The EU enlargement and “orange revolution” occurred in Ukraine have substantially changed the context of the settlement of the conflict in the eastern area of the Republic of Moldova. Before analyzing the most recent initiatives of Ukraine aimed at the conflict’s settlement, it is necessary to elucidate some points concerning the conflict’s essence and the causes for keeping it “frozen” for thirteen years.
The Reasons for the Conflict’s “Freeze”
The lack of any progress in the process of conflict settlement is mainly explained by the fact that since the conflict release early in the ‘90-es, Russia imposed and Moldavian governments accepted a conflict perception scheme which allows to obstruct the process of reunification of the Republic of Moldova. Further on, given the passivity of the Republic of Moldova, other actors (OSCE, USA, EU, etc.) adopted such an approach, too. According to the scheme proposed by Russia, the conflict emerged and persists exclusively between two parties: the Republic of Moldova and the people of a number of communities of the left bank area of Nistru river and of the city of Bender by whose will the “transnistrian moldavian republic” (“trm”) has been established in the eastern area of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria). Both parties, the Republic of Modlova and the “tmr” have their own authorities, peculiar to the rule of law, set up as a result of elections, according to their own legislation.
Such a premeditatedly distorted approach results univocally in the following consequences:
anti-constitutional regime becomes automatically a party in the process of negotiation, having the right to reject the position of official Moldavian authorities;
deployment of peace-keeping troops;
people of the “tmr” have their own particularities which are not compatible with the unitary Moldavian state;
the “tmr” can claim the “right to self-determination” and require “equal rights with the Republic of Moldova as a constituent part of a confederation”, etc.
Due to such an approach, since the 2nd of September 1990, Igor Smirnov, who is a state criminal and a citizen of the Russian Federation, claims to be and is accepted at all levels as a plenipotentiary representative of the “transnistrian people”.
In the same time, the events occurred since 1992 proved that the Transnistrian conflict is neither interethnic not a domestic one. People from both banks of the Nistru river do not perceive each other as enemies. Contrary to the statements of Russia and of its Tiraspol puppets, the peace within the security area is due just to that incontestable fact, not to the “unique formula” of peace-keeping troops.
Moreover, people of the so-called “tmr” do not differ anyhow from the people of the right bank area of the Republic of Moldova. Consequently, people from the left bank area do not have any reasons to claim some collective rights, distinct from the ones of the people from the rest of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. In addition to it, the people of the “tmr” do not have any right to self-determination and it is obvious that individual rights of each person of Transnistria can be observed within the frame set by the present Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.
The involvement of a part of the population (mainly, of the Russian-speaking people from industrial centres of Transnistria) in the conflict in the name of the separatist idea had been determined early in the ‘90-es by the wish to remain within the USSR as well as by the totally irrational fear, at the extent of a collective psychosis, of the unification of Moldova with Romania. Such a state of spirit, combined with serious political errors of new Moldavian authorities of that time, let Kremlin provoke the conflict with a view to keep the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR. Or, the Soviet Union has definitely and irreversibly disappeared, there is no precedent that a parliamentary faction of the Republic of Moldova proposes the unification of Moldova with Romania, while Romania is concerned about its own problems and does not contest the existence of the Republic of Moldova. As a result, the political reasons of the distrust of the population from the left bank area in the central power of Chiºinãu have definitely and irreversibly disappeared. It confirms the lack of any domestic conflict in the Republic of Moldova.
In the same time, the conflict approach systematically ignores that the population of the “tmr” has never been a political monolith. Despite the policy promoted by the separatist transnistrian regime, near 160 thousand in the total number of 580 thousand people of the Transnistrian area, have become citizens of the Republic of Moldova. They are categorically against granting a “special legal status” to the region under the control of the separatist regime, considering it as a real risk of extending the domination of Great-Russian chauvinism even after a possible conflict settlement. The citizens of the Republic of Moldova who form about 35% of the total number of electors in the “tmr” (450 thousand) do not have any possibility to express their opinion. As for the erroneous scheme for the negotiation process, it totally ignores the existence of 160 thousand citizens of the Republic of Moldova in the area under the control of Tiraspol regime.
