

All of that was to change dramatically when Soviet NKVD and GRU message traffic from the United States. to Moscow and back began to yield concrete results by 1948. FBI agent Robert Lamphere, working with Army Security Agency cryptologist Meredith Gardner, had made a major break in identifying members of what later became known as the Rosenberg ring.

The first major case to break from the decryption effort involved Judith Coplon. Coplon, an employee of the Department of Justice, had also been identified by the NKVD-GRU traffic. The Coplon case was tricky for the FBI, because Coplon, by virtue of her position at Justice, had access to many sensitive FBI investigative reports, many of which dealt with Soviet espionage. Intensive surveillance of Coplon revealed she was meeting with a Soviet attached to the United Nations in New York named Gubichev.

After observing her pattern of meeting with her Soviet controller during trips ostensibly to visit her mother in New York, a plan to catch her "in the act" was planned by SA Lamphere and approved by Attorney General Tom Clark. A phony document was prepared and allowed to pass across her desk dealing with Soviet espionage. The assumption was that she would attempt to pass the document to Gubichev on her next trip to New York.

When Coplon traveled to New York, shortly after receiving the bogus report, her meeting with the Soviet was observed by massive FBI coverage. She was

arrested, along with Gubichev, and charged with espionage. However, only she went to trial in the spring of 1949. Coplon was convicted; the evidence against her based primarily on the FBI produced document. The Soviet cable traffic, which had identified her, was not mentioned in court. Coplon's attorneys successfully appealed for a second trial, and she was again convicted. However, the second conviction was thrown out on appeal based on the fact that a warrant had not been issued for Coplon's arrest and the use of wiretaps in the investigation. She was not retried, and went free.

The investigation into Coplon's background revealed a familiar trail. She had graduated from Barnard College, had been active in leftwing causes, and had joined the Young Communist League, a CPUSA front organization. She was a graduate student in international relations, writing a thesis on Soviet economic planning. The VENONA message traffic dealing with Coplon had also mentioned two other female acquaintances of hers that she had recommended for recruitment. One of the women, Flora Wovschin, graduated from Barnard with Coplon and also was a member of the Young Communist League. Wovschin had married a Soviet Amtorg employee and moved with him to Russia. Wovschin's parents then heard from her in 1949 that she had divorced. In cryptic language, she apparently hinted she was headed for China where the Communists had just triumphed. Later, the Wovschins were informed that Flora had died. FBI agent Lamphere stated in his book, *The FBI-KGB War*, that he believed Flora Wovschin had died serving the communists in the Korean war.

On September 23, 1949, President Harry Truman announced that the USSR had exploded an atomic device. This was to have a drastic impact on US national security policy. US intelligence knew the Soviets were working on the bomb but believed the Russians were years behind the Americans. Immediately, the FBI attempted to determine to what extent had the Soviet's success been attributable to espionage. Following the Coplon case, the Army Security Agency, the forerunner of NSA, made major strides in decrypting Soviet messages. Newly decrypted material indicated the presence of a British spy in the Manhattan project. The FBI, working with MI5, identified a German expatriate physicist named Klaus Fuchs⁵¹ as a suspect.

A look at Fuch's background indicated that he had been a member of the German Communist party and had fled Germany when the Nazis took over. Under questioning by MI5, Fuchs confessed to passing secrets of the Manhattan Project to Soviet intelligence while in the United States.

MI5, working with the FBI on the atom spy series, allowed FBI agents to interview Fuchs. Information Fuchs provided led to the arrest of Fuch's American courier, known as "Raymond," and later identified as Harry Gold.⁵² It was the Gold arrest that led to a series of spy investigations, including the biggest FBI espionage case to date.

Under questioning, Gold cracked and named another American spy he had serviced as a courier at the US atomic center at Los Alamos, New Mexico. The FBI identified the second spy as David Greenglass,⁵³ who was also described in the VENONA message traffic. Greenglass was arrested and quickly confessed. He agreed to full cooperation with the FBI on the condition that his wife not be prosecuted. The Department of Justice agreed.

Greenglass implicated his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg,⁵⁴ as his accomplice. Greenglass's sister, Ethel, also was named as a witting member of the conspiracy. Other names were dragged in also, such as Morton Sobell, who fled to Mexico after the Rosenbergs were arrested. The backgrounds of the accused were remarkably similar. All were second-generation Americans of Jewish descent. All became active in left wing politics at an early age, and all had either joined the CPUSA or one of its front groups.

Several VENONA messages referred to the Rosenbergs but they were not used at their trial. Under interrogation, the Rosenbergs denied their involvement in espionage and their membership in the CPUSA. Greenglass described Julius Rosenberg as the hub of a wheel of Soviet espionage and his main contact and conduit to the Soviets other than Gold. It was through his brother-in-law, Julius, that Greenglass initiated his espionage.

The Rosenberg trial began in March 1951. Charged with espionage were Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Morton Sobell. Testifying against them were David

Greenglass and Harry Gold. The Rosenbergs were unable to refute the detailed testimony of the defense witnesses and were found guilty. Sobell was sentenced to 30 years for being a coconspirator although his part in the conspiracy was never as clear as the Rosenbergs. Both Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were sentenced to death.

At the time of the Rosenberg trial, the United States was fighting a Communist army in Korea, Eastern Europe had fallen under Soviet domination, and the United States had lost its nuclear monopoly. The Rosenbergs were seen as willing agents of a sinister worldwide conspiracy to destroy the United States. After nearly two years of unsuccessful appeals, the Rosenbergs were executed in 1953. In the meantime, they had become a cause celebre for the Communist movement around the world. The Rosenbergs became martyr figures, victims of anti-Semitic and anti-Communist hysteria in the United States.

During the FBI's interrogation of Harry Gold, he provided insight into the communist espionage apparatus in the United States going back nearly 15 years. Gold, like the Rosenbergs and Sobell, was the offspring of Russian Jewish immigrants. Although young Gold did not join the Communist Party, he, like his parents, was a strong believer in Socialism. Gold thought that "progressive" Russia was the one place in the world where there was no anti-Semitism.

Gold stated that his supervisor at an industrial solvent plant had recruited him into espionage for the Soviet Union in 1935 where Gold worked as a chemist. The supervisor, named Black, provided industrial secrets to the Soviets. He had recruited Gold on ideological and ethnic grounds, appealing to Gold's Jewish identification, playing to an appeal that the USSR was the refuge for world Jewry. Black was a member of the CPUSA and pressured Gold to join.

Gold stated that the Soviets paid his tuition to study chemical engineering at Xavier and Cincinnati Universities in Ohio. He revealed the identities of several American spies and their Soviet handlers. One American named by Gold was Alford Dean Slack, also a chemist. Slack confessed to the FBI that he had provided military and industrial secrets to the Soviets. Slack was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 15 years in prison. However, Black was not prosecuted.

Another Soviet agent fingered by Gold was an industrial chemist named Abraham Brothman. Brothman had provided the Soviets with industrial secrets for years. Brothman and Gold had briefly been business associates and had fallen out. Gold had also been a courier for Brothman. Gold named others who were beyond the reach of the law having fled the United States when the arrests began. Names such as Barr⁵⁵ and Katz would haunt FBI investigators for years.

The Rosenberg executions brought to a close an era in US domestic security. The interlocking efforts of the Soviet intelligence services and the American Communist Party throughout the 1920s and 1930s had resulted in the establishment of significant penetrations into American Government and industry. The absence of a serious, sustained US counterintelligence presence from 1924–36 gave almost free reign to those forces. The total lack of public awareness of the problem exacerbated the situation.

This changed during the 1950s. The FBI's counterintelligence program, born in the mid-1930s, began to mature and by 1950 had a real effect on the opposition. The FBI's penetrations of the CPUSA, along with prosecutions under the Smith Act, inhibited the CPUSA. Finally, public awareness of the Soviet espionage threat increased dramatically with the Rosenberg and Coplion trials, the HUAC testimony of ex-Communists like Bentley and Chambers, and the trials of CPUSA members. The exposure of several Soviet espionage rings caused the Soviets to retrench and rethink their spy strategy in the United States.

In 1952 a directive was issued from KGB and GRU Headquarters in Moscow. Soviet intelligence services were directed to avoid utilization of local communist parties for espionage, unless specific permission was granted from Headquarters for such utilization. An era was over.

As the 1950s progressed, the CPUSA was battered by events. The revelations of Stalin's crimes by Khrushchev and the invasion of Hungary in 1956 stunned the Communist faithful. The ability of the Soviets to recruit capable, motivated spies in the United States to work on the basis of ideology decreased dramatically. From the mid-1950s on, spying by American citizens became almost exclusively a mercenary vocation.

This development, along with the FBI's increasing sophistication in countering Soviet intelligence, resulted in increased reliance on illegals in the United States. The capture of Rudolf Abel⁵⁶ in 1957 opened a window on these operations.

Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss

According to former KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB assigned a comparatively low priority to gathering intelligence within the United States until the late 1930s. At that time, however, several influential underground CPUSA cells maintained varying degrees of contact with Comintern and Soviet intelligence officers. Gordievsky stated that the first main link between the party underground and the Soviet Service was Whittaker Chambers.

Whittaker Chambers exemplified the success the communist movement had in the United States during the 1930s in recruiting some of the best minds in a generation to the task of ultimately serving the Soviet Union. Chambers was a remarkable intellectual, translating Felix Salten's novel, *Bambi*, from German. By his mid-twenties, Chambers was a committed Marxist and party member. Disillusionment with the Great Depression and the seeming inability of the democracies to remedy the situation, along with the rise of Nazism and Fascism in Europe, were among the factors driving Chambers and other like-minded idealists toward the Communist's corner. Revelations about the savage repression of the Kulaks and real and imaginary opponents of Stalin were in the future.

Because of Chamber's literary abilities, he was made editor of the party magazine, *New Masses*. Later, he was named to the editorial staff of the Party newspaper,



Whittaker Chambers

The Daily Worker. At this time, 1930, Chambers was instructed by the party to cease all contacts with the overt party organization, including the newspaper where he was working. He was to join the party underground apparatus that existed parallel to the overt party.

Chambers then underwent an intensive tutorial in espionage tradecraft. In 1933, he was sent to Moscow for intelligence training and when he returned to the United States, his main controller was Sandor Goldberger, also known as "J. Peters," a former Comintern apparatchik who then worked for the Fourth Department. Starting in 1934, Chambers was assigned duty as a courier, servicing Communist party cells in Washington and New York, which were providing classified and sensitive information that was passed to Soviet intelligence. Harold Ware, a Communist official in the Department of Agriculture, who died in an automobile accident in 1935, founded the Washington cell.

One important source handled by Chambers was Alger Hiss. Hiss was then a rising young star in the FDR administration, and he not only was a source of information, but in the future would be in a position to influence US policy.

In April 1938, Chambers deserted the party and its underground machine and broke all contact with Soviet intelligence. Close observation of the CPUSA and its leadership had soured him on what had seemed earlier to be the solution to the nation's and the world's problems. For a time he feared assassination by Soviet intelligence and hid.

He tried to alert the authorities to Communist penetration of the government, but was brushed aside. His first attempt came on 2 September 1939 when he agreed to tell his story to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, who was also President Roosevelt's internal security advisor. Berle and others advised the President that his administration was penetrated by Soviet intelligence but Roosevelt appeared to dismiss the idea.

Even the FBI refused to take Chamber's allegations seriously. It was not until 1945, after revelations by others of Communist subversion of the US Government, that Chambers was given credence. In 1945 he was exhaustively debriefed by the FBI and in 1948 was asked

to testify before the House un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).

Chambers told HUAC that, when he made his first courier run to Washington in 1934, he discovered an underground spy apparatus already operating. Its leader was Nathan Witt, and the net had seven members, each of whom headed an underground cell of Communist agents. Ware had established this network, which was composed of persons who had first been recruited into Marxist study groups and then into the CPUSA. Each of these agents not only provided classified documents to Soviet intelligence, but was involved in political influence operations as well.

His testimony, along with that of Elizabeth Bentley, another ex- Soviet spy, created a sensation. Among the most explosive allegations was his naming of Alger Hiss as a member of a spy ring. Hiss by this time had been a high-ranking State Department officer and foreign policy advisor for President Truman, as he had been for FDR.

Chambers said that Hiss assisted in recruiting new people into the apparatus. One such successful recruitment, who worked in the State Department, was Noel Field. Hedda Massing recruited Field and his wife Herta. Knowing about the Fields' fear about the advance of Nazi Germany, Massing played on that fear as the basis for their recruitment. The Comintern apparatus



Alger Hiss

ordered Field to leave his position at the Department of State and join the International Labor Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. During World War II, Field became affiliated with the Office of Strategic Services and was in direct contact with its Bern Chief, Allen Dulles.

Field remained loyal to the Soviets and maintained contact with Communist underground operatives in Nazi-occupied Europe on behalf of Soviet intelligence. He fled to Communist Hungary when his espionage activities became known to the West and spent years in Hungarian prison cells and torture chambers. He was freed from prison in 1961 but never lost his commitment to his Communist beliefs.⁵⁷

During Chamber's extensive testimony before Congress, he had not accused any members of the group of espionage. He was attempting to protect Alger Hiss and other members of the ring, whom he hoped, had also broken with the Soviets. Chambers told the Committee that the purpose of the entire Communist network was initially not for espionage but to infiltrate the government and influence government policy by placing Communists in key positions.

Hiss denied all charges, and after Chambers repeated his allegations against Hiss on a network news interview, Hiss sued for libel. Before that could happen, Hiss was indicted for perjury by a New York federal grand jury, which charged that he had lied under oath while testifying in an inquiry involving Soviet espionage. In that testimony, Hiss had stated that he had never known Whittaker Chambers or had any relationship with him. Hiss was convicted after a second trial. The most damning evidence against him was an old typewriter that he had once owned. FBI forensic experts testified that Hiss's typewriter had produced classified documents, which had been in the possession of Chambers. These documents had been hidden on Chamber's farm in a hollowed out pumpkin, thus the name "pumpkin papers." Also damaging Hiss's credibility was the testimony of a former maid in his household who stated that Chambers had been a frequent visitor to the Hiss home, and the two appeared to have been friends.

Hiss had many defenders, including President Truman, who referred to the case against Hiss as a "red herring." Hiss never admitted his guilt and proclaimed

his innocence throughout his life. Hiss died at age 92 on 15 November 1996 at Lenox Hill Hospital in Manhattan.

Other Soviet agents in the apparatus named by Chambers included:

John J. Abt –Department of Agriculture; Works Progress Administration; Senate Committee on Education and Labor; Justice Department.

Henry H. Collins –National Recovery Administration; Department of Agriculture.

Donald Hiss –State Department; Labor Department.

Charles Kramer –National Labor Relations Board; Office of Price Administration; Senate Subcommittee of War Mobilization.

Victor Perlo –Office of Price Administration; War Production Board; Treasury Department.

Lee Pressman –Department of Agriculture; Works Progress Administration; General Counsel of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; a leading figure in Henry Wallace’s presidential campaign.

Harold Ware –Department of Agriculture.

Nathan Witt –Department of Agriculture; National Labor Relations Board.⁵⁸

Elizabeth Bentley

Elizabeth Bentley, like Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss, spied for the Soviet Union out of ideological conviction. Like Hiss and Chambers, Bentley was well educated (Vassar) and a native-born American. She became a convert to Communism during the heyday of Communist influence (and Soviet intelligence success) during the 1930s. A visit to Europe in the mid-1930s had filled Bentley with a dread of Nazism, and she became convinced, with the help of a Communist friend, that only the Soviet Union was standing up to the Nazis. She joined the party and in 1938 was assigned to the party underground. Also like Chambers, her primary

duty was as a courier, servicing Soviet spy rings in Washington and New York.

Bentley’s handler was Jacob Golos, (real name: Jacob Rasin). The Russian born Golos was a high-ranking member of the American Communist Party, a former Bolshevik revolutionary and Soviet secret police operative in the USSR. Golos illustrated the intimate relationship between Soviet intelligence and the American Communist party. The word intimate also describes the relationship between Golos and Bentley, for the two had become lovers.

By the mid-1940s, Bentley was becoming disillusioned with her new faith. This was accelerated by the death of Golos, in 1943, from a heart attack. His successors were a parade of boorish goons. She turned herself into the FBI in 1945 and gave up the names of scores of Americans who had spied for the Kremlin, including Alger Hiss. In 1948, Bentley appeared before the HUAC with her story of Communist penetration of the USG. Her testimony was a huge story, commanding wide interest, and contributed to the growing distrust of the USSR and their American adherents.

She provided testimony on two Soviet networks of government employees who had worked on behalf of the Soviets in the late 1930s and early 1940s. She identified over 30 high-level US Government officials that had worked for the two networks run by Nathan Silverman and Victor Perlo.

The Nathan Silverman Network consisted of the following members:

Nathan Silverman: Director of the Labor Division, Farm Security Administration; Board of Economic Warfare.

Solomon Adler: Treasury Department.

Norman Bursler: Department of Justice.

Frank Coe: Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury; Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador in London; Assistant to the Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare; Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.

Lauchlin Currie: Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt; Deputy Administrator of Foreign Economic Administration.

Bela (William) Gold: Assistant Head of Program Surveys, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Agriculture Department; Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization; Office of Economic Programs in Foreign Economic Administration.

Mrs. Bela Gold: House Select Committee on Interstate Migration; Bureau of Employment Security; Division of Monetary Research, Treasury.

Abraham Silverman: Director, Bureau of Research and Information Services, US Railroad Retirement Board; Economic Adviser and Chief of Analysis and Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Material and Services.

William Taylor: Treasury Department.

William L. Ullmann: Division of Monetary Research, Treasury; Material and Services Division, Air Corps Headquarters, Pentagon.

The following were members of the Victor Perlo Network:

Victor Perlo: Head of branch in Research Section, Office of Price Administration; War Production Board; Monetary Research, Treasury.

Edward J. Fitzgerald: War Production Board (WPD).

Harold Glasser: Treasury Department; War Production Board; Advisor on North African Affairs Committee in Algiers, North Africa.

Charles Kramer (aka: Charles Krevitsky): National Labor Relations Board; Office of Price Administration; Economist with Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization.

Harry Magdoff: Statistical Division of WPB and Office of Emergency Management; Bureau of

Research and Statistics, WTB; Tools Division, War Production Board; Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Commerce Department.

Alan Rosenberg: Foreign Economic Administration.

Donald Niven Wheeler: Office of Strategic Services.⁵⁹

Bentley also identified seven members of the headquarters staff of the OSS who were working for Soviet intelligence. The most important of these may have been Duncan Chaplin Lee, a Rhodes scholar at Oxford who joined the law firm of William J. Donovan. When Donovan became the head of OSS in 1942, he chose Lee as his personal assistant.

On 3 December 1963, Bentley died. During the last five years of her life she taught English at an all-girls school in Middletown, Connecticut.

Indictment of Communists January 1949

In the 1920s, the US and state governments attempted to penalize Communists for alleged subversive activities. Many states enacted laws denying the Communists the right to hold public office or to obtain public jobs. In the 1940s, another attempt was made using the same arguments, but several Supreme Court decisions decided that simple membership in or an affiliation with the party was not, in itself, evidence of an intent to overthrow the US Government by force. To clarify the vague state of affairs, Attorney General Clark resolved, in 1949, to indict the Communist Party leaders for conspiracy under the Alien Registration Act of 1940. Following is the text of the indictment.

The grand jury charges:

1. That from on or about April 1, 1945, and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York, and elsewhere, William Z. Foster, Eugene Dennis, also known as Francis X. Waldron Jr., John B. Williamson, Jacob Stachel, Robert G. Thompson, Benjamin J. Davis Jr., Henry

Winston, John Gates, also known as Israel Regenstein, Irving Potash, Gilbert Green, Carl Winter, and Gus Hall, also known as Arno Gust Halberg, the defendants herein, unlawfully, willingly, and knowingly did conspire with each other, and with divers other persons to the grand jurors unknown, to organize as the Communist Party of the United States of America a society, group, and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence, and knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the Government by force and violence, which said acts are prohibited by Section 2 of the Act of June 28, 1940 (Section 10, Title 18, United States Code, commonly known as the Smith Act.

