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ETHNIC COMMUNITIES AND ETHNO-POLITICAL STRATEGIES

THE STRUGGLE FOR ETHNIC RIGHTS:
A COMPARISON OF PERU, ECUADOR AND GUATEMALA

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ETHNIC COMMUNITIES AND ETHNO-POLITICAL STRATEGIES

THE STRUGGLE FOR ETHNIC RIGHTS:
A COMPARISON OF PERU, ECUADOR AND GUATEMALA

by

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DEDICATION

To independent thinking …

> If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of a contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind (...) But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.
>
> <div align="right">J.S. Mill, On Liberty</div>

And to the person involved…

> The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause; who at best, if he wins, knows the thrills of high achievements, and, if he fails, at least fails daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.
>
> <div align="right">JFK on Theodore Roosevelt, December 5, 1961</div>

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

One of the most intriguing socio-political phenomena of the last 10-15 years in Latin America is the emergence of the rural Indians as a force on the national political arena in a number of countries, notably Ecuador and Bolivia. How quietly this has taken place is exemplified by the relatively few academic papers and books written on the subject and the near-absence of any mentioning of the trend, including in institutions specializing on Latin America. A related enigma, given the structurally marginalized situation of these populations and the number of their constituents, 36 million at the latest count[1], is that these mobilizations have been overlooked or received hardly any attention by 'rights' and 'social society' analysts. To characterize the climate, Warren (1998: 9) refers, among other examples, to a prominent social scientist who concluded as late as 1988 that New World indigenous groups were too fragmented, assimilated, and marginalized to press for wider political goals - ironically, the same year the Ecuadorian movement, CONAIE, received the government's official recognition. Gelles (2002: 240) refers to, as one explanation, that the Indian culture, provocatively present in the rural Andes and an important basis of the Ecuadorian movement, have been denied, ignored, or denigrated by dominant scholarly discourses and by policy makers in the Andean countries alike.

Making these reflections, I hasten to emphasize that I make a distinction between, on the one hand, ethnic mobilizations with the ambition to influence the political premises of their society - in other words, an effort with the goal to change the premises of the mestizo state - and, on the other, the manifestation of this phenomenon in the form of 'identity policies'[2], a term much favored among anthropologists. The former is the topic of this study. The two categories overlap, but while both categories have to succeed on the 'inner' front, i.e., mobilizing their constituencies, the former must, in addition, establish itself as a force on the 'outer' front, toward the society at large.

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[1] Warren (1998: 8).

[2] Moore (1997), referred to by Hale (1997: 568), defines the term *identity policy* as a reference to "collective sensibilities and actions that come from a particular location within society, in direct defiance of universal categories that tend to subsume, erase, or suppress this particularity. Location in this sense, implies a distinctive social memory, consciousness, and practice, as well as place within the social structure". But, as the practice is, not everyone lives up to that standard of precision. Melucci (1989: 46) states that "the term 'identity' is inadequate because it has come to have a variety of meanings. In fact, conflicts are always conflicts of identity: actors attempt to push others to recognize something which they themselves recognize; they struggle to affirm what others deny."

To have national ambitions means, first, that the ideas of the mobilization, its ideology, must reach and win support from a much larger audience, including groups that are sympathetic to the cause but not necessarily a part of the core constituency. Second, the leadership must be able to juggle a larger diversity of expectations and demands. And, ultimately, it must successfully interpret the political landscape and counter its opponents, being it the State or other powerful adversaries. If one uses the description that members of these two categories represent people struggling from the margins to gain voice and power, the challenges confronting the 'voice'-seeking category become a subset of those confronting the 'power'-seeking one. Seen from a theoretical point of view, the two categories may not differ much. As the ambitions of each are carried out in practical work, however, they will confront widely dissimilar obstacles in their ethno-ideological, political and organizational work.

There exists an extensive theoretical literature on the 'voice'-seeking category focusing specifically on identity policies. It tends, however, to emphasize on the 'inward-looking' aspects: Why did these mobilizations arise? How do they differ from traditional social movements? How to describe them? This literature also addresses epistemological topics of importance to the search for an identity and the discourses chosen to construct identities. Wade (1997) exemplifies this approach very well, discussing certain groups that have neither the ambitions nor the resources to make a dent on the national stage; they are looking for cultural denominators of value to themselves, which might also give them a voice in the society at large. Not having the ambition or resources to mold the premises of the nation-state to one's liking does not mean that one's presence is unimportant. When social mobilizations promoting identity policies do not have the resources for a more formal presence, say, in the form of a nation-wide organization, they may specialize in symbolic challenges to the status quo that offer alternative interpretations of individual and collective experience. Their impact may reach farther than one would expect as they provoke reactions that render power visible and thus negotiable in unanticipated ways.

To my knowledge, no studies have been done focusing on the factors from the level of 'nuts-and-bolts' upward of ethnic movements to establish why they succeed or fail, contending that both 'external' (environmental) and 'internal' conditions are crucial. One reason may be, as I will argue, that it may not have been perceived that the Latin

American ethnic mobilizations represented a phenomenon that outran the reach of theory at the same time when social movements were on the decline in the North (Foweraker 2002). Another may be that the prospects of finding common denominators, assuming they exist, also seem less promising for this category than analyzing identity policies per se. One thing is to approach an emerging social phenomenon, as in the latter case, on which there exists a consensus that it represents something new, explain it, and characterize it. Quite another is to do an assessment of the social consequences of a potentially political force on the rise. Differences in opinion on the concepts of State-society, power, social mobilization and structural transformation, all having different manifestations from one country to the next, would seem difficult to bridge. A handful of studies do exist, among them, two studies on what Warren refers to as 'cultural activism' among the Mayas of Guatemala (Fischer and McKenna Brown 1996; Warren 1998); work on the successful campaign of the Miskitu Indians on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua (Hale 1994); two political studies of the rise of the ethnic movement in Ecuador (Selverston-Scher 2001; Pallares 2002); and numerous works on the armed Zapatista uprising in Mexico's Chiapas[3]. However, all present their themes as isolated events. With the authors' emphasis on the calls for 'rights', the 'power'-seeking dimension gets lost or seriously suppressed and, in spite of elements to the opposite, the mobilizations are perceived as belonging to the 'voice'-seeking category.

This will not last. Important 'power'-seeking efforts are ongoing which indeed have great visions. The ethnic movement of Bolivia was at a point in the fall of 2002 where its leader and candidate in the national presidential election, Evo Morales, an Aymara Indian heading the coca workers' federation, was only a lama hair width from winning the presidential race. The block of delegates he controls in the new Bolivian Parliament (fall 2002) - 30 percent of the total - will have a significant influence on the legislature. In mid-February 2003, few weeks after his inauguration, the government of elected president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozado, was serious shaken by increasingly influential Morales, who - evaluated by New York Times (2003: 3) on predictable premises - rallied against free-market reforms while pushing for an end to American-backed eradication of Bolivia's coca crops. From the late 1980s into the 1990s onward, the main ethnic

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[3] Setting aside the element of the media coverage and the movement's very competent use of modern information means, the Zapatista revolt may be seen as a replica of classic peasant uprisings of former times.

federation in Ecuador, CONAIE, grew from irrelevance to a political force, which no Ecuadorian government can afford to ignore. CONAIE was one of the kingmakers of the mestizo candidate, Lucio Gutiérrez, who won the presidential race in the fall of 2002. CONAIE is today represented with seats in the government. In Peru, the Mapuche people are working to get a foothold on the national map, and so do the Amazon Lowland natives of Peru. With this scenario of considerable variety, it is tempting to hypothesize that there exist some common features in the basic premises of the ethnic activists that can explain their successes, limitations or failures, and, ultimately, can help constructing a broader understanding of these movements.

As one contemplates possible common denominators among ethnic mobilizations with national ambitions, one should not be confused by the fact that there seem to be large differences between them, seemingly no cooperation or cross-fertilization between the ethnic mobilizations of different countries takes place (it does!), and that each movement defines itself politically and choose its goals narrowly within the constraints of the mestizo state to which it belongs. The teasing enigma is whether the aspect which is common to these movements - the ethnic background of their constituents – may be as important to their progress as any of their state-national characteristics. This study is based on the hypothesis that this is the case.

One may speculate with Hale (1997: 581) whether the benefits accrued when particular identities become politicized and break out from under the tutelage of the general public, will ultimately turn into much smoke and no fire. In that case, the ethnic movements of Latin America would be, well, a fad - which, however, seems unlikely at both the first and the second glance. Even without the activities in Ecuador and Bolivia, too much is going on. The emerging ethnic movements need to be seen in the *longue durée*. Perhaps for that reason, Warren (1998) does not speculate whether the Maya cultural activities in Guatemala will be able to deliver results and help to put ethnic actors on the national political stage. This study intends to help establishing a platform on which informed evaluations of this kind can be made. Hopefully, the results may also help facilitating the theoretical discussion on identity policies and bridge the conceptual gap between the two categories of ambitions discussed above.

The ethnic movements I will focus on - the 'power'-seeking ones - are "at once predominantly conservative on the cultural plane and predominantly innovative and

revolutionary on the political and economic plane"[4]. Old communal practices are being vitalized in a modern environment. I will contend that the ethnic mobilizations represent non-accounted-for dimensions in the academic debate, particularly with respect to the ignored 'two-tier' citizenship in ethnically stratified societies, genuine democratization, and the concept of social movements in Latin America. At their best, these movements educate and mobilize by peaceful means populations, which continue to be ignored by their governments and marginalized by their societies. The so-called 'democratization' of Latin America has made no dent in that practice. By giving the ethnic population a voice, the movements point out "an inherent contradiction between the universal principle of equality and the persistent marginalization of those who do not fit within the universal categories through which equality is achieved" (Hale 1997: 574).

Where the ethnic mobilizations are successful, they have resulted in a redefinition of what it means to be an Indian, among the Indians and the dominant society alike, though this has yet not translated into any change in the appalling material conditions of the ethnic population. It is increasingly appreciated, however, that in Latin America one is confronted with complex ethnic network structures - though the intricacy of these varies from country to country - manned frequently by leaders of vision and considerably tactical and political skills, and composed of dispersed social units that act as cultural-political 'laboratories'. This organizational form is not just instrumental for the movement's goals, but has become a goal in itself. In the movements' alternative ways of working, they challenge the technological rationality of the overarching social order. In those places where the ethnic mobilization is most mature, these networks relate closely and interactively with the urban and rural environments of the mestizo State where they reside, operate through systems built on organizational affiliation, migration and personal ties, cross boundaries and continents, and, in places, have access to the corridors of power by a phone call. This situation may be understood as representing a merging of - not a confrontation between - manifestations of modernity and ethno-cultural traditions. Gone is the image of isolated Indian communities studied in the past by anthropologists - what Redfield (1941, 1962) referred to as 'folk societies'. And gone is the image of the *indio humilde* (humble Indian), which is how the mestizo press in certain places has been accustomed to refer to members of the Indian population. From being silenced and

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[4] Demetrio Cojtí Cuxil, a Maya cultural activist, as quoted by Warren (1998: 3).

oppressed non-citizens or, at best, second-class citizens - the difference seems immaterial - for less than two decades ago, while still being marginalized, today they carry their Indian heritage with pride, have confident and competent organizations promoting their cause, and present a discourse of their own making by which they want to be understood, owing allegiance to no one.

In chapter I that follows, I will present and discuss the research question of this study, the independent variables, and some of the key concepts which are important to my argument. In chapter II and III, I introduce the first country, Peru. In chapter II, I focus on the native people of the Amazon Lowland. I start out discussing the socio-economic and demographic conditions of this population, followed by a presentation of my observations and reflections during a three months' 'live-in' with Asháninka Indians in the Amazon jungle of Peru. My main focus is on how ethnicity is being constructed in this kind of environment (see Anderson 1983). It will serve as an important reference throughout the later discussion but I contend that ethnicity is not a unitarian term; there are different types of ethnicity. In chapter III, I reflect upon the absence of ethnic awareness in the Peruvian Highland and analyze the ethnic mobilization efforts going on elsewhere in Peru, meaning among the native population in the Amazon Lowland. In Chapter IV I move on to the second country of this study, discussing the ethnic movement of Ecuador and its impressive diversity, based on observations and interviews with local and regional leaders across the country, both in the Highland and the Amazon Lowland. Since this is, most likely, the most mature example of ethnic mobilization on the continent; it will serve as a benchmark for my concluding comparative analysis. In chapter V, I address the special kind of ethnic initiatives that take place in Guatemala. In chapter VI I present the over-all reflections and conclusions of the study.

Since the goal of the study is to map and compare the situation of ethnic mobilization in three countries, I will focus on the particulars of each country. I will put less emphasis on conditions, which are present in all the countries and are perceived to have roughly the same effect on each country's ethnic mobilization. This choice is not without its difficulties, however. Structurally economic exploitation, absence of public services, socio-economic disadvantages, and appalling poverty are present in all three countries of the study and are certainly higher among the rural-ethnic population than in the rest of the

population. Even where these conditions should be qualitatively the 'same' from one country to the next, it does not necessarily mean that their social and political consequences to comparable groups in different countries are the same. The dilemma has been addressed by doing an extensive study of the socio-economic conditions in the largest country, Peru, and use the outcome of this as a reference in the following country discussions. As a consequence, considerable material, which might well have been included in the main text, has been moved into appendices so not to clutter the argument.

A short remark on my use of words, including the Spanish ones, is appropriate. One of my cherished idiosyncrasies is the belief that it serves an honorable purpose that the author has thought through and relays to the reader his interpretation of potentially ambiguous terms. A list of definitions is added at the end. In a few cases, I have preferred to use Spanish words instead of the English ones due to differences in connotations and associations. For example, the Latin American *municipio*[5] has a different meaning than 'municipality'; in my context, *chacra* (cultivated plot), has a spiritual dimension, which is not present in the English term; and *ronda* (patrol) that comes in two versions is more than a vigilance movement. I will use the Spanish word for all three and others identified in the text. I differ between a state (an internationally accepted sovereign unit) and State (the apparatus of the governing stratum of a state). In states where more than one nationalism dominates, I will use terms like *nation-state* (the concept of the dominant population) and *ethno-nation* (the unifying concept of a politically-conscious ethnic population). A section of an ethnic population with a particular cultural-political identity, I will refer to as a (*ethno-)nation*, a *people*, or a *tribe* (politically-conscious or not). I distinguish between a *social* and an *ethnic movement*, but refer to both as social mobilizations. And, having checked the globe, I refer to the affluent, high-industrialized world as the North, not as the West.

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[5] An administrative unit with an urban center.

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Per Ole Christian Steinert, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2003

Supervisor: Bryan Roberts

One of the most intriguing social phenomena of the last 10-15 years in Latin America is the political emergence of marginalized and previously silenced Indian in a number of countries, notably, Ecuador, Bolivia and Mexico. These mobilizations have until recently received little attention by social analysts, and then mostly from anthropologists as manifestations of the so-called identity politics, referring to ethnic groups in search for a 'voice' in the society. In this study a distinction is made between, on the one hand, ethnic 'voice'-seeking groups, and, on the other, ethnic mobilizations with the ambition to influence the political premises of their societies. The two categories overlap, but while both categories have to succeed on the 'inner' front, i.e., mobilizing their constituencies, the latter must, in addition, establish itself as a force on the 'outer' front, toward the society at large.

My study is a comparison and evaluation of strategies and methods applied by what I call the 'power'-seeking ethnic mobilizations in Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala - in the Highland as well as the Amazon Lowland. But there is more to it. To be an ethnic person is to belong to the physical, symbolic, and social construct of a community, meaning that when ethnic peoples pool their resources for ethno-political ends, I contend, something else than a conventional social movement results, because an ethno-ideological worldview guides the mobilization. To better understand the ethnic dynamics, how ethnicity is being constructed, and how this is being reflected in the political work, I lived 3 months with semi-isolated native communities of the Asháninka Indians in the Peruvian

Amazon. That experience was followed by an extensive crisscrossing of the ethno-rural regions of the three target countries - observing that the ever-present appalling poverty and socio-economic conditions of this population was not less socially constructed than my earlier environment. In the wrestling between these two realities - on the one hand, a State-driven exploitation of land and people of ethnocidal proportions, and, on the other, a community-driven worldview - the ethnic populations of the different countries have found their individual form of organized protest.

This study discloses a significant variation in the forms of ethnic mobilization. It concludes that the State has played, unintentionally, a major role in determining what kind of ethnic mobilization takes place in each country, and so does the present influences of historical State practices, as well as cleavages among the ethnic peoples themselves. At one end, one observes the absence of any kind of ethnic mass mobilization, as in Guatemala, and, at the other, a vibrant, powerful, and professional ethnic movement, as in Ecuador. In between, there exists a struggling activity ongoing in Peru, carried forward by the native Amazon population without the support from the far more numerous indigenous-rooted population in the Highland. The latter practices daily its ethnicity, but shows no awareness of it.

It should not surprise that an ethno-rural environment like this - unfamiliar, difficult to access, and with lots of discomfort for the outsider - with the mestizo State 'explaining' the Latin American reality as it likes everyone to see it, and the social fabric of the locals being torn apart by externally imposed economic forces, that 'urban myths' get established with no or little evidence to their support. One is the often repeated claim that a viable indigenous movement exists in Guatemala, today part of the sociological lore; it doesn't. The activity there, I contend, represents a very different *typology* of ethnic mobilization than those in Peru and Ecuador. Another assertion is the much touted 'democratization' of Latin America during the last couple of decades. From the viewpoint of the large ethno-rural populations, no signs of such a political 'spring' could be found in any of these countries. And a third is that a political awakening among the Indians of 'historical dimensions' is going on in Latin America. It is as exaggerated as Mark Twain's first death. What takes place are mobilizations of highly variable outcome by some of the most marginalized population groups on the continent in political environments of abysmal economic oppression of the least resourceful.

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CHAPTER I.
BACKGROUND

This chapter presents the focus of the study and introduces the analytical elements that will serve as reference for the following discussion. It consists of three parts. In the first, I discuss my research question. In the second, I discuss concepts that are central to my focus. The third part addresses my methodology.

1. Introduction

In this part I present and problemize my research question, describe how the data and observations will be structured to give a basis for a comparison of one country with another n, and discuss my independent variables.

General: This project analyzes how ethnicity is being used by ethnic communities in three Latin American countries with significant ethnic populations – Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala – to win influence and rights, and what the outcome of this effort has been as experienced from the viewpoint of the ethnic people themselves. In other words, it focuses upon strategies and means for political and cultural mobilization applied by ethnic populations against the dominant mestizo society. Qualitative methods with basis in unstructured or casual interviews and participant observation were used. With reference to Peru and Ecuador, the ethnic communities in both the Highland and the Amazon Lowland were approached. In Guatemala, where no jungle exists (in the Amazon sense) and the ethnic population along the coast and in the inland of Petén is either acculturated or disorganized with a low degree of communal coherence and ethnic consciousness, only the Highland communities were addressed. The populations of all three countries contain Blacks and Mulattos (in Guatemala called Garífuna) clustered primarily along the coast. These communities have not been included in the investigation. To the extent they are referred to, it will be specifically pointed out. The members of the dominant *mestizo* (in Guatemala referred to as *ladino*) and the White or Creole elite population are perceived as being non-ethnic. For reasons which will be clear as my argument develops, I will use the term 'indigenous' to refer to the ethnic or ethnically-rooted population in the Highland and the term 'native' as reference to the ethnic one in

the Amazon Lowland. The term 'ethnic' will refer to both.

The main fieldwork for the study was carried out in numerous rural and small urban locations spread across the length and width of Ecuador and Peru, both the Highland and the Amazon Lowland, and the Highland of Guatemala (see tables 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 5.2). The last-mentioned country was included because - according to Warren (1998) and Fisher and McKenna Brown (1996) - a different kind of ethnic mobilization, a cultural-based activism, is taking place. It was hoped that this activity would add to the over-all perspective and help generalizing the conclusions of the study.

The countries chosen are intended to offer a cross-section of the variability of what the Latin American continent has to offer on the aspects of ethno-political mobilization of the ethnic peoples. Peru and Ecuador were chosen because I knew nothing about them, except that I had indications that they would fit the implied criteria of my study. A ten-week pilot survey during the summer of 2001 to both countries supported my assumptions. Guatemala I knew from numerous stays. Also, I did the fieldwork there for my M.A. thesis on ethnic entrepreneurs in the informal economic sector (Steinert 1999). The sample of countries might well have been expanded. Bolivia, with a majority of indigenous people in its population, would have been an obvious candidate. Even Mexico with an indigenous population estimated to 12 percent of the total population (Warren 1998: 8), but concentrated primarily in certain regions (Oaxaca and Chiapas), might well have been included. I decided, however, that the three countries I ultimately chose would offer a manageable and representative cross-section of the ethnic phenomenon I intended to research - considering also that university professors need circulation in the portfolio of graduate students they are supposed to advice.

It was hoped that this study would contribute with insight won, first, from the fieldwork done within each of three countries individually, and, second, from the cross-country analysis of the observations. A cursory review of the ethnic situation in the three countries indicates important differences as well as equalities within the perspective of the study. On one extreme is Guatemala, ethnically polarized, where - according to Warren (1998) - a vanguard of Maya intellectuals aggressively and eloquently promotes a political vision with the goal of bridging by historic-cultural means the more than twenty different Maya peoples, using that as a platform to establish political recognition of the

Guatemalan Maya on equal footing with the mestizos[6] (Cojtí Cuxil 1996). On the other extreme is Peru where, paradoxically, it seems that even the most obviously identifiable ethnic person in the Highland does not have a consciousness about his ethnic uniqueness, while still using markers like traditional dress and ethnic language (Aymara or Quechua). Among the many native peoples of the Peruvian Amazon Lowland, the ethnic consciousness is strong, but their members are few in number and hampered by geographical distances and cultural heterogeneities. And, finally, Ecuador, where the ethnic movement stands strong, and a very different concept of nationalism from the mestizo one is being promoted. Here ethnic visions are challenging the dominant mestizo perspectives by omnipresent indigenous organizations with influence and political space for significant political maneuvering.

This situation points to possible scenarios this project intends to throw light upon. In spite of differences in the ethno-political situation of the three countries, one could ask whether one is faced with somewhat converging political realities - in full or in part - which are veiled by local conditions and lag time between levels of political maturation or whether they represent fully disjointed socio-political authenticities. In spite of near to two decades of international efforts to promote the indigenous peoples' rights - with significant victories within certain countries, notably in Canada and Australia - and a string of legislation, conventions and accords to show for it, a systematic search for similarities and trends in the political work of ethnic populations from one country to the next has not been done. This is puzzling, particularly with respect to Latin America, given similarities in the historical background of the indigenous peoples in different countries, and the advantages for improved political work should such similarities exist and be understood. And even if such correspondences could not be identified, an understanding in the form of a 'typology', like the one Esping-Andersen (1990) outlines for different welfare systems in the capitalistic world, would be very informative.

Table 1.1 gives some demographic indicators of the three countries. (For comparison, data for the same parameters have been given for the world.) It shows that the three countries reflect typical trends among under-developed countries, i.e., high birth rate, high population growth, high mortality rate among children, and a highly skewed

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[6] The term mestizo refers to a person with a mixture of indigenous and Spanish ancestors. The term, 'mestizo', is used in South America and 'ladino' in Central America.

population distribution toward the younger generation. Worth noting is the variation in urbanization (column 8), population density (see note 3), and the territorial size among the three countries.

Table 1.1
Population data of Guatemala, Ecuador and Peru; 2001
(Source: Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C., USA [www.prb.org])

1	2	3	4	5	6		7	8	9	10
Country	Inhab. $x10^6$	Births/ 10^3 inh.	Nat. incr./ yr (%)	Mort.rate children	%-age <45	65+	Age-exp at birth	Urban (%)	GDP/inh (US$)	Area sq.km^3
Peru	26.6	24	1.8	41	34	5	69	72[1]	4,480	1,285,216
Ecuador	12.1	28	2.2	30	34	4	71	62[1]	2,820	256,370[2]
Guatemala	13.0	36	2.9	50	44	3	66	39	3,630	108,890
The world's countries:										
Low dev. (not China)		28	1.9	67	36	4	62	41	3,210	-
Highly developed		11	0.1	8	18	14	75	76	20,520	-

[1] If one adjusts this factor by excluding Peru's largest city, metropolitan Lima of 7.5 million inhabitants, the number would drop to 41 percent. If one excludes the two largest cities in Ecuador (Quito and Guayaquil) the number drops to 46 percent.
[2] Corrected for the border adjustment following the 1998 accord between Peru and Ecuador, which builds on the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942.
[3] The population densities of Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala are 20.3, 47.2 and 119.4 person/km^2, respectively. If one had used 'corrected' numbers (see footnote 1 above), the relative rural crowdedness of Guatemala would have been even more pronounced.

The Research Question: Using the localized ethnic rural community as my unit of analysis - defined in a preliminary way as a kinship group with theoretical endogamy with descent in the male line, which cultivates a definite territory (Rowe 1963: 255) - the study was governed by the following research question:

> What are the factors that constrain or facilitate the construction of a self-awareness of ethnicity and which strategies are being used by the ethnic community to meet the cultural and political aspirations of its members? Said with other words: how does the community perceive itself in relation to the 'other' dominant society; where does it aspire to move; and by what means?

Here the concepts of ethnicity, social movements, politics and rights merge. I became quickly aware that, in practice, I was faced with two groups of questions, which not necessarily overlap. On the one hand, my research question addresses the phenomenon of ethnicity per se: *how* or *why* do members of a community understand themselves as 'ethnic persons'? Since an ethnic person maintains a consciousness about his ethnicity

whether or not he is politically active, the second part of my research question - on strategies and political aspirations - becomes irrelevant without reducing the importance of the first part. On the other hand, if the person was both ethnically conscious and politically active, a string of questions could be asked to the relationship between the individual's ethnic awareness and the form and the content of his political activism. The first part, which I will refer to as the epistemological part - why is an 'ethnic person' ethnic and how does he become one? - should turn out to be not only important in its own right, but would be the very foundation on which the other part of my research question - the socio-political aspects - rested upon. As a consequence, I separated out the first part as something I had to get a grasp on before I addressed the next.

The epistemological part I addressed by living with native Asháninka Indians as a 'member' of their communities in the Peruvian Amazon, first, two months in the native community of San Miguel in the District of Perené in the Department of Junín in the north-western part of the so-called Central Jungle (*Selva Central*). Following that, I stayed with Asháninka communities along the remote and semi-isolated Río Ene and Río Tambo in the eastern part of the Central Jungle.

Two categories of inter-connected questions follow from my inquiry into the socio-political part: one relates to the impact the dominant society has on the ethnic community, and the other, contrariwise. The former relates to the effects the outer society has on the individual's perceptions of his ethnic 'belonging', how the solidarity of the ethnic community was influenced by external influence, and the effect of these influences on the 'inner life' of the ethnic community. They address the well-being of the ethnic community within the constraints the community is given by the dominant society. The study identifies these external influences by focusing upon how they subjectively are experienced by members of ethnic communities in relation to the living conditions of these communities and their status relative to the other society. In this category belongs also the factors which *undermine* the ethnic solidarity of the community, as when one or more members or families of the community move away semi-permanently, say, in search for work in other places or leave it permanently in the form of migration. I should quickly find out that, while questions on these matters could be answered through informal conversations and short visits to ethnic communities, the answers I received took on a far more profound meaning when they were seen in the context of the insight I

had gained from the epistemological part. The second category of questions relates to the means an ethnic community has to strengthen the perception of ethnicity among its members and translate this into political action as it confronts the dominant society. My initial hypothesis (which proved wrong) was that actions would be carried out in the form of localized ad-hoc demonstrations, social movements of limited duration, and/or permanent ethnic institutions - in the latter case, promoting ethnic causes on the regional or state-national level. As will be clear, I have been careful in my use of terms like 'means', 'goals' and 'strategies'; what in one context is a means (or a goal) becomes a strategy in another.

The ultimate stage of my study is a comparison and a search for trends among the three countries. The rationale for using a cross-country approach is that it provides a check against over-generalizing of the observations of a single country. Trying out a specific research question in more than one social context does not in itself guarantee more or better generalized conclusions, though this is obviously a desired goal. What is guaranteed, however, is that testing a hypothesis in more than one environment does offer an enrichment of one's reflections on the conditions within each unit and, thus, an improved control of one's conclusions.

Independent and Dependent Variables: The dependent variable is identified from my research question as the success or failure of the ethnic 'power'-seeking mobilization. Since a social mobilization is a social construct, it is determined by one or more independent variables. To be able to make analytical statements and compare movements in different countries, I will apply Melucci's (1989: 26, figure 1) conceptual representation of a social movement as spanning a multi-dimensional space defined by three independent variables - 'goals', 'means' and 'environment'. The actors contribute to the formation of the movement's shared sense of a collective 'we' by rendering, negotiating and adjusting themselves along (at least) three orientations: the *goals* of their actions; the *means* to be utilized; and the *environment* within which their actions take place. The two first are self-explanatory.

I have hypothesized that the environment is determined by two independent variables, i.e., *regime type* of the country in which the movement operates and *socio-economic* (or *socio-material*) *conditions*, that reflect upon the opportunities of the

constituents of the movement to aggregate resources for further organizing. Combined, the two determine the ability of the actors (individuals or groups) to build social capital and create a functional movement. On the one hand, successive regimes have contributed to institutionalize and maintain a social, economic and political structure that locks the present generations of the ethnic population into a marginalized position. The accumulated effects - structural in their manifestations - have created a situation where, first, the social resources of the ethnic actor are severely limited, and, second, the possibility to improve the situation is rigidly constrained due to the ethos of the mestizo states in relation to their subordinate ethnic populations. On the other hand, this structure is controlled and administrated by the regime in power, whose values and priorities are imposed upon the population (making the two afore-mentioned variables not quite independent of each other).

Identifying regime type with precision, and more so when the regime is in transition, is an inexact science at best[7]. To my knowledge, there exist no recent country-specific studies on matters of direct relevance to the regime identifications my focus calls for. An added complication is that in stratified countries with profound ethno-social cleavages, as those of this study, the manifestations of a regime may differ qualitatively from the urban to the rural areas. I will approach this challenge by combining two descriptions - one through a discussion of the regime from what is publicly known, and the other through an evaluation of the effects of its political decisions in their social context.

2. Concepts

In this study a string of concepts comes together; primary among them are 'ethnicity' and 'social movements', as well as 'rights'. They have all been given different interpretations in the literature over the last few decades and means different things to different people in different contexts. As one tries to address the poorest of the rural poor in populations of

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[7] Using elite theory, Lowell Field and Higley (1980) applied a term, *imperfectly unified* elite, to describe the transitional state of elites. Ten years later the term was dropped from a configuration scheme presented in an article to which the same two authors contributed (Lowell Field, Higley and Burton 1990). The term, an *imperfectly unified* elite, occupies an intermediate position in flux between a *disunified* elite and a *consensually unified* one. It consists of two main factions where one, through election and other forms of representative politics, has the support of a majority among non-elites. Given unfavorable circumstances, this elite configuration may revert to a disunified elite (Lowell Field and Higley 1980: 39-40). The term *imperfectly unified* elite is no longer in use.

poor countries and the practical aspects of life among them - on their premises - additional concepts, seemingly neutral but ideologically charged, play in. I will comment on examples of that category, which I also see as central to my topic. The discussion, which follows, should not be seen only as an introduction to relevant views and discourses in the literature, though that is clearly one objective. Equally important is to problemize their use and intrinsic ambiguities.

Ethnicity: An objective definition of ethnicity assumes that there are some distinguishing features that separate members of an ethnic group from those of its surroundings. However, few members of ethnic groups are easily identifiable by, say, phenotypic characteristics, meaning that it is difficult to determine the boundaries of ethnic categories in this way. The use of a behavioral definition, combined with cultural markers like language, traditions, and dress code, is another troublesome advance since characteristics of that category are susceptible to change. Ethnic groups may survive substantial alterations in tangible manifestations of their culture, without loss of identity. Adams (1991: 200) refers to changes imposed on the phenotypic appearance and cultural patterns of the Miskitu Indians along the Nicaraguan coast under the impact of assimilated African refugees from the Caribbean. The members did not loose their belief in the uniqueness of their ethnicity as a result of this onslaught.

For isolated ethnic groups, identity is of marginal concern - it just *is*. In less idealized cases, the group's conception of its uniqueness hinges on a counterpart - an Other. The group requires a referent of itself; the idea of an 'us' requires a 'them'. *Us-them* to an ethnic group plays the same existential role as *I-thou* to the consciousness of the self of an individual (Buber 1937). That distinction becomes of paramount importance when contact with other societies poses a threat to the group's physical or cultural survival. To maintain self-identity has emerged as a central problem to peoples on the margin as the impact of an expanding State interests and economic pressures increasingly is being felt.

In their desire to assert their uniqueness, members of an ethnic group may be apt to convert their most discernible and distinguished institutions into rallying points. Ethnic identity may focus on certain central symbols - language, religion, customs, dress, origin, history and territory - which are seen as distinguishing the ethnic community from its surroundings. In that case, the nature and power of the ethnic perceptions - and with that

the ethnic worldview - are not probed. Connor (1994: 198, 204) argues that whatever way the bonds within an ethnic group are described, it is a mass phenomenon, whose inspiration is emotional and subconscious, i.e., psychological, rather than conscious and rational. It is here that the intrinsic aspects of the concept of ethnicity enter in the form of the idea of a common past, the 'otherness' of the group in relation to the surrounding society, the role of the ancestors, and so forth. The members regenerate their association with each other through a common worldview and a life style characterized by shared cultural patterns, symbols, values and other issues of communal interaction.

Brass (1991) puts little emphasis on the tangible manifestations of ethnicity. He claims that ethnic identities are creations of elites, which draw upon, distort, and in part construct the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to gain political and economic advantage for their group as well as for themselves. It follows from the ethnic variability, that ethnic group identities can be constructed and, thus, serve as a political resource for elites in competition for political power and economic advantage. The ethnic identities become referents for the identification of members of the group that is called upon in order to create a *political* identity more easily. The process of merging ethnic groups into communities and advancing them into a politically conscious ethno-nation requires an understanding of the contrasting environment - the other society. The tactics of the leaders are to emphasize the uniqueness and the righteousness of the ethnic group, and, particularly, intensifying the subjective meaning of the community's symbols of identity. These are made more relational than just personal and instrumental. Language becomes not merely a means of communication, but a priceless heritage of group culture; familiar places and historical sites become sacred shrines. Myths - in the sense that these do not just relate the history of a people, but also their way of thinking - are being created and from the combined effect of these efforts, a unique communal identity develops, both inwardly toward the group members and outwardly towards the surrounding society. In support of this interpretation, it may be noted that the pre-Columbian chronicles - *Popol Wuj, Annals of the Kaqchikels* and *Rabinal Achi* - have been given a sacred value by the cultural activists in Guatemala as they reinterpret the Maya past (Warren 1998: 39). One of their leading intellectuals, Sam Colop, emphasizes that point when he states

> [An ethnic] nation is a state of social consciousness, a psychological phenomenon. It is collective loyalty that unites a society with its collective past and involves it in common aspirations. It is cultural identification, sentiment, and

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a common means of communication: language. (…) A legislated or objective standard does not make a nation. Rather, we insist that it is the psychological or intellectual self-conception of the human group to which we are referring.[8]

So far I have used the term (ethnic) group loosely. In the literature, however, group, community[9], and a third term, nation (ethno-nation), are used to point out levels of ethnic self-awareness and political maturity, with group at the low and nation at the high end (Brass, 1991: 19-20). An ethnic *group* that uses cultural markers and symbols in order to create internal cohesion and help differentiate itself from the rest of the population, is an ethnic *community*. It is subjectively self-conscious and has established criteria for whom to include and whom to exclude from its body of members. The next level of political awakening is when an ethnic community struggles to achieve or expand its rights and influence through political action and mobilization, using its cultural capital. Then it has gone beyond ethnicity per se and is establishing itself as a political force, i.e., it has become a *nation* (ethno-nation). That is, a nation is a politicized community, in the sense that the community's beliefs, behavior, customs and other attributes accommodate a political message and political goals. The transformation of a community into a nation can be accomplished by a competent leadership by either transforming the unfocused ethnic group into a self-conscious entity, i.e., a community, and politicizing it or by amalgamating ethnic groups and give them a common identity and a political focus.

Ethnic communities observed in Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala can only to a very limited degree be characterized by cultural distinctiveness, social exclusivity, and internal homogeneity. As pointed out by Collier (1999: 7) in her study of Chiapas, Mexico, the natives may superficially be described as a backwater where they perform their age-old crafts and rituals in picturesque settings. However, beneath the surface each hamlet is filled with paradoxes that defy easy categorization. Some places weave and wear their traditional dresses, other use jeans. Within even the tiniest settlement some villagers may be rich (relatively speaking) due to their control of land, personal entrepreneurship and the like, mixing with families which hardly have food on the table. And among them, some have ambitions, others not. Clearly, 'community' has to be understood as a more

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[8] Sam Colop (1983: 35); quoted and translated by Warren (1998: 197).
[9] Community has two meanings - as a body of individuals organized in a hamlet (physically) and a social unit with an awareness of some unifying traits (symbolically). Here I refer to the latter.
Later the two will merge, as in a physically existing ethnic community.

problematic locus of contingent social cooperation, involving diverse as well as divergent individual interests. While the socio-physical community is the body in which the manifestations of ethnicity is constructed, maintained and revitalized, it is also the environment where values compete and ethnicity is being redefined.

The resilience of ethnic communities to certain kinds of changes and their adaptability to others, beg the question whether individual ethnic entities are as uniquely isolated and therefore as vulnerable to external influences as Tax (1937, 1941) concluded from his classic studies of Maya *municipios* - a view later seconded by Wolf (1957) and Adams (1988). Watanabe (1992: 5 onward) discusses interpretations of ethnicity, which he categorizes as 'essentialism' and 'historicism', before he articulates a more flexible, i.e., an 'existential', conception of Maya culture and community, expanding on an anthropological interpretation offered earlier by Redfield (1941, 1962). Redfield claims that the characteristics of what he calls 'folk societies' owe more to the inherent qualities of small-scale village life than to their specific cultural content [i.e., the basis of essentialism] and historical origins [historicism]. They represented an organization of conventional understandings about the world manifest in act and artifact (1941: 132-33). Life-long associations among the community members were understood as producing conventional understandings that were tacit, widely shared, highly personalized and densely interwoven (Redfield 1962: 231-253). I will now discuss concepts, which have offered radically new ways to how ethnicity is being understood.

The propensity to perceive an ethnic division is best stated by those most involved, i.e., the ethnic members themselves, often provoked by the interaction with the 'Other', creating what Barth (1969) called the 'ethnic boundary'[10]. He argued that ethnic identity is malleable. It is articulated at the interface between ethnic groups since that is where persons encounter each other, and where the identity of any group is modulated to and moderated by that of the Other. Barth's view implies that ethnicity adjusts itself to the specific circumstances of any ethnic interaction. According to Morin and Saladin d'Anglure (1997), Barth's (1969) essay, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries,* marked a paradigmic leap to a new way of interpreting ethnicity, much like Anderson's (1983)

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[10] Where the interface between two phenomena are heavily invested symbolically, the distinction between *border* and *boundary*, becomes important. The border is seen as a social fact and does not concern us here, while boundary is consciousness, signifying that the difference is a matter of social construction.

essay, *Imagined Communities*, introduced another shift in the 1980s onward. Barth's approach focused on the social organization of ethnic *differences* and he had no tolerance for what may be referred to as the group's 'inventory', i.e., the focus of the essentialist approach. Instead of considering ethnic solidarity as primordial, in the sense that it is a given once and for all, Barth claimed that it is a product of interaction with the external world and varies in intensity, depending on the circumstances. This view implies that ethnic solidarity has a good deal in common with the phenomenon of political mobilization, which also defines itself up toward an 'other'. After Barth, the study of ethnicity to a considerably extent became the study of ethnic politics and of ethnic groups as political and economic interest groups.

Anderson (1983), who stood for the next significant leap, did not contemplated what drives ethnic group action, but the existence of the group itself. Since the ethnic group, according to him, was conceived - imagined - as a community by its members (see the discussion in Anderson 1983: 50-65), the study of ethnicity became above all a study of ethnic *consciousness* and, ultimately, of the social construction of identities. Like Barth, Anderson opposes a view on ethnic identities as static and primordial, but the implied variability of ethnicity in Anderson's approach problemizes the notion of ethnic boundaries. However, in both approaches a significant break had been made with previous views on how ethnicity was perceived, that is, first, that ethnic groups are clearly bounded units, characterized by a common culture, shared by all its members, and, second, that ethnicity is a pre-modern phenomenon. Also, the new views distinguish ethnicity from culture. Ethnicity has become a matter of identity, of ascription and self-ascription. Vermeulen and Govers (1997: 5-6) point out two aspects that relate to my previous discussion as well as to this study specifically. First, the new focus on consciousness implies a definition of ethnicity in terms of *subjective* states that contrasts with definitions that focus on the aforementioned 'objective features' of ethnicity. Without denying the presence of ethnic characteristics, the authors emphasize the importance of distinguishing such features from their *ideological* representation and the way they are being used.

As economic forces and other influences of the outer society take their toll on the ethnic community, a new category of 'ethnicity' enter the stage - that of the *urban* person with an ethnic past, who has left his community and parted with its core values - while

still being emotionally tied to them - due to, say, out-migration or by rising in the society. As I will show, persons of this category are the driving force behind what Warren (1998) refers to as what is now - unfortunately - referred to as the 'indigenous movement in Guatemala'. I will contend in chapter V, that Warren's 'movement' does not meet the criteria of any sensible defined social movement (see Melucci 1979: 38, and Foweraker 1995: 4) and even less my concept of 'ethnic movement', which will be discussed below. Her argument, however, exemplifies the problematic claim that a person of ethnic roots is still ethnic in spite of having undergone urbanization and individualization - the very antithesis of the concept of ethnicity. The latter is linked to *common*ality with a relationship to the land and the community. Anderson's (1983) concept of 'imagined communities' should not be understood as implying that ethnicity can be constructed free of premises. In the context of this study I emphasize land and community.

Mobilizations: Social mobilizations are generally seen as social 'vehicles' whereby members of civil society mediate the relationship between the ruled and the ruler, normally the State. They may erupt due to flaws in the political system, implying that there is an unmet call for deliberations in the society. They relay a need for either a better communication with the State or adjustments for part of the population. In this interpretation, the turmoil in the streets (symbolically speaking) is an appreciative event, whereby civil society can be heard and the coherence of that society - democratic or not - being strengthened. Social movements are seen as a desirable sign of civil society in action and not only as a means to an end, but an end in itself. This perception assumes, first, that the ruler, toward whom the protesters direct their message, is listening, is willing to reason, and, within bounds, will accommodate demands. Second, that the ruling elite was not informed or had been misinformed about the conditions behind the grievances, i.e., the traditional channels between the ruler and the ruled did not function properly. And, third, that when the civil society is allowed to express its view in public without consequences to the protesters, it is a sign that the ruling elite has a benign attitude toward its underlings. None of the countries of this study would fit the assumptions listed above. They are all highly stratified societies characterized by exploitation and oppression of their large rural populations. Civil society has been given leverage to express itself in the countries of this study, but its voice is inconsequential

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and not paid attention to by a disinterested State. However, the expansion of social demands and the massive presence of the State in the Latin American societies sharpen the relevance of the relationship between social movements and their political environment, and make the questions of organization, strategy and resources essential.

The literature on social mobilizations is extensive, but the theoretical approach has tended to address its subject in broad universal categories with the result that important particulars get overlooked (see Castells 1982; Melucci 1989; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Cohen and Arato 1992: 492-563). Most of the work is based on North American and West European conditions, which means that what is being analyzed and theorized upon are *urban* expressions. Foweraker (1995: 1-8, 24-35) raises doubt how applicable these observations and successive theories are in the very different political and cultural context of Latin America, and - I will supplement - more so when one addresses structurally marginalized ethno-rural groups in ethnically stratified societies. I will comment on the implications of this, but first I will identify the basic categories of social movements and exemplify some tactical and operational problems of those, which have been referred to as 'new' social movements.

'Traditional' (Class-Based) Movements: In this category one finds the traditional version, i.e., the labor, student and agrarian (peasant) unions with an identifiable membership and a clear institutional context. Foweraker (2002: 2, footnote 3) claims that the labor movements in Latin American 'has a proven capacity to impel political change', which may be the reason why they are severely hamstrung in all the countries of this study. Labor legislation works against them and as a result, say, in Guatemala, not an atypical case, less than 5 percent of the work force is organized (Prensa Libre 2002n: 15). One of my informants in Guatemala[11] mentioned that arranging public demonstrations was difficult. Applying for a permit, which always was required, would necessitate a process that could take up to 6-8 months. In addition, each employed participant would need a permit from his employer. For this and other reasons, the unions are politically weak. Due to their ideological affiliation, it may also reflect, what Casteñeda (1993) argues, that the traditional left has lost its relevance and its appeal. The same impotence is observed in Peru in spite of the ongoing and high levels of activity in both Lima and

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[11] A member of the Secretariat of the labor union UTQ (*Unión de trabajadores Quetzaltecos*) in Quetzaltenango.

the inland. Traditionally, the tactics have been protest meetings, marches, strikes, and barricades. Class consciousness and demands focused on topics like wages and working conditions were stressed.

The peasant associations have been an important part of this category, but with a focus on land. They promoted the class-based ideological construct of a peasant (*campesino*), making no difference between non-indigenous and indigenous. The premise was that the person's relations to the agrarian production should be the basis of his public and political identity. This idea took hold in several Latin American countries from the 1920s onward. While ethnic identity was not necessarily negated, it remained in the background. In Ecuador, until the 1970s with the emergence of an indigenous movement, this so-called *campesinista* politics was the only conduit to a public identity for most indigenous people. However, peasant organizations were not autonomous. From their inception, a discourse based on the concept of class linked the peasant unions with other leftist organizations. The argument was that to develop the necessary revolutionary consciousness, peasants had to be 'awakened' and guided by the urban elite (Pallares 2002: 14, 26)[12]. As I will show, this attitude still dominates among the indigenous-rooted but de-ethnicized population of the rural Highland of Peru and in peasant organizations in Guatemala, CONIC among them[13], but today with none or a distinctly less accentuated ideological identification. Organizationally, the peasant unions favored a hierarchical structure, which collided with the tradition of their indigenous constituents, denying a role for the community that leads to a networking scheme. The expansion of the social mobilization concept, originally based on the 'traditional' movements, to include the so-called 'new' movements of the 1970s and 1980s may be explained by the introduction of unconventional forms of collective action in areas previously untouched by social conflicts and the emergence of new actors with different demands, whose organizational models and approaches differed from those of the aforementioned category. This context will be discussed next.

Social Movements: The social movement may be characterized as an action of

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[12] The ideological background of this position is exemplified by Van den Berghe (1974: 2) and McAll (1990) who point out that Marx referred to ethnicity only in the passing as a symptom of a pre-capitalistic stage of small political importance.

[13] Yashar (1998: 26) claims that CONIC is part of the backbone of what she and Warren (1998) see as an indigenous movement in Guatemala. I will discuss this in chapter V.

solidarity where the actors - in their function as social activists - recognize that they are part of one social unit. Its expression is conflictive since it lays claim to limited resources others also claim, and its forms of actions challenge the limits of the governing structure, i.e., it pushes the system beyond the range of its tolerance, often wanting to redefine the premises of the social order by non-revolutionary means. Social movements consist of large groups of otherwise unrelated people, who are being mobilized by different kinds of tactics. However, a social movement requires not only a theme or a vision with a potentially wide public appeal, but also some kind of (non-institutionalized) organization that mobilizes its constituency, structures the available resources, set priorities, make alliances, and informs the public about its cause. I am careful not to imply that the activists are characterized by a 'common meaning' in some conforming sense; they are not. What unite them are ideas, represented by symbols that, by their versatility, allows people of opposing views to find their own meanings while sharing in the common vision (Cohen 1985). The symbols become the vehicle, which facilitates the union of diverging interpretations. Quoting Geertz (1975: 5), "…man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun…" whose analysis is "…not an experimental science in search of law, but an interpretive one in search of meaning".

The social movements of the 1980s and 1990s represented not so much the persistence of previous political categories than new ways of doing politics that challenged state-centered political systems (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996: chap. 6; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Alvarez et al. 1998). One way to look at them, since it is a dynamic body which respond to and act upon the social environment, is to see them as a *process* in which consciousness, attitudes and values of the activists are constantly being created and recreated as they interactively confront and wrestle with the established social structure to meet their goals (Melucci 1989: 29; Foweraker's 1995: 23). However, much like NGOs early on were overstated as a political panacea (see Gideon 1998; Tedesco 1999), so have social movements been widely perceived as an example of democracy in action (Davis 1992: 401). Foweraker (2002: 7-9), however, points to a weakening of social movements as a political tool, a trend identified by Touraine (1988) as ongoing from the 1960s onward.

I will argue that social movements are inherently weak instruments for sustaining social protest due to vulnerabilities in their constitution, in spite of a certain ability to

adapt to changing environments and sometimes even influence them. On the one hand, they may disintegrate due to a failure of maintaining their mass appeal or, on the other, risk to turn into institutions that may undermine the movement goals and threaten the continued existence of the movement form of collective action (the 'iron law of oligarchy'[14]). With respect to the confrontations between these movements and the State, we learned from the social movements in Europe, which mushroomed after the student revolt in Paris in 1968, that these social initiatives often had a short life span or a rapid decline in their effectiveness. One reason was that the authorities quickly learned to counter their influence. In addition to stonewalling or ignoring them, the authorities would accept negotiations but 'tread water' with no intention to give anything; trying to confuse the topic by distorting the focus of the encounter; or co-opt their leaders. The movement's interests, it seemed, were best served if it alternated between a 'negotiating' and a violent or non-violent 'confrontational' approach[15], successfully used by the Ecuadorian movement in its non-violent form throughout the 1990s (Selverston-Scher 2001). As a means against evasive tactics, the 'confrontational' approach had a number of advantages. It helps to keep the mobilization in the public's focus, to motivate supporters, and to mobilize new constituencies. A successful confrontation boosted the internal debate, isolated dissidents, generated experiences, and put the authorities on the defense or made them over-react[16]. I will exemplify practical aspects of social mobilizations by discussing studies of two significant movements in Latin America.

The first, described by Starn (1999), is *las rondas campesinas*, which consisted of rural justice groups in Peru. The movement began in 1976 in north-western part of the Highland as a community-run vigilante patrol against cattle thieves. Hundreds of hamlets in the region and nearby provinces formed their own night patrols within the next three years. During the 1980s, the movement spread to adjoining departments. Quickly the rondas dramatically expanded their functions, evolving into an entirely alternative justice

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[14] Michels (1966).

[15] My 'hands-on' qualifications for the following discussion have their background in a successful social movement of national exposure I co-managed in the city of Trondheim, Norway, from 1976 to 1978.

[16] It is a question to which extent European and North-American experiences and theories on social movements are applicable in Latin America (Foweraker 1995: 1-8). In fact, with respect to strategical use of violence, most social movements in Latin America are not violent; rather they pursue advance through careful strategic calculation (ibid: 26). The ethnic movements emphasize non-violence - with the noteworthy exception of the Zapatista one in Chiapas, Mexico.

system, with open community assemblies, to resolve problems ranging from wife-beating to land disputes. Starn (1992: 90) mentions that in the early 1990s, more than 3,400 hamlets operated across Peru's northern Andes. The other study, by Edelman (1999), discusses a countrywide protest movement among peasants in Costa Rica directed against the economic effects of global competition within the agro-business.

In spite of the two movements' significant differences, there are important similarities in why these movements could not sustain themselves. The increasing disenfranchisement of the movements' followers with their leadership stands out in both narratives. This condition originated from how the movements handled their internal challenges, and from this followed that the movements became increasingly irrelevant to their individual political arena. The narratives combined say something substantially about social movements in general. Among the internal factors that Starn claims contributed to the decline - ignoring the external ones the movement had no control over - were reactions from the members to less democracy and more rigidity within the movement as it came of age, a trend reflecting Michels's 'iron rule of oligarchy'. Also Castells (1982: 41) asserts that popular movements, when they become institutionalized, lose their identity and - I may add - their following. Certain elected presidents for the ronda committees managed to establish a top-down and long-lasting rule within their territory. *Caudillismo*, bribing, vote-buying, and patriarchy, which kept women on the sideline, took hold many places. This trend went hand-in-hand with a general weakening of the internal communication, indicating the rise of attitudes that were in conflict with the initial anti-hierarchic grassroots perspectives of the movement. One may speculate whether not also the success of the rondas played a role. With success comes envy, factionalism, character assassination, and status anxiety that may contribute to erode the movement over time.

Starn narrates how competing political parties, as well as NGOs, often with their own agendas and ideologies, preyed on the rondas, but he does not link the decline of the movement with the fact that it operated in the focus of competing political interest groups. From my personal experiences, I believe Starn underestimates the effect of this aspect. The bombardment of conflicting ideas and proposals for initiatives from the inside and the outside (NGOs, political parties and other interest groups) may have contributed to wearing down the feeling of coherence and solidarity that initially existed

among the followers. The highly charged ideological environment may slowly have drained both energy and enthusiasm from the movement.

Edelman (1999: 144) mentions that the peasants established the practice of arranging public strategy meetings, but states that this led to a weakening of the movement and was an important source of its destruction (p. 157). Starn does not identify specific causes for the decline of his movement; his emphasis is on the effects of attitudes. Contrary to Edelman, however, he claims that the democratic characteristics were a condition for the success of the movement. Confrontations where ideologies and personalities collide, sometimes voraciously, to inform the strategic and tactical decisions, are an integral part of social movements, even in contexts governed by an agenda of practical tasks. But they should preferably be kept out of sight and ear of the 'common' constituents to maintain the illusion of unity. Edelman's observation is in agreement with reports on social movements in Europe in the 1970s. The leaderships of these were characterized by factions that were in intensely ideological struggle with each other during the day-to-day operation, while keeping a united front toward their followers. Social movements were sometimes destroyed in these confrontations, but while the presence of such a destructive force may seem undesirable, it also generates enthusiasm, new visions and unexpected solutions that may carry the social movement to new heights. One possible explanation for the divergence between Starn's and Edelman's narratives on this point is that Starn's movement experienced a more sedate and slow-moving environment, while Edelman's operated in a high-pitched space. Another possibility is that this type of debates, within or between rondas, may have found other less public outlets, which Starn does not identify. A bitter conflict, to be addressed in chapter II, which engulfed the native community I lived with in the Peruvian Amazon, make clear that even egalitarian communities like those Starn addresses, express themselves on many levels.

What additional general insight can be extracted from these two narratives in spite of the movements' differences? First, Edelman's (1999: 165) refers to the 'mild and sporadic' use of repression against the movement he studied. Both authors report on excesses from the State, but not in any case did it reach a level of systematic violent onslaught. Even though Guatemala during 1979-84 may be an extreme case, that country is a clear indication that some Latin-American States are prepared to respond to social provocations with unrestrained lethal violence, particularly when ethnicity is involved.

This limits the use in Latin America of theory from Western Europe and the USA where social movements may see physical confrontations as a useful tactic, because a violent response by the State is not openly tolerated by the public. Second, the two narratives confirm the absolute necessity of maintaining an open dialogue - or the illusion of one - between members and leadership and to establish *one* 'vision' throughout the movement. Third, the *belief* among constituents that their leaders are listening, even when their actions contradict this, will help to consolidate the movement, particularly in moments of crisis. Finally, the life span of a social movement is *always* limited. If that was not the case, it would turn into an institution with the trappings referred to above[17]. Both Touraine (1987) and Castells (1982) point to that because social movements function in a short-term perspective they cannot bring about long-term social change. The ultimate lesson learned from a comparison of Edelman's and Starn's narratives is that those aspects which are the social movements' strong points may - at the same time - also be their weak points. The reflections in this section have bearing on ethnic movements, which I will define and discuss next. However, while having many of the characteristics of conventional social movements, they have additional features that advice that they preferably should be perceived as belonging to a special category of social movement.

Ethnic Movements: Experience tells us that a social mobilization is more viable and durable when it is *idea*-driven and not fueled primarily by causes or grievances - and more so when it is ideological in an existential sense[18] as ethnicity among ethnic people. An ethnic movement becomes the pinnacle of an ideologicized social movement - or, as I will contend, transcends it - because, first, its constituents share a common undisputed ideology, i.e., their ethnic worldview and identity, that supercede political, social and economic (material) considerations. Second, the goals of the movement are linked to the defense of this worldview and thereby to the cultural survival of the movement's constituency and the ethnic self of each member. And, third, the means used by the ethnic movement are an amalgam of traditionally internal and modern external methods. Briefly

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[17] Cohen and Arato (1992) mention the women's movement as an exception, but it is debatable whether that case is too heterogeneous to be compared with the regular social or ethnic movements discussed here. Foweraker (1995: 31) points to, however, that the Latin American social movement refers to the dissemination of demands by an accumulation of similar groups, and not by a unified structure.
[18] Derived from the theory, stating that man's individual existence precedes his essence and stressing his responsibility for fashioning his self.

stated, the ethnicity of the movement's constituents that gives them their identity is both a resource and the very reason for collective action.

Identity, however, is a slippery concept. Referring to the New Social Movements (NSM) theory, which emphasizes the identity-oriented aspects (Cohen 1985; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Cohen and Arato 1992), put another meaning in the term 'identity' than the ethnic one used above. The NSM debate does not exclude the ethnic person, but he is not the focus. When theorists (see, for example, Melucci 1989: 46; Foweraker 2002: 2) state, in general terms, that participants in social movements share a collective 'identity', they refer to an *instrumental* identity, based on narrow social premises, which is left behind when the activists part and return to their home in the evening. The activists share a commonality with certain political-ideological symbols and the rightness of certain claims that follow from these, but little else. Hence, the passion of the collective actors of this category cannot be understood as representing existential interests. In contrast, the ethnic actor (individual or group) has been molded throughout his life to be 'ethnically social'; from that process he acquires his identity (to be discussed in chapter II). It would be a trivialization of the concept of the ethnic identity to put it at par with how 'identity' is being used in the former case.

The two main approaches to analyzing social movements are the NSM and the Resource Mobilization (RM) one. Both are based on observations of urban movements in the high-industrialized societies of the North. None of them should be understood as grand all-inclusive theories; they both have developed in many directions and are best seen as debates rooted in basic sets of premises that guide their diversified outlooks. Foweraker (1995) discusses whether they truly can address properties of social mobilizations in the very different political and cultural contexts of those of the Latin America. To the extent social movements have been analyzed in a Latin American context - to my knowledge, primarily within an urban context (with notable exceptions of the rural *rondas* and Sendero Luminoso in Peru) - very little theory has been generated (Foweraker 1995: 1). However, the ethnic movement is rurally based, i.e., it represents an *ethno-rural* construct defending (among other goals), traditional values against externally imposing *urban-based* influences. The possible implications of this constellation cannot be inferred from the NSM debate, but some come to the surface when one asks which criterion to use to assess the strength or influence of an ethnic

organization.

Selverston-Scher (2001: 30) proposes to judge them by the same criteria as applied to socio-urban movements, i.e., their popularity and ability to rally people for mass demonstrations. However, the urban activists are sophisticated to a degree where they are reasonably well informed about their rights and the complexity of their opponent, most likely the State, within the context of their mobilization. They need information more than 'education'. A rural constituency, on the other hand, is unlikely to have that knowledge; their opponent and sometimes the 'battle field' are in unknown territory. This means, as I will show, that internal 'education' is a major task of the ethnic movement (using Ecuador as example). Second, in spite of some spectacular successes on the part of the mobilization in Ecuador, mass demonstrations are not an important item in the quiver of tactics among the ethnic movements. And, third, a focus on these eye-catching 'public' appearances diverts the attention away from the consciousness-raising work on the 'inner' front, over and above what I referred to as 'education' earlier. It is here the ethnic movement invests the overwhelming part of its organizing capital. In conclusion, an urban social movement may be evaluated as Selverston-Scher proposes; an ethnic movement ought to be assessed by the preceding *process*, i.e., the quality and extent of the work at the grassroots that, ultimately, will make results possible and sustainable.

