

OPTIONS FOR PEACE

Mapping the possibilities for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus

A bicommunal survey of public opinion

in co-operation with


CYMAR Market Research Ltd.

and KADEM Cyprus Social Research


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

Underlying Attitudes




"We have much in common with the Turkish Cypriots"




"We have much in common with the Greek Cypriots"







"I would find it natural and acceptable if someone in my family chose to marry a Turkish Cypriot"




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
"If my cultural rights and my security can be guaranteed, I can imagine myself living under a local administration that is primarily Turkish Cypriot"




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
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

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


"The two communities, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, should go their separate ways from now on"




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





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
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
"To achieve a Comprehensive Settlement, we have to understand and seek to alleviate the concerns of the Turkish Cypriots, as well as our own concerns"



"To achieve a Comprehensive Settlement, we have to understand and seek to alleviate the concerns of the Greek Cypriots, as well as our own concerns"



"We should all strive, from now on, to be Cypriot first, and Greek or Turkish second"



"We should all strive, from now on, to be Cypriot first, and Greek or Turkish second"

Greek Cypriot Underlying Attitudes

Mean

2
1
0
-1
-2

"The only way to solve the Cyprus Problem is through an armed struggle"

-1,59

"I would find it natural and acceptable if someone in my family chose to marry a Turkish Cypriot"

-1,09

"If my cultural rights and my security can be guaranteed, I can imagine myself living under a local administration that is primarily Turkish Cypriot"

-0,79

"The two communities, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, should go their separate ways from now on"

-0,54

"We have much in common with the Turkish Cypriots"

0,38

"I would not mind having Turkish Cypriot neighbours"

0,54

"The Turkish Cypriots cannot be trusted to adhere to an agreement we might make with them"

0,58

"To achieve a Comprehensive Settlement, we have to understand and seek to alleviate the concerns of the Turkish Cypriots, as well as our own concerns"

0,99


"Our side is also to blame for the current situation of the Cyprus Problem"

1,11

"We should all strive, from now on, to be Cypriot first, and Greek or Turkish second"

1,11

Turkish Cypriot Underlying Attitudes



Underlying Attitudes - Analysis of findings

Both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots acknowledge that the two communities have much in common, and majorities of both communities make it clear that they would not mind having neighbours of the other community. An exception is evident in the case of the settlers from Turkey, who tend to oppose co-existence with the Greek Cypriots.



This willingness of the two communities to co-exist does not yet extend to the prospect of inter-marriage, or to the prospect of living under the other community's local administration.



Both communities tend to mistrust the other, and tend to fear that in case of a comprehensive settlement the other side will not adhere to what has been agreed. Many Turkish Cypriots go a step further, and say that it would be better for the two communities to go their separate ways from now on, a sentiment which the majority of Greek Cypriots does not share.



Concerning the prospect of a comprehensive settlement, most Greek Cypriots agree that it is important to take into account the concerns of the other community as well, and they acknowledge that their own side is also to blame for the historical course of the Cyprus problem. On the same issues, the Turkish Cypriot community is ambivalent and divided, some acknowledging the need to understand the other side and to take some responsibility, while others deny such a necessity.



The Greek Cypriots strongly support the development of an over-riding Cypriot identity, that will supersede the notions of "being Greek" or "being Turkish", while the Turkish Cypriots are on this issue ambivalent and divided, some strongly favouring the development of "Cypriotness", others strongly opposing such a social development. Again, the settlers tend to be differentiated on this issue, with a strong majority amongst them opposing the development of a common identity.



Motives for a Solution







































Greek Cypriot Motives for a Solution

Mean

2
1,5
1
0,5
0

- Motive: To put an end to the existence of the Greek Cypriot National Guard
- Motive: To have our own Greek Cypriot federated state
- Motive: To be reunited with the Turkish Cypriots
- Motive: To improve our economic condition
- Motive: To put an end to foreign interference in the affairs of Cyprus
- Motive: To be able to enjoy the benefits of EU membership
- Motive: To have a stronger voice in the international community
- Motive: To have an integrated Cypriot State, with Jurisdiction all over the island
- Motive: To avoid the risk of another war
- Motive: To put an end to the presence of the Turkish Army
- Motive: To be able to live anywhere in Cyprus
- Motive: To allow refugees to return to their ancestral homes

1,257

1,317

1,6

1,792

1,815

1,857

1,86

1,911

1,916


1,937

1,946

1,951

Turkish Cypriot Motives for a Solution

Mean



Motives for a Solution - Analysis of findings



While both communities share the desire for peace and security, they otherwise have very different motives for a settlement.



The Greek Cypriots tend to see, as primary motives, the return of refugees to their ancestral homes, the freedom to live anywhere in Cyprus and the political re-integration of the island under one common administration, while the complete withdrawal of the Turkish Army is seen as a critical and imperative corollary demand.


The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, focus more on the possibilities for economic development after a comprehensive settlement, on the fact that they would then have a stronger voice in the international community, and on the various other benefits that European accession would bring.

The Turkish Cypriots also consider it important that they will have their own Turkish Cypriot federated state, which of course is a motive/concern that needs to be carefully balanced both with the Greek Cypriots' desire for the political re-integration of the island, and with the Greek Cypriots' concern that they should be free to live anywhere in Cyprus.


Political Trust









"Tassos Papadopoulos is willing to understand and take into account the concerns of the Turkish Cypriots as well"





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




"Tassos Papadopoulos is capable of sincere and open-minded negotiations, such that will lead to an agreed solution"




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





"Mehmet Ali Talat is willing to understand and take into account the concerns of the Greek Cypriots as well"



"Mehmet Ali Talat is willing to understand and take into account the concerns of the Greek Cypriots as well"




"Mehmet Ali Talat is capable of sincere and open-minded negotiations, such that will lead to an agreed solution"






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

Greek Cypriots' trust towards Tassos Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat







Turkish Cypriots' trust towards Tassos Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat





























Greek Cypriots' trust towards third-party intermediaries



Turkish Cypriots' trust towards third-party intermediaries



Political Trust - Analysis of findings

Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots tend each to trust their own present leader's handling of the Cyprus problem, and mis-trust the other community's leader. For instance, Greek Cypriots see Tassos Papadopoulos as committed to the re-unification of Cyprus and as willing and able to engage in substantive negotiations for a comprehensive settlement, while they see Mehmet Ali Talat as committed to partition and as unwilling and incapable of substantive negotiations. The exact mirror image of these opinions are encountered on the Turkish Cypriot side. They see Tassos Papadopoulos as committed to partition and incapable of negotiations, and Mehmet Ali Talat as committed to re-unification and very able to negotiate.



This “credibility gap” in the public perception of the two leaders could cause serious problems if and when negotiations re-commence, since whatever is suggested by the leader of one community, will automatically be received by the public of the other community as arising out of ulterior motives and ill-will. On the other hand, both leaders currently enjoy the necessary prestige in their own community, in order to negotiate effectively.

Concerning the issue of trust towards third-party intermediaries, each community of course trusts above all its own “mother-land”: Greek Cypriots trust Greece above all, while Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey above all. For both communities, second-most trusted is the European Union, with the United Nations coming third. The US and the UK are mis-trusted by majorities of both communities. Furthermore, each community strongly mis-trusts the “mother-land” of the other community.



It is interesting to note that out of the three “guarantor powers” – Greece, Turkey and the UK, each community trusts only one out of the three. Greek Cypriots trust Greece but mis-trust Turkey and the UK, while Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey and mis-trust Greece and the UK. In what can be seen as a touch of collective unconscious humour, the Greek Cypriots have marginally greater trust in the Organisation of Islamic Countries, than they do in either the UK or the US!

The European Union seems to be the only third-party involved that simultaneously enjoys a substantial measure of trust both among the Greek Cypriots and among the Turkish Cypriots.