2. It was part of said conspiracy that said defendants would convene, in the Southern District of New York, a meeting of the National Board of the Communist Political Association on or about June 2, 1945, to adopt a draft resolution for the purpose of bringing about the dissolution of the Communist Political Association, and for the purpose of organizing as the Communist party of the United States of America a society, group, and assembly of persons dedicated to the Marxist-Leninist principles of the overthrow and destruction of the United States by force and violence.

3. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants would thereafter convene in the Southern district of New York, a meeting of the National Committee of the Communist Political Association on or about June 18, 1945, to amend and adopt said draft resolution.

4. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants would thereafter cause to be convened, in the Southern district of New York, a special national convention of the Communist Political Association on or about July 26, 1945, for the purpose of considering and acting upon said resolution as amended.

5. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants would induce the delegates to said

national convention to dissolve the Communist Political Association.

6. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants would bring about the organization of the Communist Party of the United States as a society, group, and assembly of persons to teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence, and would cause said convention to adopt a constitution basing said party upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

7. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants would bring about the election of officers and the election of a National Committee of said party, and be elected as officers and as members of said National Committee and the National Board of said committee, and in such capacities said defendants would assume leadership of said party and responsibility for its policies and activities, and would meet from time to time to formulate, supervise, and carry out the policies and activities of said party.

8. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants would cause to be organized clubs, and district and state units of said party, and would recruit and encourage the recruitment of members of said party.

9. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants would publish and circulate, and cause to be published and circulated, books, articles, magazines, and newspapers advocating the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

10. It was further a part of said conspiracy that said defendants would conduct, and cause to be conducted, schools and classes for the study of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, in which would be taught and advocated the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence.

In violation of Sections 3 and 5 of the Act of June 28, 1940 (Sections 11 and 13, Title 18, United States Code), commonly known as the Smith Act.

The White House

Washington, D.C., July 24, 1950

INFORMATION RELATING TO DOMESTIC ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND RELATED MATTERS

On September 6, 1939 and January 8, 1943 a Presidential Directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters. It was pointed out that the investigations must be conducted in a comprehensive manner on a National basis and all information carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion. I should like to again call the attention of all Enforcement Officers, both Federal and State, to the request that they report all information in the above enumerated fields promptly to the nearest Field Representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is charged with the responsibility of correlating this material and referring matters which are under the jurisdiction of any other Federal Agency with responsibilities in this field to the appropriate agency.

I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information relating to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this same manner.

Harry Truman

Klaus Fuchs

Dr. Klaus Fuchs, a German-born nuclear physicist was a major contributor to the atom-bomb research programs of both Britain and the United States during and after World War II. Simultaneously he was an invaluable asset to the Soviet Union's atomic research program because he secretly communicated to the Soviet Union all the sensitive data on the work of US and British atomic establishments to which he had access. Interned by the British as an enemy alien at the beginning of the war, his abilities became known to the administrators of Britain's secret atomic research

program, and he was recruited to work on the atomic bomb. By the end of 1943, his work was so outstanding that he was made one of a small team of British atomic scientists assigned to work in the United States with American physicists in developing the gaseous diffusion U-235 separation process, in making the earliest atom bombs, in planning atomic weapons, and in developing the theory underlying the development of the hydrogen bomb.

Although the security surrounding Western work in atomic energy had supposedly made the development and production of the atomic bomb one of world's best-kept secrets prior to the first explosions in the summer of 1945, it was discovered in 1949 that through the combined efforts of Dr. Klaus Fuchs, "a mild, unobtrusive, pleasant little man who never like politics," and his fellow agents, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, David Greenglass, Theodore Hall, and Harry Gold, the Russians had obtained the final drawings of the atomic bomb before the first test bomb was exploded at Los Alamos in July 1945.

According to Klaus Fuchs' own statement, when he was first brought into the British program during the early 1940s and learned the purpose of the work, he decided to inform the USSR. He contacted the office of the Soviet Military Attaché in London and embarked upon his career of professional espionage agent for the Soviet Union. With all the classic trappings of clandestine activity, Fuchs collected the information at his disposal, passed it on to secret couriers, and met his Soviet principals in Britain and in various parts of the United States. He gave the Soviet Union extensive data



Klaus Fuchs, a German-born nuclear physicist.

regarding the Oak Ridge diffusion process, weapons work at Los Alamos, British activities at Harwell, and other projects located in the United States, Britain, and Canada.

After serving 10 years in prison in the United Kingdom for espionage, Dr. Fuchs flew to East Germany, where he was appointed deputy director of the East German nuclear research station near Dresden. When asked by the press there if he would repeat his acts of espionage if given a second chance he replied, "Whatever helps the Soviet Union is right."

Klaus Fuchs died in 1988.

The Rosenbergs

The only Americans ever to be executed for espionage were the husband and wife couple, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Julius was the son of first-generation Russian-Jewish immigrants and grew up in the lower east side of New York. As many of his generation and background, Rosenberg gravitated to the left at an early age and was a member of Communist youth organizations before joining the American Communist Party. He also had a technical and scientific bent, graduating from the City College of New York with a BS degree in engineering.

From 1940 to March 1945, Julius Rosenberg worked on classified projects for the Army Signal Corps in New York City, Philadelphia, and Newark, New Jersey. The Army learned of his membership in the Communist Party, and he was dismissed from the Signal Corps. He worked briefly for Emerson Radio and then had his own business in New York City.



David Greenglass

Rosenberg first came to the attention of the FBI regarding Soviet espionage when David Greenglass named him as a coconspirator in passing atom bomb information to the Soviets. Greenglass himself was identified by longtime Soviet spy and courier Harry Gold, who had also been part of the atom bomb spy ring. According to Greenglass, Rosenberg, who was his brother-in-law, persuaded him to provide information in the form of drawings and descriptions of his work at the Los Alamos lab where the Manhattan Project, the development of the atomic bomb, was under way. Greenglass, an Army NCO, was stationed at the Los Alamos lab and worked as a machinist on bomb components. According to Greenglass, Ethel Rosenberg was not only aware of her husband's activities, but helped type material procured by Greenglass.

The Rosenbergs were both charged with conspiracy to commit espionage, based on 1917 espionage statute. Their trial began March 6, 1951 and lasted until March 29, when they were found guilty after one day of jury deliberation. The prosecution's case relied heavily on Greenglass's testimony. The testimony of Greenglass revealed the following information.

Greenglass entered the US Army in April 1943, and, in July, 1944, he was assigned to the Manhattan Project, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He did not know at the time what the project was but received security lectures about his duties and was told it was a secret project. Two weeks later, after being told his work was secret, he was assigned to Los Alamos, New Mexico, and reported there in August 1944.

In a VENONA transcript of a KGB New York to Moscow message, No. 1340 on 21 September 1944 states:

LIBERAL⁶⁰ recommended the wife of his wife's brother, Ruth Greenglass, with a safe flat in view. She is 21 years old, an American citizen, a GYMNAST⁶¹ since 1942. She lives on Stanton Street. LIBERAL and his wife recommend her as an intelligent and clever girl.

(15 groups unrecoverable)

(Ruth) learned that her husband was called up by the army but he was not sent to the front. He is a mechanical engineer and is now working at the ENORMOZ⁶² plant at Santa Fe, New Mexico.

Greenglass went on to say that in November, 1944, Ruth Greenglass, who came to Albuquerque to visit him, told him that Julius Rosenberg advised her that her husband was working on the atom bomb. Greenglass stated he did not know that he was working on such a project. He stated that he worked in a group at Los Alamos under a professor of a New England university and described to the court the duties of his shop at Los Alamos. He stated that while at Los Alamos, he learned the identify of various noted physicists and their cover names.

Greenglass testified that his sister, Ethel, and Julius Rosenberg used to speak to him about the merits of the Russian Government. Greenglass stated that when his wife, Ruth, came to visit him at Los Alamos on November 29, 1944, she told David that Julius Rosenberg had invited her to dinner at the Rosenberg home in New York City. At this dinner, Ethel told Ruth that she must have noticed that Ethel had not been engaging in Communist activities and that they were not buying the *Daily Worker* any more or attending club meetings because Julius finally was doing what he always wanted to do, namely, giving information to the Soviet Union.

After Ethel informed Ruth that David was working on the atom bomb project at Los Alamos and said that she and Julius wanted him to give information concerning the bomb, Ruth told the Rosenbergs that she didn't think it was a good idea and declined to convey their requests to David but Ethel and Julius remarked that she should at least tell David about it and see if he would help. In this conversation Julius pointed out to Ruth that Russia was an ally and deserved the information and that Russia was not getting all the information that was due her.

From a VENONA transcript of a KGB New York to Moscow message, number 1600 on 14 November 1944:

OSA⁶³ has agreed to cooperate with us in drawing in ShMEL⁶⁴ (henceforth KALIBR—see your no 5258) with a view to ENORMOZ. On summons from KALIBR she is leaving on 22 November for the Camp 2 area. KALIBR will have a week's leave. Before OSA's departure LIBERAL will carry out two briefings.

David said at first he refused to have anything to do with the request of the Rosenbergs but on the next day

agreed to furnish any available data. Ruth then asked David specific questions about the Manhattan Project, and David supplied her that information.

From a VENONA transcript of a KGB New York to Moscow message, number 1773, on 16 December 1944:

OSA has returned from a trip to see KALIBR. KALIBR expressed his readiness to help in throwing light on the work being carried out at Camp-2 and stated that he had already given thought to this question earlier. KALIBR said that the authorities of the Camp were openly taking all precautionary measures to prevent information about ENORMOZ falling into Russian hands. This is causing serious discontent among the progressive (workers)

17 groups unrecoverable

The middle of January KALIBR will be in TYRE.⁶⁵ LIBERAL referring to his ignorance of the problem, expresses the wish that our man should meet KALIBR and interrogate him personally. He asserts that KALIBR would be very glad of such a meeting. Do you consider such a meeting advisable? If not, I shall be obliged to draw up a questionnaire and pass it to LIBERAL. Report whether you have any questions of priority to us. KALIBR also reports: OPPENHEIMER⁶⁶ from California and KISTIAKOWSKI⁶⁷ (MLAD's⁶⁸ report mentioned the latter) are at present working at the Camp. The latter is doing research on the thermodynamic process. Advise whether you have any information on these two professors.

In January, 1945, David arrived in New York City on furlough, and about two days later Julius Rosenberg came to David's apartment to ask him for information on the A-bomb. He requested David to write up the information and stated that he would pick it up the following morning.

That evening Greenglass wrote up the information he had. The next morning he gave this material to Rosenberg, together with a list of the scientists at Los Alamos and the names of possible recruits working there who might be sympathetic to Communism and possibly furnish information to Russia.

Greenglass further stated that at the time he turned this material over to Rosenberg, Ruth Greenglass remarked that David's handwriting was bad and would

need interpretation. Rosenberg answered that it was nothing to worry about because Ethel, his wife, would retype the information.

A day or two later, David and his wife went to the Rosenberg apartment for dinner where they were introduced to a woman friend of the Rosenbergs. After she left, Julius told the Greenglasses that he thought this person would come to see David to receive information on the atom bomb. They discussed a tentative plan to the effect that Ruth Greenglass would move to Albuquerque, where this woman would come to see her and meet Ruth in a movie theater in Denver, Colorado, where they would exchange purses. Ruth's purse would contain the information from David concerning Los Alamos.

During this discussion the point was raised as to how an identification might be effected. It was agreed that Ruth would use a sidepiece of a Jell-O box to identify the person who would come to see her. Julius held the matching piece of the Jell-O box. David made the suggestion that the meeting be held in front of a certain grocery store in Albuquerque. The date of the meeting was left in abeyance depending upon the time that Ruth would depart for Albuquerque.

Also during this visit, Julius said he would like to have David meet a Russian with whom he could discuss the project on which David was working. A few nights later, an appointment was made by Julius for David to meet a Russian on First Avenue between 42nd and 59th Streets, New York City. David drove up to the appointed meeting place and parked the car near a saloon in a dark street. Julius came up to the car, looked in, and went away, and came back with a man who got into David's car. Julius stayed on the street, and David drove away with the unknown man. The man asked David about some scientific information and, after driving around for a while, David returned to the original meeting place and let the man out. Rosenberg who was standing on the street then joined this man, and David observed them leaving together.

In the spring of 1945, Ruth Greenglass came to Albuquerque to live, and David would visit her apartment on weekends. On the first Sunday of June 1945, a man, subsequently identified by David as Harry Gold, came to visit him and asked if David's name was

Greenglass. David said, "Yes." Gold then said, "Julius sent me." David went to his wife's wallet and took out the piece of Jell-O box and compared it with a piece offered by Gold. They matched.

When Gold asked David if he had any information, Greenglass said he did but would have to write it up. Gold then left, stating he would be back. David immediately started to work on a report, made sketches of experiments, wrote up descriptive material regarding them, and prepared a list of possible recruits for espionage. Later that day, Gold returned and David gave him the reports. In return, Gold gave David an envelope containing \$500 that he turned over to Ruth.

In September 1945, David Greenglass returned to New York City with his wife, Ruth, on furlough. The next morning Julius Rosenberg came to the Greenglass apartment and asked what David had for him. David informed Julius that he had obtained a pretty good description of the atom bomb.

At Julius' request, he drew up a sketch of the atom bomb, prepared descriptive material on it, drew up a list of scientists and possible recruits for Soviet espionage, and thereafter delivered this material to the Rosenberg apartment. He stated that at the time he turned this material over to Rosenberg, Ethel and Ruth were present. Rosenberg remarked that the information was very good, and it should be typed immediately. The information was then prepared on a portable typewriter in the Rosenberg apartment by Ethel.

While Ethel was typing the report, Julius mentioned to David that he (Julius) had stolen a proximity fuse while working at a radio corporation and turned it over to the Russians.

After the report was typed, the handwritten notes were burned in a frying pan by Julius, flushed down a drain, and Julius gave David \$200. Julius discussed with David the idea of David staying at Los Alamos after he was discharged from the Army so that he could continue to get information, but David declined.

From 1946 to 1949, David was in business with Julius, and during this period, Julius told David that he had people going to school and that he had people in upstate

New York and Ohio giving him information for the Russians.

Late in 1947, Julius told David about a sky platform project and mentioned he had received this information from "one of the boys." Rosenberg described the sky platform as a large vessel, which could be suspended at a point in space where the gravity was low and that the vessel would travel around the earth like a satellite. Rosenberg also advised David that he had a way of communicating with the Russians by putting material or messages in the alcove of a theater and that he had received from one of his contacts the mathematics relating to atomic energy for airplanes.

Greenglass testified that Rosenberg claimed to have received a citation and a watch from the Russians. Greenglass also testified that Rosenberg claimed to have received a console table from the Russians, which he used for photographic purposes.

In late February 1950, a few days after the news of the arrest of Dr. Fuchs in England was published, Julius came to David's home and asked David to go for a walk. During this walk Rosenberg spoke of Fuchs and mentioned that the man who had come to see David in Albuquerque was also a contact of Fuchs.

From the VENONA transcripts, a KGB New York to Moscow message, number 195, on 9 February 1944 describes the first meeting between Harry Gold and Klaus Fuchs.

On 5th February a meeting took place between GUS⁶⁹ and REST.⁷⁰ Beforehand GUS was given a detailed briefing by us. REST greeted him pleasantly but was rather cautious at first (1 group unrecovered) the discussion GUS satisfied himself that REST was aware of whom he was working with. R. arrived in the COUNTRY⁷¹ in September as a member of the ISLAND⁷² mission on ENORMOZ. According to him the work on ENORMOZ in the COUNTRY is being carried out under the direct control of the COUNTRY's army represented by General Somerville and Stimson; at the head of the group of ISLANDERS is a Labor member of Parliament, Ben Smith.⁷³

The whole operation amounts to the working out of the process for the separation of isotopes of ENORMOZ. The work is proceeding in two directions: the electron method developed by Lawrence (71 groups

unrecoverable) separation of isotopes by the combined method, using the diffusion method for preliminary and the electron for final separation. The work (46 groups unrecoverable) 18th February, we shall report the results.

Julius stated that David would have to leave the country. When David answered that he needed money, Rosenberg said he would get the money from the Russians.

In April 1950, Rosenberg again told David he would have to leave the country, and, about May 23, 1950, Rosenberg came to the Greenglass apartment with a newspaper containing a picture of Harry Gold and the story of Gold's arrest. Rosenberg said, "This is the man who saw you in Albuquerque." Julius gave David \$1,000 and stated he would come back later with \$6,000 more for him to use in leaving the country; also that Greenglass would have to get a Mexican tourist card. Rosenberg said he went to see a doctor who told him that a doctor's letter stating David was inoculated for smallpox would also be needed, as well as passport photos. He then gave Greenglass a form letter and instructions to memorize for use in Mexico City.

Upon David's arrival in Mexico City, he was to send this letter to the Soviet embassy and sign it "I. Jackson." Three days after he sent this letter, David was to go to the Plaza de la Colon at 5 p.m. and look at the Statue of Columbus there, carrying in his hand a guide to the city with his middle finger between the pages of the guide, and wait until some man came to him. David would then state, "That is a magnificent statue" and advise the man that he (David) was from Oklahoma. The man would then answer, "Oh there are more beautiful statues in Paris," and would give Greenglass a passport and additional money. David was to go to Vera Cruz and then go to Sweden or Switzerland. If he went to Sweden, he was to send the same type of letter to the Soviet ambassador or his secretary and sign the letter "I. Jackson." Three days later, David was to go to the statue of Linnaeus in Stockholm at 5 p.m., where a man would approach him. Greenglass would mention that the statue was beautiful and the man would answer, "There are much more beautiful ones in Paris." The man would then give David the means of transportation to Czechoslovakia, where upon arrival he was to write to the Soviet ambassador advising him of his presence.

Julius further advised Greenglass that he himself would have to leave the country because he had known Jacob Golos⁷⁴ and that Elizabeth Bentley probably knew him also.

Elizabeth Bentley was a member of the Communist underground, who served as a courier to collect information from Russian agents in the United States. Bentley stated that during her association with Golos, she became aware of the fact that Golos knew an engineer named "Julius." In the fall of 1942, she accompanied Golos to Knickerbocker Village but remained in his automobile. She saw Golos conferring with "Julius" on the street but at some distance. From conversations with Golos, she learned that Julius lived in Knickerbocker Village. She also stated that she had telephone conversations with "Julius" from the fall of 1942 to November 1943.

Bentley, in interviews with FBI agents, had described Julius as being 5'10" or 11" tall, slim, and wearing glasses. She had also advised that he was the leader of a Communist cell of engineers, which was turned over to Golos for Soviet espionage purposes and that Julius was to be the contact between Golos and the group. Golos believed this cell of engineers was capable of development.

Investigation by the FBI disclosed that Julius Rosenberg resided in a development known as Knickerbocker Village, was 5'10" tall, slim, and wore glasses. Bentley was unable to make a positive identification of Julius.

Sometime later David and his family went to a photography shop and had six sets of passport photos taken. On Memorial Day, Greenglass gave Rosenberg five sets of these photos. Later Rosenberg again visited David, whom he gave \$4,000 in \$10 and \$20 bills wrapped in brown paper, requesting Greenglass to go for a walk with him and repeat the memorized instructions. David gave the \$4,000 to his brother-in-law for safekeeping.

Also testifying was Harry Gold, who stated that Soviet intelligence was the ultimate recipient of the material. The Rosenbergs denied all charges, but were hurt by having to plead the fifth amendment when questioned about their membership in the Communist Party. The

two were sentenced to death and executed June 19, 1953.

Based on the information supplied by Gold, Greenglass was arrested on June 16, 1950, and arraigned on the same date in New York. He was remanded to the custody of a US Marshal in default of \$100,000 bail. On October 10, 1950, a superseding indictment was returned by a Federal Grand jury in the Southern District of New York charging Morton Sobell, Ethel Rosenberg, Julius Rosenberg, David Greenglass and Anatoli Yakovlev⁷⁵ with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Statutes. On October 18, 1950, he pleaded guilty to the superseding indictment. The presiding judge accepted the plea of Greenglass and bail of \$100,000 was continued.