Other differences address general conditions that have been mentioned earlier. Due to the intrinsic ethno-ideological common denominator of its constituents, carried over from one generation to the next, it is questionable whether the argument pointing to a limited life span of social movements applies to ethnic movements. The higher coherence one may assume will be created in an ethnic population when and if it is understood that its identity is at stage, may indicate that an ethnic movement is a long-term phenomenon and, hence, can offer long-term social change. I observed that the movement of *rondas* in Peru - ethno-neutral but functioning on ethnic principles - were still operative, nearly 30 years after its introduction. Few (if any) social movements can show to a similar result. If Yashar (1998) is correct that the Zapatista (EZLN) mobilization in Chiapas, Mexico, should be interpreted as an ethnic movement and not as a peasant revolt of the more traditional kind as I propose elsewhere, it may just as well be seen as the latest eruption of a long-term indigenous mobilization in the region. The confluence of the traditionally-influenced networking of an ethnic movement, rooted in the community, and other

aspects of its rural affiliation (to be discussed in the next chapter), possibly makes the threat of the Michels's 'iron rule' less relevant for the ethnic movement. The ethno-ideological platform represents a unique feature that has additional implications as well. When mobilized, the ethnic 'rationality' will lead to different perspectives and imply other organizational forms and tactics, influenced by traditions and customs. These will be discussed in later chapters. The strategies may differ as well, but they are to a larger extent dependent on the constraints set by the outer society and may not differ much from those of an imaginative non-ethnic movement. From the above, it seems that the ethnic movement may serve as a corrective to important manifestations of the governing social movements theories and thereby the theories themselves.

Those aspects I have addressed have bearing primarily on the NSM theory due to the importance it puts on the implications of versions of 'identity'. The emphasis the RM theory puts on the functionalist rationality and costs-benefits considerations of the actors would seem to make it less useful in relation to the ethnic movement with its communal approach. That misadaption follows implicit from Hannigan's (1985: 441) claim that the RM theory leads to the assumption that goals and strategies are determined by the (urban) leadership, while the (urban) membership is seen as a resource This is in contrast to how the ideal of a grassroots movement would work, ethnic or not, since the leaders, in this interpretation, may well get their ideas from outside their constituency. In an ethnic environment, there would be a consensus between the leadership and the constituents. Together they would agree on the goals, as illustrated in the aforementioned studies by Starn (1999) and Edelman (1999), and the leadership would take the necessary initiatives to carry them out. Foweraker (1995:17) refers to the RM theory's static presentation of strategic choices. This theory may not describe well the unpredictability implicit in the ethnic movements' work form of networking and bottom-up approach in the mobilizing process. According to Foweraker (1995: 16), the RM approach has been mostly ignored in the debate on social movements in Latin America.

Rights: There is an abundance of literature on individual citizenship rights in Latin America, too large to be referred here, but, to my knowledge, no part of it addresses the provocative presence of the 'two-tier' citizenship for ethnic peoples in the countries of

this study or even recognize the existence of the problem[19]. 'Rights' are not a set of defined privileges. They refer to an ideal state where human beings, as groups or individuals, are supposed to have equal opportunities. Social and political conditions influence how this ideal manifests itself over time.

In an expansion of the debate on individual citizenship rights from the 1990s onward, scholars started focusing on citizenship rights for groups, the so-called collective or group-specific rights (see Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Shapiro and Kymlicka 1997) and on ethnic groups in particular (see Stavenhagen 1996). Kymlicka (2001: 294) points to political events that contributed to this trend. Kymlicka and Norman (1994), Beiner (1992) and Shafir (1995) offer a survey of works on this extended approach to the debate on citizenship rights. The central question to the concept of group-specific rights is whether people have legitimate interests, emerging from their ethno-cultural group membership that are not adequately recognized or protected by the familiar set of individual civil and political rights as reflected in, say, the French Declaration, the American Bill of Rights or the United Nations' Rights of Man. That question addresses topics like: does an ethnic group's special interests require more protection than the 'standard', i.e., individual citizenship rights? And how important is ethnicity to personal identity and self-respect? Kymlicka (1995) argues that the reason behind the claim that group-specific rights - in addition to individual rights - are needed to accommodate enduring cultural differences, is that populations in liberal (democratic) countries make decisions based on the process of majority vote. The result renders cultural minorities vulnerable to the possibility of significant injustice at the hands of the larger number. It is legitimate, indeed unavoidable, following Kymlicka, to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights. By living in a society where individual rights are emphasized and decisions are made ideally by majority vote, a minority group that decides to live on other premises than the other society may constantly loose out. To give groups collective rights in addition to the individual rights is not a privilege given to the few at the expense of the rest, but a means to compensate for the threats the group experiences by choosing to be different. Kymlicka lists in particular three forms of group-differentiated rights, referred to as 'collective rights': 'self-government-rights' (the delegation of powers to national minorities, often through some form of federalism); 'poly-ethnic rights'

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[19] For example, see Richards' [2000] review article on social rights in Latin America.

(financial support and/or legal protection of certain practices associated with the traditions of particular ethnic or religious groups); and 'special representation rights' (guaranteed seats for ethnic or national groups within the central institutions of the dominant state). Each of them is being discussed separately by Kymlicka (1995) and is complemented by the contribution of Levy (1997).

Today, there is no shortage of international accords and legislation in favor of the ethnic peoples[20]. The problem seems to be to make them bear in favor of those they are intended to benefit. In my interviews with leaders even at the highest level in the dominant ethnic organizations in Peru and Ecuador, i.e., AIDESEP and CONAIE, they were dismissively referred to as being of little help in their work, though Convention 169 (ILO 1989) was at times referred to. The call for 'rights' in the form used in the debate of the North was never used in the discourse of representatives of ethnic movements I contacted. That the individual rights debate is culturally alien to them may be one reason. More important may be another aspect that does not seems to be recognized in the academic debate, i.e., many Latin American countries are rigidly stratified and maintained as such with ethnic peoples at the bottom of the pecking order, and that 'rights', individually or collectively, are not something which becomes available to an increasing part of the populace as the society progresses, a premise of Marshall (1950). According to Stavenhagen (2002: 37), the recognition of collective rights would require a complete overhaul of the Latin American national state, which the criollo and mestizo elites built up to serve their own interests.

The discourse of the representatives of the ethnic populations is that they demand to get back what was taken from them after the Conquest and which is part of their identity as a people. This reflects the revisionist argument of indigenous activists I would interview in Peru and Ecuador, and which Warren (1998: 136) reports on from Guatemala - prominently expressed during the time preceding the 500 years' anniversary of Columbus' arrival to the Americas - that the ethnic population of that continent was not conquered in the self-glorifying European sense of the word, denying indigenous culture and resistance. The term used is 'invasion', which conjures an image of territorial violation. This outlook gives them a very different platform on which to define their

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[20] An overview, including the ILO Convention 169 which I will refer to, is given by Steiner and Alston (2000), and a guide specifically on the ethnic peoples' rights in the inter-American human rights system, is given by MacKay (2002).

rights. The president of FIESH, representing the Amazon Shuar nation, and Kizhpe, previous president of Highland FIIS in Saraguro, both in Ecuador, called for autonomy as a basic indigenous right. Undoubtedly, they would have agreed with the wider principled view expressed by Cojtí Cuxil, an eloquent Maya cultural activist in Guatemala,

> Mayas have the right to be respected concretely and permanently in their cultural and ethnic identity. They have the right to reclaim and keep their original ethnic territories. They have the right not to become the victims of massacres, persecutions, and living conditions which prevent the expression and development of their identity and their integrity as a people […] The Mayas have the right to use, preserve and own as property the artistic, historical and cultural riches of their people. And they have the right to defend themselves from the cultural impositions, which are foreign to them[21].

There are precedents to the claim for autonomy, see Stavenhagen (2002: 34) and the discussion of Thurner (1993) in part 4 of chapter III. Self-determination suggests secession and political statehood to many critics of ethnic autonomy, meaning fragmentation of the mestizo national state. No indigenous organization has gone on record as wanting to secede, but unspecified autonomy appears at the top of the list of rights claimed in almost every major ethnic political document.

Concepts in Sheep's Clothes: In this section, I will include concepts whose denotations are ambiguous but, still, applied in the literature without clarification or based on a definition that make its use unenlightening while pretending to be substantive. The problem with this kind of concepts is that they relay a 'feel-good', but unclear and seductive message, which, by the same token, discourages scrutiny. Following Cranston (1954), language not only denotes the object, it also expresses attitudes. Paraphrasing Cohen (1985: 33), a word like 'democracy' does not merely describe a form of government and legal status; it also tells us how to regard that form. 'Development' is another - who are against development? Less seldom is the question asked, paraphrasing Merton's (1967) - development for *whom*? 'Development' and 'democracy', among others, belong to what Cranston calls "hurray" words, and what Noam Chomsky referred to as "words of persuasion by association". I will comment on the last case.

Any group with an ambition to make itself felt in the national political arena through mass mobilization must apply political strategies and tactics appropriate to the constraints

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[21] Cojtí Cuxil (1994) as quoted by Stavenhagen (2002: 39). See also Cojtí Cuxil (1996).

of the political climate. At the very minimum, this implies a correct identification of the political regime in power. This may seem trivial. Unfortunately, the wide claim that some kind of democracy has taken root in Latin America during the last couple of decades[22] - at times, dropping 'formal' and referring to the process as 'democratization' and applying the term while deducing from the general to the specific without appropriate qualifications for the individual country - has consequences. This and other 'democracy'-implying terms and their associations enhance these countries' (possibly) least significant political feature, i.e., the presence of competitive elections[23], and veil what characterize them the most, i.e., their *illiberal* characteristics, using Zakaria's (1997, 2003) term. And the practice invites for a distorted interpretation of the status of structurally disadvantaged groups in Latin America and the obstacles they confront when they mobilize to secure their rights. Foweraker (1995: 34, note 21) states that

> One of the [...] fictions [...] is that Latin America can act analytically as an empirically coherent category. [...]. Slater (1991: 44) suggests the depth of differences between national realities by referring to "the reactionary despotism of the Central American region; the violent internal fragmentation of Colombian and Peruvian societies; the fragile peripheral capitalist democracies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and [...]".

The general reference to a 'democratization'[24] of Latin America becomes particularly problematic in ethnically stratified countries when the presence and the consequences of the characteristic rural/urban divide and the stratified social structure itself are ignored, as commonly is the case, while implying that electoral democracy will give the disadvantaged what the past denied them. On my frequently asked question during the fieldwork for this study, not *one* of my many well-placed, well-educated informants, mestizo and ethnic persons alike, would describe their countries as even remotely democratic[25]. What they experienced were different versions of undemocratic

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[22] Selverston-Scher (2001) with reference to Ecuador; Weyland (2002) with reference to Peru; Yashar (1998). Guatemala is claimed to have become democratic under Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo (1986-90).

[23] One may ask whether the ethos of that statement is met and, say, Peru's elections are 'open, free and fair' when the competing political mestizo collect the votes, but systematically promote agendas that are against the basic interests of their rural and, particularly, ethno-rural constituencies, leaving - in practice - the latter without representation in the political arena.

[24] The term was introduced by Huntington (1991).

[25] The only exception was my priviliged informant, Deep Throat, who socialized with members of the very top power elite in Lima, was on first name with the First Family, and political advisor to the leadership of the governing party, differed - and even he qualified his words.

authoritarian regimes under the control of oligarchies, more 'benign' perhaps than in previous eras, implying that a *liberalization* has taken place. My field observations support this perception. It will be my conceptional platform in the later discussion. However, the frequent use of the term 'democratization' and other democracy-implying terms used by scholars and national politicians, calls for a comment.

Zakaria (2003)[26] points to S. P. Huntington who states that "elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of [political] democracy, the inescapable sine qua non" (p. 18)[27]. The use of Huntington's minimalist definition is unenlightening. Quoting Roberts (2002: 112), "concepts […] limit our appreciation of reality by focusing attention on some data at the expense of other data". For the past few years, the regimes of the rigidly, stratified countries of my study have displayed weak and transitory 'democratic' features in a minimal electoral sense, but, as I will argue elsewhere, there are signs that these features are attenuating or disappearing and even that the military in places covertly may be strengthening its hand without necessarily wanting to take overt control.

Seconding Foweraker (1995: 6), Zakaria (2003) mentions that to "people in the West, democracy means *liberal* democracy" implying "the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property"[28] (p. 17). A quick review of the literature on 'democraticized' countries shows that different versions of a 'liberal democracy' (more often implicitly than explicitly stated) indeed guides the argument and the use of the democracy terms. Westwood (2001: 23) states that democracy is not a fixed stage, but 'a site of contention and possibilities', and Held (1987) that there are 'models of democracy', warning that whatever concept of 'democracy' is being used, it is not Huntington's nor is it straight-forward. Numerous approaches have been proposed to determine quantitatively the degree of democracy in a

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[26] I am thankful to Dr. Higley for referring me to this author. Zakaria states that he did not intend to write the book as a scholarly work, but "as a contribution to a debate". However, see Zakaria (1997).

[27] This, however, is not a definition; it is an identification only of what is perceived as its most important element. However, I will assume it was meant as a definition, since many scholars define a democracy this way, among them Weyland (2002).

[28] Zakaria continues: "…this bundle of freedoms - what might be termed 'constitutional liberalism' - has nothing intrinsically to do with democracy and the two have not always gone together. […] Today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart across the globe. Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not", adding that "newly democratic countries too often become sham democracies" (p. 17). Zakaria refers to them as '*illiberal* democracies'.

given regime by using sets of measurable indicators aggregated according to theoretically sound rules, indicating that scholars indeed use widely different concepts. Munck and Verkuilen (2002) conclude that none of the proposed indicators were methodologically satisfactory, pointing to disagreements on how crucial features of a democracy and their relative importance are assessed[29]. The bottom line is that there is no accepted label for regimes such as Peru's, Guatemala's and Ecuador's, meaning that each country must be analyzed on its own merits. There are additional problems with the wide use of the term 'democracy' in relation to Latin America, i.e., that a 'democratization' has taken place. One is the provocative presence of the structurally determined two-tier citizenship in ethnically stratified countries. Another is the argument raised by Rustow (1970)[30] that "the dynamic process of democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle" (p. 352), meaning that the transfer from one regime type to democracy requires considerable time to allow for structural changes[31].

Carothers (2002a)[32] criticizes what he refers to as the 'transition paradigm' - the belief that countries in different parts of the world during the last two decades, moving from dictatorial rule toward more liberal regimes, transit near-wholesale toward democracy[33]. He points to that reality does not conform to that claim. He argues that the overwhelming majority of the 'transitional countries' have ended in a political gray zone of regimes which are neither dictatorial nor democratic. These he parts into two types, which he calls 'feckless[34] pluralistic states' and states of 'dominant-power politics'. Since

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[29] See also Coppedge and Reinicke (2002).

[30] Referred to as seminal by Foweraker (1995), Selverston-Scher (2001) and Carothers (2002a).

[31] In Peru, democracy took over, it was said, during the few months' interregnum when Valentín Paniagua served as interim president after Fujimori and before president-elect Toledo took over - without changes in the State structure or the manning of the State bodies. In Guatemala, it is claimed, became democratic during the 4 years of the first elected president, Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo - following 26 years of authoritarian rule and while strict military supervision was in effect. Ecuador has had 8 presidents in 6 years of which two were ousted. In the last case, the Joint Military Command put in Vice President Gustavo Noboa (Macdonald 2002: 170). All three countries were in conflict with one or more of the conditions Rustow established as prerequisite for a transition to democracy.

[32] Thomas Carothers, having spent much of his career in policy work, may not be a fully recognized academic comparativist. However, no article in the comparative field had more of an impact during 2002 than his article about the end of the transition paradigm [Carothers 2002a]. He triggered a lot of writing by 'professional' comparativists in response, including the small symposium that *Journal of Democracy* printed about his thesis two issues later [see next footnote].

[33] Carothers' (2002a) article provoked a debate with contributions by Hyman (2002), Nodia (2002), O'Donnel (2002), and Wollack (2002), followed by an answer by Carothers (2002b).

[34] Purists may react to Carothers' choice of word. It is explained by the Webster Dictionary as

he concludes that the former is most common in Latin America, lists Ecuador and Guatemala among them (he does not mention Peru[35]), and his description is supported by my fieldwork in all three countries, I will quote from his article (p. 10):

> Countries whose political life is marked by feckless pluralism tend to have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings. Despite these positive features, however, democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country. Overall, politics is widely seen as tale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and command equally little respect. And the State remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad or even calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous, and successive governments are unable to make headway on most of the major problems facing the country, from crime and corruption to health, education, and public welfare generally.

3. Methodology

Data for this study were collected in different, but traditional ways: first, by unstructured interviews with professionals, public servants and representatives of a variety of organizations, including NGOs; second, improvised conversations (which had the veiled form of an interview) with individuals in contexts of value to my surveys; and, third, extensive participant observation, particularly during my 'live-ins' with the Amazon natives. The first category was approached primarily in cities and urban areas; the second during short stays in hamlets at numerous places along my route while crisscrossing the countryside; and the third during normal interactions with locals while making stopovers,

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'incompetent'.

[35] Weyland (2002: 12-13) assesses the democratic credentials of the Fujimori government, using a minimalist-procedural concept of democracy: "a set of institutions that, in the context of guarantees for political freedom, permits the entire adult population to choose their leading decision-makers in competitive, honest, regularly scheduled elections and to advance their interests and ideas through peaceful individual or collective action". He labels Peru during the late 1990 as "less democratic", though with the comment that "the ample manipulation used to secure Fujimori's contested electoral victory in mid-2000 and the scandalous corruption discovered shortly thereafter jeopardized fundamental democratic principles". As Weyland himself acknowledge, calling Peru democratic while Fujimori was in power, is controversial (see McClintock and Vallas 2003: 146, 148, 158).

staying overnight or during live-ins of from days' to weeks' duration with families along my route. The fourth way information was acquired was through the national press wherever possible. The latter was used as leads for broadening my inquiries. Information of relevance in the national press would be checked with my informants.

Establishing rapport proved to be far easier than I had expected. In the native Asháninka communities where I spent considerable time and where I potentially might have experienced the largest and most catastrophic obstacles, I quickly established an unrestrained and immediate rapport with both children and adults. Since the hospitable and friendly attitude of each of these parties fed on each other, I greatly benefited. Also, since I lived with a different family each week and was taken in as a member of the household every place I stayed, with the explicit request that I would not accept privileges of any kind, my social environment increased rapidly. I mention later that I had difficulties to establish contact with the common members of native communities in the remote part of the Peruvian Amazon. I deem this as a result of cultural barriers I was not in a position to do much about. In all other contexts, except in the case of a few political leaders at the highest national level, I had no difficulties in arranging my interviews.

Access to native communities in the Amazon is extremely well guarded and when granted to outsiders, it is a personal courtesy given by the head of the community, *el jefe,* or the head of the local or regional native federation. Basically, outsiders are not wanted, are looked upon with suspicion, and they normally leave nothing behind, which could have helped to alleviate the needs of the locals. In that sense, I was highly privileged. Not only was I allowed to stay in San Miguel as long as I wanted and treated as a member (even receiving an invitation to be a permanent member), I also had unrestricted access to other native communities in that region as well as in very isolated, highly interesting, but tension-filled regions where cut-throat paramilitary fighting and narcoterrorism were ongoing - and therefore closed to non-locals. Since I felt that the outer society had made a larger impact on Shuar communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon than those I had stayed with in Peru, I decided not to do live-ins here. A scheduled live-in with indigenous families, subsiding on farming in the Highland canton of Cañar in Ecuador, was dropped since my equipment - reflecting my decision to match my clientele as closely as possible and move on the very margin during my fieldwork - was not satisfactory to get me through the freezing nights at that high altitude. Visits to indigenous communities along

the length and width of the Highland of Peru and Ecuador, sometimes in the form of overnight stays, were easily arranged and gave amble opportunities for contact with locals outside the small urban centers.

Since my requests for interviews in towns and smaller places with private individuals or persons in potentially interesting positions always were granted, my initial contacts quickly started snowballing in places I spent time. Since a basis for my fieldwork was to understand the local conditions in as many places as possible, through observation and conversations with locals, while subsequently merging that information with generalized data accessible primarily in public offices in the towns and the larger cities, the number of small places visited was extensive. The large urban town or cities I choose as my research bases and the so-called 'profiles' I traveled while crisscrossing the countries, often visiting the same place more than once, are listed in tables 2.3 and 3.1 (Peru), 4.2 (Ecuador) and 5.3 (Guatemala). The profiles were laid out with the intention to bring me to any region of potential interest to my study. The criteria for selecting a target site was a population distinctly ethnic, in this context, a site with a high presence of ethnic markers (the use of a native language as first language, traditional dress, farming etc.) as an indicator of their ethnic allegiance, being conscious or not about it.

The two central aspects of my contact with the informants were the exchange related to the overarching objectives of my study *and* the probing for potential unknowns of importance, indicating that a non-probability method was used. Participant observation is part of this approach, with emphasis on the informants and their environment and gathering of amorphous social experiences within the general social context. Living at a site and interacting informally with people for a longer time was the most - in my view, the only - successful way of identifying and understanding aspects of the local setting. Undoubtedly, crucial parts of the outcome of my fieldwork would have passed me by if I had based my approach on day visits and interviews only.

The non-probability method implies subjective decisions on which data to collect, how to collect and interpret them, and precludes the rationale of probability theory and a theoretical framework. Another limitation of the chosen approach is that it gives no indication as to how well the sample represents the survey population under investigation - in this case, 'all' ethnic communities in the largest variation of settings. However, referring to my research objectives and the wide scope of my inquiries, non-probability

sampling is not a second-best choice; it is a qualified solution and - in this case, I will contend - the only one. The advantage of a purposive sampling approach is that it allows reaching a targeted sample quickly in a situation where sampling for proportionality is not a primary concern. Its disadvantage is that subgroups or opinions in the survey population that is more readily accessible, is likely to be overemphasized. The version used was to sample by best personal judgment - by 'expert choice', to use the phrase of Kalton (1983: 91) [with the corollary that experts do not always agree] - to satisfy the two faces of what the interviewing was intended to accomplish, i.e., to map a diversity of experiences and opinions and get an understanding of what is 'typical'.

There exists no rule-of-thumb - rooted either in statistical mathematics or in practice - which offers help in deciding, which sample size is the correct one when non-probability sampling methods are applied. The guiding stick is that when the informants increasingly are giving the same answer to the same specific question or coordinated questions, a sufficient sample size is close to being reached. That was used here, but given the scope of my research, I was less interested in specificity of the conditions of the individual place, though that was obvious one goal, than how the local situation reflected on the generalized picture I tried to comprehend. Impressions had to be aggregated on the local level to give information about the regional or national situation. Later I would address the same topics from top down. The use of a questionnaire was deemed counterproductive, given the kind of people I worked with.

From the start, it was decided that a very large number of interviews would be needed, due to my ignorance about the conditions of my research environment, the painful lack of relevant studies to my topics, and the many overlapping concepts of my research question with a variety of categories involved, i.e., Highland and Lowland conditions, the impact of the State, intra-regional ethnic organizations/federations, effects of national policy making and so forth. My goal was that the number of formal interviews should be large enough to solve any ambiguities I might have in my understanding on any topic of importance. The agenda of these exchanges would reflect upon my improvised conversations and vice versa. I should quickly discover that the most valuable information far from always correlated with the social position of my interviewees. It would be difficult to quantify the number of people with whom I had serious conversations with of value to my research since these exchanges was a mixture of

formal (unstructured) and improvised interviews, often in form of focused conversations. They sum into the hundreds. The core of my formal interviews alone, lasting from an hour up to 2-3 hours, filled at the end near around 100 90-minute tapes of recording. Only interviews, which added to the core of my argument, have been referred to in the text. The majority of the formal interviews were recorded. In parallel, I would take notes. However, since I worked under difficult conditions, most of the time being on the move, it was not possible always to rehearse the interview - with catastrophic result when my entire luggage, including months of collected field data, was stolen a red-eyed early morning in a bus office in Huaraz, Peru.

CHAPTER II
PERU: CONSTRUCTING ETHNIC IDENTITY

This chapter introduces Peru; the country where I started my fieldwork. It is also the largest and was experienced as the most complex of the three countries of my study. This chapter's main subject is a discussion of how ethnic identity is being constructed among the Asháninka Indians in the Peruvian Amazon Lowland. The economic conditions of Peru, however, both the overarching national economic structure and its manifestations in the rural areas, contributed to mold my understanding of the ethnic community. Hence, a discussion of these is included. Not to clutter up my main argument, I have presented the main part of this information in appendices.

The chapter consists of 4 parts. The first describes Peru, its national socio-economic conditions (expanded upon in appendix A, C and D), and the Peruvian Amazon Lowland and its native population (expanded upon in appendix B). In the second part, I discuss my observations of near to 3 months' live-in with families of the Asháninka people in different communities in the Peruvian Amazon. Part 3 discusses three examples of recent confrontations between the Peruvian State and natives, whose worldview has been molded in the constrained setting of a traditional community. In the fourth and final part I present my reflections. The discussion of Peru continues in chapter III.

1. Background

No man is an island[36], and that applies as well to the urban dwellers as to the members of even the most remote ethnic community. If politics is understood as the relationship between social pressures and the society, represented by the State, a social (or ethnic[37]) movement operates in the tension between the reality of its constituents and the political system. My ambition is to describe the reality of the rural Peru, a world distinctly different - both conceptually and geographically - from the one seen in and from the urban Peru.

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[36] "No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; …any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never sent to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. (John Donne [1572-1631], *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions*)

[37] I distinguish between a *social* and an *ethnic* movement (see chapter I).

A National Overview

Table 1.1 shows that Peru is large and made larger by a flawed road system as soon as one strays away from the high-quality infrastructure that links Lima to Peru's main cities. Peru's territory is 4.5 times larger than Ecuador's and nearly 12 times that of Guatemala - and it is felt. Traveling overland in Peru is a very time-demanding exercise. For the most part and increasingly so as one moves inland from the coast, the rural Peru is thinly populated in spite of the nation's 27 million inhabitants.

As a reference for later use, I will sum up some global information on Peru, see table 2.1. Administratively, Peru consists of 24 departments spread across the Highland, the Coast, or the Amazon Lowland, which I refer to as 'zones'[38]. Each department is split into provinces, which further are parted into districts. According to official numbers, Peru is becoming an urban country. Based on estimates from 1996, INEI (*Instituto Nacional de Estatistica y Informatica*) informs that 71.5 percent of the population lives in the urban areas. However, the enormous size of Lima, with a population of 7.5 million inhabitants within the metropolitan area, veils the reality. If one ignores the existence of Lima, Peru's urbanization would drop to 40.3 percent (based on 2000 data). The disproportionate size of Lima - a common trait of the urbanization pattern of Latin America (Gilbert 1996) - is exemplified by the second-largest city, Arequipa, with only around 800,000 inhabitants. As with the urbanization factor, national averages give a highly distorted impression of the country due to the size of Lima and the concentration of public activities in the high-urbanized pockets. Socio-economic indicators and access to public services vary widely across the country, but with a heavy bias in favor of the high-urbanized areas.

Peru being a developing country, one would expect Peru's export to consist of raw materials, non-refined products and agricultural products. And that is what one finds. 'Traditional products' make up roughly 70 percent and 'non-traditional products' the rest. Traditional products consists of unprocessed fish; agricultural products (cotton, sugar and coffee); and, particularly, mining products (copper, tin, iron, gold, silver, lead, zinc, etc.). The non-traditional part consists of certain agricultural products (cacao, fruits and vegetables), textiles, low-processed fish and mining products, certain chemical products, and non-metallic quarry products. The result is a feeble national economy dependent on a

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[38] The lower attitude of the Highland zone is defined by local climatic conditions, but may be put at 2,000 meters above sea level (Webb and Fernández Baca 2000: table 2.4). I have assigned departments to the zones by the percentage of its districts located in each (Table A-2, App. A).

few commodities, whose prices are determined by markets abroad.

Table 2.1
Political-administrative lay-out of Peru
(Source: INEI/UNESCO 1997)

Department[1]	No. of provinces	No. of districts	Total population[2]	Surface sq. km	Zones[3]
National	**193**	**1,820**	**25,661,690**	**1,285,216**	Coast/**Highland**/**A.L.**
Amazonas	7	83	406,060	39,249	Highl./A.Lowland
Ancash	20	166	1,067,282	35,877	**Coast/Highland**
Apurímac	7	80	426,904	20,896	Highland
Arequipa	8	108	1,072,958	63,345	Coast/Highland
Ayacucho	11	109	527,480	43,815	**Highland**
Cajamarca	13	127	1,411,942	33,318	**Highland**
Cusco	13	108	1,158,142	72,104	**Highland**
Huancavelica	7	93	431,088	22.131	**Highland**
Huánuco	11	74	776,722	36,887	Highland
Ica	5	43	649,332	21,328	Coast/Highland
Junín	9	132	1,190,488	44,197	**Highl./A.Lowland**
La Libertad	12	82	1,465,970	25,500	Coast/Highland
Lambayeque	3	38	1,073,056	14,213	Coast/Highland
Lima (incl. Callao)[2]	10	171	8,239,891	34,801	Coast/Highland
Loreto	6	47	880,471	368,852	Amazon Lowland
Madre de Dios	3	10	84,383	85,183	Amazon Lowland
Moquegua	3	20	147,374	15,734	Coast/Highland
Pasco	3	28	247,872	25,320	**Highl./A.Lowland**
Piura	8	64	1,565,771	35,892	Coast/Highland
Puno	13	108	1,199,398	71,999	**Highland**
San Martín	10	77	743,668	51,253	Amazon Lowland
Tacna	4	26	277,188	16,076	Coast/Highland
Tumbes	3	12	193,840	4,669	Coast/Highland
Ucayali	4	14	424,410	102,411	**Amazon Lowland**

[1] The fieldwork of this study took place in the highlighted departments; [2] Source: INEI (2000) [adjusted numbers]; [3] Lima Metropolitan has 7.5 million inhabitants (estimated)

Domestically, the capital is controlled by an elite, whose economic interests rest with the international community. Together with the State, it makes its investments in a few economic high-growth enclaves and shows scant interests for the social needs of the population (see appendices A and C). Within such a context, one can appreciate why Peru's rural population is stuck in a seemingly lasting poverty. Making a bad case worse, negatively influencing demographic factors, like the rate of fertility in the rural Peru, are high and well above the average for Latin America (INEI 2001c). Adding to this is a labor market, which does not generate enough jobs for the increasing population. The

socio-economic situation of Peru is very bleak indeed, even when the ongoing economic slump is ignored.

The discussion of the economic climate of Peru is expanded upon in appendices A and C with emphasis on the ethno-rural population. The first conclusion one can draw from the data presented there is that Peru is a rigidly segregated country with a distinctly and structurally determined two-tier citizenship. The Peruvian society is characterized by dominant cleavages between the Inland (Highland and Amazon Lowland combined) and the Coast, between the urban and the rural areas, and between ethnic (here including the Afro-Peruvians) and the mestizo (including White or *criollo*) population. The members of the ethnic populations are the big losers in the Peruvian society. In the following section, I briefly describe the 'land of the natives' in which, as I will show, is the only zone in Peru where ethnic mobilization takes place.

The Amazon Lowland and the Asháninkas

Fifty-nine percent of Peru's territory is located in the Amazon Basin, what I refer to as the Amazon Lowland. This region has always been considered a place to be tapped indiscriminately when required with devastating results for the ecology and the original populations. Since logging began in the Peruvian Amazon for few decades ago, nearly 70,000 km^2 have been deforested with wide-spread erosion as the result. Millions of hectares of land - approximately 80 percent of land that has been taken over by settlers for farming and ranching - have been abandoned because they are no longer productive (Torre López 1999: 28). Instead of adjusting this practice, the 'frontier' is continuously pushed further into the Lowland as areas become exhausted. Today, logging, mining and petroleum companies, encouraged by Peruvian governments, are exploiting the resources of the Lowland with scant attention to the special characteristics of the region. Worse still, but indicative of the Peru's two-tier citizenship with its discrimination of the ethnic population, is that there has never been an interest in establishing a role for the native peoples. As a result, the quality of life of the native peoples of the Amazon is quickly deteriorating, even though the region has undergone considerable 'development'.

Sixty percent of the population in the Amazon Lowland lives in urban areas. The majority is concentrated in shantytowns surrounding large urban centers like Iquitos and Pucallpa, which have some of the highest poverty rates in the country. The most recent

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colonialization waves began in the 1940s with governmental support to projects that favored the extraction industries, together with constructions of roads, dams and airports. This, what I in appendix C characterize as 'internal colonization', ongoing both in the Highland and the Amazon Lowland, has been accompanied by efforts to force the native people off their lands or reduce their traditional habitats, while unleashing an extensive exploration for resources and deforesting large tracts of land. As a result, the indigenous peoples often find themselves cornered on small enclaves of land in the middle of what was once their ancestral territory (Torre López 1999: 32).

The precise population of the Peruvian Amazon is difficult to specify. Estimates range from between 2 and 3 million inhabitants, or whom at least half a million are considered natives and continue to live according to traditional customs[39]. However, the natives have no common sentiment of Indianness. They are split into, at least, 63 peoples (tribes[40]) and belong to 12 major linguistic families, which make communication extremely difficult (Torre López 1999: 32; see table B-1, appendix B). Native communities often lack even the 'tribal' allegiances imputed to them by the outside world. Their primary loyalty is to their community and their immediate environment (INEI 1993). What can be inferred is that by referring to the 'native population' one points to a conglomerate of more or less autonomous communities, lacking any wider coherence. (This topic is expanded upon in appendix B.)

As part of my fieldwork, I lived with native communities of the Asháninka Indians in the Amazon Lowland. The recorded information about the Asháninka people is scarce, though a number of studies and pamphlets give useful information, most often as part of other study subjects (see Espinosa de Rivero 1994; Fabian Arias 1997; PAR 2001; Rodriquez Vargas 1993; Rojas Zolezzi 1994; Villapolo and Vásquez 1999; Varese 2002). The Asháninka people is the second largest tribe in the Amazon Peru; the INEI (1993) estimated their number to just above 41,000, second only to the Aguaruna people. They are dispersed over the vast lowland areas stretching from east of the slopes of *la*

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[39] The estimate of the native population given here is by Torre López (1999: 32). INEI (1993) works with a number of 300,000 natives (see table B-1 in App. B).

[40] 'Tribe' is not a favored term these days, but I will use it to identify an unpoliticized nation (Brass 1991). With native 'affiliations', I refer to membership in tribes like the Yines, Asháninkas, Machiguengas, Aguarunas, etc. Frequently, more than one tribe/nation belongs to one linguistic family (see table B-1, Appendix B). To which extent this is seen among the natives themselves as a unifying factor, is unknown, but it is doubtful.

Cordillera Blanca, the eastern mountain range of the Andes, to the border of Brazil. Together with a number of other native peoples[41] they belong to the Arawak linguistic family (Santos-Granero et al. 2000: 64, 37).

2. The Ethnic Community

Ethnicity has traditionally been understood as a heritage from primordial time and that is, most likely, how members of a traditional community would understand themselves. I will address my topic of ethnicity, following Anderson (1983), as something that is being created, altered, and de-created in the consciousness of the ethnic people themselves. One context where that process takes place[42] is in the social and physical space of an ethnic traditional community during the day-to-day interactions among its members.

Motivation and Goals

My rationale for living with the Asháninkas was epistemological, i.e., to understand ethnicity first-hand and observe how ethnic people themselves relate to it. Linked to this motive, however, were the nagging questions: which sectors of human experience can be understood just from book studies, biological aging and hanging around, and which require a maturing rooted in personal experiences? Quoting Robert K. Merton:

> We thank whatever powers may be that we are not like other sociologists who merely talk rather than observe, or merely observe rather than think, or merely think rather than put their thoughts to the test of systematic empirical investigation.

How to avoid ending up like his 'others'? How to prevent what many studies of marginalized populations of Latin America do, that is, to see them as indiscriminate herds and not as individuals with the unfortunate qualification that they have had fewer opportunities than the authors of those studies? Does a hunger for intellectual insight make empathy rooted in personal interaction superfluous? And, if so, how does it influence the observer's understanding of social matters when crucial human experiences are emotionally alien? Basically, how well can one perceive a different world if one *mentally* never leaves one's home territory or protects oneself in the land of the

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[41] Ashéninka (no misprint), Nomatsiguenga, Yine, Campa Coqinte, Chamicuro, Iñapari, Machiguenga, Piro, Resigaro, and Llaneza.
[42] In chapter IV, on Ecuador, I will describe that same process in another, very different, context.

marginalized in other-worldly settings at, say, a daily expense equivalent to the monthly income of one's study subjects and their families? Another reason was my puzzlement with the question raised by Trouillot (1995): "Who define our reality?" With respect to the poorest among the poor, whose poverty is the criterion by which 'we' from the North define them, how much does the poverty concept of the North in which they are defined, say about *their* reality and them as interacting human beings? How do 'our' remedies, '*our*' solution to all their problems; the ever-present call for 'development', *our* kind of development; and the paradigm of 'underdevelopment' in which 'we' have constructed them (Escobar 1995); play into this?[43]

My stay in San Miguel was intended as a means to an end, but it became both. Even though I will report mainly on my observations from San Miguel, a number of other Asháninka communities were visited. An overview of these, including some I stayed with in the eastern Central Jungle (discussed later), is given in table 2.2.

Table 2.2
Asháninka Communities visited in the Central Jungle

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Districts of Perené and Satipo
<u>Villa Perené</u>: *San Miguel * Pachamama * Churingaveni * Santa Rosa de Virgin * Marankiari Bajo * Ubiriki*; <u>Satipo</u>: *Sontos Atallualpo*

Río Ene and Río Tambo Region
*Cutivireni * Comantovishi * Yuyato * (Shapo[2]) * Shevoriato[3]*
_____
[1] Names of urban centers are underlined and written in regular print and those of communities are in *italics*: [2] Settler community; [3] At Río Tambo

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The Asháninka Community of San Miguel

In the following I will present aspects of San Miguel, an entity as intriguing for its symbolic meaning as for its physical and social features. I will address the last two first and comment briefly on the symbolic one later. When one lives in San Miguel with the sense of a primacy of belonging, the outer world is indeed another place. It begins three hundred meters down the path.

The Setting: Five hundred meters above Río Perené and 1,100 meters above sea level, on the edge of the steep valley slope, is located the Asháninka community of San Miguel Centro Marankiari (its full name). The founders of the family Samaniego, who

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[43] I should later, after the completion of my fieldwork, see many of my views formulated by Edwards (1993).

came this way for some 50 years ago, picked the place with a fine hand. From most of the land belonging to the community there are breathtaking views. On the opposite side of the river, the land raises steeply, covered with densely packed *chacras* (cultivated plots), the same way San Miguel and nearby settler land must look like from that side. And in the other directions, across blankets of more uncountable chacras, one sees dramatic topography, lush vegetation, multiple life forms and - for the practiced eye - a place, which offers a hard and poverty-striken life. San Miguel's 40 families with a total of 232 members get their living from subsistence farming with a tiny money income from cash products of, primarily, coffee, bananas, pineapples and citrus fruits. Not until 1980 did a dirt road close by link San Miguel and nearby settler communities to the district capital of Villa Perené. But as is common in Peru as soon as one gets a short distance away from the urban centers, San Miguel is one more place forgotten by God and ignored by man. Here is no electricity, no phones, no sewer, actually, no public services at all except a school. People live communally off the land and water is taken from nearby streams.

Most of the housing of San Miguel, with exception of the cemented school building and a few homes made of adobe, are built in the traditional style with thatched roof resting on heavy tree trunks with airy walls in-between made of sticks tied with plant stems to an open frame. The living quarters consist of two clustered houses for each family with kitchen and eating area in one and the area where all the members sleep together in the other.

The atmosphere of the community is utterly pleasing and relays an other-worldly tranquility. And more so since a large number of the females and most of the children below school age use the typical Asháninka dress, *cushma*, a tunica of coarse blue or brown cotton, which hangs strait down from the shoulders to the ankles. Most walk barefooted because, I am told, it is custom - some say it is a sign of being an Asháninka - but also because they cannot afford shoes for daily use. The shoes are spared for working in the chacras where protection is needed. Most homes are located close to the social and geographical center of the community, but some families, in the tradition of the Asháninkas, prefer to live next to their chacras, which are spread outwardly from the center. Life in San Miguel circulates around the work on and the outcome of the chacras.

The day starts early in San Miguel. People are up at the first sign of dawn. Helped by their daughters, the women start the fire on the floor in the kitchen to prepare the morning

meal, often borrowing ambers from neighbors, whose fire has survived the night. In the meantime, the men may be collecting firewood, sharpening their machetes, or just be idling around chatting with their fellow man, waiting for the breakfast to be served. In spite of the human activity, the atmosphere is unhurried. Meals are prepared on open fire, burning logs and branches, with the woman crouching in front as their people must have done since the dawn of time. After breakfast, all the men and some of the women leave for their chacras with hoes and machetes on their shoulders. The women, who are left behind, get their children off to the school and start their never-ending housework, while they tend to the smallest children. From now until lunch, the school children, women with babies, the infirm, and the old take over the community. The family is gathered only during the meals. Life quiets down at nightfall and at 7:30 p.m. most people are at sleep.

The Social Order: San Miguel is a community with stated rules and unstated expectations. According to Peruvian law, all communities have autonomy with respect to internal organization, economic and administrative affairs, and the use of the communal land assigned to them. The highest authority is the communal assembly, which every second year elects the communal Authority. It consists of 4 persons, and is headed by *el jefe*, who is the legal representative when the community is economically, legally or administratively compromised. *El jefe* reports to the assembly, but in the day-to-day operation of the community significant power is invested in his office. In cases where lines need to be drawn, he is given considerable power. His duties touch on all aspects of the community's life. His decision is not challenged.

The community accepts in principle and in practice the responsibility for the wellbeing of each member. Orphans and old people in need will be helped by the community. A communal member will get help in case it has material needs, is sick, had an accident or death in its family, or has no means. Communal support may take the form of free work by other members for a limited time (days, weeks) in maintaining or harvesting the fields of a disabled person.

The member has the right to use the land assigned to its family, participate in the communal work, and take advantage of the services of the community. It may stay in the community when it behaves as required; vote and be elected to the positions of the community, and take part in the discussions and the election of the communal assembly. Members of more than 50 years of age are exonerated from their communal obligations

related to chores and physical work. In case of a divorce with a spouse not a native of the community, a female member will be given preferential help as a native of the community. And the members may express their beliefs as long as these "do not jeopardize the communal organization or threaten the social order" (*el jefe*, priv. com.).

Which legal sanctions can the community take against members, who do not abide by the rules or the customs? The community, through its Authority, solves conflicts of a civil nature, which erupt among its members. The members can punish those, who infringe on established practices, communal statutes or the national law. A petty offense may be unjustified absence from the communal assembly or a day assigned to communal chores; in these cases the culprit may be fined a sum equivalent to the value of two workdays (presently, S/20 or $5.80). Slightly more serious is it when a member has been reprimanded various times for negligence or disrespect; then the Authority may present the case to the assembly. And then it escalates. More specifically, a member may be expelled when it fails systematically in his communal obligations; promotes *divisionismo* (conflicting factions); expresses extremist political ideas or gets involved in narco-trafficking or other negative acts, compromising harmfully the community; monopolizes the land, involves itself in trade with the communal land or the natural resources of the community; or harms the interests and the good image of the community. In all these and similar cases, the decision rests with the assembly.

Among the unstated principles of San Miguel, which takes a spiritual importance, is the respect for the surrounding biodiversity. This may have the form of using trails were they exist or protecting uncultivated land - as it was phrased, to keep *la tierra limpia* (the land clean). Expectations of this kind, understood and respected by everybody were given with explicit reference to the right of future generations to take over an environment, which had not been diminished by the use of the present one. Formulations like 'showing respect for the animals, the plants and the fish' were used in sincerity, something which was expected to be expressed in all aspects of one's personal conduct. Hand in hand with the reverence given to the environment in both a practical and spiritual sense, referred to as Mother Nature, was the respect shown when the ancestors were referred to in the abstract. From this followed the urge to protect the customs and practices of the Asháninka and, likewise, their handicraft, music, traditional dress, language, traditions, and so forth. I was repeatedly informed that this imperative was more than just a way of

safeguarding the cultural elements of the community. By keeping alive the patterns and traditions of the past, one honors the way of life of one's ancestors and thereby the ancestors themselves.

One may wonder whether the afore-mentioned rule against divisionismo, promotes conformism and passivity among the members in spite of the fact that the rules also encourage members to take initiatives to benefit the community. One member should happen to test the tolerance of his fellow community members unintentionally prodded by me. He built a number of traditional houses to accommodate paying visitors, a scheme I had proposed and helped promote by having his initiative mentioned in an international guidebook. No one in the community was against the idea, but they were not happy that this man ran ahead of them all. For awhile the entrepreneur and his family were boycotted while accusation of divisionismo floated around until a Salomonan solution was found. Having worked 30 years in the district, the mayor told me that she had never experienced a conflict in a native community with such provocative edges (Haug, personal com.). Watanabe (1992: 103) mentions in his study of a Mam-Maya village in Guatemala the resentment incurred by anyone who tries to succeed in a place, which sees life as constituting a zero-sum game where someone's gain is everyone else's loss. That convention condemns those who get ahead in unconventional ways. However, entrepreneurship, which is a 'hurray' word (quoting Cranston 1954) in another culture, may easily be a threat in this kind of society (see MacDonald 1999: 128).

The Surrounding Society: In spite of San Miguel's proximity to nearby settler communities and the province capital, all within from one to a few hours' walk, weeks could go by with no outsider entering the community. The few members, who visited the urban center of Villa Perené (4-5,000 inhabitants) during the week, did not dent the impression that the members lived in a world of their own. I discussed the topic with the mayor of Perené. She said categorically that the native community members had no reflective opinions about the outer world, not even the local one bordering their community; they were solidly uninformed. "The members live and operate as in a vacuum, whose border begins where their community ends" (Haug; pers. com.). Hardly any information about the outer world - news, gossips, or educational tidbits - would enter the community. Their type of questions - what North-Americans cultivated on their chacras; whether they cooked their food on open fire as in San Miguel; what Europe was;

what type of jungle we had in Norway - informed that life in San Miguel was the basis of their perceptions about the outer world. This meant that in the case that information *did* slip through, the members had no context to relate it to and, hence, it did not invite for reflections. The lack of knowledge about and informative communication with the outside world, in combination with the low mobility and low educational level, characterizes the situation of the rural population of the Peruvian Amazon Lowland, but particularly that of the natives. San Miguel's physical and conceptional isolation was not water-tight, however. To a limited extent - some individuals more than most - related to outside persons in three contexts: when selling their agro-products, which meant interacting with colono traders and settlers[44]; when interacting with representatives of the mestizo State, i.e., the District administration; and when visiting Villa Perené for whatever reason. I will address these three categories successively.

A comparison between the outlook of the community members and that of the settlers disclosed two very different worldviews. The settlers had arrived in great numbers over the last few decades, mainly from the Highland departments of Huancavelica, Apurímac, Ayacucho, and Puno - often taking advantage of the promotions of the State. Until recently, a settler family would be given 30 hectares when they asked for land, while Asháninka communities were given only 5 per family, according to the view that Asháninkas were lazy and less productive than the Andean immigrants (Haug; pers. com.). It is noteworthy that the high esteem the Highland peasant is held in by the mestizo of the Amazon Lowland has no parallel in the Highland.

As more settlers arrived, the primary forest was cut down and the land was turned into chacras. *El jefe* told me that for only 30 years ago there had been big trees, rich vegetation, few people, big game, and abundant free land around San Miguel. Today all is gone. Men in San Miguel may still go hunting, but game is hard to get by and is not

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[44] The migrants from the Highland to the Amazon Lowland are in the Lowland referred to as *colonos* (settlers). These people are dirt-poor refugees from the appalling conditions of the rural Highland where, in addition, a violent warfare took place in certain parts between the Peruvian army and the insurgence movements, MRTA and *Sendero Luminoso*, during the 1980s and 1990s. When the conflicts between the native Amazon Lowland people and the settlers (*colonos*) for access to the same resources, particularly land, are being referred to, one is faced with two marginalized population groups, which have been put up against each other as a result of the inaction of an uncompassionate State to serve as means to an end as colonizers, to defuse social tensions elsewhere, or as a source of cheap labor and to subsidize its policy of cheap agro-products to the urban centers (Gelles 2002: 243).

larger than a rabbit. Another effect of increasing pressure on land is the problem the Asháninkas have in finding natural materials for their traditional uses. Increasingly, they are forced to use commercial products, always of the lowest quality. The process has forced Asháninkas, who traditionally got a share of their daily diet from hunting and fishing to become dependent on their chacras, i.e., turning them into full-time peasants.

The worldview of the natives makes them ill-prepared for handling commerce and, particularly, to see land as a commodity, while the settlers own their land individually and trade land frequently. While the Asháninkas have no vehicles at their disposal, many settlers have bought trucks and, as an additional enterprise, buy up the agricultural produce from the communities around and transport it to the cities with an excellent profit. Three traders serve San Miguel, creating a near-monopoly. The Asháninkas do not question the buyer's price on their products, never bargain, never check the accuracy of the buyer's scale, nor do they control his summations of the agreed prices on the different items before the closure of the trade. This is a cultural attitude, not one due to trust. In San Miguel there is a considerable resentment against settlers in general, though seldom expressed openly. They are looked upon as pushy, dishonest, accustomed to cheating, and for paying too low prices. The settlers respond by characterizing the Asháninkas as a lazy lot, but agree that they are more likeable than their own (quote) "quarrelsome" kind. In spite of the fact that the Asháninkas and settlers look down on each other, there was distance but no tensions between them. A few members maintained an infrequent social contact and a couple of settler children followed classes at the school in San Miguel, but both parties were aware that they were of different kinds and had nothing in common.

In principle, the authorities exist on two levels: the central Government in Lima and its representation locally in the form of the municipal administration of the District located in Villa Perené, strongly personalized by the mayor. The authorities in Lima are too distant and too uninterested in the conditions in the periphery to be felt by the native communities of Perené. The mayor of the District or members of her staff would visit the San Miguel fairly regularly as she did with all the other roughly 180 communities of different kinds in her territory. She would involve herself competently in discussions on technical aspects of constructions, whose maintenance are the responsibility of her administration, and details characterizing the individual place. But she had few resources and before the regional election in fall of 2002, when she was replaced, members of San

Miguel addressed her administration dismissively, stating that "it had given them nothing" (pers. com).

The health station in San Miguel, which for more than a year had been pending completion, is one example of the impotence of the district municipality. The mayor claimed that the reason the heath station was not operative as planned was that the comuneros have not been putting in the number of work hours they had promised. As practice is, for the purpose of stretching a tight municipal budget, the authorities take advantage of the *minga* tradition of the native communities, whose members proudly will get together and do communal work for free when the result benefit them all. When the municipality puts up a new installation or maintains an old one in the countryside, say, a school building, it is likely to offer materials and, at times, a technician to supervise the work, but will request the communities to supply labor. Since the municipality would not expect the inhabitants of Villa Perené to do public work in their free-time, the arrangement facilitates transfer of value from the poor countryside to the urban area.

Which opportunities do the communities have to present grievances and assess how well these are addressed up toward other needs in the District? I took part in a number of visits by representatives of the district administration to isolated communities when the local needs were being mapped in preparation for the 2002 municipal budget. Due to difficult access, not more than 5-6 communities could be visited in a day, and with 180 communities, each visit had to be brief. The conversations with the locals were improvised, and sometimes the local head did not take part since the visits were unannounced. In the visits I participated in, the strong personality of the mayor and the prestige of her office dominated the conversations. In addition, the heads of the communities would have meetings in Villa Perené with the administration. But the heads may not report back to their community, as was the case with *el jefe* of San Miguel, with the result that community members are kept uninformed about the priorities and dispositions of the municipality and how it works. The Peruvian State structure pretends that communities have a say in how they are being governed, which they, in practice, do not have. And it confronts its local representations with an impossible task due to, first, a lack of resources necessary to handle the local problems; second, a decision process controlled from Lima; and, third, the fact that allocation of values to the Inland is guided by a perspective which shuns the rural areas.

The community of San Miguel was within easy reach of Villa Perené. In 1-1½ hour, the community members can walk to town. Nearly every day one or more adult persons may visit Villa Perené for a few hours for a number of reasons, primarily for buying necessities. However, I concluded that the town also had an attraction by its entertaining vitality. In spite of the members' life-long proximity to the town, they behaved and, probably, saw themselves as outsiders. In preparation for such a visit, the women and most men would dress up, put on shoes, and replace their cushma or worn clothes used within the community with their best garments to approach the city dwellers. The situation gave associations to Eidheim's (1969) description of the encounter between Samis and the Norwegians in Barth's (1969) introduction of the 'ethnic boundary'.

The 'Rousseauian' identity: The community of San Miguel may be seen as being governed by two intertwined and competing realities. On the one hand are the effects of the social space spanned by the interacting members and their activities, and, on the other, the externally, less identifiable, economic realities imposing themselves upon the community. The facets of the former, i.e., life in the community, with emphasis on its communality, is what I will call the Rousseauian aspect of life in San Miguel - the happy native in harmony with his environment and his fellow man. How well does that concept describe San Miguel? I will address the imposing economic realities in the next section.

Within the context of the community of San Miguel, in its physical and material setting and influenced by the spiritual and symbolic aspects of the community, each person from his earliest age learns, and soon practices, the basics of being ethnically social. The members of San Miguel treated their fellow man with dignity and outmost courtesy. Compared with the nearby settler communities, which are known to be conflictive, these attitudes stand out as an important characteristic of San Miguel. It is easy to understand why their settler neighbors put the label 'happy' on them, though I would have explained their behavior more by their confidence in themselves and their including relationships.

The members of San Miguel took pride in their Asháninka culture. The majority of the women will mark that by using the traditional Asháninka dress, the cushma, and many will use it daily - if they could afford it. When there were communal gatherings or fiestas, women, men and children will use one, together with its associated regalia. For the men, these consisted of the *corona* (crown), decorated with colorful bird feathers, and

broad, heavy *bandas* (ribbons) made of seeds, crossing the chest, used by both men and women. Traditional instruments, primarily flute and drum, were parts of the men's costume and are being played at their fiestas together with their native songs and dances. The elderly (40+ years), most distinguished men of the community will always show up at the communal assemblies with all regalia. Their native symbols manifested themselves in many ways, I was told - in the handicraft, in the use of natural medicine, their traditional meals, their handicraft, music and dances, and, particularly, in the use of their native language. People, who spoke a less skilled Arawak, would be pointed out to me.

When I brought up the question with the members of San Miguel why they perceived themselves ethnic, they would most often point out the tangible expressions of their ethnicity – the cushma, their customs, their language, and so forth. They explained, competently, that their customs, their 'modes' of living, including their relationship to the land, all contributed to make them whom they were. The members of San Miguel were conscious about and proud of their otherness relative to the outside society. However, ever so often someone would refer to their customs as the vehicle through which they honored and kept in touch with their ancestors – introducing the genealogical dimension of their worldview and thereby joining hands with Roosens (1989), who argues that the belief in a common primordial ancestry is the ultimate proof of ethnicity. By maintaining the traditions and the customs of their forefathers, who had shown the same respect to their forefathers by adopting their life forms, they maintained relation to their past.

Two characteristics of San Miguel, as well as of other Asháninka communities I visited, were particularly pronounced. The first was the tight family interrelationships among the members, how well everyone was informed about his own and other families, and how in-married newcomers were accepted with full family status within one or more of the few branches following from the founding family he or she belonged to. As a result, the community members would walk in and out of each other's homes with the status as members of the previous, present or next generation of the host's extended family. The abundance of family members, who offered attention, comfort, and social links over a large spectrum of activities, undoubtedly had a major effect on the children's perceptions about their ethnic belonging. That trait was absent in settler communities I visited. They had been established with no emphasis on a common family background.

The second characteristic was that each adult mastered the communal universe,

including the chores traditionally assigned the other gender. The members were resourceful and confident as they went about their personal and social obligations. Even when they behaved unhurried, they were effective in what they did. This created the stable environment, which was further strengthened by the predictable repeatability of the social and seasonal routines. To the children, the working routines of the parents were familiar and became theirs from an early age, closely connecting everyone's welfare to that of everyone else across the generations. The necessities and pleasures of life were direct, based on a person-to-person relationship. People dropped by for a chat or to get a meal, for no obvious purpose. The conversation brought up local gossip, personal matters, the weather, and whatever came to mind. One of my informants defined ethnicity as the multifaceted interaction among members of a self-contained community.

The Identity of the 'Poverty Trap': As the 'Rousseauian' identity of life within San Miguel is an important mechanism in the construction of the identity of the 'ethnic actor', so also is its ugly twin, the identity which comes from what I will refer to as the 'poverty trap'. External forces, mostly economic, impose themselves upon the community in subtle ways. With the 'poverty trap' I will mean the effect of the combined economic mechanisms, which continuously regenerate the socio-economic situation of the marginalized peasant, characterized by too little land of too low productivity, open to exploitation by the larger society's organized groups, and with no access to public remedies needed to improve his situation. Given this situation, the peasant is not able to capitalize on his material production and is denied access to basic public resources to improve his situation, like loans, benefits from public investments, and supporting agro-policies. He is given a Potemkin offer of public services, particularly with respect to health and education, which further dehumanizes him. Since the 'poverty trap' is an important element in my conceptualization of the dynamics constructing the 'ethnic actor', I will briefly list some of its main features. The economic influences on San Miguel are discussed in appendix D and the public education is discussed in appendix J.

First, two intertwined features of the poverty trap, stand out. One is the lack of land due to increased competition from the external society. This refers to productive land as well as to the uncultivated territory (*el monte*) traditionally used for hunting by Asháninkas to secure a nutritious diet, but is also important to the natives' cultural and spiritual identity. The other is the low, actually falling, prices on *all* traditional agro-

products being produced by the small native and non-native peasant alike. (The only exception is coca leaves). This situation results in a tightening economic 'strangulation' of the individual family and the native community as a whole. These two are the main causes for the profound poverty of San Miguel; they are structural in the sense that they reflect the governing economic structure in Peru, ensuring that the community members are left with no opportunities to pull themselves out of their economic misery.

Second, the marginalized situation of San Miguel is aggravated by the fact that, for historical and traditional reasons, not every family is assigned the same area of cultivable land. Table H-1 in appendix H shows estimates of the distribution of land in San Miguel. The community consists of 40 families and owns a cultivable land area of 170 hectares. A few families have been assigned 8 or more hectares, while around 15 families have 3 or less, while the 'minimum' requirement for subsistence farming was 4.0-4.5 hectares.

Third, nobody uses chemical ingredients (fertilizers, pesticides and hormones; the last used by some Highlanders), resulting in low productivity. It is frowned upon by the Asháninkas as alien to their worldview. Instead, they apply their insight in the biology of the plants and use appropriate methods to prevent degradation of the intensely cultivated fields. Their techniques include mixing plants where one leaves behind minerals needed by the other; rotating products; keeping the land in fallow; applying organic material from the weeding as a natural fertilizer; cultivating plants most appropriate to the soil; and so forth. As shown in table H-2, appendix H, this practice is balanced up against individual strategies on which sample of cultivated products may be optimal, considering the needs of the family. The member must take into account the soil of his chacra, say, bad for pineapples but good for coffee, yucca, avocados, and citrus-fruits. He needs to compensate for the different harvest seasons to ensure that he will not be without crucial products for long periods of time. And, to the extent he produces cash crop, he must merge his other decisions with estimates of the price fluctuations to optimize the over-all economic outcome of his choices. Switching from one crop to another is not a small enterprise. It requires considerable extra labor, money for purchasing new plants, and patience to wait (sometimes) years until the new plants become productive. Settlers around San Miguel would frequently express the superiority of the Asháninkas.

Fourth, the small peasants in Peru, in the Highland as well as in the Amazon Lowland, are left defenseless against the traders (intermediaries), who buy their produce

cheaply in the chacras and transport it to the main urban centers. Here it is taken over by other middlemen and, ultimately, sold to the consumer – with a manifold accumulated increase in price. Comparing the prices at each end of the distribution chain, it is clear that the poorest member of the society, the peasant, subsidizes the urban areas. The reasons are many. The peasant federations (existing only in the Highland) pay no attention to the economic situation of the smallest producer; the economic neoliberal climate, which discourages subsidies, minimum prices, and other means of market regulation, even as part of a long-term development policy; the peasants' lack of self-owned transportation to bring their products to the market; the absence of competition among the traders, often representing economically strong constellations in the urban centers; and government policies, which deny capitalization and loan opportunities to the neediest. On a ride with a fruit trader, a settler, I was told that successful settlers would have chacras of more than 100 hectares - which put the landholdings of 170 hectares of the 40 Asháninka families of San Miguel in perspective. He told me that he (in December 2001) made a gross take-home of $400 per transport to Lima where he sold his purchase, and he did that trip 2-3 times a week in the season - an enormous gain in rural Peru.