Security





Full text: “On the issue of Security, the UN Plan provided for the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee between Greece, Turkey and the UK, which means that each one of those three countries will be allowed to intervene militarily anywhere in Cyprus. Furthermore, under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey will each maintain troops in Cyprus, 6000 each until the year 2011, 3000 each until the year 2018. After that, 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers will remain on the island indefinitely, but Greece, Turkey and Cyprus will review troop levels every three years with the objective of total withdrawal, if all parties agree.”



Full Text: “One alternative Security System is as follows: The Treaty of Guarantee will be maintained, but with various amendments. On the issue of troops, the Greek and Turkish contingents will depart within a few years, after which time Cyprus will be totally demilitarised. As for intervention rights, Greece will have the right to intervene in order to protect the security of the Greek Cypriot constituent state only, while Turkey will have the right to intervene in order to protect the security of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state only. If Cyprus comes under attack from any other country, it will not have the means for its own protection, but the guarantor powers – Greece, Turkey and Britain – will each be expected to come immediately to Cyprus’ defence.”





Full Text: “Another alternative for security is the development of a Cypriot-European security system, as follows: Greek and Turkish troops will be replaced by a European Security force, under a European commander, and this force will also include Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot soldiers, who will together receive military training in other European countries. This new security force, comprised of units for land, sea and air defence, will be responsible to deal with all internal and external threats. Until Turkey joins the European Union, however, a safety valve for the direct protection of the Turkish Cypriots by Turkey will also be in place, if the above described system of European Security fails to protect them from some particular threat.”



Full Text: “Another alternative for Security is as follows: The Treaty of Guarantee will cease to apply after the settlement, and instead Cyprus will become a member of NATO. All Greek and Turkish troops will gradually depart, to be replaced by a NATO force, composed of soldiers from various NATO countries, and including units for land, sea and air defence. Greece and Turkey will not have any unilateral intervention rights, other than their input in the decision making of NATO command – which NATO command will be making all the decisions that relate to the Security of Cyprus.”

Proposals for Security - Comparative Point Lead amongst Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots



Security - Analysis of findings

On the issue of Security, the Annan Plan proposals are unacceptable to 61% and acceptable to 27% of Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 54% and unacceptable to 42% of Turkish Cypriots.



Amending the Treaty of Guarantee in various small ways, such as by limiting the intervention rights of Greece and Turkey to the respective constituent state only, or by agreeing that all Greek and Turkish troops will eventually depart, does not change the overall acceptability of the proposal on the Greek Cypriot side. It seems that the Greek Cypriots fear a potential situation whereby the island would be totally demilitarized, while Turkey would retain the right to intervene militarily, even in a limited fashion. Not having any Turkish troops on the ground is small consolation for the Greek Cypriots, since they are aware that mainland Turkey is only 50 miles to the north of Cyprus and could land troops on the island within hours.

Creating a new security system, based on the Cypriots themselves but with the support, enhancement and guidance of the European Union, is a proposal that is seen in a positive light by the public of both communities. More particularly, the proposal that was tested was for the development of a “Eurocyriot” security system: Soldiers from various European countries, as well as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who would together receive military training in other European countries, would all be part of an integrated security force that would be responsible for the defence of the island. Intervention rights by Turkey would only apply in case this primary security system, as described above, fails to protect the Turkish Cypriots from some particular threat.



This particular proposal has a 10-point lead amongst the Greek Cypriots, and a 20-point lead amongst the Turkish Cypriots. In other words, not only is it a proposal that would gather majority support among the Greek Cypriots, it would also be more acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots than the equivalent security provisions of the fifth Annan Plan.

A final security proposal that was tested, is to allow the re-united island to become a member of NATO, so that the NATO command would then be responsible to oversee and guarantee the security of the island. Responses to this particular proposal were divided, in both communities, with about half of the respondents declaring themselves to be in favour and about half declaring themselves to be against. The prevalent “anti-Americanism” of Cypriots, but also the fact that this proposal would effectively render Cyprus a protectorate of an international military organisation, meant that this proposal had significantly less support than the proposal for a Eurocyriot security system which was cited above.



Property Rights





Full Text: “On the issue of Property rights, the UN Plan provided for the return of some territory to Greek Cypriot administration – making the Turkish Cypriot state about 28% of Cyprus – and in that area which will come under Greek Cypriot administration all property will be returned to original owners, while current occupants will be re-housed elsewhere. As for Greek Cypriot property that will remain within the Turkish Cypriot state and Turkish Cypriot property that will remain within the Greek Cypriot state, original individual owners will be entitled to 1/3rd of their property, but current occupants will have priority control of a particular property they are using if they are themselves refugees or if they have made a major investment on the property in question. Agricultural land will not be returned to original owners if this necessitates sub-dividing the property into plots of less than 5 donums, or less than 2 donums for irrigable land. For any property not returned, the original owner will be compensated.”





Full Text: “One alternative approach on the issue of property rights is as follows: More territory will be returned to Greek Cypriot administration, making the Turkish Cypriot state 18% - 20% of Cyprus, and in these returned territories all properties will be given back to their original owners, but in return no Greek Cypriot will be able to reclaim property in the Turkish Cypriot state – all such property will be compensated.”



Full Text: “Another alternative approach on the issue of property rights is as follows: Original owners will retain ownership of all their property, but current occupants will be entitled to stay in the properties they are currently using by paying rent for them, and this right to remain in a property by paying rent will apply for 15 years. At the same time, individual owners and individual current occupants will be encouraged to make their own private deals, if they so wish, to exchange, purchase or sell the property in question.”





Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of property rights is as follows: Original owners will be able to reclaim and use all their property, except that in which refugees live or that on which there has been major investment – and for such properties they will be compensated. In case an original owner is not entitled to receive his actual home, then as compensation he will be entitled to a new home built for him in the same town or village. The building of these new residences will be financed by international donors.”



Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of property rights is as follows: All refugees will be entitled to reclaim and use their original residence, and all those who currently live in these residences will be entitled to a new house built for them in the same town or village. The building of these new residences will be financed by international donors.”

Proposals for Property Rights - Comparative Point Lead amongst Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots



Property Rights - Analysis of findings

On the issue of Property Rights, the Annan Plan proposals are unacceptable to 60% and acceptable to 24% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 60% and unacceptable to 33% of the Turkish Cypriots.

One approach to resolving the Property issue might be exclusively territorial, by reducing the Turkish Cypriot federated state to 18% - 20% of Cyprus, instead of 29%, but in return allowing the Turkish Cypriots to keep all property that would remain within the Turkish Cypriot state, paying monetary compensation to the original owners.

While this proposal would be acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots, by a 28-point margin, it would be unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots by a 15-point margin. While the Turkish Cypriots might like the suggestion that they would not have to deal with Greek Cypriot property claimants within the Turkish Cypriot federated state, the Greek Cypriots do not like the implications of “ethnic purity” and “partition in disguise” which this proposal appears to them to entail.

Another approach to resolving the Property issue, would be to abandon the logic of enforced exchange, and instead acknowledge both the original owner’s right to title, and the current occupant’s right to stay in the property for an agreed period of time while paying rent. In the mean time, individual original owners and individual current occupants would be encouraged to make their own private deals to exchange, purchase or sell the property in question, if they so wish.

Quite surprisingly, the Greek Cypriot public does not feel as positively about this proposal as one would have thought – in fact they are divided, half of the Greek Cypriots accepting it and half of them rejecting it. This might be explained, firstly, as fear that such provisions would not in the end be implemented, that rent would not be paid as agreed, or that the property would not be returned to its owner when the “right to stay by paying rent” had expired. On a different level, the result might be explained as unwillingness to wait another lengthy period before being allowed to personally use the property. After 30 years living as refugees, Greek Cypriots expect a right to return that would apply immediately, not be deferred for yet another decade.

As for the Turkish Cypriots, this was the least attractive of all the suggested property proposals, with much less support than the equivalent property provisions of the Annan Plan. The reasons are obvious, since with this proposal they would be asked to find the money to pay rent for a property which for many years they have been using as their own. Furthermore, they may fear that in the long term such a proposal could have devastating effects on the bizonality of the settlement, since if Greek Cypriots prove unwilling to sell their properties in the north, then the Turkish Cypriots would be hard-pressed to find land in the north on which to build their homes and expand their economy.