To mention also that the political regime of the “tmr” is a totalitarian and a repressive one, while people of the separatist area live in an atmosphere of fear and docile submission, being deprived of any rights and freedoms. During the latest 15 years, over 20% of the people have left the conflict area. Such a fact allows the regime of Igor Smirnov to frame up infinitely “referenda” and “free and fair” elections whose results are predicted in the offices of the “state security ministry” of Tiraspol. In the same time, the clan of Igor Smirnov - whose members are Russian citizens - usurp the right to speak on the behalf of all the people of the “tmr”, being in fact a tool for promoting the geopolitical interests of Russia and of the international network of organized crime.
Two armies are illegally deployed in the “tmr”: an army of Russia and the other, so-called “transnistrian army”, is formed by Russia, is commanded by officers who are Russian nationals and is equipped with arms and ammunitions of the former 14th Russian Army. In 1992 armed conflict, both armies, together with mercenaries (kossacs) sent by Russia, killed hundreds of Moldavians on their homeland, bringing in that way the military and political victory of Russian puppets regime.
The armed conflict stopped after the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation had signed on the 21st of July 1992 the Agreement concerning the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Area of the Republic of Moldova. It leads to the univocal conclusion that Russia not Russian puppets of Tiraspol has been since the beginning and still is the real party involved in the conflict. According to that agreement, Russia and the separatist regime created by Russia too, are “parties” of the “unique” formula of peace-keeping troops. The impartial analysis of the behaviour of Russian-Russian “peace-keepers” reveals that they have built a real “iron curtain”. Contrary to most people, Russian puppets and the international network of organized crime which extended to Transnistria feel very comfortable behind that “curtain”.
From the perspective of the international law and of the resolution adopted by the ECHR on the 8th of July 2004, it follows univocally that in 1992 Russia had committed an act of aggression against Moldova and up to present the eastern area of the Republic of Moldova is under Russian occupation. This fact was obvious since the beginning of the conflict, nevertheless, Moldavian President Petru Lucinschi sighed on the 8th of May 1997 a Memorandum which vested the separatists who usurped state sovereignty by physical and psychological terror, killed their political opponents, started massive ethnical clearing, etc. with equal rights in the negotiation process with the constitutional power of Chisinau, including the right of veto and the right to conduct foreign economic activities, etc. Russia, an aggressor country, was given the role of “mediator” of the conflict between the Republic of Moldova and Russian puppets of the area occupied by Russia itself. That empowered Russia with the capacity to obstruct the processes of negotiation and of withdrawal of its military troops, manipulating to that end Russian citizens of the “tmr” who ostensibly opposed to the withdrawal of Russian troops illegally deployed in the eastern area of the Republic of Moldova.
Moreover, after the Memorandum had been signed on the 8th of May 1997, Russia and Ukraine were vested with the statute of “guarantor country”. It meant that even after a possible conflict settlement, Moldova would not be a sovereign state because Russia had to remain an arbitrator of the relationship between the central power and the regime established after its aggression against Moldova.
The above-said leads to the conclusion that throughout many years, the Republic of Moldova, either consciously or unconsciously, by the signatures of Presidents Mircea Snegur (21st of July 1992) and Petru Lucinschi (8th of May 1997) contributed to setting up the trap of the “five-side” format of the negotiation process concerning the ostensible conflict between the Republic of Moldova and the “transnistrian people”, represented by the puppet regime of Tiraspol. The lack of any progress towards the conflict settlement as well as the co-operative behaviour of Russian officials and of the “tmr” leaders proved eloquently that the erroneous schemes for the five-side negotiation process and for the peace-keeping operation had been premeditatedly imposed in order to obstruct the conflict settlement.