And, fifth, the miserable economic and material situation of San Miguel weighted heavily on the community members. On a direct question, near half of my hosts admitted that they would leave San Miguel if they had had better economic opportunities somewhere else, which would mean, either moving out of agriculture to an unknown future in an urban center, the most likely exit, or, less likely, finding a community, which had excess land. The most vocal women said that women were as prone as men to leave San Miguel for better economic conditions elsewhere. In their mind, one of their main obstacles would be that housing in the new place might be expensive and hard to find, indicating that they saw a move to an urban center as most likely. No member has permanently left San Miguel or any of the nearby Asháninka communities for the cities, i.e., they knew of nobody who could serve as 'bridgeheader'[45]. Those, who most seriously had considered their situation, were those with little land. The common argument among them was that agricultural work was hard and gave very little value back. Those in the other end of the land-use scale, with 8-10 hectares, were not interested in discussing the topic, probably, because it was not a priority to them. Their concern was

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[45] The term was introduced by John F.C. Turner and is discussed in Klak and Holtzclaw (1993).

to find additional activities while staying in San Miguel, which could help them economically. The education and the future land situation of their children worried them.

In the pragmatic view of the State, the person's material situation becomes part of the person's identity and his worth. It generates the tautological rationale to maintain that person in his marginalized position exactly because of the person's marginalized position, reinforcing the State's own ideology and producing stereotypes for national consumption. The characterization of Indians as backward, primitive in their cultivation technologies, inherently lacking the capitalist spirit, and thus destined to remain at the lowest levels of the social pecking order, is not a unique Peruvian attitude; I would meet it in all the countries of my study. According to Rex (1986), 'racism' is evidenced by the fact that while many of the distinctions of the colonial caste system have disappeared as economic factors, racist explanations are offered for the failure of Indians to succeed in a theoretically equal society. With economic modernization and restructuring, economic arguments for the inferiority of Indians have intensified throughout Latin America. Ideas about rural development, economic progress, and modernity are loaded with racial context and must be understood as shaping many of the public agrarian initiatives (or lack of same) I discuss in Appendix D. While the State's agro-decisions raises doubt whether they ever were intended to benefit the small producers, the peasants are contrasted with the large mestizo producers, who are seen as efficient, mechanized, and profit-oriented, while being economically cuddled by the State, further strengthening the stereotypes.

Asháninkas of the Eastern Central Jungle

To be able to generalize my impressions from San Miguel, I stayed with Asháninka communities also along the rivers Río Ene and Río Tambo in the remote and difficult accessible eastern part of the Central Jungle (see table 2.2). Río Ene is born in the junction of Río Mantano and Río Apurimac in the northern part of the Department of Ayacucho. From here it meanders north through the Amazon Lowland of the Department of Junín until it joins with Río Perené and conceives Río Tambo. The latter flows north to the town of Atalaya and, ultimately, under different names, joins the Amazon. In the following, I will limit myself to discuss my observations in the upper (south) Río Ene region and the community of Yuyato among the places I visited.

The Río Ene is the main conduit of an extensive river system crisscrossing a huge

roadless and thinly populated area covered with primary jungle. With exception of infrequent flights by small planes to a primitive jungle airstrip near the community of Cutivireni of 69 families in the south, it is accessible only by waterways, using *lanzas*[46]. Locally, one travels by dug-out canoes and small discardable rafts, or by foot, following a network of paths in the jungle. Then rivers are passed by swimming across. The population along the length of Río Ene and its tributaries consists of some 10,000 individuals divided roughly half-and-half between Asháninkas and settlers. All live in or near communities along the waterways, but with no or only the barest minimum of contact between the two groups. People survive on subsistence farming with a small production of cash-crops, in addition to traditional fishing and hunting. The largest clandestine cultivation of coca leaves and the refinement of coca into pasta (cocaine hydrochloride), the unrefined base for cocaine, of any region of Peru take place in the area around the upper part of Río Ene and along Río Apurímac. Gangs of well-armed Sendero Luminoso members, estimated to between 150 and 2-300 men in total, operate in cooperation with the drug traffickers. I failed in my efforts to interview any of these. While these conditions make the region socially unstable, dangerous and therefore closed to outsiders, I assumed that its isolation would offer insight in how ethnicity was practiced by the local Asháninkas.

The Asháninka communities of Cutivireni and Comantovishi were characterized by indigence, stagnation and hopelessness. In my judgment, they were still suffering from the violence of the internal war, which tore apart the social fabric of these places, and the massive neglect they have been shown by the national authorities since that time. The community of Yuyato, on the other hand, relayed an impression of coherence and dignity. The reason may be the conscious way in which it was established. It was built - not by a cluster of unrelated people on the run away from a deadly threat, but - by a tight-knit group in Cutivireni in search for a home at the time when Sendero Luminoso had been neutralized in the urban parts of Peru and the community started to deteriorate when the military and the Catholic mission were pulled out, leaving the locals to themselves.

The community of Yuyato: The first impression of Yuyato was that it was not much different from San Miguel. Its inner social space was equally pleasing. The houses were orderly, well maintained, and the lay-out was esthetic. The homes of Yuyato expressed

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[46] Long, open, slender, motorized boats.

the same balance between a territory of low-keyed privacy around the dwellings and the inviting communality of the whole. Differences - in degree not in kind - which could signify deterioration in qualities of the Asháninka culture, as it was expressed in San Miguel, stood out. All the housing constructions in Yuyato were made of local materials and were in native style, including the school house. They were better maintained than those in San Miguel and showed, generally, better craftsmanship. Contrary to San Miguel, the grass was cut in the public areas and the paths within the community were well-maintained with impeding stones and roots of nearby trees removed. In Yuyato, as in Cutivireni and Comantovishi, all women and children, in addition to many of the men, used cushma, and the governing language was overwhelmingly Arawak. Probably, many were monolinguists. I should observe that every one of the community members, as was expected, mastered their specific environment - more complex than San Miguel's - to perfection, like, navigating the jungle and rivers with ease; ability to identify plants for consumption (with liquid and food in their stems); making fire with sticks; and picking plants for traditional medicine. These were skills which had been either lost by the members of San Miguel or turned into specialized knowledge of the few. *Flecha* (bow and arrow) was much used in Yuyato for hunting, in addition to firearms, and the men showed great competence. In San Miguel where the use of bow and arrow were less common due to lack of game, the men proved less skillfully in the art of archery. Noteworthy was also the high quality of the craftsmanship, which went into making the bow and arrow. The wood of the pointed part would be hardened in a fire, and the fastening of that part to the stem of the arrow, not an easy task under any circumstance, was done with a masterly touch in contrast to the more crude form applied in San Miguel. Steering feathers, not used in San Miguel, was put on competently with a slight offset, possibly to make the arrow rotate for better stability. Traditional music instruments, drum and Andean flute, were appreciated in both places. The Asháninka music, sometimes accompanied by song, is monochromatic with an attractive melancholic sound. In the late evenings in Yuyato, after nightfall, an instrument or a voice singing could sometimes be heard. I experienced music in San Miguel only at social occasions, and then by one or two performers, renowned Asháninka musicians, invited from the outside.

Since access to market along Río Ene was difficult, the production of cash-crops in Yuyato was limited and, as a result, the size of their chacras was, at most, 2-3 hectares

per family. Possibly for that reason, an abundance of time was dedicated to social interaction, which was greased by a constant intake of *masato*[47]. The drink was served in delicate calabash shells, which circulated continuously from hand to hand as a simmering conversation took place. The consumption of *masato* characterized the social life in the region. This typical Asháninka drink was in San Miguel served only during important social events and then never as elegantly as in Yuyato.

As in all the Asháninka communities I visited along Río Ene, there was a distinct gender separation during social gatherings. When people ate or made conversations communally, men clustered in one place and women in another. The verbal interaction between the gendered groups was kept to a minimum. I was told that this was what both parties wanted. I will conclude that a strong patriarchy ruled. The women were subservient to the men, contrary to the pattern in San Miguel where there would be no imposing gender differences. Other factors also played themselves out. In my conversations with *el jefe*, he would frequently refer to the time when the local Asháninkas had been "uncivilized" and that they now were "less uncivilized", indicating that there was an attitude of inferiority in the encounter with the outer world, probably provoked to come to the surface by my presence.

Perené versus Río Ene: Comparison between the communities of Río Ene and those of District of Perené, show differences in their tangible manifestations. But while life in the community of San Miguel reflects changes, which undermine the quality of the Asháninka culture as an effect of the imposing outer society, comparable practices were not *qualitatively* different from those of Yoyato. These differences, however, are more pronounced when they can be linked directly to the effect of the aforementioned poverty trap, indicating that the traditional culture of the Asháninkas of San Miguel is being undermined faster as the less sheltered members increasingly are confronted by the outer society. The isolation of the Río Ene region has seen to that the process had not gone far, but as my references to the communities of Cutivireni and Comantovishi show, conditions vary. Yoyato is favored by the ample presence of those elements that help consolidate a traditional Asháninka life form – rivers, *el monte,* game, isolation, commonality, and a varied natural ecology. These elements facilitate the continuous

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[47] A brew made of fermented, crushed yucca - in this region added the fruit of *camote,* giving the drink a pink color and a fine, "rounded" taste.

maintenance of native customs and traditions, possibly explaining Yuyato's high degree of a patriarchy, superior craftsmanship, and low specialization of knowledge. Presumably, the difference is reflected in the non-tangible sector as well, say, in a more traditional worldview, myths, and symbols - matters I had no opportunities to investigate. What was obvious, however, was that similar ethnically constructing influences were in effect in Yuyato as in San Miguel. Hence, in both places the community members were ethnically conscious and proud of their ethnicity.

The cultural differences between San Miguel and Yuyato become less significant when compared with those of Asháninkas of the semi-isolated Gran Pajonal as reported by Varese (2002: 3-37) from his fieldwork there in the 1960s. He reports on social organizational forms which I did not observe in San Miguel (and had no opportunity to look for in Yuyato), among them, sororal polygyny (only one case of polygamy in San Miguel); matrilocal residence after marriage (patrilocal in San Miguel); and communities with much fewer families than both in San Miguel and Yayato. This raises the warning whether one can make generalizations among communities located across a vast territory of varied ecological features as I do in my comparison between communities of San Miguel and Yuyato, even when referring to the same tribe.

The native communities in the Río Ene region are represented by CARE (*Centro Asháninka de Río Ene*), whose president, Jaime Velásquez Salas, a resident of Cutivireni, was one of my informants. CARE and the conditions among its constituents do not differ significantly from those of other native federations and their member communities that make up the ethnic movement of Peru. During my days together with Sr. Velásquez in Satipo, where he stayed while in office, and later with *el jefe* of Cutivireni, who coordinated the nearby communities in that part of the upper Río Ene region on behalf of CARE's president by getting instructions by radio, I got a first-hand impression of the extent, type and content of the communication that took place between a native federation and its member communities. I will address this in the next chapter.

3. The State and the Natives

In the previous part I described one environment, the community, in which ethnicity is being constructed and reflected upon the main mechanisms in effect. In this section I will discuss three examples of how the native community, hesitantly and unprepared, is forced

to counter the increasingly imposing outer society, represented by the State, using this community background to secure their interests, but without a power base of their own, without an organizational structure to draw on, and without a worldview which can help them to interpret their opponent. The examples serve to exemplify the impotence following a community-based ethnicity in comparison with a more composite ethnic worldview as observed in Ecuador, the subject of chapter IV.

Sacrifices along Río Ene: As part of the local mobilization against the terrorism of Sendero Luminoso and MRTA - the former operating in the south-central and the latter in the Pichis and Palcazu valleys in the north of the Selva Central - a paramilitary version of the *rondas campesinas* of the northern Peru (see chapter I), was organized for self-defense - known as *autodefensa* - from 1983 onward in the rural communities of the central and central-south Peru. In this the members operated armed and militarized, had a strict hierarchy, elected the head of the local body among their members, and cooperated with the armed forces. In spite of the army's 'heavy-handedness' in places (Dean 2002: 205), this cooperation in a climate of extreme tension[48], gave the army a neutral, perhaps even a slightly positive, reputation, which I would observe in the Asháninka communities along the Río Ene. However, in Cutivireni, as soon as the *urban* threat from Sendero Luminoso and MRTA ended in the mid-1990s, Fujimori's government pulled it out. Responsibility for internal order was transferred to special military divisions of the national police (PNP), which was seen as having less experience than the army. For whatever reason, PNP ended up being as absent from where they were needed as the relocated army. Since gangs of *senderos* continued to operate in the Río Ene region, now in cooperation with narco-traffickers, the terror continued[49] and the locals had to fend for themselves. When I visited the Río Ene and Río Tambo region, groups of 8-10 armed

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[48] The internal war took an immense toll on the Asháninka people. Torre López (1999: 135) and Varese (2002: xxxii) point out that in a population of 40,000 persons, more than 10,000 were displaced; between 4,000 and 5,000, who could not seek refuge in the jungle, were killed by Sendero Luminoso; 5,000 were held in captivity until 1994. The war resulted in hundreds of orphans and widows with numerous children to support. More than 50 communities were devastated and had to be abandoned, while in the rest, agricultural production was interrupted with serious starvation and health problems as a result. Around 25,000 Asháninkas were directly affected to varying degree by the war. A considerably larger population was victimized.

[49] Peru's tropical Andes and Amazonian regions produced in the 1990s nearly half the globe's cocaine from its lucrative coca harvest (Dean 2002: 205).

men were patrolling their communities every night armed with old one-cartridge shotguns. In Yuyato, they had previously used bows and arrows, but after a particularly nasty attack they had bought firearms. A plan existed for how children and women were to run for *el monte* (the forest) in case the defenses should be overrun and how they later should be reunited with the men. For the last couple of years, there had been no violent exchanges, but I was warned against straying too far into the surrounding wilderness on my own, and was told that a significant number of Asháninkas served as prisoners to do forced labor for the senderistas, information later confirmed by the Peruvian press (La República 2002q: 2).

While in Yuyato, I was informed that there had been scheduled a meeting in Cutivireni between a representative of the United States' embassy in Lima[50] and the leaders (*jefes*) of the nearby communities where an upgrading of the autodefensa in the form of supplies of firearms would be discussed. Later it became clear that this was in preparation of President Bush's March 23, 2002 visit to Peru where the United States' domestic needs in combating drug trafficking was the main entry on the agenda between the two heads of State[51]. I found myself involved in discussions with Yuyato's *jefe* and his closest advisors on what kind of equipment they should ask for in the upcoming negotiations and proposed high-powered rifles and light radio communication equipment, which then was added to the list. Later, I was formally invited by *el jefe* in Cutivireni to take part in the meeting. However, as the story goes, according to my contacts, it had not been appreciated in high offices in Lima that a nosy foreigner was in the region. I was brought out by plane and flown to Mazimari near the town of Satipo a couple of hours before the US delegation arrived to Cutivireni in another aircraft.

Later, a few weeks before President Bush arrived to Peru, the Peruvian daily, El Comercio, with the US embassy as the source, broke the story about a major change in the United States' policy on the Río Ene/Apurímac region to fight drug trafficking and narco-terrorism; both high on the domestic agenda of the United States. An extensive military/narco-preventive cooperation agreement between the two countries was referred to (see Dean 2002: 207; McClintock and Vallas 2003: chap VI), giving the formal background for the direct involvement of United States. The Río Ene-Apurimac region is

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[50] Navy Captain (*Capitán de Návio*) Guillermo Miguel Espinosa.
[51] The second priority was to have Toledo take the lead on a resolution in the OAS criticizing human-rights violations in Cuba (McClintock and Vallas 2003: 165)

rated as the major hotspot for narco-production in Peru (El Comercio 2002f: 4, 6-7).

Not only were the Asháninkas of the Río Ene region forced to fend for themselves for 6-8 years in a local cut-throat war with the narco-traffickers. Today the same Asháninkas are called upon to actively confront weathered narco-terrorists - not to serve the interests of the Peruvian State, which let them down, but to serve the domestic interests of a third party. Articles in La República (2002q: 2-3), May 26, gave information on the new strategy. Local rondas would be mobilized to actively fight the senderistas and the drug-traffickers; members of the local Asháninka autodefensa would be given high-powered weapons, munitions and other military means; and military bases would be reinstalled in the region. The US ambassador to Peru, Mr. John Hamilton, pointed out the close link between narco-trafficking and Sendero Luminoso's terrorism, and listed road building and an influx of (quote) "millions of dollars" as the methods to combat both - ignoring any references to the local Asháninkas and their particular needs, which do not include roads. In spite of the obvious, that these roads are specifically intended to facilitate rooting-out the ongoing drug-trafficking in the region, they, too, had now become part of the 'development' of the region.

Following these events, but preceding President Bush's visit, the national newspapers in Lima began - what seemed to be a concerted effort - publishing 'educational' articles on how drug-trafficking was linked to 'international terrorism', another entry high on the US domestic agenda. The Minister of the Interior, Fernando Rospiglios claimed that Peruvian universities had been infiltrated by Sendero Luminoso from the Río Ene/Apurimac region, insistently denied by students and faculty alike. In a press article June 10, the inevitable was reported upon. Once more the Asháninkas had been put in a squeeze between the senderistas and the larger society by circumstances outside their control. The article claimed that Sendero Luminoso had proposed to Asháninka leaders that they might go about their patrolling, but not report to the army what they learned about the senderistas' whereabouts (La República 2002r: 10). With that exception, Río Ene disappeared from the public limelight together with President Bush.

Machiguengas and the Camisea Gas Field: The ongoing development of the huge Camisea gas field (see appendix C) offers an example of how marginal the interests of a the native population become when they get in the way of what is referred to as

development - paraphrasing Merton's (1967) question: "[Development] for whom?". The potential of the field overshadows Peru's other petroleum reserves many times over and will be the country's main energy source for years to come.

It all began in 1983 when Shell as operator was allowed to explore for hydrocarbons in the region. Up to 1987, the Camisea cluster of fields had been discovered, but an agreement how to develop the prospect was not reached until 1996. At the end of 1989, representatives of 21 Machiguenga communities of the upper and lower Río Urubamba, got together and agreed on a position. They demanded that the government not only adopted adequate mechanisms for effective community participation in monitoring mitigation measures and environmental management during the entire project, but that the gains derived from the production benefited also the local native communities. They were ignored by the authorities in Lima. The tensions increased, forcing Shell to leave the project "so not to hurt its international image"[52], but the only offer the State put forward was to give compensation to those Machiguenga communities whose titled land the pipeline connecting the field with the coast would cross. Sharing in the benefits resulting from economic activities on ethnic land is a right assigned the locals in ILO Convention 169, which was ratified by Peru in 1993.

In the fall of 2001 the Machiguengas from the Province of Quillabamba in the Department of Cusco, through their organization CMC, representing 35 native communities, approached *Defensoria del Pueblo* in Cusco (the local representation of an office roughly similar to that of an Ombudsman) to get help in defending their rights. On March 25, 2002, an agreement was signed by representatives of the two bodies, respectively, by the Machiguenga President of CMC, Sr. Rivas, and the representative in Cusco of the *Defensor del Pueblo*, Dr. Silvio Campana Zegarra. I was present and interviewed both men, as well as the lawyer, José Abel Muñiz Duran, who had negotiated the agreement on behalf of the *Defensoría*[53]. The development of the Camisea project leaves the impression that the operator, and the Peruvian State went forward without paying any attention whatsoever to the interests of the native locals. The resistance the Machiguengas put up against the project, including physical confrontations, stands out as a unique and desperate action by the peoples of the Peruvian Central Jungle, in light of

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[52] See De Sakar (1996) and Sala (1998).

[53] The legal matters and the *Defensoría* itself I also discussed with Eliana Rivera Alarcón, *Abogado* and *Directora Académia*, *Centro de estudios regionales Bartolomé de las Casas*, in Cusco.

previous practice in collisions between natives and the national authorities. While it is difficult to see which options the Machiguengas had to rally support for their cause, it seems clear that the agreement with the *Defensoría del Pueblo* is a futile move. The Peruvian office of the *Defensoría,* like the office of Ombudsman in a number of other countries, is a weak institution, particularly in situations like the one the Machiguengas in Convención want to use it for. The office works *within* the law, meaning that if the decision of the State is based on an 'unfair' law, an 'unfair' legal practice rooted in previous court decisions, or the conflict breaks now legal ground as in this case, it is not within the jurisdiction of that office to do anything about it. National law also takes preference to international accords of bodies like UN. This means that the ILO Convention 169, which supports the Machiguengas' case, has no effect. Worse still, the Peruvian *Defensoría* has responsibilities for a number of cases, which in the United States and the Western Europe are left to the police - with the result that scarce resources are taken away from those related to its main focus, human right violations[54]. Where a Defensoría exists, its actual functioning may still be shaped primarily by executive politics and State bureaucracy, as is the case in Peru (Ungar 2002: 39, 40). Muñiz Duran admitted willingly that in his position as *comisionado* (member) on the board of *Defensoría* in Cusco, he was not supposed to express opinions on the case and that the role of his office could only be as a mediator between the two parties. Given the national interests and the natives place in the pecking order, it may not be much to mediate about.

The Aguarunas contra Settlers: On January 18, 2002, La República (2002a: 27) reported that Aguaruna natives in the province of San Ignacio in the Department of Cajamarca, the previous day had attacked the settler community of Flor de la Frontera and left 15 persons killed and 18 seriously wounded - all peasant migrants from the Highland. The Aguarunas of the nearby native community of Salto Naranjo claimed that the Ministry of Agriculture, the provincial penal judge, and representatives of the national police (PNP) were to blame for the massacre. Referring to the fact that the native community of Salto Naranjo had title to the area occupied by the settlers, the latter had

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[54] The *Defensorías* are an off-shoot of the Ministry of the Interior, which prosecutes criminal, civil, and commercial offenses on behalf of the State and, in many countries, also investigates abuses by State officials. The administration court, which handle legal complaints against State administrators, are in Peru part of the regular judiciary. In Peru the Ministry of the Interior is part of the executive branch (Ungar 2002: 18, endnotes 2 and 3).

still succeed in getting provisional titles to the disputed land from the authorities, and from 1999 onward had taken possession of the land to sow coffee. The settlers had been ordered to evacuate the land, but had ignored the message. Then the Aguarunas had initiated a legal process. In spite of a court order in their favor and an eviction order to have the settlers removed - an order they had tried to effect four times, last time a few days before the attack - the police had not acted on their requests. Among the Aguarunas as well as among other native peoples of the Peruvian Amazon, there exist numerous documented cases where settlers have invaded land known to be in use by the natives. Such land conflicts have earlier provoked aggressive actions from the settlers against the natives, settlers had been given provisional titles to land legally belonging to the natives, or the latter have been put under pressure by the Ministry of Agriculture to accept the factual situation (Greene and Greene 2002: 22). The tame excuse presented by officials in charge for doing nothing in the case of Flor de la Frontera, was that there were no funds to remove the settlers.

The editorial of La República (2002b: 18) of January 21, 2002, four days after the event, presented the dilemma of the Aguarunas, which led to the attack, in a surprisingly balanced way. It pointed out that the attack came out of an isolated case, but reflected a wide-spread practice, which the authorities did not acknowledge. It argued that the attack neither represented a "cultural conflict" nor "savages on a rampage". To the contrary, it emphasized the poverty of both groups, that the Aguarunas had been abandoned by the official Peru and had been found by the market forces to be too "unproductive and unserviceable" to deserve attention. Stating that the Aguarunas had been forced to take force in their own hands, it concluded:

> What is being demonstrated is the inefficiency and incompetence of a State, which cannot offer justice, put in order and terminate the twisting of the law - explicitly or tacitly - in favor of those who exercise most influence or apply most force (although, as in this case, it is based on the arbitrariness of an invasion of land belonging to others). A State incapable of satisfying the basic needs of the people and ends in putting the poor up against the poor.

For the Aguarunas the case ended to their satisfaction. The case of Flor de la Frontera was investigated by the CNPAA (*Comisión nacional de pueblos andinos y amazónicos*), which has a broad representation among its members from the highest level of a number of Ministries and is chaired by Eliane Karp, the President's wife. The commission

concluded that the massacre was the consequence of irresponsibility of certain public servants, who had failed to act. It called the invasion of the Aguarunas' land "a violation of the natives' right to a life". For her own part, Karp claimed that the conflict had its background in the poverty of the land and the extreme centralization of the country.

Due to CNPAA's involvement, the surviving settlers had been brought out of the area, would be assigned land elsewhere, get an economic compensation for the land they had lost, and would be accommodated on the government's expense until their situation was finally settled. Claiming that this and numerous other land cases had been processed by the previous government on clientilistic, illegal, and insufficient technical terms, it was recommended that the Government reviewed all titles, which had been issued during the government of Fujimori to ensure that they were technically and legally sound. Finally, a 'massive' land titling of the region was promised (La República 2002s: 9).

4. Reflections

My time with the Asháninkas helped me to interpret later observations of both the Lowland and the Highland ethnic populations. In the following I will sum up some of my main reflections.

Constructing 'traditional' Ethnicity: I argue in this chapter that, paraphrasing Watanabe (1992: 217), that a person from San Miguel is an ethnic person from San Miguel because he or she grew up in San Miguel, lives in San Miguel, does what people in San Miguel are doing, and shares in the myths and symbols of San Miguel. I have identified two main processes which interact in the construction of the ethnic community identity. I argue that one of them is internal to the community, consisting of both subjective and objective factors. The internal one depends on the community, the division of labor between gender, and how the relations to the material environment are being socially structured. That process may well be referred to as 'cultural'[55]. It has been described by previously quoted authors, within their analytical context, as a mostly non-dynamic process. The other process is highly dynamic and has its roots externally to the

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[55] Any legitimate definition of culture will do, but I have choosen Cohen's (1985) formulation that culture is "the past and present creations of a community, the manifestations of the ways in which it has chosen to socially organize itself, and its worldview". It invites - as most others - to think about cultural manifestations as semi-static.

community; it may be referred to as 'economic'. On the one hand, the 'cultural' process was perceived by everyone in San Miguel as self-evident and ubiquitous and dominated the members' outlook. On the other, the *effects* of the 'economic' one were felt, but the structure behind was neither understood nor contemplated. As shown by the examples discussed in part 3, the kind of worldview the 'cultural' process creates, is inadequate in the natives' encounters with an increasingly imposing outer society. One aspect of the worldview of the traditional community is the low degree of insight the ethnic actor acquires about the ways in which the outer society affects him.

In the arena of the intertwined influences of the 'cultural' and 'economic' processes, one finds the environment in which the ethnic consciousness of San Miguel and the identity of its members are being constructed. The actor, whose ethnicity has been constructed in the traditional way, has been molded in a slow-changing environment. As the community is forced to adapt to the externally imposing forces, the sedate pattern of the former is still in effect, but gets overlaid with another of more forceful influences which modify, but does not replace the traditional influences. When this takes place, ethnicity 'as we knew it' is increasingly undermined and will, ultimately, disappear - or take new forms, meaning that traditional ethnicity has been 'modernized', a subject the next chapter will address.

An approach of seeing the construction of ethnicity as the composite process of internally semi-static influences and externally dynamic influences, and to each apply the most appropriate interpretative model - say, both the 'folk society' and the 'imagined communities' one - offers a more enriched perception of the phenomenon. Each bring into focus important but incomplete aspects of an ethnic community as seen from either the observer's or the member's standpoint. As the external influences build up and are being perceived and countered by the ethnic actor, Anderson's thesis becomes increasingly helpful in context where previously the other interpretation dominated.

The Mother of all Ethnicities: I have argue that women is the single most important source of ethnic identity due to their central role in maintaining the customs of the domestic structure of the community, and, intertwined with this, their greater responsibility in teaching the children how to be 'ethnically social'. These tasks translate into a higher ethnic consciousness and, hence, a greater burden of maintaining the

identity of the community. The material reasons why women, more than men, should end up with shouldering more responsibility for the ethnic identity are that women are living within a rigid and traditional social environment defined and constrained by the routines of their chores, and they have the youngest children around all day long during the forming years of the children. Without belittling the influence of the adult males on the children, men have another relationship to them, spend less time with them when the children are small, and, due to their different obligations, do not have the same opportunity to participate in the kind of informal 'teaching' a socialization implies.

From their first conscious moment, in interchange with their parents and their immediate nuclear family, which in this phase means primarily their mother and female siblings, the children start establishing the foundation of what later will be their concept of themselves as an ethnic person. As they get older and mobile, they increasingly will spend their day in an environment structured and dominated by women, who, in addition to their mother, will introduce them to the customs, the values, and the proper ways of behaving within the native community. And, as they get older still, they will interact with other children, who have been taught and influenced in similar environments. The kind of practices and environment children are faced with in a community like San Miguel, supplement and enhance the teaching their mothers give them. The children experience one harmonious, all-inclusive, social world where everyone is known and easily accessible. The abbreviations from this pattern are few and non-essential. There are no social barriers, as in the Western cultures, which prevent or regulate the child's direct access to other families or individuals. Like the adults, but to an even larger extent, the children will freely walk in and out of families, join their meals, play with the other children, and then move on to somewhere else when they feel for it.

A similar confidence, without mindless daring, was observed in how the children approached the natural environment around them. But it was mixed with a sound caution when something was experienced which was supposed to be outside the competence of the age they were at. At an early age the children get responsibilities and take after their parents, participate in the house chores, visit the chacras with them, and help out to the extent they can master. Over time they will be taught their gendered roles and will be able to master all aspects of their environment, like their parents do. The effect is that against this background a person raised in a native (or, generally speaking, ethnic)

community, will acquire in-grained preferences, which will tie him emotionally to the environment of his childhood and serve him as strong psychological 'defenses' in form of his ethnic identity when he later confronts the dominant society. Being ethno-social put them apart from, say, 'rational-choice' individualism with its expectations of individual preferences, goal-orientedness, and utility-maximizing behavior.

The Self-conscious 'Ethnic Person': My third main reflection is that while it is fully appropriate within a suitably analytical frame to use 'community' as a unit of analysis, the constituents of ethnic communities should not be interpreted as faceless herds, heeding Bunge's (1996: 123) statement that it is "a shallow theory that treats its referents as black boxes with invisible innards". The innards of the community are human beings - the paragon of all social sciences - whose individualities, selves and idiosyncrasies contribute to create their physical and abstract community, as they are being formed by it. Quoting Cohen (1994: 7):

> If we regard social groups as a collection of complex selves (complex, because any individual must be regarded as a cluster of selves or as a multi-dimensional self) we are clearly acknowledging that they are more complicated and require more subtle and sensitive description and explanation than if we treat them simply as a combination of roles. Indeed, the aggregation of these complex entities into groups may itself be seen as more problematic than would otherwise be the case. Collective behavior is then revealed as something of a triumph, rather than as being merely mechanical. I suspect that this is a description, which gibes more closely with our personal experiences as members of families, committees, clubs, platoons or whatever.

Communal individuality, the members' awareness of their individual self, may be easier to accept when it is appreciated that symbolism plays an important part of any ethnic community. The members of San Miguel were aware of their community's otherness relative to the other society or - same message - that society's otherness to them, perceiving a boundary between the two. The consciousness of 'community' was encapsulated in the perceptions of the boundaries between groups with awareness of each other (Cohen 1985: 13). The meaning the members of San Miguel give to that cleavage, points to the *symbolic* factors of their community, which, together with its *social* and *material* influences[56] discussed above, facilitates the process by which the ethnic actor (individual or group) is being constructed. Symbols do more than merely stand for or

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[56] The last part includes the *economic* factors, widely meant (not restricted to money).

represent something else; in that case they would be redundant. They stand for categories, which are hard to express or describe with precision, and in that lay their usefulness. The range of meanings in the elusive subject can be referred to with a commonly accepted symbol, allowing its users to attach their own meaning to it even when these differ. 'Community' is one of these boundary-related symbols since it is more than just a geographic locality; it represents a lifeworld to its members, whose precise meaning depends upon the individual member's unique orientation to it. This means that learning to be ethnically social, i.e., to be an 'ethnic person', means to manage the symbols of one's community - not for the purpose of acquiring meaning, but to acquire the ability to *make* meaning (Cohen 1985). These interpretations are in part subjective and in part a result of the features characteristic of that person's community. They are responsive to the circumstances of interaction - among the communal individuals and between the community and what is outside. This points to 'community' as both form and content, where form widely is held in common, while content differs among the members. The implication is that the *common*ality, which is found in a community, is not synonymous with uniformity; it does not clone behavior or ideas. It is a commonality of *forms* (ways of behaving) whose *content* (meanings) may vary considerably among its members. Because ethnic identity is expressed through symbols, internal heterogeneity among the community members and the members' individuality are preserved.

CHAPTER III.
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN PERU

In this chapter I will address the ethnic mobilization, which takes place in Peru. The chapter is divided into 4 parts. The first discusses to which degree an ethno-conscious climate exists in the Highland. The second discusses the influence of the two hypothesized independent variables, that is, the national socio-economic situation and the political regime. The third part addresses the nature of the ethnic mobilization ongoing in Peru. In the fourth and final section, I reflect upon some of the implications of the aforementioned discussions.

1. The Highland and the Ethnic Identity

One commonly stated characteristic of the rural Highland is that while ethnic markers and ethnic life forms may be seen 'everywhere', the indigenous-rooted individual does not perceive himself as an indigenous person. He will refer to himself as a peasant devoid of ethnic overtones. To determine whether this indeed was the case, eventually, to which extent that attitude ruled, and what the reason might be, became a task on my agenda. I will refer to people of ethnic roots in the Highland as 'indigenous', whether they are ethnically conscious or not.

The official presentation of Peru, carried out by INEI (*Instituto Nacional Estatistica e Informatica*), does not take into account the variation in human conditions along the vertical axis of the country. INEI's surveys and 10-annual census are done areally, by administrative units (department, province, and district). As a consequence, the descriptions represent averages across these units' features, ignoring that each may include zones of highly different demographic, socio-economic and ethnic characteristics. To construct a platform, which better served my research focus, I took the percentage of a department's many small districts in each zone as a measure of which zone or zones the department ought to be associated with.

Referring to table 3.1, my 'research bases' in the Highland were regional urban centers where I collected public data and carried out interview with public officials, representative of NGOs, and professionals. The so-called 'profiles' were routes I traveled while crisscrossing the rural Highland, often visiting the same place more than once. In places along the profiles, many not listed, I made stopovers and had improvised

conversations with locals of 'all ways of life'. The habitats of the people I met may conveniently be parted into the following categories. The first consisted of dispersed, single-families living on farms located at altitudes higher than 3,000-3,500 meters above sea level. Typical examples would be the high-elevation parts of profiles b and c listed in table 3.1. The land would be barren, in part covered with grass with no high vegetation. People would subsist on sparsely, low-yield agriculture combined with livestock. Even in places where families had aggregated, the settlements were too small and territorially too isolated to act as a politically united and focused community. I concluded that populations based on families of this category would not have the human and social capital to meet the criteria of an ethnic community as I have defined it earlier.

Table 3.1
Urban centers visited and profiles traveled in the Peruvian Highland

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Urban 'research bases'[2]
Lima * Huancayo * Ayacucho * Huancavelica * Cusco * Puno * Huaraz * Cajamarca

Profiles traveled[1]
a: La Merced - Tarma - Cerro de Pasco - Huánuco - La Union - Huaraz
b: Concepción/Mantaro Valley - along *Río Pampa Hermosa* - *Mariposa* - Satipo/Selva Central
c: La Merced/Selva Central - Tarma - *Acolla* - *Jauja/Mantaro Valley* - Huancayo
d: Huancayo - Ayacucho
e: Ayacucho - *Matara - Ocros - Chumbes - Uripa - Nueva Esperanza* - Andahuaylas
f: Andahuaylas - *Allpachaca/Lucuchatinga* - Abancay
g: Abancay - *Curahuasi - Pto. Cunyac - Ancauasi - Compone - Izchucata (Anta)* - Cusco
h: Huancayo - *Acostambo - Izcuchaca - Huancapampa - Huando - Quimina - Yauli* - Huancavelica
i: Cajamarca - *Magdalena - Gilete* - Chiclayo - Piura - *Tambogrande* - (Sullana)
j: Huancavelica - *Lircay - Anchonga*

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[1] Villages, settlements and hamlets are written in italic. Towns and cities are written with regular types. In addition to the places listed, smaller places in between were visited during shorter stopovers.

 The second category consisted of families living *either* dispersed near their individual cultivated plots, but with good communication to their neighbors, *or* clustered in hamlets and small settlements, which sometimes bordered at what braggingly could be labeled a settlement or even a small village. In the perception of the locals both types were 'communities' with close ties among the families. These I would normally find at altitudes from 2,000 up to around 3,000 meters above sea level. The subsistence base would be agriculture, often combined with small animals (chicken, hens, pigs etc.) as an

added income activity. The socio-material conditions and the presence of ethnic markers indicated that the population had a strong indigenous background. In addition, I had interviews with officials, individual professionals with a variety of backgrounds, and officers of private and public institutions like INEI, CTAR (*Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional de Ministerio de la Presidéncia*), *Defensoría del Pueblo, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación*, and NGOs - mostly mestizos.

To determine, on an individual basis, who is and who is not an 'indigenous-rooted' person in the Highland - and, therefore, in my definition, an 'indigenous' - is considerably more difficult than to identify a native person in the Amazon Lowland. Based on the person's relationship to the land, which is reflected in his or her use of ethnic markers, socio-economic status, and customs, it was found useful to make the distinction on whether or not the person was a member of a rural community, i.e., was working the land. Around 20 percent of the Highland population, summing to 5.5 million people, live in the more than 4,500 recognized 'peasant communities' (Gelles 2002: 240).

In spite of my efforts while crisscrossing the Peruvian Highland, *no* signs of ethnic awareness and, following from that, *no* wider mobilization promoting ethnic values could be found[57]. The exception was a few initiatives I will report upon. This is indeed a puzzling result since the distinct Andean culture, as described by Gelles (2002), is no less obvious in the indigenous-rooted rural population of the Peruvian Highland than it is (as I will show) in the ethnically-conscious population of the rural Ecuadorian Highland. My informants' explanation was often given with reference to the consequences of the Peruvian agrarian reform of 1969 that introduced the term '*comunidades campesinas'* and helped establish a non-ethnic peasant mindset in the population. The implication was that a socio-economic class-based classification of the Highland peasant (*campesino*), replacing the previous ethnicity-based one (*indígena*), became the predominant idiom for discussing rural dwellers. That explanation has merit, but is too simplistic. The discussion of Thurner's (1997) historic analysis of the Huaylas-Ancash region that follows in part 4, points to a State policy that goes much further back in time. The trend has been a ongoing weakening of the position of the Indian, most recently with the removal of safeguards on the communal property by the introduction of neoliberal reforms in the 1993 Constitution

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[57] Sendero Luminoso and MRTA, which both organized the rural ethnic and non-ethnic population quite effectively throughout the 1980s until the early 1990, rejected demands or agendas emanating from an ethnic identity.

under president Fujimori (Gelles 2002: 244).

The political impotence of the ethnic cause in the Peruvian Highland was exemplified in an interview I had with the first and only indigenous delegate in the Peruvian Congress, the Aymara Congresswoman from Puno, Paulina Arpasi Velásquez. She proudly announces her ethnic background by wearing her traditional dress in public and presents herself as the national representative of the Aymara and Quechua people of Peru; actually, in my interview with her, she claimed to represent *all* the ethnic peoples of Peru. Given that she has not been given a mandate by that population nor has an organizational apparatus at her disposal that is indeed an ambitious task. She was hand-picked in 2001 by the presidential candidate, Alejandro Toledo, and promoted by his party, Perú Posible. She gave in May 2002 an interview to La Gaceta (2002b: 7), the weekly news report of the Congress, where she was critical to how the Congress addressed the proposals of the Congress committee she was heading, *Comisión de Asuntos Indígenas y Afroperuanos*, and how she was treated personally – views she also elaborated upon with me. In her view, the Peruvian Congress had no interest in the needs of the indigenous Highland population, and she made no secret of that she felt snubbed, ignored and marginalized in her function as an indigenous Congresswoman. She told me that in Lima there was a condescending attitude to people from the Highland: "They treat me as if I was from another world". In my interview with her, Arpasi repeatedly expressed great faith in president Toledo and his wife, Elina Karp, and expressed hope that "they would help me". However, it is doubtful whether President Toledo, widely seen as a weak and indecisive politician[58], wants to have a position one way or the other in relation to Peru's 'ethnic problem'. To the extent that he has commented upon it, he has promoted the idea of a *cholo* (an indigenous turned mestizo), i.e., acculturation. When I asked Arpasi why the ethnic populations had no political influence in today's Peru, an assessment she agreed to, she referred to the ongoing marginalization. She was not familiar with the situation in Ecuador.

Two indigenous mobilizing efforts I was informed about in the Highland will be mentioned. One was the *Primero Congreso de los Pueblos Quechuas del Perú*, arranged in Cusco in November 5-9, 2001, shortly before my arrival to Peru. Since I was not able

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[58] President Toledo's popularity started tumbling shortly after his inauguration in July 2001. It was reported by *New York Times* of May 29, 2003 (p. A5), to be as low as 14 percent in some polls.

to localize its leaders, it was impossible to assess the importance of that initiative[59]. The participants were indigenous delegates representing all the Highland departments, in addition to guests from Ecuador and Bolivia. A summary of positions taken by the congress is given in appendix G. When I mentioned the congress to Arpasi, she referred to it dismissively and claimed that it trespassed on "her turf". The context in which the congress presented itself included an ethno-ideological platform comprising an interpretation of the past of the Quechua people, linking this to their present situation. It pointed out the destruction of an 'Inca nationalism' following the Spanish colonization; to the Creole State that was formed after the Independence; and to the exclusion of the indigenous peoples by the Republic, which intended to "wipe out our identity" (*extinguir nuestros ayllus*). It was argued that during the 20th century the Quechua people had been marginalized by the policies of the government and shunned by the strata of power. The delegates called on the president of the Republic to correct past errors, reorient macroeconomic policies dictated by foreign interests, establish a nationalistic model, which could operate flexible in the global market, and build a 'nation of all bloods' - an common phrase pointing out a call for a multi-nation society.

This reflects two aspects, which were not present among the native organizations I had contacted. The first is that the Quechua congress offered an ideological position for the Quechuas that merged identity, history and a vision of the future. The second is that the participants produced a discourse by which they have decided to understand themselves and want to be understood by others. Escobar (1995) describes how the perceptions of the Third World from 1949 onward - for outsiders and insiders alike - were produced in the First World and rooted in mainly two premises: the poverty and the backwardness of the former; both being the antithesis of desirable aspects of the North. In a similar way, the ethnic person in Peru often compares himself with the non-ethnic person and accepts his inferior position as he takes over the explanatory ideology of the more powerful (see Cleaver 1968; Trouillot 1995). Another mobilization took place in Andahuaylas October 25, 2002, shortly after the end of my fieldwork in Peru. This, the *Primer Encuentro Nacional de las Organizaciones Indígenas del Perú*, organized by *Frente Popular Llapanchik (Todos Juntos)*, would comprise delegates of both the native

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[59] Most of the information I acquired in interviews with the staff of the NGO, *Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas,* in Cusco and in the archive of the newspaper La República in Lima.

and the indigenous populations. Representatives of what was referred to only as 'indigenous organizations' - presumably small and localized ones since I had not been able to identify any of them during my fieldwork - came from the Departments of Apurímac, Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Cusco and Puno. Present would be Evo Morales, the indigenous leader who came in a close second in the presidential election in Bolivia in the fall of 2002. Both initiatives inform about a possible ongoing political fertilization of struggling efforts among a few Highland activists by successful ethnic mobilizations in the neighboring countries. As was mentioned in my discussion of the concept of ethnicity in chapter I, ethnicity can be de-constructed and re-constructed (Brass 1991). The indigenous-rooted Highland population of Ecuador was de-ethnicized up until the late 1960s - as that of Peru is today. Then the work started to establish an ethnic movement based on the premises of the Indians themselves that ultimately would result in the highly successful mobilization one finds in Ecuador today.

2. The Environment

This study was carried out under the hypothesis that two causal independent 'environmental' variables impose themselves upon the effort to establish an ethnic movement and influence its ability to 'succeed'. The first is the socio-economic conditions, i.e., the circumstances under which the constituents are able to generate social capital and launch a successful effort. In chapter II, the national economic structure, its manifestations, and its socio-economic effects on the rural Peru were demonstrated with reference to appendix A, C and D. The second variable was the regime type.

It has been shown that appalling socio-economic conditions, poverty, indigence, and marginalization are characterizing features of life in the rural areas and that the situation is worse for the ethno-rural peoples. Running ahead of my argument, I should find that the same situation is governing in Ecuador and Guatemala, but with larger variations from region to region within a country than between countries. Given this situation, and referring to the comparative aspects of this study, one may speculate whether it is possible to translate differences in the socio-economic conditions, comparing zone with zone across national borders, relate it to social capital, and translate it into ability of the ethnic populations to mobilize politically. Poverty is dehumanizing and paralyzing, but its effect is in certain aspects relative. Low quality of a family's dwelling, one poverty

indicator, may be less crucial in the Amazon Lowland than in the Highland, for climatic reasons, and may be felt less painful in the rural regions due to a broader parity than in the semi-urban areas with more diversity. Suffering insufficient education and healthcare are massive handicaps everywhere, though a closer proximity to the other society in the Highland may put a person of mediocre and badly focused education there at a greater disadvantage than a person in a semi-isolated community in the Amazon Lowland. On the other hand, a more densely populated region may offer opportunities to the individual that are non-existent in the low-density areas.

This points to that one cannot assume that neither the individual nor the combined effect of numerically equal quantifiable poverty indicators will affect population groups in different places to the same degree. It invites the conclusion that while socio-economic conditions are a crucially constraining obstacle to any kind of progress in a community, they may be less useful when trying to understand or explain differences between environments. For example, there can be little doubt that the Peruvian native population is more vulnerable in its encounter with the other society than the indigenous or indigenous-rooted one, for a number of reasons, one being its smaller share of the total population in the zone and another the more dispersed demography among the natives. But if high population density is one factor influencing positively the ability of a population to defend itself against the socially eroding effects of externally economic influences, one may well reflect upon the difference in population density between the Guatemalan and Peruvian Highland. I do not have the numbers for these countries' Highland regions, but the ratio between their national population densities is 5.9 (see table 1.1), indicating that Guatemalan Highlanders should be more resistant than those of Peru and even Ecuador's (see table 1.1), other conditions kept constant. Nothing indicates that. My methodological approach was not designed to address these evasive relationships. Instead, one may better ask why people mobilize - widely accepted not to be limited to grievances and material causes only (Foweraker 1995; Melucci 1989; Cohen and Arato 1992) - and look for other and probably more important causes when the obstacles to ethnic mobilization are not seen in absolute, but in relative terms.

A stronger cause is indeed found in the second of my independent environmental variables, the regime type. Any group with an ambition to make itself felt on the national political arena through mass mobilization must apply political strategies and tactics that

are appropriate to the constraints of the governing political climate. The correct classification of regime type has implications on the choice of political strategies and means, which are at the disposal of an oppositional group. Say, what emphasis should be put on the mobilization for and the participation in the political electoral process in Peru by the native movement? Will it bring influence as the democratic ideal promises, impotence as Carothers predicts or are other approaches required?

It has often been claimed that marginalized groups of the civil society have a better chance to make themselves heard and have their needs met in a democratic system than in any other type of political regime[60], which explains my focus on the contradiction between, on the one hand, the structurally oppressive conditions in the rural areas and the lack of political representativity of the rural population here, and, on the other, the ongoing formal democratization in Latin America (including the countries of this study). The political elite in Lima and the national press frequently referred to Peru as a democracy, at times qualified as 'feeble', struggling', 'weak', etc. In support of labeling Peru (as well the other two countries of my study) as democratic, it is often referred to the 'democratization wave', that is said to have swept Latin America in the last couple of decades - concluding from the general to the specific. As my informants, ethnic and mestizo alike, pointed out, in Peru as the other two countries of my study, the 'democratization' has not brought improvements in the situation of the rural population; they all dismissed it as political demagogy from political centers disconnected from the rural reality. Referring to the discussion in chapter I, expanded upon with the description of the conditions in the rural Inland given in appendix C and D, I will understand the political Peru as a regime under the control of strong interest groups, in the tradition of Latin American oligarchies, whose present-day tolerance to liberal values is volatile and, possibly, maintained by pressure imposed from the outside. My informants characterized the military as an unimportant political factor today[61].

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[60] As a general statement, the claim may be debatable. Quoting Mares (2001: 174): "Ecuador's indigenous population obtained their most significant advances during times of military dictatorships. Between 1994 and 1998, Indians say that the democratically elected government claimed that it recognized Ecuador as a multiethnic and pluricultural state, with collective rights. However, the Indians argue that the government never respected these rights in practice. In contrast, under military dictatorships Ecuador passed agrarian reform legislation, established a development plan for the country, approved and supported bilingual education projects, and advanced the acceptance of bilingualism."

[61] Mares (2001: 186) notes that the accountability between the executive and the military is

Peru's political structure is characterized by the country's excessive centralization. One implication is that alternative power bases to Lima's do not exist (Deep Throat, pers. com.)[62], possibly explaining why the traditional political parties ignore the interests of their constituents in the Inland and concentrate their efforts on Lima. Labor and peasant unions have traditionally been weak in Peru and were further curtailed during Fujimori's regime; distribution of personal income and wealth is extremely biased in favor of the few; and the State structure is permeated by racist or anti-ethnic attitudes. This might indicate that the recruitment to positions of influence and power is strictly controlled by tightly interwoven elites.

As a reflection of the last decades of liberalization in Latin America, Peru's 'enlightened' version of an oligarchically led regime does not prevent groups of the civil society from organizing and expressing their views in public. This also is in accordance with Carothers' (2002a) regime description discussed in chapter I. He states that in a feckless pluralist country "the whole class of political elites, though plural and competitive, is profoundly cut off from the citizenry, rendering political life an ultimately hollow, unproductive exercise" (p. 11). Once again this describes the situation in Peru well. With the absence of legitimate political channels to express itself, the forum left to the civil society is - the streets. Frequently during the week, peasants, unemployed, labor unions, health personnel, teachers or other interest groups demonstrate in front of the President's Palace (*Palacio del Gobierno*) in Lima and confront its anonymous facade with their demands. The same dissatisfaction with and lack of representativity in the political system are reflected also in the numerous demonstrations nation-wide. However, there are no signs that the government pays attention. Unemployment has continued to rise and so has the percentage of the population living in poverty and indigence (INEI 2001a). Polls and election results indicate a politically fragmented country with little faith among people in the traditional parties and the government. With exception of the much touted decentralization scheme, commented upon underneath, Toledo's government has done little to reform the State.

The lack of a representative political structure through which one can express one's

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complex. Peruvian civil-military relations are best characterized as one of parallel spheres of influence without civil control.

[62] The civil uprising, referred to as the Arequipa Earthquake in the spring of 2002 (see appendix A), was made possible by a combination of unique conditions.

views, is particularly troublesome with respect to the ethnic populations, which either do not exist as a conscious political body (the indigenous Highland population) or are too few, too fractured, organizationally too weak, and physically too far away to make themselves heard (the native population). The result is that the ethnic population is politically represented neither directly nor indirectly. The cleavage that exists between the mestizos and the ethnic population, continuously maintained and renewed through the economic structure and 'explained' by the nationalism of the mestizo State and the national lore, ensures that the native peoples - comparing with, say, the 'civil rights' movement in the United States in the 1970s - have no dormant reservoir of political support in the population; cannot appeal to national solidarity; is lacking means to raise its demands; and are up against a thoroughly passive State structure.

These conditions are strongly felt and well understood in the Inland. The mayor of the District of Perené claimed tersely that "neither the government nor the State agencies had the inclination to address *anything* outside the immediate vicinity of metropolitan Lima and even that they did not handle particularly well, nor do they care" (Haug; pers. com.). Other of my well-placed informants expressed similar views[63]. My informant, Deep Throat, mentioned that the debate on decentralization of the Peruvian State, which started in the spring of 2002, may well be seen as a sign of the government's inability to manage the many nation-wide problems of the country, not as a will to strengthen 'democracy'. He has a point. The 'moveable' funds put at the disposal of the 25 newly established regional governments (in addition to the city of Lima) in the fall of 2002, are tightly controlled by the central government. For the fiscal year of 2003, they have combined been assigned for locally-decided investments just one percent (US$120 million) of the national budget, compared with 14.4 percent (US$1,727) left under the control of the government. In addition, the regional governments are not allowed to raise debt; have no tax-raising power; and it is not clear whether the State enterprises are centrally or locally owned (EIU 2003: 15, 17).

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[63] Among them, Mayhua Capín, Director Municipal, Huancavelica, and Sáenz, Director de Planificación, Cajamarca.

3. Etnic Activism[64]

Bengoa claims that all Latin American countries with ethnic populations have viable ethnic movements, "perhaps with exception of Peru" (2000: 23, footnote 9). He does not distinguish between what I have called the 'voice'-seeking category of mobilizations and the more ambitious 'power'-seeking one. Both kinds are, for all practical purposes, non-existent in the Peruvian Highland. In this part, I will discuss the situation in the Amazon Lowland, and the goals and means of the native mobilization. The strategies - not formulated as such by the native movement, which approaches its tasks as unconnected projects - I will discuss in chapter VI.

Increasingly, encroachments on native territories have come from a variety of sources: Andean colonists (*colonos*), displacements of communities due to the past internal war, conflicts with coca growers (*cocaleros*), business interests, and tourism. The disruptions to the social life of the native communities in regions of intercultural collisions represent a dialectic of social relationships that is more complicated than subordinate versus dominant (Palumbo-Liu 1997). Given the constraining 'community perspective' that dominates among the natives (described in chapter II), it is not surprising that the means applied by the Peruvian native mobilization represent just a slight modification and extension of very basic remedies of the community itself. Given these conditions it is noteworthy, however, that an extra-communal population with no sense of commonality, i.e., attitudes of Indianness and tribal allegiances, is able to mobilize at all.

Means: Goals, means and strategies on the inner front of the mobilization become often faces of the same coin. Organizing grassroots work, building an organization, and do 'networking', to mention some, point out important ways of operating and become means to an end and desired goals. The organizational structure of the Amazon peoples - in Peru as in other countries of the Amazon Basin - begins with the community that is formed by extended family interrelationships. Native communities located within a river basin are aggregated into federations, which is the first-order level of organization of one people. In Peru, typical examples are the federations of CART (*Centro Asháninka del Río*

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[64] The topics of this part were discussed in numerous interviews with previous and present leaders of native communities and federations in the Central Jungle as well as with the staff of the man representative body of the native movement, AIDESEP.

Tambo) and CARE (*Centro Asháninka de Río Ene*), which represent Asháninka communities along the Río Tambo and Río Ene. CECONSEC (*Central de Comunidades Nativas de Selva Central*), the largest federation in the Central Jungle, comprising 120 Asháninka communities, is unique due to its size. The next higher level - referred to as second-level - consists of regional same-nation organizations, like ARPI (*Asociación Regional de los Pueblos Indigenas de Selva Central*). It is located in Satipo, the 'capital' of the Central Jungle, and represent 9 Asháninka federations, among them CECONSEC and CARE. The next and ultimate level is the national multi-nation representation of the native population, AIDESEP (*Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de La Selva Peruana*), with its office located in Lima. It is the highest representative body of native peoples (nations, tribes) in the Peruvian Amazon with 52 first-level and second-level organizations. AIDESEP is a member of COICA, which represent the national organizations of countries in the Amazon basin. Within Peru, ethnic peoples of different zones, including the Afro-Peruvians, cooperate loosely through COPPIP.

The above scheme ought not to be understood as if the structure of native representations - or for that sake, *any* ethnic representation - is monolithic; it never is. The centrality of the ultimate social unit of the ethnic society, the community, ensures a horizontal organization, meaning a network. In that sense, ethnic movements may represent a reassuring deviation from the North-based life-cycle model of collective action with its Michelsian dilemma (Offe 1990) - the fear that any move toward formal organization, inclusion, and institutionalization will undermine the movement goals and threaten the continued existence of the movement form of collective action (the 'iron law of oligarchy'[65]). In addition to Peru's AIDESEP, there exist other native organizations with sufficient resources to operate on the semi-national (in practice, regional) level, though their agenda is, at times, influenced, if not determined, by outside special interests. CAAAP founded by the Catholic Church in 1974, is one example. Allowing outside special interests, which may invite for factionalism and external manipulation, is one way the political immaturity of the Peruvian mobilization makes itself felt.

The natives of one people have the tradition to pool their resources when they operate in tension-filled spaces (indicating bonds of some kind among the same-tribal communities). They are often ad-hoc based and therefore volatile. Even when they

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[65] Michels (1966).

continue to exist formally, they may not be very effective. During the internal war, when the leader of the Asháninkas in Pichis was killed in 1990 by MRTA, the local Asháninkas literally organized their own 'army', drove out MRTA and pacified the region as the first in the country. When that was accomplished, the initiative disintegrated. In 1984, CART was established as a reaction to the activities of Sendero Luminoso, threatening Asháninka communities along the Río Tambo and forcing many to resettle[66]. Between 1984 and 1986, OCARE, representing communities along Río Ene, an initial version of the present CARE, was established, but became inactive after violent confrontations with Sendero Luminoso where Asháninka leaders were killed.

Native first-level federations, representing communities, are organized on narrow geographical premises. Far from all the first-level federations merge into larger same-nation bodies. They prefer to focus on their own local tasks or do not have the resources or the motivation to aggregate. CART is one example. CART feels no pressing needs to cooperate with other federations or become a member of higher-order organizations; it is very much in control along Río Tambo. This insulated attitude reflects, in part, the enormity of the jungle which - when seen from the inside - easy gives a feeling of false security. The need for pooling the resources across the Peruvian Amazon and speak with one voice up against the other society is not well understood. I once more explain this position with the constraining 'community outlook' I discussed in chapter II. The fact that being an Asháninka or a member of any other large nation (Aguarunas, Machiguengas, etc.) does not translate into an attitude of shared nationhood with other members of that same people, means in Brass' (1991) terminology, that the members are not politicized. Even the intra-communal commonality has not developed very far. For example, the Asháninkas are represented by many federations, some being 'neighbors', like CARE and CART, and CART and OIRA (representing communities along Río Atalaya, a tributary of Río Tambo), but with no cooperation among them; and there is no 'congress' for, say, all the Asháninkas. These traits are typical in the Peruvian Amazon.

For reasons related to the conditions of the restricted communal environment from where they are recruited, the native federations are often led by men who have no or very few experiences with the world outside their community before they are called to fill

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[66] The establishment of CART provoked reactions with clientilistic overtones among supporting NGOs, the State and religious organizations. They disagreed to this kind of promoting native rights (CEA 1999: 9), though without offering alternatives.

positions under very difficult economic, organizational and political conditions. Without exceptions, the present generation of leaders is inexperienced and, in addition, is handicapped by no or only a few years of basic public schooling of mediocre standard. The lack of resources is reflected in their organizations, which are without staff, technical means, and external contacts. The most common obstacles the leader will face is the absence of material and economic resources, an uneducated and indifferent constituency, and the lack of competent people with whom he can interact and lean on in his work. As a result, each incumbent is isolated and personalizes the organization while he is in office. At the same time, the president is the unchallenged authority and the one other turn to for solutions, guidance and decisions. I was invited to take part at the bi-annual meeting of CARE in Quempiri at the upper Río Ene, but up to the moment when it was delayed indefinitely, one week before it was scheduled, no agenda had been decided.

Due to the flawed infrastructure in the Amazon, the helmsman of a federation normally is located in an urban center and physically isolated from the communal heads of the member communities of his federation and, more so, their members. Radio contact may alleviate that, but since radio communication with the communities takes place between the helmsman and a locally dedicated person, most likely *el jefe*, the constituencies do not become mobilized. The same lack of interactive communication may characterize the relationship between AIDESEP and its member organizations.

The native population has a high ethnic awareness, but it has not been formulated in political terms. Due to the absence of grassroots work within the federations and the semi-isolation of the individual communities, there are few opportunities for the individual members to experience the outer society, meaning that the worldview created within the setting of the community is unchallenged and unchanged. The experiences with the outer society do not get accumulated, processed and disseminated in refined form. This creates a bad circle. The members have no rationale for getting involved in the work of the federations, further isolating the federations from their constituents. The lack of communication or isolation between the members of the communities and the federations reduces genuinely ethnicity-empowering projects into 'technical' matters, which involve only the few. Land titling is one example.