The following proposal appears much more attractive for both communities: Original owners would be entitled to the restitution, and immediate use, of all their properties, except those currently inhabited by refugees with property of roughly equivalent value to exchange, and those on which major investment has been made – and for such properties the original owners would be compensated. If a refugee is not entitled to the restitution of his original home, then he will be entitled to a new home built for him in the same town or village. The construction of these new residences would be partly self-financed through the compensation fund to which current occupants (who would be entitled to keep the property they are using) will contribute, and partly financed through the assistance of international donors.

This proposal is different to the Annan Plan in three key respects: Firstly, the 1/3rd restriction on property restitution, much despised by Greek Cypriots, has been removed. If a property is not being used by a Turkish Cypriot who can claim it under the above-mentioned criteria, then the original owner can have it returned to him, without quotas or qualifications. Secondly, the right to a new home has been added, something which the Annan Plan was struggling towards but did not quite achieve. And thirdly, if the Compensation fund fails in the end to balance its books, it will be international donors and not the Cypriot tax-payer who will be asked to cover the difference.

One might be concerned at this point regarding the economic viability of such a proposal and, more particularly, regarding the costs involved in building new residences for those refugees who will not be entitled to their original home. It should be noted however that the nominal costs will not in any way be different when compared to a Compensation-only scheme. Instead of paying the original owner “in cash” (government guaranteed bonds, property appreciation certificates etc.), the owner will be paid “in kind”, by receiving a new house. In terms of actual value, he will not be receiving anything more than he would have otherwise received. Furthermore, because these residences will mostly be built on state land which will be donated for this purpose, a large proportion of the new homes’ cost (*the land value itself*) will not in fact have to be paid

by anyone. Therefore, the real cost of compensating original owners will in fact be *less* than it would be under a Compensation-only scheme, and the need to procure the support of international donors will be correspondingly reduced.



As for acceptability, this proposal is acceptable to the Greek Cypriots by a 13-point margin, and to the Turkish Cypriots by a 29-point margin. This high level of acceptance amongst the Turkish Cypriots is not surprising, since on an individual level the average Turkish Cypriot would be entitled to keep exactly the same property that he would be keeping under the Annan Plan. It is the Property Board that will be getting less property with this revised scheme, not the average Turkish Cypriot.

A final alternative proposal that was put before respondents, is a variation of the “right to a new home” proposal described above, but with the order of priority reversed. In other words, the original owner would get to keep his original home, while the current occupant will be re-housed in a new home in the same town or village.



To this proposal, the Greek Cypriot response was overwhelmingly favourable, with an impressive 57-point lead. This of course was to be expected, since “all refugees to return to their homes” has been the constant Greek Cypriot demand since 1974. What is more surprising is the response of the Turkish Cypriots, who also accept this proposal with a strong 27-point lead. In other words, they see this proposal as on a par with the Annan Plan Property provisions, which also had a 27-point lead among the Turkish Cypriots.

The explanation of this surprising result is in hindsight simple: The Turkish Cypriots would be giving up 30-year old residences, which have already lost much of their value through wear-and-tear, and in their place they will be getting a brand new residence, with new plumbing, new wiring, modern construction, longer effective house life etc. In this way, this proposal becomes a “win-win” suggestion, with the Greek Cypriot original owners returning to the homes of their childhood which to them carry great emotional significance, and the Turkish Cypriot current occupants getting a brand new free-hold residence of equivalent size, in the same town or village as that in which they are currently residing.



Residence and Voting Rights





Full Text: “On the issue of residence and voting rights in the other constituent state, the UN Plan provided for the following arrangements. For the first six years, no Greek Cypriots will be allowed to settle in the north, and equivalently no Turkish Cypriots in the south. From year 6 to year 9, up to 6% of each village or municipality may hail from the other constituent state, from year 10 to year 14 up to 12% of each village or municipality may hail from the other constituent state, from year 14 to year 18, up to 18% of each village or municipality may hail from the other constituent state, while after the 19th year a permanent limit of 33% would apply as the maximum percent of Greek Cypriot residents of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. These Greek Cypriots would have the right to vote in all elections as residents of the Turkish Cypriot state, except for the Federal Senate where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will vote separately according to ethnic origin.”





Full Text: “An alternative approach on the issue of residence and voting rights, is to reduce the permanent limit for Greek Cypriot residents of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, from 33% to 29% of the population, but lift the time restrictions so that as many as wish to relocate – within these permanent limits - will be able to do so as soon as they wish, beginning from the next day after the settlement. Voting rights will be as above, in other words this 29% will be able to vote in all Turkish Cypriot elections, except for the Federal Senate where they will vote as Greek Cypriots. The equivalent to the above will of course apply for Turkish Cypriots living in the south.”



Full Text: “Another approach on the issue of residence and voting rights, is to further reduce the permanent limit for Greek Cypriot residents of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, from 33% down to 25%, without time restrictions to relocation, but also lift voting restrictions, so that this 25%, but no more than 25%, will be able to vote in all Constituent State elections and all Federal elections as full residents of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State. The equivalent to the above will of course apply for Turkish Cypriots living in the south.”





Full Text: “Another approach on the issue of residence and voting rights, is to have no limit to the number of Greek Cypriots who may choose to reside in the north, but with the following arrangement for voting rights: Such Greek Cypriots will vote for the Greek Cypriot constituent state government, and for the Greek Cypriot members of the Federal Government, while for municipal elections only they will vote at the place where they reside in the north. The equivalent to the above will of course apply for Turkish Cypriots living in the south.”



Full Text: “Another approach on the issue of residence and voting rights, is to institute a system of weighted voting, so that when Greek Cypriots in the north - or Turkish Cypriots in the south – are very few, their vote will weigh more so as to give them an effective political voice, while when they are very many their vote will weigh less in order to place a limit on their political influence. More particularly, if Greek Cypriots in the north – or Turkish Cypriots in the south - are 2% to 3% of the constituent state’s population their vote will be weighted upwards to 5%, if they are 6% or 7% their vote will be weighted up to 10%, etc., while 20% will be the maximum weight Greek Cypriot votes in the north - or Turkish Cypriot votes in the south - can have, irrespective of the number of residents. Other than the limitations imposed by this voting system, everyone will be allowed to live where he wishes and vote where he lives.”

Proposals for Residence/Voting Rights - Comparative Point Lead amongst Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots



Residence and Voting Rights - Analysis of findings

On the issue of Residence and Voting Rights, the proposals that were included in the Annan Plan are unacceptable to 57% and acceptable to 15% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 47% and unacceptable to 39% of the Turkish Cypriots.

One alternative approach on the issue of residence rights in the other constituent state, is to put aside timetable restrictions to relocation – so that any Greek Cypriots who wish to relocate to the north will be allowed to do so immediately after the settlement is agreed upon – while the permanent limit to relocation will be reduced, as a trade-off in favour of the Turkish Cypriot demand for bizonality, from the 33% of the constituent state population featured in the Annan Plan, to 29%.

Such an approach would be seen in a more positive light by the Greek Cypriot public, when compared to the Annan Plan, but would still be rejected by an 8-point margin. The Greek Cypriots would on the one hand appreciate the abolition of timetable restrictions, but on the other hand they would remain displeased with the construct of a permanent limit to residence rights based on ethnicity, something which in their eyes is an unacceptable violation of basic freedoms and human rights.

From a Turkish Cypriot point of view, this proposal is more attractive than the equivalent Annan Plan provisions – there is a 15-point lead in favour of acceptance, compared to an 8-point lead for the equivalent Annan Plan provisions. This may be explained partly as approval of the immediate personal freedom, for everyone, which this proposal entails, and partly as approval of the stricter permanent limit to the relocation of Greek Cypriots in the north, which limit would then more effectively safeguard bizonality.