To mention that the conflict approach scheme in which the Republic of Moldova and the “tmr” are considered as conflict parties is expressed in a series of documents that have not been ratified by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and have not been published in “Monitorul Official” official bulletin. It means that such documents have no legal power for the Republic of Moldova.
The only exception was the Friendship and Co-operation Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova, signed on the 18th of November 2001 in Moscow and ratified afterwards by the Parliaments of both countries. The Treaty provides: “ being committed to the process of the Transnistrian conflict settlement, in which Russia is a mediator and a guarantor, based on the requirement to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity...”. Thus, the Treaty states the right of Russia to be a guarantor in the process of transnistrian conflict settlement.
Meanwhile, since the summer of 1992, when the armed conflict stopped, none Moldavian government adopted a plan of country’s reunification, based on a realistic approach of the conflict essence, whose implementation would require mobilization of the whole society’s resources. The Republic of Moldova did not become an attractive example for the people of the “tmr” and is systemically defeated in the informational war with the “tmr”. All these factors have amplified the negative consequences of the distorted scheme for conflict perception, causing the “freeze” of the conflict.
Another gap of the efforts focused on conflict settlement consists in the fact that Moldavian authorities have never formulated clearly the parameters of the reunified state whose achievement would mean complete settlement of the transnistrian conflict. In 1994, the Republic of Moldova set a precedent for the “special legal status”, established by the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauz-Yeri Territorial-Administrative Unit. In Gagauz-Yeri there are no foreign troops, there was no chauvinist-totalitarian regime similar to the one of the “tmr”, etc. Nevertheless, our Gagauzian compatriots do not lose any opportunity to vote for the most non-democratic political parties which promote an anti-state, revanchist electoral message. Certainly, if Moldova falls into the traps of the legalisation of the “tmr” regime, its European prospects will be under the threat of the “special legal status” of Transnistria.
The lack of a framework for conflict settlement and the chronic passivity of Moldavian governments are favourable for submitting conflict settlement projects which contravene to the state interests of the Republic of Moldova and are not intended to lead to the country’s reunification (the Memorandum signed on the 8th of May 1997 in Moscow, the Plan for Federalisation of the Republic of Moldova (2002), Kozak Memorandum (2003) ). In addition to it, the time spent on miming the process of negotiation aimed at reaching a priori unfeasible aims, formulated in the above-mentioned projects, was permanently used to strengthen the separatist regime of the “tmr”.
Taking into account that people of the “tmr” do not have either reasons or rights to claim a “ special status” within the reunified Republic of Moldova and based on the pressing need for consolidation of the population of the whole country as a civic Moldavian nation, we may conclude that the formula of unitary, decentralised state, divided in second-level administrative-territorial units based exclusively on geographical-economic criteria, is the optimal way for post-conflict organization of the Republic of Moldova and it can be accepted as a formula for definitive conflict settlement. From that perspective, the area under the control of Tiraspol separatist regime should be divided into several districts, eliminating all risks of separatist relapse and of external interference into domestic affairs of the Republic of Moldova.
Previous Ukrainian authorities have promoted in Transnistria a policy of competition with Russia, to the detriment of the Moldavian state's interests. Moreover, the economic survival of the separatist regime was supported by the penetrability of the transnistrian segment of the Moldavian-Ukrainian border what can be easily explained by the amplitude and the deepness of the corruption throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States. On the 1st of September 2001, the Republic of Moldova made some attempts to bring the "tmr" back into the customs area of the Moldavian state by the means of putting into circulation new customs stamps and setting up joint Moldavian-Ukrainian customs points along the transnistrian segment of 452 km of the Moldavian-Ukrainian border. Unfortunately, those attempts have been upset by Kucima administration that openly sided with Tiraspol separatist regime.
2. Role and Position of Ukraine
The refusal of Chisinau authorities to sign Kozak Memorandum in November 2003 caused a chain of provocations from the side of the separatist leaders who aimed at annihilating all prospects of conflict settlement. So, in summer 2004, Tiraspol regime started a campaign of liquidation of schools subordinate to Moldavian government situated in the "tmr". The crisis which followed, including the attempts of Moldavian authorities to establish its real control on the transnistrian segment of the Moldavian-Ukrainian border, pointed out more obviously the support given to the separatist regime by Kiev administration.