On January 31, 1951, a Federal Grand jury in the Southern District of New York, handed down a second superseding indictment charging Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, Anatoli Yakovlev, Morton Sobell, and David Greenglass with conspiracy to commit espionage between June 6, 1944, and June 16, 1950. The indictment was similar in all respects to the previous superseding indictment with the exception that it changed the beginning of the conspiracy from November 1944 to June 1944.

David Greenglass received a 15-year prison sentence after his guilty plea. He was released from Federal prison on November 16, 1960 and had to report periodically to a parole officer until November, 1965.

Gen. Mikhail Dokuchayev, who was a KGB officer from 1951 to 1989, confirms in his new book that Julius and Ethel Rosenberg worked for the KGB. The general gives the Rosenbergs credit for averting a nuclear disaster. "The Rosenbergs were a New York couple convicted in 1951 of conspiracy to commit espionage and executed in 1953. They were integral parts of a Soviet spying effort directed towards obtaining the secrets of the atomic bomb from the United States."

The Rosenberg Spy Apparatus

Morton Sobell

Morton Sobell was born April 11, 1917, in New York City, the son of Russian-born immigrants. He married

Helen Levitov Gurewitz at Arlington, Virginia, on March 10, 1945.

Sobell was a classmate of Julius Rosenberg and Max Elitcher in college and graduated from this college in June, 1933, with a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering. Subsequently, he attended a graduate school at a university in Michigan in 1941 and 1942 and received a master's degree in electrical engineering.

Sobell was employed during the summers of 1934 through 1938 as a maintenance man at Camp Unity, Wingdale, New York, reportedly a Communist-controlled camp. On January 27, 1939, he secured the position of junior electrical engineer with the Bureau of Naval Ordnance, Washington, DC, and was promoted to the position of assistant electrical engineer. He resigned from this position in October 1940 to further his studies. While employed at an electric company in New York State, he had access to classified material, including that on fire control radar. After resigning from this company, he secured employment as an electrical engineer with an instrument company in New York City where he had access to secret data. He remained in this position until June 16, 1950, when he failed to appear for work. It is noted that on this date the FBI arrested David Greenglass. On June 22, 1950, Sobell and his family fled to Mexico. He was thereafter located in Mexico City and on August 18, 1950, was taken into custody by FBI agents in Laredo, Texas, after his deportation from Mexico by the Mexican authorities.

Max Elitcher, an admitted Communist, advised that during the period he roomed with Morton Sobell in Washington, DC, he was induced by Sobell to join the Communist party. He stated that this occurred in 1939 and that Sobell had informed him that he, Sobell, was a member of the Communist Party.

During the same period, Sobell was reported to have been active in the American Peace Mobilization and the American Youth Congress, both of which organizations have been cited by the Attorney General as coming within the purview of Executive Order 10450. It was ascertained that Sobell appeared on the active indices of the American Peace Mobilization and was listed in the indices of the American Youth Congress as a delegate to that body from the Washington Committee for Democratic Action.

A resident at an apartment building located in Washington, DC, reported that Sobell and Max Elitcher were among the tenants of the building who attended meetings in the apartment of one of the tenants during 1940 and 1941. This individual was of the opinion that these were Communist meetings.

The New York Office of the FBI located a Communist Party nominating petition, which was filed in the name of one Morton Sobell, and the signature on this petition was identified by the FBI Laboratory as being in the handwriting of Morton Sobell.

A check at the instrument company where Sobell was employed reflected that Sobell failed to report for work after June 16, 1950. The company received a letter from Sobell on or about July 3, 1950, wherein he advised that he needed a rest and was going to take a few weeks off to recuperate. A neighborhood investigation by the FBI developed that Sobell, his wife, and their two children were last seen at their home on June 22, 1950, and that they had left hurriedly without advising anyone of their intended departure.

Through an airlines company at LaGuardia Field, it was determined that Sobell and his family had departed for Mexico City on June 22, 1950. It was further determined that roundtrip excursion tickets for transportation from New York City to Mexico and return were purchased on June 21, 1950, in the name of Morton Sobell.

Further investigation of Sobell's flight to Mexico reflected that he had communicated through the mail with relatives through the utilization of a certain man as a mail drop. This man was interviewed and reluctantly admitted receiving letters from Sobell with instructions to forward these letters to Sobell's relatives. This admission was made after the individual was advised that the FBI Laboratory had identified handwriting on the envelopes used in forwarding letters to Sobell's relatives as being in his handwriting.

In August, 1950, the Mexican authorities took Sobell into custody and deported him as an undesirable alien. On the early morning of August 18, 1950, FBI agents apprehended Sobell at the International Bridge, Laredo, Texas.

On 10 October 1950, a superseding indictment was returned by a Federal Grand jury in the Southern District of New York charging Morton Sobell, Ethel Rosenberg, Julius Rosenberg, David Greenglass, and Anatoli Yakovlev⁷⁶ with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Statutes. On 18 October 1950, he pleaded guilty to the superseding indictment. The presiding judge accepted the plea of Greenglass and bail of \$100,000 was continued.

On 31 January 1951, a Federal Grand jury in the Southern District of New York handed down a second superseding indictment charging Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, Anatoli Yakovlev, Morton Sobell, and David Greenglass with conspiracy to commit espionage between 6 June 1944 and 16 June 1950. The indictment was similar in all respects to the previous superseding indictment with the exception that it changed the beginning of the conspiracy from November 1944, to June 1944.

On 5 February 1951, Morton Sobell made an application to a US District Judge, Southern District of New York, for a writ of habeas corpus based on the allegation that the indictment of 31 January 1951, was vague and that the incrimination of Sobell was a violation of his constitutional rights. The application was denied.

On 28 March 1951, counsel for both sides summed up their case to the jury, and, on 29 March 1951, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty against Morton Sobell. On 5 April 1951, Morton Sobell was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

Theodore Alvin Hall

The Washington Post identified Theodore Alvin Hall as an atomic bomb spy codenamed, "Mlad," in an article in its 25 February 1996 edition. The article used information from deciphered KGB messages released by the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA program, actually started by the US Army's Signal Intelligence Service on 1 February 1943, was a small, highly secret program, codenamed VENONA. The object of the VENONA program was to examine, and possibly exploit, encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications.

In one of the encrypted messages, dated 12 November 1944, Hall is identified by name and says that a KGB

officer visited Hall, who provided information on Los Alamos and its key personnel to the officer. The message read:

BEK⁷⁷ visited Theodore Hall, 19 years old, the son of a furrier. He is a graduate of Harvard University. As a talented physicist he was taken for government work. He was a (member of the Young Communist League) and conducted work in the Steel Founders Union. According to BEK's account HALL has an exceptionally keen mind and a broad outlook, and is politically developed. At the present time, H. is in charge of a group at "CAMP-2".⁷⁸ H. handed over to BEK a report about the CAMP and named key personnel employed on ENORMOZ.⁷⁹ He decided to do this on the advice of his colleague Saville SAX, a GYMNAST⁸⁰ living in TYRE.⁸¹ SAX's mother is a FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN⁸² and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF. With the aim of hastening a meeting with a competent person, H. on the following day sent a copy of the report to S. to the PLANT.⁸³ ALEKSEJ⁸⁴ received it. H had to leave for CAMP-2 in two days time. ALEKSEJ was compelled to make a decision quickly. Jointly with MAJ⁸⁵ he gave BEK consent to feel out H., to assure him that everything was in order and to arrange liaison with him. BEK met S (1 group garbled) our automobile. We consider it expedient to maintain liaison with H. (1 group unidentified) through S. and not bring in anybody else. MAJ has no objections to this. We shall send the details by post.

In another VENONA message, from KGB New York to Moscow, number 94, on 23 January 1945, it appears the KGB is running an investigative check on Hall and Sax:

The checking of STAR⁸⁶ and MLAD we entrusted to ECHO⁸⁷ a month ago, the result of the check we have not yet had. We're checking STAR's mother also....

BEK is extremely displeased over the handing over of STAR to ALEKSEJ. He gives a favorable report of him. Aleksej has met STAR twice but cannot yet give a final judgement. MLAD has been seen by no one except BEK. (On the 8th of January) MLAD sent a letter but never (made arrangements) for calling to a meeting. He has been called into the army and left to work in the camp.⁸⁸

STAR intends to renew his studies at Harvard University at the end of February.

Hall was subsequently investigated in the early 1950s for espionage by the FBI but was not prosecuted. He left the United States in 1962 and currently resides in Cambridge, England. A *Washington Post* reporter contacted Hall on several occasions but Hall declined to comment on the story that he is Mlad or to answer any questions about his possible involvement with Soviet intelligence.

A new book, *Bombshell: The Secret Story of America's Unknown Atomic Spy Conspiracy*, published on 1 October 1997, quoted Hall as saying that he passed nuclear secrets to the Soviets. According to Hall, he was concerned about the US monopoly of atomic weapons so in 1944, "to help prevent the monopoly I contemplated a brief encounter with a Soviet agent, just to inform them of the existence of the A-bomb project."

Hall anticipated only limited contact with the Soviets but things did not go as he planned. He notes that at the time of his espionage activities, the Soviet Union "was not the enemy but the ally of the United States; the Soviet people fought the Nazis heroically at tremendous human cost, and this may well have saved the Western Allies from defeat."

Hall wrote two statements to the authors. In one of them he said that his "decision about contacting the Soviets was a gradual one, and it was entirely my own. It was entirely voluntary, not influenced by any other individual or by any organization.... I was never recruited by anyone."

Hall's acknowledgment of his spying activities further confirms the VENONA transcripts, which identified him as a Soviet spy.

Joel Barr and Al Sarrant

Joel Barr, his close friend Al Sarant, and Sarant's lover Carol Dayton, the wife of a neighbor, fled the United States to Czechoslovakia. After living there for five years, they went to the Soviet Union, settling in Leningrad. To hide their identities, they each were given an alias. Joel Barr became Joe Berg, and Al Sarant became Filipp Staros.

Barr has denied that he spied for the Soviets, saying that he fled the United States because of his close, political ties to Julius Rosenberg. In a VENONA

message from KGB New York to Moscow, No. 1600, dated 14 November 1944:

LIBERAL⁸⁹ has safely carried through the contracting of HUGHES.⁹⁰ HUGHES is a good pal of METR's.⁹¹ We propose to pair them off and get them to photograph their own materials having (been) given a camera for this purpose. HUGHES is a good photographer, has a large darkroom and all the equipment but he does not have a Leica. LIBERAL will receive the films from METR for passing on. Direction of the probationers will be continued through LIBERAL, this will ease the load on him. Details about the contracting are in letter no. 8

As for Al Sarant, who died in 1979 in Vladivostok, a VENONA message from KGB New York to Moscow, No. 628, dated 5 May 1944:

Please carry out a check and sanction the recruitment of Alfred SARANT, a lead of ANTENNA's.⁹² He is 25 years old, a Greek, an American citizen and lives in TYRE.⁹³ He completed the engineering course at Cooper Union in 1940. He worked for two years in the Signal Corps Laboratory at Fort Monmouth. He was discharged for past union activity. He has been working for two years at Western Electric.

(45 groups unrecoverable)

Entry in the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN,⁹⁴ SARANT lives apart from his family. Answer without delay.

Rosenberg in fact recruited Sarant.

Barr worked in the Soviet defense industry, where he was recognized as a "father of Soviet micro-electronics."



Joel Barr

Barr and Sarant, in effect, began what can be called the Silicon Valley in the Soviet Union.

In 1992, Barr returned to the United States where he regained his US citizenship. He rented an apartment in New York and claimed to have voted in the 1992 primary in the state. Barr died on 1 August 1998.

Other Spies in the Rosenberg Net

Max Elitcher

Elitcher testified that he first met Sobell while both were attending a high school in New York City. He further stated that he and Sobell also attended college together in New York from 1934 to 1938. Elitcher graduated with a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering and pointed out that Julius Rosenberg also studied engineering at the same college during this same period. Elitcher saw Sobell daily at school but saw Rosenberg less frequently. After graduating, Elitcher was employed with the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, Washington, DC from November, 1938, until October, 1948.

In December 1938, Elitcher resided at Washington, DC. During December of that year, Sobell came to Washington and stayed at a house next to Elitcher's place of residence. In April or May of 1939, Elitcher and Sobell took up residence in a private home, and in May of 1940, they moved into an apartment. During the period they lived together, Sobell was also employed at the Bureau of Ordnance. In September 1941, Sobell left his employment to go to a university in Michigan in order to continue his studies.

Elitcher further advised that during the period he lived with Sobell they had conversations concerning the Communist Party and that at Sobell's request, Elitcher joined the Young Communist League. About September 1939, Elitcher attended a meeting with Sobell at which there was a discussion about forming a branch of the Communist Party. This branch was formed, and Elitcher joined the Communist Party at the end of 1939. Meetings of this group were held at the homes of various members and dues were paid to the chairman of the group. Elitcher stated that Sobell was the first chairman of the group. At meetings discussions were conducted

of news events based on the *Daily Worker* and literature such as *The Communist*. The group also discussed Marxist and Leninist theory. Suggestions were made to the members to join the American Peace Mobilization and to assist the American Youth Congress convention. Discussions were also held concerning the Hitler-Stalin Pact, and members were instructed to strive to get support of other people for the Russian position. Elitcher continued to go to these meetings until September 1941. In 1942, Communist Party branches were formed, which contained groups of employees from particular government agencies, and Elitcher joined the Navy branch of the Communist Party.

Elitcher testified that around June 1944, he received a telephone call from Julius Rosenberg, who identified himself as a former college classmate of Elitcher. At Elitcher's invitation, Rosenberg visited the Elitcher home the same evening. Rosenberg told Elitcher what the Soviet Union was doing in the war effort and stated that some war information was being denied to the Soviet Union. Rosenberg pointed out, however, that some people were providing military information to assist the Soviet Union and that Sobell was helping in this way. Rosenberg asked Elitcher if he would turn over information of that type to him in order to the aid the Soviet Union. Rosenberg asked Elitcher to supply him with plans, reports, or books regarding new military equipment and anything Elitcher might think would be of value to the Soviet Union, pointing out that the final choice of the value of the information would not be up to Elitcher but that the information would be evaluated by someone else.

The VENONA transcripts show a message from the KGB New York to Moscow, No. 1053, on 26 July 1944 that states:

In July Antenna⁹⁵ was sent by his firm for ten days to work in Carthage.⁹⁶ There he visited his school friend Max Elitcher, who works in the Bureau of Standards as head of the fire control section for warships (comment: which mount guns) of over five-inch calibre. He has access to extremely valuable material on guns.

Five years ago, Max Elitcher graduated from the Electro-Technical Department of the City College of New York. He has a Master of Science degree. Since

finishing college he has been working at the Bureau of Standards. He is a Fellow Countryman. He entered the Fellow Countrymen's organization after finishing his studies.

By Antenna he is characterized as a loyal, reliable, level-headed and able man. Married, his wife is a Fellow Countrywoman. She is a psychologist by profession, she works at the War Department.

Max Elitcher is an excellent amateur photographer and has all the necessary equipment for taking photographs.

Please check Elitcher and communicate your consent to his clearance.

In September 1944, Elitcher went on a one-week vacation in a state park in West Virginia with Morton Sobell and his future wife. During this vacation, Elitcher told Sobell about Rosenberg's visit and request for information to be given to the Soviet Union. When he remarked that Rosenberg had said Sobell was helping in this, Sobell became angry and said that Rosenberg should not have mentioned his name.

In the summer of 1945, Elitcher was in New York on vacation and stayed at the apartment of Julius Rosenberg. Rosenberg mentioned to Elitcher that he, Rosenberg, had been dismissed from his employment for security reasons and that his membership in the Communist Party seemed to be the basis of the case against him; he had been worried about this matter because he thought his dismissal might have had some connection with his espionage activity but that he had been relieved when he found out that it concerned only his party activity.

Elitcher also testified that, in September 1945, Rosenberg came to Elitcher's home and told him that even though the war was over, Russia's need for military information continued. Rosenberg asked Elitcher about the type of work he was going, and Elitcher told him he was working on sonar and anti-submarine fire-control devices.

In early 1946, Elitcher visited an electric company in connection with official business and stayed at the home of Sobell in Schenectady. At the time, Sobell was working at this electric company. On this occasion Sobell and Elitcher discussed their work.

Later that year Elitcher again saw Sobell, and Sobell asked about an ordnance pamphlet, but Elitcher said it was not yet ready. Sobell suggested that Elitcher see Rosenberg again.

At the end of 1946 or 1947, Elitcher telephoned Rosenberg and said he would like to see him. At this time Rosenberg advised Elitcher that there had been some changes in the espionage work; that he felt there was a leak; and that Elitcher should not come to see him until further notice. He advised Elitcher to discontinue his Communist activities.

Elitcher testified that in 1947, Sobell had secured employment at an instrument company in New York City doing classified work for the armed forces. Elitcher saw Sobell there several times and on one occasion had lunch with him at a restaurant in New York City. Sobell asked Elitcher on this occasion if Elitcher knew of any progressive students or graduates and if so, would he put Sobell in touch with them, but Elitcher said he did not know any.

In October 1948, Elitcher left the Bureau of Ordnance and went to work for the instrument company in New York City where Sobell was employed. He lived in a house in Flushing, New York, and Sobell lived on a street behind him. They went to work together in a car pool and, during a trip home from work one evening, Sobell again asked Elitcher about individuals Elitcher might know who would be progressive. Sobell pointed out to Elitcher that because of security measures being taken by the government, it was necessary to find students to provide information that no one would suspect.

Elitcher further testified that prior to leaving the Bureau of Ordnance, he had discussed with Sobell his desire to secure new employment during a visit Elitcher made to New York City in the summer of 1948. Sobell told Elitcher not to leave the Bureau of Ordnance until Elitcher had talked to Rosenberg.

Thereafter, Sobell made an appointment for Elitcher to meet with Rosenberg. They met on the street in New York, and Rosenberg told Elitcher that it was too bad Elitcher had decided to leave because he, Rosenberg, needed someone to work at the Bureau of Ordnance for espionage purposes. Sobell was present at this meeting

and also urged Elitcher to stay at the Bureau of Ordnance. Thereafter, Rosenberg and Elitcher had dinner together at a restaurant in New York City where they continued to talk about Elitcher's desire to leave his job. Rosenberg wanted to know where important defense work was being done, and Elitcher mentioned laboratories in Whippany, New Jersey. Rosenberg suggested that possibly Elitcher could take courses at college to improve his status.

Elitcher also testified that in July 1948, he took a trip to New York City by car during which he believed he was being followed. He proceeded to Sobell's home and told Sobell of his suspicion. Sobell became angry and told Elitcher he should not have come to his home if he felt he was being followed. Sobell told Elitcher to leave the house and stay somewhere else but later agreed to allow Elitcher to stay with him. A little later that evening, Sobell mentioned to Elitcher that he had some information for Rosenberg that was too valuable to destroy, and he wanted to get it to Rosenberg that night. He requested Elitcher to accompany him.

Elitcher observed Sobell take a 35-mm film can with him and place it in the glove compartment of Sobell's car. He and Sobell then drove to a building in New York City and parked on Catherine Street. Sobell then took the can out of the glove compartment and left.


When he returned, Elitcher asked him what Rosenberg thought of Elitcher's suspicion that he was being followed, and Sobell answered that Rosenberg thought it was nothing to worry about.

Elitcher testified that Sobell possessed a camera, some 35-mm film, and an enlarger and that all of the material Sobell worked on in his various places of employment was classified. He stated he last saw Sobell in June 1950.

On cross-examination, Elitcher recalled that during Rosenberg's visit to his house in June 1944, which was after D-day, Rosenberg mentioned that he had had a drink with a Russian in celebration of this event. Elitcher testified that Rosenberg contacted him at least nine times from 1944 to 1948 in an attempt to persuade him to obtain information for him, but that he always put Rosenberg off. In 1948, Elitcher told Rosenberg that he definitely would not cooperate with him.

Harry Gold

Harry Gold testified that he was engaged in Soviet espionage from 1935 up to the time of his arrest in May 1950 and that from 1944 to 1946 his espionage superior was a Russian known to him as "John." He identified a picture of Anatoliy A. Yakovlev, former Soviet vice consul in New York, as John.



Photograph of Harry Gold shown to Klaus Fuchs who identified him as his American contact in May 1950.

