Iraq Profile: Biological Weapons Agents

[See also Iraq Country Overview]
[See also Iraqi BW Sites and Facilities]

View a summary [pdf] of Iraq's Biological Weapons Agents.

Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)

Anthrax, a common disease in herbivores, is caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis. When faced with environmental stress and lack of nutrients, this gram-positive bacterium converts to a hardy, dormant stage in the form of a spore. Anthrax spores can be weaponized in two basic forms: dried powder or liquid slurry.

Anthrax spores comprised a significant, if not the most important, part of Iraq’s biological weapons (BW) program. Research on Bacillus anthracis—in its non-virulent form—began in 1974, and Iraq obtained highly pathogenic anthrax cultures in 1976. In the 1980s, Iraq procured additional anthrax strains from three major sources: the United States (American Type Tissue Collection), the Pasteur Institute (France; two strains), and strains JB17 and Sterne 3452 from the Central Veterinary Laboratory, New Haw, Surry, UK.

Reportedly, Iraq has made numerous, but unsuccessful, attempts to obtain the more pathogenic Vollum strain in the past (South Africa, 1948 or related). Since the 1980s, Iraq has also reported to have developed a dried form of anthrax as well as liquid slurry preparations. Israeli intelligence sources indicate that Iraq, at an unspecified time but perhaps during the late 1980s, tested a remotely detonated shell filled with anthrax spores on 10 Iranian enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). These EPWs apparently all died due to "internal hemorrhaging," which roughly describes some of the effects of anthrax infection.

Iraq told UNSCOM investigators that it had produced more than 8,000 liters of liquid anthrax slurry, and this number may be a gross underestimate. Spore concentration was reported to be 1 x 109 spores per milliliter. Iraq developed the following delivery methods for anthrax spores: artillery shells, missile warheads (including Scud/Al-Hussein variants), remotely piloted MiG-21 aircraft with 950-liter spray tanks, and possibly aerosol-generating aircraft adapted from crop dusters (Zubaidy device). In the 1990s, UNSCOM determined that seven missile warheads contained anthrax spore residues, and Iraq may have loaded as many as 80 missiles with anthrax bacteria, the latter including both wet and dry formulations.

Key Sources:
UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 24 January 1999; Raymond Zilinskas, "Iraq’s Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?," Journal of the American Medical Association, Volume 278, Number 5, August 6, 1997; Dany Shoham, "Iraq’s Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, pp. 181-83; United States Senate, "The Riegle Report: U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War," Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs with Respect to Export Administration, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 25 May 1994; Stephen F. Little and Gregory B. Knudson, "Comparative Efficacy of Bacillus anthracis Live Spore Vaccine and Protective Antigen Vaccine against Anthrax in the Guinea Pig," Infection and Immunity, Vol. 52, No. 2, May 1986, pp. 509-12.

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Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin)

Botulinum toxin is derived from the anerobic bacterium Clostridium botulinum. A mainstay of biological warfare (BW) programs since at least World War II, it is not clear how effective this agent might be in a military context. The methods of dissemination of this large, protein-based toxin might include its aerosolization in liquid form, the use of shrapnel (contaminated objects such as flechettes), or its introduction into food and water. Depending upon its route, botulinum toxin is incredibly toxic, the lethal dose ranging from between 70 nanograms (ingested) to about 5 micrograms (inhaled aerosol) for the average adult.

Iraq began work with Clostrindium botulinum from 1974-1978 during the Al-Hazen Program, in which by Iraqi accounts was part of wider "research on micro-organisms for military purposes." Bacterial strains were largely supplied from the United States. In addition to the American Type Tissue Collection, in March-April 1986 the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provided botulinum vaccine (in the form of the toxoid) to Iraq’s Al Muthanna and the Department of Microbiology at the University of Baghdad College of Medicine.

During 1985-87, Al Muthanna was the site for laboratory study and characterization of botulinum toxin. Full-scale production was initiated at Al Hakam in 1989, and by September 1990, some 5,000 liters of botulinum toxin were produced, although this was actually performed at Al Manal. While none of the following figures can be reliably verified, UNSCOM did obtain Iraqi data on its work with botulinum toxin. Using estimates from a 1990 report at from Al Hakam, there was an estimated 19,180 liters of 10-20 fold concentrated botulinum produced in Iraq. UNSCOM also received a declaration that 10,820 liters of toxin were filled into munitions, including 100 R-400 aerial bombs and 16 Al-Hussein missile warheads (145-liter fill each). Hundreds of liters were also used to field test botulinum toxin, including munitions trials at Al Taji and Al Mohammediyat.