Another alternative approach on this issue, is to add voting rights into the bargain, so that the permanent limit is reduced further, to 25% of the constituent state population, but with all voting restrictions also lifted, so that this 25% of Greek Cypriots will vote in all constituent state and all federal elections as full residents of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state – unlike the situation with the Annan Plan, where Greek Cypriot residents of the Turkish Cypriot federated state would not have the right to vote for the Turkish Cypriot members of the Federal Senate.

Amongst the Greek Cypriot public, this proposal would also be rejected by an 8-point margin. On the one hand, the abolition of voting restrictions is seen as a further improvement, whereas on the other hand, the imposition of a stricter permanent limit to relocation is seen as a further deterioration.

Amongst the Turkish Cypriot public, this proposal is seen in a very positive light, with a 27-point lead in favour of its acceptance. It would seem that the imposition of even stricter limits to residence of Greek Cypriots in the north is seen as a very positive change, which satisfies their concern to maintain bizonality, while the abolition of voting restrictions does not seem to worry them, given that Greek Cypriots will never be able to have more than 25% of the constituent state's vote.

Yet another possibility on the issue of residence and voting rights is to separate the two entirely, so that all Greek Cypriots would vote for the Greek Cypriot constituent state government and the Greek Cypriot members of the Federal Government, regardless of where they live, while all Turkish Cypriots would vote for the Turkish Cypriot constituent state government and the Turkish Cypriot members of the Federal Government, regardless of where *they* live. An exception to this rule would be made for municipal elections, where each person would vote at the place where he resides. Other than this separate voting system, no limits and no quotas would be imposed on the exercise of residence rights.

Amongst the Greek Cypriot public, this proposal enjoys a strong 22-point lead. It would seem that the Greek Cypriots are unconcerned about where they would exercise their voting rights, and they wouldn't mind not having a say in the local politics of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state – in fact, it may well be the case that separate voting on the constituent state level would alleviate the sense of “being a political minority” that Greek Cypriots in the north might otherwise suffer from. Furthermore, the benefit of not having limitations to the exercise of basic freedoms makes this proposal particularly appealing to the Greek Cypriot mindset.

The Turkish Cypriots would also accept this proposal by a comfortable 15-point margin, a significantly wider margin of acceptance than that of the equivalent provisions in the Annan Plan. Separate voting at the constituent state level is an effective safeguard of bizonality, no less so than limiting residence rights through quotas and other such devices.

Of course, with such a system serious issues of political representation arise, since Greek Cypriots in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south

will not be politically represented at the place where they live. If such a system as described above is instituted, it will have to be complemented with various co-operation agreements between the two constituent states, on issues that range from health to education to welfare to justice, thus ensuring that the civic rights of these individuals, as ex-territorial residents, are fully respected.



A final approach on the issue of residence and voting rights, is to institute a system of weighted voting, so that when Greek Cypriots in the north - or Turkish Cypriots in the south - are very few, their vote would weigh more so as to give them an effective political voice, while when they are very many their vote would weigh less in order to place a limit on their political influence. More particularly, if Greek Cypriots in the north - or Turkish Cypriots in the south - are 2% to 3% of the constituent state's population their vote would be weighted upwards to 5%, if they are 6% or 7% their vote would be weighted up to 10%, etc., while 20% would be the maximum weight Greek Cypriot votes in the north - or Turkish Cypriot votes in the south - can have, irrespective of the number of residents. Other than the limitations imposed by this voting system, everyone would be allowed to live where he wishes and vote where he lives.

Though this proposal was meant to satisfy the Greek Cypriot concern that basic freedoms should apply, while also ensuring that those who will relocate shall have full political rights at their new place of residence, the Greek Cypriot public seems to be divided over the acceptability of the proposal, with about 30% in favour and 30% against. Perhaps the voting system is seen by them as overly complicated, or perhaps it is felt that "it is not sufficiently democratic". It should be noted, however, that about 40% of Greek Cypriots replied that they are unsure about this proposal, so the final acceptability will very much depend on the position which the official Greek Cypriot leadership will take vis-à-vis this proposal.



The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, register a strong 20-point lead in favour of this proposal. This is not surprising, given that the proposed voting system is designed around the Turkish Cypriots' own needs for guaranteed bizonality, and for effective political participation of the Turkish Cypriot minority that will be living in the south.

The added benefit of this approach is that it would amount to a form of cross-voting on the constituent state level, encouraging politicians - through the electoral process - to be moderate in their outlooks and to fully respect the rights of those of the other ethnic group who will be living within their constituent state's boundary.



Immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey





Full Text: “On the issue of immigrants from Turkey (Settlers), the UN Plan provided for a list of 45,000 persons that would be given citizenship of Cyprus the day after the settlement, and furthermore, allowed for anyone who has already been a permanent resident in Cyprus for at least five years before the agreement to be able to claim citizenship by naturalisation four years after the settlement. In practice, this would have meant that 60,000 to 75,000 immigrants (Settlers) would have been able to remain in Cyprus and become its citizens.”





Full Text: “One alternative on the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey, is to allow the same list of 45,000 persons as per the UN Plan, but ensure that these are the only ones who will remain. Anyone above that number will be required to return to Turkey within 2 years of the settlement, and will be offered monetary compensation of USD 20,000 per family – paid for by Turkey and International Donors - to help finance their relocation.”



Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey, is to create two lists: The first list, composed of 30,000 persons, will be entitled to remain in Cyprus, while the second list, of another 30,000 persons, will be entitled to emigrate to other EU countries or to the USA, unless of course they prefer to return to Turkey. All such emigrants will be entitled to a monetary compensation of USD 20,000 per family, paid for by Turkey and International Donors. Those who have lived in Cyprus for the greater proportion of their lives will have priority to be on the first list, while everyone else who has been given TRNC citizenship will be on the second list.”





Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey is to acknowledge citizenship to those married to Turkish Cypriots, those born in Cyprus and those who arrived here before the age of 18, while also granting a permanent residence permit to their parents, who would remain citizens and voters of Turkey with the right to live and work in Cyprus. Everyone else will be required to return to Turkey within 2 years of the settlement, and will be compensated USD 20,000 per family, paid for by Turkey and International Donors, to help finance their relocation.”



Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of immigrants from Turkey (Settlers) is as follows: Those who got married to Turkish Cypriots and those who are children of mixed marriages will be entitled to stay, while everyone else will be relocated to their original place of origin in Turkey. The government of Turkey will be responsible to give new homes to these people, and will also assist them with finding new jobs, at their place of origin.”

Proposals for Citizens from Turkey (Settlers) - Comparative Point Lead amongst Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots



Immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey - Analysis of findings

On the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey, the proposals that were included in the Annan plan are unacceptable to 83% and acceptable to 10% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 66% and unacceptable to 28% of the Turkish Cypriots.

One alternative approach on this issue, which would in effect be a minor adjustment of the Annan Plan, is to maintain the “list of 45,000 persons”, but ensure that these are the only ones that will remain. In other words, effective mechanisms will be devised to ensure the departure of anyone who is not on the list, and legal loopholes in the Law on Citizenship that might have been exploited will be ironed out.

Such an amendment, it seems, would not be sufficient for the Greek Cypriot public: Though such provisions would be seen as “much better than the Annan Plan”, a 28-point lead in favour of rejection would remain. The Turkish Cypriot public, in contrast, registers a 30-point lead in favour of accepting this proposal.

Reducing the list of 45,000 would be unthinkable if nothing was offered in return, so the next proposal to be tested involved the devising of two lists: One list of 30,000 individuals who would be granted citizenship, and another list of 30,000 individuals who would be granted the right of emigration to other European countries, or to the USA.

To this proposal, the Turkish Cypriots respond with an equal level of enthusiasm as to the equivalent provisions of the Annan Plan, registering a 37-point lead in favour of its acceptance. This is significant, because it means that the right of emigration to Europe or the USA is seen as adequate compensation for being made to leave. The Greek Cypriots, in contrast, while seeing this proposal as marginally better than the previous one, still reject it by a 19-point margin.