In the middle of June 1944, Gold had an espionage meeting with Dr. Klaus Fuchs in Woodside, New York. As a result of this meeting, Gold wrote a report for Yakovlev. He also informed Yakovlev that at the next meeting, Fuchs would give Gold information relating to the application of nuclear fission to the production of military weapons.

In the latter part of June 1944, Gold met Fuchs in the vicinity of Borough Hall, Brooklyn, and received a package from Fuchs, which Gold later turned over to Yakovlev.

Gold's next meeting with Fuchs was in the middle of July 1944, in the vicinity of 90th Street and Central Park West, New York. About a week or two later, Gold turned over to Yakovlev a report he had written concerning this conversation and told Yakovlev that Fuchs had given further information concerning the work of a joint American and British project to produce an atom bomb. Subsequently, Gold had a regularly scheduled series of meetings with Yakovlev, who instructed Gold how to continue his contacts with Fuchs. In this connection, Gold stated that it was his duty to obtain information from a number of American espionage agents and to pass the information to Yakovlev. He pointed out that he effected his meetings with these sources by using recognition signals such as an object or a piece of paper and a code phrase in the form of a greeting, always using a pseudonym. He also stated that his sources lived in cities other than Philadelphia and that he paid money to these sources, which he had in turn received from Yakovlev.

Early in January 1945, Gold met Fuchs in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and received a package of papers which he later turned over to Yakovlev in New York City. He told Yakovlev that Fuchs had mentioned that a lens was being worked on in connection with the atom bomb. His next meeting with Fuchs was to be in Santa Fe on the first Saturday of June 1945.

Early in February 1945, Gold met Yakovlev on 23rd Street between Ninth and Tenth Avenues in New York. At this meeting, Yakovlev indicated the interests of the Russians in the plans mentioned by Fuchs.

On the last Saturday in May 1945, Gold met Yakovlev inside a restaurant on Third Avenue in New York, to

discuss Gold's next meeting with Fuchs in Santa Fe. Yakovlev instructed Gold to take on an additional mission in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Gold protested, but Yakovlev said it was vital, pointing out that a woman was supposed to go but was unable to. Yakovlev gave Gold an onionskin paper on which was typed the name Greenglass, an address on High Street, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the recognition signal, "I come from Julius." Yakovlev also gave Gold a piece of cardboard cut from a food package. He stated that Greenglass would have the matching piece and that if Greenglass was not in his wife would pass him the information. Yakovlev then gave Gold \$500 in an envelope to turn over to Greenglass.

Gold arrived in Santa Fe on Saturday, June 2, 1945, and met Fuchs, who gave him a package of papers. Gold left Santa Fe on the afternoon of June 2 by bus and arrived in Albuquerque that evening. He went to the High Street address, found that Greenglass and his wife were not in, and stayed at a rooming house overnight. The next day he went to the High Street address and found David Greenglass.

Greenglass told Gold that the visit was a surprise and that it would take several hours to prepare the A-bomb material for Gold. He started to tell Gold about possible recruits at Los Alamos but Gold cut him short and pointed out that recruitment was very hazardous, and he should be more circumspect in his behavior. Gold left and returned later that afternoon, when Greenglass gave him material, which he said contained information on the atomic bomb. Gold turned over to Greenglass the envelope containing the \$500. Greenglass mentioned to Gold that he expected to get a furlough sometime around Christmas and gave Gold the phone number of Julius in New York.

Gold returned to New York by train on June 5, 1945. While on route by train, he examined the material Greenglass had given him and put it in a manila envelope. He put the material he had received from Fuchs in another manila envelope. On the evening of June 5, 1945, Gold met Yakovlev along Metropolitan Avenue in Brooklyn and turned over to him both envelopes.

About two weeks later, Gold met Yakovlev on Main Street, Flushing, New York. Yakovlev told Gold that

the information he had received from him on June 5 had been sent immediately to the Soviet Union and that the information provided by Greenglass had been considered "extremely excellent and valuable." At this meeting, Gold related the details of his conversation with Fuchs and Greenglass. Fuchs had stated that tremendous progress had been made on the atom bomb, and the first test was set for July 1945.

In early July 1945, Gold met Yakovlev in a seafood restaurant. Yakovlev said it was necessary to make arrangements for another Soviet agent to get in touch with Gold. At Yakovlev's instructions, Gold took a sheet of paper from his pocket that had the heading of a company in Philadelphia. Gold tore off the top portion containing the name and on the reverse side of the sheet wrote in diagonal fashion, "directions to Paul Street." Yakovlev then tore the paper in an irregular fashion. He kept one portion and Gold kept the other. Yakovlev said that if Gold received two tickets in the mail without a letter, it would mean that on a definite number of days after the date on the ticket Gold was to go to the Broadway stop of the Astoria line for a meeting, which would take place in a restaurant-bar. Gold's Soviet contact would be standing at the bar and approach Gold and ask to be directed to Paul Street. They would then match the torn pieces of paper.

In August 1945, Gold again met Yakovlev in Brooklyn and was told by Yakovlev that Gold was to take a trip in September 1945, to see Fuchs. Gold suggested to Yakovlev that since he was going to see Fuchs, he might as well go to Albuquerque to see David Greenglass also. Yakovlev answered that it was inadvisable because it might endanger Gold to have further contact with Greenglass.

In September 1945, Gold met Fuchs in Santa Fe, New Mexico. On his return to New York on September 22, 1945, Gold went to a prearranged meeting place to see Yakovlev who failed to appear. About ten days later, Gold met Yakovlev on Main Street, Flushing, and turned over to him the package he had received from Fuchs. He told Yakovlev that Fuchs had said there was no longer the open and free cooperation between the Americans and the British and that many departments were closed to Fuchs. Fuchs also stated he would have to return to England and that he was worried because the British had gotten to Kiel, Germany, ahead of the Russians and

might discover a Gestapo dossier on Fuchs that would reveal his strong Communist ties and background. Fuchs and Gold also discussed the details of a plan whereby Fuchs could be contacted in England.

In November 1945, Gold had another meeting with Yakovlev at which Gold mentioned that Greenglass would probably be coming home for a furlough at Christmas and that plans should be made to get in touch with Rosenberg in an effort to obtain more information from Greenglass.

In January 1945, Gold again met with Yakovlev, who told Gold about a man Yakovlev had tried to contact and found out that the man was under continuous surveillance. Yakovlev used this story to illustrate that it was better to give up the contact than endanger their work.

Early in December 1946, Gold received two tickets to a boxing match in New York through the mail. The tickets were addressed to Gold's Philadelphia home incorrectly and too late for Gold to keep the appointment. At 5 p.m. on December 26, 1946, Gold received a telephone call at his place of employment. The voice said "This is John." Gold then arranged with John to meet an unidentified man in a certain movie theater that night. The man identified himself by handing Gold the torn piece of paper containing the heading, which Gold and Yakovlev had previously prepared. Gold was requested by this man to proceed to 42nd Street and Third Avenue to meet Yakovlev.

Gold met Yakovlev, who asked if Gold had anything further from Fuchs, apologized for his 10-month absence, and explained that he had to lie low. He stated that he was glad Gold was working in New York and told Gold that he should begin planning for a mission to Paris, in March 1947, where Gold would meet a physicist. He gave Gold an onionskin paper setting forth information for his proposed meeting in Paris. During the conversation with Yakovlev, Gold mentioned the name of his employer, and upon hearing this, Yakovlev became very excited. He told Gold that he had ruined 11 years of work by working with this individual because the FBI had investigated him in 1945. Yakovlev rushed away stating that Gold would never see him again.

William Perl

William Perl, born in New York City in 1918, was a classmate of both Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell at college. He worked for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics at Langley Field, Virginia, and Cleveland, Ohio, after his graduation. It was learned that Sobell maintained close contact with Perl through correspondence after their college graduation.

Perl admitted that in July 1950, a girl he recognized to be a former girl friend of a close friend of his visited him in Cleveland. He said that she explained in writing that a stranger instructed her to proceed from New York City to Cleveland to deliver a message to an aeronautical engineer. She wrote out the instructions for him to leave the United States and flee to Mexico. She mentioned the name "Rosenberg." This girl was located, and an interview verified the above information and stated that Perl refused to accept the sum of \$2,000 that she offered to him.

Perl was called to testify before a Federal Grand Jury and denied that he had been acquainted and associated with Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell. He was found guilty on two counts of perjury concerning his denial of knowledge of Rosenberg and Sobell. On June 5, 1953, he was sentenced to serve five years on each count to run concurrently.

US Senator Joseph R. McCarthy⁹⁷

Joseph McCarthy was born to a middle-class Wisconsin farm family in 1908. He attended a one-room public school in his small hometown and left after completing the ninth grade. After starting a poultry business that failed after disease destroyed his animals, young McCarthy moved to a neighboring city to manage a grocery store. He was very successful at this venture, and his innovations in marketing in this small city attracted considerable attention. McCarthy was by now nearly 20 years old, and he realized his lack of formal education would hinder his future. McCarthy decided to return to school. Like everything he did, he did it with a vengeance, completing four years worth of credits in one year with a nearly straight A average. McCarthy then enrolled at Marquette University in Milwaukee, eventually finishing with a law degree. During his student days, he worked full-time and was a member of the college boxing team.

In 1935 at age 27, McCarthy hung out his shingle as a smalltown lawyer, but his real interest was politics. In 1936 he made his first run for public office, losing a race for circuit court judge. He tried again two years later, switching from the Democratic to the Republican Party and won. McCarthy's trademark style was an aggressive backslapping, baby kissing campaign in which he kept his opponent off balance with a barrage of charges and allegations, most of which were of dubious validity.

When war broke out in 1941, McCarthy, although exempt from military service as a sitting judge, volunteered for duty. He was commissioned in the Marine Corps and was sent to the South Pacific as an air intelligence officer. In 1944, McCarthy left active duty and ran unsuccessfully for the US Senate seat from Wisconsin. In 1946 he tried again, this time taking on Democrat "Young Bob" LaFollette, the son of legendary progressive Robert LaFollette, and defeated him in a remarkable upset.

McCarthy attracted little attention during his early years in the Senate. It was not until 1950 that his star rose and that was virtually overnight as a result of his Wheeling, West Virginia, speech in which he claimed to have in his possession a list of 205 Communists working in the State Department. That speech, delivered in February 1950, created an uproar, which over the next four years centered nationwide attention on Senator McCarthy. Realizing that he had an issue that captured the imagination of millions of Americans, McCarthy became the center of a nationwide drama played out on the floor of the US Senate.

As chair of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, McCarthy was positioned to exploit his newfound fame to the hilt. From 1950-54, McCarthy initiated a series of hearings in which he named persons and organizations as Soviet agents or spies. The basis of McCarthy's charges were his access to raw, frequently unevaluated investigative files from various federal agencies, including the FBI and Department of State security.

One of the most notorious and misused source documents used by McCarthy was the so-called Lee list. This was a 1946 State Department security study conducted by a former FBI agent named Robert Lee.

This document purported to list all known or suspected security risks in the State Department after several wartime agencies were absorbed into the Department at the close of the War. Undoubtedly there were disloyal persons named. However, many were apparently listed on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations or associations. The Lee list was the source of McCarthy's original claim that the State Department was harboring hundreds of Communists.

McCarthy had a staff of investigators who in the main received leaked information from federal agencies and the military. McCarthy actively encouraged such unofficial reporting by "patriotic" citizens. McCarthy himself did not reveal in his hearings the nature of his sources, leading many to believe that he had in fact uncovered new facts as a result of his staff's investigative activities.

Initially, McCarthy's efforts won a great deal of public support. From the late 1940s into the early 1950s Americans were battered by a series of spy scandals and revelations of Soviet and Communist penetrations into the US Government and society. That, coupled with Communist advances in Eastern Europe and China led to an anxiety on the part of millions of Americans that some kind of action needed to be taken to retake the offensive, and Senator McCarthy seemed to be at least one public official doing just that. Polls taken at the time reveal that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security.

However, McCarthy had enemies, and as time went on, and his sloppy shotgun methods splattered more targets, an active opposition to the Senator began to build. McCarthy finally overreached himself in 1953 and 1954. With a Republican war hero, General Dwight Eisenhower as President, McCarthy made the mistake of taking on the US Army.

McCarthy's staff had received from leakers specific allegations of poor security and the presence of "subversives" at various Army installations. One of these installations was Fort Monmouth, home of the US Army's Signal Corps. To add to that, a small scandal ensued when it was learned that an Army dentist, Dr. Irving Peress, refused to answer a standard loyalty question regarding membership in the CPUSA. Due to

bureaucratic inertia, Peress was promoted to major despite the flap over his alleged party membership. McCarthy was infuriated to learn of the promotion and planned hearings to excoriate the Army hierarchy on the issues of security at Fort Monmouth and Peress.

In the ensuing hearings, McCarthy subjected DoD officials and Army general officers to savage attacks in which he questioned their intelligence, patriotism, and fitness to wear the uniform. McCarthy's browbeating of defense officials turned those who should have been his allies against him. President Eisenhower was outraged at the treatment meted out by McCarthy to the military brass and finally moved to disassociate himself from the Senator's efforts.

The stage was now set for McCarthy's dramatic fall. Television, now becoming commonplace in American homes, was to be a factor. Hearings were scheduled, to be televised live, on the subject of the treatment of a former McCarthy staffer, David Schine, by the Army. The Army charged that McCarthy, through his staff, tried to influence Schine's conditions of service while he was stationed at Fort Dix, New Jersey. However, the real Army agenda was to expose McCarthy as a fraud and a bully before the nation through the television cameras.

The so-called Army-McCarthy hearings lasted for 36 days in 1954. During that time, the Army's general counsel, Robert Welch, clashed with McCarthy over several issues. McCarthy's usual tactics of bullying, insulting, and hectoring witnesses exposed for the first time to a wide live television audience, led to a tide of revulsion against him. Army counsel Welch expertly played a foil to McCarthy and at least once humiliated the Senator in debate over the alleged Communist past of a young attorney on Welch's staff. The actual results of the hearings were ambiguous except for one thing; McCarthy's reputation was virtually destroyed.

McCarthy's trajectory was straight down after the hearings. The following year, 1955, the Senate censured him for his actions over the previous four years. McCarthy, always a heavy drinker, responded by lapsing into alcoholism. In 1957, Joseph McCarthy died from complications of liver failure.

Without a doubt, most American security and CI officials would evaluate the result of McCarthy's efforts

in a highly negative light. No Soviet spy or penetration of the US Government was exposed, or any significant legitimate security or CI issue settled, or even raised, by either McCarthy's hearings or his "investigative" activities. For at least the next 20 years, McCarthy's excesses permitted opponents of security or CI efforts to dismiss all such initiatives as symptoms of "McCarthyism."

The point could be raised in McCarthy's defense that he was, along with the other legislative investigative committees such as the HUAC, exposing to public view elements of a national problem that had for too long been the exclusive domain of highly secretive government agencies. The judgement of contemporary historians, however, is clear. They condemn McCarthy as the 1950s version of a witch hunter, without any socially redeeming qualities. And historians always have the last word.

William August Fisher¹⁰⁰ 'Rudolph Ivanovich Abel'

William August Fisher, a.k.a. William Genrykhovich Fisher, was a KGB illegal who operated an espionage network out of New York City under the name of "Abel" and other aliases from the late 1940s until his arrest by the FBI in June 1957.

There are actually several biographies of Fisher. There is the true one that is based on available information



Rudolph Ivanovich Abel

developed from official documents and defectors' statements. There is also the KGB operational legend to which Fisher/ "Abel" tried to adhere at the time of his arrest, trial, and imprisonment. Finally, there is the laudatory version, which the KGB fostered after his return to the USSR, to glorify its exploits and one of its greatest heroes who operated under the name of "Rudolph Ivanovich Abel."

"Abel" was actually born William August Fisher on 11 July 1903 in Newcastle-on-Tyne, England. He was the son of Henry Matthew Fisher (a.k.a. Genrykh Matveyevich Fisher), born 9 April 1871 in Russia and Lubov Vasilyevna Fisher, born Gidova, circa 1881 in Russia. Fisher had an older brother, Henry Fisher, born 18 April 1902 at Newcastle-on-Tyne.

The senior Fisher was a Communist. He apparently had been active in workers' circles in St. Petersburg in the 1890s and knew Lenin. He immigrated into England around the turn of the century and settled in Newcastle-on-Tyne where he worked as a fitter, metalworker, and engineer. In 1914 the senior Fisher applied for and received British nationality.

During his years in England, the senior Fisher did come to the attention of the British Special Branch for suspected Leftist activity. In May 1920 the senior Fisher applied for British passports for himself and his family to return to Rybinsk, Yaroslavl Oblast, USSR to visit his own and his wife's relatives. In July 1920 the British issued him a passport, replacing one obtained in July 1914, and the family apparently left the United Kingdom shortly thereafter. After his return to the USSR, the elder Fisher joined the CPSU and worked on economic matters. A book entitled, *In Russian and In England, Observations and Reminiscences of a Petersburg Worker, 1890-1921*, by the senior Fisher, was published in Moscow in 1922.

In 1922, William August Fisher reported to the British Mission in Moscow that he had lost his passport and applied for a new one. He left the Moscow area for the North, however, before formalities were completed.

The Fishers then dropped out of sight for about 10 years in the postcivil war in Russia. Over the years, however, the story of William August Fisher's odyssey in espionage gradually emerges. Much of the biographic

data is based on a variety of sources, including defector and liaison reports, and much of it is fragmentary and incomplete. There is nevertheless a general outline revealing some of Fisher's activities over the years. Reports in KGB circles indicated that the Fishers had taken a longer name, something like "Shpigelglas" after their return to the USSR. There were rumors that the two Fisher sons, William August and Henry, both eventually worked for the KGB. There was another report indicating that William August Fisher had served in the Red Army during the 1920s and became a communications specialist. Then in 1930 there was a report that intercepted official documents from the Near East were translated at KGB Center in Moscow by a certain English Jew named Fisher, who was also in training at the time to go abroad as an illegal.

In April 1931, William August Fisher appeared at the British Consulate General in Moscow and applied for another passport. He claimed that he had trained as a draftsman in the United Kingdom and came to the USSR hoping to get work in shipbuilding. He found nothing in that line and therefore worked mainly as an electrician. It was noted that Fisher spoke English with an extreme North-country accent.

Fisher arrived in Oslo in August 1931 with his wife, Yelena Fisher, born Lebedeva, 29 September 1906 in Russia and their daughter Evelina, born 8 October 1929 in Russia. He stayed in Norway until January 1935, with occasional trips to Sweden and a voyage to England in February 1932. Reports indicate that during the time Fisher was in Norway he was suspected of running an illegal wire/telegraph station. While there, he was known as a first-class mechanic but he never had regular employment. He did a certain amount of work at home in repairs for a local radio agency and occasionally did some repair work for private individuals. During their Norwegian stay the Fishers lived mostly in rented private homes.

Fisher and his family left Norway in mid-January 1935, allegedly for the United Kingdom. The Norwegian Police refused Fisher permission to remain longer in Norway.

In August 1935, the Fishers arrived in Dover from Ostend. The family went on to London where they lived first in a hotel and then in a private home. In November 1935, Fisher went to Denmark for a week.

In May 1936, the Fishers left England for Denmark and again dropped out of sight. The family had apparently returned to the USSR. Reports from various sources over the years have referred to Fisher as a wireless operator for an illegal network in the United Kingdom in 1936, as an electrician who was working for the Kremlin in the mid-1930s, and as an intelligence instructor in the USSR during World War II.

In 1948, Fisher appeared in the West again. He traveled from LeHavre, France via Quebec, Canada, to New York as Andrew Kayotis, a US citizen of Lithuanian background, who was a bachelor and an electrician, in November 1948. He settled in New York City, frequently using the alias Emil H. Goldfus or Martin Collins. From the fall of 1948, he engaged in operational activity, mostly in the eastern part of the United States. In August or September 1954, he made his contact with his assistant Reino Hayhanen, to whom he was known as "Mark." In the summer of 1955, Fisher returned to the USSR for a vacation with his family. He came back to the United States shortly after 1956.