Key Sources:
UNSCOM - Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999; Raymond Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future,?" Journal of the American Medical Association, Volume 278, Number 5, August 6, 1997; Dany Shoham, "Iraq’s Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, pp. 190-91; United States Senate, "The Riegle Report: U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs with Respect to Export Administration, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 25 May 1994.

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Brucella melitensis and other serotypes (Brucellosis)

Brucellosis is caused by the gram-negative bacterium Brucella melitensis. Related species cause illnesses in animals, such as B. abortus (goats), B. suis (swine), B. canis (dogs), and B. ovis (sheep). The species B. melitensis is responsible for most human infections worldwide. The cause of varying degrees of illness, including fever, prostration, and back pain, mortality from brucellosis is relatively low, at approximately 1 percent of all infections. Its extreme infectiveness, however, as well as having extensive animal models for study, make brucellosis a potential incapacitating weapon. In the United States, the first standardized field weapon in the 1950s was a bomb containing B. suis (M33/Brucella cluster munition, USAF). Although the pathogen was very easy to grow, it proved to be a fragile organism to weaponize, and proved a logistical nightmare for the US military in terms of fielding a workable biological weapon (BW).

In the late 1980s, there was an increased number of brucellosis cases reported in Iraq and Kuwait, and it is therefore likely that Iraq had many reasons to research this pathogen. Work with B. abortus and B. melitensis had also been conducted by Iraqi BW scientists, who may have produced some in quantity. The extent of its possible weaponization by Iraq is unknown.

Key Sources:
Dany Shoham, "Iraq’s Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, p. 184; Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom (New York: Henry Holt and COmanny, LLC, 1999) pp. 139-42; UNSCOM, "8th Report under UNSCR 715," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.

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Camelpox

Camelpox belongs to the same family of viruses (Poxviridae) that cause smallpox and many other species-specific pox diseases such as monkey pox, ectromelia, orf, among others. Based on genetic sequencing and analysis, there appears to be general agreement that camelpox virus is the closest known relative to Variola major, the cause of human smallpox. As in foot-and-mouth disease, the primary threat from camelpox is an economic one, causing death and illness in animals that reduces milk production and body weight in domesticated camels. Mortality in camels from camelpox reaches 30% with its more virulent forms. Centuries ago, Persians may have used camelpox lesions from animals to inoculate against smallpox, indicating that infection with camelpox (as in vaccinia) is definitely possible. But camelpox causing overt disease in humans is rare (if nonexistent).

Iraq reported to UNSCOM in 1995 that its scientists had researched camelpox at the Daura Foot and Mouth Vaccine Facility, beginning in August 1990. (During the time Iraq utilized this facility for biological weapon (BW) research, Daura was also known as “Al Manal.”) The precise nature and goal of research into camelpox by Iraqi BW scientists, however, is unknown. It is reasonable to assume that camelpox could have been acquired from within Iraq, as was claimed in the 1995 Iraqi declaration. Iraq further stated that its BW scientists had conducted very little research on the virus, and that none was produced in quantity.

Other reports have indicated that Iraq tested camelpox on humans. In one unverified report, 15 Kurdish prisoners were tied down in an open field in which aerial munitions containing camelpox virus were detonated nearby. These test subjects reportedly fell ill one week later, suggesting that this form of camelpox was a modified version of the wild strain. The latter is normally non-pathogenic in humans.

Because camelpox is endemic to the region, Iraq may have investigated this disease simply as a matter of ongoing veterinary research into the virus going back to at least 1979. There are suggestions, however, that other possibilities exist: Iraq chose to study camelpox because it might have been considered a possible BW agent against populations not regularly exposed to the virus, such as the US-led coalition forces in 1991. The other possibility is that camelpox, being closely related to smallpox, may have served as either a stimulant for weaponization studies, or as a candidate for genetic modification to create smallpox. According to former UNSCOM inspector Rod Barton, "The Iraqis told UNSCOM that the Iraqi population lived with camels all their lives and were immune to this disease, but coalition forces were not. UNSCOM wondered whether they selected camelpox because it can be manipulated using genetic engineering. The Iraqis denied it."