What seems to be at play here is an aversion by Greek Cypriots, to any kind of arbitrary “list” that is not based on strict, specific and fair criteria. The underlying fear of Greek Cypriots is that through a list, those who have the strongest connections with the “status quo” will remain, and this might well include nationalists, criminal elements, and ex-officers of the Turkish Army. Thus, while the “list” approach might be a convenient way to bypass the lack of reliable information surrounding this issue, it is not an effective way to win over the Greek Cypriot public, however much the list is reduced.

One alternative criteria-based approach, might be to grant Cypriot citizenship to those born in Cyprus and those who arrived under the age of 18, while also granting a permanent residence permit to their parents, who will remain citizens and voters of Turkey with the right to live and work in Cyprus. The rationale behind this approach is to grant citizenship to those who have most integrated with the Turkish Cypriot community, through being brought up in Cyprus, but without separating families by forcing the older generation to leave the island.



This approach is much more attractive to the Greek Cypriot public than any of the previous “list-based” proposals, though support is still marginal: only a 4-point lead in favour of its acceptance was registered. The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, consider this proposal to be even better than the equivalent Annan Plan provisions, giving it an impressive 40-point lead. It would seem that for the Turkish Cypriots as well, a criteria-based approach would be strongly preferred.

Of course, for such an approach to be workable it is imperative that an internationally monitored census take place amongst the Turkish Cypriots, to confirm the year of birth or time of entry into Cyprus, of all the immigrants from Turkey. This census would have to take place before any criteria-based proposal is put on the table, otherwise there will be a motive to submit false evidence in order to be included within the criteria.



A final possibility on the issue of settlers from Turkey, somewhat more radical, is for the Turkish Government to provide for their relocation at their original place of origin in Turkey. The reasoning behind such an approach would be that, even if the settlers were granted citizenship of Cyprus, they would in effect be left without a home, since they mostly live in Greek Cypriot properties and use Greek Cypriot agricultural land, which would all be returned to its original owners after a comprehensive settlement given that the settlers do not have equivalent property to exchange in the south. Thus it is questionable whether it is more humane to allow the settlers to stay, if by staying they will become an under-class of disenfranchised workers. The obvious “solution”, of allowing settlers to stay in Greek Cypriot properties, would almost certainly procure a resounding “No” by the Greek Cypriots in another referendum.

On the proposal that all settlers should return to Turkey (*except those married to Turkish Cypriots and their children*) and be given a new home by the Turkish Government at their place of origin, Greek Cypriots register support by a 63-point lead, while Turkish Cypriots register support by an 18-point lead. This proposal could be made more attractive to the Turkish Cypriot side, by adding the possibility of emigration to other European countries or to the USA, thus giving the settlers who will be leaving a wider choice of options.



Decision Making Mechanisms





Full Text: “On the issue of decision making mechanisms in the Federal Government, the UN Plan provided for a system whereby all decisions would require the positive participation of both communities. For instance in the Senate, for a law to be passed it would be necessary for at least one quarter of Turkish Cypriot present senators and one quarter of Greek Cypriot present Senators to agree with it, as well as the requirement that at least half of the overall number of present Senators must be in favour of the proposal. Similarly in the Presidential Council, at least one member from each community must be in favour of an executive decision, before it can take effect.”



Full Text: “One alternative on the issue of decision making mechanisms of the Federal Government, is to have a list of particularly critical issues for which positive participation, as described above, will be required, while for other, less important issues, a simple majority in favour will be sufficient.”





Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of decision making for the Federal Government, is to remove the requirement for positive participation, but to give each community a right of appeal in case it believes that a decision is unconstitutional or that it hurts the fundamental interests of the community. In the case of such an appeal, the issue will be forwarded to a neutral adjudicating body, and this body will make the final decision.”



Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of decision making mechanisms of the Federal Government, is to maintain the requirement for positive participation in decision making, but to institute an electoral system whereby the politicians will have a political motive to be co-operative. More particularly, cross voting would be instituted for the Senate as follows: Greek Cypriots will also vote for Turkish Cypriot Senators, but their vote will be weighted to 25% of the total vote, while Turkish Cypriots will also vote for Greek Cypriot Senators, and their vote will be weighted to 25% of the total vote. In this way, a politician will still have to satisfy his own community’s fundamental needs in order to be elected, but he will also have to convince the other community’s voters that he is open minded, respectful and co-operative.”

Proposals for Decision Making Mechanisms - Comparative Point Lead amongst Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots



Decision Making Mechanisms - Analysis of findings



On the issue of Decision Making Mechanisms for the Federal Government – and more particularly, the provision that positive participation by both communities would be required for every executive or legislative decision – the Annan Plan proposal is unacceptable to 36% and acceptable to 26% of Greek Cypriots, with a further 38% declaring that they are ambivalent on this issue. These same proposals are acceptable to 63% and unacceptable to 23% of the Turkish Cypriots.

On this issue, there are a number of options that would be acceptable to both communities: One possibility is to limit the requirement for positive participation to the most critical decisions only, while for other decisions a simple majority in favour will be sufficient. Another possibility would be to remove the requirement for positive participation, and replace it with a stronger right of appeal to a neutral adjudicating body (not necessarily the Supreme Court). A third possibility might be to institute cross-voting for the election of Federal Senators, so that politicians have an electoral motive to be more co-operative and respectful of the other community's needs.



On all these proposals, the Greek Cypriots register a 17 to 18-point lead in favour of their acceptance, while the Turkish Cypriots register a 30 to 38-point lead in favour of their acceptance. The strongly positive attitude of Turkish Cypriots towards cross-voting contrasts with the statement in the UN Secretary-General's 2003 Report to the Security Council that Turkish Cypriots oppose cross-voting. The opposite, in fact, is the case, at least on the level of public attitudes and concerns.

From a Turkish Cypriot viewpoint the least attractive of the three proposals – though still acceptable - is the one which would limit positive participation to the most critical decisions only, while for all proposals the Greek Cypriots still register a strong measure of ambivalence: "I am not sure" is the response of 38% to 40% of Greek Cypriot respondents. This ambivalence can be interpreted to mean that the final acceptability of any proposal on this issue will largely depend on the official stance of the Greek Cypriot leadership.



Legal Status



Full Text: “On the issue of Legal Status, the UN Plan approach was that the two sides would not be required to agree about the previous legal status of the two sides’ administration, and instead a “virgin birth” would take place, leading to a “new state of affairs”. The two sides would be asked “to agree about their future without necessarily agreeing on their past.””





Full Text: “One alternative, on the issue of Legal Status, is a formula that will be included in the preamble of the constitution as follows: First, it will be affirmed that the Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 as a Bicomunal Republic, to be jointly administered by the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots according to the constitution. After the unrest of 1963-4, the Republic of Cyprus entered a period of constitutional crisis. During this period, and up until the present day, the Greek Cypriots maintained a temporary caretaker government of the Republic of Cyprus, out of the necessity to maintain the continuity of the Republic, while in the same period the Turkish Cypriots formed a temporary Turkish Cypriot administration, out of the necessity to manage their everyday affairs on an interim basis. And now, with the acceptance of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement, the Republic of Cyprus is overcoming its constitutional crisis and returning to normal Bicomunal control, while evolving into a Bizonal – Bicomunal Federation through the approval of a new constitution.”



Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of legal status, is to clearly establish in the preamble of the constitution that each of the two communities has separate sovereignty, and that they freely enter into an agreement to form a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation, on the strength of the popular mandate of the two sovereign communities. Each community will then have the right to secede from the Federation if such a course of action is approved by a referendum of the community, and in such a case each side will have the right to apply for separate international recognition. Before recognition can be granted, however, all territorial obligations that arise from the Comprehensive Settlement agreement must first have been fulfilled.”