With respect to social movements in the high-industrialized countries, the policies of the government and the actions of the State will serve as rallying foci for social

mobilizations. This is not the case in Peru. The disinterest, absence or inaction of the State in ethnically stratified countries in those sectors where the constituencies of the ethnic mobilization have their priorities, become additional obstacles to the ethnic movement[67]. The situation with an absentee State is accentuated by the unfamiliarity of the native society with the dispositions of the State, combined with a lack of required political and technical competence.

Goals: The objectives vary among the mobilized native peoples, depending on the local conditions and the kind of threats they experience from the outer society. The native movement, AIDESEP, formally representing the native population of the Amazon Lowland, is not coherent enough to take broad initiatives and give support to the local levels. The case studies discussed in chapter II, where the members of organizationally isolated communities in desperation took action, exemplify the situation. An effectively operational structure is an obvious goal, but the steps required to get there have not been identified. This situation is reflected in the fact that newly elected leaders, at times, bring with them their personal priorities, which may or may not overlap with the previous agenda of their domain, preventing continuity in the over-all work. This mirrors, in part, that the problems are many and pressing, while competence and economic resources are badly missing, and, in part, that idiosyncrasies of the leaders of the movement may rule in the absence of check-and-balances in the structure. The result is frequently that the leaders become isolated and operates uncoordinated, not only within their organizations but also in their relations to other bodies, further emphasizing the effects of a flawed organizational structure. One organization may favor bilingual education (like ARPI), another titling (CARE); and a third focuses on health planning and bilingual education (CECONSEC). In the departments of Loreto and Madre de Dios, the mobilization is directed against the extractive industries and the invasion of settlers. AIDESEP, the superior body, likes to see progress in all these areas and more, but does not have the levers at its disposal to see it happens. The result is that needs are identified and sweeping ideas formulated, but with no realistic hope of having them implemented.

Kinchokre, my main informant within AIDESEP, listed numerous priorities during

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[67] A series of well educated, well-positioned mestizo informants gave me examples on how Peru was administrated, devoid of a coherent policy or a settled practice to guide the decisions of the State.

the two interviews I had with him. The primary one is to secure the ancestral territories for the native communities in a way in which they can maintain their traditional life forms, prevent invasion by settlers, and regulate the extraction of natural resources (primarily gas, petroleum and timber) in cooperation with the State with the status of a legal partner in the negotiations. The natives are given certain rights to the resources on the surface (not including the waterways), but the law is vague and illegal activities are rampant. Titling of ancestral land is widely seen as the single most important initiative to defend the integrity of the native community and secure its cultural survival. Titling, however, does not address the prerogative of the State to extract subterranean resources and do it whatever way it sees fit. For that reason, is not a conflictive issue and progress takes place. Given the many problems in Peru related to the absence of a proper title to land, however, the process is slow and has been late in coming (Gray 1998). The State's involvement has been half-hearted, human and economic resources to carry out the work have been lacking, and the efforts to speed up the work have been seriously flawed (La República 2002ae: 29; AIDESEP, pers. com.). The titling of land in the Amazon Lowland, where no earlier practices for defining ownership and/or traditional use existed, calling for new methodologies, was given priority behind the titling of 3 million private properties and land belonging to peasant communities in the Highland. AIDESEP has no influence on the progress of that work[68].

Another of AIDESEP's priorities is to secure a kind of 'home rule' for the natives in their territories[69]. This initiative is linked with demands of getting a share in the economic surplus from the extraction of subterranean natural resources in the native territories to secure a degree of economic independence for the native communities. The legal platform for both demands is the ILO convention 169, which Peru ratified in 1993, but which is subordinate to national law and therefore ignored by the national authorities. Not unexpectedly, this is not a topic the State has shown willingness to negotiate. A third overriding priority is to strengthen the status of the native cultures in the Peruvian nation-state and have them recognized in the Constitution by declaring Peru a multi-national and

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[68] Dean (2002) mentions that the State's titling efforts, carried out by PETT, may not have the interests of the natives in mind. He states that "Fujimori's neoliberal land titling program in Amazonia appears to have been designed with the aim of dividing the regions into 'concession blocks' to attract tenders for oil exploitation rights" (p. 212).
[69] When I brought this matter up, on the same premises, with the president of the Shuar organization, FIESH, in Sucúa, Ecuador, he used the word autonomy.

multi-cultural state[70]. This is linked with demands for the involvement of natives in local and regional government. Other priorities call for programs for improvements in health and education among the native peoples and their inclusion in the government's programs for general development. (AIDESEP's formal priorities are given in appendix E.)

The high-profiled and high-level CNPAA, a commission established by the Peruvian Congress, chaired by Eliane Karp de Toledo, the president's wife, was mentioned in chapter II (part 3). The commission is independent of the ethnic mobilization, but works for the interests of the ethnic population as it see them. CNPAA presented a proposal to Peru's constitutional reform which is given in appendix F. The ethnic peoples are thoroughly marginalized in the states where they reside, and the threats from the outer society to the cultural survival of the native population have urgent implications. Hence, it is no surprise that there are broad parallels between the goals of AIDESEP, the CNPAA's proposal, and - as I will show - those of the Ecuadorian movement with respect to the native population in the Amazon Lowland.

Interview with AIDESEP[71]: AIDESEP's representative, Kinchokre, did not claim that AIDESEP had national stature or represented all the ethnic peoples of Peru; nor does any other ethnic organization. But from the heterogeneity of its native member organizations and its cooperation with the Afro-Peruvians in COPPIP, it is the largest and has ambitions well above of being just a 'voice'-seeking body. He told me that AIDESEP had two platforms for being heard on the national level. One was through the Congress committee (*Comisión de Asuntos Indígenas y Afroperuanos*) Aspasi was heading, which to me did not seem to carry much influence; it was attacked in the press by Aspasi's constituents in Puno for doing very little. The other was the aforementioned forum with representation of all ethnic groups, including Afro-Peruvians, where topics of mutual interest to the ethnic populations could be discussed, COPPIP. I made a note that he did not include the congressional commission, CPNAA, led by the president's wife and with the head of AIDESEP as one of its members.

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[70] Similar demands were raised by CONAIE in Ecuador, but here it was concluded that the call for 'multi-culturism' was a toothless goal and the focus shifted to 'multinationalism' (see Macdonald 2002: 183).
[71] Twice I had interviews with Fredy Vasquez Kinchokre, an Asháninka, chief accountant and a member of the Executive Board of AIDESEP.

What I did not know at the time of my interviews with Kinchokre, was the importance put on the strategy of getting ethnic representatives into elected offices by the ethnic movements in Bolivia and Ecuador and the notable success they have had (see the Preface). Kinchokre informed me that AIDESEP promoted a similar strategy. My other informants hinted, however, that in practice very little coordination was going on between AIDESEP and the local federations in preparation for the upcoming election in the fall of 2002 for members to the district municipalities and the new regional governments created as part of the government's decentralization plan. The election law of Peru requires that the lists of candidates in regions of Amazon Lowland with a high native population have a minimum of 15 percent of native candidates. Bringing this matter up with representatives of local federations, I was informed that AIDESEP did not pursue that opportunity. One example, which I was able to verify, was that in the province of Tambopata of the Department of Madre de Dios, the ballots included 32 native candidates - one of them challenging the position of the provincial mayor, 11 the positions of mayor in the subordinate districts, and the rest competing for council positions. AIDESEP had not approached any of these candidates and had not offered its support. It may well have been uninformed about what was going on. Similarly, CECONSEC with 120 communities had not involved itself in the upcoming election[72].

As I had experienced in my interviews with the heads of native federations, also Kinchokre presented the agenda of his organization as a list of isolated, 'technical' tasks without an overarching strategy. He listed the now familiar tasks of titling, the efforts to get a share of the subterranean resources, and stronger defenses for those on the surface. And he emphasized the need for bilingual school education, self-determination, and control of the kinds of development in the territories of the native peoples. Referring to my observations of the Asháninkas in the Río Ene/Río Tambo region, he stated that road building had been and would be a disaster for the native communities in the Amazon Lowland. Opening up these territories would be an invitation to the outer society to move in, which would overwhelmingly outweigh the benefits of easier access for the locals to the market for their products. He made no comments to my questions on how to address the effects of the 'poverty trap', and a possible political cooperation with organizations among the indigenous-rooted Highland population.

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[72] Interview with the president of CECONSEC.

Kinchokre explained AIDESEP's focus on the public school system by its emphasis on Spanish and mestizo values that had the result that not only are the native pupils taught skills that are inappropriate for their particular socioeconomic situation, but they get alienated from their own cultural and linguistic heritage. He claimed that increased cultural awareness would help countering the most harmful effects of Peru's ethnocidal social policies. This required concerted political mobilization and support, however, which AIDESEP presently did not have the resources for. He mentioned that AIDESEP, together with ARPI, had a bilingual intercultural program in Satipo, with no support from the Peruvian State, educating teachers, mostly natives, for the native communities. The program was widely seen as representing one of the most significant efforts at stemming language shift and promoting cultural survival in the Peruvian Amazon[73]. When I tried to follow up mid-2002 with my contacts within that program (*Programa de la formacíon de maestros bilingües de la Amazonía peruana*), I was informed that it had been terminated.

4. Reflections

In the following I will elaborate on some topics that have not been given sufficient attention earlier.

'De-Ethnicizing' the Highland: While my conclusion is that there exists no ethnic movement of national significance in Peru, the question becomes: 'why not?'. The answer will help to understand the conditions in the two other countries of my study. The fact that the indigenous-rooted population in the Peruvian Highland is de-ethnicized today, invite comparison with similar attitudes among the indigenous-rooted Ecuadorian Highland population in the 1960s and earlier. Now the latter is highly conscious of their ethnicity. In that context, the mobilizing efforts taking place in the Peruvian Highland (reported upon in part 2 of this chapter), are intriguing.

The absence of ethnic awareness in the Peruvian Highland among population groups, which associate with ethnic language (Aymara, Quechua), traditional dress, and communal living pattern and customs is an anomaly in the three countries of my study. The influence of avante-guard leftist activists, who mobilized among the indigenous

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[73] When I tried to follow up mid-2002 with my contacts within that program (*Programa de formacíon de maestros bilingües de la Amazonía peruana*), it had been closed down.

Highland peasants from the 1920s onward, seeing them as proletarians in a Marxist sense, is one likely reason. The forceful, but essentializing *indigenismo* of Mariátegui (2001a: 35-49) and the problematic relationship between Peru's oppositional political groups and indigenous culture (Mallon's 1998: 114), reflect that era. McAll (1990) states that in the Marxist tradition, ethnicity is an "epistemological irritant" in the analysis of class conflicts. Cadena's (2000) study from Cusco in the first half of the previous century focuses on the influence of *indigenismo* among pro-Indian mestizo intellectuals. However, these ideological thoughts were not unique to Peru. They were also present in Ecuador, which today has a vibrant ethnic Highland movement. This proposes that today's absence of ethnic consciousness in the indigenous population of the Highland is the end-product of a political process within a particular Peruvian context.

In his historic study of peasant-State relations in the Huaylas-Ancash region during Peru's long nineteenth-century transition from colonial identity to a postcolonial form of nationhood, Thurner (1997: 5) reports that in the years after the independence from Spanish colonial rule, Peruvian Highland Indians represented themselves in formal contexts not as *peruanos*, but as *republicanos*. The logic behind did not refer to the new independent republic, but to Spain's juridical invention in the sixteenth century of a dual-nation system in the New World, i.e., the colonized 'Indian nation' and its 'republic of Indians' juxtaposed the colonial 'Spanish nation' and its 'republic of Spaniards' - vertically ranked in relation to each other, but each granted distinct but unequal privileges and obligations. While the concept of the dual republics of the colonial period were more fictional than actual, it is Thurner's contention that these imagined constructs had historical consequences and became focal points of Indian aspirations in time of crises during Spanish colonialism with consequences into modern time (1993: chap. 2). Following the logic of the liberating vision of Bolívar and the Creole nationalists, the banishment of the colonial Spanish republic and the abolition of the colonized Indian republic would allow formerly oppressed Indians to be gradually 'enlightened' and 'civilized' so that they could join the rest of the free citizens of Peru in the unity of an independent nation of citizens. However, with the historical load of colonial political history, postcolonial nation-making in Andean Peru did not follow the script of enlightened Creole invention. Instead, colonial ethnic 'republican' politics of the past intertwined with postcolonial national 'republican' politics of the present.

Generalizing Thurner's study of the conditions of Huaylas-Ancash to the national level, the hypothesis is that during the forming period of Peruvian nation-building, the Highland Indian had a clear idea of his ethnic uniqness and carried it out actively in a discursive struggle with the representatives of the new republic, using local *alcaldes* as legal mediators. However, the local ethnic machinery of indirect rule, which had had some value for the tributary colonial State, was of no interest to the postcolonial liberal State. To quote Thurner (1997: 12): "the contemporary Indian was de-historicized and became unimagined by the Creole Nation". When President Juán Velasco Alvarado (1968-75) introduced his Agrarian Reform Law in June 1969, its text referred throughout to *campesinos*, indicating that the de-ethnicization of the Highland Indian population already had come far.

Thurner (1997: 138) points to that in the postcolonial period, markets and politics became increasingly regionalized under caudillo-ridden regimes and, later, dislocated under the Lima-centered liberal State. Most nineteenth-century peasant uprisings in Peru, which earlier occurred on a pan-regional scale, would seldom spread beyond particular regions or even beyond local parishes. Another factor, which further constrained the Andean peasantry, was that in the post-Independence period, the *alcaldes* became subordinated to an array of petty *misti* (non-Indian) officials. Fiscal relations between the State and the Andean peasantry become more direct and increasingly entangled in petty clientage, and as a result the importance of *alcaldes* as political mediators receded. Unlike the *alcaldes*, colonial Indian chiefs (*kurakas*) had been officially recognized as ethnic political authorities and subordinate colonial administrators of the "Indian republic". After Independence, the hereditary chiefs were stripped of their titles and privileges as representatives of Indian communities.

Like Cadena (2000) in her study in Cusco, Thurner finds that in Huaylas-Ancash the 'de-Indianizing' (or de-ethnicizing) of the Highland Indian must be explained in a political context. But by putting the phenomenon in historical context, he shows that the process took place over considerable time. In Turner's analysis two intertwined reasons why the Indians became side-tracked stand out. First, they lost political influence by being represented not by their own kind. The Peruvian State increasingly bypassed the indigenous cadres and developed its own ways to administrate directly the indigenous

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population[74]. Second, another face of the same process was the rise of non-Indians as ideology producers on Indian matters in the Peruvian society (*indigenistas*). Added to this development was the failure of the Indians themselves not to be able to exploit or create political situations to their advantage and thereby regenerate an Indian leadership. Thurner proposes that the rise of *indigenista* discourse in Peru coincided with the decline of *alcalde* mediation, finally abolished during the regime of President Leguía in the 1930s (p. 145). The increasing transfer of administrative control in Peru from the indigenous to the mestizo, in line with Cadena's and Thurner's descriptions, is also noted by Degregori (1999:159). But he emphasizes the expansion and consolidation of the landowner system, interlocking with the urbanized mestizo-dominated elite, which developed at the end of the 19th into the beginning of the 20th century.

Thurner's analysis proposes to look for an explanation in the national conditions to explain why an ethnic consciousness exists in the Ecuadorian and Guatemalan Highland, but not in the Peruvian. I will show in the next chapter, on Ecuador, that the relationship between the State and the indigenous population indeed was different and created - accidentally - a favorable political climate, which was competently exploited by the activists, building the foundation for the successful Ecuadorian ethnic movement.

Ethnic Mobilization: Focusing on the native mobilization - accepting that none exists in the Highland - a number of shortcomings have been identified, primarily in relation to the organizational structure and how the first-level federations function. Most of the identified shortcomings are not fatal. Leaders, their organizations, and the interacting network may improve as people gain experience. That may lead to better formulation of and control over the discourse of the ethnic cause, an improved clarification of priorities, coordination of ongoing mobilization efforts, and so forth. Increased confidence internally may create trust externally and, ultimately, bring in economic and professional support, which will allow increased activities and further improve the mobilizing efforts. Worrying, however, is the absence of certain features, which are crucial and raise doubt whether the native mobilization in Peru should be labeled an ethnic *movement*.

First and foremost among them is the absence of grassroots work[75] in the form of

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[74] See Guerrero (1993: 83-102) with respect to the situation in Ecuador.
[75] I imply with 'grassroots work' within an ethnic movement a more profound and wider activity

informal education and consciousness-building among the members of the individual communities - as a means, a goal and a strategy. Without an involved grassroots, there is no mass following, the priorities of the constituents are not tested, the leaders do not get directives, the constituents get neither information nor 'education', and, ultimately, no communication take place between the leaders and the constituents. An elite-managed top-down campaign with, at best, a passive following does not meet the criteria of a social movement, defined as ongoing mobilizing among its constituents, exhibiting a sense of collective purpose, and establishing the kind of political objectives which require interaction with other political groups (Foweraker 1995: 4). The same dilemma, but to an even larger extent, we will meet when the Guatemalan case is being discussed. Second, the mobilization effort has not been politicized; the prioritized problem are taken out of the social arena and turned into unconnected 'technical' tasks. And, third, a unifying, overarching ethno-ideology, a common outlook, which comprises both the community and the outer society and appeals to all the ethnic peoples across their differences, has not been formulated. The constituents are ethnically-minded, but their ethnic outlook is 'community'-based, is taken for granted, it just *is*, and has not been politically mobilized. This status may explain why other aspects have not developed within the native movement in Peru, among them, solidarity throughout its organized body; promotion of demands through the use of controlled conflict; and, perhaps most important, actions that challenge or cross the limits of the system's social order (Melucci 1989: 38).

As part of the environmental dimension, one has to consider the special features, which may be hypothesized to put Peru apart from Ecuador and Guatemala in establishing and developing an ethnic movement. Among them are the extreme degree of State centralization in Peru; the size of Peru's land area combined with a flawed infrastructure; the implications of the internal war, and the de-etnicized Highland population. The first point, degree of centralization, I will discuss as I present the case of the Ecuadorian movement. The second feature, the large land area of Peru's Amazon, is indeed a unique obstacle to ethnic mobilization in Peru since it confronts with full force the only mobilized part, i.e., the natives. The Peruvian Amazon is more than 5 times

than how the term is used in relation with social movements of the North. I will discuss it in more detail in chapter IV.

larger than the Ecuadorian Amazon with a native population of only 300,000[76], roughly 10 percent of the zonal population but dispersed in semi-isolated communities. In addition, the large heterogeneity among the Peruvian Amazon peoples plays in. Officially, 63 different peoples are recognized in Peru; in the Ecuadorian Amazon 13 (Macdonald 2002: map 6-1). Probably more important is the incomplete organizing among the native Peruvians compared with that of the Ecuadorian Indians, who are organized in large geographical or ethno-national federations - like the FIESH of the Shuars and the OPIP of the peoples of the Province of Pasaza - and ultimately into one overarching body through with they speak with one voice (CONFENIAE). In Peru the local first-level federation is often the highest organizational level.

To which extent the third feature, the internal war, ravaging the countryside in the 1980s and '90s, lastingly prevented the birth of a legitimate national ethnic movement in Peru, stopped it in its tracks or just delayed it, must be guesswork given the lack of studies. However, it is worth noting, and I will address it in the next chapter, that the Ecuadorian successful movement, rose in an environment without civil warfare, while the Guatemalan Indian may have been cowed to submission by the State's ethnocidal and genocidal campaign which ended formally for less than 7 years ago. As I will show, no ethnic mobilization takes place in Guatemala and, in that sense, is worse off than Peru[77].

The importance of the fourth feature listed, the non-involvement of the indigenous-rooted Highland population, may be indicated by a comparison, once more, with the situation in Ecuador. There the far more numerous Highlanders were the vanguard throughout the build-up of the Ecuadorian movement, led by ECUARUNARI. Together with the organizations of the coastal and Amazon Lowland ethnic populations, COICE and CONFENIAE, respectively, it created the national ethnic organization of CONAIE.

The native movement in Peru has not been able to 'infiltrate' the dominant society with its views and opinions. That reflects its isolation in and stratification of the Peruvian society, but also that the Peruvian media located in Lima have no interest in what goes on in the rural Inland (Lauer 2002b). The Peruvian public's traditional understanding of the Indian's place and identity in the society needs to be changed, and new identities

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[76] Dean (2002: 200) claims more than 500,000.
[77] Yashar (1998, 1997) arrives at the diametrically opposite conclusion - comparing what she sees as a Guatemalan movement with what is ongoing in Ecuador and Bolivia - based on data that will be commented upon in chapter V.

constructed, before challenges to discriminating attitudes can appear as a legitimate issues and the native population mobilize around them. Thus, before any offensive politics of reform and inclusion can be fruitful, an ethnic consciousness - a *politicized* ethno-ideology - has to be developed and communicated to the public. Nor has the movement been successful in establishing permanent links with outside donors. This creates an evil circle. The lack of economic resources is painfully present at all organizational levels (Kinchokre/ AIDESEP, pers. com.). The economic situation of struggling native organizations is in marked contrast to the NGOs I visited. They all had an abundance of technical means, a well salaried and competent staff, tasteful and spacious office facilities, and delicate, multi-colored brochures that promoted their work. 'Empowering the natives' was a frequent slogan among heads and staff of local NGOs I interviewed, but it was a common trait that they never had contemplated to delegate any part of their agenda to the beneficiaries of their activities. Their attitude to their clients was often paternalistic, reflecting distrust in the natives and their ability to handle, even formulate, their own situation.

Peru's two-tier Citizenship: The choice of strategy reflects the activist's perceptions of viable opportunities within the constraints set by his opponents. The necessity of correctly categorizing the governing political regime has already been discussed. Another important factor is how the antagonists perceive each other - as equals (but with different access to power and political influence) or as different social 'species'. In Peru, ethnically stratified, exploitative, and permeated with racism, the ethnic activist is facing the obstacle of his structurally determined second-rank position. In the mindset of the Peruvian mestizo society, he is threatening the social order by asking for something which is perceived as not being his. That the 'citizenship rights' debate does not address the provocative presence of the two-tier system in ethnically stratified countries in Latin America - what Gelles (2002: 248) mentions has been compared with apartheid South Africa - may indicate that the message of the mestizo State has traveled far. The presence of this feature in the Peruvian social order is discussed next.

It has been argued that Peru is a society whose modus vivendi is reflected in its historical and present practice of exploitation of, on the one hand, its environment and, on the other, its rural population. This is not a new observation. Mariátegui (2001a), in his

essay from the 1930ies, mentions that the colonizers' primary focus in the colonial economy of Peru from the Conquest onward was to mine for gold and silver. He states (pp. 15-16):

> Without the greed for the metals in the enclosures of the Andes, the Conquest of the Highland would have been much more incomplete. These [metals] became the historical base for the new Peruvian economy. The effect of the colonial economy - colonial from its very beginning - has still not ended. We are observing today the continuation [of it] into a second phase, i.e., the phase in which a feudal economy is being transformed systematically into a bourgeois economy. But it has not ceased to be in reality, basically a colonial economy. (…) The first phase began with the Conquest. The second phase initiated the Independence. But, while the Conquest in all aspects created the process, which shaped our colonial economy, the Independence seems to have been determined and dominated by that same process.

The essence of that statement is that while the exploitative economic structure the Spaniards imposed upon the Indian population completely replaced the one of the Incas after the Conquest, no similar change took place after the Independence when the Republic was established. The elites of the new nation-state maintained the exploitative order, while the society slowly changed from a feudal to a bourgeois one. Thurner (1997) supports this interpretation. He writes (p. 154, note 12):

> Why were the late colonial jurisdiction largely maintained or further fragmented in the early Republican period? The Andean historian's answer to the query is terse: the Creole state was in many ways an extension of the late colonial project of the Bourbon administrative reform, albeit with a postcolonial national twist.

My data confirm, update and extend Mariátegui's description. The internal colonization, which goes on as aggressively as in the past, exploiting both man and nature, has exceeded the 'known world' of Mariátegui's time, i.e., the Highland, to include the Amazon Lowland as well.

The economic liberalization in Peru of the last decades has not changed Peru's exploitative practice; most likely, it has been intensified. It is tempting to assume that the latter has worsened the living conditions in the rural areas, but my data do not give room for a comparison with earlier conditions. Though, if the general situation of the Latin American population (including Peru's) has deteriorated in the last decade as multiple reports substantiate (among them, Berry 1996: 9-42, 235-249; CEPAL 2002; TIME 2002: 8), there is no reason to believe that the rural population has not been at the loosing end also in this era. What has changed, however, is, first, the composition of the resource

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base. Logging and hydrocarbons, primarily found in the Amazon Lowland, have been added to mining, which has been the historical staple. And, second, the increasing surplus of human labor which *neither* is needed in the profitable and capital-intensive extraction industries of Peru, *nor* is allowed to enter society *qua* ethnic person and burden the 'common' wealth on equal footing with the historically accepted citizen, i.e., the mestizo. By subtle design or by chance, the fact is, however, that an increasing number of mestizos, too, are sliding into deeper poverty, being indistinguishable from the uprooted rural population.

The historical image of Indians as a submissive and anachronistic group has been scattered by the recent mobilizations in Latin America, but one may ask whether that image has ever been true. The literature abounds with descriptions of ethnic revolts in the countryside ongoing since the Conquest, mostly locally, sometimes regionally, and, at times, threatening the national structure under great indigenous leaders like Túpac Amaru in Peru and Túpaj Katari in Bolivia. I have, at this stage of my analysis, probingly searched for an explanation to the lack of success of the ethnic mobilization in Peru due to material and political circumstances - socio-economic conditions and marginalization of the population in a environment given no political openings due to the exploitative and centralized nature of the State - and a mindset with an outlook molded within the constraining setting of the traditional community. These factors have indeed created a severely flawed resource base for ethnic mobilization and a practice, which the Peruvian activists have not been able to break away from. I will in the next chapter, on the ethnic mobilization in Ecuador, find myself rearranging my priorities and give increasing emphasis to the role of the State and the quality of the efforts on the 'inner' front of the movement. As we will see, from accidental initiatives by the Ecuadorian State has followed - not better material conditions - but opportunities to maneuver politically *in spite of* these and, in the process, develop a redefined identity, a matured worldview, and improved organizational tools that allowed repeating that cycle at increasingly more favorable terms to the ethnic activists.

CHAPTER IV.
ECUADOR

Contrary to Peru, which demonstrated a weak and struggling ethnic mobilization limited to the Amazon Lowland, Ecuador shows a mature and self-confident ethnic movement in all the ethnic territories with political punch at the national level. I will in this chapter discuss the ethnic movement of Ecuador, its mode of operation, and its working conditions. The chapter consists of three parts. In the first I will give a brief backdrop of Ecuador and the ethnic population; in the second I will report on interviews with ethnic representatives across the country; and in the third I will discuss my main reflections.

1. Background

This part gives an introduction to certain characteristics of Ecuador. This is followed by a section on the rise of the ethnic movement. Due to differences in the role of the State of these countries with respect to how they address the indigenous movement, the manifestations of the political regime will be discussed. Since there are broad similarities between Peru and Ecuador in the national socio-economic conditions of the ethnic population, this aspect will not be addressed.

Demography: Ecuador is a small Andean country with a land area only one-fifth and a population of less than half of Peru's (table 1.1) with some of the same topographical features as Peru. It is parted in two along a north-south axis by the Andean mountains, resulting in three characteristic zones: Coast, Highland and Amazon Lowland. (The political-administrative lay-out of the country is shown in table K-1 of appendix K.) The 22 provinces consist of cantons, which again are split into parishes. Of Ecuador's 215 cantons, 152 have no ethnic population. Each province is headed by an elected prefect and a government-appointed governor with an administrative mandate only. Each of the cantons of the province has an elected mayor (*alcalde*), and each parish, subordinate to the canton authorities, has an elected president heading a parochial council (*junta*). As in the case of Peru where one huge city, Lima, masks the reality of what one experiences in the rest of the country, two cities skew the impression of Ecuador - Quito, the capital, of 1.4 and Guayaquil of 2.0 million inhabitants (INEC 2001b). If these had been removed from existence, the national urbanization of 61 percent would have been reduced to 46.

More than half of Ecuador's population lives at the Coast. The majority of the ethnic population of Ecuador resides in the rural Highland, working as subsistence farmers or artisans. The largest ethnic nation in Ecuador is the Highland Qu*i*chua (no misprint), which consists of numerous peoples[78]. In the Amazon Lowland region resides a number of native peoples, each having their own language. They constitute the majority of the population outside the small urban outposts and live in dispersed communities or have isolated life styles. The native peoples consist of the large Runa (or Lowland Quichua) and Shuar, in addition to the smaller peoples of the Achuar, Siona, Huaorani, Sicoya, Zápara, Shiwiar and Cofán. Officially, and thus minimum, 46 percent of the national population of Ecuador is deemed ethnic (Macdonald 1999:95).

Ecuador's economy is based on agriculture and petroleum production, creating a wobbly economy. The Coast is the center of export agriculture of which the main products are bananas, sugar, and coffee. The economy of the Highland is dominated by agriculture and livestock production. The Amazon Lowland zone, which represents nearly half of Ecuador's land area, contains the important income source of the country: oil and gas. This region was inhabited almost solely by indigenous communities until oil exploration and drilling began in 1967, bringing roads and rapid colonization by settlers from the Highland. The wealth generated by the petroleum production is rarely invested into development of the region.

The Rise of the Ethnic Movement: Pallares (2002) discusses the reasons behind the rise of the Ecuadorian ethnic movement. She argues that the main turning point was the land (agrarian) reforms of 1964 and the resulting political dynamics. The economic transitions that moved the Ecuadorian indigenous from dependence on a hacienda economy to a more diversified participation in the market and the labor force, led to a re-articulation of power relations in the rural Highland. In the process, ethnicity became increasingly the concept that structured the view on material realities and political hierarchies. That led along a circuitous route to the construction of a new Indian identity and the creation of a national movement. The older class-based discourse was abandoned, leading from what

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[78] Saraguro (in Zamora and Loja); Cañaris (Azuay and Cañar); Paruhá (Chimborazo); Waranka (Bolívar); Chibuleo, Kisapincha, Salasaca (Turgurahua); Panzaleo (Cotopaxi); Quito-Cara, Kayampi (Pinchincha); Otavalo, Karanqui, Kayampi (Imbabura); as well in amazonic Pastazo, Napo, Sumumbios and Orellana. (Macdonald 2002: 183-84 discusses the background for these distinctions within the ethnic movement)

Pallares (2002: 249, 251) calls class-based *campesinismo* to ethnicity-based *indianismo*.

As in Peru, the natives of the Amazon have had a very different experience with the outer society than the Highlanders. Their environment was too unwelcome to invaders, too remote and, most important, invaders were not guaranteed riches. As a result, native communities in the Amazon Lowland have been the least acculturated of the ethnic population despite confrontation with missionaries, colonization by settlers, and heavy-handed extraction in their territories. Their relative isolation ensured cultural coherence and less targeting by government policies and assimilation efforts than among ethnic peoples elsewhere. However, as a result of the agrarian reform and internal colonization increasingly started to be felt in the 1960s onward, local, sectorial, and provincial native organizations began to form (MacDonald 1999). In 1980 the pan-native federation, CONFENIAE, was constituted. In 1986 CONFENIAE and ECUARUNARI, together with the coastal organizations of COICE, the representation of the Afro-Ecuadorians, formed one national organization, CONAIE. It was given a federal structure to accommodate the very different needs of its founders.

CONAIE is not the only body of the ethnic movement, but it is by far the largest and the most influential one. I was told that in 1992 CONAIE formally represented 80 percent of the ethnic population (Duj, pers. com.). Another organization is the evangelical organization FEINE with its stronghold in the central Highland, and with its financial benefactors primarily among fundamentalist Christian groups in the United States. A third is FENOCIN, which, similar to CONAIE, works among ethnic populations in all the three zones.

Environment: The same oppressive and poverty-generating environment, which was observed across the rural Peru - even echoing some of the same economic mechanisms - governs in the rural Inland of Ecuador[79]. These conditions, with a focus on Peru, were described in chapters II and III (extended upon in appendix A, C and D). They were a part of my fieldwork in Ecuador, but have not been addressed in any length in this chapter. Within the methodological premises of this study, it was not possible to identify

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[79] With this I refer to the wide-spread indigence in the ethnic territories; the subsistence economy of the peasants with an insufficient additional income base; the low prices to the small agro-producer for his products; the exploitation by the middlemen; the neglect of the State; the absence or sub-standard of public services; and the lack of public policies and investments.

socio-economic conditions which in any substantial way could help explaining the differences in success between the ethnic mobilizations in Peru and Ecuador.

Given the persistence of the 'democratization' paradigm, it is expected that Ecuador also is being referred to as a democracy, frequently with a qualifier like 'weak', 'struggling', or "democratic institutions of the State [that] are weak, particularly outside the urban areas" (Selverston-Scher 2001: 50). It has experienced many of the same political trends as its violence-infected neighbors, Peru and Columbia, but without the same extreme manifestations. Although it has had its share of military governments, these regimes governed without the despotism of other Latin American countries. In spite of the abysmal poverty among the majority of the population, social unrest has never escalated to civil war as in Guatemala and Peru. The undeniable fact is, however, that Ecuador shows the same characteristics as Peru - what Carothers' (2002a) calls a 'feckless pluralist' country (chapter I). I will conclude that Ecuador, like Peru, is characterized by a political regime in the tradition of the Latin American oligarchies.

While this regime categorization may be helpful in identifying from where the elite factions are recruited, it is too wide to explain or forecast political trends (Lowell Field et al. 1990: 159). Also, there is no contradiction between similar regime categorization, as vaguely as used here, and very different politics in different countries. I will argue that it is in the more 'benign' version of the oligarchic rule of Ecuador one finds the explanation to why an ethnic movement has succeeded in Ecuador, while it sputters in Peru and is non-existent in Guatemala. There are indeed important differences between the two first-mentioned countries in spite of the similarities. Contrary to Peru at the present, the armed forces of Ecuador play an important political role behind the scene, particularly in times of political instability. In February 1997, it helped negotiate the agreement that brought a swift end to the constitutional crisis following the ousting of President Bucaram, and it took a lead role when President Jamil Mahuad was ousted in January 2000 (see Macdonald 2002). Mares (2001: 182, 177) notes that the armed forces are the most respected institution in Ecuador, far outdistancing the Congress and the Presidency. Popular support is the basis for military influence in politics. Civil-military relations provide the military with considerable formal and informal autonomy, and the Constitution gives the military a role in the social and economic development of the country, linking it to 'national security'. Also, the military is guaranteed a share of

revenue from petroleum exports, thus reducing civilian control. A dependence upon the military for expertise, the weakness of Congressional oversight of military affairs, and the custom of having a military officer as Minister of Defense suggest that the civil-military relationship is best characterized as one of weak civilian domination. The military has had no interest in governing since 1976. I will hypothesize that the State practices observed in Ecuador may have developed because the armed forces, in its capacity as an elite faction, has been less ambitious than, say, in Guatemala; has maintained its semi-independence; kept the government at an arm's length; and nurtured its covert power position. As a result, the Ecuadorian oligarchy, contrary to Peru's, has maintained a political climate in the last part of the previous century that offered more political involvement by the ethnic population, and the State - unintentionally (Selverston-Scher 2001: 51) - initiated a process, which ultimately secured political space for the emerging ethnic mobilization[80]. Selverston-Scher (2001: 48) notes that the military has had a different and better relationship to the ethnic sector than the government, exemplified by the alliance with CONAIE during the afore-mentioned coup in 2000.

There are speculations whether the army will continue its hands-off position. The involvement of the army in aforementioned events points to that the military has become politicized during the 1990s. Lucio Gutiérrez sacked many of the most senior officers in the army and the navy as one of his first acts as president, promoting some of his companions and calling to public service others, who were sympathetic to his views. The president may seek to involve the military more in civilian life (EIU 2003a).

2. Interviews And Observations

The presence of a viable ethnic mobilization in Ecuador offered answers to the smaller but substantive questions I addressed in my discussion of my research focus, like, how widely and thoroughly is it felt in the ethnic territories; how competently does it carry out the nuts-and-bolts tasks; and, most important, how was it evaluated by its constituents. The true detailed nature of the movement, could, in my view, be pieced together only by persistent fieldwork and extensive traveling throughout the rural parts of the country at the foundation of the movement, i.e., among the ethno-rural constituents themselves. Using a similar approach as in Peru, profiles were traveled with stays in urban centers

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[80] Pallares' (2002) fine study discusses this era.

(the so-called research bases) while crisscrossing the country (see table 4.1).

To relay the many-faceted nature of the ethnic movement itself, I have chosen a 'kaleidoscopic' approach and will report on my interviews in a number of places across the country, contending that the Ecuadorian ethnic movement can truly be understood only through the social context in which it operates.

Table 4.1
Urban centers visited and profiles surveyed in the Ecuadorian Highland

| **Urban "research bases"[1]** |
| Cañar (Cañar) * Guaranda (Bolívar) * Zumbahua (Cotopaxi) * Saraguro (Loja) * Quito (Pichincha) *Latacunga (Cotopaxi) * Loja (Loja) * Macas (Morona Santiago) * Puyo (Pastaza) * Riobamba (Chimborazo) * Cuenca (Azuay) * Otovalo (Imbabura) |
| |
| **Profiles traveled[2]** |
| a: Main route (Highland): Loja - Cuenca - Riobamba - Latacunga - Quito - Otovalo - Ibarra |
| b: Main route (Amazon Lowland): Quito - Baeza - Tena - Puyo - Sucia - Méndez - Limón - Cuenca |
| c: Guaranda - *Salinas* - Ambato |
| d: Latacunga - *Zumbahua - Chugchilán - Sigchos - Saquisilí* |
| _____ |
| [1] Province given in brackets; [2] Villages and small places are written in italic. Towns and cities are written with regular types. |

The Highland

The small urban center of Cañar in the canton and the province of the same name, was my first important research base. I will discuss this place in some detail, since its many activities among its predominantly indigenous population and the extensive network I established. It relayed a micro-cosmos of the Highland and was informative on what the Ecuadorian ethnic movement does and is up against nationwide.

Cañar (Province of Cañar)[81]: The first impression of the small town of Cañar, located at a cold altitude of 3,100 meters above sea level (too chilly to carry out my intentions to live with ethno-rural families), is that the indigenous during daytime dominate the streets by their number. Most (all?) of them wear traditional clothes. Clearly, in Cañar the Other is the mestizo. Not once did I see an indigenous and a mestizo chat together except as customer and salesperson in a shop, but then the interchange was direct and humorless.

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[81] My formal informants in Cañar were a mestizo bilingual teacher working in a rural school; the mayor and vice-mayor; a number of representatives of ethnic communities in nearby parishes; and the president and the treasurer of UPCCC, the provincial ethnic federation.

This situation should be understood in a context where racism was provocatively practiced in all public spaces for only 2-3 decades ago; that the indigenous today are conscious about their marginalized position; and that they are proud of their ethnic heritage (Pallares 2001: 61-69, 76-82; pers. com.). The racist attitudes prevail, but today in veiled forms. Mestizo women would tell me that the Indians had "taken over" the town; none of them hiding their displeasure. In contrast to the situation in Peru, however, the mestizo's negative attitude to the Indian is guarded, and the response of the Indian was not that of an underdog. Many of my informants referred to the ethnic movement's anti-racist campaign in the early 1980s with demands to be shown respect by the mestizo society, as a watershed. Estimates by the locals of the indigenous share of the population in the canton and around the town of Cañar varied between 60 and 80 percent. The many municipal top officials and professionals I met, all mestizos (with exception of the vice-mayor), made clear that the numerical superiority had not translated into power.

The urban center of Cañar had an indigenous activity center, which, I learned later, exemplified well the ways by which the ethnic movement reached out and mobilized the rural indigenous population. One part was a collective workshop, *Añañay,* where women from communities around Cañar would come some days every week to make traditional dresses for export to the United States and Europe. The work was carried out along with informal conversations and discussions, making the participants confront a wider perspective in interaction with their peers and subtly pulling them into the movement's politically charged environment. In the complex of rambling houses that included *Añañay*, were found other projects of the movement, among them, a health station staffed with indigenous, who served people from the nearby communities; the administrative office of teachers working in the rural schools of the canton; and offices of CONAIE's provincial branch, UPCCC, one of its 22 provincial organizations.

One of my informants, a mestizo bilingual teacher, Sra. Enma Ordóñez, who had been working 25 years in an all-indigenous primary school outside Cañar, should add to my introduction to the rural Ecuador. Most of the 35 children in her school had their father working in the United States, and if not the father, then the mother - or both. In the latter case, the children lived with relatives, who were paid by the migrants to serve as substitute parents. The effects of this condition were (quote) "*deplorable*". The children lacked concentration, were uninterested in schoolwork and what went on in general, and

were emotionally unstable. They were embarrassed of being indigenous, had a negative attitude to using their own language, Quichua, adopt indigenous customs, and wear traditional clothes. None of the children spoke well either Spanish or Quichua. And still, less than 5 percent of the students would not be moved up to next level at the end of the school year, around 5 percent would go on to secondary school, and possibly one percent would go on to *escuela superior*. A small percentage would drop out during the school year. Adolescents would out-migrate as soon as they could.

The ethno-rural community in which the school of Ordóñez was located was governed by close family ties where the families lived closely together, doing subsistence farming combined with other part-time economic activities. Land was mostly privately owned with normally 0.5-1.0 hectare per family. The main income of the region, however, was remittances from out-migrated family members. As a result, (quote) "people lived well, with a nice house and all the basic services". She pointed out the glaring lack of public services in Cañar and mentioned that her school would get a limited amount of teaching supplies - paper, pencils, and blackboard chalk- every third or fourth year. Few texts books were available. Once per year a doctor would visit.

On my questions how she perceived the ethnic movement, she emphasized the local federation, UPCCC, which was (her emphasis) "*very*" active with uniting and teaching the indigenous population, and advising and assisting in matters related to the agro-production of its constituents. In her view, the perspective of the organization was ultimately political, not social, (quote) "to absorb the capacity, to trawl (*arrastre*) the people" - and, in her view, did it very effectively. As we moved on to discuss potential tensions between the two population groups, I was asked to turn off my tape recorder. She verified that there existed two social universes in Cañar without much overlap, but at present the situation between the mestizos and indigenous was relaxed. However, for "some years ago" there had been major clashes where people had been killed. She said that that event had put a lasting fear in the mestizo population. As long as we were on that topic she spoke with a controlled agitation.

My interviews with the mayor, Sr. Victor Cárdenas, a mestizo, and the vice-mayor, Sr. Quinde Buscón, an indigenous, both teachers by profession, should complement this picture. The vice-mayor had been elected on a ticket of CONAIE's political arm, Pachakutik (*Nueva patria*). This was my first observation of what I should find was

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standard practice all over Ecuador, that an ethnic person of a CONAIE's organization or elected on a Pachakutik ticket, would be closely involved in all of CONAIE's activities in the region. Both my informants referred to the absence of State initiatives in the rural Inland. In their view, the State ignored systematically the rural population. Investments went to the big cities along the coast, which therefore had assets and a far higher living standard, in addition to a location which gave opportunities for trade with the outer world. The Province of Cañar is among the poorest in the country with widespread indigence. Both the mayor and the vice-mayor mentioned the wide-spread indigence and marginalization as the most important targets of the municipal administration, but it had no means to improve the situation. The canton received economic transfers from the State, but their use were earmarked by the central authorities, and the local administration had few opportunities to levy taxes. The mayor claimed - seconded by the vice-mayor and other of my sources - that the policies of the State not only kept people in poverty, but regenerated the poverty. The reasons were the familiar ones I had been acquainted with in Peru: structurally-determined low prices on agro-products; no access to public loans; no public or private investments; and no policies which offered incentives and/or economic security for the peasants. While remittances were important, far from every family benefited, modifying the impression Sra. Ordóñez had given. A typical peasant family in Cañar would make US$100-200 per month[82]. The mayor confirmed my information of strong ethnic cleavages in Cañar. The relations were governed by wide-spread prejudices, distrust and resentment without even a dialog between the parties. Mestizo organizations in Cañar would boycott CONAIE's provincial representation, UPCCC. He confirmed my impression that the mestizo population controlled the shops, businesses, private capital, and the professional activities in Cañar.

I interviewed Sr. Dario Saeteros and Sr. Miguel Duj Pichozaca, president and treasurer of UPCCC, respectively. Particularly Duj was informative. He had lived through the 1970s as an activist during the time when the ethnic movement increasingly severed its ties with the class-based peasant organizations and developed its own ethnicity-based premises. Duj pointed out that what later emerged as the indigenous

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[82] As a comparison: as of mid-August 2002 the *canasta básica familiar* (see definition of poverty) was US$336.29 per month; *canasta básica de comida* was US$254.63 per month; minimum salary (*salario básico unificado*) was US$104.88; and the national average monthly income for a family of 5 was US$221.56 with an hourly earning of US$0.85 (El Universo August 17, 2002) .

leadership had been politicized well before the 1970s, referring to his own early membership in the communist party, and to others, who had served their apprenticeship in leftist mestizo-controlled peasant unions. The latter had for decades been active in guiding local indigenous initiatives, but they would not share positions of leadership with indigenous activists, seeing them as politically 'immature'. Also, mestizo organizations were organized hierarchically. This put them apart from the traditional networking among indigenous people that had the community as the crucial node. During the 1970s, as indigenous leaders earned their spurs, indigenous reaction had been building up against the implicit assumption that the tactical goals of the political struggle was best defined by urban socially-minded mestizo intellectuals, whose lack of success in their political work among the indigenous population repeatedly would be explained by an absence of working-class consciousness among the peasants. Duj emphasized the importance of the land reforms to the ethnic mobilization. On the one hand, he saw it as a test the left had failed by overlooking the importance of the relationship to land among the indigenous people, and, on the other, like Pallares (2002), he saw it as an opening of opportunities the indigenous activists had been clever to exploit. Into and during the 1970s the coalition between the left and the indigenous vanguard became increasingly problematic and, ultimately, terminated. Today cooperation between the two is purely tactical.

Duj verified that the ethnic movement aggressively 'trawled' the Highland to build support. Indigenous communities within parishes would be represented in parochial (the so-called first-level) federations, which will cooperate within cantonal and provincial (second-level) organizations. The provincial organizations would be coordinated by the Highland association, ECUARUNARI, which would cooperate with the other, similarly organized, zonal bodies of CONAIE on matters of national and provincial importance. In addition, CONAIE would maintain its own informal communications with the lower-level bodies. Duj said that he was on the phone with CONAIE's staff frequently during the week. Any event of importance would routinely be reported to CONAIE, which was organized with secretariats for all its different work areas. Relevant information at the higher levels would routinely be relayed to the lower levels such that communities and first- and second-level federations would continuously be kept updated on the situation in other parts of the country. This explains the movement's remarkable capability for mobilizing the ethnic population at short notice. During the 1990 Uprising, the country

was literally closed down. Formal meetings between CONAIE and all the provincial federations would be arranged annually or biannually. The provincial organizations, on their hand, would have monthly meetings of one day's duration with representatives of all the parochial federations of their constituency. And representatives of the individual communities and at the cantonal level would meet with their representative leadership every second week. Everywhere I asked about the functionality of the movement, I was told that it operated well, and that information moved around to everyone's satisfaction.

Duj emphasized that while there was an ongoing dialog throughout the organizational structure, there was a clear distinction between the local and regional priorities, which in the Province of Cañar was the responsibility of UPCCC and its subordinate federations, and the national tasks of CONAIE. This points to a high degree of decentralization and local integrity with distinct expectations to and responsibilities at each level. The tasks of CONAIE were to strengthen the impact of the ethnic movement on the national arena by working inside and outside the Congress up toward the government and the State bodies. Since 1996, CONAIE's president has been a delegate of the Congress. Part of this work was carried out through Pachakútik, CONAIE's political arm, whose main focus was to win public elective offices for ethnic candidates. To facilitate that task, it has been given a wide mandate which touched upon nearly every aspect of CONAIE's activities. Equally important was CONAIE's efforts to strengthen the ethnic program in alliances with non-ethnic political actors; promote economic and social development in the rural Inland; and coordinate and mobilize from above the indigenous population for the national goals in cooperation with the zonal organizations.

To make a structure like this function satisfactory, dialog, trust, and good performance with check-and-balances, is required at all levels. I was told that leaders were given considerable authority while in office, but they were not protected by their position as seemed to be the case in Peru. The helmsmen were assessed by the regular members, and it was not uncommon that leaders were replaced mid-term by majority vote if they showed misconduct or did not perform to their constituents' satisfaction. As the practice is in ethnic organizations, the officers did not receive a salary. Instead, they received an economic 'compensation' paid for by supporting NGOs. Also, UPCCC had a monthly budget, which made its operation orderly and predictable.

My informants emphasized that the modus vivendi of the ethnic movement centered

on the members of the indigenous communities. Even in my interviews later with CONAIE's leadership where the movement's national priorities were addressed, the community was repeatedly referred to as the unit everything hinged upon. Mobilizations took place in workshops like *Añañay*, which combined income-generating activities with subtle consciousness-raising and political awakening. The scheduled meetings at the different organizational levels among representatives have been mentioned. Topics raised here would later be disseminated and discussed in assemblies in the communities. In addition, there would be ad-hoc meetings with ethno-social and ethno-political agendas; seminars where matters related to, say, health, family planning and farming techniques were taught; planning committees for all kinds of activities being arranged; and so forth.

My informants would be hesitant to identity one or a few subjects as the main priorities of UPCCC. The impression I was given was that activities were carried out on a broad front simultaneously - all seen as important in the larger context. Emphasis was put on involving as many people as possible in meaningful ways, indicating that the creative *process* of doing the work was as, or more, important than the *results*. This interpretation is in accordance with Foweraker's (1995: 23) statement that "the social movement must be defined not as a group of any kind, but as a process." If any one task should be identified as more important than others, referring to my informants, it would be strengthening of the ethnic consciousness. This effort was carried in many ways, i.e., by fortifying the ethnic first- and second-level organizations and promoting the use of Quichua old customs. Duj said that the declining use of Quichua among young people, being influenced by the outer society, was a permanent worry. Also, he used hard words when he characterized the quality of the public education offered in the rural schools. The educational sector was one of UPCCC's main foci. He gave numbers on drop-out rate, degree of illiteracy, and percentages of pupils, who went on to higher levels, which painted a more depressive picture than the one Ordóñez had given me.

Contrary to many who claimed that migration - fueled by the socio-economic conditions in the rural areas - tore at the social fabric and undermined the movement's efforts, Duj was relaxed about its effects. He accepted that it had a detrimental effect on the communities, but claimed that only 6-7 percent of the families suffered. In most families with members, who had out-migrated, estimating their number to 20 percent of the total, the situation was favorable. The remittances allowed them to buy necessary

goods, give the children education, and buy land. In Duj's view, life in Cañar would have been economically impossible without the remittances. There was one aspect of migration, which, in his view, was very sad; the best seed for future leaders lived abroad.

I observed a high degree of professionalism and sophistication among the ethnic leaders, in contrast to the impression I had got in Peru. The leading positions from the second-level organizations to the national level are to a high degree manned with well educated people. Duj and Saeteros both had a *licenciatura*. All would have a wide variety of professional experiences, many as teachers in combination with assignments within the movement itself. Clearly, the Ecuadorian ethnic movement has moved out of the 'first-generation' phase the Peruvian movement still is locked into. This professionalism comes out in different ways. I observed that topics I brought up with officers of the movement were answered with insight, intellectual discipline, and a higher complex understanding than what I had experienced at any time in Peru. This may be explained by the educational background of the people I interviewed, but, more important, by the exposure and close dialogue they maintain across the movement.

Guaranda (Province of Bolívar)[83]: While the urban center of Cañar is a small place located near the Interamericana Highway, the next place I studied was the canton of Guaranda with a population of 20,666 inhabitants (census 2001). Its urban center is off the beaten track, located 2-3 hours with bus on dirt road from the city of Riobamba.

The rural parts of the canton of Guaranda showed the same depressive living conditions I encountered in Cañar and confronted repeatedly while crisscrossing the rural Highland. A few large cooperatives exist, but all with a low degree of mechanization. The canton's urbanization rate is only 22 percent (2000 data). The Province of Bolívar, like Cañar, is also one of the poorest in the country, and this was reflected in Guaranda. The poverty varies from 100 percent in the parish of Julio Moreno to 82 percent in the parish of the provincial capital, Guaranda, itself. The percentage of indigenous in the

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[83] In Guaranda I interviewed Sr. Arturo Yumbay, the indigenous mayor of the municipal canton of Guaranda; Sr. Oswaldo Gonzáles, secretary general of the Municipality; Sr. Francisco Caspi Coles, president of the provincial indigenous-peasant organization FECAB/BRUNARI; Sr. Juan Arevalo, head (*dirigente*) of one of FECAB/BRUNARI's member organization, COCICAMP (*Corporación Comunidades Indígenas y Campesinas Mushuk Pakari*), of the nearby parish of San Simón; and Sra. Maria Rosaria Chela Agualonga, a teacher and staff member of the ethnic federation, FECAB/BRUNARI.

population varies between 35 and 70 percent with 42 percent in the 'capital'. Some
social indices for the canton of Guaranda are shown in table 4.2.

Table 4.2
Social vulnerability factors of the canton of Guaranda relative to the 'worst'
and the 'best' canton in the country. (Source: UNDP 2001)

Social vulnerability factors	National 'best case' canton[1]		**Canton Guaranda**	National 'worst case' canton[1]	
Illiteracy (%)	Santa Cruz (Galápagos)	2.9	**29.4**	48.6	Suscal (Cañar)
Cronic malnutrition (%)	Guayaquil (Guayas)	32.0	**88.0**	88.0	Guaranda
Poverty rate (%)	San Cristobal (Galáp.)	23.5	**91.3**	98.7	Espíndola (Loja)
Infantile mortality ($/10^3$)	Isabela (Galápagos)	28.8	**80.0**	122.6	Guamote (Chimborazo)
[1] Name of province is given in bracket					

Table 4.2 shows that all the 'worst' cases are located in Highland provinces and the 'best'
cases are on the Coast (or the Galapagos). The economic stagnation in Guaranda is
obvious. First, migration from the canton is high and has been increasing rapidly from
1998 onward, following the national pattern. Second, the productivity of the economic
activities in the canton - agriculture and livestock - is low without diversification, with an
infrastructure among the worst in the Highland. Third, using INEC (2000) data, one-third
of the population is illiterate, nearly three times the national average; the level of
education is low with an average is 4.7 years of schooling among men and 3.8 among
women. The narrow economic base and the lack of job opportunities in the canton are
indicated by the fact that 60 percent of the population is working in agriculture.

   The provincial federation of Bolívar, FECAB/BRUNARI, serves both indigenous and
non-indigenous communities. In my interview with its president, Caspi Coles, I was told
that the inclusion of both population groups was not a problem and had not watered down
the ethnic profile of the organization. The presence of non-indigenous communities
among its members was a sign of the generally high reputation of the ethnic federations
in the rural areas and of FECAB/BRUNARI in particular. It is also a sign of the lack of
representative organizations in large parts of the Highland; none of the peasant unions
operated here. Like UPCCC, FECAB/BRUNARI is a typical example of the structure of
the indigenous movement. It represents 16 'first-level' federations, each of them
comprising a manageable number of communities within one parish. FECAB/BRUNARI
was started in 1972. It had a work program consisting of ethno-political tasks as well as

bread-and-butter topics, serving constituents located both in the Highland as well as in the subtropical regions of the province. Its ethno-political priorities did not differ noteworthy from UPCCC's, i.e., consciousness-raising, promotion of bilingual education, and strengthening the indigenous ideology and identity among members of the indigenous communities. In Caspi Coles' view, his priorities were to strengthen the organization, develop leaders, and increase the technical competence among the peasants.

To get an impression of the first-level federations that organize the communities, I met with Sr. Arevalo, the president of COCICAMP, one of FECAB/BRUNARI's 16 member federations. It represents 9 communities in the parish of San Simón. Other federations may serve up to 30 communities. Where the parish is large, more than one first-level federation may exist. I asked Arevalo about the efficiency of FECAB/BRUNARI and CONAIE as seen from his position, and how they responded to requests from below. Arevalo stated that he was unhappy with their performance because they responded in only 80 percent of the cases. He was quick to admit, however, that people in the countryside had problems in reaching FECAB/BRUNARI, since telephones and other communication means often were lacking, and the lack of education among individuals in the countryside might result in passivity when action was called for, ultimately being blamed on inefficiency on the part of FECAB/BRUNARI. The main projects COCICAMP and FECAB/BRUNARI were cooperating on were related to the promotion of agricultural techniques and the homes, like malnutrition, health precautions, and family planning. Information and education on these subjects were prioritized work areas within FECAB/BRUNARI and promoted in all the communities. The importance of ethno-ideological matters was frequently mentioned and, to my surprise, more often than clear-cut 'bread-and-butter' topics which, anyway, were vaguely formulated. When I asked my informant what he thought the priorities of FECAB/BRUNARI and CONAIE ought to be, he emphasized the need for education in Quichua and strengthening of indigenous customs and traditions. CONAIE's political work through Pachakútik was highly and repeatedly praised.

In my interview with the indigenous mayor of Guaranda, Arturo Yumbay, we covered a wide range of topics. I will focus on a few. The mayor had been elected with the backing of Pachakútik. He was quick to emphasize that Pachakútik's work was not a sectarian approach meant to serve only the indigenous population. Some progress had

been made toward the non-ethnic rural population, but the resentment and governing attitudes among the urban mestizos were deep-rooted and hard to change. Politically, the indigenous movement worked for cooperation with the non-ethnic population on a multi-cultural platform. The goal of the ethnic mobilization was not intended for the ethnic people only; it was a project with a perspective that would allow a participative, multinational democracy for all groups in Ecuador. Numerous other indigenous leaders would argue the same point and Selverston-Scher (2001) uses similar words in her fieldwork reports. I had sometimes been told that the indigenous people in the countryside were badly informed about the movement's work and did not have much understanding for the ongoing efforts. Duj had mentioned that in spite of the movement's successes, possibly not more than 5-10 percent of the ethnic population was actively involved[84]. Yumbay also painted a somewhat bleak picture. He qualified his statement by pointing out that the response was a question of education as well as of political and ideological mobilization and took time. The problem was not a lack of ethnic awareness, it was high, but it was difficult to make people appreciate the socio-economic aspects of the larger society in the semi-isolated context they were living in. To that he added that the living conditions in the rural areas did not invite for activities outside the struggle for the bare survival.

From its start in 1986, CONAIE had been against involvement in regular politics on all levels; the resources went into building the organizations and creating political space. The interpretation was that the interests of the traditional political parties would go against those of the indigenous federations; the parties did not and would not honor ethnic interests. As its experiences accumulated, CONAIE found that it continued to be ignored. It was never offered compromises, had no influence on State bodies working within areas of importance to the ethnic population, and was paid only lip-service from State authorities to its proposals and initiatives. After an extensive discussion throughout the organization and in assemblies of the ethnic communities, the movement turned around. According to Yumbay, today there was no alternative or opposition to the

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[84] On the other hand, El Comercio/E (2002d: d2) reported that, on the day before I arrived to Guaranda, political meetings arranged in Guaranda and Riobamba by Pachakútik to appoint candidates for the fall elections of 2002, had been well attended. More than a thousand peasants and indigenous in their traditional dresses had shown up in Guaranda and well over two hundred in Riobamba.

approach of Pachakútik. It had been successful and merged well with the strategy of mobilization and education within the communities, its activities serving as a permanent lightening rod. Building political strength was a slow process, but the movement was winning ground by getting control of an increasing number of public offices on all levels, in parallel with an increasing sympathy for its priorities among its constituencies. It had been widely accepted that improvements for the ethnic population would be won by its own efforts. His analysis of the political situation of Ecuador was that the national economy was under the control of narrow interest groups that depended on strong international interests - like I had learned to perceive the situation in Peru.

In Yumbay's view, seconded by many, mobilizing around bilingual education was the best ways to strengthen the indigenous identity and thereby create higher cultural awareness among the individuals. But it was an uphill battle. In the Highland, Quichua is by far the dominant language. However, the version of Quichua used was grammatically of low standard; extensively mixed in with Spanish words; it was not taught in the schools; and many indigenous parents wanted their children to get an education in the towns and did not emphasize the native language in the presence of their children. Quichua is recognized as a national language by the State and is supported as such by the Constitution, but in practice the language continues to be ignored by the authorities. According to the mayor, much the same applied to the wording 'multinational' and 'multicultural', included in the Constitution in 1998. That had been an important symbolic victory, but the political gains had not followed.