It should also be mentioned that, to justify its behaviour, Ukraine has borrowed "arguments" to the erroneous formula for conflict approach, accepted first of all by the Moldavian state - the conflict is ostensibly an internal one and Ukraine, as a mediator and guarantor-country, cannot be on the side of any "party". It meant that Ukraine recognized the right of the "tmr" to exist as a real state which had two more problems to solve - lack of definite relationship with Chisinau and lack of international recognition.
Presidential elections in Romania and in Ukraine as well as Parliamentary election in Moldova have generated totally new circumstances since the moment when the Presidents of all three states declared their decision to settle at last the "frozen" transnistrian conflict. Nevertheless, there is no answer yet to the question "How to reach such a goal?". The "seven steps" proposed by the Ukrainian President, Viktor Youshtchenko, on the 22nd of April 2005 at GUUAM Summit held in Chisinau have revealed serious dissensions. Or, Viktor Youshtchenko proposed "to hold as soon as possible free and democratic election to the Supreme Council of Transnistria", while Romanian President Traian Basescu categorically opposed to such election and the Moldavian party promised "to examine carefully" the proposals of Ukraine.
Vinnitsa Plan
On the 16th -17th of May 2005, during five-side consultations held in the Ukrainian town of Vinnitsa, Ukraine has submitted its "Plan for Settlement of the Transnistrian Conflict" (hereinafter referred to as the Plan), based on the seven steps presented on the 22nd of April in Chisinau, at GUUAM Summit, as a draft of the Plan for Conflict Settlement.
Vinnitsa Plan raises a series of questions:
- The Plan is based on the erroneous idea that the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria are parties in the conflict and that the conflict should be settled as a result of the negotiation between parties.
1. Preamble
- According to the Plan's content, this document should be signed by the representatives of the parties. On the other hand, the Plan does not explain which representative of the "tmr" should sign it. Certainly, Igor Smirnov will use all opportunities to oppose to the Plan as long as Moscow provides him with support and gives instructions. Moreover, repressive structures of the "tmr" and censored mass-media will be used to obstruct further any progress towards the reunification of the Republic of Moldova.
Chapter I. Aims of the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement.
Article 2 contains a vague formula which could generate ununivocal interpretations: “A comprehensive and definitive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict that would preserve the constitutional system of the Republic of Moldova and would lead to granting Transnistria a special legal status as a constituent part of the Republic of Moldova.” This article does not contain the univocal formula “according to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova”. It implies that the Plan’s authors are aware of the fact that the “special status of Transnistria” proposed by them contravenes to the present Constitution of the Republic of Moldova;
Article 3 provides for grating “the right to self-determination to the residents of Transnistria exclusively in the event if the Republic of Moldova loses its sovereignty and independence”. Such a provision is absolutely ill-founded; it contravenes to the international law whose norms are supposed to set the basis for conflict settlement and could be later used to reanimate separatist spirits in the region. In the same time, the term “residents” implies that the coveted right to self-determination is granted to citizens of any state residing in Transnistria. Consequently, taken into consideration the present policy of granting Russian and Ukrainian citizenship to people of Transnistria, the destiny of this constituent part of the Republic of Moldova will be decided by citizens of other states;
Article 6 defines “civic and interethnic peace” as an aim of the conflict settlement. Such an aim could not be reached if the provisions of Chapter III. p. 5 - “Moldavian, Ukrainian and Russian languages will be official languages in Transnistria” are implemented. Under the present conditions in Transnistria, it would lead to the preservation of the Great-Russian chauvinism and to the perpetuation of anti-Romanian moldovenism, will cause interethnic tension within the whole state. In the same time, Ukraine will manipulate the anti-Romanian moldovenism conserved and legalized in Transnistria to divide and to oppose Romanian-speaking people of Ukraine into ”Moldavians” and “Romanians”;
Article 7 provides for the establishment of a “multi-level system of domestic and international guarantees”. Such a provision is ill-founded because the conflict is not an internal one, while the fundamentals rights of the citizens in the reunified state may be guaranteed exclusively by the Republic of Moldova. The so-called “international guarantees” would confine to the right of interference into domestic affairs of the Republic of Moldova.