Key Sources:
"Missiles and Viruses Sill Troubling, UN UNMOVIC Report," Financial Times (London), 2 March 2001, p. 11; UNSCOM, "8th Report under UNSCR 715," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995; Rod Barton, "Profile of a Proliferator: Iraq’s Biological Weapons Program," 2 February 2001; M. Pfeffer et al., "Comparison of Camelpox Viruses Isolated in Dubai," Veterinary Microbiology, Vol. 49, No. 1-2, March 1996, pp. 135-46 (abstract); H. Tadjbakhsh, "Traditional Methods Used for Controlling Animal Diseases in Iran," Revue Scientifique et Technique (International Office of Epizootics), Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 599-614 (abstract); Z. Jezek et al., "Camelpox and Its Risk to the Human Population," Journal of Hygiene, Epidemiology, Microbiology, and Immunology (Czechoslovakia), Vol. 27, No. 1, 1983, pp. 29-42; C.L. Afonso et al., “The Genome of Camelpox Virus,” Virology, Vol. 295, No. 1, 30 March 2002, pp. 1-9 (abstract); "The Sequence of Camelpox Virus Shows It Is Most Closely Related to Variola Virus, the Cause of Smallpox," The Journal of General Virology, Vol. 83, Pt. 4, April 2002, pp. 855-72 (abstract); J. Kinne et al., "Pathological Studies on Camelpox Lesions of the Respiratory System in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)," Journal of Comparative Pathology, Vol. 118, No. 4, May 1998, pp. 257-66; M.M. Falluji et al., "Isolation, Identification and Characterization of Camelpox Virus in Iraq," The Journal of Hygiene, Vol. 83, No. 2, 1979, pp. 267-72 (abstract); U. Wernery and R. Zahariah, "Experimental Camelpox Infection in Vaccinated and Unvaccinated Dromedaries," Zentralbl Veterinarmed [B] (Zentralblatt fur Veterinarmedizin. Reihe B. Journal of veterinary medicine. Series B.) Vol. 46, No. 2, March 1999, pp. 131-35 (abstract).

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Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene, clostridial myonecrosis)

Known for centuries as a devastating disease acquired in the battlefield, gas gangrene is so named from the bubbles seen in wounds (due to hydrogen gas that is produced by the bacteria). One of the more significant causes of necrotizing fasciitis, gas gangrene spreads so quickly that loss of limbs and life are common, even with aggressive treatment.

During the late 1980s, Iraq researched the use of Clostridium perfringens bacteria and toxins as a biological weapons (BW) agent. In addition to the six strains acquired from the US American Type Tissue Collection, local varieties were stored in a pathogen library at the Al Rashid Hospital. In the mid-1990s, Iraq presented UNSCOM with a rather ambiguous description of 16 warheads that were filled with a BW agent that had a "time to effect" of more than one week. UNSCOM theorized that this could have been a reference to C. perfringens (and not Bacillus anthracis or botulinum toxin). In 1995, Iraq also claimed that it had researched the use of aerosolized spores on experimental animals; the results of these studies are still unclear. As also studied by the Japanese during experiments in China (1930s-1940s), Iraq had considered the use of this pathogen as a means to contaminate shrapnel to cause severely infected wounds. There may also have been tests conducted to aerosolize C. perfringens spores and toxins for inhalation.

Iraq declared to UNSCOM that General Nizar Attar, while working at Muthana State Establishment in 1985, initiated a plan to work with C. perfringens as part of the Iraqi BW program. UNSCOM found evidence that Iraqi scientists had conducted extensive scientific literature reviews concerning C. perfringens on 13 May 1985 and 10 July 1985. On 2 May 1986, the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) sent C. perfringens cultures to Iraq (ATCC 3624, Batch # 10-85SV, two each). According to the UNSCOM report, with regard to this and other research, "consultations were undertaken with Prof. Nasser Hindawi when at Mustansiriyah University in 1986." In 1987, some Iraqi BW researchers left the Al-Muthanna and continued research at the Technical Research Center at Al-Salman. According to Iraq, it is at the latter location that "formal research" on gas gangrene got underway in April 1988, and that the focus of the research was on the infectivity of the organism—not the potency of the toxins themselves. UNSCOM reported in 1995 that Iraqi research into gas gangrene was again moved, this time from Al-Salman to Al Hakam in August 1989. Iraq reported that some 340 liters of unweaponized C. perfringens spores were eventually produced at Hakam. However, UNSCOM notes that Iraq had not accounted for large quantities of peptone growth media, a substrate used solely for the production of C. perfringens in Iraq. Therefore, notes UNSCOM, "Quantities produced could be at least 15 times the quantity stated."