I interviewed Sr. Oswaldo Gonzáles, secretary general of the Municipality. Like Duj, he also emphasized the importance of the evolution of the movement, its ethno-ideological aspects, and its past cooperation with socialist unions as an extremely important maturing exercise. Like my informant in Lima, Deep Throat, had done with an eye to the elite of the Peruvian society, Gonzáles referred frequently to *criollos* as a powerful political group in its own right, more influential, more tight-knit, much smaller and better defined than the 'mestizos in power' I referred to[85]. I asked for his explanation to the organizational strength of the ethnic movement. Gonzáles emphasized the

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[85] My well-positioned informant in Lima, Deep Throat, told me that because of his slightly colored mestizo mother from Peru, but with a Spanish father of impeccable breed, he did not belong to the Brahmins and did not have access to privileges some of the high-placed people in his environment, with whom he identified, took for granted.

traditional ties of solidarity and obligations of reciprocity, which exist among individuals and groups belonging to the same-ethnic people. A similar internal loyalty would not exist among mestizos; not even in closed-knit, upper-stratum families[86]. Another reason was the importance being put throughout the movement on the first-level federations, which operate strictly among communities and individuals on the parish level, but with a close two-ways communication to the second-level organization. The first-level federations have been given major responsibilities with respect to mobilization, teaching and information toward the local grassroots constituents, and the higher levels are utterly dependent on their work. This combined vertical and horizontal communication had not resulted in a hierarchic structure. To the contrary, a 'flat' and highly effective network had resulted, self-motivating on each level, with opportunities and incentives for initiatives from the grassroots as well as from the top, while maintaining a balance of internal control throughout the structure. His view on why the ethnic movement in Peru still operated on a very amateurish level with few signs of progress was that while repression and marginalization were taking place in both countries, the situation in Peru had been more severe than Ecuador's. He pointed out differences in the structure of the State between Peru and Ecuador, and the degree of centralization of the former, implying more and higher barriers to informal political work in Peru compared with Ecuador.

Gonzáles explained the practical difficulties in teaching the marginalized and uneducated members of dirt-poor communities the objectives and outlook of the movement and get them mobilized. The rule-of-thumb was to get the common communal member involved in practical tasks and expose the elected representatives to tactical and abstract discussions in the context of the first-level federations, while ensuring that the outcome of these were fed back into the communities.

Zumbahua and Chugchilán (Province of Cotopaxi)[87]: The small urban place of

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[86] I experienced this when I was a guest of *the* one elite family, Cardich, of the town of La Unión in Peru during my survey project in Peru and Ecuador mid-summer 2001 - some of its members being in high professional positions in Lima, one being a Congress delegate, others occupying (literally all) top public positions in La Unión. They admitted freely that the relations within their extended family were characterized by fierce competition, back-stabbing and rivalry in spite of ongoing interfamilial socializing.

[87] In the parish of Zumbahua, I interviewed the president, Sr. Gerardo Umajinga, and the treasurer, Sr. Juan Pilolumbo, and in the parish of Chugchilán the president, Sr. Paco Garcón, of the parish leaderships (*junta parroquial*). In Zumbahua my host, Paco Ushco, also took part. Since the

Zumbahua is located on a scenic road that starts from Latacunga, passes Zumbahua, continue to the hamlet of Chugchilán, before it loops back to its origin through the market place of Saquisilí. To see whether my observations applied also to the remote parts of the country (they did), I visited this region. For only a couple of years ago, this part saw few outsiders. Still parts of the circuit had scheduled public transport only 2-3 times a week.

The populations of the parishes of Zumbahua and Chugchilán are 90-100 percent indigenous. Many of my informants emphasized that out-migration represented a major deteriorating factor to their indigenous coherence. The migrants might return for short visits, but the ethnic awareness quickly suffered among those who moved; the persons changed. They became individualistic, dropped Quichua in favor of Spanish, ignored their ethnic traditions, and stopped using the identifiers of their ethnic background even when they were back among people who kept up the traditions. My informants were worried about what they saw and its effect on the adolescents, who were the carrier of the ethnic heritage. The high priority given to ethnicity-based topics may be exemplified by what the parochial president of Chugchilán told me. He said that activists of the local federation, FOIC-CH, argued that the promotion of income-generating tourism and infrastructure projects, even in this region of widespread indigence, undermined the more important work directed toward ethnicity-oriented matters.

Even in these remote places, the remarkable organizational discipline of the ethnic movement functioned. I was told that, UNOCIZ, the parochial federation of Zumbahua, had meetings every 15th day with representatives of its ten member communities. A similar schedule was followed by the parochial ethnic federation of FOIC-CH in Chugchilán, which represented 22 member communities. Both were members of the provincial ethnic organization, MICC, which had meetings once or twice monthly with representatives of all its parochial federations. These meetings lasted most of the day and were well visited not only by the elected representatives, but by regular community members as well. As elsewhere, my informants in both Zumbahua and Chugchilán emphasized that the main priorities were to strengthen the ethnic organizations and mobilize to capture elective public offices for indigenous representatives, using the same means as I had observed in Cañar and Guaranda. In addition, a significant activity went

president of the indigenous parish federation of Zumbahua, UNOCIZ, a member organization of the provincial organization, MICC, did not speak Spanish this contact was not pursued.

on within these parishes, often in cooperation with neighboring parishes, on matters related to education and health in the form of ad-hoc public meetings and workshops. Women would, in addition, have organizational networks that focused on family matters. The conclusion one can draw is that the ethnic mobilization is neither spotty nor limited to certain regions; it is well rooted and vibrant all over the Highland[88].

I visited these parishes also to observe how well the ethnic mobilization functioned in isolated regions with all-out indigenous populations and how much 'self-rule' they had in relation to superior political authorities - mostly mestizos - at the cantonal level. My informants in both places included elected indigenous members of the parish political leadership (*junta parroquial*). In practice, very little authority is delegated to the parish public leadership, which, in addition, does not have a budget of its own. To exemplify the situation, they mentioned that the mestizo mayor of the canton of Pujili in which Zumbahua was located, had decided that the hamlet of Zumbahua needed a central park. Without discussing the matter with the local representatives, work was initiated, using funds earmarked for public work in the parishes, transferred to the canton by the central government. The locals had wanted to have the dusty, pot-holed and ill-maintained road, which passed through the center of the village asphalted, but the local authorities had no influence on the matter. They did not even have access to information on the budget of the public administration in Pujili and whether any part would benefit their parish. The mayor of a canton could - and did - dispose of public means as he saw fit, with ample opportunities for clientilism. According to the president of the *junta* of Chugchilán it was common that administrative units with an indigenous as elected head or of high indigenous percentage were boycotted or disfavored if the superior elective office was controlled by a mestizo. Like in Zumbahua, the relationship between the indigenous political head of the parish of Chugchilán and the mestizo mayor of the canton was conflictive. He claimed that neither the mayor nor the government had shown the slightest interest in the well-being of the people of Chugchilán and no public investments had ever been received, in spite of a growing tourism. In both places the local federations were going strong with the good communication between the local, regional and national level of the ethnic organizations. The work of Pachakutik was widely praised.

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[88] Even in and around small far-away places, like Salinas, a settlement of only a few hundred people, 2 hours with bus from Guaranda across barren Highland, the indigenous population had an active federation affiliated with FECAB/BRUNARI.

The difficulties of the local authorities to influence the dispositions of their political superior at the canton level on matters of direct importance to their parish, point out a characteristic in the Ecuadorian society - the stone-walling of indigenous public servants by the mestizo bureaucracy and the lack of transparency in the State system. In Guaranda, during my interview with the indigenous mayor, I asked for a copy of the municipal 2002 budget. This he approved and ordered his secretary to give me a copy. His mestizo administration stalled my request. At last a copy was leaked to me by an indigenous employee, perhaps with the indirect help from the mayor.

I was repeatedly told that capturing public offices did not translate into influence. Decisions were sabotaged and mestizo power was routinely exercised by making information inaccessible - sometimes in peculiar forms. In the provincial capital of Loja, I requested from the *Controlaría General del Estado* (a nationwide State financial control body), the official State 2002 budget. To my amazement, even with the red-faced help of its director and his top staff, we were not able to locate what I was looking for - the budgeted incomes from extraction of natural resources in the Inland.

Saraguro (Province of Loja)[89]: The *saragureños* are widely seen as the economically most successful Indian group of the southern Highland. The ethnic percentage of the population in the canton is around 40 percent. Here, as elsewhere, the rural people subsist on agriculture and livestock. The urban center comprises some 3,000 inhabitants.

Increasingly I had started to move my focus from the organizational and strategical aspects of the ethnic movement toward how my informants themselves understood their ethnicity, to better appreciate their dedication and obvious enthusiasm. More than most others of my informants, Kizhpe - dressed in the male garb of a *saragureño* with black ponco, knee-length black pants and sporting the traditional ponytail - emphasized the wholeness as crucial for a sense of ethnic belonging. It was *not* the language *or* the communality *or* the customs *or* the relation to Nature. The different aspects merged and created their own outlook and values - a worldview - that conflicted with that of a mestizo mentality and resulted in a permanent wall between the two population groups.

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[89] I had interviews with the mestizo mayor, Sr. Victor Oswaldo Torres, and Sr. Baudilio Kizhpe, his indigenous counselor (*consejero municipal*). Kizhpe was the previous president of the local FIIS (*Federación Interprovincial de Indigenas Saraguños*) - a federation belonging to the national evangelical ethnic movement of FENOCIN.

He was very conscious about the negative influence of the outer society on his ethnicity. At home he and his wife spoke Quichua, but, still, his two sons - 14 and 8 years old - did not speak the language very well. They preferred to use Spanish and had little interest in cultivating the former. This worried him, but he pointed out that using Quichua was not of *ultimate* importance to the ethnic actor. Referring once more to his sons, he mentioned that they were proud of their heritage, had regard for the interpretation of the past of their people, associated with them, knew the traditional myths, and demanded respect for their ethnicity from their environment - in total, those aspects, which I have referred to as the ethnic self of a person outside and above the ethnic markers. He explained the undesired traits among his children by the eroding impact of the outer society, particularly the effect of television and the increasing mingling with non-indigenous people. His family was far from alone with that problem; many indigenous families hardly used Quichua.

In his opinion, the efforts of the indigenous movement and the indigenous themselves to change the situation was far from enough, a position repeatedly stated by many of my informants. The ethnic consciousness was deteriorating and loosing ground where it hurt the most - among the younger generation. He also referred to the young migrants who had moved to the larger Ecuadorian cities or gone abroad. They stopped using traditional clothes, had cut their pigtail or braided hair and had tried to fit in with their new environment. Those who returned put up houses of an alien architecture. Once more I was told that those, who had migrated, neither belonged to where they lived nor where they originated - and the persons themselves and their environments were aware of it. Kizhpe mentioned the economical benefits of migration, the remittances, but was quick to mention some of the social downsides brought up by previous informants. The migration was massive. In his community alone, a place just outside the urban center of Saraguro, 20 out of 150 families had left. In addition, many families had seen members leaving.

The ethnic movement in Ecuador, as emphasized by Kizhpe, had been active for 3-4 decades, but earned national recognition by the government in the late 1980s. The international attention came first after some successful campaigns from 1990 onward (discussed by Selverston-Scher 2001). In his opinion, the movement was highly representative for the indigenous population and its political prestige in the national political arena was not challenged. In a number of provinces, Pachakútik's position in the rural areas was so strong that traditional parties had to make alliances among themselves

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to be able to compete. The increasing influence of CONAIE had helped to boost the other ethnic organizations, like FEINE and FENOCIN. The presence of more than one large organization did not create problems for CONAIE; to the opposite, the diversity had helped to consolidate it.

The diverging interests among ethnic populations in different zones had been mentioned by many. I asked whether these controversies were of a magnitude that threatened the unity of the movement. Like Duj, Kizhpe meant that was unlikely[90]. The policy of different member organizations in the ethnic movement had traditionally reflected the idiosyncrasies of their leading men and much in-fighting and back-stabbing had always taken place - often with unpredictable outcomes. But this kind of personal rivalries took place in relation to relatively small matters. They would sometimes be exploited by the government to fuel internal feuds. On the big causes, however, like the struggle for a multinational State and against neoliberal principles, the large organizations of the ethnic movement had always shown a united front.

Kizhpe, like others before him, pointed out that only a small percentage of the ethnic population joined the work. This did not reflect disagreement with the movement's dispositions. The reason was that few had resources to put at the disposal of the ethnic movement, but, as he emphasized, it was also true that many young people had an ambivalent attitude to their ethnic background. Without wanting to underestimate the importance of the problem, he hypothesized that it was present only in certain pockets of the indigenous population. As a loose number, he proposed that perhaps 30 percent of the indigenous population took an interest in the work of the ethnic movement, not meaning that all of these involved themselves[91]. On my question why the canton of Saraguro had a mestizo mayor, when the population consisted of 40 percent indigenous, he referred to organizational problems and disagreements among the indigenous themselves. While the indigenous had much in common and shared symbolic values, which made them pull together, in other aspects they were no less heterogeneous than any non-ethnic community of a similar size.

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[90] In fall of 2002, there were speculations in the press whether the demand from CONFENIAE, the body of CONAIE representing the Amazon Lowland, to CONAIE to support the candidature of a previous president of CONAIE, Antonio Vargas, in the presidential election of 2002 was a sign of growing split within CONAIE (El Comercio/E 2002j: A3). Macdonald (2002: 187) offer a deeper background for this incident and Vargas' dispositions as head of CONAIE.

[91] My informant, Duj, estimated that 5-10 percent participated actively.

Only one of my informants had raised the topic of the use of indigenous traditional or customary law (*usos y costumbres*) as a supplement to the State's law. I asked Kizhpe about his opinion. He said it was a very important subject, which the indigenous felt strongly about, but where they were on collision course with the mestizo State. The indigenous may get away with applying traditional law, most often when the authorities blatantly failed to be present or live up to their obligations, but the judiciary system would not accept traditional law and the reactions would be harsh. In his opinion, the wording of the Constitution directed the State to respect the indigenous population and its customs, which should imply that traditional law could be practiced on certain premises. Stavenhagen (2002: 38) comments on the topic. He stated that there was no single coherent body of so-called customary law. In his opinion, it was possible that the judicial practice will evolve into various forms of hybrid solutions on particular local issues - like land disputes and compensation for crimes and felonies - without formal recognition[92].

As in previous interviews, I brought up what I have referred to as the 'poverty trap' of the agro-producers in the rural areas. He immediately admitted that this was indeed a major problem and represented a negligent attitude in both the ethnic movement and the peasant organizations. In his view, the organizations had been focused on establishing themselves, building their structure, and creating a political platform from which they wanted to be heard, but when the social, economical and material conditions of their constituents came on the agenda they had addressed these through demands for the less specific 'rights'. When pressed, the dominant peasant organizations had answered with no more than lip service. In the long run, this was an unattainable position. The least resourceful stratum of the Ecuadorian society, the indigenous peasants, had been exposed to the full force of the 'free market' without any kind of State support.

Listing the priorities within the ethnic population itself, Kizhpe put 'identity' on the top. That meant to have a guiding ideology that could give focus and motivation to the political work. Without it, the ethnic population would be just another herd of people whose only common denominator would be their misery. The ethnic ideology, i.e., their identity, added the implications of autonomy to the political equation. In his own words, he said that the unfulfilled basic material needs were the ever-present, nagging 'pebble in

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[92] Sieder (1997), with reference to Guatemala, claims that customary law is a means of counter-hegemonic resistance in an asymmetrical system of power relations and gets constantly re-negotiated according to changing circumstances. See also Sieder (2002).

the shoe', while the ethno-ideological aspect - identity - was what gave direction, meaning and perspectives to the existence of the ethnic person.

He mentioned that in Saraguro, as in Cañar, there existed resentment among the mestizos, but there had been a major improvement over the last 15-20 years ago. The reasons he gave for this change in attitude were many: increased self-esteem among members of the indigenous population; the increasing presence of professional indigenous as doctors, lawyers and engineers; and the public offices they controlled in many places. Another factor was indigenous migrants, who came back with economic resources that could compete with that of many mestizo families. Over the last decade it had been increasingly difficult for the mestizo to maintain his traditional position of the indigenous person as a less worthy member of the Ecuadorian society.

The Amazon Lowland[93]

Coming from Quito, the road crosses the Papallacla Pass at 4,064 meters and descends gently into the Amazon Lowland. This is also the transport route for the products from the country's developed and future petroleum riches located in the huge Lowland stretching from the old oil fields near Coca to new finds not yet put on stream in the remote north-east of the country. Intensive construction on the trans-Ecuador pipeline was going on near the town of Baeza. But gas and oil conduits are only part of the new landscape. Next to the primitive dirt road my bus followed, a new highway 2-3 times wider was being put in with an abundance of heavy road building machinery. Massive investments are pouring in, but there exist no plans to address the widespread indigence among the native peoples and no judiciary, technical or political authority in the region has the resources or competence to offer adequate control with the industrial activities. I interviewed top leaders of the two largest native organizations of the Ecuadorian Amazon Lowland - OPIP, representing the native peoples living in the Province of Pastaza, and, FIDESH, of the Shuar nation - and will comment on the former.

OPIP represents 13 native federations comprising 117 native communities with a

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[93] In this section I will comment on my interviews with top leaders of the two largest native organizations in the Ecuadorian Amazon, i.e., the vice-president of OPIP, Sra. Miriam Guevara, and the president of FIESH, Sr. Pablo Tsere. In the next section I will discuss my interview with the vice-president of CONAIE, Sr. Tito Puanchir, who, as a Shuar, also tended to focus upon the Amazon Lowland.

population of roughly 12,500 members in regions of pure native and mixed native and settler populations in the Province of Pastaza. It was founded in 1979 and was one of the first native organizations formed in the Amazon Lowland in response to the threat from the internal colonialization. OPIP has it's headquarter in the town of Puyo. I met with OPIP's vice-president, Sra. Miriam Guevara, a Runa (Lowland Quichua) with a university degree in tourism. I asked her to detail how the ethnic awareness and 'coherence' among the natives had been influenced by the invasion of the outer society. She answered that now there was less cooperation within and among the extended families, less unity and solidarity, and less willingness to do *minga* (communal work). She assigned this to looser contacts between the generations as a result of mestizaje, migration, and marginalization. In her own community where the native tongue still was the primary language, nobody used traditional dresses or did face painting except at fiestas and occasions of special significance - a situation, which is repeated in most of the native communities, except the most remote communities. The native communities have few defenses against the deteriorating effects on their culture imposed by the outer society. People, who became exposed, picked up alien values and manners and became strangers to themselves and their fellow man - the same trend I had been informed about in the Highland. And as there, the need for strengthening the cultural identity was a concern in the Amazon Lowland. OPIP did that through communal work*,* production of handicraft, and teaching the younger generation about their culture. At the same time, to alleviate the widespread indigence in the communities, OPIP had started different development programs in the native communities[94]. However, none of these had been successful. OPIP also focuses on education, health improvement programs, and the effects of the oil and gas activities.

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[94] One of them was 'ecotourism' where groups of visitors would stay for a few days in a community and be introduced to customs, medical plants, and other aspects of the local culture. It had been a mixed blessing. The younger members would pick up bad habits, and few of the visitors seemed to have any curiosity about the local conditions; most came to relax in an exotic environment. It could, at times, be a demeaning experience. Guevara mentioned that in some of the communities the members were nude and that tour operators had requested that that custom ought to be maintained to please their clients. Nor was she happy with competitions to crown young native girls as 'Miss so-and-so', which widely are being used to promote tourism in the Amazon. But, in OPIP's communities, as everywhere else in the Lowland, the poverty was so appalling that local beneficiaries give in to demands of commercialization of their resources, including choreography of their communal life. Other projects, even less successful, had focused on different kinds of entrepreneurial activities.

The discovery of oil and gas in the Amazon Lowland had brought development to the region that had hit the natives particularly hard. Nothing of the values extracted had been used to help the natives. Some had got employment, but just to be laid-off some time later. The environment had been destroyed and polluted and the increasing impact from the outside had brought added hardship to the native communities. There was an ongoing collision between the worldview and values of the natives and the impulses from outside, with the former at the loosing end. The pressure of the outer society had forced the native peoples that earlier maintained their individual organizations, to increasingly coordinate their resources and work together across their differences. OPIP's cooperation with CONIAE included efforts to defend the territory of the communities, enhancing the cultural identity, and efforts to secure an uncontaminated environment. In addition, subjects like bilingual education and matters related to women had high priority. On all these sectors, the two organizations look eye to eye. CONAIE worked on these topics on the national level as well as internationally through their international affiliation, COICA.

In work areas of sectoral and regional importance, Guevara emphasized, OPIP promoted its own activities. OPIP maintains a tight and flexible relationship with the individual federations, representing native communities of different peoples. OPIP would be represented in the assembly of every community at least once every 6 month. Certain topics, which had been given special priority, the situation of women and adolescents was mentioned, are continuously being followed up, and radio communication is established with communities, which need special attention. The degree of interaction within and between people at different organizational levels was part of the OPIP's statutes.

Guevara had an ethno-ideological angling on her approach to most topics I brought up, more so than most other ethnic leaders I have talked with, emphasizing the importance of interweaving cultural perspectives with the organizational work itself. This may be because she, as a Runa, has a stronger affinity to the Amazon region where traditional values are more central and, therefore, is more conscious of their weakening. But it may also be that she, as a woman and a carrier of the ethnic heritage, was more alert to the matter than men I had brought the topic up with[95]. Guevara pointed out, like others before her, that there was a discrepancy - if not yet a conflict - between what CONAIE has accomplished organizationally, resulting in more space for its political

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[95] My hypothesis of a higher ethnic awareness among women was discussed in chapter II.

maneuverings, and what its members have gained materially. She had a pessimistic view on the possibilities of the native communities to lift themselves out of the 'poverty trap'. Out-migration was another problem OPIP worried about.

I asked her about women's positions in the ethnic movement, whether they had access to the top positions to the same extent as the men. Her answer was that traditionally men have been holding the women back, but that was changing. Native women had participated from the very first moment in building the organizations of the ethnic movement side by side with the men, but had been constrained by their obligations to the children and the home. The women's participation had been on the increase over the last years. In many communities women filled the leading position as head and ethnic women were members of the Parliament. She herself had worked her way up to her present position through years of involvement in women's organizations. She mentioned that there was no cooperation between OPIP and the State authorities.

From my interviews with the native leaders, it was clear that Ecuadorian organizations were far better organized than the Peruvian ones and, hence, played an active role, influenced the political agenda, and had more political punch in their dealings with the government and the State. Titling of ancestral land was ongoing and had high priority, as in Peru. However, the Ecuadorian native organizations have been less willing than the Peruvian ones to leave the initiative to the State bodies in charge of this work. They challenged the criteria used by the State bodies to define what was ancestral land and how land was assigned to communities. They had established their own land administration and had politicized the land issue by demanding that other economic activities in the region should be stopped until disputed claims had been solved. The equalitarian networking among the ethnic representative bodies, throughout the movement, may be exemplified by how the 1990 Uprising (*levantamiento general*) came about. In June 1990, the government failed to advance on an agreement between native organizations and representatives of the government related to land claims resulting from oil exploration (the 'Sarayacu Accords'). CONAIE became involved and together with land-related issues in the Highland, this should become the expressed motives for the national, nonviolent Indian uprising.

While the internal colonialization of the Ecuadorian Amazon Lowland continues to move rapidly forward, the native organizations challenge it on a far more advanced level

than what I observed in Peru. None of the two organizations seemed to be hampered seriously by the diversity of the native population, a dispersed population pattern or the large land area with a flawed infrastructure, which I speculated in the previous chapters might be possible causes of the political impotence of the native population in Peru.

Interview with CONAIE (Quito)

In Quito, I interviewed Sr. Tito Puanchir, a Shuar and vice-president of CONAIE. Puanchir himself was a teacher by profession, had extensive practice from different activities in the ethnic organizations. He had also completed an education in an academy CONAIE runs, whose purpose is to develop leaders for the ethnic movement. I started out asking whether the concept of ethnicity had to be as a variable to be able to describe CONAIE's constituencies in widely different environments. Puanchir agreed that the concept of ethnicity needs a reference to the material conditions of the population to which it is applied. He pointed out the large cultural variations between the ethnic populations of these environments and their different historical and contemporary trajectories. As a Shuar and nine months into his elected term, he naturally focused on the precarious situation of the native Amazon population. The debate on which projects to be prioritized within CONAIE with respect to the different zones is an ongoing source of wrestling and tensions. While CONAIE's efforts to gain rights and political influence for the ethnic population nationally have broad support, the most serious challenge, according to Puanchir, is being faced in the Amazon Lowland. The squeeze on the native peoples of the Lowland is enormous. Among the problems reported upon in this text - invading settlers, road building, legal and illegal extraction of natural resources, logging, and so forth - the petroleum activities top them all, and one sees the same pattern in Ecuador as in Peru. Exploration, development and production go on outside as well as inside the officially protected areas. Places, which were frontier towns for just a couple of decades back with virgin jungle around, are today settled places. The oil industry have moved on, leaving pipe lines, roads, traffic, oil wells, settlers, and numerous unrelated activities in its path. The richer experiences among the indigenous Highlanders with the outer society, translated into a higher capacity to master the challenges. But in his view, not only did the past of the two populations differ, but they would continue to diverge.

He listed territorial rights of the native Amazon peoples as the most pressing topic on

the ethnic agenda of Ecuador today, but stopped short of using the word autonomy. At present, the colonization of the Ecuadorian Amazon Lowland was massive with eradication of whole native civilizations and ecosystems as if a fire sale was going on, without constraints from an ever cash-strapped State and an indifferent government. As in Peru, emphasis is being put on titling of native land and a share in the extracted values, but the latter does not follow from the former. While the State showed flexibility on titling, it was hostile to any proposal that would limit its control of the subterranean resources. Other priorities were revitalization of traditional ethnic values and customs, including traditional ways of local government, and demands for education and other public services. In response to my question, which part of CONAIE's work over the last 1-2 decades had been most crucial to the success of the organization. He answered that, first, it had managed to maintain a rapport with the grassroots and, second, the leaders had been able to interpret the mood of their constituency convincingly. He was not willing to identify any particular turning points to explain the movement's success as Selverston-Scher (2001) does. In that sense, he was in agreement with Pallares (2002).

When CONAIE in 1996 turned around and introduced Pachakutik and its strategy to get indigenous candidates elected to public offices, the reasons were - seconding my informant, Duj's views - lack of trust in the traditional political parties, the State's indifference to the demands of the ethnic population, and an increasing self-confidence within CONAIE. Establishing alliances with political actors was an important part of Pachicútik's political work, but they were always tactical since CONAIE had a clear policy of its own. Today there were indigenous mayors in 23 cantons, a smattering of parochial presidents and numerous council members. At the higher level, the movement had got elected 5 prefects (*prefectes provincials*)[96] and 6 delegates in the Parliament[97]. Given that this strategy had been in operation for less than 6-7 years, he was convinced that Pachakútik's progress would continue on all levels. That policy followed its own logic, and would, he believed, force through a functioning multinational society in the future in spite of massive mestizo resistance to changes. Up toward the larger society, the strategy of getting people elected was the only one CONAIE at present pursued. He did not sympathize with calls for blockades, marches and similar noisy means, which are so

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[96] Elected political heads of provinces at the same level as the administrative government-appointed governor position.
[97] Two of these are seen as having defected to mestizo parties.

common in Peru, though he did not exclude them if the situation should call for them. In the past, the Indian mobilizations had always been nonviolent, which had created support far outside the ethnic ranks. Referring to the presidential election in Bolivia where the indigenous leader of the *cocaleros* (coca producers), Evo Morales, was a candidate and did well, Puanchir said that Pachakútik would have an indigenous candidate in the presidential race "within 10 years".

He commented upon the difficulties to work in alliance with mestizo organizations and political parties. Frequently they would not deliver when payday arrived. As one example he mentioned the participatory council, PRODENPE[98], together with other initiatives, initiated by President Jamil Mahuad in agreement with CONAIE after the 1998 elections. The promised funds had not been approved, the dialog stalled, and the positive working relationship became short-lived and, probably, provoked the coup in the alliance with the military in January 2000[99]. As a result, the present leadership of CONAIE, i.e., President Leonidas Iza and himself, kept its distance to the State; was not seeking executive power at this time, contrary to the previous CONAIE president, Antonio Vargas, who actively participated in ousting Mahuad (see Macdonald 2002); and would not integrating the CONAIE's organizations in the State programs. Instead they maintained one dialogue with the ethnic peoples[100] and another with non-ethnic members of the public sector, focusing on national political and economic issues.

CONAIE has for some time challenged the mestizo perceptions of the ethnic peoples as being somewhat 'separate' from the rest of the society. The movement's vision of the future Ecuador was that each ethnic people should be accepted as unique by its nationality, understood by its origin, history, traditions and territory[101]. Its vision was that of a nation*s*-state - a multinationalism - that would include, on equal footing, all the nations of Ecuador, views that had been expressed by other of my informants, who had

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[98] Consejo de desarrollo de las nacionalidades y pueblos de Ecuador.

[99] A similar breach may be in the making with the new president, Lucio Gutiérrez, who came to power with the support of CONAIE.

[100] The last Congress had established a Counsel of Nations (*Consejo de las nacionalidades*) with 24 members, each representing one nation in Ecuador from the Coast, Highland or Amazon Lowland. In addition, the CONAIE works with internal commissions, which each has their own sector responsibility.

[101] Macdonald (2002: 183) argues that by defining themselves as nationalities, Ecuador's ethnic population sought to institutionalize diversity through recognition of the differences that exist within the broad term '*indio*', simultaneously suggesting that the often used 'multicultural', which served as a unifying category during the 1980s, is too vague and misappropriate for that goal.

pointed out the non-sectarian motives of the ethnic movement. The way CONAIE would accomplish this was through democratic representations built on strong ties with the grassroots and with links to the broader society. That position had led to increased grassroots mobilization and popular participation at the parochial and cantonal levels.

Addressing what I having referred to as the 'poverty trap', Puanchir referred to the 'free market' mechanism of Ecuador. As with other high-placed representatives of the ethnic movement I raised that topic with, he also seemed to accept the right-of-way of a policy which kept his constituents at the mercy of the market forces. He was evasive when I brought up the options of price regulation, minimum prices and subsidies, even when being part of a constructive policy, which could offer the peasants some economic predictability. He admitted that criticism had been raised at the grassroots level against inaction on this point at the hand of CONAIE, but did not elaborate.

3. Reflections

Contrary to the Peruvian situation with an ethnic mobilization ongoing only among the natives, but with disjoint activities without much coordination and lacking coherence both in goals and means, the one of Ecuador is very different. The Ecuadorian movement has been on the constant rise for, at least, since the 1970s; has a remarkable string of political victories over the last 10-15 years to show for it; its national reputation is unchallenged; and its organizations are vibrant, focused, smooth-running, ubiquitous and competent on all levels. Due to the difficulties in getting first-hand observations about the performance of the movement in the Amazon Lowland, I will not make assessment on that part, but there is little doubt that also this also functions well (see Macdonald 1999).

The ethnic vanguard in Ecuador has very competently, systematically and consistently built a strong organizational structure with a coherent symbolic and, ultimately, a political message. The movement expresses itself with a vision, rooted in an ethnic ideology, which merges the movement's short- and long-term goals into one seamless whole. The movement has been able to pull together in a few representative top-end bodies - foremost among them, CONAIE - the overwhelming majority of the ethnic peoples and their communities and organize them in manageable units at the parochial, cantonal and provincial levels. The structure is staffed with competent officers, backed by an enthusiastic following, and characterized by a remarkable internal discipline. It

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represents a unique mobilization apparatus both inwardly toward its constituents and outwardly toward the other society.

One is confronted with a dynamic organizational network that draws upon the grassroots. The grassroots is mobilized around ethnic values - a means as much as a goal - carried out primarily by the first-level organizations, and given a focus by the aim to conquer public offices through elections. While the first part without the second, over time, might have ended as a futile exercise - and once more Peru may serve as an example - the marriage of the two gives an over-all focus to the mobilization, a rationale for its continuous maintenance and expansion, and introduces a continuous dynamics to the movement with a remarkable élan among its officers. The vibrancy of the ethnic movement may be explained by the self-confidence that characterizes its officers, rooted in the movement's stable progress, a string of political leaps over the last couple of decades, and its vision that embraces both ethnic and non-ethnic rural constituencies. Added to this is the favorable aspect that the movement has been able to develop a discourse without import from the outside.

My interviews point out the overarching objective of the ethnic movement to transform the present one-nation, mestizo-dominated society into a multinational society - a nation*s*-state - which includes all Ecuador's population groups. The movement has been able to promote that long-term goal without sacrificing its ethnic premises. The short-term goals within that vision are, on one hand, the development and strengthening of the movement's organizational structure and, on the other, the grassroots mobilization by a focus on teaching, consciousness-building and information. With reference specifically to the Amazon Lowland, the expressed goals are native participation in deciding the use and maintenance of the native territories to ensure the cultural survival of the native population. This discourse manifests itself in a call for specific rights, some promised by the Constitution, but in practice non-existent (see Appendix F).

It is worth looking at CONAIE's strategies in some detail. CONAIE, which determine the political trends of the ethnic mobilization in Eucador - and I will hypothesize, inspires the mobilization efforts going on in Peru - may be perceived as working with three strategic schemes in parallel. First and foremost, in its position as a representative political body of national stature, it fills a role where it promotes the interests of its constituency in all

areas like any traditional political party would do, but with an unconventional emphasis on the ethnic discourse[102]. Through Pachakútik, it works alone or in alliance with unions, political parties and other actors as it sees fit. Pachakútik has been given a broad mandate and involves itself in promoting ethnic subjects among the indigenous communities in a number of ways with an unchallenged emphasis on the grassroots, i.e., focusing on the ethnic communities, in close cooperation with the movement's federations and the zonal associations.

CONAIE's second strategy - not to be seen independent of the aforementioned - is to unite across the diversity among the ethnic peoples in Ecuador. This is promoted within CONAIE through a cooperation and coordination of initiatives among the representative of the ethnic zonal associations of CONAIE - CONFENIAE (the Amazon Lowland), ECUARUNARI (the Highland), and COICE (the Coast). CONAIE's ambition is to establish an overarching ethnic idea, which each of the ethnic zonal populations can relate to. Contrary to what is ongoing in Guatemala, as I will show, this is not ideas without a footing, but carried out in practice through political initiatives at the national and transregional levels. However, the different pasts, physical environments, and threats to cultural survival of the constituencies of these associations indicate that this, not unexpected, is a demanding task. Tensions exist within CONAIE. Regional ambitions, opinions on priorities and resource allocation collide, and conflicts erupt. However, as argued in chapter I, an ongoing wrestling with ideas in a movement of this kind is not necessarily a bad thing.

CONAIE's third strategy, which is intertwined with the two aforementioned, is - through grassroots work - to promote the values and the qualities of the ethnic cultures from which the movement gets its momentum and ultimately both its raison d'etre and modus vivendi. I have referred to this earlier as the politicization of the ethnic awareness. This is done through a call for bilingual education in the public schools, promotion of the ethnic worldview in every aspect of its activities, and ongoing consciousness-raising activities in a variety of forms among its constituencies. Many of the elements of these initiatives are as much a means to an end as an end in itself. CONAIE's emphasis on reaching out to the individual community member *and* the special form this effort takes,

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[102] While CONAIE's double function as both a movement and a political party, through Pachacútik, is unique, it is not the first time this has happened. The 'green' movement in Germany maintains both functions - in the political arena through the Green Party.

given its ethnic platform, is, in my view, the most important tactical characteristic of the movement and on which its past and future successes hinge. A string of analysts, who most closely have discussed ethnic movements in Latin America, hardly address this aspect (Fischer and McKenna Brown 1996; Yashar 1998; Warren 1998; Dean 2002; Gelles 2002).

CHAPTER V.
GUATEMALA

Guatemala was included in this study because earlier work had reported upon the existence of a viable indigenous movement there (Warren 1998) and Fischer and McKenna Brown (1996) presented contributions by some of its leading proponents (Sam Colop 1996; Cojtí Cuxil 1996). Yashar (1998) supports Warren's claim of a movement and claims that it is in the same league as the forceful ones in Ecuador and Bolivia and contrasts them with the Peruvian one, which (quote) "barely exists" (ibid: 26).

Guatemala shows many of the same ethno-national and socio-economic traits as Peru and Ecuador. However, the society is ethnically more polarized; its population has a higher share of ethnic people, found primarily in the Highland; the indigenous population (referred to as Mayas) is highly diverse; and it has a recent past of State-sponsored terrorism directed against the Mayas during its civil war from 1960 to 1996[103]. It was assumed that this background of similarities with and differences to the conditions in Peru and Ecuador and the all-out cultural approach of the Guatemalan activism (Warren 1998) would complement and enrich the perspectives of my study.

This chapter consists of four parts. The first describes the environment of the Maya cultural mobilization. The second sums up and discusses the activism Warren (1998) refers to. The third presents the outcome of my efforts in the Highland to map the effects of this activism. And in the fourth I present my reflections.

1. Background

In this part, I give a demographic overview of the Maya population and address the two independent variables of my study. I emphasize the effects of the Guatemalan violent civil war that, I contend, haunts the society and has created a political climate that functions as one obstacle to ethnic mobilization.

Demography: Guatemala is a small Central American country with an area of only 40 percent of Ecuador's and 8.3 percent of Peru's (see table 1.1). Like the other two, Guatemala may be divided into three zones - the Coast, the Highland and the inner

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[103] The terms genocide or ethnocide is used by CEH (1999: tomo 3), Schirmer (1999), Adams (1991: 187), Falla (1983), Carmack (1988), Fischer and McKenna Brown (1998: 10).

Lowland, but without a native population[104]. Unique features of Guatemala's population are the high density of 119.4 persons per km^2, compared with Peru's 20.3 and Ecuador's 47.2 (table 1.1), and the share of indigenous of 60.3 percent (Warren 1998: 8). The country's two other ethnic groups, the Xinca and the Garifuna – the latter being Blacks of African/Caribbean origin - are both of insignificant size and will be ignored. One-third of the country's 22 departments, mostly in the western Highland, has Maya majorities ranging from above 60 to near to 100 percent of the population; one-third have roughly balanced numbers of Maya and non-Maya; and one-third (primarily in the southeastern section of the country) have non-Maya majorities mirroring the first-mentioned case (Warren 1998: 12). In the urban areas, the proportion of Mayas is 20.5 percent and of ladinos 45.7 percent (INE 1991). The composition of the indigenous population of Guatemala is far more complex than those of the other two countries. It consists of a large number of peoples belonging to 21 officially recognized linguistic families, though the largest four language communities (K'iché, Mam, Kaqchikel and Q'eqchii') are said to comprise combined almost 80 percent of the Maya-speaking population. The affiliation of subgroups of these families goes no further than to the municipality (*municipio*) in which its members live (Smith 1990a). Each Maya people see itself as different from the other, having different traditions, customs, and worldview. That the main social cleavage is between the ethnic population and the ladinos[105] - distinctly more pronounced in Guatemala than in the other two countries - should not confuse the fact that the Maya population has no common denominator. In situations where the ladino society is less imposing, other schisms easily come to the surface (Stoll 1998).

Environment: Following the scheme used in the two previous country discussions, I approach the Guatemalan environment by using the two independent variables - socio-economic conditions and regime type. However, once again it was not possible to determine a correlation between the former and the degree of ethnic mobilization in Guatemala and even less so when it was intended to inform upon differences among the countries. As in the case of Peru and Ecuador, I will conclude that this factor has, at best,

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[104] Those who live in the lowland of the Inland, i.e., Petén, are ladinos or indigenous migrants from the Highland. The latter is too unorganized, aculturated and dispersed to be included in this study.
[105] A mestizo in South America is referred to as a latino in Central America.

a secondary impact and it will not be discussed here. (Together with a general presentation of aspects of Guatemala, it is detailed in appendix L.) However, the regime type and thereby the role of the State offer significant insight. Guatemala's traditionally higher degree of ethnic polarization, the country's brutal civil war with strong ethnocidal and genocidal characteristics, and the unwillingness by the State to meet the conditions of the Peace Accords of 1996, point out a polarized political climate that continues to haunt the country and set the conditions of civil society in Guatemala apart from those of Peru and Ecuador. Also Guatemala is frequently referred to as a democracy. However, in spite of the liberalization which has taken place, it diverges even less than the other two countries from the traditional authoritarian Latin American oligarchic rule. Referring to the discussion in chapter I, this will be my premise for characterizing its regime type. I will discuss Guatemala within a slightly wider time frame than I did in the case of the previous two country cases. And I will look at the country from the point of view of elite theory with the objective of establishing a conceptual platform for assessing the working conditions of an ethnic mobilization.

Elite theory implies that elite configurations predate regime, and that the relationship between the elite factions is the key to understand the elite configuration (Lowell Field, Higley and Burton 1990: 159). Another contention is that variations in elite structure and functioning are decisive for major political outcomes. Hence, a correct classification of the elite configuration is crucial for the analysis and the possible forecasting of political trends. McCleary (1999) identifies two major elite factions for the period she analyzes, 1982-93. One is the Guatemalan armed forces with the army at the vanguard; the other is the economic private sector represented by CACIF.

In the early 1980s, the military had, seemingly, successfully ensured its national political dominance. McCleary (1999) claims, however, that the military's might and influence was illusionary. She argues that the standing of the military had been in constant decline from the late 1970s onward. The reasons were, first, general mismanagement, ineptitude in economic affairs, and inefficiency in increasing public revenues by governments under military control in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, the army had been unable to decisively crush the popular insurgency in the Highland, even after the guerrilla had lost the war both politically and militarily by the end of 1982. Third, all of Central America had in the 1980s been under increasing international

pressure to end their internal warfare. For this reason, Guatemala - notoriously for its human rights abuses - experienced a deteriorating effect on the flow of international aid and foreign investments. And finally, Guatemala's economic elite that had supported authoritarian rule in the past, effectively confronted the military regimes through its umbrella organization, CACIF, to the point that the government could not govern on economic issues without consulting its counterpart (ibid: 29). According to McCleary, the decline in the hegemony of the military continued into the 1990s.

The economic elite had had its own problems, but came out of them in the 1980s strengthened, unified and focused. Increasingly it came to see the pariah status of the country as a liability for their business dealings in the merging world of globalism, trade blocks, and the transnational investment opportunities. It was appreciated that Guatemala could not reenter the community of nations without a definitive domestic peace. A move toward a more open society was recognized as an economic necessity (Warren 1998: 54; McCleary 1999: 10). Driven by circumstances and pushed by necessity, the first steps in a transition from authoritarianism to a more liberal society took place during 1983-86, signaling the rise of the economic elite at the expense of the military elite. Following the 18-months' brutal dictatorship of general Rios Montt (1982-83), general Mejia Victores (1983-86) took over and prepared the transition to civil rule in collaboration with the political parties. With Guatemala still dominated by the military, the governmental leaders proclaimed in 1985 that the country was ushering in a new era where governance and societal relations would be determined by democratic principles. A liberal 1985 Constitution that went a long way to accommodate the economic elite by guaranteeing liberal principles with respect to private property rights, market competition, and individual liberties, was introduced with the support of the main elite factions (McCleary, 1999: 15-17, 28). However, the elites kept the government at a short leash, limiting the reforms that would be allowed.

The assessment of Guatemala's elite configuration of the mid-1980s is difficult and, therefore, the political events of the 1980s cannot be fully interpreted. And, second, very little is known about the elite configuration of 1993 onward. It is, therefore, problematic to assess the full nature and the degree of stability of the present liberal 'spring' in Guatemala. One interpretation is that during the 1990s one had an intermediate elite

configuration, i.e., a configuration in flux[106], where the military accepted its reduced role, which, however, still was formidable. The military focused on its overlapping interests with the economic elite and together they nurtured a liberalization process, while disruptive disagreements were put aside. However, important changes are taking place under the present government of Portillo and, one may speculate whether not the military is strengthening its position as the civil society conditions are deteriorating.

How superficial the redress of the Guatemalan society after the 1996 Peace Accords has been, may be exemplified by the fact that the person responsible for the military campaign in the Highland in 1982-83, General Efraín Ríos Montt, today is president of the Guatemalan Congress, and that his political party, FRG, carried his hand-picked candidate, Alfonso Portillo Cabrera, to a solid victory with a comfortable majority in the Congress - 63 seats out of 113 - in the election of 1999. Ríos Montt is FRG's official candidate in the presidential election in November 2003. Since president Portillo cannot be reelected, his influence is doomed to decline as the 2003 election gets closer (EIU 2002: 7, 14). To indicate the relationship between the factions within the elite - updating the discussion above, but lacking hard data - the following information is offered, building on information mostly from the national and international press and MINUGUA.

The military keeps a low public profile, but maintains a strong position in the Guatemalan society, de facto outside civil control, and cuddled by the government and the Congress through the majority of the official party, FRG. The influence of the military can be seen in the large number of key positions inside and outside the government that are filled with men with background from the highest positions of the military establishment. Nothing has been done on the compromise of the Peace Accords to curtail and re-ideologicize the military, supporting accusations by the public, MINUGUA, and from abroad (EU and USA) that a re-militarization may be going on. According to Warren (1998: 53), Guatemalan military had 40,000 troops with 77

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[106] Lowell Field and Higley (1980) used a term - *imperfectly unified elite* - which, however, was dropped in their configuration scheme in an overview article of 1990 with both as co-authors (Lowell Field, Higley and Burton 1990). The term refers to an elite constellation that occupies an intermediate position in flux between a disunified elite and a consensually unified one. It consists of two main factions where one, through election and other forms of representative politics, has the support of a majority among non-elites. Given the circumstances, this configuration may converging towards a (politically stable) consensually unified or diverging towards a (politically unstable) disunified elite configuration (Lowell Field and Higley 1980: 39-40).

stronghold installations manned across the country at the peak of the internal war and agreed in the Accords to reduce its size by one-third. At the end of 2002, it had down-sized with less than 9,000 men to 31,106 troops (22.5 percent) and with all its strongholds maintained (Prensa Libre 2002e: 3-4; 2002z: 4). The military budget has been considerably increased over the last years, in addition to funds not open to public scrutiny (MINUGUA 2002c: 14). The significant economic interests of the armed forces from the 1960s and 1970s, spread through ownerships within industry, land property and agricultural production (McCleary 1999), is said to be intact, but the information is difficult to verify (pers. com.). What is less difficult to control is the ongoing impunity for people in high offices, particularly in sectors related to the military (El País 2002a, 2002b). Reports abound that human rights violations under the present pro-military government are on the rise and promoters of a strengthened civil society are being targeted, i.e., harassed or assassinated. Rumors has circulated in the press that there exist secret structures and groups, even death squads that are responsible for the violations (Prensa Libre 2002w: 3). Similar speculations reached me from sources within the military and were later repeated and expanded upon (pers. com.). Nothing or very little has been done in areas, which directly address the socio-economic situation of the rural Maya people and the skewed wealth distribution in the country. I was informed that the national press exercises self-censure on investigative journalism after prominent journalists had been assassinated. And still, the press is vocal and vehemently against the government, discusses its rampant corruption, and regularly supports the standpoints of CACIF, which, however, have no compassion for the Mayas.

Since 2003 is an election year, the different political factions are positioning themselves, with the advantage to FRG, which has easier access to the public coffers and can take initiatives to influence groups in the electorate as it seems fit. As CONAIE in Ecuador used the political openings of the 1970s to establish and consolidate itself and secure political space, so do factions in Guatemala – some being more unexpected than others. According to the 1985 Constitution, personnel of any kind employed by the Armed Forces, civil or military, are not allowed to engage themselves politically, not even vote in the national elections. That, however, put no limit on the involvement of retired personnel. Of the 14 political parties that so far have been inscribed to take part in the presidential and congressional elections in November of 2003, seven are led by

retired officers, most from the very highest ranks of the army. According to a study by the Guatemalan daily, Siglo Veinteuno (2002a: 2), a broad mobilization is indeed taking place among retired military personnel, using the electoral political system, with the declared goal to "regain what has been lost in politics".

2. Maya Cultural Activism

In the following I will analyze the means and perspectives of the Maya cultural activism based on, primarily, Warren's (1998) description, but also through the contributions of Fischer and McKenna Brown (1996). For reasons which will be clear, I will distinguish between an ethnic movement, as I have defined it in chapter I, and ethnic *activism* as Warren uses it in her book. With the latter I will mean uncoordinated efforts guided by a shared, but vague vision, without defined goals, without a unified organization and a mass following, and without a mandate to the fragmented leadership from the constituency it pretends to represent. From that follows that activism takes place without an overarching strategy. It may take the form from informal and improvised talk-shops (not meant derogatively) among individuals with a common interest, to something more substantial - short of a social (or ethnic) movement, which needs to meet certain minimum requirements discussed earlier (Melucci 1989: 38; Foweraker 1995: 4).

By distancing themselves from the ladino ideology, the Maya cultural activists challenge the legacy of colonial and nineteenth-century state formation. The present Guatemalan nationalism, promoted by the ladino State, becomes another historical representation the activists seek to reinterpret and change (ibid: 11). The construction of the revisionist discourse is facilitated by letting Maya culture stands for a meaningful but selected mix of practices and knowledge, drawn on and re-synthesized from a viewpoint that sees indigenous identity as highly salient to self-representation, and as a vehicle for political change. Like ethnic activists in Ecuador and Peru, the Maya activists work to promote the revitalization of the traditional culture among the indigenous population. To the Maya cultural activists (Warren's term), this amounts to an approach of 'unity within diversity' (ibid: 13) intended to bring Mayas into the national socio-political mainstream to redress Guatemala's development dilemmas. They propose a multicultural model for participatory democracy, appreciating the need among the many Maya peoples to maintain their individual identity.

The control of the discourse on Maya history is of central importance to the movement's cultural promotion because of the widely held fundamentalist view (Warren's term) that 'true' Maya culture consists only of those features that survived from the pre-colonial period. The influence of recent centuries of European and African culture is seen as 'contamination' and the incorporation of non-Maya elements as a weakening of the Maya culture. From this point of view, the Maya languages that have remained largely intact throughout centuries of foreign incursions represent a uniquely authentic cultural possession for those who speak them. Local costumes, though assumed to have been forced upon the indigenous population by decree by the colonial State, are seen as another important ethnic manifestation. Early colonial documents and the Maya pre-colonial hieroglyphic writings are a third important source of original Maya culture and seen as a correction to the ethnocentric interpretation by ladino writers. The breakthrough in the last few decades in the deciphering of the Maya hieroglyphs may help to explain the fundamentalist approach of the Maya activists. Table 5.1 lists a synopsis of prioritized tasks.

Table 5.1
Priorities of the Maya cultural Activism.
Source: Warren 1998: 39

1. Language revitalization, literacy training in Maya languages, and local language committees. 2. The revitalization of Maya chronicles of culture, history and resistance to the Spanish invasion. 3. The production of culturally inclusive school texts and teacher training materials for use in intercultural school programs. 4. The revitalization of Maya leadership norms, specifically community councils of elders, midwives, and Maya shaman-priests. 5. The dissemination of internationally recognized discourse of indigenous rights, focusing on recognition and self-determination. The movement envisions a radical transformation of Guatemalan politics to accommodate a multicultural nation with decentralized state services.

Following Warren, Maya activism seeks a culture-based solution to Guatemala's many problems. In a short-term perspective it works for the conservation and resurrection of elements of the ancient Maya culture; in a long-term perspective it wants to force through governmental reforms within the framework of the 1985 Guatemalan constitution and international law. The views of one of the most articulate activists, Cojtí Cuxil (1996), calling for Maya autonomy (see also quote in chapter I), are a clear indication of the

political dimension that inspires the more advanced of its proponents. The goals of the Maya mobilization overlap in substance in certain ways with cultural elements of the discourse of the mobilizations of Ecuador and Peru, among them, recognition of cultural diversity within the nation-state; a greater role for indigenous priorities in state-national politics; a reassessment of economic inequities; and a wider distribution of cultural resources to improve education and literacy in the indigenous languages.

The early years of the movement, in the mid-1980s, were focused on issues of cultural origin and self-definition. Since then, Maya activists have focused their debates more squarely on questions of the best direction for Maya nation-building, elaborated specific demands on the state for major reforms in administration, language policy, the future role of the military, economic priorities, education, and respect for Maya ceremonial centers (Fischer and Brown, 1996). How it intends to translate its ideas into political action and confront the State is not addressed by either Warren or any of the contributors to Fischer and McKenna Brown (1996).

3. Interviews and Observations

The challenge I initially experienced with the indigenous cultural activists in Guatemala was whether their approach represented a strategy, which overlapped those I had observed in Peru and Ecuador, or something distinctly different. Given Warren's reference to the activity as an 'indigenous movement' that confronted the ladino society, it was expected to meet Melucci's (1989: 38) criterion for a social movement that "its actions challenge or break the limits of a system of social relations", or, at the minimum, exhibit a sense of collective purpose and political objectives, requiring interaction with other political actors, and *mobilize* its supporters in pursuit of its goals, according to Foweraker (1995: 4). To be able to establish to which extent the cultural activists made themselves felt and the degree to which they reached out to and involved the indigenous grassroots in their cultural mobilization, interviews were carried out with individuals, professionals, and public officers in numerous places across the Guatemalan Highland. With only a couple of exceptions, the large majority of my informants were Maya in pronounced positions. Table 5.2 identifies the sites of four Highland departments were I did fieldwork and carried out interviews.

A number of interviews were carried out in the town of Quetzaltenango, the second

largest city of Guatemala and the capital of the department of the same name. Since this region is perceived as the center of the Maya mainland, a number of mayors and their staff in municipios spread across this department were approached. My rationale was that ideas of importance to the rural and semi-urban indigenous population would, at least, reach municipios that were located within a few hours' bus ride from the town of Quetzaltenango. The other region I earmarked, as a back-up if that assumption should be wrong, included places within and close to the Ixil triangle in the central-north of the Highland, the very heart-land of the Maya population and the most 'typical' indigenous region of Guatemala. This was the region where the atrocities by the State against the Mayas during the civil war were most pronounced.

Table 5.2
Urban centers visited and profiles surveyed in the Guatemalan Highland

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Urban "research bases"
Quetzaltenango[3] * *Aquacatán*[4]

Profiles traveled
a. Quetzaltenango - *San Juán*[1] - *Concepción Chiquírichapa*[1]
b. Quetzaltenango – *Sibilia*[1] – *Capricán*[1] – *Huitán*[1]
c. Quetzaltenango – *Aquacatán*[2] – *Sacapulas*[3] – *Nebaj*[3] – *Cunén*[3] – *Uspantán*[3] – Sta. Cruz de Quiché[3] – Chichicastenango[3]
d. Quetzaltenango – Totonicapán[5] – *Santa María Chiquamula*[4]

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Formal interviews were carried out in places underlined; smaller places are written in italic; larger urban places are written with regular types; all the departments and sites listed are located in the Highland.
[1] Dept. of Quetzaltenango[2]; Dept. of Huehuetenenago[3]; Dept. of Quiché[4]; and Dept. of Totonicapán[5].

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The Town of Quetzaltenango[107]: Assuming that Quetzaltenango would be a sure place to experience the effects of any Maya cultural activism, a number of interviews was

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[107] My informants included Sr. Federico Velásquez, the owner of 'Celas Maya', one of the Quetzaltenango's many Spanish schools catering to foreigners; Professor Fernando Cajas, a ladino and Fulbright scholar, educated in the United States, and newly appointed Director of CUNOC (*Centro Universitario de Occidente*), University of San Carlos in Quetzaltenango; Sr. Luis Alberto Prieto, a Spanish anthropologist who worked as a consultant to the Quetzaltenango-based NGO, PIES (*Asociación de promoción, investigación, educación y salud*) with extensive experience with Maya communities in the rural areas. I also met with representatives of the organization CEDEPEM (*El Centro Experimental para el Desarrollo de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa Rural*) - some of profesor Cajas' contacts - Sr. José Luis Siguel and Sr. Rubén López Herrera. The former is a K'iché-Maya and the latter a ladino.

carried out here. All my informants (listed in footnote referred to above), however, were adamantly convinced that there existed no organized grassroots movement in the Maya population or a network of Maya activists, which somehow connected and coordinated different Maya communities. My conversations with the well-connected professor Fernando Cajas, who reported on his impressions from conversations with a number of Maya cultural activists, should further strengthen my growing assumption that the 'indigenous movement', referred to by Warren, was non-existent in Quetzaltenango. Sr. Luis Alberto Prieto, an experienced fieldworker (anthropologist) from Spain with long practice working among the Maya communities, was familiar with the cultural activists and their ideas, but was immediately dismissive, stating that they were an urban phenomenon of no importance. They had no influence outside their own intellectual environment and none at all in the countryside among the indigenous communities where the overwhelming Maya majority lives. He was equally unequivocal in his denial that there existed indigenous organizations with an ethno-political focus working on the grassroots of the indigenous communities.

My request for an interview with the mayor of the municipio of Quetzaltenenango, Rigoberto Quemé Chay, a K'iché Maya, serving his second term of 4 years, was not answered. His political machine, a civil committee, *Xel-jú*, with its base in the town of Quetzaltenango, has no influence outside the municipio of the departmental capital. In late December 2002, Quemé announced publically that he would give up his position as mayor, spend his time to build a broad coalition and run as a candidate in the presidential elections of the fall of 2003 (Prensa Libre 2002x, attachment *Suroccidente*: 2). His strategy will be to establish an electoral base in the traditional top-down way, i.e., appeal to groups and parties, but without a grassroots mobilization of the kind that has served CONAIE in Ecuador so well. His choice of approach may be one more indication that no large-scale grassroots networking or mobilization is going on among the Mayas in Guatemala. I contacted and talked briefly with the Nobel Prize Laureate, Rigoberta Menchú Tum[108], to solicit her views. She declined my request for an extended interview.

To widen my inquire and better understand the kind of organizing which is going on among the Mayas, I met with representatives of CEDEPEM, a conglomerate of 8 NGOs

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[108] The 10-years' anniversary of Rigoberta Menchú's Nobel Prize was celebrated with a public meeting in Quetzaltenango December 13, 2002, arranged by the foundation carrying her name.

covering a wide spectrum of activities, created jointly by ladinos and indigenous to improve the material living conditions in the western rural Highland. My two informants were remotely familiar with the ideas of the cultural activities Warren (1998) discusses, but they also pointed out that there existed no activity of that kind among the Highland Mayas in the form of either a regional or even a local indigenous movement. To the extent organizing took place, I was informed, it was in the form of either informal intellectual nuclei of the kind Warren (1998, 2002) may have in mind, what I have referred to as talk-shops, or small isolated culturally oriented societies.

The organizing pattern among the Mayas in Guatemala was presented to me as being very different from the one I experienced among Amazon natives in Peru or within the ethnic movement of Ecuador, i.e., networks with their base in the communities, each speaking on behalf of all the community members. In Guatemala, when more communities are involved, external organizations - like traditional political parties, NGOs, and ethno-neutral peasant unions - are in control and dominate and define the agenda. Also, when Mayas join an organization they do it as individuals of special interests and not as a result of a communal call. This has far-reaching consequences. It may explain why grassroots tactics, i.e., working with and through the individual indigenous members of the basic social unit (the community or the municipio), are absent, perhaps impossible, and play no role in situations where social mobilizations among the Mayas might have been expected. This would be further exemplified as I moved away from the town of Quetzaltenango and will be commented upon later.

I was told that the oppression and internal unrest from the 1960s onward and particularly during the systematic destruction of the social fabric of communities by the army in the early 1980s, may have played a role in delaying the mobilizing of the indigenous population in Guatemala when compared with the progress in other countries. Predictably, Ecuador was mentioned. However, more important, according to José Luis Siguel, and seconded by other of my informants, was the dormant and deep distrust, which exists among Mayas of different peoples. In his experience, Mam-Mayas, as one example, would not accept K'iché-Maya leaders in organizations they took part in, and they would be more individualistic than Kachiquel-Mayas, who traditionally had a stronger affiliation with their communities. It was telling that when he and other indigenous leaders I spoke with, mentioned any of the six indigenous delegates in the

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Guatemalan Congress, serving different traditional political parties, they were referred to not as Mayas, but as *K'iché*-Mayas. Trust across the boundary between different Maya peoples was generally non-existent; in some cases the distrust among social units of different Maya peoples matched the one everyone had to the ladinos. I brought up the recently announced plans of the mayor in Quetzaltenango, Rigoberto Quemé, to build a front among Mayas for his presidential bid in the fall of 2003. Luis Siguel brushed it off as a futile task. I was later informed that Quemé had solicited the support of PAN, the party of ex-President Arzú (1995-99), but had been turned down as being not representative of the Mayas.