Chapter II. Principles for Settlement
Article 2 provides that “Transnistrian conflict will be settled in strict compliance with… the people’s right to self-determination”. Such a formulation does not explain univocally which “people”. Or, the people of the Republic of Moldova self-determined on the 23rd of June 1990, when deputies elected on the whole territory of the Moldavian SSR, including Igor Smirnov, adopted the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. That process ended on the 27th of August 1991, when the Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence. Consequently, such a formulation aims at the legalisation of the “transnistrian people” within the Moldavian state, with negative consequences on the existence of the Republic of Moldova.
Article 3 provides for conducting, based on the status of Transnistria as defined by the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, “early free, transparent and democratic election to the Supreme Council of Transnistria, under international control, as an essential element for Moldova’s recognition of the Supreme Soviet as a legitimate representative authority of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova”.
The provisions of Article 3 are unfeasible because of several reasons. First of all, Vinnitsa Plan is an obvious regression compared to the “Seven Steps” proposed on the 22nd of April 2005. The “Seven Steps” were intended to ensure in Transnistria favourable conditions for the activity of national level parties. Vinnitsa Plan does not contain any concrete parameter of the eventual “democratisation” of the totalitarian regime in the “tmr”. Or, democracy is incompatible with the repressive structures of the regime (“ministry of state security”, etc.), with the harmful information environment, with the forced isolation of the “tmr” from the rest of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The democratisation of the region requires a transition stage in order to help people adapt to new reality (people of the “tmr” are totally derived of any experience of political democracy because early in the ‘90-es they passed from the totalitarian Soviet system under the totalitarian-chauvinist regime of the “tmr”). On the other hand, the Plan’s authors ignore that democracy can only exist within a democratic state based on the rule of law. It means that, to be democratized, the “tmr” needs to be incorporated within the Moldavian state where democracy will be further consolidated.
Vinnitsa Plan does not say anything about the localities where election to the Supreme Council will be held and it means acceptance of the present regime’s claims within the state.
Free and fair election is unfeasible as long as the region is under military occupation of the Russian Federation and the key-positions in the “tmr” are held by Russian citizens, most of them being in fact sent by Moscow to the “tmr” on a business trip.
Free and fair election “based on the status of Transnistria as defined by the legislation of the Republic of Moldova” is unfeasible as long as the Plan attempts to combine incompatible things like the Law on the Basic Provisions of Transnistria’s status adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and the “constitution of the “tmr” which provides that “Transnistrian Moldavian Republic is a democratic, sovereign and independent state of rule of law”, but article 8 of the same constitution stipulates that “public structures, as well as authorities and representatives, cannot conduct any activities aimed against the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova”.
In the same time, article 3 does not set any requirement concerning the citizenship of the people who will have the right to vote at “free, transparent and democratic” election. It is obvious that, according to the Plan, the election must be held within the present legal frame of the “tmr” (“constitution” with dual citizenship, local “Election Code”, etc.). The same conclusion emerges from Chapter III on the Stages of the Settlement Process (the second stage) which contains the formula “The Newly-Elected members of the Supreme Council of Transnistria”. Such an univocal formula implies the legal continuity between the existing “supreme council” and the one to be recognized by the Republic of Moldova. The recognition of the Supreme Council by the Republic of Moldova would also mean recognition of the integral legal system, existing in the “tmr”, and, implicitly, of the “statehood” of the “tmr”.
Further on, the Supreme Council recognized by Moldavian authorities and, implicitly, by the international community, would form a government which would work within the legal frame existing in the “tmr”, while Russia or Ukraine would establish direct bilateral relations with that government and with the Supreme Council, ignoring Chisinau.