Iraq apparently investigated the use of gas gangrene relevant to application in fragmentation weapons. A "senior Iraqi worker" told UNSCOM that research had been conducted into the use of C. perfringens spores delivered by fragments (shrapnel) from munitions. However, "Iraq denies carrying out any developmental work on weapons exploiting this research." The possibility also exists that Iraq had undertaken studies into the respiratory pathogenesis of C. perfringens spores to be delivered in an aerosol.

Key Sources:
"UNSCOM Final Disarmament Report," S/1999/94, 29 January 1999; Sherwood L. Gorbach, "Gas Gangrene and Other Clostridial Skin and Soft Tissue Infections," in Sherwood L. Gorbach et al., eds., Infectious Diseases (Philadelphia: W.B. Saudners Company, 1992) pp. 764-70; United States Senate, "The Riegle Report: U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War," 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 25 May 1994; Dany Shoham, "Iraq’s Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, pp. 183-84.

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Enterovirus-70 (EV70, infectious hemorrhagic conjunctivitis; aka acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis, Apollo conjunctivitis)

Enterovirus-70 is a virus that can cause severe irritation of the eyes (usually affecting both) that leads to extreme pain, as well as swelling and hemorrhage within the orbs. Compared to other members of the enterovirus group, enterovirus-70 has a relatively short incubation period of about one to three days. Enterovirus-70, in addition to its pathogenic effects on the eyes, is also associated with aseptic meningitis, that is, non-bacterial inflammation of the brain meninges. It is possible that Iraqi research into this disease was done so out of both public health interests and as a search for an incapacitating agent for its biological weapons (BW) arsenal. (Symptoms of enterovirus-70 infection are not too far removed from that of Venezuelan equine encephalitis [VEE], and may have served as a surrogate.) Iraqi BW scientists may have also contemplated the genetic modification of this virus, although this is only speculation based on inchoate evidence provided by the Iraqis themselves. According to one account, Iraqi BW scientists intended to use embryonated eggs to grow large quantities of this and other viruses for possible weaponization.

First reported and named "Apollo conjunctivitis" following an outbreak in Ghana (1969), enterovirus-70 has since then often been reported in India, as well as the rest of Asia and Africa. A member of the family Picornaviridae (pico=small, RNA virus), these are non-enveloped and range from 25-30 nanometers in size. Enterovirus-70 is related to a number of viruses responsible for many human as well as animal diseases, including polio, Coxsackie, and more than 100 rhinoviruses, the latter being a significant cause of the common cold. (While the polio virus is a close relative, the existence of a vaccine makes it a poor choice for a BW agent in the modern era.) The foot-and-mouth disease virus, for example, is a picornavirus that affects cloven hoofed animals. Similarly, enterovirus-70 is considered extremely contagious in humans, although fatalities associated with the disease have not been reported. While sensitive to acidic solutions, picornaviruses are otherwise notoriously stable. Being resistant to detergents and wide temperature ranges, this characteristic may have made enterovirus-70 (as well as others) attractive to Iraqi BW scientists.

In 1995, Iraq admitted to having conducted research on enterovirus-70 at its Daura Foot and Mouth Vaccine Facility. (During the time Iraq had utilized the facility for BW research, Daura was also known as "Al Manal.") Iraq claimed that it had acquired enterovirus-70 among other viral cultures from within Iraq, although the ultimate validity or significance of this information is not clear. By its own account, Iraq studied the culturing and disease-causing potential of this virus beginning in the late summer of 1990. With regard to research in Iraq on enterovirus-70 and its applicability to BW, the Iraqi declaration reports that "very little work had been done," and that none of the virus had been "produced in quantity." Other reports that Iraqi BW scientists had researched enterovirus types 17, or even 71 (so-called hand-foot-mouth disease now common in East Asia) are not supportable.

Key Sources:
UNSCOM, "8th Report under UNSCR 715," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995; R.S. Maitreyi et al., "Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis Due to Enterovius 70 in India," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 2, March-April 1999, p. 268; Patrick R. Murray et al., Medical Microbiology, 2nd edition (St. Louis: Mosby, 1994), pp. 607-19; Dany Shoham, "Iraq’s Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Review in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, p. 188; Mark A. Pallansch and Larry J. Anderson, "Coxsackievirus, Echovirus, and Other Enteroviruses," in Sherwood L. Gorbach et al., eds., Infectious Diseases (Philadelphia: W.B. Saudners Company, 1992) p. 1774-79.