In June or July 1956, Fisher recontacted Hayhanen. The last operational meeting between them occurred in February 1957. Fisher ordered Hayhanen to return to the USSR because his assistant's performance was poor. Hayhanen sensed what was at stake, and he defected to CIA in Paris on 6 May 1957 while en route to Moscow. As a result of Hayhanen's defection and the information he supplied to US intelligence, the FBI arrested Fisher in Brooklyn on 21 June 1957. Apparently he was making preparations to leave the United States, probably for a return to Moscow. He admitted to being "Rudolph Ivanovich Abel." Fisher/"Abel" was tried for conspiring to transmit US defense secrets to the USSR, gathering such information, and failure to register with the US Government as a foreign agent. Fisher/"Abel" was fortunate in obtaining the services of James B. Donovan as his court-appointed defense counsel. Donovan represented Fisher/"Abel" well, both in court during the trial and afterwards. The trial lasted from mid-to-late October 1957. Fisher/"Abel" was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 30 years and fined \$3,000.

Fisher/"Abel" apparently did not reveal much during his interrogation, trial, and imprisonment. He claimed that he was born "Abel" on 2 July 1902 in Moscow. He

admitted to being a Soviet citizen and explained that the name “Abel” originally came from the German. The scanty information that he divulged or revealed to Hayhanen indicated that he had completed secondary school and then specialized in the electronics phase of engineering. He knew English, French, German, Russian, Polish, Yiddish, and Hebrew. He was also a skilled photographer and an artist. He reportedly joined the KGB in 1927. His wife and daughter had remained in the USSR during his long stay in the United States. Interestingly enough, several of his acquaintances in the New York area thought that he spoke English with a Scottish brogue or a New England “twang,” which would seem to indicate that Fisher/ “Abel” had never quite lost his English North-country Tyneside accent.

In 1961 and early 1962, Attorney Donovan became involved in negotiations with the Soviets regarding an exchange of Fisher/ “Abel” for the ill-fated U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, who was shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960. Finally, on 10 February 1962, Fisher/ “Abel” was released and exchanged for Powers on the Glienicke Bridge in Berlin.

After his return to the USSR, Fisher/ “Abel” reportedly served for a time as a KGB instructor. Then, in the middle 1960s, the KGB began a propaganda campaign to glorify the exploits of their dedicated officers. Konon Molody, in his book, *Spy: Twenty Years in the Soviet Secret Service*, boasted that he had served with Fisher/ “Abel” during World War II in a series of



Reino Hayhanen

daring operations behind enemy lines. Molody then went on to claim that he was Fisher/ “Abel’s” radio man in the United States during the late 1940s and early 1950s, during which time they successfully carried out a series of successful operations under the noses of the FBI. Fisher/ “Abel” himself contributed to the KGB frolic in self-praise. He was the hero in a number of articles, which appeared in the Soviet press regarding his success as a KGB officer abroad. He also made a number of public statements about his career and in general did his bit for the KGB image.

“Abel’s” death after “a grave illness” (probably lung cancer) was announced in the Soviet press on 16/17 November 1971. The *Tass* release praised the long and devoted service of this dedicated Chekist to the Soviet cause and the KGB. Interestingly enough his grave marker in a Moscow cemetery finally reveals a glimpse into his background. The marker refers to him as “Fisher, William Genrykhovich-Abel, Rudolf Ivanovich born July 11, 1903 and died November 15, 1971.” At last in death the truth emerged.

Fisher was perhaps typical of the turn-of-the-century Russian-Jewish immigration to the textile and industrial belt in the north of England (Tyneside, Cheetham Hill, Manchester). Only in this case the Fishers returned to the Soviet Union and one or perhaps both sons served the Soviet cause effectively and well, using their knowledge of Western languages and lifestyles.

Fisher/ “Abel’s” lawyer, James B. Donovan, presented an interesting study of this case in his book, *Strangers on a Bridge*, based on the diaries that he started to keep when he agreed to act as counsel for the defense in August 1957.

Reino Hayhanen

The key to the arrest of Abel was a 36-year-old lieutenant colonel of the KGB. Early in May 1957, he telephoned the US Embassy in Paris and subsequently arrived at the Embassy to be interviewed. To an Embassy official, the Russian espionage agent explained, “I’m an officer in the Soviet intelligence service. For the past five years, I have been operating in the United States. Now I need your help.”

This spy, Reino Hayhanen, stated that he had just been ordered to return to Moscow. After five years in the

United States, he dreaded the thought of going back to his Communist-ruled homeland. He wanted to defect.

Hayhanen was born near Leningrad on May 14, 1920. His parents were peasants. Despite his modest background, Hayhanen was an honor student and, in 1939, obtained the equivalent of a certificate to teach high school.

In September 1939, he was appointed to the primary school faculty in the village of Lipitzi. Two months later, however, the NKVD conscripted him. Since he had studied the Finnish language and was very proficient in its use, he was assigned as an interpreter to a NKVD group and sent to the combat zone to translate captured documents and interrogate prisoners during the Finnish-Soviet war.

With the end of this war in 1940, Hayhanen was assigned to check the loyalty and reliability of Soviet workers in Finland and to develop informants and sources of information in their midst. His primary objective was to identify anti-Soviet elements among the intelligentsia.

Hayhanen became a respected expert in Finnish intelligence matters and in May 1943, was accepted into membership in the Soviet Communist Party. Following World War II, he rose to the rank of senior operative authorized representative of the Segozerski district section of the NKGB and, with headquarters in the Village of Padani, set about the task of identifying dissident elements among the local citizens.

In the summer of 1948, Hayhanen was called to Moscow by the MGB. The Soviet intelligence service had a new assignment for Hayhanen, one which would require him to sever relations with his family, to study the English language, and to receive special training in photographing documents as well as to encode and decode messages.

While his Ministry of State Security (MGB) training continued, Hayhanen worked as a mechanic in the City of Valga, Estonia. Then, in the summer of 1949, he entered Finland as Eugene Nicolai Maki, an American-born laborer.

The real Eugene Nicolai Maki was born in Enaville, Idaho, on May 30, 1919. His mother also was American

born; but his father had immigrated into the United States from Finland in 1905. In the mid-1920s, Eugene Maki's parents became deeply depressed by glowing reports of conditions in "the new" Russia. They sold their belongings and left their Idaho farm for New York to book passages on a ship to Europe.

After leaving the United States, the Maki family settled in Estonia. From the outset, it was obvious that they had found no "Utopia" on the border of the Soviet Union. Letters that they wrote their former neighbors showed that Mr. and Mrs. Maki were very unhappy and sorely missed America.

As the years passed, memories of the Maki family gradually began to fade, and all but possibly two or three oldtime residents of Enaville, Idaho, forgot that there had ever been a Maki family in that area. In Moscow, however, plans were being made for a "new" Eugene Maki, one thoroughly ground in Soviet intelligence techniques, to enter the scene.

From July 1949 to October 1952, Hayhanen resided in Finland and established his identity as the American-born Eugene Maki. During this period, he was most cautious to avoid suspicion or attract attention to himself his Soviet superiors wanting him to become established as an ordinary, hard-working citizen. This false "build up," of course, was merely part of his preparation for a new espionage assignment.

While in Finland, Hayhanen met and married Hanna Kurikka. She was to join him in the United States on February 20, 1953, four months after his arrival here. Even his wife knew him only as Eugene Maki, so carefully did he cover his previous life.

On July 3, 1951, Hayhanen then living in Turku, Finland, visited the US Legation in Helsinki. He displayed his birth certificate from the State of Idaho, which showed that he was born in Enaville on May 30, 1919, and, in the presence of a Vice Consul, he executed an affidavit in which he explained that his family had left the United States in 1927: "I accompanied my mother to Estonia when I was eight years of age and resided with her until her death in 1941. I left Estonia for Finland in June 1943, and have resided there for the reason that I have no funds with which to pay my transportation to the United States.

One year later, July 28, 1952, a passport was issued to Hayhanen as Eugene Maki at Helsinki. Using this passport, he sailed October 16, 1952, from Southampton, England, aboard the Queen Mary and arrived at New York City on October 21, 1952.

Several weeks before he departed for America, Hayhanen was recalled to Moscow and introduced to a Soviet agent, "Mikhail," who was to serve as his espionage superior in this country. In order to establish contact with "Mikhail" in the United States, Hayhanen was instructed that after arriving in New York he should go to the Tavern on the Green in Central Park. Near the tavern, he was told, he would find a signpost marked "Horse Carts."

"You will let Mikhail know of your arrival by placing a red thumb tack in this signpost," a Soviet official told him. "If you suspect that you are under surveillance, place a white thumb tack on the board."

The information, which Hayhanen furnished to US officials in Paris, France, in May 1957, was immediately checked. There was no question of its accuracy. Accordingly, passage was secured for Hayhanen on an airliner, and he was permitted to return to the United States.

Following his arrival in New York on May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was given a thorough physical examination, suitable quarters were found for him, and arrangements were made for him to be interviewed by FBI agents.

From the fall of 1952 until early in 1954, he said, "Mikhail" served as his espionage superior in New York. They met only when necessary, the meeting place being the Prospect Park subway station. To exchange messages and intelligence data, they used "dead drops" in the New York area. One of the drops was an iron picket fence at the end of 7th Avenue near Macombs Bridge. Another was the base of a lamppost in Fort Tryon Park.

In one of the dead drops identified by Hayhanen, a hole in a set of cement steps in Prospect Park, FBI agents found a hollowed-out bolt. The bolt was about two inches long and one-fourth inch in diameter. It contained the following typewritten message:

"Nobody came to meeting either 8 or 9th...as I was advised he should. Why? Should he be inside or outside? Is time wrong? Place seems right. Please check."

The bolt was found on May 15, 1957. It had been placed in the dead drop about two years previously, but, by a trick of fate, a repair crew had filled the hole in the stairs with cement, entombing the bolt and the message it contained.

Questioned about the hollow bolt, Hayhanen said that the espionage apparatus that he served often used "trick" containers such as this. Among the items he had been supplied by the Soviets were hollow pens, pencils, screws, batteries, and coins; in some instances magnetized so they could adhere to metal objects.

The FBI wanted to identify "Mikhail," the Soviet with whom Hayhanen maintained contact from the fall of 1952 until early 1954, and "Mark," "Mikhail's" replacement. Hayhanen obtained the impression that "Mikhail" was a Soviet diplomat, possibly attached to the Embassy or the United Nations. He described "Mikhail" as probably between the ages of 40 and 50; medium build, long, thin nose, dark hair, and about five feet nine inches tall. This description was matched against the descriptions of Soviet representatives who had been in the United States between 1952 and 1954. From the long list of possible suspects, the most logical candidate appeared to be Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin.

Svirin had been in and out of the United States on several occasions between 1939 and 1956. From the latter part of August 1952, until April 1954, he had served as First Secretary of the Soviet United Nations delegation in New York.

On May 16, 1957 FBI agents showed a group of photographs to Hayhanen. The moment his eyes fell upon a picture of Svirin, Hayhanen straightened up in his chair and announced, "That's the one. There is absolutely no doubt about it. That's Mikhail." Unfortunately, Svirin had returned to Moscow.

The FBI turned its attention to "Mark." Hayhanen did not know where "Mark" lived or what name he was using. He did provide other details.

According to Hayhanen, “Mark” was a colonel in the Soviet State Security Service and had been engaged in espionage work since approximately 1927. He had come to the United States in 1948 or 1949, entering by illegally crossing the Canadian border.

In keeping with instructions contained in a message he received from Soviet officials, Hayhanen was met by “Mark” at a movie theater in Flushing, Long Island, during the late summer of 1954. As identification symbols, Hayhanen wore a blue and red striped tie and smoked a pipe.

After their introduction, Hayhanen and “Mark” held frequent meetings in Prospect Park, on crowded streets, and in other inconspicuous places in the area of greater New York. They also made several short trips together to Atlantic City, Philadelphia, Albany, Greenwich, and other communities in the eastern part of the United States.

“Mark” also sent Hayhanen on trips alone. For example, in 1954, Hayhanen was instructed to locate an American army sergeant, one formerly assigned to the US Embassy in Moscow. At the time he related this information to FBI agents in May 1957, Hayhanen could not remember the Army sergeant’s name. “I do recall, however, that we used the codename ‘Quebec’ in referring to him and that he was recruited for Soviet intelligence work while in Moscow.”

An intensive investigation was launched to identify and locate “Quebec.” In examining a hollow piece of steel from Hayhanen’s home, the FBI laboratory discovered a piece of microfilm less than one-inch square. The microfilm bore a typewritten message that identified “Quebec” as Army Sergeant Roy Rhodes and stated that Soviet agents had recruited him in January 1952. Full information concerning Rhodes’ involvement in Russian espionage was disseminated to the Army; and following a court-martial, he was sentenced to serve five years at hard labor.

Hayhanen described “Mark” as about 50 years old or possibly older; approximately five feet ten inches tall; thin gray hair; and medium build. The unidentified Soviet agent was an accomplished photographer, and Hayhanen recalled that on one occasion in 1955, “Mark” took him to a storage room where he kept photo supplies

on the fourth or fifth floor of a building located near Clark and Fulton Streets in Brooklyn.

The search for this storage room led FBI agents to a building at 252 Fulton Street. Among the tenants was one Emil R. Goldfus, a photographer who had operated a studio on the fifth floor since January 1954 and who also had formerly rented a fifth-floor storage room there.

In April 1957 (the same month Hayhanen boarded a ship for Europe under instructions to return to Moscow), Goldfus had told a few persons in the Fulton Street building that he was going South on a seven-month vacation. “It’s doctor’s orders,” he explained. “I have a sinus condition.”

Goldfus disappeared about April 26, 1957. Less than three weeks later, FBI agents arrived at 252 Fulton Street in quest of the mysterious “Mark.” Since Goldfus appeared to answer the description of Hayhanen’s espionage superior, surveillance was established near his photo studio.

On May 28, 1957, Agents observed a man resembling “Mark” on a bench in a park directly opposite the entrance to 252 Fulton Street. This man occasionally walked about the park; he appeared to be nervous and created the impression that he was looking for someone, possibly attempting to determine any unusual activity in the neighborhood. At 6:50 p.m., this man departed on foot, the Agents certain their presence had not been detected chose to wait rather than take a chance of trailing the wrong man. “If that’s ‘Mark,’ he’ll return,” they correctly surmised.

While the surveillance continued at 252 Fulton Street, other FBI agents made daily checks on the dead drops, which Hayhanen stated he and “Mark” used. The Agents’ long hours of patience were rewarded on the night of June 13, 1957. At 10:00 p.m., they saw the lights go on in Goldfus’s studio and observed a man moving in the room.

The lights went out at 11:52 p.m., and a man, who appeared to generally fit the description of “Mark” stepped into the darkness outside the building. This man was followed down Fulton Street to a nearby subway station. Moments later, FBI agents saw him take a subway to 28th street, and they stood by unnoticed

as he emerged from the subway and walked to the Hotel Latham on East 28th Street.

On June 15, a photograph of Goldfus, which the FBI took with a hidden camera, was shown to Hayhanen. “You found him,” the former Soviet agent exclaimed. “That’s ‘Mark.’”

Goldfus, registered at the Hotel Latham under the name of Martin Collins, was kept under surveillance from the night of June 13 until the morning of June 21, 1957. During this period, FBI agents discreetly tied together the loose ends of the investigation, matters which had to be resolved before he could be taken into custody.

Arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on an alien warrant, based upon his illegal entry into the United States and failure to register as an alien. “Mark” displayed a defiant attitude. He refused to cooperate in any manner.

Following his arrest, “Mark” was found to possess many false papers, including not one American birth certificate, but two. The first showed that he was Emil R. Goldfus, born August 2, 1902, in New York City. According to the second one, he was Martin Collins, born July 2, 1897, also in New York City. Investigation was to establish that the Emil Goldfus, whose birth certificate “Mark” displayed, had died in infancy. The certificate in the name of Collins was a forgery.

But during his career as a Soviet spy, “Mark” also had used many other names in addition to the ones cited above. For example, during the fall of 1948, while en route to the United States from the Soviet Union, he had adopted the identity of Andrew Kayotis. The real Kayotis, believed to have died in a Lithuanian hospital, was born in Lithuania on October 10, 1895. He had arrived in the United States in October 1916 and became a naturalized American citizen at Grand Rapids, Michigan, on December 30, 1930.

On July 15, 1947, Andrew Kayotis, then residing in Detroit, was issued a passport so that he could visit relatives in Europe. Investigation in Detroit disclosed that several persons there considered Kayotis to be in poor physical condition at the time of his departure from the United States. Letters subsequently received from him indicated that he was in a Lithuanian hospital.

When Kayotis’ friends in Michigan heard no more from him, they assumed that he had passed away.

Nearly 10 years later, “Mark” was to admit that he had used Kayotis’ passport during the fall of 1948 in booking passage abroad an ocean liner from LeHarve, France, to Canada. On November 14, 1948, he disembarked from the ship at Quebec and quickly dropped out of sight.

“Mark” made one final admission—that he was a Russian citizen, Rudolph Ivanovich Abel.

The Case of the Substitute Colonel

The following is an example of a “legal” operation concerning the actives of Maksim Grigorlevich Martynov, born 17 February 1915 at Leningradskaya Oblast, USSR, who held the rank of colonel in the Soviet Military Establishment.

In August 1954, a Soviet officer invited a US Army Colonel, whom he knew through official contacts, to lunch with him in East Berlin. The Soviet, who knew the American planned to retire from the Army, indicated he wanted to have a private conversation with him. On the designated date, the two met by prearrangement and drove to a house that was unoccupied. There they met a newcomer, dressed in civilian clothes. He acknowledged the introduction by saying, “Hello, Colonel, how are you?” in perfect English. This Soviet stated he had been in New York during the war and inferred that he had worked at Amtorg (The Soviet Government’s Purchasing Commission in the United States).

After the meal, the American colonel indicated that he must leave, but the Soviet officer insisted that he stay at least for a cup of coffee. The Soviet officer then left the room and was gone about 30 minutes. During his absence, the Soviet civilian talked about inconsequential things, then asked the colonel if he planned to live in Leavenworth, Kansas, (location of the Army Command and General Staff School) upon his return to the United States. The colonel replied that he did. (The colonel had not mentioned his place of retirement to the Soviet civilian, though he recalled he had previously mentioned it to another Soviet officer at an official function).

The Soviet civilian then asked, “colonel, if I come to the States, could I come and see you there”? The colonel’s reply was “Why certainly.” The Soviet then remarked that he was a man with a wife and child and wanted security for them. He asked the colonel if he would help him if he (the Soviet) came to the States, thereby implying that he might be seeking asylum or financial assistance by working as a double agent. Again the colonel replied that he would. The Soviet then made a chart of downtown Manhattan. He marked the northeast corner of 86th Street and Madison Avenue with a dot. The Soviet then asked if the colonel could come to New York, and the colonel replied that he might do so in the fall. The Soviet then indicated that if the colonel would come to the above mentioned spot he would meet him there in New York City at 4 p.m. on any of the following alternate dates: October 15, 25; or November 5, 15, or 25; January 1; February 1; or March 1.

The Soviet then contradicted his earlier comments by stating that although he himself would probably not meet the American in New York, someone would do so and would make the following statement, “Seems to me that I have met you at Spechstrasse, Colonel. What is the number of your house there?” The Soviet continued, “You should reply: “Oh yes, I have lived there at Spechstrasse 19.”

The Soviet then asked if the colonel could bring some books, pamphlets, and maps from the school in Leavenworth with him. The colonel replied that since he would be retired, he would have nothing to do with the Leavenworth school. The Soviet suggested that he could perhaps get some material anyhow. The American, now realizing that he was definitely being approached for espionage purposes, stalled by replying: “I’ll have to think it over.” The Soviet then asked the colonel if he needed any money, and he replied in the negative. With that, the colonel left the house and returned to West Berlin.

The American Army Colonel immediately reported this meeting and approach to appropriate authorities and indicated his willingness to cooperate in any way with the proper intelligence agencies in connection with any future meetings with the Soviet. Shortly thereafter, the colonel returned to the United States and full details were made available to the FBI. On October 15, 1954—

the first meeting date set by the Soviet civilian—FBI agents took inconspicuous positions near the intersection of 86th and Madison, in New York. At the same approximate time as the colonel’s appointment, these agents observed Soviet officers attached to the Soviet representation at the United Nations obviously looking over the contemplated rendezvous point. They seemed to be expecting another party to appear.