There is no guarantee that after its recognition by central power of Chisinau, the Supreme Council, according to Chapter II, article 62, p.3-d of the “constitution” of the “tmr”, will not conduct a referendum to force “the transnistrian people” to vote for the independence of the “tmr”, etc. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Council will have a majority able to ensure the reunification of the Republic of Moldova and the dismantling of the “tmr”, be within the frame set by Vinnitsa Plan.
The Ukrainian Plan contains one certain commitment. It concerns the Republic of Moldova whose Parliament is supposed to adopt before the end of July 2005 the Law on the Basic Provisions of the Status of the Transnistrian Region (Transnistria) of the Republic of Moldova. The key-points of those “basic provisions” proposed by Kiev are reproduced from 1997 Memorandum which provided for the transformation of the Republic of Moldova into a confederation.
At least four alarming conclusions could be drawn from the provisions of Vinnitsa Plan:
The first stage of Vinnitsa Plan implementation will legalize the transnistrian Supreme Council in the context of the international community, without granting any guarantee that Moldavian state will afterwards be reunified.
The declaration that “ The definition of Transnistria’s status is done… based on the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova” (Chapter II, p.1) is a trickery. Or, the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (article 111) provides expressly for the prospects of granting the special legal status of an autonomy (not “republic”) to some localities on the left bank area of Nistru river exclusively by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, with no need for negotiation with any “supreme councils”. The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova also provides that the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova has the exclusive power to modify the competencies of such an autonomy or even to liquidate it, while the Plan does not contain such an idea;
The euphemism “administrative-territorial unit in the form of a republic” proposed by Vinnitsa Plan dissimulates the notion of subject of an eventual federation, which has the power to negotiate (maybe infinitely) with central power the mutual delegation of competencies, etc. According to the Ukrainian Plan, some competencies to be granted by Chisinau in the Law on the Basic Provisions of the Status of the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova, should reach the confederative level of the relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Consequently, Vinnitsa Plan aims at the federalisation of the Republic of Moldova as a result of the legalization of the totalitarian regime of the “tmr”.
The Ukrainian Plan requires the substantial modification of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. If the desideratum of federalisation is recognized, there will be need for a referendum. This fact puts a priori at zero all chances of the Ukrainian Plan’s implementation and, what is even more serious, the prospects of Moldova’s reunification due to that Plan.
Vinnitsa Plan pleads for granting Transnistria some competencies which are inherent to a confederation subject, i.e. the right “to take part in promoting the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova in relevant fields to its interests, according to the rules established by the parties”. It is obvious that such a provision will become an obstacle in promoting the state’s foreign policy.
As a whole, Vinnitsa Plan aims at the legalization of the existing separatist regime of the “tmr” and at granting it a number of totally ill-founded guarantees. On the other hand, Vinitsa Plan does not guarantee anything to the Moldavian state.
The future Agreement between the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE on the guarantees of Moldova’s adherence to the Law on the special legal status of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (Third stage. P.a)) is based on the presumption of guiltness of the Republic of Moldova. Probably, the Plan’s authors assume that the Republic of Moldova, not Russia, was the aggressor in 1992 and that the regime of the “tmr” should be further protected against aggressors of Chisinau. Such an Agreement is incompatible with the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, it is easy to assume that if an Agreement concerning the guarantees to be granted to Transnistria is concluded, Russia and the Supreme Council of Tiraspol will first of all use it to impose the condition of legalizing Russian presence in “reunified” Moldova.
According to the Plan’s authors, the role of the European Union and of the USA is absolutely uncertain and negligible. They propose to sign the Plan “in the presence of the EU and USA representatives”. Besides it, neither the EU nor the USA are supposed to play any role, including in what concerns the inexistent guarantees concerning Moldova’s reunification.
Vinnitsa Plan does not provide for the involvement of Romania, even Romania, as a NATO member state and a neighbour country committed to protect the eastern border of the EU, can for many reasons involve directly in conflict settlement.