Proposals for Legal Status - Comparative Point Lead amongst Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots



Legal Status - Analysis of findings

On the issue of the Legal Status of the new State of Affairs – and more particularly, the “virgin birth approach” – the Annan Plan proposal is unacceptable to 37% and acceptable to 31% of the Greek Cypriots, with a further 32% declaring that they are ambivalent on this issue. These same proposals are acceptable to 62% and unacceptable to 32% of the Turkish Cypriots.



One alternative approach on this issue, might be to seek a more explicit statement of continuity, such that will not give cause for legal disputes later on. More particularly respondents were asked to evaluate a proposal whereby “a formula will be included in the preamble of the constitution as follows: First, it will be affirmed that the Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 as a Bicomunal Republic, to be jointly administered by the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots according to the Constitution. After the unrest of 1963-4, the Republic of Cyprus entered a period of constitutional crisis. During this period, and up until the present day, the Greek Cypriots maintained a temporary caretaker government of the Republic of Cyprus, out of the necessity to maintain the continuity of the Republic, while in the same period the Turkish Cypriots formed a temporary Turkish Cypriot administration, out of the necessity to manage their everyday affairs on an interim basis. And now, with the acceptance of the comprehensive settlement agreement, the Republic of Cyprus is overcoming its constitutional crisis and returning to normal bicomunal control, while evolving into a Bizonal – Bicomunal Federation through the approval of a new constitution.”

This proposal, which aims to satisfy the key concerns of both communities on the issue of legal status, is found to be acceptable by the Greek Cypriots with a 17-point lead, while the Turkish Cypriots also find it acceptable, with a 25-point lead.



Another alternative on the issue of legal status might be to explicitly grant separate sovereignty to the two communities, and explicitly grant the right of secession as a corollary to separate sovereignty, but with the proviso that, before separate international recognition can be granted, any territorial obligations that arise out of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement must first have been fulfilled.

This proposal is acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot public with a 48-point lead, but it is clearly rejected by the Greek Cypriots with an 18-point lead. Furthermore, a strong measure of ambivalence is registered amongst Greek Cypriots concerning all Legal Status proposals, so their final decision to accept or reject a proposal on this issue, will very much depend on the official stance of the Greek Cypriot leadership.



Implementation Guarantees



Full Text: “On the issue of implementation guarantees, the UN Plan provided for guarantees to be given by the three guarantor powers, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, that in case the constitutional order was not upheld then each of them would have the right to intervene in order to re-establish the constitutional order. Also, a multinational force under UN mandate would be stationed in Cyprus, with its mission being to oversee the implementation of the solution. This UN force would act to encourage the two sides to be co-operative and keep their word, but it would not have any authority to actually enforce the agreement.”





Full text: “One alternative approach is to guarantee implementation through a Security Council resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which means that if any side does not keep its part of the agreement, other countries will have the right to use force, or sanctions, in collaboration with the UN Security Council, against the responsible party. This resolution would cover the responsibilities of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and Greece, so whichever of these sides fails to keep up to its part of the bargain will face the possibility of serious consequences.”



Full Text: “Another alternative approach on the issue of implementation guarantees is for all the sides involved, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey, to sign a binding protocol with the European Union, which protocol will clearly define the responsibilities of each side regarding the implementation of the solution and also define specific consequences for particular acts of non-implementation. Depending on what the breach is, the consequence might be a monetary fine or the withdrawal of some particular EU-related benefit.”

Proposals for Implementation Guarantees - Comparative Point Lead amongst Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots



Implementation Guarantees - Analysis of findings

On Implementation Guarantees, the proposals that were included in the Annan plan – in essence the continuation of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee between Greece, Turkey and the UK - are unacceptable to 60% and acceptable to 19% of the Greek Cypriots, while they are acceptable to 62% and unacceptable to 28% of the Turkish Cypriots.

One alternative on the issue of implementation guarantees is to pass a Security Council resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which resolution would clarify the responsibilities of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey. In this way, if any side violates what has been agreed it will face the risk of very serious consequences.

While the Turkish Cypriots find this proposal acceptable by a 35-point lead, the Greek Cypriots are effectively divided over it, with a mere 2-point lead in favour of its acceptance.



Perhaps what is at work here is a lack of confidence towards the UN, whose military force in Cyprus all these years has been experienced by Greek Cypriots as incapable of enforcing earlier UN resolutions. Furthermore, the fact that Britain and the US are permanent members of the UN Security Council, with full veto powers, is another reason for the Greek Cypriots to mistrust any UN-based proposal for implementation guarantees.



Another proposal on this issue, might be for all the sides involved, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey, to sign a binding protocol with the European Union, which protocol will clearly define the responsibilities of each side regarding the implementation of the solution and also define specific consequences for particular acts of non-implementation. Depending on what the breach is, the consequence might be a monetary fine or the withdrawal of some particular EU-related benefit.


This proposal is seen as much more acceptable than any other arrangement, both by Greek Cypriots and by Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots register a 40-point lead in its favour, while Turkish Cypriots register an even stronger 47-point lead.

It would seem that both communities believe in the “soft power” of the European Union to enforce agreements, through the relationship of co-operation and dependence which the EU establishes with member states. This “soft power”, it seems, is trusted much more than the admittedly blunt instrument of Chapter 7 Security Council resolutions.


Amendments to improve the social and political cohesion of the re-united State









Areas of archeological and environmental significance to be part of a Federal zone, to be administered and protected directly by the Federal Government




Areas of archeological and environmental significance to be part of a Federal zone, to be administered and protected directly by the Federal Government




A common and mutually acceptable view of the recent history of Cyprus to be taught in all the schools of the island, under the responsibility of the Federal Government




A common and mutually acceptable view of the recent history of Cyprus to be taught in all the schools of the island, under the responsibility of the Federal Government




Provision to be made to encourage the development of Biccammunal schools, for parents who might voluntarily choose to send their children there





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


Provision to be made in the Constitution for the coordination between the two constituent states, to harmonise their policy and legislation on matters related to trade, industry and tourism




Provision to be made in the Constitution for the coordination between the two constituent states, to harmonise their policy and legislation on matters related to trade, industry and tourism





Bizonality (the provision that most Greek Cypriots will have to live in the south and most Turkish Cypriots will have to live in the north) to be temporary, until trust develops, after which time the two communities to be allowed to mix freely



Bizonality (the provision that most Greek Cypriots will have to live in the south and most Turkish Cypriots will have to live in the north) to be temporary, until trust develops, after which time the two communities to be allowed to mix freely

Amendments to improve the social and political cohesion of the re-united State - Analysis of findings



Various other secondary amendments, which aimed at creating a climate and a dynamic in favour of stronger cohesion, were also tested with the public of both communities.

The proposals that a common and mutually acceptable version of the recent history of Cyprus should be taught in all the schools of the island, and that provision should be made for the development of bicomunal schools, were received with enthusiastic support by both communities. Furthermore, the proposals that there should be close coordination between the two constituent states on matters of trade, industry and tourism, and that provision should be made to encourage the development of Bicomunal business ventures, were also received with enthusiastic support by both communities.

On politically oriented proposals, such as the direct election of the Presidential Council by the people and provisions to encourage the development of bicomunal political parties, the Greek Cypriots responded with enthusiastic support while the Turkish Cypriots responded with qualified support. One concern of the Turkish Cypriots is that, if the election of the Presidential Council is taken away from the prerogatives of the Senate, any alternative system should ensure the two communities retain an equal voice in the choice of its members.

Proposals that relate to stronger geographical integration, such as that areas of environmental and archaeological significance should form part of a Federal zone, or that bizonality should be a temporary regime, until trust develops, after which time the two communities should be allowed to mix freely, were received with enthusiastic support by the Greek Cypriots, and with qualified support by the Turkish Cypriots. It should be noted, however, that Turkish Cypriots are much more positive than Settlers from Turkey regarding such possible provisions.

Willingness to Recommence Negotiations





Willingness to re-commence Negotiations - Analysis of findings

Large majorities of both communities indicate a desire that comprehensive settlement negotiations should begin as soon as possible.