Municipios in the Department of Quetzaltenenago: Extending on my efforts in the town of Quetzaltenango, a number of elected indigenous officials were interviewed in municipios throughout the Department of Quetzaltenenago and, later, elected leaders of municipios in a number of other Highland departments as well. An overview of my informants is given in Table 5.3.

The municipio of Concepción is located 14 kilometers from the town of Quetzaltenango. It has around 20,000 inhabitants of which 4-5,000 lived in the urban center of the same name. The population consists of Mam-Mayas with exception of 10-15 ladino families located in the urban center. The mayor of the municipio, Leonardo Escalante, to whom, among others, I formally addressed my questions on the Maya activism, was totally unfamiliar with any activities of that kind. He doubted strongly that any movement of the kind I inquired about existed anywhere in Guatemala, and, to his knowledge, surely not on a departmental or higher organizational level. He also emphasized the many cultural and political cleavages in the indigenous population, even in a small municipio like his.

Two hours with bus from Quetzaltenango one reaches the urban center of the municipio of Sibilia. It is a chilly place at 3,000 meters above sea level with great views across an extensively cultivated and densely populated landscape underneath. The municipio of 15,000 members with only 20 percent of the population being Mam-Mayas, all living in the rural area, has an urban center of around 1,000 inhabitants dominated by ladinos. The ladino mayor was nowhere to be found, but my contact, Sr. Laurence Barrios, a ladino who runs a small metal factory with 3-4 workers, was an informative

replacement. He rejected the idea that there was any kind of ethno-cultural or -political organizing or activism going on among the Mayas in his or in the neighboring municipios of the kind I inquired about. The region was characterized by massive and wide-spread poverty with a few ladinos doing relatively well. As is common all over the Highland, the ladinos cluster in the villages and the towns. Due to the better opportunities to accumulate wealth there and that they do networking among themselves, keeping the Mayas out, they have an edge over the indigenous population.

Table 5.3
An Overview of elected Persons interviewed in the Highland

Person[1]	Office held	Municipio	Department
I. The Department of Quetzaltenango:			
Laurence Barrios	(Not elected)	Sibilia	Quetzaltenango
Tomás Enrique Pérez,	Mun. vice-mayor	Cabricán	"
Juan Perez Batén,	Mun. counsellor	"	"
Egidio Miguel Lopez Mateo	Mun. mayor	Huitán	"
Asturo López Pérez	Mun. vice-mayor	"	"
José Lucas Godines	Mun. counselor	"	"
Santos Vicortex Vicente	Mun. counselor	"	"
Leonardo Escalante	Mun. mayor	Concepción	"
II. Other Highland Departments:			
Pablo Escobar Mendez	Mun. mayor	Aquacatán	Huehuetenango
Gaspar Alcon Ortiz	Mun. vice-mayor	"	"
Pedro Raymundo Cobo	Mun. mayor	Nebaj	El Quiché
Marco Antonio Pacya Gamarro	Mun. councellor	San Miguel Uspantán	"
Eusebio Tzunum Lopez	Mun. mayor	Sta. Cruz del Quiché	"
Edgar Arévalo	Mun. mayor	Totonicapán	Totonicapán

All persons listed as elected are indigenous

The public neglect becomes increasingly more pronounced as one moves into the remote northern part of the Department of Quetzaltenango, exemplified by the roads, which in places look like dry river beds; an absence of electricity poles; etc. My arrival to the municipio of Huitán was seen as a great event and I ended up having interviews with most of the local political elite (see Table 5.3), all Mam-Mayas. The municipio of Huitán is slightly smaller than Sibilia. Only 15 percent of the population were Ladinos (some claimed an even lower number), 7 percent K'iché, and the rest Mam. I asked the mayor how ladinos and the indigenous got along and he answered diplomatically, smiling ever so slightly, that "*somos separados*" (we are separated). When I brought up my topics -

ethnic consciousness-raising and networks that would indicate that some kind of organized interaction took place - the mayor concluded, seconded by the other informants that no such indigenous mobilization existed. Once more, none of my informants in Huitán had heard about the kind of cultural activities Warren (1998) reports upon. My informants agreed that the Maya population was fundamentally fractured. There exists no indigenous congress or other types of representative bodies for the different Maya peoples (nation, tribe) where topics of importance could be discussed and used as a vehicle to reach across to other Maya peoples. My informants stated that the reason was that there were too many political, cultural and personal cleavages within each Maya people and among the different peoples.

The municipio of Cabricán is located next to the most northern municipio in the Department of Quetzaltenango and has the smallest area of all the places I visited in this department. Its population consisted of 21,000 inhabitants, overwhelmingly Mam-Mayas, with 2,000 living in the urban center. Even with its remote location and the center located in a cul-de-sac, the economy of Cabricán is slightly better than most of the small municipios. It has deposits of quicklime, which offer jobs to some 40 persons, in addition to the regular economic activities, dominating in the rural areas of the department. I interviewed jointly the vice-mayor and the municipal councilor and once more the answer to my inquire about indigenous mobilization efforts was negative. However, the organizational activity, which I have referred to as 'ethno-neutral', was considerable. Numerous bodies were active within the community and between communities, many being of the form of NGOs and outlets of external organizations, like regional and national peasant unions, political parties and coordinating associations. It slowly dawned on me that my informants were telling me something which I had been told before and would repeatedly be told again, but had not understood the significance of. A large part of the indigenous population is organizationally involved in one or more ways, but the priorities of these activities are determined by the external environment with the local constituency taking the cue and carrying out the 'message' in their environment. Because of the origin of these activities, the topics were 'ethno-neutral'. The form this 'communication' takes is top-down. The information reaches the involved community members from the higher external organizational levels; very little goes the other way.

Municipios of the Northern Highland: Even though the town of Quetzaltenango is the 'capital' of the Mayas, I could not be sure whether my failure to identify any trace of an indigenous movement in and around the city was not an unfortunate anomaly. I therefore visited municipios in a number of departments in the Northern Highland outside the Department of Quetzaltenango; see part II of Table 5.2.

There is a pleasing intimacy to the rural landscape of the central and northern part of the northern Highland. It is hilly, which implies patches of forest where the land is either too steep or too barren to be cultivated, alongside densely packed, intensely farmed parcels. In between are single-family adobe houses with characteristic rusty-red tiled roofs. In places where the land was being tilled, it was done with a wooden plow pulled by oxen. Sometimes one sees children, women and men walking along the road, supporting the huge burdens on their backs with a band across their forehead. This is a region with life is as hard as it comes. Not more than an hour with bus out of the departmental capital of Huehuetenango the two-lane asphalted road ends, and a ill-maintained, dusty, potholed, one-lane dirt road takes over, slowing the bus from 40-50 to 15-20 km per hour. In spite of the sign of modernity, exemplified by electricity poles along the road, the road standard indicated that this was well into the rural areas, without the attention of central authorities. While most of the houses seen from the road seemed to have been connected to the electricity poles, it says nothing about people's access to public electricity, or even a public road system, just on the other side of the nearby hill.

My failure to identify anything which even remotely could be associated with an ethnic movement, as I have defined it, or even with Warren's type of activism, prevailed in the Northern Highland as well. Once more my informants were definite in their answer that no Maya movement existed on the national, regional or even the local level. Numerous groups or free-standing organizations were in operation, but, first, their foci were narrowly oriented on ethno-neutral topics related to, say, 'development', 'education', and 'women matters'; second, they did not cooperate or coordinate their efforts in any way; and, third, they made no effort to mobilize the members of the Maya constituencies. Eusebio Tzunum, the mayor of Sta. Cruz del Quiché, was the only one who reflected upon the absence of an ethnic movement in Guatemala. In his view, the reason was the absence of prominent Maya leaders supported by a broadly based movement. Clearly, in his view, neither Rigoberta Menchú nor the mayor of

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Quetzaltenango did have the required appeal.

With no ethnicity-oriented organizations of their own, with weak and ethno-neutral peasant unions, and ignored in the programs of the traditional political parties, as in Peru, the Maya population of Guatemala, in spite of its numerical majority, has no representation *qua* ethnic actor and, hence, no influence on either the national or the regional decisions. As my informants frequently would tell me, even an indigenous heading a public office, would have negligible influence due to the centralization and the tight-fisted control of the budgets in the periphery by the authorities in Guatemala City. Ramos (2002) discusses the dilemma. The mayor of the municipio of Concepción, Leonardo Escalante, referred to himself jokingly as a 'housekeeper' not as a politician.

4. Reflections

Warren (1998) comments extensively on the views of the cultural activists, sometimes with long excerpts from and commentaries to their public statements. In later papers she refers repeatedly and prominently to the Guatemalan indigenous movement (Warren 2002; Warren and Jackson 2002). And so does Yashar (1997, 1998). Nowhere, however, do any of them address the apparatus, popular support, strategies and practices, which must be present to put the stated visions into effect and translate the intellectual effort into a political force. Then, how do the activists intend to inform, educate, and mobilize the *non*-intellectual part of the Maya population - the overwhelming majority - to get support for their visions? The result of my fieldwork makes clear - they don't. The Maya cultural activism Warren discusses was unknown all over the very heartland of its perceived constituency; the few who had heard about it, found its activities irrelevant to the situation of the rural indigenous people.

One might well address this enigma as a matter of linguistic; what Warren 1998) and Yashar (1997, 1998) report upon and call an 'indigenous movement' is not a social (or ethnic) movement in the conventional meaning. Foweraker (1995: 4) points to that

> A wide variety of disparate social phenomena have suddenly been certified by the new social movement label. In some accounts it appears that folk dancers, basket weavers and virtually any form of social or economic life may qualify. But not everything that moves is a social movement. […] In contemporary Latin America a large proportion of its populations do not enjoy the minimum material and social conditions for social movement activity, living as they do in physical penury, social deprivation and fear. But even where people have begun to come

together in neighborhood associations or Catholic base communities they are not necessarily engaged in social movement activity. [...] The social movement itself must exhibit a sense of collective purpose and the kind of political objectives (construed broadly) which require interaction with other actors, very often State actors; and, unlike interest groups or NGOs, it must also *mobilize* (italics by Foweraker) its supporters in pursuit of its goals.

The cultural activists neither mobilize among those they pretend to speak on behalf of, nor do they exhibit a collective purpose. Referring to Melucci's (1989: 38) statement that "among my criteria for defining a social movement is the extent to which its actions challenge or break the limits of [society's] social relations", one may ask to which degree the Maya activism meets that criterion. A paper by Cujtí Cuxil (2002), discusses the negotiations between self-appointed representatives of the Maya from a number of cultural activist organizations and the Department of Education on educational reforms agreed upon in the Peace Accords. It exemplifies that while the activists do not communicate with the common Maya, they do negotiate with the ladino government, but within the premises of the ladino State[109] and without a Maya mandate. Referring to Melucci's criterion, nothing in Warren's (1998) book invites to believe that the cultural activists represent a challenge to the State.

However, instead of focusing on the wrongful use of the term 'movement' a more illuminating interpretation is at stake. I will argue that the Guatemalan cultural activism represent a very different kind of ethnic mobilization than those observed in Peru and Ecuador, exemplifying the 'typology of movements' I hinted to in chapter I as a possible outcome of a cross-country study of this kind. And I will argue that it reflects and comes about due to the high degree of fragmentation in the Maya population that I repeatedly was informed about during my fieldwork and also Yashar (1997: 5) acknowledges.

My fieldwork verified that the urban centers of the Highland is characterized by a high presence of organizational capital in the form of numerous Maya organizations, societies, associations and councils, some of them undoubtedly representing the cultural activists. But they are all small, sectarian, intensely independent, each defending its own 'turf', and without an organizational apparatus, political influence, or coordination, and,

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[109] Cujtí Cuxil was one of the most articulate of the cultural activists and widely quoted and analyzed by Warren (1998). Many of my indigenous informants meant that he lost his creditability when he accepted the position as Vice-Minister of Education in Alfonso Portillo's government (1999-2003).

most important, without an emphasis on grassroots work in the countryside or any of the other strategies so successfully used by the ethnic movement in Ecuador. They are one more sign of the profound fragmentation of the Maya population.

This situation is in part historically conditioned. Following the 1985 Constitution and during the rule of the civilian government under Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo (1986-90), civil society started slowly to organize. However as the liberalization began to be felt from the late 1980s and early 1990s onward, the activities mushroomed - in the Highland particularly among the Maya. When I did the fieldwork for my M.A. thesis in 1999 in Quetzaltenango (Steinert 1999), I was shown data by Sr. Carlos Villagran, *Auditor de la Municipalidad*, one of my informants at the time and a close co-worker of the mayor, Sr. Rigoberto Quemé. The information made clear that the authorities, as of end of 1992, had registered formally more than 80 'permanent' civil society associations - Maya, mestizo or mixed, but (according to Villagran) mostly Maya. As their number continued to increase rapidly, the municipality had given up further registration, not meaning that every one had been registered before that time. Another of my informants at the time, Sr. Ulises Quijiuix, head of *Sociedad El Adelanto*, the oldest cultural Maya association in Quetzaltenango, confirmed Villagran's information. These activist bodies would consist of a nucleus of a few activists, had been able to establish a constituency of kind around themselves, and who maintained their activities by donations from abroad driven by the peace process. They were a typical urban phenomenon. As my informant, Luis Alberto Prieto, claimed and my fieldwork verified, the present Maya civil society activities, notably the cultural activists, have continued that mode of operation.

Using data from the municipio of Aguacatán of the Department of Huehuetenango, both the high degree of organizing among Mayas in the Highland and the fragmentation can be exemplified. A survey was in progress when I arrived, implying that the local municipal staff had data at hand and was better informed than in other places I visited (MdeA 2002). The municipio of Aguacatán is quite typical for the cultural, linguistic and ethno-tribal diversity of the Guatemalan Highland. In addition to ladinos, who sum to roughly 10 percent of the population, there are four ethnic groups: K'ichés (33.6 percent), Chalchitecos (31.2), Awakatekos (17.3), and Mames (7.6), representing three distinct linguistic families, with Chalchitecos and Awakatekos speaking the same native language. Each indigenous group has its own ethnic identity and cultural references. The

municipio has an area of 300 km² and a population of 45,500 persons of which 8,200 lived in the urban center, reflecting the high population density of Guatemala. The urban center of Aguacatán had a rich flora of ethno-neutral organizational activities. It had 29 civil society organizations, which were spread on 'culture' (3 organizations), 'economy/commerce' (5), 'environment' (1), 'development' (8), 'women matters' (3), 'social help' (1), 'organization' (1), 'education' (5), and 'youth' (2). These numbers tell about a socially involved population. The political arena is equally informative. In the last national election of 1999, the municipal electorate followed the general trend in Guatemala and gave half their votes to the presidential candidate, Alfonso Portillo, put forward by the party of retired general and ex-dictator Ríos Montt, FRG. Votes were spread on all the 12 national parties. In the municipal election, the votes were split roughly equally among four lists belonging to two local independents in addition to FRG and PAN. The numbers report on a significant absence of shared views, reflecting the same non-committal attitude to the ethnic identity as the aforementioned organizational activities, in spite of an ethnically aware population of 90 percent Maya.

How are the consequences of the phenomenon, observed in Cabricán, that the social and political organizing may not be so much be decided based on the premises of the community members but on external organizations? This may happen when the heterogeneity and rivalries among the Maya peoples become significant and cooperation across ethno-tribal boundaries within the community is seriously hampered. Then the individual may prefer to 'unite' with 'someone' outside his habitat. In the process he will sacrifice his right to influence the agenda, i.e., he may be mobilized but by 'remote control'. Working with and serving an indigenous community on premises, which have not originated among its members, may not necessarily be in conflict with the idea of grassroots activism, but it is doubtful whether outside initiatives will conform to the values of the constituency or strengthen the integrity and coherence of the community. Another likely effect is that non-ethnic topics will dominate the agenda, as I observed.

The contradictory situation in the rural and semi-urban Guatemala is that the indigenous person is characterized by high ethnic awareness and, simultaneously, a high *de*-ethnicized type of organizing, as in the cases of Aguacatán and Cabricán. Comparing with Ecuador, the comparable population is also ethnically highly aware, but if he or she is organizationally active, the effort is closely associated with the person's ethnicity and,

very likely, absorbed by the ethnic movement.

Another factor, in addition to the fragmentation among the Maya, may structure how the cultural activists work. Warren (1998: 68) points to a rationale of the Maya activists that is very different from that which guided the ethnic leaders I interacted with in Peru and Ecuador. Their motive was to improve the lot of their fellow men while helping to strengthen their ethnic identity. Warren explains the Maya cultural activism as the promotion of what she calls 'pan-Maya activism' by Maya 'public intellectuals' (ibid: 3). With the former term is to be understood ideas, which are meant to overarch the cleavages among the many Maya peoples[110]. About the latter, Warren (1998: 68) states:

> The movement is especially attuned to the dilemma facing 'post-peasants' who have managed to *superarse*, to get ahead, as many agrarian parents wish for their children. In prizing Maya culture, the movement has given educated Mayas a continuing stake in the future of their home communities. With its emphasis on community councils, the movement seeks to include those for whom agrarian life remains central. […] Thus, these ethnic 'post-peasants' continue to reaffirm religious meaning and cultural distinctiveness through an idiom that reflects their Maya-agrarian roots[111].

This may explain why the Maya cultural activists are not talking *to* or *with* the regular Maya peasant, as my fieldwork made clear; they are talking with each other, and being upward mobile they might be prone to relate to the ladino State (see Cujtí Cuxil 2002) or use the ladino press as their medium as Warren (1998) establishes. This points to a profound difference between the situations of the educated indigenous activist in Ecuador and in Guatemala. My informants in Ecuador repeatedly pointed out that those who left their indigenous community changed; consequently, they were not any longer one of 'us'; they were discarded as ethnic persons by those who stayed behind. In Guatemala, following Warren, those who have left want it both ways - control the activist agenda *and* represent the worldview of the 'we'. My field data report that none of the 'we' listens.

What Warren (1998) and Yashar (1997, 1998) refer to as an 'indigenous movement' and do not distinguish from the Ecuadorian category of mobilization with its all-out emphasis on the grassroots, is in fact a large number of semi-isolated 'administrative'

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[110] Warren (1998: 68) states: "With its blend of tradition and novelty, pan-Mayanism offers a language for common identification in the face of fragmentation and dislocation, designs for transcommunity affiliation, and non-manual job opportunities."

[111] In a footnote, Warren points to that the religious revitalization has been fraught with tensions, reflecting the diversity of theologists and organizational interests in Guatemala.

bodies, without a mandate from those they claim to represent and without either a rural or an urban following, i.e., the totality is neither an ethno-rural nor a socio-urban movement[112]. Combined, these individual units function as a top-down uncoordinated effort where each of its numerous parts has established its own mandate, appointed its own 'constituency', being accountable to no one in particular. At best, it may serve as a *pre-movement* if they compose the 'social networks', the 'recruitment networks' or the 'micro-mobilization contexts' that provide the social and cognitive preconditions for movement emergence (Foweraker 1995: 39). Quoting Touraine (1988: 11), "social movements only occur if actors can acknowledge and assert themselves as producers rather than consumers of social situations". Their co-optive usefulness for the ladino State aside, five years after Warren published her 1998 study, the cultural activists are still not felt outside their urban enclaves by them they claim to represent - the rural population that represents 80 percent of the Maya.

This observation is not a judgment on whether the Maya benefit from the cultural activism Warren reports upon. However, the question should be asked. The proposal of amending the 1985 Constitution in the plebiscite of 1999, was widely expected to be accepted, and the resulting '*no*' was seen as a setback for both the Maya and the liberalization process in Guatemala. Selverston-Scher (2001: 30) proposes that the success of an ethnic movement (referring to the Ecuadorian one) must be assessed by "its popularity and its ability to mobilize". On this criterion alone, the high abstention of 82 percent in the indigenous population may be seen as a sign of the failure of the Maya cultural activists to disseminate their views, their inability to relate to the indigenous grassroots, and, ultimately, to raise interest for their message in the Maya population (but see Warren 2002).

Building on Warren's (1998) analysis and the articles of Maya contributors to Fischer and McKenna Brown (1996), one notes that the discourse offered by the Maya activists are eloquent, refined, and profound in the structure and the arguments - as one would expect given the educational background of those being quoted. But it is doubtful whether a common rural Maya would benefit. What I experienced in my interviews with ethnic Ecuadorian leaders was a down-to-earth form that any peasant could identify with.

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[112] An urban social movement may be said to draw support from a highly differentiated class structure which include the classical working class, street vendors, casual labor, small scale (familial) enterprise, informal petty bourgeoisie and the informal service sector (Pansters 1986).

This difference may reflect that the discourse of the leaders had matured among and by the ethno-rural people themselves. In the case of Guatemala it is the domain of the public intellectuals. Another observation is that a study of these texts discloses broad similarities between elements of the discourse of the Maya activists - the Maya particulars aside - and what was brought up in my conversations with leaders of the ethnic movement in Ecuador. This is not surprising. The symbols being used in the ethnic discourses in the three countries, both in the Highlands and the Amazon Lowland, are to a large degree universal. Their main difference is in the context in which they are presented.

Yashar (1998: 26) refers to three bodies as the proof and the backbone of the existence of an 'indigenous movement' in Guatemala, putting it on par with the movements in Ecuador and Bolivia. Two of them are CONIC and COMG. However, CONIC (*Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina*), serves - as its name states - both Maya and non-Maya peasants, with a focus primarily on acquisition of land by legal or illegal ways (land occupation). I inquired with my informants in the Department of Quetzaltenango about it. All of them dismissed CONIC as relevant to my topic, pointing out its ethno-neutral stand and its emphasis on acquiring land for land-poor peasants of both categories. I was given the impression that it was not very active in the central Highland. COMG (*Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala*) is a loosely-based 'Maya culturist' council without an organizational base (as its name indicates), and a constituency that reflects the fragmentation among the Mayas[113]. Together with four other umbrella groups - one of them being another 'culturist stronghold', ALMG (*Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala*)[114] - it constitutes COPMAGUA (*Coordinadora De Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala*). It is not clear why CONIC and COMG have been assigned the role as 'pillars' of the claimed Guatemalan movement. Yashar (1997, 1998) gives no explanations. The third 'pillar' Yashar refers to, Majawil Q'ij, I was not able to find information on. Yashar (1998: 26) dates the start of the 'movement' to a meeting[115] arranged in 1991, meaning that, eventually, it should have emerged from

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[113] Cujtí Cuxil (2002), referred to above, mentions COMG.

[114] ALMG coordinates the political, linguistic and cultural actions of the Maya communities with the governmental Ministries, as well as entities which are autonomous and decentralized from the State and the institutions to which they relate (MdeA 2002: 2).

[115] 'Second Continental Meeting of Indigenous and Popular Resistance', which took place in Guatemala in 1991. Yashar refers to Bastos and Camus (1993, 1995) and Smith (1990c) - none of them addressing the subject.

nothing to prominence in 5-6 years (or less). The Ecuadorian ethnic movement, with which she puts it on par with, spent more than 30 years to get where it is today - and under a 'benign' political regime.

One may ask why there is no indigenous mobilization in Guatemala. One obvious factor is that the State has not allowed any political openings, contrary to the situation in Ecuador. That is hardly surprising given the oppressive regime that ruled during the internal war. The unwillingness by different Guatemalan governments to comply with the compromises of the 1996 Peace Accords shows that the fundamental structure and objectives of the State have not changed, even though the effects of a political liberalization are felt. A second factor, which then comes to the forefront, is the heterogeneity or diversity among the Maya peoples and the lack of cooperation among them. One may speculate why not a similar negative situation governs among the many native peoples in the Amazon Lowland, which have established organizations, though, far more successfully in Ecuador than in Peru. I will propose that the main reasons are, first, that each native people (tribe) lives within its own territory, and, second, the nature of the threats from the internal colonialization that initiated the organizing was direct and easily understood (Macdonald 2002: 86-90; pers. com.). In Guatemala's Highland, on the other hand, the different peoples' habitat overlap, the social environment is far more complex, and the population density is distinctly higher, possibly creating and maintaining insurmountable barriers between the many different ethno-social units.

The nature of the political regime of Guatemala put this country apart in comparison with Peru and Ecuador. I have categorized the regimes of these countries as undemocratic authoritarian oligarchies that have created a 'Potemkin democracy' devoid of influencing and representative democratic qualities for the ethno-rural population. However, these regimes manifest themselves differently. While all three countries have undergone liberalization and Peru and Ecuador may continue that trend, the situation may warn that in Guatemala it has stopped or may even be backtracking under the Portillo government. My data listed above are not extensive enough to draw conclusions. In both Ecuador and Guatemala, the military plays an important political role, more so in the latter country where the government and army traditionally have been closely intertwined. The strong position of the Guatemalan military has been discussed above and its increasing influence under president Portillo is not in doubt. The upper echelon of officers in the army today

are those, who as low- or middle-level officers, carried out the army's campaigns in the Highland in the 1980s. Recent history shows that both countries are politically unstable, but while Ecuador has a tradition to let this be reflected in a wobbling economy, Guatemala is quick to attack civil society. This precarious situation is felt. The civil society of Guatemala is the jitteriest of those of this study. The unrestrained brutality of the Guatemalan ladino State during the internal war and the price paid by thousands of Maya families are not forgotten by the indigenous population. The atrocities of the Guatemalan army during the internal war left massacres and clandestine cemeteries in the hundreds in its trail, still being discovered, and the effects were felt everywhere in the Highland where rural Maya people lived. This was a sensitive topic I only hesitantly brought up with my Maya informants, but my impression was that while the liberalization does not prohibit enlivening and extending civil society, the memories of the past discourage those involved to make it forceful. Granting that I read the civil society correctly, Guatemala may be an example that being labeled 'democratic' counts for very little for those who will pay dearly if the true nature of the governing political regime is being misjudged. That it is the same men, who are in charge in Guatemala today as during the 'dirty' years, surely, will not bolster the trust in labels.

CHAPTER VI.
ANALYSIS

The research question, which guided this study, was two-fold, within the overarching task of comparing the conditions of ethnic mobilizations in Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala. The first part of the question asked which factors constrain or facilitate the construction of an awareness of ethnicity among members of ethnic communities. The second part asked which strategies are being used by the ethnic community to meet the cultural and political aspirations of its members.

Construction of ethnic awareness

This study has identified two kinds of circumstances under which ethnic consciousness is being constructed. One is the 'traditional' (essentialist) community; the other is in the public arena of confrontations with the outer society, most often the State, where new premises are being identified and formulated. They were discussed in chapter 2 and 4, respectively. The principal difference between them is in the effects of the awareness the ethnic actor gains about the outer society.

The 'traditional' community: The pre-Anderson (1983) way of interpreting ethnicity fell - and frequently still does - within the tradition of understanding ethnicity as rising out of a mostly culturally dominated context. Versions of this would be, say, the interpretation of Redfield (1941, 1962) with his concept of 'folk societies', and the approach taken by Watanabe (1992) in his fine study of the importance of myths in the daily life of a Mam community in the Guatemalan Highland. In that alley is also my description of what I called the 'Rousseauian' identity, referring to certain aspects of life in the Asháninka community of San Miguel (see chapter II). In these examples, the community is seen - and sees itself - as an enclave semi-isolated from the surrounding society, where changes to the social order is assumed to be slow or of little relevance. With a narrow analytical focus, such choices may be acceptable, but with a broader perspective, given the impact of a modern fast-changing society, they are misguided. The close association between the concept of ethnicity and culture is problematic also due to the vagueness of 'culture' itself (Palumbo-Liu 1997: 3). The term may be used within its narrow 'folkloric' meaning, i.e., referring only to the artful but static manifestations of human creativity, in which case the association misses its point, or in its broader version

(Cohen 1985; see footnote in chapter II), in which case it is too general to offer analytical precision. The folkloric version is how domestic ethnic cultures frequently are presented by the mestizo societies in which they reside; the broad version may allow for a more complex representation, but does not identify the social forces that constitute the 'cultural' manifestations and therefore becomes uninformative.

In the 'traditional' Asháninka community of San Miguel, ethnic awareness grows out of the interaction between the person, his community and the material environment. The ethnic person is someone who relates in certain ways to his *material* environment (including economic factors, widely interpreted) that structures and dominates the *social* order of the community of that person. This, together with the person-to-person and person-to-community interactions, and the overarching *symbolic* images being produced, brings about the sense of commonality that lies at the heart of his distinctiveness. The combination of these, what I have referred to as *influences* - material, social and symbolic - imprints itself upon each community and creates its particular characteristics. This means that the term 'ethnicity' refers to a range of possible life forms within bounds set by these mechanisms.

As argued in chapter II in the discussion of life in San Miguel, the community is the arena in which the ethnic person acquires his most fundamental experience of social life outside the confines of the home. Here he learns the meaning of kinship and the practices of how to be ethnically social by perceiving the boundaries of the community up against the outer society. Learning to be a member of an ethnic community, however, does not mean to adapt to a certain body of rules or conform to a set of meanings; it implies to acquire the *symbols* which will equip the person to behave socially. Paraphrasing Cohen, people's experience and understanding of their communal environment - in view of my topic, their ethnicity - resides in their orientation to its symbolism (1985: 16). However, contrary to the Ecuadorian case where the ethnic population interacts forcefully with the other society individually and through their organizations, more in the Highland than in the Amazon Lowland, Peru's native mobilization has not matured to the level where the conscious-raising process of its constituents has transcended the boundary of the 'traditional' native community. As pointed out in chapter I, to be ethnic means to have an Other to define oneself against, implying that the Other must be perceived at some meaningful level. The members of San Miguel suffer the impact and are aware of the

proximity of the other society, but they have neither the concepts (State, nation-state, society, national policies, etc.) nor are they familiar with a vocabulary which would make them comprehend the Other[116]. In their doubly marginalized situation, they are blocking out the externally imposed impact and, in effect, are making themselves even more vulnerable by not being able to adapt or develop countermeasures, exemplified by the case studies in chapter II (part 3). In spite of the fact that the ongoing colonialization of their life-world has gone very far indeed, using Habermas' (1987) phrase, the community members do not include, interpret or symbolize the outer society as part of their worldview. Instead they are holding on to a familiar outlook that may have served their ancestors well. But the conceptual resources which follow from that narrow viewpoint will not suffice against the onslaught of today's forces. The Peruvian natives are in a situation where they must recognize and adjust to the larger environment - or perish.

The material, social and symbolic influences that interact to construct the 'ethnic person' - referring to the ethnic community as well, since the 'person' is its individualized representation - points to crucial aspects, which often are not identified in the discussions on ethnicity. Addressing the first part of my research question, applying these 'elements of influence', one can appreciate the factors that constrain and facilitate the construction of an ethnic awareness. Putting the factors implicit in the description of the 'Rousseauian' identity up against those, which are imbedded in the concept of the 'poverty trap' (both described in chapter II and extended upon in the appendices), the constructive and the destructive factors stand out when each is understood in its particular context. The internal *material* influences on the community, most notably manifested by the relationship to the land, but which transcends into the spiritual reverence of Mother Nature, are challenged by the competition over land with the outside world, the decline in the availability of uncultivated no-man's land (*el monte*), and the effects of economic exploitation to which the ethno-rural population is subject (see appendix C and D) within ethnically polarized and stratified societies (see appendix A). The internal *social* influences on the community, and the rich culture creating as well as being created by the commonality that grow out of these, compete with the effects of individualization,

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[116] Kuhn (1957) mentions that as soon as Marie Curie published her paper reporting on the discovery of radioactivity, leading researchers rushed to their laboratories and found shades on their photographic films from experiments similar to hers. In lack of a concept to explain it by, they had written it off as caused by experimental errors.

commercialization and urbanization encroaching upon the community. And the reverence for the communal *symbolic* values rooted in the traditions and customs of the community - explained, in part, by the importance given to the ancestral past of the community - are in conflict with the symbols of the outer society, which seep in through mass media and the increasing degree of interactions between these two civilizations of very different worldviews and values. The influences on each side of the divide are closely intertwined, feeding upon and enforcing each other. A social order, however, and less so when it is in transition, cannot fully be described by a small set of influences as I schematically have done here. It may be more correct, but less precise, to state that these factors manifest underlying currents of a more complex nature, ultimately, modernity imposed in a senseless way (referred to as internal colonialization in appendix C). I am not claiming that 'community' and 'modernity' are irreconcilable, but that the values of the communal lifeworld are being discarded out of hand in favor of those of its dominant counterpart.

It is worthwhile to compare the understanding among the members of the highly ethnically conscious San Miguel of their ethnicity and their marginalized situation, with how the equally ethnically conscious but mobilized constituents of the ethnic movement in Ecuador understand theirs. The members of San Miguel live in the tension between the 'Rousseauian' values and the poverty trap. Given their limited knowledge of and experience with the outer world, they explained the misery due to the latter in no more complex terms than the effect of the low payment they received for their agro-products from the *colono* traders. Not surprisingly, at times they contemplated quietly and individually an exodus into the unknown that would mean an end to the only kind of life they know and want. That 'solution' relays an impression of fatalism and hopelessness - a reflection of their understanding of their ethnic community as being both different and excluded from the other society, but without socio-political overtones. A similar tension is present in Ecuador, but the communities' familiarity with the dominant society, both in the Highland and Amazon Lowland - interpreted and conceptualized under conditions I will discuss next - and therefore with an ability to put names to the causes behind their situation *within* the premises of their matured ethnic worldview, manifest itself, on the one hand, in a rapidly increasing out-migration, and, on the other, in an concerted effort to challenge the premises of the dominant society.

Out-migration, however, was perceived very differently in the two environments,

reflecting the extent to which the potential migrant linked his ethnicity to the wider society. In San Miguel it was seen as the end of the world as the person knew it. In Ecuador - my experiences on this topic are limited to the Highland - it was seen as a drastic but tolerable solution to a pressing but manageable problem. The potential migrant would come back, or so he thinks, and pick up where he had left, but with more resources and therefore better opportunities. What is noteworthy, schematically described, is that the Asháninka lets himself be overwhelmed by the invading outer society, while the other goes with the flow, but consciously is trying to dig out a new niche for himself in a process he is in a better position to understand and, therefore, manage - and, ultimately, influence. An example of the latter, taken from the Ecuadorian Andes, is Kyle's (2000) description on how local indigenous traders go one step further, adapting to a global market and becoming part-time transnational commuters.

The politicized ethnicity: Only in one country of the three I studied, i.e., Ecuador, does there exist an ethnic movement, which operates on the national stage and has the necessary mass support and political resources to confront constructively its opponents, primarily the State. In Peru, the ethnic mobilization is limited to the native organizations of the Amazon Lowland. While the latter undoubtedly has ambitions to play a national role, it has too few resources to make itself felt outside its base region, and even here its influence is very limited. As chapter V argued, no trace of an ethno-political mass mobilization was found in Guatemala, but answers to the 'why-not', as I showed in chapter V, add important information to my research objective. Because of the large variety of experiences in countries with ethnic mobilizations, resulting from the decentralized nature of any ethnic movement whose subordinate components have self-rule and are expected to take initiatives, some general reflections can be made.

When a population group mobilizes, involves itself in the political battle, gains strength, and reaches an organizational level from which it is able to confront the outer society, the awareness and perceptions of its members are sharpened, informing its actions, further facilitating that process. This means that both material and ideological factors are relevant to social mobilizations; if not, it would be impossible to explain why certain causes and not others become issues or the reason behind the passion among the actors (Cohen and Arato 1992). This is particularly obvious in the case of ethnicity, which is both an existential platform for its members in terms of a collective identity and

a structural variable in terms of resources. That ethnic awareness is being constructed during the confrontations taking place in the public arena - by politicizing the followers of the ethnic movement through a reinterpretation of their ethno-ideological worldview - is well demonstrated in the Ecuadorian case. One example could be the idea-based transition from class-based *campesinismo* to ethnicity-based *indianismo* during the 1970s, described by Pallares (2002) and reflected upon by a couple of my interviewees, who had lived through that phase as political activists. Another example is the campaign of the early 1980s to be shown *respeto* (respect) as an Indian by the mestizo environment, whose outcome I reflected upon in the case of Cañar in chapter IV.

Both examples, and more could be added (Selverston-Scher 2001), demonstrate, first, that a rising number have joined in the formulation of a conceptually increasingly more complex argument, linked with a richer articulated understanding among the individuals themselves of what it means to be an ethnic person. Given how thoroughly cowed the Ecuadorian Indian was for only 20-30 years ago, according to my informants, a mass-based campaign, say, like the call for *respeto*, could not have succeeded if not a large and increasing number had reinterpreted whom they were, as individuals and as members of a group, and on that platform had acquired the understanding and the integrity to challenge dismissive treatment where it would be most obvious - against them personally. Second, the Ecuadorian example shows that principled positions are not pre-existing unknowns to be excavated by a handful of farsighted helmsmen. They grow out of and get distilled - that process being as much the effect as the cause of the growing ethnic awareness - in the nitty-gritty, confusing and sometimes contradictory maneuverings of the process of political activism itself, propelled by the involvement of the many. And, third, certain ethnic core values and the practice in which they are rooted must exist, serving as a continuous reference and a growth nucleus for the maturing ethno-ideology. In a comparison between this kind of ethnic construction and that of the 'traditional' community discussed above, what is new is the richer ethnic *awareness*, the personal and social insight that is gained, and the realization that these two combined represent political power - not the ethno-ideological core substance itself.

This process points to differences between social and ethnic movements, indicating that one has to distinguish clearly between them, as argued in chapter I. Cohen and Arato (1992: 557) reject the interpretation that social movements develop in stages, where they

create their identity in the first and focus on strategic action in the next. Foweraker (1995) supports that view, when he states, referring to social movements, that "identity cannot simply be conceived as a precondition of strategic action, because the processes of organization and strategic choice contribute crucially to construct and shape this identity" (1995: 22). However, without being specific about it, these authors allude to a movement with a predominantly urbanized constituency with a fair knowledge about the structure they challenge, which also is urbanized. I argued in chapter I, first, that an ethnic mobilization represents a *rural-based* protest against an *urban-based* power structure, and that they are situated in countries where 'rural-versus-urban' represents a defining national cleavage where the rural population historically has been given the subservient role as a source of cheap labor and foodstuffs (on the Andean countries, see Gelles 2002: 243). And, second, that the *ethnic* identity is a significant characteristic - to the ethnic person it takes on an existential importance - more profound than what these authors have in mind with their use of the term identity. Ethnic identity in its rudimentary form does exist already in the pre-politicized stage of its constituents - in what Brass (1991: 16) refers to as ethnic (pre-community) groups. In conclusion: ethnic identity exists before *and* is created during the ethno-political mobilizing process.

The awareness of the importance of the basic institutions as pillars in upholding the ethnic civilization - the family (in Quechua: *ayllu*), the community (*ayllu llakta*), the collective work (*minka*), agreements (*yuyarinakuy*), and the Nature (*pacha mama*) - is not less developed among the natives of the Peruvian Amazon than among the ethno-politicized peoples of the Highland and Amazon Lowland of Ecuador. What differs is the degree of coexistence the community members have had with the dominant society and, more important, the experiences they have drawn and the initiatives they were able to take within the political space they created. One example is that when the agricultural communities (*communas*) were established in Ecuador in the 1950s and 1960s - a State initiative, which especially affected the indigenous population - the communities started local and regional organizations to counter basic weaknesses inherent in the implementation of the law at the State level. Ultimately, these would become building blocks in the organizational structure of the ethnic movement (Selverston-Scher 2001). Another example is mentioned in chapter IV, i.e., the involvement of indigenous leaders in the implementation of the agrarian reform in Ecuador. While this law did not intend to

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promote organizing among the indigenous population, the willingness to cooperate, even narrowly, indicates that the Ecuadorian State has been less excluding at times than the Peruvian and Guatemalan ones. For its part, the indigenous population very competently exploited the small openings it was offered, wielded tools to deal with the specific challenges from the State, the political system, and the governing practices, and in the process gained insight and redefined its role. On the practical side, this process resulted in an expansion and linking together of the isolated cells of organizations, mentioned above, into a structure of local, regional, and, ultimately, national representative bodies, whose purpose became tools in mobilizing the common members of the ethnic communities - in the form seen today. An overarching organization, ECUARUNARI, a regional organization in the Andes and co-founder of CONAIE, became operative as early as in the 1970s. A somewhat similar process, but on different criteria, was seen in the Amazon Lowland. On the ideological side, political alliances and cooperation with class-based mestizo bodies were established, facilitating administrative and organizational practices, and the development of political visions and priorities through debates on themes such as ethnic self-awareness (*indianismo*) and class struggle (*campesinismo*) in particular. In due time, the former view took preference over the latter and led to a break with the previous ideological partners. In the same time period, the Peruvian movement, operating in a very different and far more constrained political climate, was not able to either gain experiences or establish a coherent organizational structure. And the repressive political climate that dominated in Guatemala during the internal war, combined with the ingrained fear of the revolting Indian in the ladino psycho, offered no openings for the Maya population to organize from bottom up.

The initial, but small gains in the 1950s and '60s in Ecuador were consolidated and led to further progress. In 1988, CONAIE was officially recognized as a representative of the ethnic peoples of Ecuador. Later followed eye-catching initiatives like the Uprising of 1990 and the March on Quito in 1992. In parallel, less spectacularly, but more important for my topic and the movement itself, was the conscious-raising activity going on in hundreds of communities across the country. It would lead to the next great leap forward when the imaginative strategy of promoting indigenous candidates for elected offices.

Ethnic Strategies

In this section I will sum up the results of the other half of my research question that addresses the strategies being used by the ethnic community to meet the cultural and political aspirations of its members. My field data indicate that while the mobilization efforts in the different countries are up against a variety of practical obstacles, the activists apply only a limited set of basic strategies. This scheme is used by the ethnic activists of the different countries with varied degree of competence and focus.

Grassroots mobilization: Not unexpectedly, the emphasis put on grassroots work by ethnic activists may stand out as being the main identifier of the degree of success or failure of the different country efforts in meeting their aspirations. Referring to Foweraker's (1995: 4) statement that a social (and then also an ethnic) movement must "*mobilize* its supporters in pursuit of its goals", the degree of grassroots efforts may well be the litmus test of what should and should not be rated as a social mobilization. Without a continuous two-ways communication and cooperation between the leaders and the members, a social movement will not be able to exhibit a sense of collective purpose and formulate the kind of political objectives, which grow out of the internal debate. Nor will it be able to make its followers adhere to a politically applicable collection of symbols - what I refer to as the basis of a politicized ethno-ideology - and, hence, will fail to construct a common political identity. And if that stage of ethno-political maturity is not reached, the next stage - interactions with other political actors - will not follow.

The task of mobilizing in an environment with widespread illiteracy and massive socio-economic deficits, as in the countries of this study, implies more than promoting topics, distributing information, and aligning opinions. It means to establish an epistemological base - in most cases from scratch - to make the followers able to form opinions by themselves. Mobilization under these conditions has to include a strong element of basic informal education about the larger society. That point is particularly important when one refers to constituents of dispersed settlements in the Amazon Lowland. This kind of grassroots work was aggressively pursued by the ethnic movement in Ecuador, probably more efficiently in the Highland than in the Amazon Lowland for logistic reasons. It was carried out in the form of regularly scheduled workshops, discussion groups, and improvised types of inter- and intra-communal meetings. Nothing of this educational effort took place in either Peru or Guatemala. Warren mentions that

the Maya activists did present their views in the communities. But while the meetings of Maya activists - referred to by Warren (1998) and contributors to Fischer and McKenna Brown's book (see also Schele and Grube 1996) - in principle, were open to everyone interested, in practice, they catered through their content to privileged, educated Mayas with special interests, were organized infrequently, and were not easily accessible by the geographically dispersed rural population of few intellectual and material resources.

Pallares (2002) does not emphasize - but my informants did - that the successful rise of ethnic mobilization in Ecuador was not primarily about exploiting or creating opportunities and ensuring that 'correct' positions were identified and reached more often than not. The successes of the movement in the past did not hinge upon the decisions of a few far-sighted leaders. Instead, each crucial decision along the way was molded in a process where a large part of the movement's constituency was involved through tedious and time-consuming grassroots work. The crucial point is not that the ethnic activists in Peru and Guatemala do this part less well - the point is that they do not do it at all. Grassroots mobilization is not a strategy of ethnic mobilization in these countries. In Peru, it may be explained by lack of resources and difficult infrastructure; in Guatemala it may indicate flawed priorities because the Highland offers less of Peru's physical obstacles and their most prominent ideologist have expressed ambitious visions for the general Maya population (Cojtí Cuxil 1996). Hence, given the importance of grassroots work, it is not so much the results of the successful Ecuadorian movement, but the process of getting to them that should have our attention. Only from that position is it possible to appreciate the political potential of its spectacular results.

Ethno-ideology: Closely connected to the educational aspects of the grassroots mobilization is the strategy of developing and keeping control of the discourse by which the movement presents itself and its demands, reflecting how it understands itself and wants to be understood by the outer society. It may be correct to say that the degree of consciousness the prevailing ethno-ideology represents, reflects the level and maturity of the ongoing grassroots activity. The ethnic people's understanding of their ethnicity in its most 'traditional' version - constructed in a setting without any overt influence by the outer society - was experienced in the Asháninka communities in the Central Jungle of the Peruvian Amazon. Their ethnicity was taken for granted by the members and to them it had always been there; it just *was*. Their immediate social and material world was the

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reference point of their ethnic universe, whose presence was everywhere in the form of symbols, behavior, customs, artifacts and markers for 'everyone' to see without a need of being explained. This world they related to with reverence and a vivid linguistic imagery.

However, when they addressed the premises of the outer world, their speech did not relate to their ethnic worldview. They became like a Northerner explaining a new electronic gimmick he is trying to understand from the barren language of the manual. Practical tasks imported into their world, whatever their importance, like organizing bilingual education or land titling, were talked about as soulless technical matters - as alien tasks, which just had to be done without a need for reflections. At the other extreme was the politically mature worldview of the representatives of the ethnic movement in Ecuador, which seamlessly merged the values of the basic ethnic worldview with the practicalities on the interface with the outer society. The discourse of the ethnic populations of the Ecuadorian Highland and the two countries' Amazon Lowland built on the same core values, but the Ecuadorian ones was marked by insightful perceptions about the other society and the conscious use of powerful images. This was particularly well exemplified in my interviews, among them, in the review by UPCCC's Duj in Cañar on how the ethno-based outlook of *indianismo* gained strength and ultimately replaced that of the class-based *campesinismo*, and the description by OPIP's Miriam Guevara in Puyo of the life qualities of the native communities versus the economic growth philosophy of the Ecuadorian oil industry operating in the Ecuadorian Amazon.

Using and expanding upon the cultural heritage was the nucleus of the discourse of the Guatemalan activists as well, but with a crucial difference to the Ecuadorian version. Again I will build on Warren's discussion. What the message of the Maya activists relays - the Guatemalan particulars aside - addresses only remotely the reality of the indigenous peasant. Their discourse has been intellectualized; it has been formulated in a context and given a focus where it ends up with little relevance to those among whom it originated. It was experienced as being unfamiliar to the persons for whom their ethnicity is a given - those, who represents the raison d'etre (one might have thought) of any kind of ethnic mobilization. It speaks volumes about the priorities of the cultural activists of Guatemala that the overwhelming majority of my well-positioned rural-based Maya informants across the Highland, listed in chapter V, had not heard about their activities, and the two persons who had, referred dismissively to their efforts as urban-based and irrelevant.

To the contrary, it is difficult to see that any part of the Ecuadorian ethnic discourse would invite the kind of literary analysis Warren (1998) applies extensively to the discourse of the Maya activists and particularly the contributions - to a large extent to mestizo newspapers - of the most distinguished among them, Cojtí Cuxil and Sam Colop. The reason may be found in the different purposes of the two discourses. The Ecuadorian movement focuses on real-life challenges with political and practical consequences. Its intellectual capital is subordinated and channeled into facilitating solutions to these, guided by an intercourse with the grassroots. The movement seems to have concluded that progress will not be won on the basis of public debates with the mestizo society, but toward a background of political strength grounded in the socio-economic reality of the ethnic population and supported by the many. As one informant told me, the institution of 500 years' of oppression of the ethnic person ensures that rights will not be handed to them just because the society develops, the elite gets better informed, and Ecuador claims to be 'democratic' (Duj, pers. com.). The form and substance of the Ecuadorian discourse reflect that goal, with the result that the movement does not cultivate an intellectual elite, contrary to the Maya activists. Building on Warren's presentation, the difference in priorities between the two mobilizations stands out by the fact that Maya cultural activists are not talking *to* or *with* the regular Maya peasant; they are talking with the ladino or each other.

Organizational structure: The third strategic pillar of both the Peruvian and Ecuadorian movement, reflecting their urge to pool the resources of the communities into one body (though with distinctly different priorities given to the individual community member), is the building of organizations with the ambition to represent communities locally, regionally and nationally. In that respect, they both use a basic and revered building block in the social order of the ethnic population - the ethnic community. One might have believed that that would have been an obvious choice, but not so. The traditional peasant movements, having a hierarchical structure, recruited their ethnic constituents as individuals or through communal heads.

In principle, in both countries, it is from the communities that the structure draws its inspiration and it is in the organizational structure that views get processed and fed back to the constituents in a coordinated and processed form. In practice it functions differently. The near-ideal may have been reached in Ecuador where communities and

first- and second-level federations, i.e., at the parochial and cantonal level, are closely intertwined and feed upon each other. This organizational network is prominently present in all the ethnic territory of Ecuador. In Peru, the structure is characterized by the absence of grassroots work with efficient links between the highest level (AIDESEP) and the first-level federations of communities, with the regional second-level link often missing. This means that elected leaders at the middle levels frequently are organizationally isolated from both the top and the bottom. In spite of the availability of radio communications, the effects of their work are not felt much outside the administrative enclave of their headquarters.

Since the rationale of building an organizational infrastructure is closely intertwined with that of the two aforementioned strategies and the success or failure of one is dependent on the outcome of the others, it is no surprise that the quality of the Ecuadorian effort in this sector, once more, greatly surpasses that of the Peruvian. In places like Cañar and Saraguro of Ecuador, discussed in chapter IV, both with high indigenous populations, the centers of the local federations were places where people hang out, met acquaintances, and socialized. This indicates that these bodies also play a role in the local social life in and around the urban centers, in addition to their organizational obligations and as locations for gatherings with the purposes of education, production of handicraft, discussion groups, planning of intra-communal activities, and other initiatives of political and non-political intentions. The fact that the administrative centers of the different Peruvian first- and second-level native organizations were located in urban centers (Satipo, La Merced and Atalaya among them) far away from the habitats of their constituents, similar to the headquarters of the Ecuadorian native organizations (as OPIP in Puyo and FIESH in Sucúa, see chapter IV), gave these places a very different aura. These were places where clerks worked and, eventually, people waited to be served, but without the additional networking and multiplicity of forms of social life I observed around the centers in, say, Cañar and Guaranda in the Highland. The low percentage of natives in the population of the Amazon Lowland of both countries, concentrated in dispersed communal enclosures, augmented the differences in social intra-communal life of the two zones. Once more the Guatemalan case stands apart. The small urban places in the Guatemala Highland do have a high degree of social activities. However, the region is characterized by strong tribal cleavages and the social capital is spread on numerous

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activities, but, as was discussed in chapter V, all without an ethno-ideological agenda.

If the organizational structure is seen as a road map, indicating where ideas and initiatives are channeled and where they get processed, what moves along these 'roads' signifies the difference in level of maturity between the organizations of Peru and Ecuador. In the former, very little of substance is attached to the data moving along the 'roads'. The volume of the traffic was small and taken up by the outcome of administrative dispositions, and routine messages were received and relayed on to others, who would repeat that process. The low degree of representativity in the structure, the absence of any dynamic interactions between the constituents and leaders within the structure, and the absence of cooperation between the staff of the structure and external actors, implied that what took place was of a trivial nature and resulted in few initiatives or services directed toward the constituencies. Once again the contrast to Ecuador is significant. The ongoing activity with inter- and intra-communal meetings, workshops and assemblies in the nodes of the 'road' system with interactive organizational cooperation both horizontally and vertically across the country, implies a considerable 'traffic' of substance along the 'roads' of the Ecuadorian map. The close cooperation between the people staffing this structure, members of the communities and external actors made a dynamic and creative environment. In the latter case, when these actors were elected ethnic representatives, they merged their work portfolio with that of the structure, and when they were not, their work was closely and competently being evaluated by the staff of the structure. The distinctly higher educational level and more organizational experience among key personnel throughout the Ecuadorian structure than in that of Peru, ensured a more vibrant, focused and professional environment. Ultimately, the former was able to respond with force and flexibility to political challenges and opportunities on the regional and the national levels.

It was mentioned in chapter IV that the organizational structure of the ethnic movement of Ecuador attracted also non-ethnic Highland peasant communities due to, according to my informants, its reputation and the lack of other options of representation in parts of the Highland. I was told that the ethnic movement had no intention to dilute its ethnic agenda to accommodate its non-ethnic supporters. And still, the presence of many non-ethnic communities as members in the cantonal organization of FECAB-BRUNARI in Guaranda may explain the emphasis on material conditions by its president in my

interview with him, relaying a different outlook than my contacts among the leaders of the fully ethnic UPCCC in Cañar. The comparison between the two, points to complex trends which one presently can only speculate about. The movement's organizational structure may be on the way to represent a larger share of the peasant population than what the size of its ethnic constituency should imply, though, I was told, non-ethnic peasants were organizing in the Province of Cotopaxi specifically to counter the movement's hegemony here. It may also be a sign that the movement's successful emphasis on ethnic topics at the expense of material gains for its constituents, a topic I will return to, has created a backlash-in-waiting in the poverty-striken rural Highland.

Competing for public offices: The kind of hybrid activity which is born when a social mobilization takes upon itself to function also as a traditional political party, is a unique addition to the arsenal of strategies of civil society. This approach is being applied by the ethnic movements in both Peru and Ecuador. CONAIE's political arm, Patchakutik, has strong support among the numerous Quichua Highlanders as well as among the heterogeneous native population. It functions, I will propose, because ethnic persons, ultimately, may share a special bond *qua* ethnic (or subaltern), even among members of different peoples, though Guatemala, as pointed out in chapter V, is an exception. Since the success of this strategy depends on the ability to merge seamlessly and constructively the activities of the ethnic mobilization with those of a traditional political party, the Ecuadorian ethnic movement once more offers the best case study.

In Ecuador, the promotional work this strategy calls for is being pursued successfully on a broad front with force and imagination, inwardly toward the constituents of the movement and outwardly toward possible alliance partners and potential non-ethnic followers, i.e., non-ethnic peasants and socially-minded mestizos. The native movement in Peru half-heartedly struggles to get its scheme off the ground. Nobody I interviewed in either country seemed to know the exact outcome of this approach, i.e., how many and what category of public offices had ethnic persons as heads, but in Ecuador it is presently the mother of all strategies. As with the other approaches, it also works best when it is applied in combination with other strategies. The tight coordination and cooperation seen in Ecuador between Patchakutik, which carries out this strategy; the first-and second-level (parochial and cantonal) ethnic federations; and public offices with elected ethnic people; strengthen the combined effort well above what the sum of resources put into

each should imply.

Given a very broad mandate, Patchakutik draws extensively on the resources of the local and regional organizations in its work. The high reputation of that body, combined with the solidarity among the movement's constituents, ensures that Patchakutik's problem is less to prevent a split of the ethnic vote than to get out the vote, particularly in remote ethnic communities. Successes breed their own successes. Because Pachakutik is a powerful actor with a solid backing in most of the country, it can establish alliances at will by securing support for an acceptable mestizo candidate where that is no acceptable ethnic candidate. The strategy to "rub culture's nose in the mud of politics"[117] has indeed added an intriguing chapter to the activities of the Ecuadorian movement. Not only have new opportunities and battle fields opened up, but, more important, this approach serves as a continuously motivating and mobilizing vehicle, whose effect would have been difficult to realize by other means.

The lack of genuine grassroots work by the Peruvian native movement in and among the native communities is probably most damaging when seen in combination with this strategy. It implies that the effort to bring out the vote is, at best, improvised and uncoordinated. If an elected office is captured, no apparatus exists which ensures a close cooperation between the native incumbent and his native constituency - or, if it does, it is seriously flawed. Nor did the native leaders I interviewed seem to have grasped that this strategy may be the best way to compensate for their low percentage in the Amazon Lowland population - 10 percent over-all, but higher in some provinces than others. With the plethora of parties participating in local and national elections in both Peru and Ecuador and with offices regularly won based on only 20 percent or less of the votes[118], coordinating and drawing on the solidarity among native voters *qua* natives might give high returns. While AIDESEP claimed to be responsible for a considerable part of the victories by natives presently occupying public elected offices (Kinchokre, pers. com.), other informants told me that its presence was not particularly well felt and that election victories by natives were more due to favorable conditions and local efforts than systematic work by AIDESEP. Hence, the organization was not seen as a body, which could deliver the votes, and was not an attractive alliance partner for other actors.

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[117] Cited from Said (1979: 13).
[118] Only the presidential elections require a majority of the votes to win, meaning a rerun between the two foremost candidates with the highest support when nobody gets 50+ percent of the votes.

Mass demonstrations: Ecuador's movement is the only one, which has the resources to carry out mass demonstrations with a fair degree of success, though I was told that this strategy was fraught with complications and could easily have unpredictable outcomes. And still, it has been applied in Ecuador numerous times in the last 10-15 years with stunning success, when the movement switched from negotiations with the State, to confrontations when the State did not deliver as agreed, an approach discussed in chapter I. According to a number of my informants, this strategy has now been replaced with the one of Pachakutik, which is believed to offer more profound changes, but requires more time. However, no one ruled out mass confrontations as a tactical option if and when it was deemed advantageous.

Country Comparisons

This section will briefly relate the summaries above with the performance of the ethnic activity in the countries of the study.

On strategies: Of the five main strategies identified above - (1) grassroots mobilization; (2) developing a politicized ethno-ideology; (3) building an organizational structure; (4) competing for public offices; and (5) mass demonstrations - the Ecuadorian movement is successfully and aggressively promoting the first four. The fifth is used, but ad-hoc. It shows a consistently high performance in all the sectors where it has decided to invest its resources. Peru's is half-heartedly working on (3) and (4), but ignores the others - with a less than successful performance both specifically and generally. And the Guatemalan activists focus only on (2) and have - within the premises of this study - nothing to show for it.

Since the discussion above indicates that the success of one strategy is closely dependent on the simultaneous use of one or more of the others, other factors kept constant, one may contend that the consistent emphasis on the largest possible number of strategies *simultaneously* is the cause - not the effect - of the favorable characteristics of the Ecuadorian movement. These may be listed as ethno-ideological coherence throughout the movement; organizational maturity and professionalism among its staff; a high motivation among its activists and constituents alike; a larger than 'critical mass' of motivated activists; political strength to establish alliances at will with other actors; and a high ability to create and exploit political opportunities. Peru's movement shows none of

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these features. As argued earlier, Guatemala has no ethnic movement in the conventional meaning of the term. The top-down initiatives that are going on here, without a representative mandate from the Maya population, represent a different typology of ethnic movements that makes the Guatemalan activism vulnerable to co-optation.

Environmental factors: This part comprises a discussion of the effect of the two hypothesized independent variables of this study - the socio-economic conditions of the ethnic population and the political regime. I will address them in that sequence.

My field data indicate that there is no social sector in the three Latin American countries of my study, which undergoes more fundamental and catastrophic changes than that of the ethno-rural population, particularly the Amazon Lowland one (see appendix C, part 1). Here the State-promoted industrial onslaught on the vulnerable native population, lacking sufficient defenses, takes the form of ethnocide. In the Highland, the increasing out-migration and continuous marginalization are strong indicators to the same. However, when making comparisons between zones (Highland, Amazon Lowland) of different countries, using the conditions of Peru as a reference, my research was not able to explain the observed differences in ability to establish an ethnic movement from one country to the next due to socio-economic conditions. The poverty is widespread in all the countries, and so is the marginalization of the ethno-rural population. Poverty indicators showed large variations from one rural region to the next within a country, but not significantly in averages from one country to the next. How the much higher population density, say, in Guatemala as compared with Peru's, influences the ethnic mobilization efforts, could not be determined. In research locations of the study, differences in living conditions and ability to mobilize could be observed between the Highland and the Amazon Lowland, which were not reflected in the regional socio-economic indicators. I will propose that these variations are best explained by ecological and demographic factors.