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Rotavirus (human)

Rotaviruses are a significant cause of gastrointestinal disease in humans. During the last decade, some 5 million deaths, mostly in infants and children, were caused annually by diarrhea, and a large percentage of these cases were due to rotavirus infection. While most adults are asymptomatic in the course of rotaviral infection, severe illness is sometimes seen in elderly and young adults. In developing countries, rotavirus is often deadly, leading to more pronounced dehydration than even many bacterial forms of diarrhea. Illness often begins with fever and vomiting, lasts about one week from onset, and sometimes hospitalization is required for about four days. The virus infects cells (villus) responsible for fluid balance in the gut, whereupon diarrhea occurs due to electrolyte imbalance. Rotaviruses are also known to infect animals, including rotavirus groups A, B, and C. (Rotavirus groups B and C, however, are not major contributors to infant diarrheal disease.)

According to its own account that was produced for UNSCOM in 1995, Iraq began the culturing and study of rotavirus in the late summer of 1990. Research on this and other viruses was reported by Iraq to have taken place at the Daura Foot and Mouth Vaccine Facility. (During the time Iraq utilized this facility for BW research, Daura was also known as "Al Manal.") As in the case of enterovirus-70 (hemorrhagic conjunctivitis) and camel pox, the precise goal of research into rotavirus by Iraqi BW scientists is unknown. (UNMOVIC reported in 2001 that "in the absence of further documentary evidence and explanation, the rationale and the scope of the virus research undertaken remains unclear, in particular the basis for selection of the viruses.") According to the 1995 declaration, rotavirus and others were obtained from within Iraq. Further, Iraq claimed that little work had been done on this virus and that none had been produced in any quantity. According to one account, Iraqi BW scientists intended to use embryonated eggs to grow large quantities of this and other viruses for possible weaponization.

What is common among rotaviruses and other viruses that had been studied by Iraq, including those that were part of a BW research program, is that these are relatively hardy pathogens. Rotaviruses are stable over a range of temperature, pH, drying, and are also stable in aerosolized form. Being non-enveloped viruses, rotaviruses are resistant to detergents as well as chlorinated water, and this could have made rotaviruses possible candidates for weaponization, perhaps against Kurdish elements in their own country or as an anti-animal pathogen. This, however, is speculation based on incomplete data from Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM.

Key Sources:
"Missiles and Viruses Sill Troubling, UN UNMOVIC Report," Financial Times (London), 2 March 2001, p. 11; John Herrmann, "Rotaviruses and Other Reoviridae," in Sherwood L. Gorbach et al., eds., Infectious Diseases (Philadelphia: W.B. Saudners Company, 1992) pp. 1791-97; Patrick R. Murray et al., Medical Microbiology, 2nd edition (St. Louis: Mosby, 1994), pp. 641-50; UNSCOM, "8th Report under UNSCR 715," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995; Dany Shoham, "Iraq’s Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, p. 188.

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Francisella tularensis (Tularemia)

The disease tularemia, caused by the gram-negative bacterium Francisella tularensis, can be separated into two major biovars: In the United States, the F. tularensis biovar tularensis is most commonly found, while outside the continental United States, especially in Europe and Scandinavia, the biovar palearctica is more prevalent, and can be isolated from water, aquatic mammals, and mosquitoes. When inhaled as an aerosol, as few as 10 bacteria can cause disease in humans. Because of this high infectivity, tularemia was investigated as a biological weapon (BW) agent by both the United States and the former Soviet Union. According to the literature, the severity of disease caused by the European variant is somewhat milder than the one found in North America.

One strain is reported to have been used by Iraq in conducting BW research. However, if this research was conducted using the above variant (tularensis Olsufiev), this is a non-pathogenic form that would have limited value for offensive BW research. In 1989, Senator John McCain noted that Iraq might weaponize tularemia bacteria, and British military intelligence indicated that this was the case. However, since then, no firm evidence has revealed work with this bacterium by Iraqi BW scientists.

Key Sources:
Dany Shoham, "Iraq’s Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, pp. 185; UNSCOM, "8th Report under UNSCR 715," S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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