Amongst Greek Cypriots, 48% believe that negotiations should begin immediately, and a further 33% believe that negotiations should begin in a few months, once the necessary preparations have taken place. Only 4% believe that comprehensive settlement negotiations should never again take place.

Amongst Turkish Cypriots, 47% believe that negotiations should begin immediately, and a further 21% believe that negotiations should begin in a few months, once the necessary preparations have taken place. Only 6% believe that comprehensive settlement negotiations should never again take place.



Appendix A:
Direct Trade





Full Text: “The Greek Cypriots to allow the Turkish Cypriots to trade with other countries, through the direct administration of ports in the north by the European Commission, and in return the Turkish Cypriots to allow the return of Greek Cypriot refugees in the closed city of Fama-gusta, under UN supervision.”





Full Text: “The Greek Cypriots to allow the Turkish Cypriots to trade with other countries, through the direct administration of ports in the north by the European Commission, and in return the Turkish Cypriots to stop construction over Greek Cypriot properties.”



Full Text: “The Greek Cypriots to allow the Turkish Cypriots to trade with other countries, through the direct administration of ports in the north by the European Commission, and in return the Turkish Cypriots to repudiate the TRNC and re-define themselves as “the Interim Turkish Cypriot authority, pending the re-unification of Cyprus as a Bizonal - Bicomunal Federation.””





Full Text: “The Greek Cypriots to allow the Turkish Cypriots to trade with other countries, through the direct administration of ports in the north by the European Commission, without receiving anything in return, on the logic that if the standard of living of Turkish Cypriots is raised now through direct trade, then the financial burden of a Comprehensive Settlement will be shared more equitably between the two communities.”



Full Text: “The whole issue of direct trade to be put aside for now, and instead the leaderships of the two communities to recommence negotiations, without delay, for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.”

Proposals for Direct Trade - Comparative Point Lead amongst Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots



Direct Trade - Analysis of findings



On the issue of direct trade, the Turkish Cypriot public would accept a deal being made in which they too would offer something in return for direct trade – for instance, the return of Varosha to its rightful residents, or the freezing of construction over Greek Cypriot properties, or even the repudiation of the “TRNC” and the re-definition of the governmental apparatus in the north as “the interim Turkish Cypriot authority, pending the re-unification of Cyprus as a Bizonal-Bicommunal Federation”.



The Greek Cypriots, in sharp contrast, would oppose any deal being made on the issue of direct trade, whatever else they might receive in return. The Greek Cypriots fear that direct trade may lead to the “taiwan-isation” of the north, and eventually to the partition of the island, and no trade-off can be found which will be an acceptable counter-balance to this perceived risk.



Above and beyond the possibility of such deals, both sides would strongly prefer it if the whole issue of direct trade were bypassed, and the two leaderships returned to the negotiating table for a comprehensive settlement as soon as possible. Clearly, the Turkish Cypriots perceive direct trade as a poor substitute to the much more substantial benefits that would arise if a comprehensive settlement is reached.



Appendix B:



Socio-political comparison of Turkish Cypriots and Immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey





























Full Text: “Another alternative for security is the development of a Cypriot-European security system, as follows: Greek and Turkish troops will be replaced by a European Security force, under a European commander, and this force will also include Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot soldiers, who will together receive military training in other European countries. This new security force, comprised of units for land, sea and air defence, will be responsible to deal with all internal and external threats. Until Turkey joins the European Union, however, a safety valve for the direct protection of the Turkish Cypriots by Turkey will also be in place, if the above described system of European Security fails to protect them from some particular threat.”





Full Text: “Another approach on the issue of residence and voting rights, is to have no limit to the number of Greek Cypriots who may choose to reside in the north, but with the following arrangement for voting rights: Such Greek Cypriots will vote for the Greek Cypriot constituent state government, and for the Greek Cypriot members of the Federal Government, while for municipal elections only they will vote at the place where they reside in the north. The equivalent to the above will of course apply for Turkish Cypriots living in the south.”





Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of decision making mechanisms of the Federal Government, is to maintain the requirement for positive participation in decision making, but to institute an electoral system whereby the politicians will have a political motive to be co-operative. More particularly, cross voting would be instituted for the Senate as follows: Greek Cypriots will also vote for Turkish Cypriot Senators, but their vote will be weighted to 25% of the total vote, while Turkish Cypriots will also vote for Greek Cypriot Senators, and their vote will be weighted to 25% of the total vote. In this way, a politician will still have to satisfy his own community’s fundamental needs in order to be elected, but he will also have to convince the other community’s voters that he is open minded, respectful and co-operative.”





Full Text: “On the issue of immigrants from Turkey (Settlers), the UN Plan provided for a list of 45,000 persons that would be given citizenship of Cyprus the day after the settlement, and furthermore, allowed for anyone who has already been a permanent resident in Cyprus for at least five years before the agreement to be able to claim citizenship by naturalisation four years after the settlement. In practice, this would have meant that 60,000 to 75,000 immigrants (Settlers) would have been able to remain in Cyprus and become its citizens.”





Full Text: “One alternative on the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey, is to allow the same list of 45,000 persons as per the UN Plan, but ensure that these are the only ones who will remain. Anyone above that number will be required to return to Turkey within 2 years of the settlement, and will be offered monetary compensation of USD 20,000 per family – paid for by Turkey and International Donors - to help finance their relocation.”



Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey, is to create two lists: The first list, composed of 30,000 persons, will be entitled to remain in Cyprus, while the second list, of another 30,000 persons, will be entitled to emigrate to other EU countries or to the USA, unless of course they prefer to return to Turkey. All such emigrants will be entitled to a monetary compensation of USD 20,000 per family, paid for by Turkey and International Donors. Those who have lived in Cyprus for the greater proportion of their lives will have priority to be on the first list, while everyone else who has been given TRNC citizenship will be on the second list.”



Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey is to acknowledge citizenship to those married to Turkish Cypriots, those born in Cyprus and those who arrived here before the age of 18, while also granting a permanent residence permit to their parents, who would remain citizens and voters of Turkey with the right to live and work in Cyprus. Everyone else will be required to return to Turkey within 2 years of the settlement, and will be compensated USD 20,000 per family, paid for by Turkey and International Donors, to help finance their relocation.”



Full Text: “Another alternative on the issue of immigrants from Turkey (Settlers) is as follows: Those who got married to Turkish Cypriots and those who are children of mixed marriages will be entitled to stay, while everyone else will be relocated to their original place of origin in Turkey. The government of Turkey will be responsible to give new homes to these people, and will also assist them with finding new jobs, at their place of origin.”

Socio-political comparison of Turkish Cypriots and Immigrants (Settlers) from Turkey - Analysis of findings

Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey are quite different in their perception of Greek Cypriots and in their vision for the future of Cyprus. While Turkish Cypriots tend to acknowledge that they have much in common with Greek Cypriots, that it would not be appropriate to define Cyprus as a “Turkish Island”, that the two communities should seek to approach each other and strive for an over-riding integrated Cypriot identity – on all these issues the Settlers from Turkey tend to have an opposed view, favouring “Turkish-ness” above all, but also the distancing of the two communities.

On the issue of voting patterns, again the Settlers vary significantly from the Turkish Cypriot population. Settlers tend to more frequently vote for the right-wing and more nationalistic parties, UBP and DP, and much less frequently for the left-wing Cypriot-oriented parties, CTP and BDH.

In last April’s referendum, the vote of the Settlers was split, about 50% voting “Yes” and 50% voting “No”.

Concerning a prospective comprehensive settlement, Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey tend to disagree on issues of security, residence rights and power sharing: Whereas Turkish Cypriots would accept a Cypriot-European Security system, the gradual mixing of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations, and a closer political integration with Greek Cypriots through cross-voting, the Settlers tend to favour a “purely Turkish” solution to the issue of Security and an “ethnically pure” Turkish Cypriot Federated State, while they are ambivalent about the prospect of political integration with the Greek Cypriots through cross-voting.