This study will conclude that the second hypothesized independent factor - regime type and, hence, the role of the State - is of paramount importance to ethnic mobilization. Better than any of the other conditions addressed, it helps explain the successful rise of the ethnic movement in Ecuador and the situation in the other two countries as well. Selverston-Scher (2001: 51), studying Ecuador, proposes that this came about as by accident, stating that "the government was prepared to confront armed subversion, but it did not consider that organizing based on culture might lead to political power". This is

too simplistic, but she does point out an important factor by correctly identifying Ecuador as the most 'benign' version of the three regimes discussed in this study. The fine political-historic study of Pallares (2002) supports Selverston-Scher's generalization. Pallares points to the Ecuadorian agrarian reform of 1964 as a political watershed, which redefined the relationship between the indigenous population and the State (ibid: 38-43). Due to demands from the indigenous peasants, the government, which initially had taken a role as a neutral arbiter in the peasants' confrontations with landowners and local authorities, found itself as a provider of benefits, which had been lost in the reform. Pallares also notes that the cooperative model was not implemented top-down on a broad scale in Ecuador, as in Peru. The Ecuadorian State allowed indigenous organizations considerable participation in the implementation of the reforms and enough leeway to find workable solutions to problems on their own. The result was that individual landholders relied on indigenous communities and organizations and cooperated with them to gain access to State officials and programs. The presence of State bureaucrats in the towns of the Ecuadorian Highland institutionalized unmediated exchanges between peasants and the State; in many instances legitimizing indigenous organizations as political actors. The permission to participate in State-funded development projects helped local Indian activists to gain hands-on expertise in rural policy development that would prove crucial in later mobilization efforts. And at the national level, local ethnic activists learned about broader political processes as they worked closely with legal representatives of indigenous organizations such as ECUARUNARI, the umbrella Highland representation. The result was that the indigenous leaders that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s benefited from experiences their predecessors had never had.

The climate was distinctly different in Peru. Pallares (2002: 41) notes that in Peru more than one thousand cooperatives were created during the land reform, but managed from a distance by State-appointed officials, who rarely consulted with indigenous peasants. The high centralization of the Peruvian State saw to it that indigenous activists did not became involved, continuing the process of circumventing local indigenous authority Thurner (1997) describes for an earlier era (discussed in chapter III).

Particularly oppressive conditions ruled in the rural Guatemala during the internal war from 1960 to 1996 and the less turbulent but still hostile political climate that followed - in spite of the political liberalization of the last 1-2 decades. One can safely

assume that these conditions effectively contributed to prevent any serious ethnic mobilization in Guatemala, putting the indigenous population at a disadvantage in comparison with those of Peru and, particularly, Ecuador. While Peru's internal war was extremely destructive to the ethnic communities, it was not used by the State to label them as an internal enemy and an excuse to increase the oppression, as in Guatemala (Schirmer 1999). To the opposite, cooperation of sort took place between the two.

This aspect, however, is only one of the factors, which makes Guatemala unique. All three country cases show difficulties in unifying peoples of different ethno-tribal background, but nowhere is this as pronounced as in Guatemala. The low density of natives in the Peruvian Amazon Lowland and their small percentage of the total zonal population indicate that dispersed communities may not have much in common, particularly when they are populated by different peoples (tribes). The same may be said about the natives of the Ecuador's Amazon, but the number of peoples (tribes) here is fewer, possibly explaining why they are better organized locally and, on the zonal level, represented with one organization, CONFENIAE. The main cleavage in the ethnic population in Ecuador is not, as in Guatemala, between tribes, but between native and indigenous due to their different priorities rooted in history, ecology of habitats, and types of threats to their cultural survival from the outer society. But both communities have their own zonal organizations, primarily ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE, which cooperate within CONAIE.

The lack of any kind of cooperation among the many different Maya peoples, exemplified by the absence of ethnicity-based representative bodies, which could have facilitated a common ethno-ideological ground among them, is unique to Guatemala (discussed in chapter V). In the Highland of very high population density, where the activities of different Maya peoples overlap within constrained geographic territories, the Maya population maintains an uncompromising front against the dominant mestizos, but also against each other, nurturing their tribal differences. They have no affiliations in common and limited interest in establishing one; distrust rules. A number of authors have in passing reflected upon this phenomenon in local contexts - Smith (1990a) with reference to municipal affiliations and Stoll (1998) with clan- or family-based contradictions - but it does not explain the nationwide situation. The multitude of small Maya organizations in the Guatemalan Highland reflects that situation. The lack of any

wider allegiance among them indicates that the Maya cultural activism Warren discusses, has failed in one of its main goals - to bridge them. The conditions in Peru and Ecuador are different; where many peoples exist, as in the Amazon Lowland, they are territorially separated, and in the Highland, where much social interaction takes place, only one or two peoples reside.

Convergence and typology: In the introductory discussion of chapter I, leading to my research question, I contemplated two possible outcomes of my cross-country study of 'power'-seeking ethnic mobilizations in ethnically stratified countries, i.e., either a disclosure of *converging* political realities in different countries or a *typology* of ethnic mobilizations. Within the constraints of my small sample - three countries - one may see both. In spite of the shortcomings in how they are defined and used, the Peruvian native mobilization does build on some of the same tactical ethno-elements as the Ecuadorian movement, among them, the ethno-ideological core elements and the organizational principles rooted in the community. Some of its initiatives - among them titling and demand for a share in the value of subterranean resources - have their rationale in perspectives that the far more mature Ecuadorian movement is promoting at the highest political levels nationally. The earlier discussion identified other similarities, though at distinctly lower levels of maturation. One may assume that the Ecuadorian (and Bolivian?) example serves as a lightning rod for ethnic mobilizations elsewhere, as the political initiatives in the Peruvian Highland, reported upon in chapter III (part 1), inform.

With respect to typology, the 'bottom-up' approach applied by the Ecuadorian movement, with its emphasis on grassroots strategies, represent a distinct and principled contrast to the 'top down' approach used by the Guatemalan cultural activists. It is commented upon in chapter V and only a few comments will be added here.

The top-down solution may be seen as the best possible solution under the very difficult conditions for Maya mobilization that govern in Guatemala. On the one hand, the cultural activists are up against an oppressive State in a society still haunted by the brutality of the recent past. Faced with a passive and 'disinterested' State, the native mobilization in Peru has not been doing too well either, controlling for other variables. In comparison with Ecuador, the two cases confirm the importance of a constructive State involvement during the emergence of an ethnic movement, either intentionally or accidentally. In addition, the cultural activists are facing a potential constituency whose

members have agreed not to agree, with intense fragmentation among the Maya peoples as a constraining independent variable. Where the Ecuadorian movement has a strong stratum of first- and second-level organizations, which operate constructively in communication with and under the guidance of the grassroots 'underneath' and the superior bodies 'above', the stratum of autonomous activist bodies in Guatemala is richly populated but without communication - not down to the grassroots, not up (because there is nothing above), and not much with each other. Some kind of cooperation undoubtedly takes place, at times, within that stratum (see Cojtí Cuxil 2002), but the work form becomes like 'leading by committee' - as the absence of results indicates. The temptation to see 'results' by working with the mestizo State may be overwhelming, but at the cost of being co-opted. Very little is known about the outcome of the activities in the Guatemalan activist stratum.

Genesis

This study concludes that political openings, unwittingly made possible by the State, are the main reason for the emergence of ethnic movements in the countries of this study, in addition to a number of secondary factors discussed in the previous chapters. While not overlooking the influence of the State, Yashar (1998: 24, 36-38) forwards the thesis that politicized ethnic identity has found organized expression as an indigenous movement only where communities have been able to draw upon preexisting networks rooted in the State, the church, unions and NGOs. She claims that where sustained national networks did not exist, say, as in Peru, ethnic peoples did not mobilize.

Yashar may be overemphasizing the importance of this point[119]. Clearly, ethnic movements do not pop up out of nothingness as new political opportunities and needs present themselves; an organizational context is needed to acquire experiences and identify persons with potential for leadership. As referred to in chapter VI, my Ecuadorian informants, Duj in Cañar and González in Guaranda, among others, pointed out the experiences won by future indigenous leaders while working with State representations during implementation of the agrarian reform, a point Pallares (2002) also emphasizes. And they referred to the peasant unions as important environments where the

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[119] McAdam (1989) raises a similar idea with respect to (Northern) social movements and Foweraker (1995: 16) points to that "levels of prior social organization influence the degree and type of social mobilization" - but as one of many factors.

ethnic identity (*indianismo*) emerged. However, the State did not *train* its indigenous associates and the birth of politically ethnic awareness took place within but in *opposition* to the structure of the politically leftist mestizo bodies. The establishment of the native federation, CART, in the Peruvian Amazon Lowland provoked reactions with clientilistic overtones among supporting NGOs, the State and religious organizations, which disagreed with this kind of promoting native rights (CEA 1999: 9). Also, these externally influenced networks were never extensive in the Amazon Lowland in either Peru or Ecuador. Here I was told, native organizing took place in response to the threats from colonialization (see also Macdonald 2002: 86 with respect to the Runas), later merging into larger federations (see also Selverston-Scher 2001:32-35) - in Ecuador with CONFENIAE and in Peru with AIDESEP. Macdonald (1999) mentions also the effects of the agrarian reform. To the extent externally rooted organizations were the crib for ethnic mobilizations, as Yashar claims, one may assume they may well have served more as an obstacle than as a midwife to ethnic empowerment.

The importance Yashar (1997, 1998) puts on preexisting networks is contradicted by the *absence* of any indigenous movement in Guatemala while, at the same time, there is an abundant presence of *externally-rooted* networks in the Maya communities, as discussed in chapter V. Yashar's arguments for the existence of an indigenous movement (using conventional definition of the term) in Guatemala, I addressed in chapter V. Here I pointed out that the Maya cultural activism she and Warren refer to is sectarian, fragmented, 'top-down', and with no communication with the rural grassroots that, after all, embodies the vast majority of Mayas, whom they claim to represent. As a result, her comparison between and ranking of ethnic mobilizations in Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala becomes ill-founded, like comparing apples and oranges. Referring to the discussion in chapter III, there can be no disagreement, however, on the point that the native mobilization in Peru is struggling. But in contrast to the activism in Guatemala, the Peruvian structure does have legitimacy rooted in its representation of native communities. The former has none.

Epilogue

A few supplementary observations should be listed. First, with the one exception of Ecuador - ignoring Bolivia since I do not know its premises - it is difficult to find support

for the optimism among analysts (see Bengoa 2000; Yashar 1998) who refer to ongoing Indian mobilizations in Latin America, as a kind of political watershed. Mobilizations do take place in countries with from small to large ethnic populations, most of them 'voice-seeking'. Among the 'power-seeking' ones, only Ecuador stands out. Given that the mestizo population in countries with large ethnic populations continues to discriminate against their ethnic citizens with impunity, keeping them structurally marginalized and preventing them having influence and representation at the regional and national levels, this points to an over-all situation of human rights abuses on a massive scale - following a well documented historical practice.

The absence of democracy in Peru and Ecuador puts the promotion of the strategy of conquering public offices in threes countries through election in an interesting light. Why these efforts if they are not guaranteed to lead to power? In chapter IV, when discussing Ecuador, I emphasized that preparing for elections has become a year-around activity that has great benefits for the *general* mobilization of the ethnic population with a focus far wider than the individual public office in focus. Second, conquering public positions by ethnic candidates or just the threat that this might happen, generates self-confidence in the ethnic population and awe among the mestizos. Third, even if the regional public offices are given just crumbs to administrate by the central government and, say, a mayoralty may be less a political than a housekeeper position (as one of my informants, the mayor of Concepción in Guatemala, phrased it), an ethnic mayor is seen as preferable to a mestizo one. Fourth, ethnic people gain administrative and political competence. And, ultimately, for the right person, a public office may offer power where none exists (Caro 1974, 2002).

My third and last note is that democratization indeed takes place within my research area, but, once again, only in Ecuador, and then in a way that contrasts to the mirage of the aforementioned 'democratization'. I refer to the ongoing efforts by the ethnic movement to activate and educate its marginalized constituents on a broad front; introduce them to the outer society; inform them about their citizenship rights; and, ultimately, bring them into the electoral process with the hope that they might be given a voice and influence in their society. My claim is that this kind of work by both 'voice'- and 'power'-seeking versions of ethnic mobilizations represent a genuinely new and unappreciated dimension of civil society's activities in Latin America. Foweraker (2002)

claims that the influence of *social* movements is on the decline, but he refers implicitly to socio-urban mobilizations. It is questionable whether his argument applies to the ethno-rural movements. At present, referring to Ecuador, by far the largest part of the mobilization effort of the latter is directed inwardly toward the ethnic communities where it undoubtedly creates empowerment and ethnic confidence; only a smaller part is directed toward the political arena of the dominant society. Where this will lead is too early to speculate about, but even if the ethnic movement in Ecuador succeed only in part, a significant part of what today is established wisdom on social mobilizations may have to be reviewed.

APPENDIX A

SOCIO-ECONOMY OF PERU AND THE NATIVE POPULATION

The appendix focuses on Peru's general socio-economy with emphasis on the situation of the native population. The general picture is exemplified with data on level of poverty and standard of education.

Peru's Economic Climate: Subordinate ethnic populations generally suffer from a capitalist economy and more than the general public. The spirit of capitalism is contrary to their worldview, implying that they start out with a massive handicap as the outer economic regime imposes itself upon them. Also, the non-ethnic population is more strategically located; the ethnic communities are rarely in a favorable position or powerful enough to be favored by the operation of the market. As Adams (1991: 197) points to, if the members of ethnic communities become weaker, they become more disadvantaged and dependent. And to become stronger, they must confront mestizos and mestizaje. Particularly over the last decades, the Amazon Lowland natives have felt the continuous battering of the market forces. They have had a more traditional starting point with less contact with the modern society than other population groups and, hence, have been and are in a more vulnerable position.

Different versions of economic neoliberalism have common features, but they do not necessarily have the same consequences with respect to poverty and inequality. Sheahan (1997) mentions that economic restructuring programs are not usually aimed at social concerns, although the expectation of their proponents is that greater efficiency and success in avoiding inflation should favor economic growth and thereby reduce poverty in the long run. That these assumptions may not be fully supported by empirically-based analyses is pointed out by Easterly (2001). He argues that after 50 years of promoting development, economists still have not been able to identify the factors, or combination of factors, which favor economic growth and reduce mass poverty. One way to define development is to create opportunities for those able to respond and attack obstacles that hold able people back. This is exactly the opposite of what the native peoples in the rural areas of Peru are being offered.

Toward a backdrop of economic decline in Peru, President Fujimori in 1991 introduced an economic neoliberal policy with deregulation and privatization of State enterprises as goals, replacing the previous protection and control policy which had meant heavy involvement by the State. Following Sheahan (1997), Peru applied closely the same macroeconomic scheme, which had been used during the first economic phase in Chile under Pinochet until the economic collapse of 1982 - referred to as 'the standard model'. Production output and employment were allowed to grow as rapidly as possible within the limits of two constraints. The first was that the rate of increase in production and spending was not allowed to rise faster than that inflation could be kept under control, and the second was that the balance between imports and exports of goods and services ('current account') was controlled such that growth did not become hostage to rising external debt. The standard model implied that labor and foreign exchange was left almost entirely unregulated; labor unions and labor rights were weakened; employers were given increased control over the working conditions of their workers; and real wages were reduced. The use of private capital determined the balance on the current account and Peru's 'comparative advantage' - export of unprocessed raw material without diversification into industrial value-added production - determined the structure of the country's production and trade. Throughout the State was kept on the sideline. What had happened in Chile was repeated in Peru. The policy decreased inflation and increased growth, but resulted in increased poverty, and higher unemployment and inequality (Graham 1994; Sheahan 1997).

The social component of the new economic policy is discussed by Sheahan (1997: 28-31). He speculated on Peru's possibilities of avoiding the economic downturn the two other countries he discusses, Mexico and Chile, experienced toward the end of the time period when they applied the standard model. Today the answer is on the table. Peru went from bad to worse in the years after Sheahan wrote his article, as he predicted it would if the standard model was maintained (as it was). In addition to the aforementioned effects, industrial exports have been discouraged, and imports have increased. In foresight, Sheahan (1997: 33) sums up well what should be the main line of critique against the Toledo government shortly after his ascent to power in 2001 and which exploded in public rage in the summer of 2002 in what was referred to as the 'Arequipa earthquake':

During a period of increased hope for Latin American economies in a political

environment much more favorable for private investors, the capital flows have moved inward, favored currency appreciation, and financed large current-account deficits. For many economists, for international investors, and apparently also for the multilateral financial agencies at present, these effects are natural and desirable. According to this view, it would be a mistake to interfere with the capital inflows, or with the exchange-rate stability that international investors greatly prefer, or with the structure of exports that results. The logic of this position points directly toward the standard model. This logic appeals to many. The costs, unhappily, fall hardest on the poor.

In June of 2002 there were demonstrations all over the southern part of Peru, which erupted in Arequipa, Peru's second largest city, and Tacna in response to the economic policy of the Government, lit by its decision to privatize two State electricity companies, Egasa and Egesur. Very quickly things turned ugly, the President backtracked, the Minister of the Interior, Rospigliosi Capurro, one of the hardliners among the Cabinet's economic neoliberalists, quit in protest against the Government's handling of the matter, and the Government wobbled indecisively along. Ultimately it replaced its most exposed orthodox neoliberalist members, but without changing its economic policies.

On Poverty: Peru is characterized by wide-spread poverty and indigence (extreme poverty) both in its urban and rural areas, but far more significantly in the latter. The literature on Peru and other countries on how people cope in the cities - by finding work in the informal sector - is extensive (see, among others, Birkbeck 1978; Bromley 1978: de Soto 1989; Babb 1989; Portes, Castells and Benton 1989; Roberts 1991; Rakowski 1994). The conditions of a third population group, the Afro-Peruvians (not a part of this study), mainly living along the coast, further help identifying the separation between the 'favored' and the 'unfavored' of the stratified Peruvian society, i.e., between the ethnic and mestizo population[120]. This stratification, often marked by massive racism (Torre Lopéz; personal com.), does not mean that the 'line of separation' cannot be crossed. Berghe and Primov (1977) conclude from their study of class and ethnic inequalities in Cusco that there are opportunities for social mobility in the Peruvian society and that these are higher in the mestizo-dominated urban areas than in the rural areas. But

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[120] La República (2002j: 26) carried May 9, 2002, an article on the rise of racism in Peru. It concluded that the Afro-Peruvians, who comprises roughly 10 percent of the population, is the group which experiences the open prejudices strongest, and is among the marginalized groups of the Peruvian society.

crossing that line means to leave one's ethnic identity and social environment behind and start at the social bottom at the other side. Adams (1988: 283) states:

> For an Indian to lose Indian identity – to become a mestizo – two things must happen. The Indian must, for whatever reason, find it undesirable to be an Indian, and the mestizos with whom the Indian associates must also desire or at least accept it. While some Indians may feel that there are advantages to becoming mestizo (…) there are rarely any complementary reason leading mestizos to accept them. Thus mestizos in Guatemala and other Latin American countries are still often referred to as indios [a pejorative term for 'Indian'] irrespective of the traits and desires of the individuals.

What the urban space has to offer, in comparison with the rural areas, are more opportunities and certain public services - if not in the home of the individual so, at least, in the public space. But these urban amenities and varied opportunities come at a high price for many due to the high underemployment and unemployment rates, forcing many to find ways of making money in any way they see fit. In Lima today (mid-2002) where close to 30 percent of the Peruvian population lives, prostitution industry is wide-spread, offering its services to prospective customers at (negotiable) prices starting as low as S/15 (US$4) per pop. Young people are lucky to have a job in, say, a café, which demands 13 hours of work per day, 6 days a week, at an hourly salary of S/1.15 (US$0.33) without tips, security or social benefits. And adults and children down to pre-teen age spend 10-12 hours per day either as free-lance entrepreneurs or as commissioned street sellers (see Bromley 1978), earning S/5-S/15 (US$1.50-US$4.50) per day (pers. com.). The cost of living in the countryside is significantly lower than in the urban areas, but, more important, jobs are extremely scarce (Campos Ponce; pers. com.). The lack of work and public services, combined with profound poverty, in the rural Inland of Peru, point to a structural difference between, first, the urban and rural areas, and, second, the coast region and the Inland (combined Highland and Amazon Zones). This is, in part, a reflection of the investment profiles of State and the private capital. Investments go where the profit is highest, without social considerations, meaning to the high-urbanized areas and pockets along the coast (the extraction industries aside), never into building up the rural areas of the Inland as part of a long-term national strategy. See Cortázar, Lustig and Sabot (1998) for a comparison between economic policies of Latin America and the Asian 'Tigers' in the period from 1960s to 1980s.

Table A-1 shows that among Peru's population of 26.6 million inhabitants 54.8

percent (14.6 million) live in poverty. Out of these, 6.5 million - 24.4 percent of the national population - live in extreme poverty[121]. The average poverty in the rural areas of Peru is 78.4 percent versus 42.0 percent in the urban areas. The numbers for extreme poverty are 51.3 and 9.9 percent, respectively. Across zones (Coast, Highland, Amazon Lowland), the poverty varies from 39.3 percent at the coast to 72.0 percent in the Highland and the extreme poverty from 5.8 to 45.6. In the last two cases, the numbers for the Amazon Lowland are only slightly lower than those of the Highland. The highest levels of poverty were recorded in the rural Highland where the poverty affected 83.4 percent of the population and the extreme poverty 60.8.

Table A-1
Estimated rate of poverty and extreme poverty across Peru,
in percentage of population (source: INEI 2002a).

Areas		Total poverty	Extreme poverty
National:		54.8*	24.4*
Areas:	Urban	42.0	9.9
	Rural	78.4	51.3
Zones (gross):	Coast	39.3	5.8
	Andean highland	72.0	45.6
	Amazon Lowland	68.7	39.7
Zone (areal):	Urban coast (excl. Metropolitan Lima)	44.6	7.6
	Rural coast	62.7	19.7
	Urban Highland	51.6	18.3
	Rural Highland	83.4	60.8
	Urban Amazon Lowland	62.4	34.9
	Rural Amazon Lowland	74.0	43.7
	Metropolitan Lima	31.9	2.3

The study is based on data for 18,824 families (13,296 in urban areas and 5,528 in rural areas) across Peru.

At the time these data was collected, a national study was carried out, which gave the rating of the departments according to how students in public and private primary and secondary schools scored in a recent nationwide test of intellectual aptitude (*Evaluación*

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[121] 'Poverty' is defined as conditions where the total income of an 'average' family income is lower than the cost of a 'basket' of a set consumption, i.e., food, a dwelling of a set standard and certain basic services (*canasta básica familiar*). At the time of this study (4th quarter, 2001) the value of that was S/147.39 (US$42.72) in the rural Amazon Lowland and S/260.21 (US$75.42) in Metropolitan Lima per capita monthly. 'Extreme poverty' is defined as the condition where a family has an income less than the cost of a set basket of food (*canasta básica de alimentos*). The cost of the latter fluctuated between S/95.01 (US$27.54) in the rural Amazon Lowland to S/138.18 (US$67.59) in the urban Amazon Lowland, while in Metropolitan Lima it was S/121.95 (US$35.35) per capita monthly.

Nacional de Aprendizaje 2001) and discussed widely in the national press (see *La República 2002m*). The correlation between the school performance and location in the different zones is nearly as clear as the rating of poverty distribution among the departments. Seven of the departments of the Coast scored among the ten best. The aforementioned contrast between the better-off coastal and the less favored Inland zones is reflected also in the distribution of access to basic necessities in the population - or presented as *unsatisfactory* access to basic necessities (UBN) - among the zones, but now with a less clear distinction between the situation of the Highland and of the Amazon Lowland (INEI 2001b).

Table A-2 breaks down the national averages and shows the rate of poverty by department, categorized by zones. INEI (*Instituto Nacional de Estatistica y Informatica*) processes its demographic data areally, i.e., by department, without taking into account the vertical variation of the population[122]. This is corrected for in the following. Table A-2 gives, first, a zonal (Coast, Highland, Lowland) categorization of each department based on the percentage of its districts located in each zone (columns 2-4). Then follow total poverty and indigence in the 24 departments, with ranking added for the former (column 5-7).

The table shows that seven of the eight Highland departments are among the departments with the highest total poverty. The five departments with the lowest total poverty are all located in the Coast zone. In fact, the ten Coast departments are among the twelve departments with the lowest poverty. With exception of Madre de Dios, the departments of the Amazon Lowland and those of both Amazon Lowland and Highland fall distinctly between the Coast and the Highland group with respect to the rate of total poverty.

<center>Table A-2</center>

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[122] Peru represents a cultural and socio-economic variety and a biodiversity, which are exceptional, both 'horizontally' (across departments) and 'vertically' (with altitude). In the literature, the vertical diversity is often split into eight zones (using the local terms): the costal natural region from sea level to 500-700 meters above (*chala*, *costa*); the maritime and fluvial *Yunga* region (500-2,300 meters); the *quechua* region (2,300-3,500 meters); the *suni* or *jalca* region (3,500-4,000 meters); the *puna* region (4,000-4,800 meters); and *janca* above 4,800 meters). As the landscape falls on the other side into the Amazon lowland on the eastern flank of the Andes, one has the *rupa-rupa* or the *selva alta* (400-1,000 meters), and the *omagua* or the *selva baja* below 400 meters above sea level. Local variations may influence the altitude brackets referred to here (Pulgar Vidal 1941). From a material point of view, this biodiversity explains the large variation in human forms as people try to carve out a living, using the local resources.

Estimated Rate of Poverty and extreme Poverty by department; Zone-wise distribution of the Population, given as percentage of population; departmental share of national GNP. [Sources - Col. 1: La República/Domingo (2002n); Col. 2-4: Webb and Fernández Baca (2000: table A-5); Col. 5-7: INEI (2002a); Col. 9: La República (2002z: 21)]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Department	District distribution[1]			Total poverty	Rank	Extreme poverty	Percentage of GNP
	Coast	Highland	Amazon				
Coast/Highland:							
Ancash	9	91	0	61.1	10	33.3	2.9
Arequipa	28	72	0	44.1	6	14.5	6.8
Ica	11	89	0	41.7	5	8.6	3.0
La Libertad	34	66	0	52.1	8	18.3	5.9
Lambayeque	100	0	0	63.0	11	19.9	4.0
Lima	43	57	0	33.4	3	3.1	46.3
Moquegua	25	75	0	29.6	1	7.6	1.9
Piura	87	13	0	63.3	12	21.4	3.3
Tacna	35	65	0	32.8	2	5.2	1.4
Tumbes	100	0	0	46.8	7	7.4	<1.0
Highland:							
Apurímac	0	100	0	78.0	22	47.4	<1.0
Ayacucho	0	100	0	72.5	17	45.4	1.1
Cajamarca	10	77	13	77.4	20	50.8	3.2
Cusco	0	95	5	75.3	19	51.3	2.6
Huancavelica	0	100	0	88.0	24	74.4	<1.0
Huánuco	0	86	14	78.9	23	61.9	1.8
Junin	0	89	11	57.5	9	24.3	4.6
Puno	0	98	2	78.0	21	45.1	1.8
Highland/Amazon Lowland:							
Amazonas	0	63	37	74.5	18	41.1	<1.0
Pasco	0	75	25	66.1	13	33.2	<1.0
Amazon Lowland:							
Loreto	0	0	100	70.0	15	47.2	3.2
Madre de Dios	0	0	100	36.7	4	11.5	<1.0
San Martin	0	0	100	66.9	14	36.2	1.5
Ucayali	0	0	100	70.5	16	44.9	1.2

- Fieldwork carried out in highlighted departments.
[1] Number of districts of the department's total districts located within given zone.

Column 8 gives the share of the GDP of each department, showing the extreme concentration of the national economic activity in Lima, which has, roughly, 30 percent of the country's population but close to half the national GNP. Even nearby urban industrial centers, like Arequipa and La Libertad, have a paltry contribution. The large majority of the other departments shows between 1 and 5 percent, and the rest below 1

percent. The six departments with a contribution of less than 1.0 percent contribute combined only 3.5 percent.

When the data of INEI's survey are compared with those of previous years, they show that the poverty in Peru is *increasing*[123]. It has augmented 1.4 percent points from year 2000 to year 2001 and with 7.1 percent points from 1997 to 2001. Extreme poverty has increased with 4.5 percent points from 2000 to 2001 and with 1.3 since 1997. INEI points to for Peru what TIME (August 5, 2002) and Berry (1996) pointed out for the Latin American that matters go from bad to worse.

The difference in pattern between the coastal and inland regions documented above invites a reflection, which will be of value for my discussion on Peru. Mariátegui (2001a: 15), in his essay from ca. 1930, mentions that the colonizers' primary focus in the colonial economy of Peru from the Conquest onward was to mine for gold and silver:

> Without the greed for the metals in the enclosures of the Andes, the Conquest of the Highland would have been much more incomplete. These [metals] became the historical base for the new Peruvian economy. The effect of the colonial economy - colonial from its very beginning - has still not ended. We are observing today the continuation [of it] into a second phase, i.e., the phase in which a feudal economy is being transformed systematically into a bourgeois economy. But it has not ceased to be in reality, basically a colonial economy. (…) The first phase began with the Conquest. The second phase initiated the Independence. But, while the Conquest in all aspects created the process, which shaped our colonial economy, the Independence seems to have been determined and dominated by that same process.

The essence of what Mariátegui states is that while the exploitative economy the Spaniards imposed upon the Indian population completely replaced the economy of the Incas after the Conquest, no change took place after the Independence when the Peruvian Republic was established. The elite of the new state-nation maintained the same type of exploitative economic order, while the society slowly changed from a feudal to a bourgeois one. Thurner (1997) supports this interpretation. With a slightly wider outlook he writes (p. 154, footnote 12):

> Why was the late colonial jurisdiction largely maintained in the early Republican period? The Andean historian's answer to the query is terse: the Creole state was in many ways an extension of the late colonial project of the Bourbon

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[123] INEI (2002a: 4) warns that slight differences in methodology imply that the conclusions from different years are not strictly comparable (see INEI 2001a). Other data of the study related to ethnicity; the individual's perceptions of his/her own poverty, civil participation, security and violence; health, education, employment, living expenses, income, etc. is still being processed.

administrative reform, albeit with a postcolonial national twist.

Within the perspective of these interpretations, the numbers of the tables above support these views. They show that the economically healthiest parts of Peru, i.e., those departments with the lowest poverty, are - exceptions commented upon earlier - located in the coastal Lowland, which from the beginning was the preferred region of the colonizers. The Highland, which is the region where the exploitation has been most intense, has gone on longest, and in which the colonizers had only an economic exploitative interest, is where the population still suffers economically most. And the conditions of the most recent 'conquered' or 'colonized' zone where the exploitative apparatus is still in its infancy, relatively speaking, i.e., the Amazon Lowland, is trailing those of the Andean highland seemingly along a trajectory of increasing exploitation and - as I will argue later - socio-economic retardation of the population. Whatever way would want to define and delineate the ethnic population of Peru it is clear that it overlaps to an overwhelming degree with the poorest stratum of the Peruvian society.

On Education: Marshall's (1950) concept of citizenship had as one of its main premises the existence of equal *opportunities* for all members of the society, meaning that he emphasized not which rights the citizen had, but that he or she, if so wanted, should not be prevented from acquiring the same benefits as any other members of the society. He made only one exception, i.e., education, because without proper education the member was not expected to be able to make sound choices for himself. Therefore, in Marshall's view, the society had an obligation to give every citizen a suitable education.

It is widely accepted that the basic educational offer in Peru varies widely across the country. For example, the children in the Asháninka community of San Miguel, district of Perené, where I stayed and which I report upon (see appendix J), received in their local school a low-grade primary education characterized by disinterested and frequently absent teachers, questionable pedagogy, substandard or no school material, and no support when a pupil fell behind. Adding to this was the absence of the use of Arawak, the language of the Asháninkas, in the education. Bilingual education in the schools is important for two reasons: to facilitate the instruction of the teacher *and* to strengthen the identity of the ethnic person by countering the eroding effect of Spanish and mestizo values on the person's ethnic identity. The result is that children are not able to

understand the teaching and may loose interest, with bad performance throughout their schooling. Not unexpectedly, these factors go hand in hand with high drop-out rates, absence from class, taking classes more than once, and failure to graduate as planned. Usually ethnic parents have little to offer their children in way of encouragement since they may have less education that their children strive for and no practice in exercising what they once learned.

A group of rural primary school teachers - all mestizos - whom I discussed these matters with on a bus ride in the Highland between Ayacucho and Huancayo, underscored the aforementioned points by pointing out that the language skills in Spanish among many of the children during their first school years were far from satisfactory. In their estimate, at least one-fourth of the students needed additional explanation in class on the subject in the indigenous language of Quechua (or Aymara where that dominates). Unfortunately, only a small fraction of the teachers working in ethnic communities of Peru is bilingual. I was tempted to believe, but without having hard data, that due to a broader economic and social interaction with the dominant society between the indigenous Highland communities and the dominant society, indigenous children may have been more exposed to Spanish-speaking people and therefore should have had better Spanish skills than children in the more isolated native communities of the Amazon Lowland. In that case, other factors being equal, one would expect that children in the native Amazon communities are more in need of bilingual teaching than indigenous children in the Highland. However, according to my informants, they did not have a lower failure rates in their rural Highland schools than those I later will record on from the Amazon Lowland. I emphasize, however, that flawed school performance is depending on a number of interacting factors, whose effects cannot be easily assessed individually. What I did note was that low performance was quickly written off by the teachers as being related to cultural factors and stupidity among the students.

The educational system of Peru does not honor the plurality of cultures and life styles of its population; a daunting task under the best of circumstances. Worse, it does not even prepare its pupils for entering this multicultural, multinational society, ultimately putting the least resourceful stratum of the population at an even greater disadvantage. The discussion above on the quality of the national educational system - private versus public, rural versus urban, Coast versus Inland etc. - shows that the system does not aspire to any

uniform level across the country.

The INEI 1993 census, the latest available, reported that in the rural areas of Peru, 29 percent of the population had pre-school or nothing. In the Department of Loreto, whose population has the large share of native people, 62 percent of its rural population had completed one or more of the six grades of primary school, while the number for Peru's native Amazon population was 49 percent, much the same situation as for the Peruvian rural population in general, which shows 50 percent. Among those who have completed some grade in secondary school, once more the Amazon native population score slightly lower than the Peruvian rural population, 16 and 18 percent, respectively. The national average is 36 percent, meaning that in Peru a child in the urban areas have a 3.5 better chance of completing a grade of secondary school than a child in the rural areas, using a 'corrected' urbanization factor of 40 percent (Lima excluded)[124]. An Amazon native child is slightly worse off than a rural child. With respect to getting into superior school both the rural and the native population show 3 percent (rounded number) while the national average is 20. Using the same assumption as before, it means that an urban person has a 15.2 better chance than a native (or rural) person to make it into superior school.

Among the Amazon natives, the females are the overwhelming losers. The percentage of native males and females who go to primary school is 53 and 44, respectively, i.e., for every 100 boys who have completed one or another grade in primary school, only 83 girls reach that educational bracket. The gender gap increases as the pupils move up in the educational system. Only half as many females as males go to secondary school.

The normative educational age in Peru is from start of primary school at 6 years of age until completed secondary school, i.e., the age bracket from 6 to 17 years of age. In the ideal case, the child should enter secondary school at the age of 11. INEI (1993) reports that of the native Amazon population in the normative age, 67 percent is still in primary school (instead of ideally 55), 7 percent have moved on to secondary school (ideally 45), and 26 percent is outside the educational system (ideally 0). The high number outside the system veils the delay of the progress of native children. Of those *inside* the system, 90.5 percent of those in the normative age are still in primary school, while only 9.5 percent are in secondary school. From those numbers one can identify one

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[124] All numerically-derived conclusions here and in the following are mine.

more reason why few pupils move on to secondary school - they are getting 'old' and are needed by their families elsewhere. The explanation to why the pupils get delayed or fall outside the system are many, some overlapping: delayed start in school; repeating same grade, i.e., not being promoted to next grade; physical difficulties getting to the school, often due to long distances; language problems, particularly in the crucial first couple of school years; lack of interest or support in the child's environment for schooling; deserting the school; and flaws in the educational system itself. School attendance among native children is lower than among any other group. Eighty-seven percent of Peruvian children between 6 and 11 years attend an educational center, in metropolitan Lima the percentage is 92, and in native communities 75 percent. For the age group 12-17 the percentages are 74, 81 and 62, respectively - showing that native children, as a group, are behind other groups throughout their normative educational age (INEI 1993).

According to INEI (1993), 13 percent of the national population at or above the age of 15 years of age was illiterate. Among indigenous communities, the percentage was 2.5 times higher than the national average and *nearly 10 times larger* than in metropolitan Lima where the percentage was 4 percent. Once more women were at the loosing end.

APPENDIX B

THE NATIVE POPULATION OF THE PERUVIAN AMAZON

Table B-1 lists the native peoples (with more than 2,000 members) of the Peruvian Amazon together with their location and linguistic affiliation[125].

Table B-1
Native peoples of the Peruvian Amazon of more than 2,000 members.
(Source: INEI 1993)

Native people[1]	Population[2]	Located (departments)	Language
Aguaruna	45,137	Amazonas, Loreto, San Martin, Cajamarca	Jiboro
Asháninka	40,518	Junín, Ucayali, Cusco, Ayacucho, Pasco	Arawak
Lamas-Chachapoya	22,513	San Martín	n/d
Shipibo-Conibo	20,178	Ucayali, Loreto, Madre de Dios, Huánuco	Pano
Chayahuita	13,717	Loreto, San Martín	Cahuapana
Cocama-Cocamilla	10,705	Loreto, Ucayali	Tupi Guarani
Quichua-Napo-Pastaza	10,553	Loreto, Cusco	n/d
Machiguenga	8,679	Cusco, Madre de Dios	Arawak
Amuesha	6,980	Pasco, Junín, Huanuco	Arawak
Huambisa	5,545	Amazonas, Loreto	Jibaro
Campa-Nomatsiguenga	5,531	Junín	Arawak
Achual	4,719	Loreto	n/d
Campa de Pichis	3,918	Pasco	Arawak
Campa-Pajonalino	3,823	Ucayali	Arawak
Yagua	3,487	Loreto	Peba Yagua
Campa del Ucayali	2,793	Ucayali, Huanuco	Arawak
Piro	2,553	Ucayali, Madre de Dios, Loreto, Cusco	Arawak
Others	17,398	Loreto, Ucayali, Madre de Dios, Junín, Cusco, Huánuco	

[1] Peoples with less than 2,000 members have been lumped together in 'Others'; [2] These numbers are uncorrected. After correcting for native members not reached, the number of people approached, 239,674, was increased with 24.8 percent to 299,218 persons (as of 1993).

Some of the information referred to above was collected by INEI in 1993, the latest national census. Data were collected under difficult conditions since a considerable part of the population was uprooted and census workers were intimidated due to the still ongoing internal war, and large areas were inaccessible. Besides, even under the best

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[125] Dean (2002: 200) gives slightly different numbers: Asháninka (approx. 60,000); Aguaruna (approx. 45,000); Shipibo (approx. 25,000); Cocama-Cocamilla (approx. 11,000); Machiguenga (approx. 11,000). In the Peruvian Amazon there are numberous native societies whose numbers have dwindled to the hundreds - such as the once mighty Omágua and the Jebero (numerous in Ecuador) - or those that are literally on the verge of cultural extinction - such as Orejón, Ocaina and Pinchi - or whom only a handful remain.

working conditions, one may wonder how reliable demographic data can be in the rural areas, given the dispersed population, their skepticism to outsiders, and with infrastructure often missing.

The 1993 census recorded 1,450 native communities of 65 different peoples with a total of 299,218 members (adjusted), representing more than 11 different linguistic families. Some peoples have no linguistic classification. The data point to the heterogeneity and of the native peoples, indicating the difficulties in establishing *one* representative authority, which can speak on behalf of all the native peoples. The table shows that members of the same people often are spread over numerous departments and - by implication - over large areas within each department with a lack of normal infrastructure.

The native peoples have a clear notion what constitutes their territory, but the boundary is more social than physical, meaning that it is delineated mostly by the extension of their social relationships. For this reason, native territories will expand and contract over time. A native territory should be appreciated less than a region where a population is situated, but as a 'world' surrounding the community to which it is physically and spiritually connected through a worldview of itself. Given this cultural condition, titling of land used by native communities raises its own problems.

The 1993 census showed that a higher percentage of natives are found in the age brackets of 0-14 than in the rural Peru in general due to higher fertility among native women than among women in the rural areas in general *and* that the trend of declining number of children among native women is trailing that of women in other rural areas. Half the native population is 14 years of age or younger (INEI 1993), for Peru in general it is 37, and in metropolitan Lima 30 percent.

APPENDIX C

<u>INTERNAL COLONIALIZATION (PERU)</u>

The Peruvian legislation declares that all subterranean resources, like hydrocarbons and minerals (ore), are the property of the State and therefore at the discretion of the government. This has been challenged by native organizations, among them the most representative one, AIDESEP, which has demanded that part of the values extracted from native land must benefit the local communities. The CNPAA (*Comisión Nacional de Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuanos*), a high-profiled congressional commission headed by the president's wife, CNPAA, has proposed changes to the Constitution, which would give native communities a 50 percent share in the tax revenues of the State from resources extracted from their land and would oblige the Government to ensure that an agreement is reached between the State, the extraction companies, and the involved communities how the land is being used before any extraction starts (see appendix F). The latter is less impressive than it sound; it is part of the obligations Peru accepted when the Congress ratified the ILO convention 169 in 1996. Formally, all resources on or above the surface of native land belongs to the local community, but the law is vague and is badly enforced, giving ample opportunities for misuse, in addition to extensive illegal logging and extraction of 'green gold' (exotic flora and fauna). The main extraction activities will be addressed.

Petroleum: The government's policy of petroleum exploration and production in the Amazon Areas is aggressively being promoted and has led to a new and intense stage in the Peruvian oil and gas industry with serious consequences for the native population. Almost the entire Peruvian Amazon Lowland - including protected areas like the Pacaya Samiria National Reserve between the Río Marañón and Río Ucayali in the Department of Loreto - has been divided into huge lots, which are auctioned for gas and oil extraction. Most of these areas coincide with the ancestral land of the indigenous peoples. According to the contract, the concessionaire is the owner of the resources produced. Up to 1998, concessions for an area of more than 200,000 km^2 had been opened for petroleum exploration and production (Torre López 1999: 21).

Natural gas and oil are presently being produced in Peru in primarily three locations.

One location is onshore and offshore in the north-west of the country near the coastal city of Talara of the Department of Piura. This does not affect the ethnic people. Another field, discovered in the 1970s, is located in the northern Central Jungle not far from the town of Pucallpa in the Department of Ucayali on the river of the same name. A cluster of fields were discovered in the 1970s in the north-central part of the Department of Loreto in the northern Peruvian Amazon. Today this has turned into a massive enterprise with over 150 wells drilled.

The third region where petroleum production is taking place comprises two lots located in the Department of Madre de Dios in the south-eastern part of the country near the border with Brazil and Bolivia. One of them covers a concession area of 10,000 km^2, which overlaps with the territory of native groups, the so-called 'uncontacted'. These are remnants of larger native groups that have maintained their nomadic life style and have isolated themselves due to their experiences with the dominant society over the past centuries in the form of epidemics, inhuman treatment, slavery and genocidal practices. The imposed or self-imposed isolation (depending on one's point of view) is protected by Peruvian law and the invasion of petroleum companies of their territories creates special problems, which call for special precautions, but is often ignored or manipulated. Torre López (1999: 99) reports that petroleum companies working in this area have formally issued strict orders to their employees to respect the integrity of these peoples and not disturb them, but contacts have generally been prevented in the form of fly-overs with aircrafts designed to make native families flee the area. The other lot in the southern Amazon covers an concession area of 15,000 km^2, comprises areas of great biodiversity as well as protected areas, and is located in the ancestral land of the native Harakmbut and Ese'eja peoples (ibid.: 117). The native population, which has been most directly affected, has not received any compensation or benefits from these activities. All the districts impinged upon are characterized by extreme poverty.

The huge gas field of Camisea that will be put on stream in 2004 and will be Peru's most important energy source for years to come is located in the Province of Convención of the Department of Cusco, in the very heartland of the ancestral land of the Machiguengas and Yines, as well as four indigenous peoples living in isolation. That region includes extensive, well-preserved biodiversity, and the majority of the territory is virgin with forests untouched by logging and settlers. Additional work is in progress to

construct a pipeline across the Andes to transport the production to Lima.

In a previous undisturbed environment, the impact of this kind of activities is massive. It includes building of roads able to carrying heavy equipment; airports; drilling platforms; production and treatment plants; pipelines; camps for personnel; refineries; heliports; aircraft and helicopter activities; an invasion of workers; and, following them, settlers; and so on, spread over the total concession area of 5,000 km^2 per concession block. Seismic exploration precedes the build-up and production phase. That is a time of massive impact on an environment and a population totally unprepared for this kind of industrial activity - and more so where access is troublesome and primary jungle has to be cleared. This work requires large numbers of workers, noisy machinery, chainsaws, overland vehicles, helicopters, and so on. The preparatory work of seismic testing consists of clearing narrow paths of 2,000 to 2,500 km in length crossing the concession lot. Every 100 meters a 20-meter hole is drilled, and an explosive charge is placed. The reflections of the emitted seismic waves contain information whether the geological structures underneath are oil-bearing. During the production phase, pollution may add to the problems in the form of oil spills both from the production facilities and pipelines that transport the crude to the refineries on the coast; the daily discharge of huge volumes of salty formation water into the area's creeks and streams; and discharge of production chemicals by accidents, negligence or unprofessional standards.

Mining: Mining is an important earner of foreign currency for Peru, but the absence and slack implementation of the legislation on security, protection of the environment, and health standards make these activities a heavy burden on the local environment and the local population. Mining plays an important role in the employment in the Highland, but it is of minor importance along the Coast and in the Amazon Lowland. In the Highland, 27.3 percent of the economically active population is influenced, while 2.3 and 2.9 percent in the two last-mentioned zones, respectively (CTAR/Ayacucho, pers. com.). It is not known how jobs in the mining industry in the Highland are distributed among migrating workers from the Coast or within the Highland and residents of the regions where mining take place. Most likely, locals have little to offer due to the needs of highly qualified personnel[126].

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[126] Eighty-three percent of the national EAP is located along the coast, 13 in the Highland and 4

The town of Cajamarca[127] will be used to exemplify this industry. The town is located in the Highland department of the same name. The main mining company here, Minería Yanacocha, is a joint venture of foreign investors, with a production in 2001 of 58.7 tons of refined gold out of a national production of 138.0 tons (INEI 2002c: 472), arrived to Cajamarca in 1992. The activity represents the largest mining activity in South America. Its location is only 15 km from the town of Cajamarca. Its activities are spread over 20 km^2, but the company owns additional land around comprising 250 km^2. The official production in year 2000 was 55.0 tons of refined gold (INEI 2002c: 472), representing a market value of US$10.58 million per ton, in addition to a string of other valuable products. The output has been increasing over the years. The proven reserves imply that the mine has an estimated life time of another 20 years at present production level. To indicate the extent of this activity, the following numbers are offered. Using a rough measure for gold mining in Peru, each gram of gold produced requires extraction of one million gram of ore (Saenz; pers. com.). In other words, for each ton of gold produced, the weekly volume of extracted ore is roughly 385 m^3. After centrifuge and concentration processes, the gold is removed from the crushed ore in a water bath containing a large volume of a cyanide compound. That part is ideally supposed to be a closed system. Extraction water, which fails to be recycled, i.e., spill water, goes into the nearby rivers or the underground water basin. Mercury is used to separate the gold from other fine materials toward the end of the processing to form an amalgam. The mercury is vaporized by heating, leaving behind pure gold. Production of 1 kg of gold requires 2 kg of mercury (Sáenz, pers. com.).

The effects on the town of Cajamarca, which earlier was nearly self-sufficient and lived off mainly livestock production, have been heavily felt. One aspect is social consequences - prostitution, drug use and crime - another is the cost of living where prices are being inflated by the well-salaried miners, a moneyed aristocracy with devastating effects on the rest of the population. In spite of the size of the Yanacocha company, no aspect of its activities functions as a motor for development of value to the

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in the Amazon Lowland (INEI staff, pers. com.).

[127] In Cajamarca I had repeated interviews with Sáenz, Director of Planning of the Municipality of Cajamarca, and with a representative of CONACAMI (*Coordinadora Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería*), who did not wanted his name released. My subsequent requests for interviews with representatives of the Yanacocha Mining Company were declined.

town of Cajamarca. Instead, the town has been turned into a resort camp for the company's labor force, mostly men. The sectors of education, transport and hotels have gained economically, but these services are economically outside the reach for the large majority of the regular population. Contrary to what one might have believed, Yanacocha has no responsibility for the local infrastructure, schools for its workers' children, medical services or benefit plans for its workers, etc. Through the arrangements which govern the relations between foreign investors and the Peruvian State, these responsibilities are all left to the State, meaning that the locals of Cajamarca are no better off than the rest of the Highland population in spite of their hugely profitable neighbor.

This peculiar situation is one more example of the extreme centralization of Peru. The major part of the income of the Peruvian State is based on extraction of natural resources - the most profitable being petroleum (produced primarily in the Amazon Lowland) and ore in the Highland. All dealings between the representatives of the foreign investors and those of the Peruvian State are handled by State officials in Lima, which were said to have as little knowledge *about* the local populations in the areas where the extraction is going on as they have responsibility *for* their social and economic conditions (Sáenz, priv. com.). One on my high-placed informants in Lima added that no one in the center really cared about the situation in the Inland (Deep Throat, priv. com.).

The key to the absolution of the mining industry with respect to its responsibility to its workforce and the local environment is that no workers are hired by the mining companies themselves. The labor force is hired by service companies, which mostly are foreign-based - the majority from Chile and Columbia. Yanacocha deals only with this multitude of service companies; not only with respect to hiring manpower, but in relation to the acquisition of other services as well. In practice, the service companies serve as a buffer between Yanacocha and the surrounding society. They come and go, depending on their usefulness to the mining company. The service companies, on their hand, are protected from any long-term claims from their employees since they sign only 3-months' contracts, which are routinely renewed when things run smoothly. Due to this organizational scheme, greased by high salaries because the mining industry needs well qualified workers, which are in short supply and seldom available locally, Yanacocha never has had conflicts with its workers. This does not mean that the company is a flawless employer. Instead, the organizational scheme implies that there is no one to

focus one's complaints and grievances up against - perhaps with exception of the much-used anonymous façade of *Palacio del Gobierno* at Plaza de Armas in Lima.

The scheme with service companies and their short-term contracts ensures that the workers and anyone else dealing with the mining industry are at its mercy. The Peruvian State is utterly dependent on the revenues from the activities of companies like Yanacocha and the foreign investors behind. It is unlikely that the State will rock the boat by expanding the supervision of the mining activities or propose legislation that would improve the conditions in the environment where the extraction industry is active since it might cut into the profit and disrupt the relationship with the investors. To the extent Yanacocha at all responds to complaints about its operations, it claims it has an excellent environmental record. That record, i.e., the marks on the surroundings and the lifeless polluted rivers, tells another story. The latest 'accident' took place in June 2000. One of the service companies, working for Yanacocha, dumped 150 kg of extremely poisonous inorganic mercury along a 60 km long road crossing 6 districts. More than 1,800 persons were infected. Ultimately, Yanacocha accepted the responsibility. According to my sources, Yanacocha offered children S/5 (US$1.42) per day to pick up the mercury, later raised to S/100 per kilo of mercury found, without giving any of them protective gear or informing anybody about the health risk of the contamination. One year later, locals continued to show mercury contamination far above the danger level. Yanacocha's offer of a few hundred soles as compensation to some of the victims has been rejected by the locals. Local and regional authorities had gone to great length not to be involved, and, likewise, some NGOs, fearing for having their activities jeopardized (priv. com.).

The information of my interview with a representative of CONACAMI (name withheld on request) - a national association of representatives of environments affected by the operations of the mining industry, put the problems of Cajamarca into a larger perspective. On the one hand, the mining activities, which are heavily dependent on foreign investments, technology and competence, generated an export value of US$3,188 million in 2001 - slightly less than half the total value of Peru's export of 7,108 million (INEI 2002c). On the other hand, the mining industry has no forward or backward linkages to the rest of the economy of Peru. The share of the State's income from mining, which is transferred to the provinces, the so-called *canon,* represents only 0.7 percent of the aforementioned export value. The mining industry of Peru, therefore, is an excellent

example of what Jaffee (1990: 176-177) refers to as 'enclave economies' created by foreign investments in poor countries producing mainly raw materials.

The mining activities in Peru have compromised a large number of rivers, which are crucial to communities and populations downstream of the mining sites. My informant mentioned that 3,200 peasant communities had been influenced without warning or consultation. The State, represented by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, is supposed to regulate and establish policies and industrial guidelines in the mining sector and see to that existing safety regulations are followed. Clearly, this part does not function. There exists no institution, which oversees the dispositions of that Ministry or has an independent mandate and resources to keep a watch on the mining companies. This means that any rights the members of the affected communities may have, become illusionary.

Protests raised against the mining industry have little change to succeed or get attention. The State's economic interests in the industry and the scheme of service companies have been mentioned. Others points are that the communities are not well organized, do not have the resources to confront the companies, and the center, i.e., Lima, has no interest for what goes on in the Inland. The mines are located in remote locations, and the local influence of the medium to large mining companies makes them a local power center. One conflict, however, which got national attention was the plan of the large Canadian mining company, Manhatten, in the spring of 2002, to buy land and start mining for gold, copper, and zinc in the very center of the agricultural area of Tambogrande in the Coast zone some 90 km from the town of Piura. The company claimed that its mining practices would not contaminate the environment and would have no effect on the agricultural activities carried out by numerous small producers in one of the most fertile agricultural areas of the country. In conflict with the law, Manhatten never presented to the governmental body in charge, the Ministry of Agriculture, the obligatory Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) document that details the ecological and social consequences for public and professional scrutiny. In spite of initial investments, claimed by the mining company to be in the multi-hundred-million dollar range, Manhatten could guarantee direct jobs for only 350 persons, in an area where agriculture at present offers 16,000 jobs. A sizeable part of the latter would be lost if Manhatten get the concession (La República 2002ao: 12).

In June 2002, with a solid presence of international observers, but without the approval of the government, the locals voted over Manhatten's proposal and turned it down overwhelmingly. Manhatten's proposal got 283 votes (1.4%), while the no-votes summed to 19,996 (98.6%) with a participation of 58 percent of eligible voters. The result in Tambogrande was widely interpreted as an example of democracy-in-action, but offer an interesting look into how State-sanctioned industrial projects are implemented in Peru over the head of the local population (La República 20.06.02: 18; 21.06.02: 19; 22.06.02: 19). In the case of Tambogrande, the Ministry of Agriculture declared in advance that a public vote was illegal, would be ignored by the government, and that its decision would be based on an assessment of the EIA – which, however, formally speaking, needs local endorsement to be approved.

Alluvial gold mining: Only a small part of Peru's mining activities carried out by big companies takes place in the Amazon Lowland, but the ongoing small-scale mining can have severe consequences for the native population. A significant proportion of the native population in the Department of Madre de Dios, in the so-called Karene Zone, is located within areas opened up for petroleum exploration and production. This is also an area which has received the largest concentrations of migrants from the Highland; more than 25,000. They have settled on the banks of the rivers and dedicate themselves to extraction of alluvial gold, putting additional pressure on the territory of the local Harakmbuts and Ese'ejas, who now frequently collide with the invaders over access to water. Alluvial mining implies a massive impact on the environment. The rule-of-thumb is that to obtain two grams of gold it is necessary to remove a cubic meter of sediment, which muddy the river water, change the river bed and inflict damages on the hydrobiological resources. Along with the activity, comes contamination from fuel, human waste and mercury from the gold separation process. In the latter case, mercury used in the gold extraction enters the food chain and works its way to people who consume the fish. Gold prospecting along the riverbanks is interrupted during the rainy season. Then the settlers return to their homes in the Highland or attempt to survive on the local resources in competition with the local natives. Alluvial exhaustion causes prospectors to move in search of ore inland, belonging to native communities. Heavy machinery is being used for this type of extraction, removing the forest at a massive scale and leaving a lunar landscape in its path. In addition to the pressures from mining and

petroleum extraction, plans exist for opening the land for regional roads and an international Peru-Brazil trans-oceanic highway, adding logging, immigration, unregulated harvesting of the jungle flora and social conflicts to the list of threats to the environment and the local people (Torre López, priv. com.)

Logging and 'Green Gold': Another serious threat to the native Amazon population, its environment, and its way of living is logging, which take place within and near to the territory of their communities. Precious timber, which fetches a good price on the international market - sometimes with a permit, but more often without one - is brought out in truckloads. Existing roads are being used for this transport, though most is taken out by rivers, and people are being paid off to look another way. Allowing loggers to cut down trees indiscriminately and illegally is a way out of the poverty, which rules in most of the Peruvian Amazon. For example, *cumala,* a valuable timber, which sometimes replaces mahogany, is sold locally to traders for S/40 (US$11.60) per m^3 and resold on the Mexican market FOB at US$470-520 per m^3. The product fetches a significantly higher price on the US market. In the district of Mazán of 90 km^2 and 15,600 inhabitants, in the department of Loreto north of the town of Iquitos, with wide-spread and extreme poverty, *cumala* of a market value of US$14 million were brought out illegally in a few weeks in the spring of 2002. Chain-saws work day and night and mahogany, *cumala*, cedar, *ishpingo* and other valuable trees are cut down and brought out from unprotected as well as legally protected areas, like the National Reserve of Pacaya-Samiria north-east of Yurimaguas. The total value of illegal extraction of biomaterial from the Peruvian Amazon – timber and so-called *oro verde* (green gold) like orkidés, live animals, rare fishes, etc. - may sum to more than US$500 million annually (La República 2002ad: 16).

One side of the problem with logging is the illegal part; another is the legal one where, on the one hand, the interests of the State, small/medium and large private businesses, foreign investors, and market forces, and, on the other, those of the locals and NGOs, collide. Mid-2000, the Government of Fujimori passed a law (*Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre*, No. 27308), which allowed larger areas to be logged annually, and put previously protected species on the list of those which could be exploited freely. The new law increased the limit on land, which could be leased out to small or medium logging companies for a period of 40 years. The small companies are now granted from 5 to 10

thousand hectares (50-100 km^2), while the medium ones are assigned up to fifty thousand. However, as the argument goes, a company that wants to be competitive internationally needs at least a concession of 120,000 hectares, because the investments are high. For example, a forestall tractor costs US$180,000.

APPENDIX D

THE STATE AND THE SMALL-SCALE AGRO-SECTOR (PERU)

In this part I will demonstrate, through policy examples, the economic priorities by which the rural population is kept in stagnation and poverty and how that poverty is continuous regenerated. The information builds and details information which was presented in Appendix A.

Introduction: To an extraordinary degree the Peruvian State has taken a hands-off position in relation to the social problems created by its economic policies (or lack of same). It is difficult to say whether its position is a result of pressure from international finance institutions, which worry for the security of its investments and therefore put a bound on the Government's ability to establish a policy of its own, as the political opposition claims, or whether it is old wine in new bottles, meaning that the State feels no responsibility for the rural population and the massive value transfer from the rural to the urban areas is unofficial policy. In the mid-2002 the Peruvian Congress started to discuss the wording of its next Constitution. This is intended to distance the present regime from the authoritarian past of Fujimori. Proposals have poured in from the civil society with requests, like, strengthening individual and, particularly, labor rights which had been lost in the last decade; honoring the existence of Peru's large ethnic population; and modifying the economic principles of the State, which have shown no compassion for the increasingly disadvantaged majority of the population, as the economy has gone from bad to worse.