The FBI made arrangements to effect a meeting on the next scheduled date of October 25, 1954. Plans were made for a Special Agent of the FBI to act as a substitute for the Army Colonel and accordingly, a Bureau agent who came closest to resembling the colonel was selected for the assignment. The agent also had to familiarize himself to a considerable extent with the background of the colonel, his family, activities and whereabouts, the colonel’s previous assignments in Germany, and many other details that might be necessary to deceive the Soviets.

On October 25, the Special Agent posing as the Colonel arrived at the intersection. Two Soviet nationals were observed in the area closely scrutinizing the agent posing as the Colonel, but they made no attempt to contact him. Again on November 5, 1954, the Special Agent was present at the meeting place; however no Soviets were seen in the area.

On November 15, the Special Agent arrived at the designated intersection by taxicab. He noticed a man standing on the corner who was obviously watching him. He wore a dark blue overcoat, blue suit, and dark gray hat. For five minutes the stranger studied the Agent intensely, then after a series of passings by and general uninterested glances, he walked up to him and mumbled something. The substitute Colonel didn’t hear him and queried: “Pardon me?” The Soviet national then gave the prearranged code phrase: “Seems to me that I have met you at Spechstrasse colonel, what is the number of your house there?” The Agent replied: “Oh yes, I have lived there at Spechstrasse 19.” The Soviet then introduced himself as “Schultz” and suggested they go for a ride. The agent declined, suggesting a walk to Central Park instead. The Soviet accepted this proposal. “Schultz” was immediately recognized by FBI agents concealed in the area as one Martynov attached to the Soviet delegation at the UN.

As they walked, the “colonel” asked whether he would meet the Russian to whom he had been introduced in August in East Berlin. “Schultz” replied in the negative indicating that he was his friend and was carrying out the mission for him. The “colonel” then showed his identification card, which the Soviet examined.

Being unable to find an available bench upon their arrival in Central Park, the “colonel” and “Schultz” continued walking with the latter posing questions concerning Fort Leavenworth and the substitute colonel furnishing innocuous answers and unclassified data. The Soviet indicated he needed specific information about the Army school, which the “colonel” said he might be able to obtain. The Soviet then handed the “Colonel” 25 \$10 bills after commenting on his heavy expenses in coming to New York for this meeting.

“Schultz” asked the “colonel” to meet him again the same hour at 86th and Madison Avenue on 15 January 1955. If “Schultz” did not appear on that date, he requested the “colonel” to come on the 1st Saturday of each succeeding month for 4 months to a Fifth Avenue book store, the address of which he furnished.

“Schultz” then indicated that if he did not appear, another Soviet would take his place and would carry in his left hand a red and blue pencil, sharpened at both ends with a street guide of Manhattan and the Bronx in his right coat pocket. The type of greeting was also agreed upon.



Giuseppe E. Cascio

On 15 January 1955 “Schultz” himself was waiting at the appointed time and place when the substitute “colonel” arrived by taxicab and suggested they take a walk. When the “colonel” mentioned Central Park, “Schultz” refused and insisted on walking up Madison Avenue. They agreed to go to a hotel bar. As they walked along, the “colonel” told “Schultz” that he had been successful in getting some of the desired material and that he had it in his briefcase.

As the entered the bar, they sat down and the “colonel” placed the briefcase on the seat next to him. “Schultz” cautioned the “colonel” to speak in a low voice. The “colonel” then indicated he had in the briefcase all the material the Soviet desired. “Schultz” whispered, “I don’t like this place” and appeared extremely anxious to leave the bar and get possession of the briefcase.

At this point the “colonel” placed the briefcase on the table in front of him. This was the signal for the other Special agents secreted in the area to approach. As they identified themselves to “Schultz,” he appeared shaken but upon request displayed credentials identifying himself as Martynov, a member of the Soviet delegation to the UN. As such, he enjoyed diplomatic immunity. He was confronted with the knowledge of his act of espionage.

Martynov refused to talk further with the agents. He paid for the drinks, left the bar at 4:13 p.m., and proceeded by bus to the Soviet UN delegation headquarters. On 21 February 1955, Martynov was declared *persona non grata* and departed the United States on 25 February 1955.

Other Spies

Giuseppe E. Cascio

Giuseppe E. Cascio was a bombardier in World War II, who twice won the Distinguished Flying Cross. In 1952, Cascio was assigned to Korea as a photo laboratory technician and occasional photographer with the 9th Air Base Group. On 21 September 1952, the US Air Force staff sergeant was arrested following a 6-week investigation and charged with 16 counts of accepting military payment certificates from a Korean civilian. He tried to sell the classified flight test data about the

F-86E Sabre jet aircraft to North Korean Intelligence officers. The 9-year service veteran had obtained the classified information from US Air Force Sergeant John P. Jones.

Subsequent to his arrest, Cascio's wife revealed that her husband was "goofy at times." She is further quoted as saying, "That man is a psychopathic case and is not responsible for what he is doing." Additionally, the chief medical officer at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Houston, Texas stated that Sergeant Cascio had been diagnosed as "a dangerous paranoid."

On 8 June 1953, the 34-year-old Cascio was convicted by general court-martial and sentenced to 20 years at hard labor on charges of conspiracy to pass "secrets of the Sabre jet fighter to the Communists." Jones was not prosecuted because he suffered a nervous breakdown and was deemed incompetent to stand trial.

Jack Edward Dunlap

Jack Edward Dunlap was a high school dropout who served in the merchant marines for eight years before transferring to the US Army. On 23 April 1958, after 6 years of Army duty, including a combat tour in Korea, Dunlap was assigned to the National Security Agency (NSA). In June 1960, the married sergeant purchased a cabin cruiser for cash. Following this initial purchase, Dunlap, who also had a girlfriend, bought a hydroplane skimmer, joined a boat club, and bought two Cadillacs and a Jaguar automobile.

Although his lifestyle did attract some attention, it was not until Sergeant Dunlap sought to leave the military service and join NSA as a civilian that suspicions were aroused sufficiently to initiate an investigation into Dunlap's activities. The NSA routinely polygraphs civilian job applicants and as a result of these polygraph tests an intense investigation was conducted on Dunlap. Within days, in July 1963, the 38-year-old sergeant first class was found dead, an apparent suicide. Because his death occurred prior to questioning, or an admission of guilt, the exact nature and extent of his activities remain unknown.

Approximately one month following his death, Dunlap's widow discovered a cache of highly classified documents in their home. This discovery, along with additional investigations, confirmed that Dunlap had

been involved in espionage rather than petty thievery or other immoral conduct. It is believed that Dunlap volunteered his services to the Soviets by walking into the Soviet Embassy in Washington DC, on or before June 1960.

Dunlap's espionage activity is thought to have netted him between \$30,000 and \$40,000 during his first year of spying. It is suspected that Dunlap removed documents from NSA, turned them over to the Soviets for microfilming, and then returned the originals to the NSA. He had access to classified material including Central Intelligence Agency estimates concerning Soviet missile forces and locations and Soviet troop dispositions in Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany.

George H. French

On April 5, 1957, an individual attempted to personally deliver a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, by placing the letter in a newspaper and leaving it on the Embassy grounds. The newspaper was recovered by the FBI and was found to contain a note with information identifying a hotel room in New York City (room 1877, Hotel New Yorker); instructions on how to make contact with the individual; and an offer to commit espionage.¹⁰¹ The note included an offer to sell "valuable military information, including diagrams of weapons for \$27,500. A check of the hotel disclosed that Cap. George H. French, from Mount Vernon, New York, and a bombardier-navigator assigned



George H. French

to the 60th Bombardment Squadron, Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, was registered in the room described in the note.

Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and FBI agents, posing as Soviet intelligence officers, followed the instructions provided by French in the note and met him in his hotel room in New York City. Believing the AFOSI and FBI agents to be Soviet intelligence, French offered to sell classified drawings, but indicated that they were in Puerto Rico. The agents identified themselves and arrested French.

A search of his room revealed a key to a train station locker, and French led agents to the locker that contained classified notes and diagrams pertaining to special weapons research and development. The sketches and notes concerned special weapons fuse and control systems, along with circuit wiring diagrams of the weapons. A search of his residence in Puerto Rico disclosed 60 classified documents, which French had collected and intended to provide at a later date to Soviet intelligence.

French had served in both World War II and the Korean war and had received several decorations during a career to include the American Defense Service Medal and the Air Medal with five oak leaf clusters. In Europe, he flew 35 combat missions as a B-17 bombardier and navigator, and during the Korean war he flew five combat missions in B-29s.¹⁰²

His wife attributed her husband's espionage attempt to financial difficulties. He was supporting a family of five on \$803.38 a month.¹⁰³ Captain French was addicted to gambling and could not afford the stakes he lost. His gambling losses apparently resulted in a debt of over \$8,000 or almost one year of pay.¹⁰⁴

On September 20, 1957, after a five-month investigation, French pled guilty and was convicted of espionage at a court-martial. He received a life sentence; however, although the conviction was upheld, the sentence was reduced to 10 years.¹⁰⁵

Valentin Alekseyevich Gubichev

On March 1949, with the arrest in New York of Valentin Gubichev, a Soviet engineer employed by the United Nations and engaged in working on the

construction of the United Nations headquarters building, the FBI ended a lengthy search for an individual known to have been channeling to Moscow confidential investigative material originating in the Bureau itself. Arrested as coconspirator and the source of Gubichev's reports to Moscow was a US citizen, Judith Coplon, an employee in the Department of Justice's Foreign Agent's Registration Section.

At the time of his arrest, associates of Gubichev at the UN described him as a good man who did his work in the planning office and "worked both inside and outside," a statement which cannot be considered inaccurate.

Although Gubichev claimed diplomatic immunity, and diplomatic immunity was claimed for him by Soviet officials (despite the fact that he was not a Soviet but a UN employee), he faced indictment, conviction of espionage, and eventual expulsion (in preference to a 15-year prison sentence) as the holder of an expired diplomatic visa.

Upon the arrest of the pair, whom Miss Coplon described in her later testimony as trysting lovers, Miss Coplon's purse was found to contain secret lists taken from the files of the Justice Department and containing the names of counterespionage agents and also of Communists engaged in espionage in the United States.

Although the true origin and history of the Gubichev-Coplon association is unknown, the Soviets are believed to have selected Gubichev to be Miss Coplon's contact and handler under the belief that official Soviet personnel in the United States at the time were more liable to close scrutiny than would be a member of the United Nations group.

Gubichev did not testify during his trial, claiming the whole situation an "illegal" one, but nonetheless was convicted on both counts of conspiring (with Miss Coplon) and espionage.

The Soviet had originally come to the United States in 1946 as an engineer/architect and had reportedly previously worked in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prior to which he was a construction engineer. He was recommended by the Soviets to the United Nations as an engineer and as part of the Soviet quota

of employees on the United Nations headquarters project.

Following his conviction 10 March 1950, Gubichev departed the United States on the Polish ship *Batory*.

John P. Jones

On September 21, 1952, AFOSI apprehended Staff Sergeant John P. Jones, assigned to the Headquarters Squadron, Taegu, Korea, and a resident of Manchester, Massachusetts, for conspiring to “give intelligence to the enemy.” Apprehended along with Jones was Staff Sergeant Giuseppe E. Casio.

Jones provided classified information to Casio, which Casio in turn provided to a Korean national. Casio was tried and convicted, receiving a 20-year prison sentence. Jones was not charged and returned to the United States after a medical board declared him to be insane and incompetent to stand trial.

Hans Kessler

Hans Kessler, a West German businessman, was arrested for espionage. He was recruited in 1953 by the foreign intelligence component of Polish State Security (UB) when he went to East Berlin to seek new business. The UB officer who spotted and recruited him was stationed in East Berlin under the cover of the Polish Trade Delegation. Kessler agreed to provide the UB with information if the Poles would provide him with business. Meetings were held in East Berlin and Warsaw.

During 1957, Kessler told his UB case officer that he was able to deliver valuable information on the American bomber “HUSTLER” as well as actual parts of the bomber. The UB notified Soviet Intelligence (KGB) of this development, and the KGB showed considerable interest. Kessler claimed to be able to subvert an American friend as his source on the bomber and said he would bring this American with him to a meeting with the UB in East Berlin. The KGB asked the UB if one of their officers could attend this meeting, and the UB agreed. Later, Kessler said that he could not bring the American with him, but would come alone.

The meeting took place finally in May 1957, in a Polish safehouse in East Berlin. At this meeting Kessler stated that he would be willing to introduce his friend,

the American, to the Poles on the condition that he was paid his and the American’s expenses and a bonus of \$100,000 if it was possible to procure the necessary components of the “HUSTLER” bomber. The Soviets agreed to these demands despite their believing that the American was notional. During this meeting with the KGB officers in Berlin, Kessler mentioned that he had excellent contacts in Teheran, which he might be able to use to transship the necessary components of the “HUSTLER” bomber where he was able to procure them.

Further negotiations on this matter were carried on between the Russians and Kessler without Polish involvement. The Russians never discussed the outcome of this matter with the Poles, and it might be conjectured that the deal was actually consummated between Kessler and the KGB.

Kessler received a total of 10,000 West German marks from the Poles, as well as \$1000 for expenses from the KGB. He also made profitable business deals with Poland, arranged by the UB.

Kessler’s son, Hans, was also recruited by the UB, and Kessler was instrumental in arranging meetings between his technical advisor, Herbert Schweitzer, and the UB, which led to recruitment of Schweitzer. Kessler had excellent contacts in the West German munitions and chemical industries and would have been in a position to supply good information on them. He and his son ran Kesko GmbH and were well known for obtaining strategic materials for the Soviet bloc. An investigative procedure was brought against them in 1959 on charges of suspected treasonous contacts with Col. Eugeniusz Jajko (Z-II officer stationed at the Polish Military Mission, West Berlin) and Alexei Nikolayevich Ktorov, KGB officer stationed in Karlshorst.

The “American” mentioned was undoubtedly John Diess, German-born Canadian citizen who was arrested ca. March 1958, on charges of violating the US export laws, by shipping critical equipment to Kesko in Frankfurt. No mention was made of the “HUSTLER” in that account. However, in December 1959, there was a report from Vienna that a business contact had discovered in Kessler’s briefcase complete blueprints on the jet fighter “BLASTER” (probably garble for HUSTLER) and other information pertaining to West

German mine detectors. Soviet Air Force General Romanov of the Soviet Embassy, Vienna, was overheard telling Kessler that \$100,000 had been deposited for him in the Paris Bank du Nord.

The West German police again arrested the Kesslers. Kessler, Jr., was released for lack of evidence, but Kessler, Sr., was still in jail. Neither confessed.

Gustav Adolph Mueller

Gustav Adolph Muller was born in Rangoon, Burma, of an English mother and a Swiss father. His mother became a naturalized US citizen while Mueller was still less than 18 years of age. Mueller enlisted in the US Air Force in 1947 in St. Paul, Minnesota, after having attended the University of Minnesota.

Corporal Muller was assigned as a student in the European Command Intelligence School, Oberammergau, West Germany, when he sent a telegram to the Soviet Consulate in Bern, Switzerland. In the telegram, Mueller suggested that the Soviets would find it beneficial to contact him. Another student, who was with Mueller at the time he sent the telegram under the pseudonym John S. Watson, became suspicious and reported the incident to authorities.

On 7 October 1949, Mueller was arrested as he attempted to hand over two SECRET documents to the US Army investigators who were posing as his Soviet

contacts. Mueller admitted to having stolen the documents from the school library where he was a student. He claimed in his defense that he was attempting to entice the Soviets into thinking he would serve as their agent. He said that it was easy to steal classified material because Americans were so careless. He further claimed that he hated Communism and that he sent the telegram on a juvenile impulse to see what would happen.

The medical examination conducted on Mueller showed the 19-year-old to be immature and emotionally unstable. Mueller is believed to be the first US active-duty serviceman to have attempted to pass classified information to the Soviets following World War II.

On 15 April 1950, Mueller was found guilty of attempting to deliver US classified information to the Soviets. He was sentenced by court-martial to five years in prison, received a dishonorable discharge, and forfeited all pay and allowances.

Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr.

Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr. was born on 30 September 1914. He attended Loyola University in his hometown of New Orleans, Louisiana, and received a Master of Science degree from St. Louis University in 1938. Prior to his government employment, Petersen taught physics courses at Loyola and Ursuline College in New Orleans.

In 1941, Petersen began work as a DoD civilian in communications analysis. During World War II, he established a close liaison relationship with the Dutch military and regularly exchanged information with his Dutch contacts. His friendship with a Dutch expert cryptologist, Col. J. A. Verkuyll, resulted in an introduction to Giacomo Stuyt, an official of the Dutch Embassy in Washington, DC. Petersen gave Stuyt information on movements of North Korean intelligence personnel, documents dealing with a Chinese telegraphic code, and a Hagelin cryptographic machine. Petersen removed the classified documents from his office and provided them to Stuyt who made photocopies and returned the original copies to Petersen.

Petersen was arrested on 9 October 1954 and charged with three counts, including two counts of violating espionage statutes. Petersen's espionage activity may have been discovered as a result of a routine updating



Gustav Adolph Mueller

of his security clearances when it was determined he was corresponding with Verkuyl. The complaint issued against Petersen charged that he obtained classified documents for illegal purposes from March 1948 to 31 December 1952. He was allowed to plead guilty on the lesser of three counts in order to avoid the need to disclose classified information at a public trial. There appeared to be no rationale for Petersen's actions beyond that of friendship. The Dutch Embassy stated that it was under the impression that Petersen had been authorized to provide the information to the Dutch Government.

On 4 January 1955, Petersen was sentenced to seven years in prison because he "knowingly and willfully used in a manner prejudicial to the safety and interest of the United States classified information concerning communications intelligence activities of the United States and foreign governments."

Roy Adair Rhodes

In 1951, US Army Master Sergeant Roy Adair Rhodes was assigned as a mechanic in the US Embassy garage, Moscow, USSR. Rhodes was on an unaccompanied tour, having left his wife and daughter in the United States.

In December 1951, Rhodes participated in a drinking party with his two Russian mechanics and two Russian girls. He awakened the next day in the presence of one of the girls and was subsequently accosted in the street by the other girl, her brother, and another man. Rhodes was then blackmailed into revealing information about himself to include his earlier training in code work. He also related information concerning the habits of other US personnel assigned to the US Embassy in Moscow. In return for the information he provided, Rhodes was paid between \$2,500 and \$3,000 in five or six payments.

Following his transfer from the USSR to the United States, Rhodes never tried to recontact the Soviets. His espionage activities in Moscow were not discovered until 1957 when Reino Hayhanen, a defector and confessed former Soviet spy, testified that he had been ordered to locate Sergeant Rhodes.

On 21 February 1958, Sergeant Rhodes was convicted by court-martial for conspiracy to spy for the USSR and falsifying a loyalty certificate. He was sentenced

to five years in prison, received a dishonorable discharge, and forfeited all pay and allowances.

James Sattler

James Sattler was a well-known scholar and consultant to a private foreign policy study foundation. As such, he had access to US Department of State and Defense Department officials. In 1967 he was recruited by the East German Ministry of State Security and trained in microphotography.

He reported on US foreign policy via a witting letterdrop in West Germany until the FBI confronted him. In 1975 he confessed to his spying activities. He did not have access to classified documents; however, the insights he provided to the East Germans were undoubtedly useful.

Otto Verber

Otto Verber and Kurt Leopold Ponger, both born in Vienna, Austria, became naturalized US citizens in 1943. Verber served in the US Army during World War II and was commissioned as a second lieutenant on 8 December 1944. He served as a military intelligence officer until 8 February 1945 and later as a civilian interrogator for the War Crimes Commission that conducted the trials of German war criminals at Nuremberg, Germany. Ponger joined the US Army on 11 June 1943 and subsequently was also employed as a civilian by the War Crimes Commission. Ponger married Verber's sister, and, in 1948, both men went to Vienna, where they were registered as correspondents for the Central European Press Agency. They also had attended school in Vienna under the GI Bill.