Concerning their own presence on the island, the Settlers felt comfortable with the Annan Plan provisions, while they would strongly oppose any reduction in their numbers without adequate compensation. Being given the right to emigrate to the USA or to the EU is on the whole seen by Settlers as significant compensation, while being allowed to stay on the island as citizens and voters of Turkey rather than of Cyprus, is also something they might be willing to tolerate.

Appendix C:

Is it possible to define a mutually acceptable
revised Peace Plan?

- a hypothetical experiment

Is it possible to define a mutually acceptable revised Peace Plan?

- a hypothetical experiment

Many have expressed doubt over the preceding months, as to whether it is at all possible to define a Peace Plan that will be simultaneously acceptable to both sides. The Turkish Cypriots in particular have expressed concern, that a new round of negotiations would “inevitably seek to satisfy the Greek Cypriot side”, “thus making the Plan less attractive to the Turkish Cypriot side than the Annan Plan was”.

To examine whether it is indeed possible to define a Peace Plan that will be seen as an improvement over the Annan Plan *by both sides*, a selection from the options included in this survey has been made. While the selections made are not necessarily the only possible options for solving each particular aspect of the Cyprus Problem, they have been chosen, as far as possible, according to the double criteria of acceptability and workability.

Revised Security: The development of a Cypriot-European security system, as follows: Greek and Turkish troops will be replaced by a European Security force, under a European commander, and this force will also include Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot soldiers, who will together receive military training in other European countries. This new security force, comprised of units for land, sea and air defence, will be responsible to deal with all internal and external threats. Until Turkey joins the European Union, however, a safety valve for the direct protection of the Turkish Cypriots by Turkey will also be in place, if the above described system of European Security fails to protect them from some particular threat.

Revised Property Rights: Original owners will be able to reclaim and use all their property, except that in which refugees with equivalent property to exchange live or that on which there has been major investment – and for such properties they will be compensated. In case an original owner is not entitled to receive his actual home, then as compensation he will be entitled to a new home built for him in the same town or village. The building of these new residences will be financed by international donors.

Revised Residence / Voting Rights: There will be no limit to the number of Greek Cypriots who may choose to reside in the north, but with the following arrangement for voting rights: Such Greek Cypriots will vote for the Greek Cypriot constituent state government, and for the Greek Cypriot members of the Federal Government, while for municipal elections only they will vote at the place where they reside in the north. The equivalent to the above will of course apply for Turkish Cypriots living in the south.

Revised Provisions for Settlers/Immigrants from Turkey: Citizenship will be acknowledged to those married to Turkish Cypriots, those born in Cyprus and those who arrived here before the age of 18, while a permanent residence permit will also be granted to their parents, who will remain citizens and voters of Turkey with the right to live and work in Cyprus. Everyone else will be required to return to Turkey within 2 years of the settlement, and will be compensated USD 20,000 per family, paid for by Turkey and International Donors, to help finance their relocation.

Revised Decision Making Mechanisms: The requirement for positive participation of both communities in decision making will be maintained, but an electoral system will be instituted whereby the politicians will have an electoral motive to be co-operative. More particularly, cross voting will be instituted for the Senate as follows: Greek Cypriots will also vote for Turkish Cypriot Senators, but their vote will be weighted to 25% of the total vote, while Turkish Cypriots will also vote for Greek Cypriot Senators, and their vote will be weighted to 25% of the total vote. In this way, a politician will still have to satisfy his own community's fundamental needs in order to be elected, but he will also have to convince the other community's voters that he is open minded, respectful and co-operative.

Revised Legal Status: A formula will be included in the preamble of the constitution, as follows: Firstly, it will be affirmed that the Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 as a Bicomunal Republic, to be jointly administered by the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots according to the constitution. After the unrest of 1963-4, the Republic of Cyprus entered a period of constitutional crisis. During this period, and up until the present day, the Greek Cypriots maintained a temporary caretaker government of the Republic of Cyprus, out of the necessity to maintain the continuity of the Republic, while in the same period the Turkish Cypriots formed a temporary Turkish Cypriot administration, out of the necessity to manage their everyday affairs on an interim basis. And now, with the acceptance of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement, the Republic of Cyprus is overcoming its constitutional crisis and returning to normal Bicomunal control, while evolving into a Bizonal – Bicomunal Federation through the approval of a new constitution.

Revised Implementation Guarantees: All the sides involved, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey, will sign a binding protocol with the European Union, which protocol shall clearly define the responsibilities of each side regarding the implementation of the solution and also define specific consequences for particular acts of non-implementation. Depending on what the breach is, the consequence might be a monetary fine or the withdrawal of some particular EU-related benefit.

The above package of proposals has clear and definite benefits for both sides. For the Greek Cypriots, a Security System whereby the intervention rights of Turkey are relegated to a “last resort” option, and with an essentially Cypriot Army maintaining the defence of the island, a proposal for Property Rights that will grant the “right of return” to each and every refugee, even if it might be to a new home in the same town or village, a proposal for Residence Rights that will not be in violation of basic freedoms and that will not render those Greek Cypriots who will choose to live in the north a political minority, a proposal for Settlers which will reduce the political influence of people originating from Turkey and ensure that power will be shared, on the Federal level, “with the Turkish Cypriots rather than with Turkey”, a proposal for Decision Making Mechanisms that will guarantee, through the electoral process, that politicians of both sides will have to pay a heavy penalty if they choose to be unreasonable and uncooperative, a proposal for Legal Status that will explicitly affirm the Legal Continuity of the Republic of Cyprus, and finally, a proposal for Implementation Guarantees that will rely on the tried-and-tested power of the European Union to enforce, in a non-violent way, adherence to agreements and political reform.

For the Turkish Cypriot side, the benefits are also numerous: A Security System that will offer safety and stability, while not depriving Turkish Cypriots of Turkey’s protection in a worst-case scenario, a proposal for Property Rights that will allow the average Turkish Cypriot to keep exactly the same properties that he would be keeping under the Annan Plan, but with the added bonus of a booming construction industry that will guarantee to the Turkish Cypriots full employment and economic growth for years to come, a proposal for Residence and Voting Rights that will remove all Greek Cypriot interference from the local politics of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, but with the added bonus that Greek Cypriot individual consumers will indeed be present in the north, boosting the local economy with their spending, a proposal for settlers that will not upset the Turkish Cypriot economy by removing a large bulk of its manpower, but which will remove the political distortions which the settlers would have brought to the local politics of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, a proposal for Decision Making Mechanisms that will guarantee, through the electoral process of cross voting, Greek Cypriot respect for the rights and concerns of Turkish Cypriots, a proposal for

Legal Status that will strongly affirm the bicomunal nature of the Republic, but which will also acknowledge the temporary administration which the Turkish Cypriots set up between 1963 and 2005, and finally, a proposal for Implementation Guarantees which will make Greek Cypriots stop and think before attempting to unilaterally amend any aspect of the agreement.



A statistical analysis of the above proposal reveals that its acceptability would be approximately as follows:

Greek Cypriot projected result in a referendum over this revised Proposal: **60% Yes, 40% No**



Turkish Cypriot projected result in a referendum over this revised Proposal: **70% Yes, 30% No**

In the above figures, the effect of potential support of or opposition to the proposal, by the respective political leaderships, has not been included. From earlier models in which the result of last April's referendum was analysed, it is estimated that political support or opposition can swing the final result by up to 7 or 8 percentage points, either in favour or against, depending on the stance of the political leadership.

Comparative Point Lead of Annan Plan and Revised Plan, amongst Greek Cypriots



Comparative Point Lead of Annan Plan and Revised Plan, amongst Turkish Cypriots



Poll Identity

Method of Data Collection: Face-to-Face interview with structured questionnaire

Period of Data Collection: 15th to 30th May 2005

Sampling Method: Multi-stage random stratified sampling

Sample Size: 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots

Primary Author: Alexandros Lordos

Co-authors: Muharrem Faiz, Costa Carras

Field-work responsibility: CYMAR Market Research Ltd. and KADEM Cyprus Social Research.