Everyone of my informants, including common people and public officers in high places in Lima and elsewhere, would point out that neither the government nor the State had established clear policies for their initiatives in the rural socio-economic sectors - with policies meaning perspectives, guidelines or principles; defined targets; deadlines; in-pour of appropriate resources, thought-through implementation plans; and regular reviews to make adjustments when programs did not merge well with reality or did not meet progress goals. They would claim that uncoordinated initiatives may take place on a case-to-case basis, primarily close to metropolitan Lima or the Coast, but without

changing the impression of indifference to the task at hand. And they would point out that the promotion of grand schemes, combined with an absence of follow-ups, was the most typical characteristic of the government's 'policies' with exception of a few high-yield economic target areas. As La República (2002f: 11) phrased it: 'Much indicate that in spite of that the agro-sector was declared a 'priority A-1' by the presidential candidate, Alejandro Toledo, it is not for the government'. Numerous large and prestigious State programs exist in Peru, each with large staffs, premises and resources. Glossy planning reports of no future are written and ultimately filed locally or centrally in chancy ways where they quickly get lost - as I experienced when I followed up some of my interviews and looked for recent regional reports by CTAR (*Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional*) both in that organization's regional offices and, failing there, in its headquarter in the *Ministerio de la Presidencia*, in Lima. But even well-intended programs do not sum up to a policy. Scrutinizing the State bodies that are in charge of these programs, may be an equally good way to learn about the hopelessness and stagnation in the countryside as to watch a family working on its plot and count the few pennies it earns after a long workday.

The Agro-Sector and the 'Free Market'-Economy: Even without the ongoing economic crisis, the problems in the agricultural sector of Peru are enormous and they are getting worse. The agro-sector employs 32 percent of Peru's economically active population and the average unit of production nationally is 3.2 hectares and in the Highland 2.4 hectares (INEI; pers. com.). The last numbers, however, is highly distorted by averaging the huge, but relatively few large agro-businesses with the many small subsistence farms. Peasants in numerous places in the southern Highland of Peru would tell me repeatedly that plots of land of ⅓-½ hectare (0.13-0.20 acres) per family was common in their communities. The overwhelming part of these production units (called *minifundios* when they are less than 3 hectares) are run by individual families at or near subsistence level. Most have small additional economic activities on the side, raising small animals, but very little money goes through the hands of these families. In addition to the plot sizes, one needs to consider the low-yield soil, low technification, insufficient use of artificial means (fertilizers etc.), no access to loans, and no public investments. The negative effects of these factors are enhanced by the crushing effects of free market

ideology, which leave the most vulnerable in the Peruvian economic pecking order without defenses. That topic will be discussed in the following.

The continuous decline over the last years in prices on the agro-products to the small producer in both the Amazon Lowland and the Highland, the extremely low purchasing power of the rural population, the absence of public incentives, the contraband and the Government-sanctioned legal import which push down the prices on the products of the small peasant, were frequently mentioned by my informants as the main domestic reasons for the abysmally bad situation of the small-scale Highland peasants. And the situation deteriorates. The drop in prices to the customer in the local market from 2000 to 2001, shown in table D-1, is given as an example. It shows that the price has dropped for a number of widely produced products of the Peruvian medium to large-scale producer in the national and international markets with up to 40 and 60 percent, respectively. The table shows prices for products in the regional markets and for export.

Table D-1
Drop in market prices (soles, US$) in Peru for some agro-products
from end-2000 to end-2001. (Source: La República 2001f: 11).

Product	Unit	Year 2000	Year 2001	Price drop (%)
National retail markets[1]		**soles**[3]	**soles**	
Potatoes	/kg	0.50	0.30	-40
Rice	/kg	0.80	0.60	-25
Cotton	/quintal (100 lbs, 48 kg)	110	80	-27
Milk	/liter	0.80	0.60	-25
International markets (delivered USA)[1]		**US$**	**US$**	
Rice	/metric ton	400	245	-39
Yellow maize	/metric ton	160	85	-47
Wheat	/metric ton	200	100+	<-50
Sugar	/metric ton	350	270	-23
Coffee	/quintal	180	60+	<-67
Cacao	/kg	140	78	-44
Cotton[2]	/quintal	100	57	-43

[1] These are prices in the local markets, not what the small producer receives.
[2] The sole was fairly stable against the dollar within the time window.
[3] Agraria (2002b: 13)

What is the government doing to help the peasants in the continuing worsening situation? A National Council (*Consejo Nacional de Concertación Agraria*), without a specific

mandate, was established by the president in June 2002, but as one newspaper commentator phrased it (La República 2002ar: 30):

> Only to make a decision to establish a body to coordinate agrarian strategies is remarkable given the authoritarian political views and the economic neoliberalists, who claim - particularly in the case of agricultural sector - that the State has little to do there and should treat it as any other sector.

The prices of the products of the Amazon Lowland, sold by the peasant in his chacra, were addressed in my discussion of the conditions of the Lowland, using the Asháninka community of San Miguel as my basis. The same situation, with low prices on the products to the small producer, which benefit the intermediaries, governs in the Highland as well. One example: urban and rural people I talked with in the southern Highland between Ayacucho and Huancayo would tell me that while price in the chacra was S/0.10 (US$0.03) per kilo of potatoes, the price in the urban market, sometimes just a few kilometers away, would be 3 kilos per S/1.00, i.e., an increase of 230 percent.

According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the cost of the statistical minimum basket of food (*canasta basica de alimentos*), which defines the level between 'poverty' and 'extreme poverty', decreased from 1997 to 2000 with between 6.5 and 14.6 percent (Agraria 2002b: 3), reflecting the declining prices of domestic food products in different parts of the country. One would think this would be to the benefit of the non-agrarian poor. Not so; the national real income fell 16 percent from 1997 to 2000, meaning that the majority of the population had less money to spend on needed food - with falling prices as a result.

Access to the Capital Market: In a modern economy the goal of the monetary policy is not only to maintain the stability of the national currency and a low inflation rate, but to make capital available at interest rates that encourage the economy to grow and create employment, particularly in a country with a fast rising population as Peru. Recent INEI data show that the employment in Peru has increased with 0.9 percent per year since 1994, while the economically active population has increased annually with 2.3 percent[128]. The work force in manufacturing has decreased with 11 percent since 1994, in part because the Peruvian market, reflecting the government's free market policy, is flooded with legally and illegally imported low-grade manufactured and agrocultural

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[128] La República (2002ay: 28).

products from countries where the labor is even cheaper than in Peru. Given this situation, why does Peru maintain this institutionalized exclusion of access to capital in a country that is badly in need of entrepreneurial attitudes and producers of products, but whose economic activity - as exemplified by the activities of its informal sector - consist mostly of unregulated intermediaries and layers and layers of cost-adding *vendedores* (salespersons)? De Soto (1989) offers one answer, which points to that the government feels no responsibility for addressing the social conditions of the population - and less so in the rural areas.

Following up a campaign promise by candidate Toledo, the Peruvian Congress signed into law in December 2001, the establishment of an agrarian bank (*Banco Agropecuario de Peru*, referred to as *Agrobanco*) to help, as it was claimed, 'the least resourceful of the agro-producers'. At present, less than 1.0 percent of the agro-producers have access to the public financial institutions. La República (2002c: 11) had an analysis in early 2002, that did not promise well for the government's initiative. The article claimed that out of 1,745,000 small producers targeted by the bank, the Agrobanco would be able to serve only 200,000. The reason was that 490,000 had less than 3 hectares and were in a state of subsistence, while another 500,000 were in precarious conditions. These would need not only credits, but different kinds of technical support and direct help in addition to the removal of structural conditions that worked against them. Agrobanco had made clear that it would exclude both these categories. Out of the rest, i.e., roughly 648,000 small producers, 200,000 struggled with specific problems like access to the market, lack of proper technology etc. To put the size of the capital of Agrobanco into perspective, the article mentioned that the formal financial sector in the eight months from January through September of 2001, had given loans to only 25,884 large and medium agro-producers for a total amount of US$540 million - more than seven times the initial capital of Agrobanco. The new bank started operating in June 2002. It is too early to say to which extent this initiative will reach those it had in mind.

One might have assumed that a category of peasants including native groups like the Asháninkas of San Miguel and the peasants in the Highland, being among the poorest of the poor, would have been targeted by a support program like Agrobanco; not so. Peru's around 5,700 peasant communities and around a thousand native communities in the Amazon Lowland, which together represent between 3 and 4 million persons (Agraria

2002b) - other sources claim close to 6 million (and I propose an even higher number) – will be excluded. The reason is that loans, as the present practice is, are given only on an individual basis. Those who belong to the Peruvian kind of communities cannot put up security for their bank loans. The land is communal, and their houses offer no security for the bank since a person needs a permit to enter communal land.

The attitude in Peru is that when private and public investments go to the Inland, it is to facilitate the extraction of raw products, not to develop the countryside. State investments may participate in such enterprises, as is the case with the Peruvian oil industry through the State-controlled oil company, PetroPerú, and/or help to build infrastructure, which improve the transport of the extracted products to the Coast and then, primarily, Lima (Deep Throat; pers. com.). The 'economic inactivity' of the Inland, reflected in the social conditions here, explains why close to 46 percent of the GNP of Peru is generated in the Department of Lima alone (see table A-2, appendix A).

Both the indigenous person in the peasant community and the native, in spite of his semi-isolation within or on the fringes of the jungle, is caught up in an economic web which permeates the Peruvian society from top to bottom. Economic theory advices that Peru should switch to products, which have a comparative advantage and are competitive in the international market. It is indeed difficult to see how Peru - or any country under similar conditions - should be able to switch anything anywhere given its predominantly unskilled, low educated, and fast increasing population denied access to capital and struggling with problems ignored by its own government. Stiglitz (2001: 16) states that capital market liberalization has been pushed despite the fact that there is no evidence showing that it spurs economic growth, and points to that while blanket protectionism has seldom worked for countries that have tried it, nor has rapid trade liberalization. The successful Asian Tigers and China opened their markets very slowly, under national control, and with an eye to the social conditions of their populations (Cortázar, Lustig and Sabot 1998) - ignoring the advices of the international lending organizations.

The Cost of Money: What is the reason behind the excessively high interest rates the lenders in Peru charge? Stiglitz claims that IMF's insistence on developing countries to maintain tight monetary policies, based on its 'one-size-fit-all' scheme, has led to interest rates that would make any kind of economic stimulation initiatives, and particularly job

creating, impossible even under the best of circumstances (ibid: 17). How the situation is felt for common people can be exemplified as follows. A mestizo woman with a tiny grocery shop in the outskirts of Villa Perené told me that her take-home per month was S/800 (US$232). To be able to pay up front for the soft drinks she sold in her shop, as demanded by the distributor, she regularly had to take short-term bank loans, which had an interest of 3.5 percent per month - which, on an annual basis, is equivalent to 51.1 percent p.a. Her profit on a case of 12 bottles, each costing in sale S/0.50, was S/1. Her opportunity for economic capitalization was nil.

While the small potential borrower will have difficulties to meet the conditions of a loan, critique is often aired pointing to the very favorable conditions the big lenders are offered, often down to a small fraction of what is quoted above. That difference can, in part, be explained by the lower risk of defaulting on the loan of the big, established lender. However, given that Grameen Bank, which works only with micro-loans and risky lenders, but still has a default rate lower than commercial banks with 'solid' borrowers, it is tempting to speculate - given the social climate in Peru - that the reason is a desire within the moneyed elite with influence on the lending institutions to reserve the available capital for its own projects. The regime of Fujimori is still so near in time that all evils in the Peruvian society are being put on his account. One of my informants told me that one major stronghold of the surviving so-called Fujimori-Montesinos 'mafia' was the national finance system. It was difficult to root out since it is the main contributor to the campaigns of the national political figures (Deep Throat; pers. com.).

The rule-of-thumb to set interest rates on short-term bank loans in the industrialized world, given a reasonable stable economic environment, is the inflation rate plus 5-7 percent to account for administrative costs, risk and profit involved. Following that rule, short-term bank loans in Peru should, under ideal circumstances, not exceed 10-12 percent per annum - with a slight adjustment for the higher risk. My efforts to get an explanation to the high interest rates, including an interview with the higher management of *Banco de Commercio* in Lima, all failed. The most convincing explanation I found, offered in an article in the Peruvian daily, El Comercio (2002b: b4), is that the credit market in Peru is extremely tight because the legislation offers no remedies to the lender to get his money back if the borrower defaults on his loan, even when the latter has economic resources. Peruvian banks use, as a rule-of-thumb, a default rate among its

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'small' customers of 8-10 percent; large customers are rated as far more creditable[129]. Assuming the explanation offered by the article is correct, why does not the government - eventually prodded by the ubiquitous and powerful IMF - tightening the lending laws instead of establishing an ineffectual bank, like the Agrobanco?

Public and Private (Economic) Centralization: Clearly, the Peruvian State does not allocate its economic resources on premises like those of either the social-democratic Europe or the United States with a view to the combined short- and long-term gains. Further, the extreme centralization of Peru should not be described in relation to only the State located in Lima, though this is how it is normally done. One has to take into account also the mirrored centralization, which is present in the powerful, oligarchic, but also stealthier private sector of which the credit institutions are a central part. When seen in conjunction with the extraction priorities of the State, it is clear why no long-term socio-strategical investments take place anywhere in Peru. The private economic elite may be identified through its positions in the country's largest and most profitable cnterprises. Its members have a string of privileges in the national economy, both as in their capacity as helmsmen for their enterprises and as private citizens, most given them when President Fujimori was in power. Access to favorable State loans with no social obligations is one of them (La República 2002ax: 30; 2002g: 18). The members of the elite, may pay low or no personal taxes, while those just underneath in the social hierarchy do (Deep Throat, pers. com.). That practice raises important questions to how the State and the private oligarchic interests are intertwined. None of these, however, are answerable based on publically available data and, to my knowledge, no relevant studies have been carried out.

Minimum prices, subsidies, guaranteed prices: Time-limited and goal-oriented measures in the form of subsidies, minimum or guaranteed prices, target-oriented taxation, tariff barriers and so on, are widely used regulations in the advanced economies to promote economic restructuring, give breathing space to faltering industries and soften the economic blow to exposed population groups hurt by the market. The five billion dollar verdict slapped on the United States by the WTO (World Trade Organization) in

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[129] Interview with representative of Banco de Credito, Lima.

the fall of 2002, triggered by international complaints to that country's tariff barriers to protect its steel industry from what is routinely called 'dumping prices' when the competition from abroad tightens, shows that free market rhetoric get the back-seat when political realities stand in the way. Subsidies are particularly frequent in the agricultural sector. This is in accordance to what Polanyi (1944) argues - a 'free market' economy needs regulations to protect those parts of the population, which are worst hit by the market forces. In 2001 the OECD countries supported their agro-sector with US$311,000 million, while they contributed US$50,000 million to the development of the Third World (Prensa Libre 2002i: 26). In Peru governs the fundamentalist views Polanyi argues against. I discussed with my informant, Deep Throat, the possibility of using, say, minimum prices for agro-products to secure a 'decent' salary for a day's work on the numerous small family plots in Peru as part of a larger economic strategy for the Inland. His answer was (being a top advisor to the Peruvian government on development): 'Why should I pay more for a product I could get at a lower price under normal circumstances?' And he added that it would create a black market based on illegal import, which the government would not be able to control. His general statement on the matter was that, in his mind, the rural population did not need any help.

With an amazing absence of economic arguments, I was repeatedly told by my well-placed and well-educated informants that any State intervention in the agrosector would fly against the basic neoeconomic principles followed by the present and the previous government. Peru's economic hardliners steer the country's economy according to basically two over-arching goals: fiscal austerity and maintenance of, without increasing, the external debt (La República 2002an: 12; Deep Throat: pers. com.). The social cost aside, this policy has been effective. The annual inflation has been low for the last five years, the sole has been stable, and the foreign debt has not increased significantly over the last 10 years (La República 2001e: 13). The Peruvian economy is basically without State regulations, at abysmally high social costs, while being under the thumb of the IMF, pulling an increasing part of the population deeper into poverty. But that part is not part of the economic equation.

APPENDIX E

AIDESEP: AMBITIONS AND WORK PROGRAM (PERU)

AIDESEP ha venido trabajando, desde su reacción en 1980, en función de sus objetivos generales. Un resumen de las actividades que desarrolla en sus áreas operativas actualmente, son:

TERRITORIO Y RECURSOS NAURALES
- La defensa integral del territorio étnico, recursos naturales y medio ambiente.
- Linderamiento y titulación del territorio de las comunidades indígenas. Así come el establecimiento de Reservas comunales.
- Capacitación legal a promotores para el cuidado y la defensa del territorio indígena y de los recursos naturales.
- Propuesta de reglamento sobre actividades hidrocarburíferas en territorios indígenas.

ECONOMIA Y DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO
- Recopilación, investigación, promoción, capacitación y difusión de la tecnología agraria ecológica tropical, de acuerdo a los conocimientos y prácticas indígenas.
- Elaboración de planes de manejo y proyectos de desarrollo económico asentable de los recursos naturales, de acuerdo a los lineamientos de autodesarrollo de los pueblos indígenas.
- Programas de conservación y regeneración de recursos naturales renovables como garantía para el mejoramiento del nivel de vida de los pueblos indígenas.
- Participación en acciones de política nacional e internacional mediante convenios de cooperación técnica y asistencia a la población indígena.

LA SALUD INDIGENA
- Desarrollo de acciones de atención primaria de salud.
- Rescate y desarrollo de la medicina indígena, como componente básico de nuestra cultura, tanto de sus recursos humanos y materiales y fundamentalmente de sus aspectos espirituales, mágico, antropológico.
- Asimilación critica de los aportes eficaces de la medicina occidental u oficial, para ser integrados complementariamente en un sistema indígena de salud, cuya base y eje principal será la medicina indígena.
- Realización y ejecución de acuerdos y convenios con el Ministerio de Salud para apoyar en el control de las epidemias y en las campañas de inmunización a la población indígena.

DERECHOS COMO PUEBLOS INDIGENAS Y DERECHOS CIVILES
- Capacitación integral de los dirigentes y profesionales de las organizaciones indígenas.
- Defensa y asesoría legal en asuntos relacionados a los derechos colectivos e individuales de la población indígena.

- Saneamiento de la documentación personal de la población (inscripción en el Registro Civil, Registro Militar y Registro Electoral, promoviendo además la regularización de los indocumentados).
- Apoyo, asesoría y capacitación a los alcaldes y regidores indígenas en asuntos legales referidos a su gestión municipal.
- Apoyo a la gestión administrativa y la obtención de personería jurídica de las organizaciones y federaciones indígenas que lo soliciten.
- Propuesta de Ley Indígena.
- Propuesta de Ley sobre Protección de Conocimientos Tradicionales y Acceso a los Recursos Genéticos.
- Propuesta de Legislación Tributaria.

EDUCACION Y CULTURA
- Coejecución del Programa de Formación de Maestros Indígenas Bilingües de la Amazonía, colaborando y aportando además con el sector Educación en la revisión de los programas curriculares de educación primaria y de los programas de formación de maestros en la especialidad de educación bilingüe intercultural oficial.
- Conducción del Programa de Becas para formar profesionales y técnicos entre los más destacados jóvenes indígenas de las organizaciones.
- Promoción y afirmación de los valores culturales de los pueblos indígenas de la amazonía.
- Realización de investigaciones realizadas por los mismos indígenas sobre aspectos de la cultura, la ciencia, la tecnología y el arte de sus pueblos.
- Desarrollo de actividades de prensa y difusión referida a temas de interés tanto para la misma población indígena como para la opinión pública nacional.

APPENDIX F
(Reference: CNPAA 2002a)
A CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Submitted by
Comisión Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos y Amazónicos (CNPAA, Peru)

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TITULO: ESTADO Y NACIÓN

**DE LOS DERECHOS DE LOS PUEBLOS ANDINOS,
AMAZÓNICOS Y POBLACIONES AFROPERUANAS**

Articulo 1^0. - Del reconocimiento del Estado

El estado peruano reconoce la existencia de los pueblos indígenas, comunidades y poblaciones afroperuanas en la Constitución.

Articulo 2^0. - De los pueblos indígenas

Los pueblos indígenas son pueblos originarios que tienen derechos anteriores a la formación del Estado, mantienen una cultura propia, un espacio territorial y se autorreconocen como tales.

Articulo 3^0. - De las comunidades

Las comunidades indígenas constituyen formas de organización social que adoptan los pueblos indígenas. Son organizaciones de interés público, con existencia legal, personería jurídica, autonomía de gobierno y administración de sus territorios.

Articulo 4^0. -

Las poblaciones afroperuanas están constituidas por varias comunidades afroperuanas que comparten una cultura de raíces africanas insertada históricamente en el Perú.

Articulo 5^0. - De los derechos colectivo de los pueblos indígenas, comunidades y poblaciones afroperuanas

El Estado peruano reconoce la existencia de los pueblos indígenas, comunidades y poblaciones afroperuanas come personas jurídicas definidas en la Constitución.

El Estado peruano garantiza el pleno ejercicio de los derechos colectivos de los pueblos indígenas y poblaciones afroperuanas:

1. **Uso y reconocimiento del nombre.-** La denominación 'indígenas' comprende y puede emplearse como sinónimo de 'originarios', 'tradicionales', 'étnicos', 'ancestrales', 'nativos' u otros vocablos.

2. **Derechos Humanos.-** El Estado reconoce los derechos humanos indígenas y afroperuanos.

3. **Cultura.-** Identidad propia, espiritualidad, cosmovisión y control de su patrimonio cultural. Son idiomas oficiales el castellano, el quechua, el aymara y demás idiomas ancestrales.

4. **Territorio.-** Propiedad de los territorios que ocupan y de los recursos naturales tradicionalmente utilizados en sus actividades, en armonía con su preservación y adecuado uso. Tiene autonomía en el control, uso racional y administración de los recursos naturales existente al interior de los mismos. El territorio y las tierras de los pueblos indígenas son inalienables, imprescriptibles e inembargables.

5. **Minería e hidrocarburos.-** Los recursos mineros e hidrocarburíferos en tierras y territorios indígenas podrán ser explotados previa consulta y acuerdo, entre ellos, las empresas y el Estado. Se garantizará la participación en los beneficios, integridad económica y se protegerá la integridad cultural, moral y física de los pueblos afectados. Para estos casos, donde se encuentran los recursos explotados, recibirán en aplicación del principio de equidad, una participación del 50% del canon que corresponda pagar. Todo acto de prospección, exploración o tránsito, incluido el tendido de oleoductos y gasoductos, estará obligado a pagar una compensación directa por el impacto social y ecológico que produzca, incluso en casos de servidumbre legal. Los beneficios de este canon permitirán mayor calidad de vida para estos pueblos y promover un desarrollo sostenible.

6. **Derecho al desarrollo económico sostenible.-** compatible con sus practicas tradicionales, sus valores e instituciones, definición de prioridades.

7. **Derecho a la educación indígena bilingüe.-** El sistema educativo nacional es intercultural. El Estado promoverá centros de formación descentralizados en comunidades indígenas estratégicas, con el propósito de permitir educación a nivel superior a alumnos de los pueblos indígenas. El Estado en cada instituto, Universidad o centro de instrucción militar asegurará el ingreso y sostenimiento de hasta en diez por ciento su capacidad de vacantes para los pueblos indígenas. Asimismo, establecerá un programa de becas.

8. **Derecho a la propiedad colectiva de sus conocimientos.-** El Estado reconoce y garantiza el derecho y facultad para decidir sobre sus conocimientos colectivos, establecer derechos de propiedad intelectual sobre ellos, su cultura e idioma, conocimientos de medicina y salud, valores genéticos, recursos biológicos y patentes, control de los beneficios de comercialización, industrialización y puesta en el mercado.

9. **Autonomía.** - Derecho a la definición y ejercicio de sus propias instrucciones de gobierno interno, a la jurisdicción y a la participación política en los organismos del Estado, a la consulta previa a cualquier acto legal o administrativo que los afecte en concordancia con la legislación nacional.

10. **Participación Política.**- Diez por ciento de congresistas serán elegidos por circunscripción nacional especial, que serán elegidos por los pueblos indígenas y poblaciones afroperuanas. La Ley electoral se adecuará a este objetivo.

11. **Municipalidades Indígenas.**- Es derecho de los pueblos indígenas crear Municipalidades Indígenas en los territorios que habitan, cuando lo soliciten justificamente, en forma asociada. Los pueblos indígenas que cuenten con Municipalidades se adecuarán al régimen especial de Municipalidades Indígenas.

12. **Derechos de los pueblos indígenas y poblaciones afroperuanas** a presentar iniciativas de ley, en las materias que les conciernen a través de sus organizaciones representativos.

   El incumplimiento de las obligaciones estatales establecidas en la Constitución Política del Estado, habilita a la Acción de Amparo Especial.

13. **Derecho de los pueblos indígenas y poblaciones afroperuanas** a presentar iniciativas de ley, en más materias que les conciernen a través de sus organizaciones representativas.

   El incumplimiento de las obligaciones estatales establecidas en la Constitución Política del Estado, habilita a la Acción de Amparo Especial.

14. **Administración de Justicia.**- Las autoridades de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas, con el apoyo de sus propias instituciones, ejercen las funciones jurisdiccionales dentro de su ámbito territorial de conformidad con el derecho consuetudinario y en armonía con los derechos fundamentales del la persona.

   En el plazo de 06 meses se emitirá la norma de coordinación con las instancias de poder judicial.

15. **Los pueblos indígenas en aislamiento voluntario** son representados por las organizaciones indígenas locales o nacionales respectivas. Cualquier persona puede solicitar la intervención de la Defensoría del Pueblo para cautelar los derechos establecidos a favor de los pueblos en aislamiento voluntario.

16. **El Estado proveerá el marco institucional administrativo y presupuestal** adecuado para cumplir con sus obligaciones frente a los pueblos mediante la Comisión Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos y Amazónicos.

Lima, 13 de marzo del 2002

APPENDIX G

POSITIONS OF
PRIMERO CONGRESO DE LOS PUEBLOS QUECHUAS DEL PERÚ

AGREEMENTS REACHED:
1. Confirm the revitalization and importance of the Quechua culture to construct solidly the Quechua nations, which together make up the grand Quechua nation.
2. Reinforce our consciousness about the value and importance of the Quechua culture as part of the Peruvian nationality, such that we can feel being part of a State, which include all citizens, without marginalization and cultural, social and racial prejudices.
3. See to it that the Andean culture, in its historical context, will be acknowledged from the very start of the education and through the primary, secondary and superior levels to prevent that distorting and mistaken ideas are cultivated; that the Andean culture is not discriminated against, and to prevent that there exist professionals who are alien to or ignorant about their culture.
4. Proclaim the worth of the Andean culture as a central part of our activities such that we can raise substantial economic, social and cultural demands, which are just.

RESOLUTIONS SUBMITTED:
1. Propose to the Government and the Congress of the Republic to recognize the need to build a new democratic, multicultural and decentralized Peru, to meet the aspirations of the large majority of Peruvians, by beginning with the recognition of the indigenous peoples as original and constitutive peoples of the Republic of Peru.
2. We propose to the Congress of the Republic that the reform of the Constitution and the Law of the Nation must recognize that as Quechua peoples we have the right to develop our cultural diversity within a Social Pact, which reflect the general will of all the people without discrimination or exclusion.
3.   We propose that this recognition must be done in a permanent consultation with our Quecha peoples, and following this that the Laws, which are passed, promote efficiently our identity, languages, traditions, insight, development of our territories, the right to take advantage of the natural resources, autonomy and the government.
4. We declare our will to unite with descendents of other cultures and peoples of the Peruvian Republic in the patriotic task to build a unifying country, which comprises the pluri-ethnic and multicultural diversity, and with a State and a Government suitable for pluri-national diversity. We will construct as true brothers a solid base for a governability of 'all bloods'.
5. Democratically we decide the establishment of the Unifying Council of all Quechua Peoples (*Consejo Unitario de los Pueblos Quechuas*) of Peru to strengthen our culture and the representation of our interests toward the Government, the Congress of the Republic, CTARs, and other national and international institutions, which will help to promote our demands and rights.

<div align="right">Cusco, Noviembre 2001</div>

APPENDIX H

LAND AND AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES IN SAN MIGUEL (PERU)

At the time San Miguel was founded, for some 50 years ago, Perené was virgin land and each family took the land it needed, but soon pressures from the outside prevented territorial expansion. The titled territory of San Miguel consist today of 170 hectares of cultivable land. With 40 families at the latest count, summing to 232 persons, this gives 4.25 hectares of land to each family, which, I was told, was slightly on the low side of the area needed to give a 'fair' living for a 'normal' family subsistence economy[130]. However, not only land size, but the location of the land, the quality and kind of the soil, access to water etc. play in.

The land of new families must come from the land-use rights of their parents, which create problems when the family has two or more sons. Normally girls move away when they get married, and this has become the practice in families with more than one male child. However, some members have more and some less land. Table H-1 presents two independent estimates of the distribution of land-use rights in San Miguel by two members of the community - data which are kept tightly protected.

Table H-1
Distribution of cultivable Land in San Miguel (estimated)

AREA	FIRST ESTIMATE		SECOND ESTIMATE	
Plot sizes	# Families[1]	Tot. area (ha) (Control)	# Families[1]	Tot. area (ha) (Control)
8 and more hectares	6	46	5	40
6 and 7 hectares	10	65	10	65
4 and 5 hectares	10	45	8	36
3 and less hectares	10-15	30	17	34
SUM	40	186[2]	40	175[2]

[1] Total number of families is 40, comprising 232 members.
[2] Total size of cultivable land is 170 hectares (ha). As seen, total areas based on given numbers do not quite sum up to total disposable area.

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[130] In reality, very few family economies in Latin America are all-out based on subsistence farming, meaning that the family lives fully off the products of its land. Usually, a part of the produce is sold to cover expenses for purchased necessessities, indicating that the family, in part, is incorporated in the money economy. For the perspective of this study, the use of the word 'subsistence' is warranted.

A few families in San Miguel - estimated by my two informants to 6 and 5 in number, respectively - had relatively large landholdings, i.e., 8-10 hectares. In the cases I was able to identify, at least three of these were the families of the children of the main founding family of Samaniego. Close to half of the families in the community subsist on plots of a total size less than the 'minimum'. While all the families of San Miguel are poor by any sensible standard, the effects of small landholdings could easily be seen in the distinctly lower material standard of families with small land-use areas compared with that of those with more land. The dwellings of the latter were more spacious, slightly better maintained, the atmosphere in the home was less marked by absence of resources. Also, the heads of poor families and their spouses seemed to be younger and have fewer children than those of better-off families, i.e., around 30 years of age vs. 35-45 with 0-3 children versus 5-12, indicating that they belonged to third generation of Asháninkas in San Miguel and were influenced by the trend of applying family planning.

I was repeatedly told that the material needs of a family might have an impact on how land-use rights were assigned. In practice, this is not the case[131]. However, there was no disagreement - even among the favored landholders - that, in principle, a majority of the community members had the power to have the land redistributed more equally by a democratic vote in the communal assembly. But I was also told that that would be unacceptable in light of the traditions of the community and the prestige of the families with the closest relationship to the founders. It would also go against what the ancestors had laid out. Such a call would undoubtedly be countered by an accusation of *divisionismo.*

The chacras of San Miguel offer a rich variety of production – beans, coffee, pineapple, banana, mango, papaya, yucca, just to mention a tiny sample. Though some chacras are laid out with well organized beds or fruit trees lined up in columns (depends on the product), most represent a confusing picture with a variety of plants and unproductive vegetation intermixed both on the horizontal plane and on the vertical one - the latter to offer shade. However, as with Popkin's (1979: 1-31) peasant, there is a rationality in the seemingly chaos - one plant may extract minerals from the soil, which

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[131] When 23 hectares recently was transferred to the community by the Municipality of Perené, bought by funds raised in Norway, they were distributed equally among the families - not according to needs.

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the neighboring kind leaves behind. Table H-2 shows the production strategies of 4 producers, all with small land-use areas, how they have organized their chacras, size of these, the degree of utilization - under the premises of optimizing their income, the use of soil and the plants used - and my subjective impression of their family's economic-material situation. Most prefer a strategy with a variety of products, but Rubén had put all his eggs in one basket and produced for cash only bananas.

Table H-2:
Examples of land utilization in San Miguel

Area (ha)	Flavio	Enrique	Rubén & Maribel	Demetrio
¼	Coffee	Platano	Platano	Platano
¼	Coffee	Platano	Platano	Platano
¼	Yucca	Platano	Coffee	Platano
¼ - 1st hectare	Guangua	Misc.	Coffee	Platano
¼	Guangua		Beans	Platano
¼	Guangua		Avocado	Avocado
¼	Avocado		Yucca[2]	Avocado
¼ - 2nd hectare	Avocado		Yucca[2]	Avocad
¼	Not used		Not used[3]	Coffee
¼	Not used[1]		Not used[3]	Coffee
¼	Not used[1]		Not used[3]	Coffee
¼ - 3rd hectare	Not used[1]			Coffee
¼				Coffee
¼				Maize
¼				Maize
¼ - 4th hectare				Maize
Material situation:	Fair	Shaky	Shaky	Stable
Total area (hectares):	3	3	2.75	4
In use (hectares) :	2	1	2.75	4

[1] Low-productivity soil; [2] Reserved for the household; [3] Uncultivated land or land lost by erosion.

An Asháninka in San Miguel would also not use fire to prepare virgin land for cultivation. However, Varese (2002: 12) mentions in his study of Asháninkas in Gran Pajonal in the mid-1960s that slash-and-burn was normal practice "not only [as] a way to clear the land but is also [as] a process of transferring to the soil the rich nutrients stored in the vegetation". The practice is forbidden by law and condemned by professionals, who claim that the heat destroys the upper biomass of the soil.

APPENDIX J

THE PUBLIC EDUCATION IN SAN MIGUEL (PERU)

In this part I will address specifically the public educational offer the community had at hand. With the construction of the health station pending, San Miguel had no health service. Electricity, portable water and a sewer did not exist. The one-kilometer side-road from the local highway to the community, presently only a rough track, had not been maintained for considerable time, and thought it was a public responsibility and needed by the outer society, represented by the traders, the authorities had ignored the matter and left the maintenance to the community. The Ministries in Lima have the direct responsibility for the road system and the education and health services. The district Municipality was in charge of constructing and maintaining facilities dedicated for the two last-mentioned tasks.

The primary school of San Miguel, offering education at all six levels, consisted of two houses with a total of three classrooms. As the custom is in the rural areas of Peru, education was given to pupils at two (sometimes more) levels in the same room simultaneously. I was told that a total of 22 persons were or had been out of San Miguel to study for their secondary education and 6 for their *educación superior.* Table J-1 gives an overview.

Table J-1
Students from San Miguel seeking higher education, past and present

Presently in Secondary	Completed Secondary	Presently in Superior	Completed Superior
10	8	3	1

Given San Miguel's population of 232 persons, skewed toward the lower age brackets, the status is not impressive. It was expected that if the trend from earlier years continues, only 2 or 3 out of the 8, who graduated from primary school in December of 2001, would continue their education. The reason for the small number of people, who continue with higher education, is less a lack of interest among the students, but the economy of the parents and the attitude that education is not important. The status of the local school at the end of 2001 is shown in Table J-2.

Table J-2
Student status at the San Miguel school at end of the school year, Dec. 2001.
(Source: Profesor Eleuterio Ramíres Quispe; Director, Victor Camacho Perez)

Level	Started	Passed	Not passed	Dropped out
1 and 2	30	n/d	n/d	5
3	15	10	5	0
4	16	15	1	0
5	15	7	6	2
6	11	8	0	3
SUM	87	40*	12*	10

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* levels 3-6 only

The school had 87 pupils, including two settler children, at the beginning of the school year in April 2001. Ten pupils, from all six levels of primary, dropped out during the year - half of them from the first two levels. At levels 3-6, twenty-one percent - 12 pupils out of 57 - failed to pass to the next level, and an additionally 9 percent dropped out – 5 pupils out of 57. This sums to a total 'loss' of 30 percent. I was told that my statistics on the pupils' performance reflected a trend that was repeated year after year. Normally, the teachers return some weeks before school starts at April 1 to give back-up education to those students, who failed their fall exams. Around 30 percent then recover and get their pass credits. When I mentioned these numbers to *el jefe* he responded that it was due to stupidity among the children, probably expressing a general feeling that failing children were not a concern for the community. In addition to the afore-mentioned reasons for low performance is the quality of the teachers and the health situation among the children. I was told that the rate of abstention among the pupils during a normal school day was 10 percent. Parents in San Miguel had never been given information on either health or nutrition, though one would have thought that this was a simple matter for the district Municipality to do.

The low quality of rural teachers was a topic, which should often be mentioned by my informants, but not easily talked about in San Miguel. During 2001, the local school of the community had three teachers - one woman, who was pregnant and had announced her departure at the end of the school year in December, and two male teachers of which one was an Asháninka and also the director of the school. The female teacher, who commuted to San Miguel daily, frequently did not show up or showed up late for her work. My hosts at the time said that this happened twice a week, with the consequence

that time was lost in the education of the youngest pupils, but nothing was done. I was told that the Asháninka director and the only one among the teachers who spoke Arawak, did not use that language in his education even though the guidelines invited for it, did not allow the pupils to use cushma (though it would have been cheaper), and had no interest in adult education to combat the high illiteracy rate among the adults in San Miguel. Both *el jefe* and the president of the influential *club de madres* were in favor of adult education and agreed that it was within their power to do something about it, but did not want to challenge the director.

The quality of the education I should experience first-hand. When I was invited to sit in during classes the teacher taught mathematics to the children at the levels of 8-9 years of age. He offered something, which could be rated as highly abstract mathematics or, in my opinion, nonsense - and definitely the latter seen in the context of his young audience. Intrigued by my introduction to the school, I took a look at the exercise book in mathematics belonging to my host's son, who would graduate few weeks later. Most of the homework he had been given over the last months was on calculating percentages, fractions and decimal points. I discovered that the teacher systematically had checked off as correct answers, which were obviously and provocatively wrong - like: 'What is 70 percent of 250?' Answer: '1750'. That kind of answers and 'corrections' constituted the overwhelming majority of the entries over the 2-3 months' time span of the book. I asked the boy about the matter – decimal points and percentages – and he was devoid of any conceptions about the topics. His parents were apathetic about my discovery. In an encounter with the teacher he claimed that it was a classmate of the boy who had given the OK-checks in the book, even added the words in the teacher's own handwriting, but accepted finally his responsibility. The result of our conversation was that the boy would graduate as normal and got his grades as if he knew the matters, and in March of next year he would be given back-up classes to bring him up to speed in preparation for secondary school he had decided he wanted.

During the pupils' last year in primary school, level 6, the education focuses on the following topics: communication; mathematical logic; the sciences and the environment; personal/social matters; and religious forming. In the last one, *Area de formación religiosa,* the pupils were also assessed[132]. In *Area de personal/social* the pupils would be

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[132] The pupils were graded individually in each of the following topics: recognize that God The

introduced to Peru's history, 'public-spirited' behavior, social sciences, and physical training. The version of Peruvian history the children encountered , I was told, was a pure mestizo version with its viewpoint in Lima and with no concessions given to the fact that the Asháninkas had had no or only a peripheral link with the Peruvian nation-state. Not unexpected, the educational system encourages problem-solving abilities, as called for by the outer society, with no concessions given to the local environment's needs for transmitting native symbols, customs and knowledge.

The school facilities in San Miguel reflected the standard of the rural Peru. All rooms had a blackboard and a table/chair for each child. The pupils had no printed material, but were given a pencil and a notebook at the start of the school year. The community members are given a say in who would teach in their school - a recent concession from the State. The mayor of the District told me that S/30,000 (US$8,700) was available in her 2002 budget for maintaining and building new school houses in the 180 communities the municipality manages. To cut costs, it was left to the locals to build the school house – sometimes with disastrous results. In communities I visited with the mayor, the school building could not be used due to construction errors, like a sagging wall from an un-drained foundation.

Father loves us and have a plan of salvation for all of us; recognize that Jesus Christ, as the son of God, came to save us; accept one's life as new order of love as taught by Jesus Christ; and appreciate the Church's function and see it as an obligation to join it.

APPENDIX K

A NOTE ON ECUADOR

Table K-1
Ecuador's politico-administrative and demographic lay-out
(Source: INEC 2001a; 2001b)

Zone/ Province[1]	No. of cantons[5]	No. of parishes			Surface sq. km	Population	
		Urban	Rural	Total		Total	Urban (%)
National	**215**	**367**	**788**	**1,155**	**256.370[3,4]**	**12,090,804**	**61.0[2]**
Coast							
El Oro	14	28	47	75	5,817.3	515,664	76.3
Esmeraldas	7	10	56	66	15,895.7	386,032	40.7
Guayas	28	50	35	85	20,566.0	3,256,763	81.7
Los Ríos	12	23	15	38	7,150.9	650,709	49.9
Manabí	22	38	53	91	18,893.7	1,180,375	51.8
Highland							
Azuay	14	28	60	88	7,994.7	598,504	52.2
Bolívar	7	10	19	29	3,926.0	168,874	25.6
Cañar	7	10	26	36	3,141.6	206,953	36.7
Carchi	6	9	26	35	3,749.6	152,304	47.1
Chimborazo	10	17	44	61	6,470.4	403,185	39.1
Cotopaxi	7	11	33	44	5,984.5	350,450	26.7
Imbabura	6	13	36	49	4,614.6	345,781	49.9
Loja	16	24	74	98	10,994.9	404,085	45.2
Pichincha	9	34	57	91	13,270.1	2,392,409	71.7
Tungurahua	9	19	44	63	3,369.4	441,389	42.7
Amazon Lowland							
Morona Santiago	10	11	47	58	23,796.8	113,300	33.9
Napo	5	5	18	23	12,483.4	79,610	32.5
Orellana	4	4	29	33	21,675.1	85,771	30.3
Pastaza	4	4	16	20	29,325.0	61,412	43.6
Sucumbíos	7	7	26	33	18,998.3	130,095	38.8
Zamora Chinchipe	8	9	22	31	10,456.3	76,414	35.6
Islands							
Galápagos	3	3	5	8	8,010.0	18,555	86.8

[1] The provinces are listed roughly from north to south. The split into zones has been determined by INEC (2001a).

[2] The two largest cities, Quito and Guayaquil, with a combined population of 3.35 million (28 percent of the nation population) determine the high degree of urbanization. Without these two cities, the urbanization would drop to 46 percent.

[3] Corrected for the border adjustment following the 1998 accord between Peru and Ecuador, which builds on the Rio de Janeiro decision of 1942 (INEC, censo 2001b)

[4] The number includes a total area of 775.2 km^2, which has not been assigned any specific province - the so-called *zonas no deliminadoas.*

[5] A canton is the political division around each town in a province.

APPENDIX L

A NOTE ON GUATEMALA

Guatemala is among the poorest countries in Latin America with wealth and income extremely unequally distributed. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994: 99) mention that the Gini index for Guatemala is 0.60, indicating one of the most skewed national income distributions in Latin America, which normally show values at .50 or slightly below (Portes 1989: 30). Half of all Mayas are in the lowest two income quintiles compared to half of all non-Mayas, who appear in the top two quintiles. Within each quintile the average income is lower for Mayas than non-Mayas and the difference between the two population groups increases in the higher quintiles (ibid.: 100). Guatemala represents one of the worst cases in Latin America with respect to bias in land ownership. Ninety percent of the total number of farms accounts for 16 percent of total farm area, while 2 percent of the total number of farms occupies 65 percent of total farm area (De Villa and Lovell 1999: 48). Near to 300,000 families living off subsistence farming, most often on low-productivity land, are trying to eke out an existence on just over 4 percent of the land base. These farms are under 1.4 ha in size, far too small to support a family (Egan 1999: 95). Poverty and indigence are a typical characteristic of Guatemala, which affects the rural Maya the most. PNUD (1999: 21) gives as the national average that 79 percent of all Guatemalans are poor and 59.3 percent are extremely poor. However, the poverty is more significant in the rural areas where the population is living in 19,000 dispersed communities with less than 2,000 inhabitants in each. Here the numbers for 'poor' and 'extremely poor' are 86.8 and 71 percent, respectively, while the corresponding measures for the urban areas are 67.0 and 36.4 percent. Again, these poverty incidences are distinctly higher in the Maya part of the population than in the non-Mayan one (ibid.: 24).

As with income, wealth, and landownership, the distribution of social benefits is also highly skewed in disfavor of the Mayas. Illiteracy in the population of 15 years and above is 41 percent, among women 56 percent, and in the rural areas 77 percent. The fertility rate is the highest in Latin America with 6.2 children in the rural areas and 3.8 in the urban areas. One could say that the Guatemalans have demonstrated with their feet what they think about the regime they have had to live under for the last decades. Today

around 1.5 million Guatemalan are living legally outside Guatemala. If one adds to this the illegal immigrants, minimum one-fifth of all Guatemalans live outside Guatemala (CEH-1 1999: 78-79). The latest data (July 2000) indicate that the remittances have increased to close to $600 million per year, slightly below the main foreign currency earner, coffee production, and ahead of tourism at $530 million (Prensa Libre 2000a).

The social structure and the nature of the economic, cultural and social relations within the Guatemalan society between the haves and the have-nots have been, and still is, to an extreme degree excluding and conflicting toward the majority of the population, i.e., the Mayas - mirroring the colonial past. From the independence of 1821 an authoritarian State developed, which was racist in its precepts and practices and whose purpose was to maintain the interests of a small privileged class (Martínez Peláez 1994). The evidence from throughout the Guatemalan history, but exemplified by the systematic cruelty during the euphemistically so-called *enfrentamiento armado interno* (armed internal war) - a civil war from 1960 to 1996, which during 1979-83 took the form of a genocide against the Maya population (CEH-3, 1999; Schirmer, 1999; Adams, 1991: 187; Falla 1983; Carmack 1988) - confirms that the violence was directed fundamentally by the State and carried out by the Army against, in particular, the Maya population, but also anyone who was thought to be in opposition to the regime (CEH-5 1999: 21). The official CEH report, *Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio,* assigns blame for fully 93 percent of the atrocities taking place during the *enfrentamiento armado* to the government and its armed forces and their allied paramilitary bands, and only 3 percent to the guerrillas (CEH-5 1999). The rest is unaccounted for.

The near-total absence of socio-political initiatives to the benefit of the large part of the population by the Guatemalan State, with exception of those during the liberal "spring" of 1944-54, accentuates this aggressive policy of exclusion of the many to the benefit of the few. For example, during the 20 years of major economic growth from 1960 to 1980, the social investments per capita in Guatemala were by far the lowest among the Centro-American countries (CEH-5 1999: 22) - and still are. In 1954 the Eisenhower administration's CIA-managed coup d'etat put an end to the liberal 'spring' and overthrew the elected government of Arbenz, provoked by the government's plans to expropriate idle land owned by the United Fruit Company for a land-redistribution program, though, with the public justification of stopping the spread of communism

(Immerman 1984). In the aftermath of the coup, the achievements of the liberal years were reversed and a wave of violent repression followed. In response, an armed insurgency, with roots in an aborted army rebellion in 1960, began to take root among the rural population. The influx of foreign capital, primarily U.S.-based multinational corporate investments, helped to reinforce the intransigence of the Guatemalan bourgeoisie. While financing new technologies and in this sense 'modernizing' Guatemalan capitalism, foreign interests shared in the absolute opposition to any redistributive reforms and in support of the generally right-wing political perspective of the regime (Jonas 1991: 89). The United States, with a high stake in preserving the so-called 'democratic project' of that era, provided military aid to the Guatemalan army, along with advisors who promoted an extensive counterinsurgency strategy. The result should be a politio-military scheme of state terrorism which was carried out in full from the late 1970s toward the mid-1980s, but ongoing well into the 1990s (Schirmer 1998; Taylor 1998: 22).

The 1996 Peace Accords were far from satisfactory, but probably the best which could be accomplished in the tension-filled environment (MINUGUA 1997; see also Cojtí Cuxil 2002). None of them addressed the issue of land reform, the central issue for the majority of the population, or the economic conditions of the Mayas. In a follow-up of the signing of the Accords, an amnesty was signed into law, which removed all liabilities of the guerrillas and their leaders for the political crime of "seeking to overthrow the State". However, at the same time, the law incorporated a broad-scale amnesty for a far larger number of government agents, including the military and the police, who had committed common crimes in their campaigns during the war. The law excluded from amnesty those guilty of torture, genocide and forced disappearances, and massacres and extra-legal executions are not among the crimes for which the perpetrators could seek amnesty, but it left a heavy burden on the victims to identify the culprits and prove before notoriously weak courts that such crimes had been committed.

Particularly two of the four accords stand out in the context of this note. The accord for 'The Resettlement of Populations Uprooted by the Armed Conflict' was initialed in June 1994. The principled scope was very ambitious and mandated the resettlement of everyone displaced by the war, but the practical aspects of the accord were weak. A breakthrough came in March 1995 with the signing of 'The Accord on the Identity and

Rights of Indigenous Peoples'. Against a backdrop of centuries of virulent racism directed against its Maya peoples, Guatemala would, once the necessary constitutional amendments were passed, be defined as a multinational, multicultural and multilingual nation. If fully implemented, that would have required profound reforms in the country's educational, judicial, and political systems. As of end of 2002, very little progress has been seen (El Periodico 2002d: 13).

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[133] The list is incomplete due to thievery of my luggage, including months' of field data, during the fieldwork in Peru.

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ACRYNOMS

Peru

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AIDESEP	Inter-Ethnic Development Association for the Peruvian Jungle (*Asociacion Interétnica de Desarrollo de La Selva Peruana*)
APRA	*Partido Aprista Peruano*; largest opposition party in the Peruvian one-chamber Congress.
ARPI	*Asociación Regional de los Pueblos Indígenas de Selva Central,*
ARPI-S.C./AIDESEP	*Asociación Regional de los Pueblos Indígenas de la Selva Central de* AIDESEP
CARE	*Centro Asháninka de Río Ene*
CART	Tambo River Asháninka Council (*Centro Asháninka del Río Tambo*)
CEA	*Comisión de Emergencia Asháninka*
CECONAMA	Council of Machiguenga Native Communities
CECONSEC	*Central de Comunidades Nativas de la Selva Central.*
CEDIA	Center for Development of Amazon Indigenous Peoples (*Centro para el Desarrollo del Indígena Amazonía*), NGO.
CMC	*Consejo Machiguenga de la Convención*, Province of Quillabamba, Department of Cusco
CNPAA	*Comisión Nacional de Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuanos*
COICA	*Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica*
COPPIP	*Conferéncia Permanente de los Pueblos Indígenas del Perú*
CTAR	*Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional* (Each department has a CTAR unit which reports to *Ministerio de la Presidencia* in Lima)
DEVIDA	*Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas*
EIA	*Estudio de Impacto Ambiente* (Environmental Impact Assessement document)
FECONACO	Federation of Native Communities of the Corrientes River
FECONARSA	Federation of Native Communities of the Santiago River
IACHR	Inter-American Court of Human Rights IACHR
ILO, OIT	Internacional Labor Organization
INEI	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*
IWGIA	International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (Copenhagen)
KANUJA	*Unión indígena Asháninka y Nomatsiguenga*
MRTA	*Movimiento Revolucionario Tupác Amaro*
OAGP	*Organización Ashéninka del Gran Pajonal*
OARA	*Organización Asháninka del Río Apurimac*
OCARE	*Organización Campa Asháninka del Río Ene*
OIRA	*Organización Indígena Río Atalaya* (a tributary of Río Tambo).
PETT	*Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras*
PNP	*Policía Nacional de Perú*

Ecuador

Amauta Jatari	Political arm of FEINE
AME	*Asociación de Municipalidades del Ecuador*
CEPAL	*Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe*
COCICAMP	*Corporación Comunidades Indígenas Campesinas de Mushuk Pakari*
COICA	*Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica*
COICE (CONAIE)	*Coordinadora de Organizaciones de la Costa Ecuatoriana.* (CONAIE's ethnic federation on the Coast.)
CONAIE	*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador*
CONFENIAE (CONAIE)	*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazona Ecuatoriana.* (CONAIE's native federation in the Amazon Lowland.)
CONIC	*Coordinadora de Organizaciones y Naciones Indígenas del Continente*
ECUARUNARI (CONAIE)	*Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Quichua del Ecuador* also known as *Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui*, i.e., "Ecuador Indians Awakens". (CONAIE's indigenous federation of the Highland.)
FECAB/BRUNARI	*Federación de las organizaciones indígenas y campesinas de Bolívar/Bolivar runakunapag riceaarimui* (name in Spanish/ Qiuchua),
FEINE	*Federación de Indígenas Evangélicos del Ecuador*
FENOCIN	*Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinos, Indígenas, y Negras*
FIESH	*Federación Interprovincial de Centros Shuar*
FIIS	*Federación Interprovincial de Indígenas Saraguños*
FIPSE	*Federación Independiente del Pueblo Shuar*
FOIC-CH	*Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas y Campesinas de la Parroquia Chugchilán*
INEC	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos,* Ecuador
MICC	*Movimiento Indígena y Campesina de Cotopaxi*
OPIP	*Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pasaza*
OSG	*Organización de Segundo Grado* - the organizational unit at grassroots level in the structure of CONAIE.
Pachakútik	*Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional - Nuevo País*; the political arm of CONAIE.
PSE	*Partido Socialista Ecutoriana* (political party)
PSP	*Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero*; political party and alliance partner with Pachakutik for the presidencial election, fall of 2002, promoting ex-colonel Lucio Gutiérrez.
UNOCIZ	*Unión de organización Indígena Campesina de Zumbahua*
UPCCC	*Unión Provincial de Cooperativas y Comunes del Cañar*

Guatemala

ALMG	*Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala.* ALM coordinates the political, linguistical and cultural actions of the Maya communities

with the governmental Ministries, as well as entities which are autonomous and decentralized from the State and the institutions to which they relate (MdeA 2002: 2).

ANN	*Alianza Nueva Nación;* political party
BBF	The monthly basket of basic food items for an average Guatemalan family (two adults and 5.38 children).
BBL	The monthly basket of basic food *and* life commodities for an average Guatemalan family.
CACIF	*Comité coordinador de asociaciones agrícolas, comerciales, industriales y financieras*
CECMA	*Centro de Estudios de la Cultura Maya*
CEDEPEM	*El Centro Experimental para el Desarrollo de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa Rural*, Quetzaltenango.
COMG	*Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala.*
CONIC	*Coordinador Nacional Indígena y Campesina* (National Indigenous and Peasant Coordination), a Maya-identified group with strong popular roots, which focuses on land issues
COPMAGUA	*Coordinadora De Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala.*
CUNOC	*Universidad de San Carlos*, Quetzaltenango
EGP	*Ejército guerrillero de los pobres*
FRG	*Frente Republicano Guatemalteco* (Ríos Montt's party with majority in the Congress.) - the official political party.
INE	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*
ILO	International Labor Organization
MINUGUA	*Misión de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala* (UN Verification Commission in Guatemala - with reference to the Peace Accords of 1996.)
ORPA	*Organización del pueblo en armas*
PAC	*Patrullas de autodefensa civil* (paramilitary groups which controled and defended rural communities during the civil war)
PAN	*Partido de Avancada Nacional*; largest opposition party in the Congress.
Parlacen	*Parlamento Centroamericano*
PNC	*Policia National Civil*
PSN	*Partido Solidaridad Nacional*; nacional political party.
PP	*Partido Patriota*; national political party.
UD	*Unión Democrática*; nacional political party.
UNE	*Unión Nacional de la Esperanza*; nacional political party.
URNG	*Unidad revolucionaria nacional guatemalteca* (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) – the umbrella party for the previous guerilla movements.

GLOSSARY AND DEFINITIONS

Acculturation   See: mestizaje

Activism
(social/ethnic)   Uncoordinated efforts guided by a shared, but vague vision, without defined goals, without a unified organization and a mass following, and without a mandate to the fragmented leadership from the constituency it pretends to represent.

Analphabetism or illiteracy   When a person, who at the age of 15 years or above, cannot either write or read.

Arawak   The language of the Arsháninkas and other peoples in the Peruvian Amazon.

Cajón   A volume of a box, roughly 0.35 x 0.35 x 0.60 cm = 0.074 m^3, used equivalent to 12 kg.

Caste   A caste is described by endogamy (extensive same-ethnic concubinage), hierarchy, and ascribed membership by birth and for life.

Chacra   Small cultivated plot (Peru, Ecuador).

Chronic
Malnutrition   Malnutrition has a lasting effect on a child's physical and mental growth. The factors which cause malnutrition are sanitary, socio-economic and cultural in nature. The principal ones include lack or insufficient access to food, health services, and pre- and post-natal attention, shortcoming in the parents' education on these matters and so on. The relationship height and age indicate the possible presence of cronic malnutrition in the past. The relationship of weight and age is a measure of past and recent malnutrition (World Health Organization).

Cuerdra   1 cuerdra = 1/16 hectare= 25x25 meters= 625 m^2= 0.16 acre (Guatemala).

Economically active
population   The part of the population at or above the age of 15 years of age which has or is looking for a job.

Ethnic person   An ethnic person is the expression of a social consciousness linked to work and economy, with his or her own language, and with a tradition of the original people. (Bengoa 2000: 230).

Fertilitiy   The average number of children born alive by women between the age of 15 and 49 (INEI, Peru).

Hectare	1 hectare=16 *cuerdras*; 1 *cuerdra*= 25x25 meters= 625 m^2= 0.16 acre (used in Guatemala); 1 hectare=100x100 meters.
Ideology	A system of ideas that addresses limited sectors of human experience by building on 'obvious' assumptions (taken for granted), i.e., with no need of proof.
Infantile chronic malnutrition rate	The relative number in a given age group which show permanent nutritional defects (INEI, Peru).
Infantile mortality rate	The number of children dead before the age of one year among thousand children born alive (INEI, Peru).
mestizaje	Derived from '*mestizo*' (mixed blood), *mestizaje* means miscegenation, that is, biological fusion. But in Latin America, mestizaje has also been used increasingly to refer to cultural and social fusion rather than to miscegenation. As the term mestizaje has come into greater use, its meaning has become increasingly diffuse. (...) The natural solution would be that of making a clear and systematic distinction between *mestizaje* (miscegenation) connoting biological fusion, and acculturation (and ultimately assimilation) which refers to the process of cultural mixture (Mörner 1970: 5).
Movement (ethnic)	An ethnic movement is a special kind of social movement with the extra quality of having a deep-rooted *ideological*, i.e., ethnic, perspective on its effort. (See "social movement".) An ethnic movement comprises goals, an ethnic ideology, a kind of organized structure, and a mass following.
Movement (social)	A large group of otherwise unrelated people who coordinate their efforts with the purpose to influence the social order in an articulated way. A social movement requires not only a theme, but some kind of organization, which structures the available resources, defines the goals and mobilizes its constituency and the public for its cause. A social movement is understood as mobilization of people for a cause, through which a common identity is being constructed. Ideological values may be of lesser relevance.
Movement (urban-social)	An urban social movement may be said to draw support from a highly differentiated class structure which include the classical working class, street vendors, casual labor, small scale (familial) enterprise, informal petty bourgeoisie and the informal service sector
Poverty measures:	An average family is defined as <u>poor</u> if its total income is insufficient to buy, on a regular basis, a basket of certain basic goods, including, first, a set amount of nutritious and caloric food, and, second, a dwelling of a certain standard transport, education and certain services services [called *canasta básica familiar*]. If its total income is

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insufficient to buy the first part [called *canasta básica de alimentos*], it is classified as extremely poor (indigence).

Procedural democracy   With *procedural democracy* is meant that the procedural aspects of the democratic regime are in place, but the application of them reflects that the democratic institutions do not function because of a lack of commitment to democratic practices.

Settler (*colono*)   A migrant from the Highland who has settled in the Amazon Lowland (Peru).

Social capital   The resources of the surrounding society a group or an individual can benefit from, i.e., a proper access to health, education, communication, information, social experiences, and other public services like legal protection.

State   'The State' is defined here as the network of agencies under executive authority and "all those individuals who occupy office that authorize them, and them alone, to make and apply" binding decisions (Nordlinger 1987: 362; Stepan 1978: xii).

Titling (*titulación*)   The process of delineating the land *and* formal registration of the declared owner in a public register.

Urban, rural areas   A settlement with has at least 5,000 inhabitants. Rural areas refer to places with dispersed population and where all settlements (*poblados*) comprise less than 5,000 members. Terms like "countryside" (*campo*) and "rural areas" (*áreas rurales*), on one hand, and "towns" or "cities" (*ciudades*) and "urban areas" (*areas urbanas*), on the other, will be used indifferently (INEC, Ecuador).
A rural area is a region which does not comprise settlements of more than 100 houses (INEI, Peru).

Usos y costumbres   Traditional law of the ethnic people.

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