In 1949, a US Government employee in Vienna reported to US military intelligence that Verber had approached him for espionage purposes. US Army intelligence kept a 4-year watch on the activities of the two until they were arrested in Vienna on 14 January 1953 and returned to the U.S. for trial. Verber and Ponger, both married, were 31 and 49 years old, respectively, at the time of their arrest. The 14-count indictment against the brothers-in-law listed specific acts of conspiracy dating from mid-June 1949 until 4 January 1951. Named in the conspiracy charges was Yuri V. Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, DC. Ponger and Verber were

specifically charged with attempting "... to violate the espionage statutes by obtaining information relating to the intelligence and counterintelligence work of the US Army and Air Force, and data relating to aircraft, defense works, and other military installations and operations."

Motivations, not specifically mentioned, were alluded to by their attorney who claimed that the two had turned to Communism after Hitler's invasion of Austria.

In April 1953, both men pleaded guilty to several counts of the indictment and were sentenced in June; Verber from 3¹/₃ to 10 years in prison and Ponger from 5 to 10 years in prison. In 1957, it was reported that a Federal judge revoked Ponger's citizenship and directed that Ponger be deported upon his release from prison.

Sybillie Wambach

A defector from the principal East German foreign espionage organization, Central Intelligence Administration (HVA) reported on an operation directed against the American Consulate General in Munich and the American Embassy in Bonn from East Berlin.

Early in 1957 this defector was given a lead to a possible agent by one Kotek, a staff officer of the East German intelligence service. Kotek had recruited one Sybillie Wambach, a kindergarten teacher in Spindlersfeld, to work against West German visitors to East German Mass Organizations (i.e., Free German Youth (FDJ)), but she had been unsuccessful in that assignment. Checks showed that Wambach was a loyal Socialist Unity Party (SED) member, and she was contacted and recruited for the East German intelligence service after a meeting with an officer of that service in a Spindlersfeld restaurant. She agreed to move to West Germany and eventually emigrated to the United States.

Until late in the summer of 1957, Wambach went once a week to a clandestine meeting place where she was trained in tradecraft, cover, surveillance, and communications and was briefed on West German security organizations. Her communications training included secret writing, microdots, and cryptography.

In September 1957, she was sent to Tuebingen, West Germany to live with her aunt and uncle, the latter, a philosophy professor at the University of Tuebingen, for a period long enough to acquire West German

documentation and find a job as a domestic servant in an American home in the Munich area. By October, Wambach had found work in the home of a USAF major. She remained there until July 1958, when the officer was transferred to the States; she then returned to East Berlin for a meeting with her East German superiors.

At this meeting she reported on the morale of the American troops in the Munich area, training exercises she had seen or heard about, and the preparedness of the 7th Army. All reports were based on her observations. Wambach also gave the East German service a one-page list of the telephone numbers of her employer's unit. After the meeting in Berlin, Wambach returned to Munich and found employment at the home of another USAF officer, who was assigned to the same unit as her former employer. She was given the additional assignment of spotting and assessing other maids in American households for possible recruitment.

In spring 1958, at the time of the Lebanon crisis, she reported that paratroops had been alerted and the 7th Army was on an alert basis. This information was highly prized by the HVA and was passed immediately to the Soviets.

After her employer was transferred in December 1958, Wambach again met with the East German officer in East Berlin, this time reporting that she had found a new job with an unidentified Department of Army civilian in Munich, who was in the habit of bringing home work from the office and holding political discussions with his friends in his home. The East German Service trained Wambach to use a Minox camera and instructed her in the photographing of documents and how to reconnoiter the house of her employer for the possible installation of a microphone.

Before Wambach reported on the above mission, Horst Jaennicke, Chief of Department 3 of the HVA, decided to turn her over to the branch of the HVA that had as its major target the American Consulate General in Munich. Jaennicke was so impressed by Wambach's intelligence and her experience with children that he was certain she would have no problem finding a job with a family in the Consulate.

In the spring of 1959, Wambach was turned over to Gotthard Schramm, an officer of the HVA branch working the American Embassy in Bonn, and moved to Bonn. Between 1959 and 1961, Wambach was employed by several Americans in Bonn, including two officials in the American Embassy.

In June 1961, she received a telephone message that her mother, who lives in East Germany, was very ill and that she should come home immediately. She departed immediately.

Subsequently, Wambach telephoned and said that she was obliged to remain in Berlin because her mother had had a severe heart attack, but that she planned to return in a few days. Her employer received a second call from Wambach stating that she would not be able to return as expected.

Wambach telephoned a third time to apologize for her delayed return, and when her employer offered to forward her mail, she said this was not necessary since she would be returning soon.

A fourth telephone call was received from an unidentified female who asked for Wambach. When the caller was told that Wambach was not available, she requested that Wambach be told she was urgently

expected. An attempt was made to obtain more details as to where Wambach was expected but the caller hung up.

The Soble Spy Ring

Jacob Albam

On August 9, 1957 Albam, like Mrs. Soble, was sentenced to five and a half years in prison after pleading guilty to, and being convicted of espionage in behalf of the Soviet Union as a member of the Soble spy ring.

On October 8, 1957, the sentences of Mrs. Soble and Albam were reduced, respectively, to four and five years. In lightening the sentences, the judge stated that he was taking into account the remorse of both people for what they had done and the valuable assistance they had given to the US Government since their arrest.

Jack Soble

On October 8, 1957, Soble was sentenced to seven years in prison after pleading guilty in his trial to spying for the Soviet Union.

A Lithuanian refugee who had come to the United States in 1941 and used a brush importing business as a cover for his activities as head of a Soviet spy ring, Soble was arrested in 1957 under an indictment, which might have brought the death penalty had he been convicted under it.

Soble at first claimed innocence but later had a change of heart, expressed remorse for what he had done, and cooperated with the US Government by giving it further information on Soviet espionage activities in the United States. At the time of his trial, he pleaded guilty to the second count of his indictment, conspiring to obtain information vital to the United States while knowing that it would be turned over to the Soviet Union. As a result, the first count of the indictment, which charged him with actually transmitting defense secrets to Moscow and carried a possible death penalty, was dropped. The chief government witness against Soble was US counterspy Boris Morros.

Myra Soble

On August 9, 1957, Myra Soble, wife of Jack, was sentenced to five and a half years in prison after pleading guilty, with him, to charges of espionage.



Jack Soble



Myra Soble

Mr. and Mrs. George M. Zlatovski

On July 8, 1957, the Zlatovskis were indicted as members of the global Soviet spy ring run by Soble. In all, 38 overt acts of espionage were charged against them. The indictment stated that they had been members of the Soble spy ring as early as 1945, that they had turned over information to Boris Morros, and that Soble had paid them for their work with funds supplied by the Soviet Union.

Zlatovski was a Russian-born engineer and a former US Army intelligence officer, who had left military service in 1948. His wife, the former Jane Foster, was an artist and an 11th-generation American, a former employee of the Office of Strategic Services, and the daughter of a prominent San Francisco family.

At the time of indictment, the Zlatovskis were in Paris where they had lived since 1949. They denied the charges made against them in the indictment, but refused to return to the United States to face trial.

One of the important elements in the Zlatovski case was that in 1955, when Mrs. Zlatovski's passport expired, Secretary of State Allen Dulles tried to have its renewal blocked on the basis of information concerning Communist activities on her part over a



Jane Zlatovski, a former employee of the OSS and the daughter of a prominent San Francisco family.

George M. Zlatovski, a Russian-born engineer and a former US Army intelligence officer.



period of years up to and including 1948. She then sued for renewal of her passport, and Judge Burnita S. Matthews of the Federal district court in Washington, DC, ruled that the State Department had to renew her passport unless it could present more recent and damaging evidence against her.

Faced with the choice of revealing information that would have led to the disclosure of Boris Morros to the Soviets as a counterspy for the United States or renewing Mrs. Zlatovski's passport, the State Department took the latter course as the lesser of two evils. Mrs. Zlatovski was thus able to evade trial for the acts she had committed against her country in behalf of the international Communist conspiracy.

Mr. and Mrs. Alfred K. Stern

On June 16, 1958, a Federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Stern, which could have brought them the death penalty, if they were ever brought to trial. They were charged with being members of the Soviet spy ring that included Boris Morros and Vassili Zubilin, former second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

The Sterns had been subpoenaed on March 14, 1958, to appear before the same grand jury that indicted the Sobles, Albam, and the Zlatovskis. Both were in Mexico at the time, having moved there in 1953. Following their refusal to appear before the grand jury, they were convicted of contempt and fined \$25,000 cash.

Early in July 1958, they left Mexico City by plane for Zurich, renounced their US citizenship, and took refuge behind the Iron Curtain. Like the Zlatovskis, Mr. and Mrs. Stern had both been very active in Communist fronts in earlier years. Stern was a wealthy New York investment broker. In their contempt trial, the government prosecutor claimed that they were worth \$1,250,000, that they had an annual income of \$50,000 from securities, and that in February and March of 1957, they had liquidated in the United States securities worth \$532,000 and also sold a large estate in Ridgefield, Connecticut. Mrs. Stern, the former Martha Dodd, was the daughter of US Ambassador, William Dodd, to Germany in the 1930s.

Boris Morros revealed that it was Mrs. Stern who placed him under suspicion with his Soviet espionage

bosses—and thus endangered his life—by writing a report to Moscow saying that she suspected his loyalty to the Soviet Union.

On September 9, 1957, the Sterns were indicted in absentia on espionage charges. The indictment charged them with conspiring to act as Soviet agents; receiving American military, commercial, and industrial information; and transmitting it to the Soviet Union. In 1979 the charges against them were dropped when the Department of Justice said witnesses considered crucial to the case had died.

From Mexico, they went to Prague, Czechoslovakia, and then to Moscow, where they resided for a year. In 1958 they returned to Prague where they lived until 1963, when they went to Cuba and lived there until 1970 before returning to Prague. In June 1986, Alfred Stern died of cancer.

Mark Zborowski

On November 20, 1958, Zborowski, a Russian-born anthropologist and former Harvard research assistant, was convicted of perjury in denying to a Federal grand jury investigating espionage that he had known Jack Soble.

Zborowski had come to the United States as a refugee in 1941. He had admitted that he had been an agent of the Soviet secret police in France in the early 1930s and that he had infiltrated the Trotskyite movement there to report to Moscow on its activities. He denied, however, that he had ever committed espionage while in the United States.

Jack Soble testified in the trial of Zborowski that he had met him 40 to 50 times and that Zborowski had given him information for transmission to the Soviet Union.

On December 8, 1958, Zborowski was sentenced to five years in prison, the maximum penalty for perjury.

Defectors

Yuriy Aleksandrovich Rastvorov

Yuriy Aleksandrovich Rastvorov, born 11 July 1921, Dmitriyev, Kurskaya Oblast, USSR, is a former Soviet

State Security officer who defected to the West in 1954 while stationed in Japan.

Rastvorov's father was a colonel in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) who retired at the end of World War II. His mother was a physician who died in 1946. As a youth, Rastvorov was a member of the Young Pioneers and then the Komsomol.

After completing his secondary education, Rastvorov was drafted into the Soviet Army in 1939. Initially he was an enlisted man in the First Proletarian Division that participated in the occupation of Latvia and Lithuania. In December 1940 he was assigned to study Japanese at the Far Eastern Language Institute in Moscow. At that institute he automatically became a member of Soviet Military Intelligence (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense-GRU), and in 1941 he was commissioned as a junior lieutenant while serving on temporary duty in Mongolia. After graduating from this institute in March 1943 he was transferred to Soviet State Security (then the People's Commissariat of State Security-NKGB) and assigned to the Far East where he was involved in deciphering Japanese, British and German codes. In 1944 he was assigned to the Soviet State Security Intelligence School in Moscow. Upon completion of this school in 1946, he was assigned to the Soviet Mission in Tokyo under Foreign Ministry cover as an interpreter/translator.

In 1946, Rastvorov was recalled to the Soviet Union for security reasons primarily concerning his grandfather whom he had failed to identify as a kulak on his personal history statement. After successfully defending himself, he was assigned to the Japanese section of State Security in Moscow. A year later he became a member of the Communist Party, and in 1950 he was assigned to Japan as the senior political advisor at the Soviet Mission. His wife and daughter remained in Moscow because he believed that his assignment to Japan could be jeopardized if he attempted to obtain the necessary security clearances on them. At that time he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Soviet State Security (then the Ministry of Internal Affairs-MVD).

In January 1954, Rastvorov received a cable again recalling him to Moscow. He believed that this recall might have been in connection with the purge of Lavrenti

Beria and others in the intelligence community that was in progress at that time. He therefore questioned whether he too might not be in serious difficulty. After initially attempting to defect to the British in Tokyo, he sought out an officer of American Intelligence and defected to him on 24 January 1954. At that time he was a lieutenant colonel in Soviet State Security.

The debriefing of Rastvorov began in February 1954, soon after his arrival in the United States and continued for several years. He proved to have extensive information on the organization and personnel of the Soviet intelligence services, on active Soviet penetration of the Japanese Government, and on Soviet operations aimed at Americans in Japan. In all, he produced over 1,000 positive and operational intelligence reports, including the identification of about 600 Soviet intelligence officers and agents. The information that he provided was considered to be very important and useful.

Rastvorov also participated in operational activities and suggestions for covert action programs. He met with representatives of several US and foreign liaison services and he appeared as a witness before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. He lectured at the Naval Intelligence School and at the Counterintelligence Corps School at Fort Holabird. Finally, he published a number of articles on Soviet intelligence in *Life* magazine.

Beginning in 1957, efforts were made to resettle Rastvorov, and he became involved in several unsuccessful business ventures. In 1960 he obtained US citizenship. Three years later he resumed work for American Intelligence as an analyst and consultant primarily in the counterintelligence field. Since that date he was employed to prepare analyses of selected Soviet cases and to provide photo identifications of Soviet intelligence personnel.

According to the KGB *Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Service, Defectors, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of Punitive Units and Other Criminals Under Search Warrant* published in 1969, Rastvorov was sentenced to death in absentia in September 1954 by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court.

Ivan Vasilyevich Ovchinnikov

Ivan Vasilyevich Ovchinnikov (born 28 January 1929, Selo Tochilnoye, Smolenskiy Rayon, Altayskiy Kray USSR) was a GRU officer who defected to the West in Berlin in December 1955. Three years later he redefected to the Soviets in Germany.

Ovchinnikov, the son of Siberian peasants, joined the Komsomol in 1944. That same year he also entered the Soviet Army. During his army service, he attended the Military Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow from September 1949 to September 1954 and later served as a military translator with the rank of lieutenant in the 28th Special Purpose (Intercept) regiment in Stahnsdorf, East Germany.

On the night of 4 December 1955, Ovchinnikov made his move to defect to the West. While trying to cross the border between the American sector of West Berlin and the Soviet zone of Germany on foot, he became lost several times. However, he finally succeeded in riding an electric train across to the American sector. Once there, he contacted the police who turned him over to US Intelligence.

Ovchinnikov professed hatred for the Soviet regime, which he claimed had imprisoned his father for 13 years and, in effect, killed him. Ovchinnikov also stated that he had deep affection for his wife and son whom he had left behind in his flight.

At the time of this defection, Ovchinnikov seemed to be an almost fanatical anti-Communist who had defected for ideological reasons. On the other hand, there were various discrepancies in his story. His professed motivation did not appear wholly genuine to some US intelligence officials who interviewed him at length. Furthermore, his statements about his family ties were puzzling because he had scarcely known his father, and there were indications that he was not truly deeply attached to his wife.

Ovchinnikov, however, was cooperative during his debriefings by US Intelligence. He provided useful information on the Soviet military and Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG); GRU intercept operations and activities; and the mission of the KGB signal battalion in Stahnsdorf, which monitored official radio traffic

of the Allied military and foreign diplomatic transmissions. Ovchinnikov also had access to Soviet intelligence bulletins and publications.

The defection of Ovchinnikov to the West precipitated a series of reactions by the KGB and GSFG components. KGB Third (Military Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate units investigated the case with the cooperation of the Soviet garrison in Berlin; GSFG GRU Headquarters, to which unit Ovchinnikov was subordinated; and the East German Volkspolizei.

In February 1957 Ovchinnikov was reinterviewed by US Intelligence and admitted that he defected because he believed opportunities for personal advancement were better in the West. He confessed that in order to gain acceptance and approval in the West, he felt he must appear to have an ideological motivation. His statements about his family ties, he claimed, were deliberately misleading.

After his redebriefing Ovchinnikov associated with various Russian émigré groups in West Germany. In December 1957 he joined Radio Liberty. He also became active in a small circle of émigrés that had a markedly anti-American, anti-Masonic, anti-Semitic, and pro Great Russian bias. Shortly thereafter he began to undermine the morale of other Radio Liberty personnel through constant office intrigues.

In August 1958, Ovchinnikov contacted the Soviet Embassy in Bonn to discuss repatriation. He redefected in East Germany two months later. During a "Return to the Homeland" radio broadcast on 31 October 1958, he confessed the folly of his ways.

Ovchinnikov, a highly unstable person, was often subject to fits of depression. His period of defection was characterized as one of strong enthusiasm and unrealized expectations followed by disappointments, which lead to denunciations of people and activities familiar to him.

According to a mid-1974 report, one Ivan Vasilyevich Ovchinnikov had become editor of *Veche*, a samizdat publication in the USSR. This new editor was reportedly of peasant stock and born in 1929. He allegedly had spent 10 years in a political concentration camp. It is probable that the editor of this magazine, which has an

anti-Semitic and chauvinistic Great Russian bias, was identical with the defector.

Ismail Gusseyonovich Akhmedov

Ismail Gusseyonovich Akhmedov, born 17 June 1904, Orak, Orenburg Oblast (now Chkalov), Russia, was a GRU officer with the rank of colonel and one of the early Soviet defectors.

Akhmedov was the eldest of several children of a Tartar schoolteacher and Moslem mullah. He received his early education first in a Koranic school and then in a Russian school. During the confusion of the post Revolution and Civil War era, Akhmedov, who had joined both the Komsomol and the Communist Party, held various jobs in Central Asia. From 1925 until 1929, he attended the Leningrad Military School of Signal Communications from which he graduated as a junior lieutenant in the Red Army Signals Corps. He went to various Red Army communications schools and advanced in rank to major in the 1930s. While a language student in Tiflis in 1930, he met and married Tamara Yefimovna Perskaya. Although of Georgian-Jewish ancestry, Tamara was born in Germany and had a western outlook on life.

In 1940 after graduation from the General Staff Academy, Akhmedov joined the GRU and soon was named chief of the Technical Intelligence Section. A year later he was posted to Berlin using the alias Georgiy Petrovich Nikolayev and under the cover of assistant chief of *Tass*. After the German invasion of the USSR, the Germans interned Akhmedov. In July 1941, he was released and dispatched by train to the USSR via neutral Turkey. Akhmedov learned on arrival in Istanbul that the GRU had ordered him to remain there as a Soviet Embassy Press Attaché and organize an intelligence network to work against Germany.

While in Turkey, Akhmedov learned that his wife had died in the USSR in the fall of 1941. In June 1942, Akhmedov received orders to return to Moscow. Fearing that he would be arrested if he went home, he defected 3 June 1942, to the Turks, who accepted him as a political refugee and allowed him to change his name to Ismail Ege.

During World War II, Akhmedov tried unsuccessfully to contact US Intelligence. His failure to make contact

was at least partly due to a KGB inspired story that he was a German agent. Finally in 1948, US Intelligence contacted him and began to use him operationally.

However, in 1951, it was discovered that the KGB was trying to ascertain Akhmedov's location in Turkey. US Intelligence then decided, for security reasons, to move him to Germany where he served as an interpreter. (It may be significant that the British SIS representative in Istanbul who debriefed Akhmedov after World War II in conjunction with US Intelligence personnel was Kim Philby.) Akhmedov subsequently moved to the United States where he testified before Congressional committees and remained available to US Intelligence for debriefing on the Soviet intelligence services.

Akhmedov provided information on GRU scientific and technical operations in the United States during World War II, Soviet activities in Turkey in World War II, and Soviet communications school and research institutes prior to World War II. He also provided material on the GRU's modus operandi and aided in the compilation of a glossary of terms used in the KGB and GRU.