The analysis of the present situation in the “tmr” reveals that the phrase “as soon as possible” used in Vinnitsa Plan with respect to “democratic” election is directly linked with election to the “supreme council” of the “tmr” to be held on the second Sunday of December 2005. This fact points out that in Transnistria there are groups of interests with which Vinnitsa Plan and the “seven steps” submitted at GUUAM Summit had been previously co-ordinated. In other words, up to now the role of “transnistrian people’s” representative was monopolized by Igor Smirnov, a puppet of Russia and of the underworld. Vinnitsa Plan pleads for substituting the puppets and such a desideratum contravenes to both the interests of the “tmr” people and of the Moldavian state. The most serious point is that such a way does not lead to the transnistrian conflict settlement, it can only bring to another stage - legalization of the separatist regime of Transnistria, without the reunification of the Republic of Moldova.
On the 2nd of June 2005, immediately after the meeting of the Ukrainian and Moldavian Presidents held in Odessa, Piotr Poroshenko, Secretary of Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, met Igor Smirnov in Tiraspol and claimed comprehensive Ukrainian presence in the Transnsirian region of the Republic of Moldova; first of all - broadcasting Ukrainian TV channels all over the “tmr”. The above-said reveals Ukraine’s attempts to replace Russia in the “tmr” and to take control on Transnistria to the detriment of the Moldavian state.
The attitude towards a number of points could be a test for Ukraine’s position towards the conflict in the eastern area of the Republic of Moldova.
On the 27th of February 2003, the European Union and the USA imposed travel ban on a group of leaders of “tmr” administration. Nevertheless, those people can move with no restrictions on Ukrainian territory, to use Odessa airport. Kiev authorities, despite their pro-European declarations, do not associate with the EU and with the USA to qualify those people non grata on the Ukrainian territory.
Another test could be the attitude of Ukraine towards the idea of establishing joint customs points along the transnistrian segment of the Moldavian-Ukrainian border. The monitoring, be with the participation of either the OSCE or the EU, of that segment of the Moldavian-Ukrainian border means neither unconditioned re-establishment of the unique customs area of the Republic of Moldova nor unconditioned dismantling of the existing separatist regime of the “tmr”. At present, joint customs points are the only means to re-establish the unique customs area of the Republic of Moldova, to stop smuggling flows via the “tmr” and to ensure unconditioned dismantling of the “tmr”. The avoidance, under various pretexts, of Ukrainian authorities to establish joint customs points is an univocal proof of the duplicity of Ukraine’s policy concerning the conflict in the eastern area of the Republic of Moldova and the prospects of the Moldavian state existence.
In addition to it, Ukraine allows the flights of Russian military planes to the military airport of Tiraspol, ignoring that such flights are not authorized by the concerned structures of the Republic of Moldova. Taken into account that Moldavian officials and the OSCE Mission to the Republic of Moldova do not control Tiraspol airport, the above-mentioned flights can be used for illegal traffic in arms. On the other hand, it is up to Ukraine to claim that such flights were done via Chisinau airport and were subject to customs control of the Republic of Moldova and of the OSCE Mission.
Consequently, Vinnitsa Plan is an expression of Ukraine’s interests, it is not aimed at the reunification of the Republic of Moldova and, implicitly, contravenes to our country’s interests.
Vinitsa Plan has outlined more imperiously the need for a Plan for Country’s Reunification to be developed by state authorities of the Republic of Moldova. Civil society of the Republic of Moldova has done the first steps in that direction, developing in 2004 the “3D Strategy”, the only attempt to draw a plan for the transnistrian conflict settlement which takes into consideration all involved factors. The nearest future will prove to what extent the declared consensus among the main political forces of the Moldavian Parliament, elected on the 6th of March 2005, will be able to strengthen the efforts of Moldavian society aimed at the reunification of the country.
If you can access Yushchenko plan click here
Chiºinãu,30th of May 2005
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