According to the *Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of Punitive Units and Other Criminals Under Search Warrant* published in 1969, Akhmedov was condemned to death in August 1958 by the Military Collegium of the Supreme court of the USSR.

During Akhmedov's career, he used the following aliases: Georgiy Petrovich Nikolayev, Ismail Ege, Roger N. Witthof, and Hans Zuayter.

Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Granovskiy

Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Granovskiy, born 25 January 1922 or 25 June 1922, Chernigov, USSR, was a KGB agent who defected to the West in Sweden after World War II.

Granovskiy was recruited by the Soviet State Security service during World War II. He served as a partisan and a counterintelligence agent principally in the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. He was demobilized at the end of the war and entered the Soviet maritime service. As a sailor aboard a Soviet ship, he defected in Sweden on 21 September 1946, thus becoming one of the first important post-World War II Soviet defectors.

Granovskiy's defection occurred at the very time that Swedish authorities were forcibly repatriating scores of Baltic refugees who had fled to Sweden when the USSR invaded and annexed their homelands. Also, the Swedish cabinet was involved in delicate commercial negotiations with the USSR when it received Granovskiy's request for asylum. Despite these factors, the request was granted.

US intelligence subsequently debriefed Granovskiy and from 1946 to 1947 he worked as a US Army translator in West Germany. He immigrated into Bolivia in October 1947 and in April 1948, he entered Brazil illegally. Later he was employed by Brazilian intelligence as a consultant. He also wrote for the press exposing the brutalities of the Soviet regime and the KGB. In 1955 he published his autobiography, *All Pity Choke*, (London, William Kimber & Co., Ltd).

Through his writings, Granovskiy attracted the attention of several prominent and influential Americans, principally Charles Edison, former Governor of New Jersey, who assisted him in settling in the United States in 1958. Supported by his friends, Granovskiy continued his efforts to publicize the plight of the Soviet people and the inhumanity of the regime. He appeared on several TV shows and had his book republished in the United States in 1962 under the title *I Was An NKVD Agent*, (New York, Devin-Adair Company). After settling in the United States, he again worked as a consultant for US Intelligence. He died of heart and lung disease complications during the night of 4 September 1974 at his home in the Washington, DC area.

Granovskiy used the following aliases during his career: Mikhail Jan Kulovic, Mikhail Vanov, Gheorge Alex Filipas, Gradov and Shishkia.

Petr Sergeyeovich Deryabin

Petr Sergeyeovich Deryabin, born 1921, Lokot, Siberia, USSR, was a Soviet State Security officer who defected to the West in 1954, while stationed in Vienna.

Deryabin's peasant family was forced into a collective farm while he was quite young. At the age of nine he joined the Pioneers and the Komsomol at age 15. After graduating from secondary school in 1936, he completed a two-year course at a Teacher's Institute

and then taught history until he was drafted into the Red Army in the fall of 1939. In the Army he became a political instructor and was commissioned. He participated in a number of battles, including Stalingrad, and was wounded four times.

In mid-1944, Deryabin transferred from line duty to military counterintelligence (Chief Directorate for Counterintelligence Ministry of State Security-GUKR/MGB). Later he worked as a senior case officer for State Security in Barnaul, the capital of Altay province. Following this assignment, he served for four years in the Guards directorate (Okhrana) of State Security where his duties included conducting security investigations of directorate personnel. This directorate was responsible for guarding high-level Soviet officials. After the Guards Directorate experienced a personnel cutback in the summer of 1951, Deryabin moved to the Foreign Intelligence directorate and was assigned to the Austro-German Section of the directorate. In the fall of 1953, he was posted to the Soviet Embassy in Vienna, Austria, as a major in the MVD running counterespionage agents and checking on other Soviet nationals in Austria. In February 1954, he defected.

A major factor in bringing about Deryabin's defection was his disillusionment with the difference between Soviet theory and reality, especially the corruption and ruthless power struggle among the Soviet elite. In

addition, he was dissatisfied with his work and worried about his future career. The final impetus to his defection, however, was provided by the infidelity of his second wife.

Deryabin was brought to the United States in 1954 and obtained citizenship in 1960. After his defection he was employed by US Intelligence as a contract agent and later as a career agent.

The operational debriefing of Deryabin produced a vast amount of information on Soviet State Security organization and personalities. He had been used extensively as an operational consultant and planner, as an instructor in training courses, and as a lecturer. In addition, he published four books: *The Secret World; Watchdogs of Terror; The KGB: Masters of the Soviet Union (with T.H. Bagley)*, and *The Spy who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War (with Jerrold L. Schecter)*, and a number of magazine articles.

Deryabin was condemned to death in the USSR according to the KGB's *Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Service, Defectors, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of Punitive Units and Other Criminals Under Search Warrant* published in 1969. Deryabin died in 1992.



KGB Headquarters

Grigoriy Stepanovich Burlutskiy

In June 1953, Soviet State Security Lt. Col. Grigoriy Stepanovich Burlutskiy, defected to the West by crossing the Soviet-Afghan border.

Burlutskiy, born 30 January 1918, in Orenburg Oblast, USSR, was the son of a “poor Cossack peasant.” In 1934 he began studying animal husbandry but after completing his studies in 1938, he switched to a military career. He was accepted by State Security as an officer candidate at its school for Border Troops in Saratov in 1938. He graduated two years later with an excellent record and was commissioned as a lieutenant.

He began his Border Troop career as the commanding officer of a Border Post but subsequently became assistant company commander of a border detachment, serving along the Western Ukrainian and Bessarabian border.

From 1942 to 1949, Burlutskiy was a member of the 95th Special Purpose Border Regiment. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1943 and one year later became assistant chief of staff of the regiment. He participated in the forced resettlement of the Chechan-Ingush, Kalmyk, Karachay, and Crimean Tartar minority groups. Between 1944 and 1945, he also participated in the liquidation of partisans and resistance leaders in Lithuania.

When World War II ended, he became chief of the 4th Komendatura on the East Prussian border. In 1949 he was again promoted, this time as head of the 2nd Komendatura of the 94th detachment in Lithuania where his unit was responsible for the Soviet-Polish border. In November 1950, he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel. The next year, Burlutskiy attended a course for State Security officers at the Moscow Border School. After completing this school, he was named commanding officer of the 4th Komendatura of the 68th Border Detachment in Turkmen, SSR.

According to Burlutskiy, he became disillusioned by the harsh treatment of minorities by the Soviets and said he thought about defecting during World War II. After being sent to the Soviet-Afghan border, he claimed he planned his escape by first studying the conditions at the border, looking for a place to cross. His opportunity to defect occurred on 3 June 1953, when

his chief assistants were on duty elsewhere. He told his driver that he wanted to inspect the border. When he reached the point he had selected to cross, he told his driver to walk to the nearest telephone. When the driver disappeared from sight, Burlutskiy drove the jeep across the border. He asked the Afghan authorities for political asylum. He later was taken to Western Europe by US Intelligence.

Burlutskiy stated his reasons for defection at a June 1954 press conference in which he provided the media with firsthand information about the realities of Soviet life. Accounts of defection appeared in *Life* and other western publications during the spring and summer of 1954. Information provided by Burlutskiy served as source material for chapters in Robert Conquest’s *The Nation Killers* as well as Simon Wolin’s and Robert M. Slusser’s *The Soviet Secret Police*.

The KGB’s *Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of Punitive Units and Other Criminals Under Search Warrant*, published in 1969, stated that Burlutskiy was sentenced to death in absentia.

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1948-1959

1948	12 February	National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 7 authorizes CIA to collect foreign intelligence from American citizens with overseas contacts.
	25 February	Communist coup in Czechoslovakia.
	1 May	The Soviet Union defies the United Nations and establishes a people's republic in North Korea.
	20 June	USSR initiates Berlin Blockade; lifted 11 May 1949.
	25 June	First IAC interdepartmental committee established.
	1 July	NSCID-9 put USCIB under the NSC and increases civilian control of signals intelligence.
	20 July	General Secretary Eugene Dennis and 11 other CPUSA leaders are arrested and indicted under the Smith Act of conspiring to advocate violent overthrow of the US Government.
	31 July	Elizabeth Bentley testifies before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA), publicly accusing Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie of being Soviet agents.
	August	UK-USA Security Agreement signed, codifying cooperation on signals intelligence collections and sharing among the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
	August	The VENONA secret and techniques to decrypt Soviet messages leaked to the Soviets by Army Signals cipher clerk William Weisband.
	3 August	Whittaker Chambers publicly identifies Alger Hiss as a Communist agent. Chambers had provided information previously to the State Department and the FBI nine years earlier but three separate investigations of Hiss gave him a clean bill of health.
	September	British cryptanalysts join the VENONA project full-time.
	1 September	Donald Maclean, having been promoted to First Secretary of the British Embassy, is transferred out of the US to Cairo, Egypt.
	27 September	Alger Hiss unsuccessfully sues Whittaker Chambers for \$75,000 for libel when Chambers accuses him of Communist party membership from 1934-1938.

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1948	October	The House Un-American Affairs Committee began an investigation of Dr. Edward U. Condon, Director of the Bureau of Standards and the first American labeled by the committee as an “atom spy.”
	19 October	Meredith Gardner and Robert Lamphere meet at Arlington Hall and formally inaugurate full-time FBI-ASA liaison on the Soviet messages.
	November	The US Attorney General issues a list of 78 subversive organizations in the United States.
	10 November	The FBI recommends that Communist leadership be prosecuted under the Smith Act to set a constitutional precedent for legally arresting party members as “substantive violators” of the Act.
	17 November	Chambers produces the “Pumpkin Papers,” and five rolls of microfilm of Secret state papers he hid in a pumpkin to substantiate his new charge that Hiss and White spied for Moscow during the 1930’s.
	9 December	Army Intelligence Division and Security Group work out specific plan covering the exact duties that each will undertake in the production of domestic intelligence.
	16 December	A federal grand jury indicts Alger Hiss for perjury.
	29 December	FBI identifies covername SIMA as Justice Department analyst Judith Coplon.
1949	3 January	British government notified that VENONA intercepts show that information had been transmitted to the Soviets from the British Embassy in 1944 and 1945 from a spy codenamed HOMER (later identified as Maclean).
	17 January	11 Communist Party members are tried for violating the Smith Act violation. Convicted 14 October and sentenced to prison.
	22 January	Beijing, the capital of China, falls to the Communists.
	23 February	Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) members sign a new Delimitations Agreement to govern investigative activities by Army ID, ONI, FBI and AFOSI.
	4 March	FBI arrests Coplon and Soviet UN employee Valentin A. Gubitchev in New York. They are found guilty on 7 March 1950. Gubitchev is expelled from the U.S.

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1949	23 March	Truman approves NSC 17/4, which reconstitutes the secret Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to coordinate jurisdiction of FBI and military counterintelligence.
	28 March	Defense Department approval given for Army ID Censorship Plan which would become immediately effective in case of an emergency.
	4 April	The North Atlantic Treaty is signed.
	20 May	Defense Secretary Louis Johnson directs a quasi-merger of service signals intelligence in a new Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), subordinate to the JCS.
	23 May	Federal Republic of Germany established.
	31 May	Alger Hiss is tried the first time for perjury but it ends with a hung jury. The 3 year statute of limitations had run out on any possible espionage charges.
	18 July	NSC authorizes a regular charter for the IIC and creates a new Inter-Departmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), composed of representatives from Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice and the National Military establishment to function within the security field but outside that of IIC.
	21 July	The Senate ratifies the North Atlantic Treaty, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
	3 August	Office of Provost Marshal given operational function of clearing civilian industrial facilities for work on classified Army projects.
	10 August	National Military Establishment becomes Department of Defense.
	14 August	FBI agent Robert Lamphere informs the British that the US concluded that Klaus Fuchs had transmitted information about the atomic bomb to the Soviets.
	23 September	President Truman discloses that Soviet Union exploded its first atomic weapon.
	1 October	The People's Republic of China is proclaimed in Beijing.
	7 October	German Democratic Republic established.

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1949	7 October	Gustav Adolph Mueller, US Air Force, arrested for attempting to deliver classified information to the Soviets.
	10 October	Kim Philby arrives in Washington as the British intelligence liaison to the US intelligence community. Part of his responsibilities involves US/UK exchanges of VENONA material.
1950	19 January	Intelligence Community agrees on defector handling.
	21 January	Alger Hiss is found guilty of perjury.
	24 January	British Scientist Klaus Fuchs is arrested by British authorities and confesses his involvement in Soviet atomic espionage.
	31 January	President Harry Truman gives his approval to build the hydrogen bomb.
	9 February	Senator Joseph McCarthy comes to national attention when he charges that 205 (later changed to 57) State Department employees are Communist Party members. Without any evidence, he names State's Owen Lattimore as the "top Russian espionage agent."
	20 February	East Germany establishes Ministry for State Security (MSS).
	7 April	A Central Personality Index established at Camp Holabird, MD., in order to speed up security clearance procedures.
	15 April	Gustav Adolph, an Air Force enlisted student, is convicted of espionage and sentenced to five years in prison.
	22 May	FBI arrests Harry Gold for espionage.
	16 June	David Greenglass, a member of the Rosenberg Atomic Spy Ring, arrested for spying on behalf of the Soviet Union.
	25 June	North Korean Troops invade South Korea.
	17 July	Julius Rosenberg arrested on charges of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.
24 July	President Truman issues statement that FBI should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.	

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1950	11 August	Ethel Rosenberg arrested for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.
	18 August	Morton Sobell, a member of the Rosenberg Atomic Spy Ring, was taken into custody by the FBI after his deportation from Mexico.
	24 August	AFSA assigns Soviet intercept material a restricted codeword BRIDE and special handling procedures.
	14 September	Alfred Dean Stark sentenced to 15 years in prison for conspiracy to commit espionage.
	23 September	Congress passes the Internal Security Act (the "McCarran Act"), which it would soon pass again over President Truman's veto. The Act requires Communist-linked organizations to register and allows emergency detention of potentially dangerous persons.
	6 October	Donald Maclean returns to London to head the British Foreign Office's American Department.
	5 December	U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturns Judith Coplon's conviction.
	9 December	Harry Gold is sentenced to 30 years imprisonment for conspiracy to commit espionage.
	27 December	Congress passes legislation giving federal agents the power to make warrantless arrests in cases involving espionage, sabotage and other major crimes.
1951	4 January	Deputy Directorate for Plans established in CIA; Allen Dulles named chief.
	6 March	Ethel and Julius Rosenberg go on trial for treason.
	29 March	The Rosenbergs are found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. Morton Sobell is sentenced to 30 years imprisonment for conspiracy to commit espionage.
	April	The British narrow the search for Homer to two persons, one of whom is Maclean.
	6 April	David Greenglass is sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for conspiracy to commit espionage.
	9 April	The Rosenbergs are sentenced to death by Judge Irving Kaufman.

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1951	14 April	A decoded VENONA message provides conclusive evidence that Maclean is HOMER. Surveillance of Maclean begins in order to gather evidence that can be used in court as the US and UK do not want to reveal the existence of the VENONA intercepts.
	21 May	British Foreign Office officials Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess flee Great Britain and defect to the Soviet Union. Kim Philby recalled from US.
	12 June	The CIA's counterintelligence chief William Harvey writes a memo to DCI Walter Bedell Smith making the case that Philby is a Soviet agent; a letter is sent to the British stating that Philby is no longer welcome in the US.
	10 July	Philby is asked to resign from British intelligence.
	11 July	CPUSA announces that the Party will operate as a "cadre organization," with many of its leaders underground.
	17 August	Army G-2 Central Records Facility at Fort Holabird, Md., established to provide centralized repository and master index for all personal security information available from closed investigative cases.
	4 November	A Gallup poll finds that 51 percent of Americans favor using the atomic bomb on military targets.
	10 December	Philby is subjected to a judicial inquiry in the UK.
1952	24 February	Attorney General J. Howard McGrath orders an end to FBI black bag jobs that involved trespass.
	1 May	Department of State bans US travel to Communist countries.
	13 June	Brownell Report on SIGINT completed; led to creation of the National Security Agency.
	21 September	Giuseppe Cascio, US Air Force, arrested in South Korea on charges of conspiring to pass secrets to the Communists.
	1 November	First US hydrogen bomb test.
4 November	President Truman creates the National Security Agency (NSA) to supersede AFSA and further centralize control of signals intelligence under the Secretary of Defense and a reconstituted USCIB.	

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1953	5 March	Stalin dies.
	6 April	KGB defector Alexander Orlov's story appears in Life magazine; finally alerting the FBI to his residence in the United States.
	1 June	President Eisenhower issues Executive Order 10459 establishing a new International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board.
	8 June	Kurt L. Ponger sentenced to 5-15 years imprisonment and Otto Verber sentenced to 3 1/2 years on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage.
	19 June	Ethel and Julius Rosenberg are executed at Sing Sing Prison in New York after President Eisenhower denies executive clemency. First convicted spies ever executed in the U.S. on order of a civil court.
	10 July	Ouster of Beriya, Soviet Internal Security Minister; subsequent upheaval in Soviet intelligence services.
	26 July	Armistice signed in Korea.
	3 August	Senator McCarthy announces his intention to investigate the U.S. Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey.
	6 November	Attorney General Herbert Brownell sparks controversy by claiming in a Chicago speech that former President Truman had appointed Harry Dexter White to head the International Monetary Fund despite FBI warnings that White was a Soviet agent. Truman ridicules the charge.
1954	30 January	McCarthy probe of Army begins.
	13 March	KGB established.
	22 April	Senate hearings on Army-McCarthy dispute begin.
	20 May	Attorney General Brownell lifts former AG McGrath's ban on black bag jobs by FBI.
	24 August	Communist Control Act deprives Communist Party of rights, privileges and immunities.

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THE ATOMIC BOMB SPIES AND POST WORLD WAR II
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1954	6 September	Herbert Hoover's Commission on Government Organization report on CIA asserts that "no rules" existed in the struggle between the Free World and the international Communist conspiracy.
	9 October	Joseph Sidney Petersen Jr., DoD civilian, arrested and charged with violating espionage statutes.
	2 December	Senate votes to condemn McCarthy for contempt of Senate.
	20 December	CIA's Directorate of Plans creates the Counterintelligence Staff with James J. Angleton as its chief.
1955	11 May	The Berlin Tunnel becomes operational.
	14 May	Warsaw Pact created.
	25 July	First U-2 delivered to test site.
1956	8 March	NSC approves the FBI's proposed COINTELPRO operation against the CPUSA.
	1 April	Gehlen Organization turned over to West Germany as BND.
	17 April	Cominform dissolved.
	21 April	Berlin Tunnel "discovered" by East Germans. In reality, Soviet spy George Blake had previously informed the Soviets about the tunnel.
	4 June	CIA facilitates publication in the West of Khrushchev's "secret speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress, in which he denounced Stalin's crimes.
	5 August	FBI Director begins COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) against the Communist Party USA.
	10 October	Soviet troops suppress a popular uprising in Hungary.
1957	4 May	KGB officer Reino Hayhanen, en route from the United States, defects at the US Embassy in Paris.
	17 June	Supreme Court in Yates vs. US rules the government had enforced the Smith Act too broadly by targeting protected speech instead of actual action to overthrow the political system; this ruling makes the Act almost useless for prosecuting Communists.

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THE ATOMIC BOMB SPIES AND POST WORLD WAR II
1948-1959

1957	21 June	Federal authorities detain Hayhanen's superior, KGB illegal Colonel Rudolf Abel, in New York.
	9 September	Alfred Stern and Martha Dodd are indicted in absentia on charges of espionage. In 1979 the charges are dropped when witness considered key to the case had died.
	20 September	George H. French, a US Air Force Captain, is convicted of espionage and is sentenced to life in prison.
	15 November	Soviet illegal Rudolph Abel found guilty and sentenced to 30 years in prison for conspiring to commit espionage.
1958	21 February	M/Sgt. Roy Adair Rhodes was sentenced to five years of imprisonment at hard labor, dishonorable discharge from US Army, and forfeited all pay and allowances, for conspiring to deliver US secrets to the Soviet Union and falsifying loyalty certificates.
	29 July	NASA established.
	15 September	US Intelligence Board created.
	10 November	The Berlin crisis begins.
1959	1 January	Fidel Castro takes over Cuba.
	4 October	Soviet GRU officer Popov arrested for working for CIA.